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LINGUISTIC COMBAT IN THE HUNGARIAN
PARLIAMENT: EXPLORING POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND
PERCEPTION OF INCIVILITY IN A GENDER-
IMBALANCED ARENA

Corvinus Doctoral School
Doctoral School of Sociology and Communication Science
Communication Science Doctoral Program

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	3
LIST OF TABLES	4
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The relevance of the topic	2
1.2 The aim of the thesis	5
1.3 Theoretical framework	6
1.4 Research questions, hypothesis, and analytical framework	8
1.5 The structure of the thesis	9
2 IMPOLITENESS AND INCIVILITY	11
2.1 Conceptual foundations: politeness, impoliteness, civility and incivility	11
2.1.1 Politeness theories	11
2.1.2 Impoliteness theories	12
2.1.3 Civility theories	14
2.1.4 Incivility theories	15
2.2 Definition overlaps and contradictions in the case of impoliteness and incivility	15
2.2.1 Defining impoliteness	16
2.2.2 Defining incivility	16
2.2.3 Overlaps and contradictions in definition	16
2.2.4 The use of the term impoliteness and incivility in a political context	17
2.3 Political incivility	18
2.3.1 Defining political incivility	18
2.3.2 AI-assisted synthesis of existing definitions	20
2.3.3 Categorisation methods of political incivility	21
2.3.4 Definition and categorisation applied in the present research	24
3 SOCIOLINGUISTIC DIMENSIONS AND PARLIAMENTARY COMMUNICATION	26
3.1 Sociolinguistics	26
3.1.1 Foundations of sociolinguistics	27
3.1.2 Socialisation and gender stereotypes, femininity vs. masculinity	29
3.1.3 The influence of gender on communication style	31
3.1.4 Language and power dynamics	32
3.2 From parliament to perception: gender, measurement, and political incivility	33
3.2.1 Parliamentary communication and gender	34
3.2.2 Measurement methods of political incivility	40
3.2.3 Gender differences in the application of incivility in politics	43
3.2.4 Effects of incivility on the voters' perception	46
3.3 Hungarian Parliament	48
3.3.1 The operation and tasks of the Hungarian Parliament	49
3.3.2 House rules: Conduct that conflicts with disciplinary law provisions and inevitable legal consequences that may be applied as a result	50
3.3.3 Speech types: Interpellation and oral questions	53
3.3.4 Female politicians in Hungary	54
4 AI-AUGMENTED DISCOURSE ANALYSIS	57
4.1 Applied method	57

4.1.1 AI-augmented discourse analysis: Large Language models	57
4.1.2 Advantages of AI-assisted text annotation	57
4.1.3 Potential limitations of AI-assisted text annotation	59
4.1.4 Research design and sample	60
4.2 Results	68
4.2.1 ChatGPT-Based Discourse Analysis Results	69
4.2.2 Combined LLM Analysis Results	72
4.2.3 Notable patterns and outliers in party and gender context	75
4.2.4 Policy area and policy type analysis	79
4.3 Discussion of the discourse analysis	82
4.3.1 Policy area and policy type analysis	83
4.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Gender and Incivility	84
4.3.3 Hypothesis 2: Political Party, Gender, and Incivility Patterns	85
5 SURVEY EXPERIMENT	87
5.1 Applied method	87
5.1.1 Survey experiment	87
5.1.2 Research Design	88
5.1.3 Sampling and data collection method	93
5.1.4 Data analysis procedure	101
5.2 Results	103
5.2.1 Patterns of political consumption	103
5.2.2 Emotional Responses and Interest in Politics in the Context of Incivility	106
5.2.3 Speech scaling outcomes and observations	111
5.2.4 Inferential Statistical Analysis	114
5.3 Discussion of the survey experiment	120
5.3.1 Hypothesis 3: Gendered Perceptions of Incivility	120
5.3.2 Hypothesis 4: Demographic Predictors of Incivility Tolerance	122
5.3.3 Broader Implications of Gendered and Demographic Effects	123
6 CONCLUSION	125
6.1 Novelties and contributions of the research	125
6.2 Applicability	127
6.3 Limitations and generalizability	128
6.4 Recommendations for further research	129
REFERENCES	131
SOURCES	140
APPENDIX	141

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Summary graph of the use of the terms impoliteness and incivility in research, including politics	17
Figure 2. Manifestations of political incivility by approaches in (Illés, in press)	22
Figure 3. A zoomed-in world map highlighting countries featured in the text for their political incivility research methods	42
Figure 4. Heatmap of scaled average incivility by party and gender based on the ChatGPT results, on a scale of 0-5, created with the help of Matplotlib chart, AI	71
Figure 5. Uncivil language score comparison across political parties and genders: Results from ChatGPT and combined LLM annotations	72
Figure 6. Heatmap of scaled average negativity by cycle, party and gender, based on the LLM results, on a scale of 0-3, created with the help of Matplotlib chart, AI	78
Figure 7. Violin plot of negativity score distributions across policy areas, grouped by policy type (hard vs. soft)	79
Figure 8. Mean negativity scores by policy area and policy type with standard deviations	80
Figure 9. Mean incivility scores by policy area and policy type with standard deviations	80
Figure 10. Ordered mean negativity scores across policy area and policy type combinations	81
Figure 11. Frequency of political discussion and average interest by age group	104
Figure 12. Parliamentary media consumption and political talk frequency by age group	105
Figure 13. Familiarity with the segment of hour of immediate questions in the Hungarian parliament by age group	106
Figure 14. Thematic breakdown of how survey respondents define political incivility	107
Figure 15. Distribution of emotional responses to political content based on the Paul Ekman Basic Emotions Framework (Ekman, 1992)	109
Figure 16. Perceived impact of politician's gender: Responses by gender of survey participant	110

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Twenty-one distinguished policy areas in the Comparative Agendas project, with their classifications and examples	37
Table 2. The number of submitted and implemented immediate questions, created based on the data available in parlament.hu	54
Table 3. Gender distribution of representatives (at the time of the inaugural meeting) - created based on the data available in parlament.hu.....	56
Table 4. Fine-tuning experiments with the Hungarian large language models	64
Table 5. Validation methods to assess the reliability of ChatGPT 4o annotations	66
Table 6. Confusion matrix annotation results for the models analysing parliamentary speeches	68
Table 7. ChatGPT incivility category annotation results, sorted in descending order	70
Table 8. Combined LLM incivility category annotation results, sorted in descending order	73
Table 9. Further incivility manifestations identified by the combined LLM	74
Table 10. Summary of averaged passage points compared to their expected value.....	91
Table 11. Participants needed per effect size (d).....	95
Table 12. Summary of gender, range of age, and education across survey respondents.....	99
Table 13. Summary of political leaning, range of age, and religiosity across survey respondents.....	100
Table 14. Thematic breakdown of justifications for gendered perceptions of politicians	111
Table 15. Incivility 7-point Likert scale speech perception averaged results for versions 1,2, and 3 of the questionnaire	112
Table 16. Incivility 7-point Likert scale speech perception averaged results for version 4 of the questionnaire	112
Table 17. Final Cluster Centers by Factor Score.....	115
Table 18. Detailed 3-way interaction analysis: Tone[Negative-Uncivil] × Speaker_Gender[Male] × Respondent_Gender[Male].....	120

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1 INTRODUCTION

Political discourse has become increasingly polarised with politicians often adopting confrontational and uncivil communication styles (Bajomi-Lázár, 2021; Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018) in political debates across a range of democratic contexts, including Hungary. Although political incivility is not a novel phenomenon, its increasing scholarly prominence (Coe et al., 2014; Stryker et al., 2016) and shifting boundaries, even within formal settings, such as parliamentary debates, raise questions about how democratic norms are challenged or redefined through language and how such communication is perceived by citizens. Incivility, broadly defined as deviation from expected standards of conduct and expressions of disrespect (Stryker et al., 2016), can influence public trust in political institutions and political engagement (Mutz, 2015).

Political conflict has historically taken both verbal and physical forms. In some periods and political contexts, disagreements between political actors escalated into physical confrontation, including duels and political violence. One well-known example is the 1856 caning of Senator Charles Sumner on the floor of the United States Senate, which demonstrates how political disagreement could escalate into physical attack (Mutz, 2015). Although physical violence has become rare within contemporary parliamentary settings, political conflict continues to be expressed through language, while modern communication technologies have considerably expanded the reach and visibility of such discourse.

Rhetorical confrontations that were once largely confined to parliamentary chambers and written transcripts can now be broadcast in real time, archived, repeatedly viewed, and shared across digital platforms. Consequently, citizens may witness political conflict as it unfolds and may also encounter it later through media coverage and online circulation, where it can be framed and reinterpreted in different ways. Parliamentary communication is therefore directed not only at immediate political opponents but also at wider audiences. Political messages may simultaneously seek to persuade, attract attention, mobilise support, or provoke reactions.

Within this highly visible communicative environment, uncivil rhetoric may sometimes function strategically to demonstrate dominance, attract attention, or undermine political opponents (Gervais, 2014). However, not all instances of political incivility can be

assumed to be intentional, and their significance also depends on how they are interpreted by audiences. This makes both the production and the perception of political incivility relevant to understanding its role in contemporary political communication.

Examples from the Hungarian Parliament illustrate how such incivility is linguistically realised. In 2017, János Volner, a Member of Parliament (MP) for Jobbik, then a right-wing opposition party, accused his political opponents explicitly of dishonesty, stating that “*önök ... elkezdtek arcátlan módon hazudozni*” [“you ... shamelessly started lying”] (Hungarian National Assembly, 2017). Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Hungarian into English are the author’s own. In another instance, in 2016, Tamás Harangozó, an MP for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), a centre-left opposition party, directly attacked Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén’s standing by stating: “*Ha ön ezt most nem teszi meg a következő egy percben, akkor ön szégyene ennek az országnak!*” [“If you do not do this within the next minute, then you are a disgrace to this country!”] (Hungarian National Assembly, 2016). These examples illustrate two recurring manifestations identified in the corpus, lying accusation and character assassination, and demonstrate how political disagreement can move from substantive criticism towards direct personal and normative attacks.

The significance of such communication lies not only in how it is produced but also in how it is received. Aggressive rhetoric may alienate voters, damage reputations, and reinforce negative stereotypes, particularly in relation to women and minority politicians (Searles et al., 2020). Its political consequences are therefore not necessarily uniform: communicative strategies that attract attention or signal strength may simultaneously generate negative audience evaluations.

1.1 The relevance of the topic

Due to growing scholarly attention to political incivility in Western democracies (Coe et al., 2014; Searles et al., 2020), the phenomenon has been examined through a range of methodological approaches. These include manual content analysis (Fridkin & Kenny, 2011), computer-assisted coding (Coe et al., 2014), and critical discourse analysis (Wodak, 2015), as well as survey experiments and perception studies (Searles et al., 2020), media analysis, and experimental linguistic approaches (Ott, 2017). Nevertheless, research focusing specifically on Hungary remains comparatively limited. Existing Hungarian scholarship has begun to address political incivility from both conceptual and

empirical perspectives. Szabó & Farkas (2021) examined incivility in political communication through an interdisciplinary and norm-oriented framework, while Szabó, Kmetty, and Molnár (2021) used computational linguistic methods to analyse incivility in more than 17 million online comments, demonstrating the importance of topic, platform, and interactional context. Existing studies have predominantly concentrated on online and mediated political communication, while empirical research on incivility within the Hungarian National Assembly remains relatively scarce (Polyák, 2022). Research is also limited on how such behaviour is perceived by citizens, particularly in relation to the gender of both the political speaker and the audience member. The present dissertation extends this emerging Hungarian literature by shifting the focus to parliamentary discourse and by connecting the production of political incivility with its perception by citizens, with particular attention to gender.

Research from the United States and Western Europe suggests that gender stereotypes and social norms may shape both communicative behaviour and the evaluation of political incivility. Previous studies suggest that female politicians can face stronger negative reactions when they violate expected communicative norms than male politicians displaying similarly aggressive or dominant language (Fridkin & Kenney, 2014; Herbst, 2010). These findings, however, are context-dependent and should not automatically be assumed to apply in the same way within Hungary. These findings, however, are context-dependent and should not automatically be assumed to apply in the same way within Hungary.

The Hungarian case provides a particularly relevant context for testing these patterns because women remain markedly underrepresented in national politics. As of the most recent parliamentary cycle examined in this dissertation, women constitute only around 14% of the Hungarian National Assembly, a figure significantly below the EU average. This gender imbalance creates a distinct institutional setting in which to examine whether gendered expectations shape both political communication and the evaluation of incivility.

These gendered expectations are not confined to parliamentary representation but may also be reflected in the wider political media environment. Examples from Hungarian political media illustrate how female politicians may be framed through gendered or personalised language. For instance, Cseh Katalin, a former Member of the European

Parliament for the opposition Momentum party, has been mocked in headlines not primarily for her policy positions but for perceived rhetorical missteps. Magyar Nemzet, a national conservative daily newspaper that was part of the KESMA media network during the period discussed, stated in 2025 that “ismét szénné égette magát, csúnya öngólján nevet az internet” [“she has yet again burned herself to ashes, and the internet is laughing at her self-sabotage”] (Magyar Nemzet, 2025). In another article, Cseh Katalin and Donáth Anna, also a former Momentum Member of the European Parliament and former party leader, were described as having been verbally outmatched by the Prime Minister: “A Donáth, Cseh kettős köpni, nyelni nem tudott, Orbán rendesen kiosztotta őket” [“The Donáth–Cseh duo could neither spit nor swallow; Orbán properly put them in their place”] (Magyar Nemzet, 2024). Similarly, Szél Bernadett, a former opposition Member of the Hungarian National Assembly, was described as “hisztérikus” [“hysterical”] and associated with an “ellenzéki cirkusszal” [“opposition circus”] by Origo.hu (2019), a major Hungarian online news portal that was also part of the KESMA media network during the period discussed. Such representations provide examples of the kinds of gendered and personalised framing that may shape public evaluations of female politicians.

Media representations do not merely reflect public attitudes; they may also contribute to their reproduction and reinterpretation. In this sense, the relationship between language and society is bidirectional: social and political norms shape communicative practices, while political and media discourse can also reinforce, contest, or reshape those norms. The institutional and ideological positioning of media outlets is particularly relevant in this process. Magyar Nemzet and Origo.hu were both associated with the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), a foundation that brought together a large number of Hungarian media outlets during the period examined. These examples demonstrate why political communication should be examined not only as a reflection of existing gender expectations but also as a potential contributor to their reproduction.

This dissertation examines these issues by analysing how political incivility is produced in Hungarian parliamentary discourse and how it is perceived by citizens according to speaker gender and respondent characteristics, including gender and political orientation. In doing so, the research investigates how communicative norms interact with existing gender and power structures within Hungarian political life.

1.2 The aim of the thesis

The thesis aims to contribute to the growing literature on political incivility by offering a gendered and context-sensitive analysis rooted in Hungarian parliamentary discourse. The findings may have broader theoretical implications for understanding how democratic norms are negotiated and perceived within gender-imbalanced political environments and how gendered expectations influence political communication. However, the empirical findings are interpreted primarily within the Hungarian political and cultural context. The contribution of the dissertation can be summarised along three dimensions: theoretical, methodological, and empirical.

The theoretical contribution lies in clarifying the relationship between political incivility and impoliteness and in integrating discourse production, audience perception, and gendered expectations within a single analytical framework. The dissertation examines whether political incivility is interpreted differently across speakers and audiences within the Hungarian context.

The empirical contribution lies in providing a systematic analysis of political incivility within a highly gender-imbalanced, post-socialist Central European parliamentary setting. The study broadens the geographical scope of political incivility research, which has predominantly focused on the United States and Western Europe. The Hungarian case therefore offers an opportunity to examine political incivility within a political, institutional, and cultural environment that differs from many of the contexts most frequently represented in the existing literature.

The methodological contribution lies in combining qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis with AI-assisted annotation of uncivil language in Hungarian parliamentary debates and subsequently linking these findings to a quantitative survey experiment. The survey experiment examines how citizens perceive selected examples of parliamentary language and presents political speech excerpts that vary in tone and attributed speaker gender, allowing controlled comparison of audience evaluations. The combination of these approaches connects the production of political incivility with its perception: the discourse analysis identifies how incivility is manifested in parliamentary communication, while the survey experiment examines how such communication is interpreted and evaluated by citizens.

The scientific value of the research therefore lies less in claiming that the empirical findings are universally generalizable and more in the replicability and comparative potential of the research framework. While the specific findings remain context-bound, the combined methodological design can be applied across different political periods, countries, parliamentary systems, and sociocultural settings. Such replication would allow similarities and differences in the production and perception of political incivility to be systematically compared across contexts.

1.3 Theoretical framework

Political incivility is conceptualised in this dissertation as a socially interpreted and context-dependent communicative phenomenon rather than simply as the presence of inherently rude linguistic forms. The theoretical framework therefore integrates insights from impoliteness research, political incivility, sociolinguistics, and gender theory to explain both how incivility is produced in parliamentary discourse and how it is interpreted by audiences. Rather than treating these theoretical perspectives separately, the framework integrates them according to the analytical functions they perform in explaining the production and perception of political incivility.

Politeness theory provides a limited but necessary conceptual background for understanding face, interpersonal expectations, and communicative norms. Goffman's (1967) concept of face, referring to the social self-image individuals seek to maintain in interaction, and subsequent politeness approaches, particularly Brown and Levinson (1987), explain how speakers manage interpersonal relations and face-threatening acts. However, politeness is not the primary theoretical starting point of this dissertation. Instead, impoliteness research provides the more direct foundation for examining communicative behaviour that is perceived as offensive, inappropriate, or face-threatening. Culpeper (1996, 2005, 2011), Bousfield (2008), and Terkourafi (2008) demonstrate that impoliteness cannot be understood solely through linguistic form, as its interpretation depends on context, expectations, power relations, and audience evaluations. This contributes to the present framework by explaining the interpersonal and interactional dimension of norm violation and why the same linguistic behaviour may not be interpreted identically across speakers, audiences, and contexts.

Importantly, impoliteness and incivility are treated here as overlapping but analytically distinct concepts rather than as stages in a linear theoretical progression. For the purposes

of this dissertation, their relationship is organised across three analytical levels: micro, macro, and meta. At the micro level, impoliteness concerns interpersonal interaction, including face threats, insults, personal attacks, and violations of interactional expectations. At the macro level, political incivility concerns violations of broader political, social, and democratic norms, including expectations surrounding legitimate political conduct, mutual respect, and institutional behaviour. Theories of civility (Goffman, 1976; Rawls, 1971; Carter, 1998) are particularly relevant at this level because they move beyond individual interaction and connect respectful conduct to institutional and democratic order. At the meta level, the analysis recognises that political communication can be recontextualised and evaluated within the wider public sphere, including through media and public commentary, where particular statements may be framed, amplified, contested, or normalised. The micro–macro–meta distinction therefore provides an analytical structure for examining interpersonal linguistic behaviour without reducing political incivility to impoliteness alone.

This distinction also reflects the broader sociolinguistic assumption that language and society influence one another bidirectionally. Sociolinguistic approaches demonstrate that linguistic behaviour is shaped by social position, audience, identity, and context (Bernstein, 1971; Labov, 1972), while approaches to identity emphasise that language simultaneously contributes to the construction and negotiation of social identities (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). Critical sociolinguistic perspectives further connect linguistic practices to power and ideology, demonstrating that particular forms of communication can acquire different legitimacy and social value depending on who uses them and within which institutional context. This contributes to the framework by explaining why parliamentary incivility is simultaneously shaped by existing political and social norms and capable of reproducing, challenging, or reshaping those norms.

A further distinction central to the framework is between etic and emic perspectives (Pike, 1967). The etic perspective relies on analytical categories external to participants, whereas the emic perspective concerns meanings understood from within the relevant social or cultural system. In this dissertation, the corpus study adopts primarily an etic perspective through researcher-defined, AI-assisted coding, while the survey introduces an emic perspective by examining how participants evaluate political statements. This distinction is important because an utterance classified as uncivil analytically may not be perceived as equally uncivil by all recipients. Together, these perspectives connect the

two empirical studies by linking the analytical identification of incivility with its audience interpretation.

Gender theory provides the final component necessary for explaining why these interpretations may vary across speakers and audiences. Role Congruity Theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) proposes that individuals may receive more negative evaluations when their behaviour conflicts with gendered social expectations, while Butler's (1990) account of gender performativity conceptualises gender as reproduced and negotiated through repeated social practices. Connell's (1995) concept of hegemonic masculinity further highlights how assertiveness, dominance, and other conventionally masculine forms of behaviour may acquire different legitimacy within institutional environments. Together, these perspectives contribute to the framework by explaining why identical or comparable forms of political incivility may be interpreted differently depending on speaker gender and why gendered expectations may condition audience responses.

Taken together, the framework links interpersonal norm violations, broader political and democratic expectations, audience interpretation, and gendered social norms across the micro, macro, and meta levels. The etic–emic distinction further connects the theoretical framework to the empirical design by distinguishing analytical classification from participant evaluation.

1.4 Research questions, hypothesis, and analytical framework

The research questions and hypotheses guiding the thesis are the following:

Research Questions

RQ1: Is there a relationship between issue salience and the frequency and forms of political incivility in parliamentary discourse?

RQ2: How do gender and individual characteristics shape perceptions of political incivility?

Hypotheses

H1: Female politicians exhibit lower levels of incivility than male politicians.

H2: Patterns of incivility vary by political party and gender.

H3: Identical uncivil statements are evaluated more negatively when attributed to female politicians than when attributed to male politicians.

H4: Age, gender, and education level predict respondents' tolerance for political incivility.

To operationalise the theoretical framework outlined in Section 1.3, the dissertation combines discourse-level and perception-level analysis. The corpus study examines parliamentary speeches according to rhetorical tone and communicative manifestations of incivility, while the survey experiment examines how selected parliamentary statements are evaluated by participants under different speaker-gender conditions.

On the discourse side, speeches are classified at two levels: first, according to overall tone as civil, negative civil, or uncivil; and second, where relevant, according to recurring communicative manifestations, including name-calling, aspersion, exaggeration/hyperbole, mockery/sarcasm, character assassination, contrast, excerpts, and lying accusation.

On the perception side, selected corpus-derived statements are presented to survey respondents to examine whether evaluations of incivility vary according to speaker gender and respondent characteristics. Together, the two empirical components connect the analytical identification of political incivility with its audience evaluation.

1.5 The structure of the thesis

The research contains two main sections together with six chapters. The first part establishes the theoretical framework about political incivility by focusing on Hungarian parliamentary operations. The second chapter defines impoliteness and incivility through politeness and civility theories while distinguishing their meanings and explaining their definitional difficulties. The chapter investigates political term usage to create a single definition of political incivility.

The third chapter investigates sociolinguistic aspects of political communication through an examination of how gender and power structures along with social expectations influence language use. The chapter connects these themes to political incivility perception especially when gendered expectations are considered. The chapter provides information about the Hungarian Parliament's structure alongside its regulatory framework and gender-based dynamics and the speaking roles and rhetorical limitations of female politicians.

The empirical research forms the second part of the dissertation and is presented across Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 introduces the AI-augmented discourse analysis, combining large language model processing, AI-assisted annotation, quantitative pattern analysis, and qualitative interpretation of parliamentary speech. Chapter 5 presents the survey experiment, which uses selected parliamentary excerpts with different tones and attributed speaker genders to examine how respondents perceive and evaluate political incivility. Together, the two chapters connect the production of political incivility in parliamentary discourse with its perception by audiences.

The thesis concludes with Chapter 6, which presents the main findings and original contributions of the research, assesses its practical relevance and limitations, and outlines directions for future research. The research structure integrates theoretical, methodological, and empirical perspectives to provide a comprehensive analysis of political incivility and its gendered perception within the Hungarian political context.

2 IMPOLITENESS AND INCIVILITY

This chapter provides the detailed conceptual foundation for the distinction between impoliteness, incivility, and political incivility introduced in Section 1.3. It reviews how these concepts have been defined and operationalised in previous research before developing the working definition and classification applied in this dissertation. Politeness and civility are introduced briefly as conceptual foundations, while greater emphasis is placed on impoliteness, incivility, and political incivility.

A central challenge is that no universally accepted definition of political incivility exists (Muddiman, 2017; Sapiro, 1999; Sifianou, 2019). The chapter therefore examines the main areas of conceptual overlap and disagreement, as well as the context-dependent ways in which political incivility has been classified across different communicative settings.

Throughout Sections 2.2–2.3, findings from a previously conducted systematic and narrative literature review (Illés, in press) are also presented. The review focused exclusively on studies examining political incivility by political elites. Eligible studies were identified through systematic searches of Web of Science and Scopus using “political incivility” as the search term, while studies focusing on non-political settings or citizen incivility were excluded to maintain alignment with the focus of this dissertation.

2.1 Conceptual foundations: politeness, impoliteness, civility and incivility

Politeness, like civility, has been a subject of extensive study and debate. Although Watts (2003, p. 211) wrote the following about im/politeness it is just as true for in/civility: “... (im)politeness is a term that is struggled over at present, has been struggled over in the past and will, in all probability, continue to be struggled over in the future.” For a deeper understanding, prominent im/politeness and in/civility theories will be introduced, and their relations will be interpreted in the chapter. First, I start with politeness, continuing with the newer term, impoliteness, and the same is true in the case of civility, followed by incivility.

2.1.1 Politeness theories

Politeness provides a conceptual foundation for understanding how communicative behaviour is evaluated in relation to interpersonal expectations and social norms. Central

to this literature is Goffman's (1967) concept of face, referring to the social self-image individuals seek to maintain during interaction. Brown and Levinson (1987) subsequently developed this idea by distinguishing positive and negative face and proposing that speakers use politeness strategies to manage potentially face-threatening acts. Other influential approaches, including Lakoff (1973a) and Leech (1983), similarly conceptualise politeness as contributing to the management of social relationships and communicative expectations.

For the purposes of this dissertation, the significance of politeness theory lies primarily in establishing this face- and norm-management background. A comprehensive review of politeness theory is therefore neither necessary nor intended here. Instead, this conceptual foundation provides a starting point for the more directly relevant question of what happens when interactional expectations are violated, which is addressed by impoliteness research.

2.1.2 Impoliteness theories

Research on impoliteness developed in close dialogue with earlier politeness studies (Kádár et al., 2021). Impoliteness has been described as the “long-neglected cousin” of politeness (Locher & Bousfield, 2008), partly because systematic research on impoliteness emerged considerably later and initially drew on existing politeness frameworks (Locher & Bousfield, 2008; Culpeper, 2015). However, impoliteness should not simply be understood as the absence or opposite of politeness. More recent research treats it as a distinct phenomenon requiring theoretical approaches that account for face-threatening behaviour, contextual expectations, and recipient interpretation (Dynel, 2015; Eelen, 2001). Important approaches include Culpeper's model of impoliteness (1996, 2005, 2011), Bousfield's (2008) work on conflict interaction, and Terkourafi's (2008) frame-based approach.

Culpeper (1996) is one of the foremost scholars in impoliteness. His work on impoliteness strategies parallels and contrasts Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. Impoliteness strategies are aimed at causing social disruption rather than maintaining social harmony. Culpeper (1996) identified five main strategies: bold on record impoliteness; positive/negative impoliteness; sarcasm or mock politeness; and lastly, withholding of politeness. In his 2005 paper, Culpeper elaborated on the role of context and audience in the perception of impoliteness and highlighted how impoliteness can be

strategic and serve to entertain an audience. In his 2011 book, Culpeper provided a more detailed and systematic account of impoliteness. He expanded on key concepts such as context, formulae, the recipient's role, and intentionality.

Bousfield (2008) has extensively studied impoliteness, particularly in conversational exchanges and conflict. He applied the same five categories as Culpeper (1996). The analyses use real-life conversational data to validate his theoretical arguments.

Terkourafi (2008) presents a frame-based theory of politeness and impoliteness which draws from cognitive linguistic frames. Terkourafi's frame-based approach extends the understanding of impoliteness through its analysis of relational work and cultural norms in social contexts. Her unified theory establishes a complete analytical system to study politeness and impoliteness which enables better comprehension of social communication.

The introduced approaches share an emphasis on context and interpretation while differing in their analytical focus. Culpeper foregrounds face-threatening behaviour and the potentially strategic character of impoliteness, Bousfield highlights its conversational and power-related dimensions, and Terkourafi emphasises relational and culturally situated expectations. Recent empirical research also demonstrates that impoliteness-related language can be multifunctional and that the strategies through which it is realised may differ across political and cultural contexts (del Saz-Rubio, 2023). Importantly, these approaches demonstrate that impoliteness cannot be identified solely from linguistic form or assumed speaker intention; recipient interpretation and contextual norms are also relevant. This makes impoliteness particularly important for the present dissertation, as it provides the interpersonal and pragmatic dimension against which the broader concept of incivility can be distinguished.

A particularly important point of debate concerns intentionality. Both impoliteness and incivility may involve intentional behaviour, but intention should not be treated as a necessary definitional condition. A useful distinction can instead be made between speaker-intended and hearer-perceived norm violations: speakers may deliberately employ confrontational or face-threatening language, while recipients may perceive an utterance as impolite or uncivil regardless of whether such an effect was intended. This distinction is supported by recent hearer-oriented approaches in pragmatics. Hansen and

Terkourafi (2023) distinguish Speaker's Meaning from Hearer's Meaning and argue that hearers do not have direct access to speakers' communicative intentions; instead, interpretation is constructed from linguistic, contextual, and social information. Terkourafi and Hansen (2026) further emphasise the role of hearer interpretation and uptake in determining the communicative meaning and social action associated with an utterance. Since speaker intention is not always empirically accessible, the present dissertation treats intentionality as an explanatory dimension rather than a criterion for identifying incivility. This hearer-oriented perspective also provides a pragmatic basis for the dissertation's later emphasis on perceived norm violation and audience evaluation.

2.1.3 Civility theories

Civility remains challenging to define extensively because it has evolved over the years, while scholars study it from multiple disciplines (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Muddiman, 2017; Rowe, 2015; Sapiro, 1999; Sifianou, 2019). Throughout history civility has meant being an active member of society who conducts themselves properly. The current understanding of civility assesses it through both speech politeness and democratic rule adherence (Smith & Bressler, 2013). The historical development of politeness and civility shows clear connections between these two concepts. Civility theories examine the social rules and behavioural patterns which support respectful conduct in different social environments. The most cited theories are the following:

Civility concerns norms of respectful conduct that extend beyond interpersonal face-management to broader social, ethical, and democratic relations. While Goffman's (1967) concept of face highlights the maintenance of social relations, Rawls (1971) connects respect and fairness to principles of justice, and Carter (1998) explicitly conceptualises civility as important for democratic coexistence and engagement with differing perspectives. Compared with politeness, civility therefore operates at a broader socio-institutional and normative level, providing an important conceptual foundation for understanding incivility as more than interpersonal rudeness.

The collective body of theories demonstrates that civility plays a vital role in sustaining social equilibrium and achieving justice and operational effectiveness in democratic and organisational settings. Different contexts benefit from these theories which explain civil behaviour understanding and promotion methods. The idea of politeness emerges in all of them. However, they go beyond (or above) and put civility on a pedestal as a key

concept essential for a well-functioning society and perpetuating democratic values. It possesses a more philosophical and political connotation.

2.1.4 Incivility theories

Incivility overlaps conceptually with impoliteness, but the two should not be treated as identical (Sifianou, 2019). While their relationship is examined systematically in Section 2.2, the present section focuses on theoretical approaches that conceptualise incivility as a socially and institutionally embedded form of norm violation.

Early theoretical approaches to incivility have frequently examined the phenomenon in organisational and interpersonal settings. Andersson and Pearson (1999), for example, conceptualise incivility as low-intensity deviant behaviour that violates norms of mutual respect and introduce the concept of the “incivility spiral” to explain how relatively minor violations may escalate into more serious conflict. Importantly, their definition emphasises ambiguous intent to harm, demonstrating that intentionality is not necessarily a defining condition of incivility.

Felps, Mitchell, and Byington (2006) demonstrate how norm-violating behaviour by an individual can influence wider group dynamics, while Lim, Cortina, and Magley (2008) identify gendered differences in the experience and consequences of workplace incivility. Although originating in organisational research, these studies highlight two dimensions relevant to the present research: the social and institutional embeddedness of incivility and the role of gender and context in shaping its consequences.

Taken together, these approaches conceptualise incivility as behaviour involving violations of socially expected norms of respect, while emphasising the importance of context and social consequences. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, intentionality is treated in this dissertation as an explanatory dimension rather than a necessary definitional criterion.

2.2 Definition overlaps and contradictions in the case of impoliteness and incivility

Building on the theoretical foundations outlined above, this section examines how impoliteness and incivility have been defined in previous research, before identifying their principal overlaps and points of divergence.

2.2.1 Defining impoliteness

When defining impoliteness, two key concepts dominate the field: intentionality and perception. Terkourafi (2008) considers impoliteness as an unintentional face-threat, while Culpeper (2008) and Bousfield (2008, 2010) view it as intentional. Impoliteness is often conceptualised in relation to face-threatening acts and social disruption (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Culpeper, 1996; Goffman, 2005). More recent research further emphasises the evaluative dimension of impoliteness, demonstrating that its interpretation depends not only on linguistic behaviour itself but also on how that behaviour is perceived and evaluated by participants (Gao & Liu, 2023).

Although impoliteness is commonly associated with face-threatening interaction, its conceptual relationship with incivility remains contested (Lakoff, 2005; Mills, 2017; Sifianou, 2019), as discussed further in Section 2.2.3.

2.2.2 Defining incivility

Definitions of incivility across disciplines converge around disrespect, belittlement, intimidation, and challenges to social status or reputation. Hunt (2013), Zauderer (2002), and Peters (2015), for example, emphasise harmful or belittling conduct and its effects on self-esteem, while Barber (2016) relates incivility to conflicts over social status and hierarchy. In political contexts, Feldman (2023) further connects incivility with power, humiliation, and the pursuit of strategic objectives. Collectively, these approaches position incivility not merely as an interpersonal offence but as behaviour embedded in wider relations of status and power.

2.2.3 Overlaps and contradictions in definition

The literature therefore suggests substantial conceptual overlap between impoliteness and incivility without treating them as interchangeable. Impoliteness is primarily concerned with interpersonal and pragmatic interaction, including face-threatening behaviour and its context-dependent interpretation (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Culpeper, 2011; Tóth, 2016). Incivility extends this perspective towards broader socio-institutional and normative expectations, including questions of status, hierarchy, and legitimate conduct (Lakoff, 2005; Mills, 2017; Sifianou, 2019). In political discourse, for example, strategic incivility may function not only as an interpersonal attack but also as a means of publicly challenging status and reputation (Feldman, 2023). The boundary between the concepts is therefore analytical rather than absolute: the same communicative act may

simultaneously be interpretable as interpersonally impolite and institutionally or socially uncivil. Intentionality does not provide a reliable dividing line and is consequently treated in this dissertation as an explanatory dimension rather than a necessary definitional criterion.

2.2.4 The use of the term impoliteness and incivility in a political context

The previous chapter clarified a few key points of the two terms. However, it is worthwhile observing the terms in use in the field of the dissertation, political communication. With the search of the database, Web of Science, the date is set from the 1600s up until the day of data collection (27th of May 2024). The search to list articles with the included terms resulted in 717 finds for impoliteness and 3444 for incivility. In the case of a more detailed search including the word politics and its variations, observing the abstracts resulted in 110 for impoliteness and 275 findings with incivility. The numbers show that incivility is a more prominent term for research concerning politics. However, it can be suggested that it is more broadly used than impoliteness. When looking at distribution over time, Figure 1 below shows that both terms in research connected to politics started to gain popularity after 2017/2018. Incivility has been rising; however, impoliteness in researching politics and political communication has been declining since 2021. It is important to note that the data for 2024 at the present point of the year is incomplete, which is why the graph shows a sudden drop in the case of both terms.




Figure 1. Summary graph of the use of the terms impoliteness and incivility in research, including politics

Considering the roots of the terms, their founding theories, the points where they differ, and their application in research, political incivility is suitable and will be applied.

2.3 Political incivility

To examine political incivility and what it entails, the results of a previously conducted systematic and narrative literature review and analysis (Illés, in press) will be recalled, which observed the existing definitions of political incivility and aimed to arrive at or create a unified definition. The research also examined existing ways political incivility has been categorised, methods used to research it, the connection between political incivility and gender, and the implications of politicians' use of it. The present section will focus on the observations regarding definition and categorisation, while chapter four will discuss the latter two, gender and implications.

2.3.1 Defining political incivility

Parliamentary discourse is inherently competitive and non-cooperative, where the aim is often not to build consensus but to gain rhetorical superiority (Ilie 2010, Murphy 2014). This type of discourse differs from ordinary communication and is often accompanied by violations of Grice's (1975) four conversational maxims, quality, quantity, relevance, and manner, which describe the principles speakers are generally expected to follow to communicate cooperatively and effectively. In the light of Leech's (1983, 2014) maximalist politeness theory, the discourse of parliamentary speeches proves to be particularly sensitive, as it often violates the maxims of approval ("Minimize criticism of the partner / maximize praise!"), agreement ("Minimize disagreement / maximize agreement with the partner!"), and sympathy ("Minimize resentment / maximize sympathy for the partner!"), and almost all of them (for a review, see Nemesi 2016 [2011]: 73–76). While following politeness maxims in everyday interactions maintains social harmony, the competitive nature of political discourse often overshadows their effectiveness. This specific communication medium can also be a breeding ground for various forms of disrespect.

In the context of the above systematic and narrative literature review, applying exclusion criteria yielded 29 relevant matches, of which 18 articles defined political incivility. The review showed considerable variation in how political incivility was defined across studies (Bentivegna & Rega, 2022; Muddiman, 2017; Nehring, 2011; Rowe, 2015; Sapiro, 1999; Sifianou, 2019). To systematise these differences, the review (Illés, in press) identified three main definitional approaches: Politeness (2/18), Rudeness & Disrespect (6/18), and Civility & Social Norms (10/18).

Of the three approaches, definitions based primarily on politeness were the least frequent in the reviewed literature. Hopmann et al. (2018), who adopted the definition of Rinke et al. (2013, p. 483), defined incivility “as unusually impolite forms of verbal or physical social behaviour”. This definition aligns with how respondents in the survey by Kenski et al. (2018) interpreted incivility. Mutz and Reeves (2005) also claim that incivility violates politeness norms.

The second group of definitions takes the path of connecting notions of rudeness and disrespect with political incivility. According to Stryker et. al. (2016), political incivility is a multidimensional construct that cannot be treated as a synonym of impoliteness or face-threat. Brooks and Geer (2007) see incivility as an attack that does not aim to weaken the opponent by introducing factual evidence but by name-calling, derision, and contempt. Many state (Goovaerts & Marien, 2020; Gervais, 2021; Fienberg & Frimer, 2022; Goovaerts & Turkenburg, 2023) that incivility is using rude and disrespectful language. Riet and Stekelenburg (2022) adopt Coe et al.'s (2014) definition and state that incivility is the unnecessary attribute in discussion that conveys a disrespectful tone and therefore implies disrespect towards the opponent.

The final group of researchers defined political incivility based on the etymology of civility and social norms. In this context, civility refers to individual actors, or citizens (*cives*), acting for the collective good, or the *civitas*. Those chosen by the citizens govern the *civitas* and should adhere to rules and act in the best interest of the collective, clearly resembling a political environment, such as parliamentary debate. In the civility and social norms approach, incivility is the “lack of respect for the shared principles and democratic traditions that govern the collectivity” (Bentivegna & Rega, 2022, p.1). It is a communication strategy “utilised by political subjects, expressed as a lack of respect for the social and cultural norms that govern personal interactions as well as those that govern the functioning of democratic systems” (Bentivegna & Rega, 2022, p.4). Bybee (2020) also adopts the perspective that civility is the foundation and defines incivility as a violation of good manners for personal gain. This behaviour disrupts order and deviates from societal expectations of a citizen. Additionally, Poljak (2022) accepted the definition of Walter (2021), who stated that political incivility is a type of communicative interaction among politicians that breaches social norms. Lately, Gervais (2017) generalises and states that political incivility is a norm-defying behaviour; however, since norms vary in different cultures and with time, political incivility is a relative concept.

The highly visible and competitive character of parliamentary discourse makes the strategic use of incivility plausible. Impoliteness may also be employed strategically in political communication, for example as part of blame-avoidance practices in government communication (Hansson, 2024). However, such a communicative environment does not in itself demonstrate individual speaker motivation. Accordingly, and consistent with the hearer-oriented treatment of intentionality outlined in Section 2.1.2, the present research does not infer motivation from parliamentary statements but identifies incivility primarily through observable norm violations and their communicative context.

Political norms should therefore not be understood as universal or static thresholds. They are socially constructed, context-dependent, and subject to historical change and renegotiation. Repeated norm violations may contribute to the normalisation or legitimisation of communicative practices, although this does not necessarily mean that the underlying norm violation disappears. Political incivility is therefore evaluated against expectations that may themselves change over time and across political and cultural contexts (Shmargad et al., 2022). Recent experimental research further suggests that perceptions of political incivility are shaped by both contextual characteristics of the communication and individual dispositions of the audience (Vargiu et al., 2026). Taken together, these perspectives identify recurring conceptual dimensions that provide the basis for the context-sensitive working definition adopted in the present research.

2.3.2 AI-assisted synthesis of existing definitions

As an exploratory extension of the systematic and narrative literature review (Illés, in press), an AI-assisted synthesis was conducted to examine whether the conceptual elements identified across existing definitions of political incivility could be integrated into a single formulation. The definitions explicitly provided in the 18 studies identified in the review were submitted to ChatGPT with the instruction: “Combine the following definitions of political incivility into one, while keeping the essence of each of them.” The purpose of this exercise was not to delegate the conceptual definition of political incivility to AI, but to explore how the recurring and divergent elements identified in the literature would be synthesised when processed together.

The resulting synthesis defined political incivility as:

“Political incivility encompasses behaviours that disrespect democratic traditions, defy norms, and employ negative tones and polemic language

in political contexts. It involves seizing indignation to serve personal agendas, often manifested through communication styles such as name-calling, hyperbolic accusations, and disrespectful gestures like eyerolling. Additionally, political incivility involves adding inflammatory comments that contribute little substance to discussions and includes impolite, rude, or disrespectful language directed towards others' character or policies in debates.” (ChatGPT, 2024)

The synthesis captured several recurring dimensions identified in the literature, particularly norm violation, disrespect, negative language, and specific manifestations such as name-calling. At the same time, it reproduced some of the conceptual problems present in the source definitions: it combined interpersonal, normative, behavioural, and intentional elements without clearly distinguishing their analytical roles. References to personal agendas implicitly attribute motivation to political actors, which is not empirically accessible in the present research. The AI-assisted synthesis is therefore treated as an exploratory methodological exercise rather than as the definition adopted in this dissertation. It helped identify points of convergence and tension across the existing definitions, but the theoretical and conceptual decisions remain those of the researcher. These observations, together with the preceding literature review and the distinction between impoliteness and incivility developed earlier in this chapter, inform the context-sensitive working definition introduced in Section 2.3.4.

2.3.3 Categorisation methods of political incivility

Following the sprawling trends in defining political incivility, categorising its manifestations is not straightforward. In a previously conducted systematic literature review (Illés, in press), 11 of the 30 articles proposed manifestations of political incivility.

It occurred that connecting the three main definitional approaches created in the systematic literature review (Civility & Social Norms, Rudeness & Disrespect, Politeness) with the categorisation systems of political incivility in these papers could reveal whether the definition approaches align with the applied categorisations. However, as mentioned earlier, not all papers clearly define political incivility, making it challenging to link some categorisations to a specific definition approach. Figure 2 summarises the results and connections.

Civility & Social Norm	Rudeness & Disrespect	Politeness	No definition
impoliteness, incivility and delegitimization (Bentivegna and Rega, 2022) comprehensive typology of norm violations: include attacks against liberty rights and attacks against democratic and constitutional principles (Bormann et al., 2021) Invectives and ridicule, hyperbole and distortion, emotionality and histrionics (Gervais, 2017) level 1: positive, negative civil or negative uncivil, level 2: name-calling, aspersion, exaggeration /hyperbole, mockery / sarcasm, character assassination, contrast, excerpts (Hill et al., 2015)	negative / positive tone, policy / person focus and in / civility (Brooks and Geer, 2007) insults, name-calling, obscenity, mockery and can be directed toward the character of the politician or their policies (Goovaerts and Marien, 2020)	negative / positive tone, policy / person focus and in / civility (Hopmann et al., 2017 adapting and building on Brooks and Geer, 2007)	lying accusation (Kenski et al., 2018) two dimensional model: personal and public level (Muddiman, 2017) mockery, sarcasm, misrepresentative exaggeration, insulting language, defamation, mudslinging (Rega and Marchetti, 2021) polarizing tone and style (van Elsas and Fishier, 2023)

Figure 2. Manifestations of political incivility by approaches in (Illés, in press)

Much like their definitions, categories for political incivility exhibit significant overlaps, as Figure 2 shows. One of the most prominent cases is Brooks and Geer (2007), whose definition got grouped under rudeness & disrespect in contrast to Hopmann et al. (2018), who adapted their categorisation, however, whose definition belonged to the politeness group. Similarly, specific manifestations of incivility, such as name-calling or mockery, appear in studies with definitions based on civility and social norms (Hill et al., 2015) as well as rudeness and disrespect (Goovaerts & Marien, 2020). This indicates that regardless of researchers' definitional approach, their categorisation choices show considerable overlap and contradictions, underscoring the complex nature of political incivility. This might be because all the cited studies investigate the same phenomenon from different perspectives, such as parliamentary or televised debates, and this focus shapes their definitions and categorisations of political incivility.

Another notable observation from Figure 2 concerns the categorisation, where the researchers did not clearly define political incivility in their paper. These studies either focused on a single category (Kenski et al., 2018), created a novel multilevel model (Muddiman, 2017), or provided vague categorisations (van Elsas & Fishier, 2023). An

exception is Rega and Marchetti (2021), who offered clear categories without defining political incivility.

As a closing paragraph for the categorisations, it would be helpful to circle back to the overlaps of impoliteness and incivility. As a reminder, scholars often argue that impoliteness is personal, while political incivility is related to democratic values (Massaro & Stryker, 2012; Papacharissi, 2004); however, the two cannot be clearly separated, and personal attacks are also considered incivility. Muddiman (2017) solved this by combining the two ideas into one model that she created, a two-dimensional model that consists of the personal and public levels of political incivility. Personal level incivility violates interpersonal politeness norms, including name-calling, derision, insulting, mockery, and aspersion. In contrast, the public level of incivility is believed to violate political and democratic norms and can consist of denying personal freedom or stereotyping. Another idea where the two had been combined in one categorisation is by Bentivegna and Rega (2022). They accepted and maintained the multidimensionality of the concept by comprising individual (personal) and collective (public) incivility and formulating three subgroups: impoliteness incivility, individual delegitimation, and institutional delegitimation. Impoliteness incivility includes making fun of someone, belittling, interrupting, eyerolling, or shouting. Racial slurs, discriminatory stereotypes, and exclusion or dissemination characterise individual delegitimation. Lastly, institutional delegitimation denigrates national symbols but can also encourage harm or physical confrontation.

To categorise political incivility, Brooks and Geer (2007) took a different approach and did not create subgroups, but instead contrasted and separated incivility from civil negative and positive messages. Hopman, Vliegenthart, and Maier (2017) further elaborated this categorisation system and created another three dimensions, implementing the ideas of Brooks and Geer (2007): negative/positive tone, policy/person focus, and in / civility, and they analysed the variation of the six factors. Goovaerts and Marien (2020) used one out of the six factors of Hopman et. al. (2017) when categorising political incivility as they stated that it is either directed towards the character or the policy of the politician through name-calling, obscenity, or mockery, which are recurring manifestations in many incivility categorisations.

Rossini (2020) also identified uncivil behaviour as an utterance that contains ad hominem attacks, vulgarity, derogatory language, direct insult, and name-calling. These manifestations are widespread in the parliamentary context, where the competitive nature of discourse not only allows but sometimes encourages various linguistic forms of social disrespect, reinforced by the principle of reciprocity (cf. Culpeper & Tantucci 2021).

2.3.4 Definition and categorisation applied in the present research

The preceding literature review and AI-assisted synthesis demonstrate the difficulty of establishing a single universally applicable definition of political incivility. Nevertheless, a study centred on political incivility requires an explicit working definition that reflects both its theoretical foundations and the specific context in which it is examined. Accordingly, drawing on the preceding conceptual discussion, the following working definition is adopted for the present research:

For the purposes of this dissertation, political incivility is defined as context-dependent political communication that is perceived as violating norms of respect or broader social, political, and democratic norms. Its identification depends on the interaction between the communicative act, its institutional and cultural context, and the expectations of speakers and audiences. Intentionality may shape political incivility but is not treated as a necessary definitional condition.

The emphasis on perceived norm violation is consistent with the hearer-oriented pragmatic perspective outlined in Section 2.1.2 (Hansen & Terkourafi, 2023; Terkourafi & Hansen, 2026), according to which communicative meaning cannot be reduced to presumed speaker intention but is shaped through recipient interpretation in context. In creating the definition, the overlapping and contradicting points of impoliteness and incivility were considered, along with the results of the summary graph of terms used for researching a political context. Furthermore, the definition builds on the three main incivility theories (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Lim et al., 2006; Felps et al., 2008), the ideas of scholars who defined political incivility (Barber, 2016; Bentivegna & Rega, 2022; Bybee, 2020; Hunt, 2013; Lakoff, 2005; Mills, 2017; Peters, 2015; Poljak, 2022; Sifainou, 2019; Stryker et. al., 2016; Walter, 2021; Zauderer, 2002) and aligns with the

Civility & Social Norms approach, which was the most prevalent definitional perspective identified in the systematic literature review (Illés, in press).

As presented in section 2.3.2, how researchers categorise political incivility can vary greatly while overlapping simultaneously. In some research, only a specific manifestation of political incivility is observed (e.g., Kenski et al., 2018), while others focused on several, or even aimed at creating a system (e.g., Hill et al., 2015), or at least a grouping.

The present research adapts and builds on the categorisation system of political incivility created by Hill et al. (2015). The system has two levels: first, the tone of the speech can be civil, negative civil, or uncivil. The second level applies where relevant and identifies recurring manifestations of political incivility: name-calling, aspersion, exaggeration/hyperbole, mockery/sarcasm, character assassination, contrast, excerpts, and lying accusation. The classification is functional rather than hierarchical: these manifestations distinguish how political incivility is realised in discourse rather than representing different levels of severity. They are therefore treated as analytical manifestations rather than fixed or universally applicable types of incivility.

Lying accusation was added to the original categorisation system as an additional manifestation. Although it could theoretically be classified under aspersion, the corpus contained recurring explicit formulations in which political actors directly accused others of lying, for example through expressions equivalent to “you are lying” or “this is a lie”. Because these formulations emerged repeatedly in the data and constituted a rhetorically distinct form of direct accusation, lying accusation was retained inductively as a separate analytical manifestation.

Besides the question of definition and categorisation, central areas of research in the field concern the possible effects of political incivility: whether it is beneficial for politicians (Bybee, 2020), whether it increases interest in politics (Brooks & Geer, 2007), or, conversely, discourages citizens from engaging with political communication and negatively affects political trust (Goovaerts, 2025; Van’t Riet & Van Stekelenburg, 2022; Fienberg & Frimer, 2022). The upcoming chapters introduce the literature and foundations of the areas mentioned above.

3 SOCIOLINGUISTIC DIMENSIONS AND PARLIAMENTARY COMMUNICATION

The fundamental role of language in political discourse includes shaping communication content and forming public perceptions of political figures. This chapter examines the sociolinguistic aspects of parliamentary communication through an analysis of gendered speech patterns and socialisation processes. Sociolinguistic analysis enables researchers to study how language maintains and strengthens social systems which include gender-based communication patterns. Section 3.1 introduces the broader field of sociolinguistics, and section 3.2 shifts the focus to the intersection of gender, parliamentary discourse, and political incivility, addressing how gendered expectations influence communication in legislative settings. This section examines political incivility measurement approaches together with gender-specific applications and their effects on voter understanding. Section 3.3 describes the Hungarian Parliament's institutional framework by explaining its organisational structure and its operational rules and disciplinary procedures for speech conduct. The discussion focuses on the available speech types for politicians which include interpellations and oral questions because these forms create essential spaces for political confrontation and incivility. The chapter dedicates special attention to Hungarian female politicians who participate in parliamentary debates while discussing their challenges in working within a historically male-dominated political sphere.

The research combines sociolinguistic theories with gender studies and political communication research to achieve its main goal of analysing parliamentary language use and its relationship with political and audience-level outcomes.

3.1 Sociolinguistics

This section investigates the complex relationship between language and society by showing how linguistic practices both reflect and contribute to the reproduction or transformation of social structures. The first part of section 3.1.1 provides an extensive review of the field by showing how social elements affect language usage through class and ethnic background and environmental factors. The following section 3.1.2 examines how people learn social expectations about gender roles through internalisation. The following section 3.1.3 examines gender differences in language usage as well as conversational approaches and interactional behaviours. The last section 3.1.4 studies

how language serves to display and sustain social power systems by showing how linguistic choices represent authoritative positions and social ranking. These themes show how language interacts with social roles and power dynamics throughout various communicative situations.

3.1.1 Foundations of sociolinguistics

Sociolinguistics represents an extensive research field that includes multiple sub-disciplinary areas. The section focuses on sociolinguistic aspects which relate to the dissertation research without providing comprehensive coverage of all sociolinguistic topics. This section concentrates on areas which directly relate to the research goals of the dissertation while presenting an overview of how language interacts with society. This section examines both the study of linguistic variation and identity as well as the research methods sociolinguistics and critical discourse analysis use to investigate their topics.

Sociolinguistics explores the dual role of language in everyday usage as it connects with social standards and governmental rules and legal frameworks (Wardhaugh & Fuller, 2021). Language exists both as a social system that reflects social dynamics and as an active force that can shape, reproduce, or challenge them. Sociolinguists use their analytical techniques to detect widespread linguistic patterns before they evaluate these observed patterns to determine their social implications. The fundamental basis of sociolinguistics states that complete understanding of language requires study of the social groups which use it (Labov, 1981). Sociolinguistics separates from Chomskyan theory through its examination of actual language use which Chomsky calls performance while he studies an abstract speaker model, he calls competence.

The literature presents four different models which Wardhaugh & Fuller (2021) have discussed extensively. According to Bernstein (1971) and Labov (1972) social structures affect both linguistic structures and behavioural patterns. According to Whorf (1956) and Lucy (1997) language determines how societies organise themselves along with their worldview. A third perspective considers an interplay between language and society. According to Sapir (1985) language exists in a connected relationship with culture so understanding either one requires knowledge of the other. The present dissertation is most closely aligned with this reciprocal perspective, as it treats language and social structures as mutually constitutive rather than assuming a one-directional causal relationship.

However, Newmeyer (2003) and Chomsky (1965) together with other scholars maintain that social structures and language systems exist as independent elements.

Sociolinguistics contains linguistic variation as one of its primary sub-disciplines. Speakers from various geographic locations or social groupings along with individual speakers exhibit different language use. Every speaker uses language in distinct ways because they adapt their speech to match both social situations and their intended audience and message (Wardhaugh & Fuller, 2021). Sociolinguistics contains the essential concept of identity which serves as an explanation for linguistic variation. Modern social theory has transformed the way scholars view identity because it no longer considers it a static quality that defines people or groups. Discourse along with social interaction create an ever-changing concept of identity. The linguistic approach to identity creation was explained by Kroskrity (2000, p. 111) as the process of establishing membership in multiple social categories. Through this definition it becomes clear that language functions as an instrument to indicate membership within social groups while creating social connections.

Sociolinguistics has progressed to study language power dynamics in political discourse across social environments through its critical research methods. According to Gumperz (1971) sociolinguistics functions to establish relationships between social frameworks and linguistic systems during periods of social change. The broad field of sociolinguistics consists of two main areas: micro-sociolinguistics which studies communication through language and macro-sociolinguistics which examines how social structures impact language use (Hudson, 1996). The approach demonstrates how linguistic practices maintain social structures while displaying the wide-ranging effects of language use.

Sociolinguistic research employs three main methodologies which include correlation studies together with micro- and macro-linguistic analyses and discourse analyses. The field of discourse analysis generated a specialised field known as critical sociolinguistics which examines how power dynamics and social inequality relate to language use. The method incorporates critical theory to study how social power systems sustain their control through ideological mechanisms. Critical sociolinguistics according to Tollefson (2006) specifically analyses structural inequalities which become invisible because of ideological processes thus making natural or inevitable what appears as structural disparities. The scholars Fairclough (2009, 2013) and van Dijk (2015) have developed

critical discourse analysis (CDA) to study how language preserves dominant systems of power and privilege. Through CDA analysis institutions including politics and law and medicine and education demonstrate how their seemingly neutral language practices maintain social inequalities that support dominant ideologies (Fairclough, 2009, 2013; van Dijk, 2015).

Sociolinguistics offers researchers a tool to study the operational dynamics of language as it appears in social situations. The research project operates within sociolinguistics because it conducts analyses of communication patterns to establish typical linguistic patterns. Knowledge of the social environment where communication takes place becomes essential to understand linguistic utterances. The research focuses on the political domain and its cultural framework together with the Hungarian cultural background as its context. The research investigates the relationship between language and society from a bidirectional perspective. Social structures, institutional norms, and gender expectations shape linguistic behaviour, while linguistic practices can simultaneously reproduce, reinforce, or challenge these social structures and expectations. The section investigates how identity functions as a dynamic concept which people develop through their need to join social groups. The research examines whether female politicians' communication patterns reflect or challenge prevailing political and gendered expectations. The section lists standard research methods while discourse analysis stands out because it reveals subtle details in complex systems containing various components especially power relations which makes it suitable for studying political communication.

3.1.2 Socialisation and gender stereotypes, femininity vs. masculinity

Social systems create and sustain gender roles along with expectations which do not derive from biological factors. People receive their first cultural gender norms about appropriate boy and girl behaviours during their early years of childhood. The development of gender stereotypes emerges from the extensive socialisation process which leads to the creation of widespread beliefs about male and female appropriate traits and roles and behaviours.

The Role Congruity Theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) shows that people receive positive evaluations when they demonstrate behaviours which match traditional gender-based expectations. According to cultural norms men need to demonstrate aggressive traits

including assertiveness and dominance alongside ambition, yet women need to express communal characteristics through warmth and empathy and cooperation. The social world penalises people who do not match traditional gender expectations through sanctions that affect their behaviour. Research by Rudman et al. (2012) demonstrates that women face more severe penalties than men when they exhibit non-traditional behaviour. The Social Expectation Theory (Berger et al., 1972) demonstrates how individuals undergo continuous evaluation through widely accepted beliefs about how particular groups should conduct themselves. Gender functions as an essential organising principle in this theoretical framework which determines personal identity formation and controls how people interact with each other and establishes social group structures.

The difference framework in gender research (Troemel-Ploetz, 1991; Freed, 1992; Cameron, 1995; Reményi, 2001; Tannen, 2021) explains the impact of socialisation on producing distinct behavioural patterns. Boys and girls start their development by playing different types of activities from their early childhood. Boys create bigger groups that use competitive frameworks to establish hierarchical structures along with rule systems and social status rankings. Girls establish smaller close-knit groups which emphasise sharing resources and emotional bonding between members. People develop enduring communication methods and conflict management abilities and relationship development patterns because of their early social encounters. Such differences become essentialised through stereotyping which assigns unchangeable characteristics to people because of their group affiliations. The essentialist approach described by Wardhaugh and Fuller (2021) implies that all members of a category share identical core traits which results in gender identity becoming the only defining characteristic while ignoring individual variations. The implementation of strict expectations becomes possible because of resistance toward individuals who do not fit into traditional role expectations.

Theoretical approaches from Butler and Connell offer specific explanations about the broader systems that support gender norms. According to Butler's Theory of Gender Performativity (1990) gender exists only as a set of performed actions rather than an inherent state because it emerges from repetitive activities. This theory contests essentialist perspectives by demonstrating how gender roles persist through regular activities. According to Connell the concept of Hegemonic Masculinity (1995) describes how societal institutions enforce dominant masculine ideals that include strength and control alongside emotional restraint to maintain gender power structures. These

established standards determine how men should act while creating public expectations about what constitutes normal or desirable behaviour for all genders.

Behavioural patterns related to gender develop from intricate socialisation processes and cultural systems along with established social norms. The established gender norms create lasting effects on personal identity formation and social structures through their reinforcement of traditional masculinity-femininity dualities.

3.1.3 The influence of gender on communication style

Talbot (2006) states there exist separate styles for male and female conversation and research areas in linguistics such as politeness validate this distinction. Most studies show that men use conversation to achieve dominance through competitive interactions and power acquisition. According to Talbot (2006) women use their conversations to prioritise both cooperation and unity. Research studies in the previous section established that the difference framework explains gendered speech patterns, but dominance theory and poststructuralist theories question the concept of gendered language as a product of difference and the development of male and female identities in early childhood which manifests in language use. According to poststructuralists people choose their gender identity through discourse practices while producing language as cultural products. Because women remain underrepresented in political leadership roles while men dominate political domains, research predicts that female politicians will display the same political incivility as male politicians instead of following gender-based communication norms.

Research across multiple disciplines confirms how people's communication patterns differ by gender because both personal characteristics and social expectations and power dynamics influence their speech. Psychological research shows women tend to remain quiet in group meetings within hierarchical structures because society expects them to avoid assertive behaviour (Brescoll, 2011). Such patterns stem from cultural beliefs that define what behaviours are acceptable or desired between men and women in formal or professional environments.

Tannen's Genderlect Theory (1990) presents a fundamental concept about how men and women communicate in separate linguistic environments through competitive "report talk" and cooperative "rapport talk." Despite its popularity the theory faces challenges because it presents overgeneralised binary distinctions while ignoring contextual and

power-based factors. Speech styles exist independently from gender because multiple intersecting elements like class position and racial background and institutional rules simultaneously influence them according to Cameron (2008). The initial research by Lakoff (1975b) about "women's language" included hedging and politeness markers and deference, but scholars now understand these features as responses to societal expectations and gender rule violations.

The social practice of gendered communication continues to evolve through cultural norms which actively monitor and shape its expressions. The research shows how social structures and speech politics create the differences between communication styles.

3.1.4 Language and power dynamics

Social power operates through language because it serves both as a communication system and an instrument that enables people to shape social power dynamics. The way people communicate depends on their position within social structures which in turn affects their communication style. The fundamental idea of sociolinguistic theory matches Foucault's (1972) discursive system that produces knowledge while constraining it and Bourdieu's Theory of the Linguistic Marketplace. Every communicative act takes place in a specific market environment which holds linguistic styles in higher esteem according to Bourdieu (1991). The technical mastery of language requires strategic deployment because individuals need to use appropriate language forms that match the expectations of their context to achieve acceptance or prevent penalties.

Through strategic language deployment individuals manage social interactions in situations with uneven power distribution such as institutions. According to Morand (2000) subordinates use negative politeness strategies including hedging, indirectness, honorifics and apologies to minimise face-threatening acts and signal deference as Brown and Levinson (1987) explained in their politeness theory. Positive politeness tactics, such as inclusive language or compliments, aim to reduce social distance. According to Morand, negative politeness stands out as the main indicator of perceived politeness during official interactions. The maintenance of hierarchical roles occurs through linguistic choices when subordinates modify their speech to follow institutional expectations and superiors face less obligation to adapt. Goffman (1967) demonstrates how politeness operates as a dual mechanism which maintains interpersonal relationships while performing the maintenance of power dynamics and roles.

The linguistic market concept developed by Bourdieu shows how specific speech modes containing formal elements and deferential and indirect language maintain their symbolic value in professional or bureaucratic settings. The ability to use these linguistic modes becomes crucial for people who want to move forward or rise through institutional structures. A linguistic form gains its value exclusively from the social field where people use it. The same expression that shows confidence and solidarity in one situation might appear improper or condescending to others.

The social structures of gender, race and class interact with these dynamics. The freedom to communicate directly without any modifications exists unequally between social groups which benefits those holding positions of power. A critical assessment of politeness politics requires examining how identity intersects with institutional power dynamics.

3.2 From parliament to perception: gender, measurement, and political incivility

Research focuses heavily on the point where gender meets political communication within parliamentary settings. Parliaments function as fundamental areas for political dialogue and policy development and democratic authority. These political spaces remain vulnerable to power imbalances and inequality when viewed through a gender perspective. The IPU Parline shows that women make up fewer members than men in parliaments across numerous nations. Research indicates women in politics encounter more hostile treatment through incivility and criticism and opposition than male politicians do according to Krook (2017). The gendered environment shapes how political messages get transmitted to the public.

Given these complexities, it is essential to examine parliamentary communication in more detail and to explore how incivility is applied in these forums; different aspects of this topic are discussed below. Subsection 3.2.1 deals with parliamentary communication, presenting the communicative practices and rhetorical strategies used in parliamentary debates and discussions. This includes analysing how gender shapes the tone and content of political discourse and the deciding factors on who speaks and in what manner. Following this, subsection 3.2.2 examines the methods of measuring political incivility in European countries. It reviews and summarises current measurement methods, considering both qualitative and quantitative approaches, focusing on how these methods can capture the gendered characteristics of parliamentary discourse. Subsection 3.2.3

discusses gender differences in the use of political incivility. It examines whether male and female politicians differ in their use of incivility and how gender influences the likelihood of using incivility. Lastly, it raises the question of how the public perceives these behaviours. Subsection 3.2.4 addresses the influence of political incivility on voter perceptions, investigating how incivility in political discourse affects voter attitudes and trust. Specific focus is given to how political incivility influences voter responses contingent on gender, and how male and female politicians are evaluated based on the same behaviours. All subsections are based on and present the results of a previously conducted systematic and narrative literature review (Illés, in press). This chapter aims to comprehensively understand the interaction between gender and incivility in the context of parliamentary communication by analysing these four dimensions.

3.2.1 Parliamentary communication and gender

The third section of the paper focuses on parliamentary communication by analysing the relationship between speech frequency and gender as well as gendered policy areas and topics based on the Comparative Agendas Project Codebook (Baumgartner, 2019) and the institutional and stereotypical pressures that affect genders differently in political settings.

Although gendered language use, female and male conversational styles, and their differences have occupied researchers (see also section 3.1), the connection of gender and political discourse has received little attention, despite its potential for understanding power in a political setting (Rojo, 2006). The field lacks research because women remain underrepresented in government positions and parliamentary seats (Peterson & Runyan, 1993). The social position of women remains weaker than men's position despite worldwide progress toward equality in various domains. The concept of masculinist hegemony exists as a diffuse idea which affects social class and ethnic differences, but Walsh (2001, p. 17) explains it as a system embedded in historical institutional structures and discursive practices that have traditionally been associated with men.

The first issue discussed in detail is the gender of the politician and its connection, as well as its possible influence on the frequency of parliamentary speeches made. Parliamentary speeches are an essential way for members of the parliament (MPs as an abbreviation), or parties, to signal their priorities and position on issues, and also a valuable opportunity for competition between the government and the opposition. Plenary time can be short.

Therefore, only a small number of MPs have the chance to speak. In political settings, parties within established (informal) rules and hierarchies, leaders can strategically decide who gets the opportunity to talk (Proksch and Slapin, 2012). Although all MPs have access to freedom of speech, going against party rules and the party leader may result in the withdrawal of further opportunities. Analysing the Swedish parliament, Back et al. (2014) find that female MPs speak less often, regardless of their party affiliation, expertise in the policy area, or party position. The difference is even greater when discussing a hard policy area (discussed in the following subsection). The Swedish parliament is an exciting basis for analysis, and almost the opposite of the Hungarian, since the number of female MPs is over 40%, which makes it possible to test whether gender mainstreaming takes place in a parliament where both genders are almost equally represented. However, the high percentage of female MPs in the Swedish parliament does not encourage more active participation. Kathlene (1994) found similar results in the USA, where male members still dominated the discussion in committees with a higher proportion of women. They took most of the speaking opportunities and therefore controlled and had greater influence on the debate, which is known as the interference effect (Kathlene, 1994). Hargrave and Blumenau (2022) analysed parliamentary debates in the UK from 1997 to 2019. The researchers observed that female MPs started with lower speaking frequencies while using communal speech patterns which included emotional and empathetic elements. The female MPs transitioned from communal to agentic communication styles by becoming more assertive while adopting the speaking patterns of their male colleagues. However, these findings originate from Swedish, US, and UK institutional contexts, therefore it should not be assumed to apply directly to Hungary, where parliamentary composition, political culture, and gender representation differ substantially. The present research examines whether comparable gendered patterns can be identified within the Hungarian parliamentary context.

The observed shift indicates that speaking frequency differences between genders continue to exist. Women gain confidence as social norms change and new generations emerge which enables them to adapt to parliamentary spaces. In line with social norms, Strøm (1997, 2012) suggests that the frequency of speaking and its relation to gender can also be determined by career goals, but also by emotional incentives (Searing, 1994), which can also stem from the social identity and social role adapted by individuals during their socialisation (Mead 1934, Simon 1985). Burden (2007) makes a similar point when

examining the frequency of speeches, arguing that "politicians are people too" and therefore their backgrounds and experiences are crucial in determining their legislative and political behaviour (Saalfeld, 2014). In conclusion, the distribution of speaking time can be attributed to social norms, gender stereotypes, and the culture of masculinity within political organisations (Eagly & Karau 2002; Lovenduski, 2005). Traditional roles of men and women exist to this day. They were even more critical several decades ago, when current MPs were growing up, and may have influenced their socialisation and inherited norms (Back et al., 2014).

Moving on to gendered topics and policy areas within political communication, the primary source and one of the most significant shapers of the discussion is the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al., 2019), CAP for short. The project dataset was coded according to the original codebook created by Baumgartner and Jones (2010). CAP highlights notable trends in gender issues and policy priorities in 16 countries, including Hungary, complemented by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where the States of Florida and the State of Pennsylvania are considered. The patterns observed reflect broader societal norms and institutional biases. The CAP distinguishes between 21 policy areas considered soft, 7/21, or hard, 14/21 (see Table 1 below). A policy is considered soft if it aligns with traditional expectations of women as nurturers and caregivers, such as education or health. Female politicians may be expected to champion such issues, but this expectation may limit their participation in broader policy debates. Men are expected to be authoritative figures in hard policy areas, such as economics or foreign policy. Hard policy areas in general have higher stakes. The dominance of men in these areas continues to reinforce the stereotype that men should make decisions about important and technical matters (Baumgartner et al., 2019). The categorisation in Table 1 shows how legislative and public discourse prioritise issues and how institutional structures and social norms direct attention to these issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010).

Policy Area		Classification	Example
1.	Macroeconomy	Hard	Fiscal budgets, inflation policies
2.	Banking and Finance	Hard	Credit regulations, stock exchange oversight
3.	Labor and Employment	Hard	Workplace safety laws, unemployment benefits
4.	Defense	Hard	Military strategy, national security policies
5.	Foreign Trade	Hard	Trade agreements, export-import tariffs
6.	International Affairs	Hard	Diplomatic relations, conflict resolution
7.	Transportation	Hard	Infrastructure development, public transit systems
8.	Energy	Hard	Renewable energy initiatives, resource management
9.	Science and Technology	Hard	Research funding, tech regulations
10.	Environment	Soft	Conservation programs, climate change policies
11.	Agriculture	Soft	Farming subsidies, rural development initiatives
12.	Healthcare	Soft	Public health campaigns, hospital funding
13.	Education	Soft	Curriculum reform, school funding
14.	Housing	Soft	Affordable housing projects, urban residential planning
15.	Social Welfare	Soft	Poverty reduction programs, childcare subsidies
16.	Civil Rights	Hard	Anti-discrimination laws, voter protection
17.	Crime and Justice	Hard	Penal reforms, policing policies
18.	Culture	Soft	Media regulation, preservation of cultural heritage
19.	Government Operations	Hard	Administrative reforms, state efficiency measures
20.	Immigration	Hard	Refugee policies, integration programs
21.	Public Lands	Hard	Urban planning, conservation of national parks

Table 1. Twenty-one distinguished policy areas in the Comparative Agendas project, with their classifications and examples

Coinciding with the early work of Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993), Kathlene (1994) also examined how gender affects the policy areas discussed in legislative committees. The findings suggest that female politicians have been and continue to (Illés & Mwangi, 2024) actively engage more in soft policy areas such as education, health, and social welfare, which are in line with traditional gender roles. In contrast, male politicians dominate hard policy areas (Kathlene, 1994). These divisions reinforce stereotypes and may limit women's ability to influence broader legislative agendas. Hargrave and Blumenau (2022) similarly find that male and female MPs focus on different topics in the UK parliament, with women more likely to address social welfare issues (coded as soft areas in the CAP, 2019). However, female MPs have diversified their engagement with their speech frequency over time, addressing a wider range of policy areas, including traditionally male-dominated topics (Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022). This shift reflects the gradual erosion of gender roles in parliamentary discourse, at least in the UK Parliament. According to Boda and Sebők's analysis (2019) within the Comparative Agendas Project, the parliamentary focus in Hungary demonstrates limited diversification in topics when analysed by gender. Female MPs are generally underrepresented and less likely to lead debates or contribute to the conversation in strategic policy making on hard policy areas such as fiscal policy or international relations. The findings of Illés and Mwangi (2024) support this conclusion. The study by Boda and Sebők (2019) also highlights the broader issue of gender inequality in Hungarian political institutions. It claims that female representatives often face systemic barriers that make it challenging to influence key policy areas. These findings are consistent with broader patterns observed in other Central and Eastern European countries. Still, the problem is more acute in Hungary due to the parliament's lower-than-average number of female representatives (Boda & Sebők, 2019).

As the previous section's results hinted, institutional structures and social stereotypes create persistent barriers for female politicians, conditioning their behaviour and limiting their influence. Associating policy areas, such as education and social welfare, with women reinforces societal perceptions of their values, priorities, and legislative roles (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). These stereotypes confine female politicians to certain areas and marginalised their contributions in hard policy areas traditionally dominated by men. Institutional mechanisms such as party unity, discipline, and agenda control (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Kam, 2009) further confirm this dynamic. Party leaders may also use

incentives and sanctions to maintain electoral unity, while agenda control suppresses issues that could divide the party and limit members' autonomy, especially women. Another pressure emerging from stereotypes is the gender differences in communication styles, which remains an essential topic to observe in parliamentary discourse. Female MPs use less confrontational and constructive rhetorical approaches (Bochel & Briggs, 2000), refer to personal experiences more (Childs, 2004b), and employ fewer polarising strategies than their male counterparts (Haselmayer et al., 2022; Hargrave & Langengen, 2021). Research in the Austrian parliament shows that a balanced gender ratio reduces the polarisation of debates and promotes a more collaborative environment (Haselmayer et al., 2022). However, this finding reflects the Austrian institutional context and cannot be assumed to operate identically in Hungary. At the same time, these behaviours often align with societal expectations that encourage women to adopt more communal and non-confrontational roles. Kathlene (1994) suggests that legislative committees, historically designed to favour male norms, further reinforce these hierarchies, discourage women from assertive behaviour, and undermine their authority. Although progress has been made, as Hargrave and Blumenau (2022) show in the British Parliament, the expectation and suggestion that women will radically change political culture places an unfair and also unnecessary burden on them, perpetuating outdated stereotypes even as they increasingly adopt more assertive, 'agentic' qualities. These institutional and social pressures underline the need for reform to ensure equal representation and influence for women legislators.

In summary, parliamentary communication is shaped by individual differences, gender stereotypes, and institutional practices. While these factors are crucial, cultural differences add a layer of complexity. For example, research on political incivility, a specific communication tool analysed in the dissertation, reveals striking cultural contrasts: British MPs often engage in confrontational rhetoric, using emotionally charged insults to challenge opponents and assert authority, whereas Swedish MPs favour a restrained, fact-based approach that minimises verbal polarisation (Ilie, 2004). Political incivility serves several functions in parliamentary settings, such as addressing power dynamics, exposing institutional norms, and shaping public perceptions. However, it is influenced not only by culture but also by the individual, gender stereotypes, expectations of social norms, and institutional factors. Political incivility may be associated with communication styles traditionally characterised as masculine or confrontational,

potentially placing female politicians in a different position within adversarial parliamentary environments. Taken together, these cross-national findings demonstrate that gendered patterns of parliamentary communication are shaped by cultural and institutional contexts rather than representing universally applicable effects. Accordingly, the present research does not assume that patterns identified in other national and institutional contexts apply directly to Hungary but examines whether comparable patterns emerge within the specific institutional and cultural context of the Hungarian Parliament. Understanding how political incivility operates and is measured is essential to exploring its broader implications. The following section examines the research designs and methods used to analyse this aspect of political discourse.

3.2.2 Measurement methods of political incivility

The preceding subsection introduces the general characteristics and intricacies of parliamentary communication. The present subsection will not focus broadly on the methods applied in analysing parliamentary communication; instead, it will introduce methods used in analysing political incivility. As illustrated in Figure 3, the research methods about political incivility have been disseminated from differing geographical areas. It is imperative to acknowledge that the fundamental premise upon which the analysis is based may vary; nevertheless, the methodology can be universally applied. This section aims to provide a concise overview of the methods that have been employed in the past, without asserting completeness.

In the systematic and narrative literature review (Illés, in press), 27 to 29 articles described their applied methodology. The three primary methods for analysing political incivility by politicians in descending frequency are: measuring citizens' opinions and effects on political incivility using questionnaires (10/27); various experiments (9/27); and lastly, discourse or content analysis (8/27), which examines recordings or published manuscripts. The books included in the literature review state that experiments represent the gold standard in research on mechanisms (Sydnor, 2019) but also highlight that questionnaires are increasingly popular because they are relatively easy to conduct nowadays (Tesler & Zaller, 2017). Mutz (2015) combined all the methods in her book *In-your-face politics*.

The genres examined in these analyses included television debates, politicians' social media platforms, campaigns, political advertisements, and parliamentary question time.

Goovaerts and Turkenburg (2023) used quantitative content analysis to analyse 4,102 speeches collected from Belgian television political debates over 35 years. The speeches were from 24 debates. The authors coded incivility based on a previously established definition and categorisation system. Poljak (2022) used a similar approach, but focused on parliamentary question times. He did not focus on a specific communication format, but on political figures, and analysed 40 politicians. Another area of analysis was and could be presidential election campaigns as broadcasted advertisements, which were researched by Hill, Capella, and Cho (2015). They systematically examined 379 such political campaign advertisements.

When researching political incivility on a big data set, artificial intelligence-based classifiers are a commonly used tool, and it is even more popular when political incivility is examined online. Frimer et al. (2023) analysed 1.3 million tweets using an automated classification process. Petkevic and Nia (2020) also used this approach to analyse over 16,000 tweets and identify character- and policy-focused incivility. Kenski, Filer, and Conway-Silva (2018) examined uncivil tweets by politicians and political parties, focusing on one manifestation of incivility, the accusation of lying.

Questionnaires, the most common method according to the literature review (Illés, in press), were distributed on platforms such as Google Platform, Mechanical Turk, Turk Prime, and Knowledge Networks. Including such platforms indicates that collecting many respondents and aiming for representativeness is the goal when applying the questionnaire method. The questionnaires included general questions and collected data about the participants' demographics, interest in politics, and media consumption. The general questions were then followed by a second stage of the questionnaire, where researchers measured their specific focus within the phenomenon of political incivility. A common theme is to rate the incivility or acceptance of statements on a 5- or 7-point Likert scale. An example is the study by Bentivegna and Rega (2022), in which 797 university students were asked to rate the presence or absence of incivility in 20 statements on a 5-point scale. Similar methods were used by Muddiman (2017), Gervais (2017), Skytte (2022) who combined content analysis, Goovaerts and Marien (2020), who combined text and audio, and Deckman (2022), who also incorporated a tolerance scale created by College (2016), and finally Gervais (2021), who used a 0-100 scale.

The last observed research method is experimentation. Experiments investigate causal relationships by manipulating one or more independent variables and observing their effects on dependent variables. They typically have a structured design, such as a control and experimental group, where participants are exposed to different stimuli or conditions to measure attitudes or perceptions. It is a preferred method because it can rigorously isolate variables and test hypotheses. However, it has the disadvantage of potentially risking validity because the setting is artificially created. For this reason, Brooks and Geer (2007) aimed to conduct their experiment in a less laboratory-like setting. Participants were at home, in front of a television, and had to respond to three previously defined dimensions of political communication and incivility. Another experiment by Feinberg and Frimer (2022), with 1479 participants, examined whether individuals are more accepting of politicians who are consistent with their political views but engage in political incivility. They also measured whether participants would be willing to consume additional content and information from them. Hopmann, Vliegenthart, and Maier (2018) conducted another interesting experiment in which participants watched a political debate while continuously rating their perceptions of incivility using a seven-point scale.




Figure 3. A zoomed-in world map highlighting countries featured in the text for their political incivility research methods

Most experiments and questionnaires aimed to investigate the acceptance of in-group and out-group political incivility, perceptions of incivility, willingness to participate in politics based on exposure to incivility, changes in the level of incivility among politicians over time, or the use of incivility based on the gender of politicians. Some articles focused on specific countries, such as Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the United

Kingdom, or the United States (see Figure 3). In contrast, others focused on a specific politician, such as Donald Trump.

In summary, content analysis is most appropriate when the researcher aims to analyse data from real-life events, such as debates or campaigns. At the same time, questionnaires and experiments are helpful when seeking to measure opinions and perceptions of incivility.

3.2.3 Gender differences in the application of incivility in politics

The incorporation of a gender perspective into research on political incivility represents a relatively novel approach, as evidenced by the observation that the majority of research on this topic has a relatively recent publication date. Furthermore, of the 29 systematically collected articles (Illés, in press) on the subject, only four have included a gender perspective. To gain a deeper understanding, the systematic literature review was supplemented with a narrative literature review, which provides space for additional research and book chapters that address the topic of gender, politics, and incivility.

Notwithstanding formal barriers, women continue to be underrepresented in political leadership. It is often suggested that this is due to the competitive and resistant nature of political discourse, which is perceived to be at odds with women's cooperative and conflict-avoidant communication style (Cameron, 2022). Civility is frequently presented as a female preference, yet it is also regarded as an obligation (Lakoff, 1973b; Hobbs, 2003; Chen-Xia et al., 2022). The standards of civility expected of women are higher, as the avoidance of incivility is seen as a key aspect of socially accepted femininity (Smith, 1992). Incivilities such as shouting or swearing are frequently regarded as "unladylike" (Smith-Hefner, 1988). Consequently, women are expected and evaluated based on their capacity to civilise public discourse through less confrontational speech styles (Cameron, 2022). This creates a challenging situation for female politicians, who must adhere to a specific behavioural code. Failure to do so may result in negative judgment, while adherence may be perceived as a lack of authority, a prerequisite for success in this field. Competing without adapting to the established norms and conventions of the political arena may not be feasible, as instances of incivility in politics are not only conventional but also functional (Cameron, 2022).

Results on gender differences in the application of incivility can be grouped into four categories: female politicians use less incivility than male politicians; female politicians

use the same communication tactics as male politicians, including incivility; female politicians use more incivility than male politicians and lastly the use of incivility depends on the gender balance of the situation. These results will be discussed in the following sections, and a potential comprehension will also be provided.

The first generalisation that can be gathered from research findings is that female politicians exhibit a lower incidence of incivility than their male counterparts. Some researchers posit that women can succeed in politics by employing their expected speech style. Cameron (2022) quotes UK MP Gisela Stuart, who asserts that democracy is predicated on consensus, rather than on the imposition of intentions. By collating a selection of media reports, the researchers identified claims that female MPs who refrain from misconduct and incivility contribute to the dignity and peacefulness of the UK parliament. It was anticipated that an increasing number of female MPs would moderate the extremes of incivility observed in a male-dominated political arena.

Furthermore, Poljak (2022) discovered that women are less prone to incivility, thereby adhering to the conventional gender roles observed in parliamentary settings. Female Members of Parliament (MPs) tend to discuss political issues in a more precise manner (Bochel & Briggs, 2000), frequently connect their arguments with personal experiences (Childs, 2004a), and are generally less hostile and uncivil than their male counterparts (Hargrave & Langengen, 2021; Ennser-Jedenastik et al., 2017). Haselmayer et al. (2022) concluded, based on an analysis of 52,000 plenary speeches, that female MPs' speeches are, on average, less harmful and more civilised than men's. It was posited that the results were influenced by the number of prior female speakers and the proportion of female MPs in the parliamentary party group.

The second generalisation, derived from the research findings, is that female politicians employ the same communication tactics as their male counterparts, including incivility. The extant research conducted in the United States has demonstrated that women and men employ similar resistance tactics and engage in comparable degrees of incivility in political discourse (Banwart & McKinney, 2005). Furthermore, their argumentative strategies and linguistic repertoires do not differ significantly (Birdsell, 2017). The findings of Evans and Clark (2016) align with those of Banwart and McKinney (2005) in that they indicate a recent increase in the use of incivility by female political candidates, which has brought them into closer alignment with their male counterparts.

Based on the research findings, a third potential generalisation is that female politicians engage in more incivility than their male counterparts. This finding challenges the initial generalisation. However, some research indicates that women not only utilise negative campaign strategies and incivility with the same frequency as their male counterparts, but in fact, with greater frequency (e.g., Walter 2013). In the Scottish Parliament, female members are likely to engage in disruptive behaviour and make uncivil remarks. Shaw (2020) posits that this is due to a lack of perceived intrusion and reduced pressure to adhere strictly to the rules to prove one's worth. The findings indicate that the male dominance of institutions may impede women from exhibiting different behaviours, such as refraining from rule violations. Conversely, these constraints appear lessened in contexts where women's positions are more secure.

The final generalisation derived from the findings is that incivility is contingent upon the gender balance. Some research has established a correlation between the ratio of men to women in the political environment and the prevalence of political incivility. Kathlene's (1994) findings indicate that as the ratio of women increases, men become more verbally aggressive and controlling during legislative hearings. Yoder's (1991) findings suggest that female chairpersons do not receive the same respect as their male counterparts in committee hearings. Furthermore, the more feminised a committee becomes, and the more female members it has, the more overt hostility and incivility men direct at women. A further study revealed that men interrupt women during parliamentary speeches with a frequency of 96%, whereas the rate for interrupted men is considerably lower (Mills, 2008).

In light of the disparate and occasionally contradictory generalisations that can be derived from the research findings, it can be posited that contextual factors may exert a greater influence on speech style than the gender of the speaker. Speech style is not a fixed trait; rather, it is a malleable phenomenon that adapts to the norms and dynamics of each situation. It is therefore inaccurate to suggest that men or women communicate in a specific manner within the context of politics. This raises the question of the determining factor in communication style and the application of political incivility. Several potential solutions may be identified, including the electoral system, the political atmosphere of the country in question, the proximity of elections, the personal traits and party affiliation of the politician, current global events, or a combination of these factors. Future research

must consider a multitude of variables. However, it is also possible that this is not the most pressing issue to be addressed, but rather how this communication is perceived.

The interpretation of uncivil speech from female politicians depends on the situation because it does not necessarily break feminine norms but serves to fulfill political roles. The practice of using incivility can serve two purposes by enabling politicians to perform their watchdog duties and by allowing them to function as whistleblowers (Brown et al., 2020) to reveal hidden abuses. The roles of watchdog and whistleblower require assertive communication methods which traditional gendered politeness norms might view as uncivil. Incivility may function as a political resource in contexts where assertive communication is associated with particular institutional roles.

Given that these findings originate from different political and institutional contexts, they should not be assumed to apply directly to Hungary. The present research therefore examines whether gender differences in political incivility identified elsewhere are also observable within Hungarian parliamentary discourse.

3.2.4 Effects of incivility on the voters' perception

The impact of political incivility on democracy and democratic values and norms is an essential topic among politicians, journalists, and academics (Theocharis et al. 2020). Of the 29 articles discussed in the literature review (Illés, in press), 21 addressed the effects issue. The main results reported were loss or increase of interest in politicians or politics, adverse effects on support for politicians or politics, partisan behaviour, behavioural mimicry, neutrality, and finally, some articles reported mixed results. This suggests that the findings on the effects of political incivility are ambiguous and contradictory when comparing studies. This may be because the effects of political incivility were measured using different methods and settings, the participants' composition, or the politicians' characteristics and position observed in the political arena. Another possible differentiating factor, as argued by Britzman and Kantack (2020) and cited by Walter (2021), is that cultural differences, more specifically political culture, may play a role not only in the use of political incivility but also in its effects. Nevertheless, the analysis of the findings from the articles included in the review provides a deeper understanding of the potential effects of political incivility.

The first finding presented is that political incivility generates interest in politics. Brooks and Geer's (2007) findings show that fundamental incivility is the most concerning as it is the least accepted in campaign discourse and the most outrageous to the public. Research using a two-dimensional model developed by Muddiman (2017) also suggests that public judges' personal (trait-based) incivility is more negative than public incivility. Despite this, personal (trait-based) incivility does not reduce democratic engagement and does not appear to be associated with negative perceptions of incivility and loss of political trust. In contrast, political incivility generates political interest, increases the accessibility of politicians, strengthens public concern, and increases the likelihood of electoral participation (Brooks & Geer 2007; Mutz 2015). Bybee (2020) agrees that incivility can generate enthusiasm, as was observed among Trump supporters about the former president's use of language. Frimer et al. (2023) analysed political incivility on Twitter and observed a 23% increase in tweets containing incivility by politicians since 2009, a phenomenon caused by positive reinforcement from Twitter users. Uncivil tweets received more attention and acceptance in the form of likes and retweets, and were favourable for politicians. Sydnor (2019) took a different approach, considering personal characteristics: for conflict-avoidant individuals, incivility reduced their interest in politics, whereas for conflict-seeking individuals it generated enthusiasm or entertainment, and therefore political interest.

The second set of findings shows the opposite. Political incivility reduces interest in politics, but partisan bias does not emerge (Feinberg & Frimer 2022; Boatright et al. 2019). Muddiman (2017) and Skytte (2022) also observed in-group bias: participants were more accepting of a politician who was a member of the party the participant supported. Furthermore, in contrast to Brooks and Geer (2007), Riet and Stekelenburg (2022) found that political incivility negatively affected political trust, which is supported by other researchers (Goovaerts & Marien 2020; Mutz & Reeves 2005; Jamieson et al. 2017), but did not affect political participation.

The third group of findings suggests that political incivility has a neutral effect. Hopmann, Vliegenthart, and Maier (2018) reached this conclusion, stating that incivility is not beneficial for politicians, but does not cause negative consequences. Furthermore, Nai and Maier (2020) concluded that the acceptance, disdain, or praise of political incivility is a matter of taste and is rooted in an individual's desire to avoid conflict, an idea that ties back to Sydnor (2019).

The final group of findings is not only about the potential effects of political incivility, but also about the relationship between effects and gender, where the results are diverse and sometimes contradictory. Swearing, a form of political incivility, has been condemned when used by female politicians, while it has increased positive perceptions of male politicians (Sung 2012; Cavazza and Guidetti 2014). However, other research has shown that female politicians are not judged more negatively when they deviate from gender stereotypes in their language use (Brooks 2013). Other researchers have focused on gender among voters, finding that women in general are less tolerant of political incivility (Kenski & Rains, 2019) and that Republican women are the least tolerant of political incivility (Deckman, 2022). Voters, both men and women, who hold gendered nationalist views and believe that American politics has become too soft and feminine, were more likely to find Trump's speeches acceptable and more civil.

In summary, the effects of political incivility are diverse: they can range from negative effects, to neutrality towards the phenomenon of incivility and the politician who uses it, to generating interest in politics. Gender seems to be a factor that further complicates the understanding of the effects of incivility, as when a gender perspective is applied, the results suggest that female politicians are judged differently from their male counterparts. In a generally male-dominated environment, the understanding and use of or misusing political incivility is a fascinating area of research that raises further questions worth exploring.

3.3 Hungarian Parliament

As the dissertation's primary focus is the verbal incivility among Hungarian elite politicians, analysing it in a special section of the Hungarian parliament, the hour of immediate questions, it is essential to introduce this institution's operation briefly. The following chapter will introduce the tasks of the Hungarian Parliament, providing a comprehensive overview of its functioning, rules, and communication practices. First, the fundamental tasks and roles of the Hungarian Parliament will be described, paying particular attention to its role in the political system and the legislative process (3.3.1). Then, formal guidelines will be introduced to regulate parliamentary conduct, paying particular attention to the rules of procedure that shape debates and discourse (3.3.2). The following subsection introduces parliamentary speech forms, such as interpellations and

oral questions, which are key tools in political communication and accountability (3.3.3). The last subsection presents the past and present of female politicians in Hungary.

While incivility by both genders is relevant to the present research, the underrepresentation of women in the Hungarian Parliament provides a particularly important context for examining gendered communication. Women in politics may face barriers associated with gender stereotypes and institutional dynamics (Shaw, 2020; Fellegi et al., 2023). Hungarian research further demonstrates the importance of examining political incivility within its specific social and political context (Szabó, Kmetty, & Molnár, 2021; Szabó & Farkas, 2021). Building on this literature, the present dissertation connects patterns of incivility in parliamentary discourse with their gendered public perception.

3.3.1 The operation and tasks of the Hungarian Parliament

The operation and tasks of the Hungarian Parliament are summarised and publicly available on its website, Parlament.hu. According to the Basic Law, the Parliament is the main representative body of the people of Hungary. According to the website:

“Like most European parliaments, the functioning of the Hungarian Parliament is characterised by lively, often heated debates between the government and opposition parties. This is fine; in addition to its public law duties, the Parliament also has political functions such as presenting the most important political views and opinions in society. However, parliamentary debates take place according to specific rules, in a procedural order that ensures freedom of speech, but also enforces the requirement of efficiency.” - Parlament.hu 2024.

The Parliament also elects the most important public law officials. Still, it also has important tasks in foreign policy, national security, national defense, justice, the economy, finance, health, education, and culture, as well as in many other areas that determine the living conditions of citizens. The two main functions of the Parliament are law-making and control of the Government.

The mandate of the Parliament begins with the inaugural session and lasts until the new Parliament's inaugural session, which also concludes one parliamentary cycle. The Parliament holds two ordinary sessions per year: from February 1 to June 15 and from September 1 to December 15, but there can also be extraordinary sessions if necessary.

The President of the Parliament convenes the meetings. The House Committee (Házbizottság) proposes the agenda or, if there is no agreement between the factions, by the President of the Parliament. The Parliament decides on the adoption of the agenda. The agenda of the meetings includes debates and votes on motions before the Parliament (in particular: bills, resolution proposals, reports, interpellations, and questions). After the president opens, the meetings are chaired by the vice presidents. The change of president usually takes place every two hours. The management of the meeting essentially consists of the following parts: (1) opening the meeting, (2) presentations, announcements that are read out by the president or the clerk (e.g. on immunity requests, committee decisions on inclusion in the subject series, etc.), (3) opening disputes, (4) granting the floor for non-agenda, procedural and "normal" speeches, (5) monitoring the discussion (if necessary, warning about exceeding the time limit, applying disciplinary measures), (6) closing or postponing disputes, (7) ordering a break or adjournment of the hearing, (8) ordering and conducting the polls and establishing the results, (9) adjourning the meeting and announcing the expected date of the next meeting. Verbatim minutes of the meetings are prepared, which the Parliament publishes on their website (Parlament.hu - Napló). Also, on the Parliament website, the live television broadcast of the entire session can be seen.

Like most modern parliaments, the Parliament's session hall has a semi-circular system and perfectly meets the practical aspects of the debate. The Partisan and the majority of opposition representatives sit opposite each other in the government. Still, they are not separated to the same extent as in the corridor-like English parliament. The government members sit on velvet chairs in front of the first row, according to the order determined by the prime minister. Deputies and government members can see the chairperson at the lectern and vice versa. The sitting order of the Parliament is characterised by the fact that the pro-government factions sit on the right, while the opposition factions sit on the left.

3.3.2 House rules: Conduct that conflicts with disciplinary law provisions and inevitable legal consequences that may be applied as a result

According to Article 5 (7) of the Basic Law:

"To ensure the undisturbed functioning of the Parliament and preserve its dignity, the President of the Parliament is entitled to exercise the disciplinary and policing powers specified in the rules of the house".

The body's calm, undisturbed, and balanced functioning is a functional prerequisite for performing the Parliament. The effective and undisturbed functioning of the Parliament is therefore linked to such a pressing public interest that it can constitutionally justify the exercise of disciplinary and policing powers – i.e., even the restriction of the rights of individual representatives, including the right to speak under certain conditions. According to the Constitutional Court, the right to speak is not only the representative's license, but also a fundamental element of the parliamentary hearing, which needs to be regulated precisely. The basic law creates the constitutional basis for exercising these two powers to ensure the smoothness of parliamentary work and preserve its dignity. The rules of the house regulate the order of hearings for this purpose (3206/2013. (XI. 18.)) The Basic Law authorises the President of the House to exercise these two powers. However, the Vice-President of the National Assembly is also entitled and obliged to exercise disciplinary powers in the jurisdiction that replaces the President, acting as the session's chairperson. The following list contains the behaviours that conflict with disciplinary legal provisions and inevitable legal consequences that may be applied because of them (OGYTV, 2024):

Deviation from the subject, unnecessary repetition: the chairperson may order a representative to stop speaking if they deviate from the subject in an obvious manner or repeat themselves unnecessarily. If the representative ignores this order, their right to discuss the same agenda item for the rest of the day may be revoked.

Blatantly disruptive intervention: A disciplinary order can be used against a representative who disrupts the meeting or interrupts a speaker. This aims to curb interruptions and ensure orderly conduct. If the representative ignores the order, their right to speak can be revoked, and their monthly remuneration will be reduced by at least half.

Use of offensive or indecent expression: a representative may not use offensive or obscene language or gestures against the National Assembly, the session's dignity, or any person or group, especially national, ethnic, racial, or religious communities. Such behaviour will result in their right to speak being withdrawn. If they continue to violate the rules, their honorarium can be reduced by one to two months, or they can be banned for up to three meeting days or eight calendar days. These stricter sanctions reflect the severity of the offense.

Demonstrations are not permitted: demonstration devices (e.g., boards, recordings) may only be used in parliamentary sessions with prior permission from the House Committee. They must be limited to explaining the speaker's position. Violations can incur the same sanctions as previously mentioned, but only if an order is ineffective.

Objecting to the meeting chairing: A representative cannot object to the chairman's decision or conduct during a meeting. If they do, their right to speak may be withdrawn without prior warning, but no further sanctions can be imposed. The representative can request a resolution from the committee responsible for interpreting house rules as a legal remedy.

Using blatantly offensive or intimidating terms: if a representative's words or actions are deemed blatantly offensive or intimidating, the chairman may exclude them from the meeting for the day or longer. The representative must leave the meeting room but can stay in the building and return for voting. Non-compliance with this order can lead to an immediate ban. Sanctions may include reducing the representative's honorarium by two to four months or banning them for up to six meeting days or fifteen calendar days.

Disruption: a representative who disrupts the meeting, debate, voting, or hinders others' rights or duties may be expelled for the day or banned immediately by the chairperson. Sanctions are similar to those for other serious offenses. Disruptive behaviour is intentionally or recklessly disturbing the meeting's normal course or others' participation.

Obstruction: a new disciplinary provision covers more serious disruptions that make the meeting, debate, voting, or others' participation impossible. The chairperson can impose an immediate ban. Fee reductions can range from four to six months' worth, and a subsequent ban can last up to twelve meeting days or thirty calendar days.

Behaviours related to physical violence: the most serious sanctions can be imposed on a representative who directly threatens physical violence, calls for its use, obstructs the expulsion of another or uses physical violence, including immediate ban at the meeting, followed by fines ranging from four to six months - fee reduction or ban for up to twenty-four meeting days or sixty calendar days.

3.3.3 Speech types: Interpellation and oral questions

The traditional parliamentary control tools that representatives can use in the plenary session are the interpellation, the question, and the immediate question. The special weight of the interpellation is that, if the representative does not accept the answer, the Parliament decides. If the Parliament rejects it, the interpellation, in the form of a committee report, is brought before the plenum again. The representatives also have other tools to control the Government. Such is the speech outside the agenda, especially the speech before the agenda.

There is a difference between interpellation and the oral question: on the one hand, among the recipients, and on the other hand, in their negotiation order. A Member of Parliament may address a question to the Government, any member of the Government, the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights, and the President of the State Audit Office, the Chief Prosecutor, and the President of the Hungarian National Bank. Still, the addressee of the interpellation may only be the Government or one of its members. At the Parliament session, the government's response to the interpellation can be evaluated in the representative's reply. If it is not accepted, the Parliament decides on the response. If the Parliament rejects the answer, the president issues it to the competent committee for review. The committee formulates its proposal in its report, and the interpellation is brought before the House again. In the event of an oral question, there is no possibility for a representative's reply or a parliamentary decision.

The main difference between the question and the immediate question is that in the case of the question, the responder receives the question in advance. In contrast, in the case of the immediate question, the responder only gets a title for the question, which often does not reveal much about the topic that the questioning politician wishes to discuss, making the responder's task more difficult as they are not able to prepare a response ahead of time. This makes the immediate question format often less official, more heated, and more difficult for the responder.

Table 2 below shows the number of submitted and implemented immediate questions from 1994 until the last complete cycle when the chapter was written. It shows that the government submits and implements significantly fewer immediate questions than the opposition. The reason for this is that this format is suitable for confronting questions. When the government does implement a question, it usually sets a positive tone, praises

past deeds in parliament, or uses the time and setting to clarify the matter. This topic has been scrutinised in the parliament, the media, and the public.

Cycle	Submitted			Implemented		
	Government	Opposition	Total	Government	Opposition	Total
1994–1998	232	1287	1519	193	1083	1276
1998–2002	249	496	745	193	396	589
2002–2006	381	938	1319	372	792	1164
2006–2010	244	963	1207	234	791	1025
2010–2014	243	1064	1307	216	920	1136
2014–2018	322	1132	1454	274	785	1059
2018–2022	420	1124	1544	279	853	1132

Table 2. The number of submitted and implemented immediate questions, created based on the data available in parlament.hu

Table 2 also shows that immediate questions are a regularly used parliamentary control tool, particularly by the opposition, supporting the selection of this format as a setting for direct government–opposition confrontation.

3.3.4 Female politicians in Hungary

Women in Hungary were granted full voting rights in 1945, and that year also marked the beginning of a steady increase in their numbers in parliament, until 1980, when almost a third of MPs were women. Based on this indicator, Hungary could have been considered a pioneer even among the Scandinavian countries, which were and still are considered to be at the forefront of gender equality (Koncz, 2014). However, in 1985, the number of female MPs decreased, mainly due to the modernisation of the electoral system. However, Hungary still ranked high in terms of female politicians in parliament compared to countries in the region. Modernisation meant introducing the two-candidate electoral system, in which the electorate had a greater influence on the composition of parliament. Around the time of the regime change in 1989, the presence of female representatives decreased significantly (IPU Parline, 2023). Since then, the number of female MPs has fluctuated around 10% over the last twenty-five years, which can be considered a very low number by European and global standards. For a detailed gender distribution of the parties, see Table 3 below, which summarises the gender consistency in the Hungarian

Parliament over the last four cycles. In the IPU Parline 2025 ranking, Hungary ranks 144th out of 184 countries, with 15% of MPs being female, while the regional average for Europe is 31%. This persistent gender imbalance makes Hungary a particularly relevant context for examining political incivility and gendered communication. Rather than assuming that gender patterns identified in more gender-balanced parliaments apply to Hungary, the present research examines how incivility operates within an institutional environment in which women constitute a small minority of political speakers. The literature evaluates the disproportionate political institutional system as a democratic deficit, as the inclusion and participation of women in parliament is considered a measure of equality and equal opportunities. The current state of the Hungarian parliament can be described by the frequently used term from the literature: men's club or old boys' network, and an institution where masculinisation (Craske, 2003). However, according to the Critical mass theory, a transformation in political culture could be triggered if women in society grew up not seeing women in political or leadership roles as token individuals, but more as a considerable minority (Dahlerup, 1988). With their numbers rising, the theory suggests several changes would occur in political culture: softening tone, less formality, more precise speeches, and less incivility.

Nowadays, in Hungary, most female politicians become MPs through a political party list rather than being elected directly by voters. However, some female politicians win their mandates in single-member districts. Furthermore, there are female mayors and municipal representatives as well. Nonetheless, based on the numbers, the question arises whether Hungarian society requires and promotes the presence of female representatives and, if so, what could be the underlying reason for their underrepresentation (Koncz, 2014). Women's and men's strengths lie in different competencies, abilities, and life experiences. Therefore, the ratio of their presence can shape decision-making (Kelemen, 2010). This phenomenon has been coined as "politics of presence" by Phillips (1998, p. 65), and it declares that without the presence of women, the proper representation of women's interests and related issues cannot be imagined. According to Dahlerup (1988), for women politicians to succeed in parliament, their number should reach the critical mass, which is around 30%, otherwise they are believed to be underrepresented. Another struggle that is important to mention for female MPs is that they not only represent themselves, but also their group, so they must meet a double standard: fulfill the role and

meet the expectations of society of being a woman and as the holder of the given role (Kelemen, 2010).

	2006–2010		2010–2014		2014–2018		2018–2022	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Fidesz	130	11	207	20	109	8	107	10
FKgP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jobbik	-	-	44	3	21	2	23	3
KDNP	21	2	34	2	15	1	15	1
LMP	-	-	11	5	3	2	6	3
MDF	10	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
MIÉP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MSZP	165	25	54	5	25	4	12	3
SZDSZ	18	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
DK	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	1
Párbeszéd	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2
Independent	1	-	1	-	7	2	1	-
Nationality rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
2018–2022	345	41	351	35	180	19	176	23
	89%	11%	91%	9%	90%	10%	88%	12%

Table 3. Gender distribution of representatives (at the time of the inaugural meeting) - created based on the data available in parlament.hu

Existing Hungarian research provides an important foundation for examining political incivility in its specific social and communicative context. Szabó, Kmetty, and K. Molnár (2021), analysing more than 17 million online comments, demonstrated that the occurrence of incivility in Hungarian online discourse varies according to factors such as topic, platform, and interactional context. Szabó and Farkas (2021), in turn, highlighted the conceptual limitations of treating incivility solely as norm violation and emphasised the importance of considering its sociolinguistic dimensions and audience-dependent interpretation. Building on these foundations, the present dissertation shifts the empirical focus from online user-generated discourse to elite parliamentary communication and extends this line of research by connecting the analysis of political incivility with gender and audience perceptions.

4 AI-AUGMENTED DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

This chapter details the methods used in the dissertation, the results obtained, and their discussion. The chapter is divided into three main parts accordingly. Each section is divided into further sections. This structured approach ensures clarity and consistency in the description of the research, the presentation of the findings, and their implications.

4.1 Applied method

The methods used in this study were selected to provide complementary perspectives on political incivility in Hungary and to strengthen the validity of the analysis. The research combines AI-assisted annotation, quantitative analysis, and qualitative discourse analysis within a mixed-methods framework. AI-assisted annotation enables the scalable classification of large volumes of parliamentary text, quantitative analysis identifies broader distributions and patterns, while qualitative discourse analysis provides contextual interpretation of linguistic and cultural nuances and supports human oversight of automated classifications. Together, these components provide both a bird's-eye view of large-scale patterns and a worm's-eye view of individual linguistic and contextual features. The following sections detail the research design, sampling, data collection, data analysis, ethical considerations, and methodological limitations.

4.1.1 AI-augmented discourse analysis: Large Language models

The present approach can be situated within the growing field of computationally assisted text and discourse analysis, in which natural language processing and, increasingly, large language models (LLMs) support the systematic analysis of large textual datasets (Allen, 2021). Recent developments have extended this approach to LLM-assisted qualitative coding, where researcher-defined coding frameworks can be applied at scale while human interpretation and validation remain central (Tai et al., 2024; Than et al., 2025). In the present research, these methods are combined with corpus-linguistic and contextual discourse analysis to identify recurring patterns in parliamentary speech while retaining attention to culturally and contextually specific meanings that automated methods may not capture reliably.

4.1.2 Advantages of AI-assisted text annotation

The implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) in text annotation offers several practical advantages for large-scale discourse analysis, particularly in terms of scalability,

efficiency, consistency under controlled conditions, adaptability, and methodological transparency. These advantages can support, rather than replace, human interpretation in the systematic analysis of large textual datasets. These advantages are also consistent with recent LLM-assisted qualitative research, which highlights the potential of computational tools to extend the scale and efficiency of qualitative coding while retaining human involvement in interpretation and validation (De Paoli, 2024; Tai et al., 2024).

Human coders who excel at language interpretation may nevertheless differ in their judgements as a result of factors such as prior knowledge, fatigue, or individual interpretation. AI-assisted annotation can reduce some forms of procedural inconsistency by applying predefined categories and coding instructions repeatedly under controlled model and prompting conditions. This does not eliminate interpretive bias or classification error, but it can provide a more standardised annotation procedure when combined with human validation and oversight.

Another essential advantage is scalability and efficiency: manually coding large datasets, such as political speeches or social media posts, is a resource-intensive task that requires significant time and effort. Compared to human resources, AI can rapidly process large data sets, allowing researchers to analyse corpora containing thousands of entries in a fraction of the time required for human analysis. Dictionary-based, automated discourse analysis is another standard method that combines human resources and technology. However, dictionary-based approaches may be limited in their ability to capture the nuanced and context-dependent nature of language, including political incivility. AI-assisted methods, particularly machine-learning approaches, can provide greater flexibility in identifying more complex linguistic patterns. Bon and Walter (2021) propose using supervised machine learning techniques, a form of AI, that can adapt to complex language patterns and more accurately detect incivility in political communication. Their findings demonstrate the potential of machine-learning approaches for the computational analysis of political communication. When analysing plenary debates from an extended period, five legislative terms, resulting in large amounts of data, Haselmayer et al. (2022) also opted for a machine-learning-based model which learned on a crowd-coded training set.

AI-assisted annotation can also support methodological reproducibility when the model, coding framework, prompts, and analytical procedure are documented in sufficient detail.

However, identical outputs cannot necessarily be guaranteed across repeated runs or model versions, particularly when generative AI systems are used. Reproducibility should therefore be understood primarily in terms of a transparent and replicable analytical procedure rather than perfectly identical classifications. The limitations of AI-assisted annotation, including model dependence and contextual sensitivity, are discussed in the following section.

4.1.3 Potential limitations of AI-assisted text annotation

The implementation of AI-assisted text annotation brings numerous benefits yet it faces certain restrictions. This chapter evaluates the difficulties of using AI for linguistic analysis through a critical assessment of ambiguity management and training data reliance and contextual subtlety handling and ethical algorithmic decision-making challenges.

The primary difficulty of AI-assisted annotation stems from its inability to handle ambiguous content. The lack of clarity in statement tone or intent makes it difficult for structured taxonomies to produce definitive categorisations. The use of probability scores and pattern recognition by AI models for ambiguous statement classification produces results that sometimes lack the nuanced context needed to analyse political discourse because they operate without human judgment.

The main drawback of AI models stems from their requirement for training data. AI models need large datasets to achieve effective training results. The quality of training data directly affects the accuracy of resulting classifications because biased or incomplete or unrepresentative data leads to classification errors. Political discourse frequently employs rhetorical devices together with humour and implicit references which need cultural or situational understanding. The ability of AI to detect textual patterns does not extend to complete understanding of subtle meanings which results in oversimplified interpretations of complex narratives.

The lack of transparency in AI decision-making raises methodological and ethical concerns. AI processes can resemble a 'black box', making verifying and justifying specific classifications difficult. The ethical implications of algorithmic language classification become significant because AI errors in sensitive discourse classification

create liability concerns. The need for thorough oversight and continuous evaluation of AI systems emerges from these concerns to maintain consistent use.

The scientific basis for using generative AI to analyse political incivility in speeches remains valid because the technology offers scalability, efficiency, and potentially consistent classification under controlled model and prompting conditions. However, its outputs remain sensitive to ambiguity, contextual variation, and model-specific behaviour, which makes human validation necessary. AI-assisted analysis is therefore particularly useful for processing extensive datasets that would be difficult to analyse manually at the same scale.

The combination of human oversight with AI-assisted analysis produces highly reliable and insightful results when properly integrated. Therefore, after careful consideration of both the advantages and the potential limitations of incorporating AI into the discourse analysis of political speeches, the method was designed to take advantage of the positive aspects mentioned above, but with the inclusion of human oversight, with which the potential limitations, critical aspects are intended to be eliminated or at least controlled.

In the following, the research design will be introduced that aims to answer the following research questions and hypotheses:

Research Questions

RQ1: Is there a relationship between issue salience and the frequency and forms of political incivility in parliamentary discourse?

Hypotheses

H1: Female politicians exhibit lower levels of incivility than male politicians.

H2: Patterns of incivility vary by political party and gender.

4.1.4 Research design and sample

The objective of the present study is to analyse the presence of political incivility in Hungarian parliamentary speeches, with a particular focus on the gender of the speaker, and manifestations, and amount of incivility applied. The study employs a dual approach, utilising both quantitative and qualitative methods following a mixed methodology framework. The quantitative analysis employs artificial intelligence (AI)-based text analysis, enabling scalable and efficient processing of voluminous text data. With the

assistance of AI-based annotation, the speeches are categorised into issue salience, based on twenty-one distinguished policy areas in the Comparative Agendas project; and also into civil, negative civil, and uncivil classes, as well as further subcategories: name-calling, aspersion, exaggeration, mockery/sarcasm, lying accusation, character assassination, contrast, and lastly, excerpts. In the qualitative analysis, I examine the discourse and contextual features of the texts, taking into account the nuances of political discourse and the cultural context. This combined approach facilitates a more profound comprehension of political incivility and the exploration of gender and political differences in parliamentary communication. The three components are complementary: AI-assisted annotation provides scalable classification, quantitative analysis identifies distributions and comparative patterns, and qualitative analysis supports contextual interpretation and human validation of the automated results.

The sample consists of the last two complete parliamentary cycles during data collection (2024), i.e., the cycles 2014–2018 and 2018–2022. The selection of these two consecutive completed cycles reflects the scope of the research, which focuses on contemporary patterns of Hungarian parliamentary incivility rather than long-term historical change. The period 2014–2022 was also selected to ensure greater institutional comparability across the analysed terms. The year 2014 constitutes a meaningful institutional boundary, as the 2014 parliamentary election was the first held under the electoral framework introduced by Act CCIII of 2011. Among other changes, the reform reduced the size of the National Assembly from 386 to 199 members and established a system of 106 single-member constituency seats and 93 national-list seats (Hungarian National Assembly, 2011; OSCE/ODIHR, 2014). The 2014–2018 and 2018–2022 terms therefore represent two consecutive, complete parliamentary cycles operating within a more comparable institutional framework.

By contrast, the 2010–2014 term can be considered partly transitional, as major constitutional, electoral, and parliamentary changes took place during this period. Its inclusion would therefore have introduced a different institutional context into the comparison. Extending the corpus to this and earlier cycles would also have shifted the research towards a more explicitly longitudinal analysis of historical change, requiring additional research questions and hypotheses beyond the scope of the present dissertation. Nevertheless, comparisons across earlier and later periods, including changes in rhetorical

patterns associated with parties moving between government and opposition, represent a relevant direction for future research.

The plenary debates are public and televised by the parliamentary administration. Furthermore, the media and individuals on social media regularly report on these sessions, making them highly visible to the general public. This heightened visibility is particularly pronounced during controversial debates that elicit spirited discussions and often incivility, notably during the session segment dedicated to direct questions, *The Hour of Immediate Questions*. In this segment, the allocation of speaking time and the sequence in which members of the parliament (MPs) contribute are regulated. MPs prepare their opening statements in advance, but they continue to respond spontaneously to their questioner and the interventions of others. These characteristics make the Hour of Immediate Questions particularly suitable for the present analysis: it combines formal institutional regulation with direct government–opposition confrontation, partially prepared and partially spontaneous speech, and public visibility. The suitability of the Hour of Immediate Questions is also evident in the linguistic material itself. For example, the statement “Ezért kérdezem államtitkár urat, hogy mire számíthat Magyarország a befagyasztott uniós források ügyében” [“I therefore ask the State Secretary what Hungary can expect regarding the frozen EU funds”] was coded as civil. By contrast, “Várom érdemi válaszát, és őszintét” [“I expect a substantive and honest answer”] was coded as negative civil, with aspersion as the second-level manifestation. A more direct example, “én még egy ilyen gyáva alakot, mint ön, nem láttam” [“I have never seen such a cowardly person as you”], was coded as uncivil name-calling. As noted in the first chapter, all Hungarian–English translations are the author’s own unless otherwise indicated. These examples illustrate the range from civil to negative civil and uncivil discourse within the same parliamentary format and demonstrate why the Hour of Immediate Questions is particularly suitable for the analysis of political incivility.

The dataset from the two cycles contains 11,021 speeches given by MPs from seven political parties (Fidesz, KDNP, Jobbik, DK, LMP, MSZP, Párbeszéd) and a small number of non-affiliated MPs and the formalities of the chairperson. Speeches by the chairperson have been omitted, as have formalities such as accepting or declining the individual nominated to respond to the raised question. This process has left 8,849 speeches in the dataset.

Data Collection Methods

To collect the written transcript of the hour of immediate questions, web scraping was employed; however, it is essential to note that the data is openly available and downloadable for the public, dating back to the 1990–1994 parliamentary cycle, through parliament.hu, the official website of the Hungarian Parliament. Following the retrieval of the data, it was meticulously organised into Excel spreadsheets for the specific purpose of the research. Each speech exists as an independent entry with the following columns that show the cycle number and date and day of the session and speaker name and gender and party affiliation and full speech text. The data includes extra markings which help analyse audience reactions through applause indicators and party origins and speaker interruptions and chair signals that include time limit bell notifications.

Study 1

Study 1 applied the method of teaching a large language model for this specific purpose, more precisely, fine-tuning transformer models for incivility analysis.

The analysis of incivility can be approached as a classification task, where the examined text is assigned a label from predefined categories. In my case, these categories are “civil,” “negative civil,” and “uncivil.” This task is similar to sentiment analysis, in which different labels are assigned to given sentences based on their sentiment or tone. Besides large language model-based AI applications, such as ChatGPT, task-oriented encoder-based transformer models (Vaswani et al., 2017) are often more suitable and cost-effective for classification tasks. These models are specifically designed to encode input text into meaningful representations, enhancing efficiency and accuracy in tasks such as incivility classification.

For Hungarian, the state-of-the-art encoder-based models are HuBERT (Nemeskey, 2021) and PULI BERT-Large (Yang et al., 2023), which have achieved high performance in Hungarian sentiment analysis tasks (Laki & Yang, 2023).

The models were provided with teaching materials comprising over 600 annotated speeches from parliamentary cycles that fall outside the scope of the research. Four annotators worked on the annotation of the teaching material, with each speech being annotated by two annotators. Annotator agreement was required for a speech to be included in the teaching material.

For fine-tuning HuBERT and PULI BERT-Large, I applied (Illés & Yang, manuscript submitted for publication) the Hugging Face implementation¹, with the following modified parameters: sequence length = 512, learning rate = 5e-6, batch size = 16, epoch=10.

Fine-tuning experiments with Hungarian large language models were also conducted, the results can be found in Table 4 below, specifically PULI Trio (Yang et al., 2023) and PULI Llumix (Yang et al., 2024). For fine-tuning PULI large language models, the LoRA method (Hu et al., 2023) was selected with the following parameters: lora alpha = 16, lora dropout = 0.05, task type = SEQ_CLS, r = 16, learning rate = 1e-4, batch size = 8, epoch=10.

	Accuracy
HuBERT	73.33
PULI BERT-Large	74.82
PULI Llumix	65.93
PULI Trio	61.48
ChatGPT	71.11
PULI-Llumix-Llama-3.1-Chat	65.93
PULI Trio Q Chat	68.89

Table 4. Fine-tuning experiments with the Hungarian large language models

Although HuBERT and PULI BERT-Large achieved the highest scores in the fine-tuning experiment, the full-dataset analysis was conducted using the PULI-Llumix-Llama-3.1-Chat and PULI Trio Q Chat models. This choice reflects the limitations of BERT-style models in tasks that go beyond simple classification. While they can reliably label entire texts as polite or impolite, they require large annotated datasets to learn more complex tasks, such as identifying problematic segments within longer texts. In previous attempts, these models failed to perform adequately due to the lack of sufficient training data. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) like Chat-based PULI models are more data-efficient and capable of handling multiple objectives simultaneously, such as extracting relevant text spans and performing nuanced, two-layer classification in a single step. This

¹ <https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/tree/main/examples/pytorch/text-classification>

makes them better suited to the specific demands of the current analysis. The gained data will be introduced in the results section.

A compact overview of the fine-tuned Hungarian language models, training material, parameter settings, and achieved accuracies is provided in Appendix B.9.

Study 2

Study 2 aims to contrast and compare the two self-taught and trained transformer models' results with the results of ChatGPT 4o, when given the same task and categories. ChatGPT 4o is a state-of-the-art, commercially fine-tuned large language model based on the transformer architecture, developed by OpenAI. The comparison is of particular interest in that the transformer models employed in Study 1 are subject to control, and the knowledge they apply is similarly governed and recognised. This knowledge has been imparted through teaching materials that have been annotated by human annotators. In contrast, ChatGPT draws on broader pretrained knowledge but offers less transparency regarding its underlying training data and model updates. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of research, ChatGPT exhibits the previously mentioned 'black box' limitation and the absence of control and knowledge regarding background updates. Moreover, the comprehensive functionality is contingent upon subscription. A subscription imposes limitations on the number and type of inquiries that can be posed, thereby increasing the time burden associated with analysis and necessitating additional tasks related to annotation organisation.

For this reason, and also since it serves the purpose of comparison, an equal but limited number of speeches were collected from all parties and both male and female politicians. Specifically, the analysis focused on 25 randomly selected speeches per party per gender, except for female politicians in the KDNP during the 2014–2018 cycle, who did not reach this total. Since in the 2014–2018 cycle, five parties represented themselves in parliament, and in the 2018–2022 cycle, seven parties represented themselves in parliament, the sample size results in 590 speeches analysed instead of 600 due to the aforementioned lack of speeches by female politicians in the KDNP. For the distribution of the number of speeches given in the hour of immediate questions, see Appendix A. The rationale for the choice of sampling method is that by including equal numbers from all parties and genders, no weighting is needed to compare the number of categories observed.

At the present state of ChatGPT 4o (January 2025), it has the potential to process a more substantial volume of data, specifically 2000–3000 lines (speeches) in the context of the present research. However, when the entirety of the data is provided to the program, it fails to identify numerous potential categories, resulting in a remarkably low number of observed negative civil and uncivil categories. This is in comparison to the method where transcribed speeches are analysed individually. Consequently, integrating AI, particularly ChatGPT, encompasses the beneficial elements of AI-based text annotation. However, its capacity to expedite the process is only partial, as it cannot reliably analyse multiple speeches concurrently for the purposes of the present coding task.

To assess the reliability of the annotations, two validation methods were employed, as shown in Table 5. In addition to percentage agreement, Cohen’s kappa (κ) was calculated for the human annotations to assess inter-annotator reliability while accounting for agreement expected by chance.

Validation method	First-layer agreement	Cohen’s κ	Second-layer agreement	Cohen’s κ
ChatGPT 4o (new chat)	87%	–	77%	–
Human coders	74.8%	.38	70.4%	.63

Table 5. Validation methods to assess the reliability of ChatGPT 4o annotations

In the first, one-third of the annotated speeches were re-evaluated using ChatGPT in a new chat window to avoid contextual memory bias. This reverse-check method involved highlighting the previously identified sentences and asking ChatGPT to reclassify them using the same codebook. The agreement with the original annotation was 87% for the first layer and 77% for the second layer, providing an additional consistency check under repeated application of the same coding framework.

The second method involved human coders who received definitions and categories identical to those used by ChatGPT. They annotated the texts independently, resulting in 74.8% observed agreement for the first layer and 70.4% for the second layer. Cohen’s kappa was $\kappa = .38$ for the first layer, indicating fair agreement, and $\kappa = .63$ for the second layer, indicating substantial agreement. For the second-layer calculation, the absence of a manifestation was treated as a valid coding outcome, ensuring that cases in which only

one annotator identified a manifestation were retained as disagreements rather than excluded. The lower kappa at the first layer indicates that distinguishing between civil, negative civil, and uncivil discourse involves a degree of interpretative ambiguity, reinforcing the importance of human oversight and contextual interpretation in the annotation process.

Data Analysis Procedures

The data analysis involved several steps and followed a consistent process across Studies 1 and 2. First, the dataset was annotated using the model assigned to each study. The annotation categories were based on the categorisation system developed by Hill et al. (2015), with two modifications. Hill et al. distinguish between a first and second analytical layer. The first layer identifies the overall tone of the speech, which can be classified as *civil*, *negative civil*, or *negative uncivil*. In the present study, the label *negative uncivil* was simplified to *uncivil*. This change was made because the qualifier "negative" is redundant in this context. While *negative civil* refers to speech that is civil in tone but critical in content, *uncivil* speech is inherently negative, there is no concept of "positive uncivil" or "civil uncivil" discourse. This modification was intended to make the categorisation system more intuitive and easier to apply.

The second layer does not represent a higher level of severity, but identifies the communicative manifestation through which negativity or incivility is realised. It is therefore applied when the first-layer classification is either *negative civil* or *uncivil*. The manifestations defined by Hill et al. (2015) include name-calling, aspersion, exaggeration/hyperbole, mockery/sarcasm, character assassination, contrast, and excerpts. These manifestations are analytical categories rather than fixed or hierarchical types of incivility. The second layer was expanded in the present study to include an additional manifestation, *lying accusation*. This extension was deemed necessary during the early stages of creating the training materials for the self-taught LLMs, as instances of this rhetorical strategy were frequently observed but not adequately captured by the existing manifestations.

In Study 1, annotated teaching material was used to train the models to recognise the coding categories, while in Study 2 speeches were submitted to ChatGPT individually using a codebook-like command. The complete coding procedure and first- and second-

level frameworks are provided in Appendices B.1–B.5, while the model settings and exact ChatGPT coding command are reproduced in Appendices B.6–B.7.

To facilitate comprehension of a given speech and enable meaningful comparison of parties and politicians as individuals, a weighted scaling technique, designated the AT/TACTICNESS scale, has been developed. This scale is notable for its unique conceptualisation, incorporating a non-existent English word to capture the tactic and attacking side of political incivility. It measures an individual's or party's willingness to employ the method of political incivility. The scale is structured such that negative civil speeches are assigned a score of 1, while uncivil speeches are assigned a score of 2. At the same time, the lengths of the speeches are also taken into consideration by comparing them to the average character length of speeches in the cycle (see Appendix C, D and E):

$$final\ score_x = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n uncivil\ score + \sum_{i=1}^n negative\ civil\ score \right) \div \frac{length\ of\ speech_x}{average\ length\ of\ speech\ in\ the\ cycle}$$

Once all the speeches had been assigned scores, the speech with the highest score was designated as 100, and all the others were positioned on a scale from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the most uncivil. Detailed results are available in the results section 4.2.1.

The results of the two models (Pulitrio, Pulillumix) in study 1 have been compared by contrasting the annotation agreements and disagreements. In case of disagreements all annotations have been considered in order to create a combined model with the most extensive results, producing 26023 annotations in total (see Table 6 below).

	Pulillumix	Not In Pulillumix	Total
Pulitrio	3239	11799	15038
Not In Pulitrio	10985	-	10985
Total	14224	11799	26023

Table 6. Confusion matrix annotation results for the models analysing parliamentary speeches

4.2 Results

This section presents the results obtained from the discourse analysis.

4.2.1 ChatGPT-Based Discourse Analysis Results

The ensuing tables offer a synopsis of the findings derived from discourse analysis, augmented by using artificial intelligence (AI), particularly the ChatGPT model. This analysis encompassed an equal proportion of speeches from each party and gender, selected randomly from the Hungarian parliament's immediate questions during the 2014-2018 and 2018-2022 periods. This data was collected and analysed during the dissertation writing phase from 2024 to 2025.

The AT/TACTICNESS scale, as outlined in Chapter 4.1, has been utilised to obtain the quantitative results. In the event of all filtration, a version where two parties are excluded, Fidesz and KDNP, has been created, along with filtrations where all parties are included. The rationale behind this choice is that Fidesz and KDNP represent the ruling party and its coalition in both observed cycles. As elucidated in Chapter 4.1, the analysed segment, the hour of immediate questions, is designated for the opposition to interrogate the ruling party. However, when members of the aforementioned parties take the floor, their purpose is merely to utilise the opportunity for the opposition or to promote their policies and past achievements. Consequently, the inclusion of these parties distorts the results of the observed phenomenon, as it is not in their interest to engage in self-criticism, particularly in an uncivil manner. Tables including the results for all the parties can be found in the Appendix I.

The initial filtration of the results discloses the mean negative civil and uncivil main categories identified within a single speech for both genders, encompassing all parties, excluding Fidesz and KDNP in the two cycles combined. This analysis reveals that the outcomes of male and female politicians approximate a slightly higher figure than those of male politicians. The mean number of negative categories observed is 4.02, with negative civil categories averaging at 2.5 and being more prevalent than their stronger counterpart, uncivil, at an average of 1.4 per speech, see Appendix I for a detailed table.

A subsequent, more detailed analysis and filtration focused on the subcategories and their number and distribution across different genders. This analysis summarises the results of 590 speeches. The total number of examples observed from the speeches was 1923. Aspersion was the most prevalent of these subcategories, comprising 1018 instances and accounting for 53% of the observed subcategories. The least common subcategory was excerpts. The subcategories exhibiting the most pronounced division were aspersion, with

541 examples from male politicians and 477 examples from female politicians, and name-calling, with 58 examples from male politicians and 25 examples from female politicians. While a few subcategories exhibited a higher prevalence among female politicians, this difference was insignificant. The categories that demonstrated this were contrast, character assassination, lying accusation, and excerpts. For detailed results, see Table 7 below.

Incivility manifestation	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Aspersions	541	477	1018
Mockery/sarcasm	173	181	354
Exaggeration/hyperbole	119	118	237
Contrast	43	47	90
Name-calling	58	25	83
Character assassination	36	40	76
Lying accusation	13	22	35
Excerpts	11	19	30
Gender total	994	929	1923

Table 7. ChatGPT incivility category annotation results, sorted in descending order

The more detailed filtration (see Appendix J) considered the cycle, party, and gender as variables. It calculated the average incivility score, where every annotation with the label uncivil was considered. It received 2 points multiplied by the length of the speech that contained it, compared to the average length of speeches in characters. Consequently, a speech of shorter duration, containing an equivalent number of uncivil labels, would receive a higher score than a speech of greater duration, despite the equal number of uncivil labels. Therefore, this method rewards the "density" of incivility within a speech.




Figure 4. Heatmap of scaled average incivility by party and gender based on the ChatGPT results, on a scale of 0-5, created with the help of Matplotlib chart, AI

The heatmap in Figure 4. shows the average incivility scores of male and female politicians from different Hungarian political parties. Differences in both party and gender terms can be observed. The average incivility score of male politicians in DK (Demokratikus Koalíció) reaches 5.8 while female politicians in KDNP have the lowest score of 0.3. Most parties show higher uncivil behaviour among men than women except for MSZP and Párbeszéd where female politicians display slightly more incivility.

Average negativity scores have been calculated similarly to average incivility scores, except that for average negativity scores, the negative civil label has been considered as well. However, only one point has been allocated for each negative civil label, indicating its leniency compared to the uncivil label, which received two points per label. The results of this calculation can be seen in the heatmap below.

The final column of the table is located in the Appendix J provides a scale ranging from 0 to 100. This scale has been determined by considering the speech with the highest negativity score to be 100 and comparing every result with that, thus creating the scale. Consequently, the table does not include a result of 100, as this would already be the average of all the speeches the parties gave, including both male and female politicians.

Finally, can the most complex and detailed table be found in the Appendix J, which also includes individuals, but solely those from the opposition? This table presents the results

previously discussed, in addition to providing further data regarding the number of speeches randomly included in the analysis on an individual basis, gender, and cycle average results for all the scoring. Furthermore, the negativity and the scale of 0-100 are also calculated individually, thereby demonstrating that individuals within a party can vary significantly and affect the party's reached incivility and negativity score differently.

4.2.2 Combined LLM Analysis Results

Since the results generated by ChatGPT were intended to serve as a point of comparison for the self-trained LLM, the following sections will first present a high-level comparison between the two models. This will be followed by a more detailed, in-depth analysis of the self-trained model's performance. The research questions posed earlier will also be addressed in light of the findings from the LLM.




Figure 5. Uncivil language score comparison across political parties and genders: Results from ChatGPT and combined LLM annotations

When comparing the incivility score results of ChatGPT and the self-trained combined LLM, it becomes evident that ChatGPT generally perceived the speeches as more uncivil across nearly all gender and party categories, with only a few exceptions. Although the differences vary, only one party, Párbeszéd, showed a notable discrepancy. This tendency aligns with observations made during the review phase of ChatGPT's annotations: ChatGPT appeared to be more "sensitive" than the human coders whose judgments were used to train the combined LLM.

When analysing the self-trained LLM in depth, first I will describe the incivility manifestations observed, their proportion and their distribution across gender (see Table 8). All eight researched incivility manifestations were observed, and aspersion was the most prominent as in the case of the ChatGPT results as well, however, there are differences between the two lists.

Incivility manifestation	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Aspersion	12917	2107	15024
Mockery/sarcasm	3739	402	4141
Character assassination	1213	166	1379
Lying accusation	745	130	875
Name-calling	320	49	369
Excerpts	239	44	283
Contrast	166	20	186
Exaggeration/hyperbole	158	11	169
Gender total	19497	2929	22426

Table 8. Combined LLM incivility category annotation results, sorted in descending order

It's important to note that in the research conducted using the combined LLM, all speeches made during the hour of immediate questions were analysed. As a result, the data presented in Table 8 does not include the gender-based speech balancing that was applied in the ChatGPT analysis. To properly interpret Table 8, it's essential to understand the gender distribution of speeches during the two parliamentary cycles: 89% were delivered by men and 11% by women. The total number of incivility instances reflects this ratio, with 19,497 attributed to male speakers and 2,929 to female speakers in an 87% to 13% split. This alignment suggests that female politicians slightly exceeded their expected share based on speech frequency.

The two most frequent manifestations, aspersion and mockery/sarcasm can be illustrated through individual passages from the corpus. For example, Varjú László (DK, 2 July 2018) stated: “Azt gondolom, hogy ebből látszik, szintiszta mellébeszélés, amit most ön itt elmondott” [“I think this shows that what you have just said here is pure evasion”], which was coded as uncivil aspersion. Uncivil mockery can be illustrated by a speech excerpt from Bósz Anett (DK, 11 May 2020): “Gyalázat, hogy a kormány már az átláthatóság

látszatát sem kívánja fenntartani” [“It is disgraceful that the government no longer even wishes to maintain the appearance of transparency”].

An interesting aspect of the self-trained combined LLM is that it deviated from the original set of incivility categories and introduced 16 new ones. Some of these could be integrated into existing categories, while others are less relevant as indicators of incivility. It is also important to note that within these new instances of emergence, not all categories can be understood as an incivility category. Rather, they are to be considered as aspects in which an opponent can be criticised, for example by reference to failure or a felony, or by way of factual inaccuracy. Moreover, there are categories that overlap in meaning or are otherwise similar. To illustrate, the use of profanity and offensive expression, or the highlighting of error or factual inaccuracy. Although the number of instances in these new categories is limited—suggesting they were not particularly prominent, their emergence is still a noteworthy finding.

Incivility manifestation	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Reference to felony	3	1	4
Contradiction	3		3
Simile	2		2
Reference to failure	1		1
Profanity	1		1
Factual inaccuracy	1		1
Alleged inactivity	1		1
Accusation of abuse	1		1
Offense	1		1
Failure to fulfill promise	1		1
Blending	1		1
Distrust		1	1
Dissenting opinion	1		1
Offensive expression	1		1
Attention to error	1		1
Accusation of slander	1		1
Gender total	20	2	22

Table 9. Further incivility manifestations identified by the combined LLM

It is important to acknowledge that the perpetuation of incivility categories is an unending process and one that may be unnecessary. The adapted categorisation system from Hill et al. (2015) necessitated a single addition, 'lying accusation', which can also be regarded as a more severe category of aspersion. However, in some cases of severity, aspersion alone did not seem to be sufficient. Nevertheless, further categories were not deemed necessary, as all speech experts examined could be accommodated within one of the existing categories, as confirmed by feedback from the human annotators.

4.2.3 Notable patterns and outliers in party and gender context

In the following I will introduce a more in-depth analysis of the observed results of the combined LLM.

Higher incivility density among some opposition female MPs

The AT/TACTIVNESS scale is designed to reward concise incivility, meaning that speeches which are both brief and contain a higher number of uncivil elements receive higher scores. This approach is particularly effective in identifying rhetorically aggressive speakers who operate within limited speaking time. Using this method, several opposition female MPs emerged notable for their high incivility density.

One prominent example is Dr. Ágnes Vadai (DK, female), who delivered only nine speeches but achieved an incivility score twice as high as the male average within her party. This indicates a comparatively high concentration of uncivil elements within her speeches. Similarly, Tímea Szabó (Párbeszéd, female) recorded an incivility score of 3.24, significantly above her party's male average of 1.74. A corpus example illustrates the type of direct incivility underlying this score. Szabó Tímea (Párbeszéd, 26 April 2021) stated: "Az az igazság, miniszterelnök úr, hogy ön hazudik, és ezt politikai indíttatásból teszi, azért, mert nem hajlandó elismerni, hogy ön semmi mással nem foglalkozott az elmúlt egy évben, mint a lopással, az emberek megvezetésével és az ellenzék elleni hergeléssel." ["The truth is, Prime Minister, that you are lying, and you are doing so for political reasons because you are unwilling to admit that over the past year you have done nothing other than engage in theft, mislead people, and incite hostility against the opposition."]. The passage was coded as uncivil, with lying accusation as the second-level manifestation. For a detailed breakdown of the results, see Appendix J.

In the case of LMP, members demonstrated moderate incivility scores. However, a slight gender reversal was observed in cycle 2014–2018, when women exhibited higher levels of uncivil behaviour. Nonetheless, female MPs such as Erzsébet Schmuck and Bernadett Szél, maintained moderate incivility scores of approximately 1.4–1.6. An exception to this was Márta Demeter, who exhibited a high incivility score in general, but demonstrated an increase from 2.82 to 4.27 in the consecutive parliamentary cycles. Within the analysed corpus, LMP generally shows moderate incivility scores, although as the examples show, individual-level variation is substantial. Demeter represents a notable exception to this tendency. The subject's scores indicate a more confrontational tone, which may be indicative of her transition towards an activist role in opposition.

Changes in gendered rhetorical patterns across cycles

As the two latest, finalised parliamentary cycles were considered for the study, it gave the possibility to observe slight shifts within party rhetoric and incivility also with a gender focus. Jobbik's male incivility results were low, averaging at 1.27 in the parliamentary cycle 2014–2018, while in 2018–2022 cycle the male incivility score averaged at 2.00. This is due to the emergence of new political figures within the party with exceptionally high incivility scores such as Péter Jakab with 4.43 while also previously present political figures, such as Tamás Pintér increase his incivility score from 0.00 to 6.15. An example from Péter Jakab (Jobbik, 2 July 2018) illustrates the confrontational language captured by this score: “Hát nem szégyellik magukat? [...] az önök fideszes bolsevik ötletgazdái [...]” [“Aren't you ashamed of yourselves? [...] your Fidesz Bolshevik masterminds [...]”]. The passage was coded as uncivil aspersion and name-calling.

Meanwhile women in Jobbik had lower moderate scores in both cycles for example Dóra Dúró 0.96 in the 2014–2018, in the 2018–2022 she was running as an independent.

In the case of MSZP, an increase in incivility was observed among female MPs in the second parliamentary cycle analysed, spanning from 2018 to 2022. Whilst male Members of Parliament from the MSZP party demonstrated a decline in incivility, with a decrease from 1.48 to 1.07 average incivility score, female MPs, including Ildikó Bangóné Borbély, exhibited relatively high incivility levels, an average of 2.65 incivility scores from 40 speeches and an average of 1.78 incivility scores from 82 speeches in the cycle 2018–2022. Zita Gurmai also exhibited an average of 1.38 incivility scores. Notably, both Gurmai and Bangóné Borbély maintained incivility levels that surpassed the male average

(see Figure 6.). In the case of Bangóné, what is also exceptional is that she sustains a high incivility score average with a high number of speeches per cycle, suggesting intense incivility in a significant proportion of her speeches.

Independent MPs: high variability and some outliers

Independents demonstrate significant variability in incivility scores. The use of incivility varies considerably among individuals, with some displaying higher scores while others show little or no incivility. As demonstrated by the case of János Volner, who, despite delivering only two speeches and consequently having limited speaking time, attained an incivility score of 2.19. As a further illustration, consider Dr. Bernadett Szél, who, in her capacity as a member of LMP during the 2014–2018 electoral cycle, delivered a total of 104 speeches within the designated hour-long time frame. She attained an incivility score of 1.43 and a negativity score of 4.63. In contrast, as an independent MP in the 2018–2022 electoral cycle exhibited an incivility score of 0.66 and a negativity score of 5.25 within the same segment. From this, it can be concluded that in her case there is a decline in incivility, yet an increase in negativity, suggesting a critique style that is more serious in nature, yet still civil in form once running as independent, instead of as a member of a party.

Fidesz & KDNP: Disciplined, Low-Density Speech Patterns

A further observation was the disciplined, uncivilly low-density speech exhibited by MPs from Fidesz and KDNP across both genders. This has also been observed in the ChatGPT sample and it is also an outcome that is consistent with prevailing expectations, as the examined segment, the hour of immediate questions, is primarily focused on evaluating the governing party (Fidesz in coalition with KDNP) and the policies it has implemented. The low-density of uncivil speech in Fidesz and KDNP, where uncivil remarks are more common in the media or in the speeches of designated spokespersons, as opposed to being voiced directly in parliament or within this particular segment.

The comparatively low incivility scores do not imply an absence of negative or critical rhetoric. For example, Lőrinc Nacsa (KDNP, 24 September 2018) stated that the opposition “az eredményeket pedig nem ismeri el, vagy egyszerűen nem vesz tudomást azokról” [“does not acknowledge the results, or simply ignores them”]. The passage was coded as negative civil, with aspersion as the second-level manifestation.

Another example of this, among many other MPs, is Dr. Rózsa Hoffmann delivered 24 speeches yet maintained an incivility score of 0.00, while Szilárd Németh, with 15 speeches, attained an incivility score of 0.09, as detailed in Appendix J. Nonetheless, it should be noted that two outliers and exceptional cases were identified. Péter Ovadi (Fidesz) had the highest incivility score, an average density of 8.57 in his speeches across the entire dataset, with only two speeches. An excerpt from one of his speeches (Fidesz, 16 November 2020): “Sajnos a baloldal viselkedése folyamatosan megmutatja, hogy jobban gyűlölik a kormányt, mint szeretik a hazájukat” [“Unfortunately, the behaviour of the left continually shows that they hate the government more than they love their country”]. This statement was coded as uncivil character assassination.

A further example is Katalin Csöbör (Fidesz), who had an incivility score of 4.97. This is regarded as a particularly high score, especially in relation to other female politicians within her party. It is evident that the two cases under discussion resulted in the delivery of concise yet contentious orations, characterised by the utilisation of uncivil language and the transgression of established party norms.




Figure 6. Heatmap of scaled average negativity by cycle, party and gender, based on the LLM results, on a scale of 0-3, created with the help of Matplotlib chart, AI

In summary, the results show substantial variation in incivility density across parties, genders, and individual MPs. Within this corpus, several opposition female MPs display comparatively high incivility scores, while Fidesz and KDNP generally show lower scores in the Hour of Immediate Questions. Individual outliers are present across party categories, indicating that party- and gender-level averages do not fully capture variation between speakers.

4.2.4 Policy area and policy type analysis

To address RQ1, “Is there a relationship between issue salience and the frequency and forms of political incivility in parliamentary discourse?”, speeches were grouped into the policy areas introduced in Chapter 3.2.1 and adapted from the Comparative Agendas Project.

To investigate how negativity and incivility in political speech vary across different policy areas and between soft vs. hard policy types, a series of inferential statistical tests were conducted, including one-way ANOVA and Welch's t-tests.

The one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine whether average levels of negativity and incivility differed significantly across the 21 policy areas in the dataset. The analysis revealed

statistically significant differences in negativity scores between policy areas, $F(20, 923) = 2.12$, $p = .0029$. Similarly, incivility scores also differed significantly across policy areas, $F(20, 923) = 1.63$, $p = .039$, see Figure 7 below. These results indicate that both the tone and the use of uncivil language vary depending on the policy domain being addressed.




Figure 7. Violin plot of negativity score distributions across policy areas, grouped by policy type (hard vs. soft)

To assess whether policy classification (soft vs. hard) influenced negativity and incivility, Welch’s independent samples t-tests were performed. For negativity, the results showed that hard policy speeches were significantly more negative than soft policy speeches, $t(\text{unequal variances}) = -3.19$, $p = .0015$, please see Figure 8 below. For incivility, a significant but weaker difference was also observed, $t = -2.01$, $p = .045$, again indicating greater incivility in hard policy contexts, please see Figure 9 below. This is due to incivility scores being smaller, therefore the differences are smaller in the standard

deviation. Overall, within this sample, hard policy speeches showed higher average negativity and incivility scores than soft policy speeches.




Figure 8. Mean negativity scores by policy area and policy type with standard deviations




Figure 9. Mean incivility scores by policy area and policy type with standard deviations

To assess whether political speech within specific policy areas systematically differs in tone from the overall discourse, one-sample t-tests were conducted comparing each policy area's mean negativity and incivility scores to the overall sample mean.

The overall mean negativity score across all policy areas was $M = 4.07$. Several policy areas

showed meaningful deviations, please see Figure 10 below:

Significantly higher negativity was observed in:

- Government Operations (M = 5.28, t = 3.69, p < 0.001)

Significantly lower negativity was found in:

- Education (M = 3.28, t = -2.31, p = 0.024)
- Foreign Trade (M = 1.59, t = -4.04, p = 0.016)
- Agriculture (M = 1.58, t = -5.29, p < 0.001)

Two additional policy areas showed marginally significant differences:

- Transportation had marginally higher negativity (M = 6.04, p = 0.055).
- Environment had marginally lower negativity (M = 2.98, p = 0.065).

All other policy areas did not significantly differ from the mean, indicating relatively stable negativity levels across domains such as Healthcare, Macroeconomy, and Defense.




Figure 10. Ordered mean negativity scores across policy area and policy type combinations

The overall mean incivility score was lower at M = 1.42, reflecting the fact that incivility is a subset of negativity and occurs less frequently. Several policy areas exhibited statistically significant deviations:

Significantly higher incivility was found in:

- Government Operations (M = 2.16, t = 3.06, p = 0.002)

Significantly lower incivility was observed in:

- Education (M = 0.90, t = -2.43, p = 0.018)
- Immigration (M = 0.60, t = -2.42, p = 0.036)

- Agriculture ($M = 0.16$, $t = -7.86$, $p < 0.001$)
- Foreign Trade ($M = 0.00$, $t = -\infty$, $p = 0.000$)

In addition, Banking and Finance showed marginally lower incivility ($M = 0.66$, $p = 0.057$), closely approaching conventional significance thresholds. The remaining areas did not significantly deviate from the overall mean, including domains typically associated with high emotional salience such as Crime and Justice, Defense, and Social Welfare.

The contrast between policy areas can also be illustrated through individual passages from the corpus. In Education, Dúró Dóra (Jobbik, 8 December 2014) stated: “Ezért arra kérném első körben a miniszterelnök urat, hogy tegye tisztába a céljaikat, és magyarázza, hogy miért nem tudnak több állami forrást a felsőoktatásra fordítani” [“I would therefore first ask the Prime Minister to clarify their objectives and explain why they are unable to allocate more state funding to higher education”]. This passage was coded as negative civil aspersion.

By contrast, Government Operations included more explicitly uncivil formulations. Szél Bernadett (LMP, 14 November 2016) stated: “Én azt gondolom, hogy aki össze vissza hazudozik miniszterként, az nem méltó erre a pozícióra” [“I believe that a minister who lies repeatedly is not worthy of this position”], coded as negative uncivil character assassination. A further example is provided by Bangóné Borbély Ildikó (MSZP, 6 June 2016): “Ön már régen kiürült, miniszterelnök úr, olyan, mint egy kiszáradt mákgubó, pedig Magyarországon most a szél sem fúj” [“You have long since become empty, Prime Minister, like a dried-out poppy head, even though there is no wind blowing in Hungary now”], coded as negative uncivil mockery/sarcasm and name-calling.

These findings indicate that negativity and incivility were not uniformly distributed across policy domains within the analysed sample.

4.3 Discussion of the discourse analysis

The aim of the research is to explore how political incivility is performed and perceived within the context of Hungarian parliamentary discourse, with a focus on the gender of both the speaker and the audience, the Hungarian public. By combining discourse analysis with a survey-based experiment, the study provides a twofold perspective on the use of

uncivil rhetoric in formal political communication and its reception by the public. In this chapter, the results of these analyses are interpreted in light of the research questions and hypotheses. The discussion positions the research results within political incivility studies and sociolinguistics and gender theory to analyse how institutional power and gendered expectations and communicative norms interact in Hungarian political discourse. The chapter evaluates the research findings about democratic discourse in post-socialist male-dominated parliaments while critically assessing the gendered nature of incivility as a communicative act. The interpretation examines how these patterns affect dominant political norms and evaluates how media and audience expectations influence the consequences of norm violations in parliamentary speech.

4.3.1 Policy area and policy type analysis

The first research question asked whether there is a relationship between issue salience and the frequency and forms of political incivility in parliamentary discourse. In order to answer this question, female politicians' speeches were categorised into policy areas, as in the focus of the dissertation is their communicational practices and adaptation stands.

The analysis indicates a statistically significant association between policy area and levels of negativity and incivility within the analysed corpus. Government Operations showed significantly higher incivility, whereas Education, Immigration, Agriculture, and Foreign Trade showed significantly lower scores than the overall mean. These patterns may be interpreted in relation to existing research on gendered expectations and policy domains, but the present design does not establish speakers' motivations. More broadly, some lower-incivility domains, such as Education, are consistent with patterns identified in the literature on soft policy areas.

These findings align with existing literature suggesting that female MPs, when engaging with traditionally masculine or "hard" policy topics, often adopt more confrontational and uncivil rhetorical styles. This pattern may be interpreted in relation to adaptation to masculine norms of political communication, which are often associated with assertiveness, dominance, and adversarial debate (Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022). Conversely, in "soft" policy areas, such as education, health, and social welfare, female MPs tend to maintain a tone that aligns more closely with feminine communication expectations. These include collaborative, empathetic, and inclusive rhetorical styles,

which are often perceived as more authentic when coming from women (Erikson & Josefsson, 2022).

This pattern is consistent with the findings of the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al., 2019) and Hungarian analyses (Boda & Sebők, 2019), which show that female MPs are typically overrepresented in “soft” domains and underrepresented in “hard” ones. The observed “shift in tone” in hard policy areas resonates with Hargrave and Blumenau’s (2022) conclusion that female MPs in the UK have increasingly adopted more agentic, assertive styles over time. This can also be interpreted through Butler’s (1990) theory of gender performativity: women may deviate from these norms in contexts where credibility and authority are negotiated.

Moreover, studies have shown that female politicians frequently blend masculine verbal strategies with feminine nonverbal cues, especially in contexts where they must assert authority without alienating constituents or colleagues (Erikson & Josefsson, 2022). This dual strategy allows them to navigate the gendered expectations of political discourse while maintaining credibility and relatability.

Overall, the data underscores that incivility is not uniformly distributed across political discourse but is moderated by the nature of the issue at hand, highlighting the importance of contextualising rhetorical strategies within the framework of policy salience.

4.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Gender and Incivility

Hypothesis 1 proposed that female politicians would exhibit lower levels of incivility than male politicians.

The findings do not support the hypothesis with complete certainty. Across both parliamentary cycles analysed, female politicians in several parties, particularly opposition parties, displayed comparable or even higher levels of incivility than their male co-partisans.

These results challenge the expectation of uniformly restrained female communication in the parliamentary setting and the earlier findings in Western European contexts, which suggest that female MPs tend to adopt less confrontational and more constructive rhetorical approaches (Bochel & Briggs, 2000) and generally employ less polarising strategies than their male counterparts (Haselmayer et al., 2022; Hargrave & Langengen, 2021).

According to the literature review, social norms impose stricter standards of civility on women (Cameron, 2022; Lakoff, 1973b; Smith-Hefner, 1988). Therefore, the comparatively high levels of incivility observed among some female MPs are noteworthy. They can be interpreted through the dual political functions of incivility: as a “watchdog” and “whistleblower” role (Brown et al., 2020), which often require assertive, even confrontational communication. These findings also resonate with Role Congruity Theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), which highlights the dilemma women face: behaving civilly may undermine their perceived authority, while confrontational rhetoric risks sanctions for deviating from feminine norms. One possible interpretation is that the comparatively high incivility density observed among some opposition female MPs reflects the communicative demands of highly visible and adversarial opposition roles. Their minority position within parliament may further shape the conditions under which assertive or confrontational communication is performed; however, the present corpus does not allow these motivations to be established directly.

At the same time, considerable individual variation is evident: some prominent female opposition MPs use relatively confrontational language, while others display lower levels of incivility. This suggests that the relationship between gender and incivility is context-dependent and varies across parties and individual speakers. Overall, the findings provide only limited support for H1, as lower female incivility scores occur in some party contexts but do not constitute a consistent pattern across the corpus.

4.3.3 Hypothesis 2: Political Party, Gender, and Incivility Patterns

The second hypothesis proposed that patterns of incivility vary by political party and gender. The results support this hypothesis descriptively, as clear differences were observed across parties and gender groups within the analysed corpus. Clear differences emerged between parties in terms of average incivility levels, with opposition parties, such as Demokratikus Koalíció (DK), Párbeszéd, MSZP, and Jobbik (during its opposition period), exhibiting higher incivility densities, however it is important to note that within the segment analysed, its unique qualities have been discussed in detail in the previous chapters. In contrast, ruling parties, Fidesz and KDNP, consistently demonstrated lower levels of incivility, with KDNP maintaining the lowest average.

These party-level differences are consistent with literature that conceptualises incivility as culturally and institutionally dependent (Bentivegna & Rega, 2022; Gervais, 2017).

They may partly reflect party-specific rhetorical styles and communicative norms, which interact with the institutional roles of government and opposition. Parliamentary debates are structurally designed to encourage confrontation (Ilie, 2010; Murphy, 2014), while governing parties may face stronger incentives to emphasise stability and norm-following through mechanisms such as agenda control and party discipline (Cox & McCubbins, 2005).

In addition to party-based differences, individual-level patterns further nuance the picture. Certain politicians notably deviate from their party's overall rhetorical norms. For example, a small number of Fidesz representatives stand out with exceptionally high incivility scores, despite their party's general tendency toward more restrained discourse. Similarly, figures like Jakab Péter played a central role in Jobbik's populist turn, adopting a markedly confrontational style that exceeded even the elevated incivility norms of his party. The increase observed in Jobbik between the two cycles may be interpreted as part of a broader rhetorical repositioning towards more confrontational communication, although the present analysis cannot establish whether this change reflects a deliberate party strategy. The greater individual variability observed among independent MPs may also be related to the absence of a shared parliamentary party framework, although the data do not allow a direct test of this explanation.

Gender-related differences were also observed, particularly within some parties. As previously discussed in relation to Hypothesis 1, female MPs in ruling parties (Fidesz and KDNP) showed very low levels of incivility. However, female politicians in some opposition parties, including DK and Párbeszéd, showed comparatively higher incivility scores within this corpus. One possible interpretation of the comparatively low incivility scores among Fidesz and KDNP speakers is that confrontational communication may be more tightly structured by party and institutional roles within this particular parliamentary format. The present data, however, cannot determine whether uncivil rhetoric is displaced to other communicative arenas.

This duality reflects the context-dependent nature of the gender–incivility relationship identified in previous research and may be interpreted in relation to broader gendered institutional dynamics (Connell, 1995; Poljak, 2022; Haselmayer et al., 2022), although the present results do not establish strategic intent.

Taken together, these findings suggest that gender-related patterns of incivility are shaped by their interaction with party and institutional context rather than operating independently.

5 SURVEY EXPERIMENT

This chapter details the second method applied, its results and discussion. The chapter is divided into three main parts accordingly. Each section is divided into further sections. This structured approach ensures clarity and consistency in the description of the research, the presentation of the findings, and their implications.

5.1 Applied method

The following sections detail the survey experiment, sampling, data collection and analysis.

5.1.1 Survey experiment

The present study follows an experimental design in which controlled manipulations are used to examine how changes in selected variables affect participants' responses. More specifically, the design aligns with the methodological logic of experimental pragmatics, which investigates how recipients interpret communicative meaning in context (Noveck & Reboul, 2008; Gibbs & Colston, 2020; Bambini & Domaneschi, 2024). Rather than treating meaning as determined solely by linguistic form, experimental pragmatic approaches examine how interpretation emerges in relation to contextual and communicative factors. In the present survey experiment, authentic parliamentary statements provide the linguistic stimuli, while speaker gender and communicative tone are systematically controlled or manipulated, and respondents' evaluations provide the recipient-level outcome. This approach is particularly relevant to the dissertation's working definition of political incivility, which treats recipient perception as an important component of identifying and evaluating norm violations.

The current survey experiment investigates three main patterns in public perceptions of communication style, political incivility, and gender, using controlled comparisons between experimental conditions to examine their effects on political evaluations and choices. However, the findings should not be assumed to be nationally representative or directly generalizable beyond the sample or to other cultural and political contexts.

The second research method is designed to provide answers to the following research questions and hypotheses:

Research Questions

RQ2: How do gender and individual characteristics shape perceptions of political incivility?

Hypotheses

H3: Identical uncivil statements are evaluated more negatively when attributed to female politicians than when attributed to male politicians.

H4: Age, gender, and education level predict respondents' tolerance for political incivility.

5.1.2 Research Design

A quantitative research design, utilising a survey experiment, allows for an investigation of the perception of political incivility with a particular focus on gender. Quantitative data collection is essential for creating statistical analyses of numerical data, which are crucial for hypothesis testing and exploring relationships among variables.

In this way, the corpus analysis provides an etic analytical categorisation of political discourse, while the survey captures an emic perspective by examining how members of the audience themselves perceive and evaluate the same communicative acts. This corpus-to-stimulus design also aligns with experimental pragmatics and the hearer-oriented pragmatic perspective outlined in Section 2.1.2, as it connects researcher-defined discourse categories with recipient interpretations under controlled conditions and recognises that communicative meaning cannot be reduced to presumed speaker intention (Hansen & Terkourafi, 2023; Terkourafi & Hansen, 2026). The survey therefore complements the researcher-defined corpus classification by examining how the same or comparable communicative acts are actually evaluated by recipients, in line with the dissertation's working definition of political incivility as perceived norm violation.

Participants were presented with an online questionnaire in Hungarian during the survey experiment. The questionnaire consisted of 53 questions altogether. The questionnaire was structured into six sections. The initial section was the central part of the experiment. In this section, respondents received six passages from a politician, followed by the same perception measuring statements, and an attention check all of which had to be evaluated

on a Likert scale. The passages have been selected from the transcript of parliamentary speeches delivered during the hour of immediate questions. The six original Hungarian passages, their English translations and corpus classifications are provided in Appendix G.1; the mapping between stimuli, original classifications, expected ratings and experimental conditions is summarised in Appendix G.2; and the three questionnaire versions and speaker-gender manipulation are presented in Appendix G.3.

The second block of questions is designed to assess the self-reported impact of political incivility and its association with gender. This block comprises three questions. The first assesses how respondents feel when they perceive incivility from a politician, using the Ekman and Friesen scale (1978). The second evaluates the impact of political incivility on respondents' interest in politics. The third compares the judgment of male and female politicians for displaying uncivil behaviour, with an optional follow-up question if the respondents indicated that they have observed a difference in perception.

The third block comprised questions about attitudes towards politics, encompassing emotional, cognitive, and behavioural aspects. These included measures of interest in politics Likert scale, past voting behaviour, frequency of political discourse, and opinion on political incivility.

The fourth block consisted of general demographic questions, such as age, place of residence, and highest educational qualification.

The last block included the *Public/Private Subscale*, and the *Conflict Approach/Avoidance Subscale*, both devised by Diana Mutz (2006; 2015). The *Public/Private Subscale* aims to gauge the degree to which an individual is predisposed to engage in political discourse. People who have a public orientation tend to share their political views freely while participating in political discussions. People with private orientation tend to stay away from political discussions and avoid expressing their political opinions. The subscale consists of four statements which respondents need to rate on a Likert scale to show their level of agreement or disagreement with each statement. The subscale serves to establish a link between political debate participation and political incivility judgments. The *Conflict Approach/Avoidance Subscale* helps researchers determine how individuals handle political conflicts by either seeking them

out or trying to avoid them. People who have a conflict approach orientation tend to discuss opposing political views and view these exchanges as beneficial.

Pilot study

Before distributing the primary survey, a pilot version was created and tested. This is an essential element of a survey experiment, allowing for small-scale testing and refinement of various aspects of the research design. Therefore, it is not to achieve statistical power for hypothesis testing but to assess feasibility and refine methodology. The size of the sample needed depends on whether the goal is to detect logistical issues or to obtain precise parameter estimates for planning future research. The goal was to find and solve problems with question clarity, questionnaire length, settings, question order, block logistics, and data collection procedures to improve the reliability and validity of the final survey. The pilot study increases the chances that the main survey will produce reliable and significant findings which will help achieve the research project's overall success (Malmqvist et al., 2019; Soori, 2024).

The preliminary version of the pilot was created using Google Forms. However, this platform proved unsuitable for the project, as certain logistical aspects of the questionnaire, such as conditions and block randomisation, could not be implemented. A total of 55 students from three different universities in Budapest participated in the pilot study. Some scholars recommend a minimum of 12 participants for a pilot study, while others suggest a sample size between 10 and 40, depending on the research design (Viechtbauer et al., 2015). A general rule of thumb and a statistical consideration is to have between 30 and 70 participants for a pilot (nQuery, 2024). The present pilot achieved this.

The assessment included evaluations of feasibility and practicality together with test reliability and internal consistency.

The pilot study results show that the questionnaire design and distribution methods and data collection procedures were effective. Seven participants stopped the questionnaire before reaching 40% completion while two participants finished more than 75% of the items. The survey dropout rate reached 16% which falls within the moderate range for complex large-scale surveys according to Couper (2007) and Dillman et al. (2014). The total time participants needed to finish the questionnaire matched the 10–15 minutes

prediction made in the introductory section. The process of establishing feasibility and practicality requires feedback collection (Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). Participants received the opportunity to give feedback after finishing the questionnaire. Two participants stated the questionnaire was too long while one participant expressed confusion about specific response choices. The questionnaire received positive feedback from one participant who found it thought-provoking while nine participants showed interest in the results and one participant found the questionnaire easy to complete and one participant praised its well-structured design.

Although the pilot's aim was not to test hypotheses and check expected results, the objective was to check the reliability and internal consistency of the manipulations and the Likert scale; an expected score was determined based on the first level of each speech passage. Civil passages were expected to have an average score of 1–2, negative civil passages were expected to have an average score of 2–3, as they are civil but contain criticism that can be perceived as stronger than an entirely civil passage. Finally, negative civil passages were expected to score between 3–5 points. Overall, some results suggest a slight under- or over-scoring, but never anything drastic.

	Female	Male	No gender	
Civil				
1.	1.44	1.85	1.53	expected value between 1–2
2.	1.54	1.25	1.56	
3.	1.38	1.23	1.35	
4.	1.57	2.13	1.29	
Negative civil				
1.	3.06	2.93	2.29	expected value between 2–3
2.	2.15	2.44	2.12	
3.	2.00	2.13	1.88	
4.	2.69	2.54	2.00	
Uncivil				
1.	2.53	3.62	2.94	expected value between 3–5
2.	3.46	3.63	3.06	
3.	4.08	3.88	3.65	
4.	3.25	3.62	2.71	

Table 10. Summary of averaged passage points compared to their expected value

Furthermore, the responses were not checked in depth for possible use of the extremes (only marking 1s and 5s on the scale and nothing in between) however this has been monitored in the primary survey. Checking for such details could resolve the anomalies

and reveal what might distort the results. All sections passed the reliability and internal consistency test, and the data met assumptions for planned statistical tests.

Following the evaluation of the pilot, the following items were changed in the questionnaire: as the *Public/Private subscale* and the *Conflict Approach/Avoidance subscale* were measured on a 7-point Likert scale, and the incivility was measured on a 5-point Likert scale, therefore there was a need for standardisation, resulting in the general use of the 7-point Likert scale. The second change was that the number of passages presented to evaluate decreased from 12 to 6. After evaluating the pilot results and discussing with experts, 12 passages have been determined unnecessary as the three main categories researched (civil, negative civil and uncivil) can be presented equally in 6 passages as well. From the pilot, the ones with the bigger dispersion in scoring have been included in the primary survey. This change has resulted in respondents having greater availability of time and energy. Consequently, additional recurrent measurements have been incorporated following each passage, with a view to further investigating the respondents' perception of the politician who would have made the statement. The specific aspects investigated include competency, sympathy and, finally, support for the politician. The last change before the distribution of the primary survey was to add an open-text response with 'other', where respondents are asked about the impact of political incivility on their habits of following politics, as one respondent in the pilot indicated that none of the existing options covered the way they wanted to respond.

Study 1

Based on the pilot study, the survey experiment has been fine-tuned and distribution started in mid-January, after receiving the approval of the research ethics committee (see Appendix F).

In study 1, respondents received randomly one of the three versions, these three versions are the manipulations of the study. All versions comprised six passages from a politician, followed by the same perception measuring statements, and an attention check. Within the six passages, two were civil, two were negative civil, and two were uncivil. The passages have been randomly selected from the transcript of parliamentary speeches delivered during the hour of immediate questions, as presented in the preceding section. In manipulations 1 and 2, the politician's gender was stated; however, the genders are reversed in the case of the passages. Thus, the statements attributed to a female politician

in manipulation one are attributed to a male politician in manipulation 2, and vice versa. This method allows for the investigation of the causal relationships between the gender of the politician and the perceived incivility of the statement. Manipulation 3 is distinct from the other two in that it serves as the control group, as no gender is explicitly stated; instead, it is simply stated that "A politician said the following..."

Overall, each stimulus retained a traceable connection to its original Level 1 corpus classification (civil, negative civil, or uncivil), while speaker gender was manipulated independently of the original speaker (see Appendix G for the complete stimulus mapping).

Study 2

The structure and questions of Study 2 were the same as those of Study 1, except for the manipulation. In Study 2, the manipulation focused on six manifestations of uncivil discourse: name-calling, aspersion, mockery/sarcasm, lying accusation, character assassination, and exaggeration/hyperbole. The original Hungarian passages and their English translations are provided in Appendix H.1, while their first- and second-level corpus classifications are mapped in Appendix H.2. As it was important not to focus on political party preferences, passages were carefully chosen to give as little away as possible about who might have said it and to whom. Name-calling and character assassination require special attention, as these are sub-categories where identities are often clearly stated.

All English translations of the original Hungarian parliamentary passages and survey materials presented in the dissertation were produced by the author and manually checked against the Hungarian originals to preserve their intended meaning and pragmatic force. The survey itself was administered in Hungarian; translations are provided in the dissertation for reporting purposes.

5.1.3 Sampling and data collection method

The objective of the sampling process was to recruit a sufficiently large and demographically diverse sample of Hungarian adults while broadening coverage across relevant age, gender, and educational groups. The sample was not designed as a probability-based nationally representative sample; therefore, population-level generalisation should be made cautiously. Consequently, the choice of sampling method,

the calculation of the sample size, and the techniques used to elicit responses were of paramount importance.

The following key demographic characteristics were considered for the Hungarian population, with the only exclusion criterion being that the survey focuses on individuals aged 18 and above, as they are of an age where they can participate in political decision-making and potentially vote. The population of Hungary, according to the 2024 numbers of KSH, is 9.584.627, of whom around 7.9 million are aged 18 or above (Census, 2022; Medve, 2024). In terms of gender distribution, Hungary's population is approximately 52% female and 48% male, which represents a notable proportion.

Studies 1 and 2 required differing sample size calculations due to their slightly differing structures. However, they both had the desired confidence level of 95%, margin of error of 5%, and the same population size and proportion. Furthermore, the significance level was set at 0.05%, representing the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true (Type I error). The statistical power, which is the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false (i.e., detecting a true effect), aimed for 0.80 or above, indicating an 80% chance of detecting an effect if one exists, my sample size calculation is primarily driven by the specified confidence level and margin of error.

To ensure the primary aim of Study 1 and Study 2, as described in section 4.1.2, is adequately powered to detect statistically significant differences between groups, a sample size calculation was conducted based on a two-sample t-test using Cohen's d as the measure of effect size. The effect size calculation, used when comparing two means (measures the standardised difference between two groups), assumes the following parameters: sample size (n) for each group is calculated using the standard power analysis formula for a two-sample t-test:

$$n = \frac{(Z_{\frac{\alpha}{2}} + Z_{\beta})^2 \times 2 \times s^2}{(d \times s)}$$

Where:

$$Z_{\frac{\alpha}{2}} = 1.96 \text{ (for 95\% confidence level)}$$

$$Z_{\beta} = 0.84 \text{ (for 80\% power)}$$

$$s = \text{standard deviation of the population (assumed to be 1.2)}$$

$d \times s = \text{difference in means } (M_1 - M_2) \text{ calculated as Cohen's } d \text{ times standard deviation}$

Cohen's d differentiates between different effect sizes, but I focus on small ($d = 0.2$), small-medium ($d = 0.35$), medium ($d = 0.5$), and large effect sizes ($d = 0.8$). The required sample size to detect different effects is inversely proportional to the effect size. The required sample size decreases if the effect size is larger (e.g., $d = 0.5$). Plugging in the desired power for detecting small effect sizes along with the preferred statistics, I calculate the sample size as follows:

$$n = \frac{(1.96 + 0.84)^2 \times 2 \times (1.2)^2}{(0.2 \times 1.2)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{22.5792}{0.0576}$$

$$n = 392$$

Since I have three groups (Male, Female, Neutral), I multiply the result; however, because each participant rates six speeches, the number of participants can be reduced by a factor of six, assuming random and balanced exposure:

$$n_{\text{participants}} = \frac{1176}{6} = 196$$

Effect Size (d)	Total n (per group)	Total n	Participants needed
Small (0.2)	392	1176	196
Small–Medium (0.35)	129	387	65
Medium (0.5)	63	188	31
Large (0.8)	25	74	12

Table 11. Participants needed per effect size (d)

Thus, if the expected effect size is small ($d = 0.2$), the study would require approximately 196 participants to achieve 80% power. If the true effect is larger, the size of the sample needed decreases accordingly. These calculations confirm that the study is feasible even

under conservative assumptions, and the planned sample size exceeds the minimum thresholds for adequate statistical power.

In Study 2, an adequate sample size for proportion-based estimates was calculated using Cochran's formula. This calculation was used to establish an appropriate sample-size target rather than to claim national representativeness, as the recruitment strategy did not constitute probability sampling. For this, I employed Cochran's formula for an infinite population:

$$n_0 = \frac{Z^2 x p x (1 - p)}{E^2}$$

Where:

Z = Z-score = 1.96 (for 95% confidence level)

P is the estimated proportion (0.8)

E is the margin of error (0.05)

Plugging in the values:

$$\begin{aligned} n_0 &= \frac{1.96^2 x 0.8 x (1 - 0.8)}{0.05^2} \\ n_0 &= \frac{0.5559}{0.025} \\ n_0 &\approx 222 \end{aligned}$$

This calculation indicated that approximately 222 respondents would provide an adequate sample size under the specified statistical assumptions (95% confidence level, 5% margin of error, and an estimated population proportion of 0.8).

Data collection method

The data collection tool was an online questionnaire created in Qualtrics, licensed by Corvinus University of Budapest. The primary recruitment channel was Prolific, supported by a university grant awarded through the Workflow application of Corvinus University of Budapest. The grant initially covered 800 participants; however, at the time of recruitment, only 711 Prolific users met the eligibility criteria of Hungarian citizenship and Hungarian as a mother tongue. Of the final analytical sample, 500 respondents were recruited through Prolific.

To supplement the Prolific sample and broaden the demographic reach of the survey, additional participants were recruited through several channels. In-person recruitment was conducted during three seminar classes at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME), resulting in 63 completed questionnaires. The survey was also distributed through university mailing lists at Corvinus University of Budapest, including doctoral student organisations and students enrolled in the Hungarian-language programme of the Department of Communication and Media.

The questionnaire was further distributed through two Facebook groups: *Fulbright ösztöndíjasok 2020-* and *Káposztásmegyer I*. The former provided access to an established network of Hungarian adults, while the latter was selected as a geographically based local community group that could reach participants outside university-affiliated networks. These groups were used as supplementary recruitment channels to broaden participation rather than as a basis for representative sampling. Recruitment-source tracking was not retained separately for the two Facebook groups or the university mailing lists; therefore, their individual contributions cannot be reported. Together, these channels accounted for the remaining 169 respondents in the final analytical sample.

Finally, to improve access to older respondents who may be less likely to participate in online surveys, printed versions of the questionnaire were administered at two residential care homes for older adults. This recruitment channel resulted in 48 completed questionnaires, which were subsequently entered into the digital dataset.

A total of 1,055 responses were initially recorded across all recruitment channels. Before analysis, responses were excluded if participants failed the attention check, did not complete the questionnaire, completed it in less than two minutes, or displayed uniform response patterns across items. Following these exclusions, 780 respondents remained in the final analytical sample. The use of multiple online and offline recruitment channels was intended to broaden the demographic coverage of the sample; however, given the recruitment strategy and self-selection involved, the final sample should not be interpreted as a nationally representative probability sample.

Results of the data collection

Table 12 presents the demographic composition of the final analytical sample (N = 780) according to gender, age group, and level of education. Of the respondents, 33% were female, 45% were male, and 22% preferred not to disclose their gender. All age groups

were represented, with the largest proportion of respondents in the 25–34 age group and the smallest in the 55–64 age group. Most respondents had educational attainment between bachelor's and master's degree level.

The sample nevertheless differed substantially from the demographic composition of the Hungarian adult population. Respondents aged 18–34 were overrepresented, while older age groups were underrepresented. In particular, the 18–34 age group constituted 64.59% of the sample, compared with approximately 30–35% of the national population, while respondents aged 65 and above represented only 6.34%, compared with approximately 20% nationally. These imbalances should be considered when interpreting the survey findings and limit population-level generalizability.

In contrast, the latter age groups, 55 and over, claimed to be less interested or active in politics. Again, the age distribution could be due to the subject matter of the questionnaire, as participation was voluntary and could be terminated at any time. Most of the respondents' educational level is between a bachelor's and a master's degree; lower levels of university education were mostly associated with the age group 18–24, too young to have reached a higher level of education, or with the older age groups.

As a component of demographic data and an important element in analysing and formulating responses to the research questions and hypotheses, I have also observed the correlation between the respondents' age, religiosity, and political leaning. The results of this observation are summarised in Table 13 below.

Gender / Level of Education	Age Group						Grand Total
	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+	
Female	8,98%	9,78%	5,15%	2,77%	1,06%	5,02%	32,76%
Primary education	0,26%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,26%	0,53%
Secondary education	5,15%	2,25%	0,66%	0,66%	0,13%	2,77%	11,62%
Bachelor's degree	2,77%	4,76%	1,85%	0,79%	0,79%	1,19%	12,15%
Master's degree	0,00%	2,38%	1,98%	0,66%	0,13%	0,26%	5,42%
Doctoral degree	0,00%	0,40%	0,66%	0,66%	0,00%	0,26%	1,98%
Other	0,79%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,26%	1,06%
Male	15,85%	17,83%	6,61%	3,17%	0,92%	0,26%	44,65%
Primary education	0,26%	0,26%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,53%
Secondary education	11,10%	5,15%	0,92%	0,92%	0,26%	0,26%	18,63%
Bachelor's degree	3,70%	7,27%	3,17%	1,45%	0,00%	0,00%	15,59%
Master's degree	0,26%	4,76%	2,11%	0,13%	0,26%	0,00%	7,53%
Doctoral degree	0,13%	0,26%	0,26%	0,66%	0,40%	0,00%	1,72%
Other	0,40%	0,13%	0,13%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,66%
Prefer not to say	2,51%	9,64%	3,57%	4,49%	1,32%	1,06%	22,59%
Primary education	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,13%	0,13%
Secondary education	1,45%	0,79%	0,26%	0,53%	0,66%	0,26%	3,96%
Bachelor's degree	0,92%	4,62%	1,19%	1,72%	0,26%	0,53%	9,25%
Master's degree	0,00%	3,43%	1,32%	1,45%	0,13%	0,13%	6,47%
Doctoral degree	0,00%	0,53%	0,66%	0,79%	0,26%	0,00%	2,25%
Other	0,13%	0,26%	0,13%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,53%
Grand Total	27,34%	37,25%	15,32%	10,44%	3,30%	6,34%	100,00%

Table 12. Summary of gender, range of age, and education across survey respondents

Political leaning / Religiosity	Age Groups						Grand Total
	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+	
Conservative	1,59%	4,23%	1,72%	1,98%	0,40%	0,92%	10,83%
Religious	0,66%	1,45%	0,40%	1,32%	0,26%	0,79%	4,89%
Rather not religious	0,53%	1,59%	0,53%	0,26%	0,00%	0,13%	3,04%
Not religious	0,40%	1,19%	0,79%	0,26%	0,13%	0,00%	2,77%
Prefer not to disclose	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,13%	0,00%	0,00%	0,13%
Liberal	8,19%	13,08%	5,02%	2,91%	1,06%	1,06%	31,31%
Religious	1,32%	1,59%	0,66%	0,26%	0,26%	0,13%	4,23%
Rather not religious	1,72%	3,43%	0,92%	0,79%	0,26%	0,40%	7,53%
Not religious	5,15%	8,06%	3,30%	1,72%	0,26%	0,53%	19,02%
Prefer not to disclose	0,00%	0,00%	0,13%	0,13%	0,26%	0,00%	0,53%
Moderate	8,85%	12,81%	5,55%	2,91%	1,59%	2,38%	34,08%
Religious	1,72%	1,98%	1,85%	0,79%	0,40%	0,53%	7,27%
Rather not religious	2,38%	3,04%	1,72%	1,19%	0,40%	0,79%	9,51%
Not religious	4,49%	7,27%	1,85%	0,92%	0,53%	0,66%	15,72%
Prefer not to disclose	0,26%	0,53%	0,13%	0,00%	0,26%	0,40%	1,59%
Uncertain	3,96%	3,70%	1,72%	0,66%	0,13%	0,53%	10,70%
Religious	0,92%	0,92%	0,26%	0,13%	0,00%	0,40%	2,64%
Rather not religious	1,19%	1,45%	0,53%	0,26%	0,00%	0,00%	3,43%
Not religious	1,85%	1,19%	0,66%	0,26%	0,13%	0,13%	4,23%
Prefer not to disclose	0,00%	0,13%	0,26%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,40%
Prefer not to disclose	4,76%	3,43%	1,32%	1,98%	0,13%	1,45%	13,08%
Religious	1,06%	0,79%	0,00%	0,40%	0,13%	0,79%	3,17%
Rather not religious	1,32%	0,79%	0,53%	0,40%	0,00%	0,13%	3,17%
Not religious	1,98%	1,59%	0,66%	0,92%	0,00%	0,00%	5,15%
Prefer not to disclose	0,40%	0,26%	0,13%	0,26%	0,00%	0,53%	1,59%
Grand Total	27,34%	37,25%	15,32%	10,44%	3,30%	6,34%	100,00%

Table 13. Summary of political leaning, range of age, and religiosity across survey respondents

The data presented in Table 13 indicates that a significant proportion of respondents identifying as conservative are religious, particularly within the age groups of 25–34 and 45–54. Conversely, most respondents who identified as liberal are not religious, with the highest percentages observed among the 18–24 and 25–34 age groups. The prevailing

theme was also non-religiosity in the groups designated as moderate, uncertain, and those who did not specify a preference.

The sample includes respondents from all examined demographic groups, but its composition differs substantially from that of the Hungarian adult population. These demographic imbalances should be considered when interpreting the findings and limit population-level generalizability. The younger composition of the sample may also be associated with the relatively high prevalence of higher education and liberal or moderate political orientations. Male respondents constituted the largest gender category (44.65%), followed by female respondents (32.76%), while 22.59% preferred not to disclose their gender. Overall, the dataset provides insight primarily into the attitudes of younger and more politically engaged segments of the Hungarian population rather than a statistically representative cross-section of society.

5.1.4 Data analysis procedure

A multi-step analytical approach was employed to address the research questions regarding the survey experiment, combining descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The analysis was conducted using SPSS and Python, depending on the nature and complexity of each procedure.

Initial descriptive statistics were used to summarise the demographic composition of the sample (e.g., age, gender, political orientation) and to explore basic relationships between demographic variables and key outcome measures. Frequency distributions, means, and cross-tabulations were calculated to identify potential patterns and guide subsequent inferential analyses.

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted separately for each questionnaire version (female speaker, male speaker, neutral speaker) to understand the underlying factors that shape how people evaluate political speech. This technique reduced the dimensionality of the data and identified clusters of related items, reflecting shared evaluative dimensions such as tone, incivility, and cooperativeness. Factor scores were extracted using the regression method as input for further cluster analysis.

Based on the extracted factor scores, k-means cluster analysis was performed to identify distinct subgroups of respondents who evaluated the speeches similarly. Two-cluster solutions were derived for each questionnaire version, allowing for identifying respondent

profiles based on their patterns of general sensitivity to incivility, selective gender-based perception, tone sensitivity, or reactions to aggressive vs. assertive speech. These clusters were later examined in relation to demographic variables such as age group and gender.

To test whether the identified clusters differed significantly on the extracted factors, a series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. These tests helped validate the distinctiveness of the clusters by confirming statistically significant differences in factor scores between groups ($p < .005$ across all factors).

To evaluate the main experimental effects and interactions between speaker gender and speech content, a two-way ANOVA was also conducted on the perceived incivility ratings. The following null hypotheses were tested:

1. Null hypotheses for Speaker Gender: $H_{0.G}: \mu M = \mu W = \mu N$, which means the mean incivility ratings are the same across all genders.
2. Null hypotheses for Speech: $H_{0.S}: \mu S1 = \mu S2 = \dots = \mu S6$, which means the mean incivility ratings are the same across all speeches.
3. Null hypotheses for Interaction: $H_{0.Interaction}$: There is no interaction between Speaker Gender and Speech, meaning the effect of speaker gender does not depend on the specific speech.

To test the main hypotheses and explore more nuanced patterns of evaluation bias, multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were estimated. Separate models were specified for each dependent variable: perceived incivility, sympathy, support, and competence. Independent variables included speaker gender, respondent gender, age group, tone (civil vs. uncivil), and perceived incivility. Interaction terms (e.g., tone $\times$ speaker gender, speaker gender $\times$ respondent gender, and three-way interactions) were included to examine conditional effects and potential gendered biases in perception and evaluation.

Multicollinearity diagnostics were performed to ensure the validity of the regression models. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were examined for all predictors and interaction terms. All VIF values remained below conventional thresholds ($VIF < 5$), indicating no problematic multicollinearity in the models.

Ethical considerations and limitations

The introductory section of the questionnaire informed participants about the purpose and framework of the research project, as well as the voluntary, anonymous, and interruptible

nature of their participation. It also clarified that the results would be used exclusively for academic purposes.

A potential limitation that emerged in the post-pilot study discussion with the student participants is that despite the questionnaire's stated aim of remaining apolitical and including speech experts where the speakers' or receivers' identity is not implicitly stated, it is possible that those with a deeper understanding of the subject matter could be able to discern between whom the discussion occurred. Furthermore, participants indicated that they occasionally encountered difficulty determining the degree of incivility associated with a given statement, citing instances where the statement's perceived humor or alignment with their beliefs influenced their assessment. While such individual interpretive biases cannot be eliminated, the experimental design and statistical analysis allow systematic patterns across respondents to be examined. These individual differences nevertheless remain a limitation of the study.

5.2 Results

This section presents the results obtained from the survey experiment. The preceding section sets forth the results, which form the basis for the following section devoted to data interpretation and discussion.

5.2.1 Patterns of political consumption

Before presenting the survey experiment's results in relation to the research questions and hypotheses, it is essential to first introduce a series of general results, which were also obtained from the survey. These results will serve as a foundational framework for comprehending the results of the research questions and hypotheses. The results obtained can be categorised within three primary domains: The first category of results is about the general consumption of politics; the second category concerns the general feelings and interest in politics in cases of political incivility; and the third and final category comprises scaling results of the speeches and further observations. This is followed by inferential statistical results that have the data to answer the posed research questions and hypothesis.

General results of political consumption in Hungary based on the data

In this domain, the following sections of the survey are included: general interest in politics; the connection between level of interest and likelihood to discuss with others;

the frequency of following parliamentary reports; the connection between interest in politics and frequency of watching political reports; and lastly how well the analysed segment, *hour of immediate questions*, is known among respondents.

The results about the general interest in politics demonstrate a marginal increase in interest among the 18–24 age group up until 35–44, followed by a slight decline in interest thereafter. There is a further decline in interest among the 65+ age group. The results for the frequency of political discussion with others exhibited a similar rising and then falling pattern, with the lowest results observed among respondents 65+ once again (see Figure 6). Following the implementation of a control group for gender and residency, no protruding tendencies were observed. The Hungarians residing abroad demonstrated the most interest in national politics, with an average score of 3.86 on the interest scale from 1–5. This was followed by those living in Budapest's capital, with an average score of 3.27. Regarding the frequency of discussion, analogous trends were identified based on residency.




Figure 11. Frequency of political discussion and average interest by age group

The chart in Figure 11 provides a synopsis of the comparative analysis of the engagement of different age demographics in Hungary with parliamentary content and discussion. The left axis indicates the percentage of individuals consuming parliamentary media through the following two channels: official broadcasts (television and radio) or a secondary

source, such as news, articles, or videos. The right axis of the chart in Figure 11 illustrates the proportion of the population in each age group who discuss politics either weekly or daily. The research data shows that people aged 18–34 primarily access political information through secondary digital platforms (40%). The older population consisting of 55–64 and 65+ age groups showed stronger dependence on official parliamentary broadcasts at 36%. The 65+ age group receives political information through official broadcasting yet shows minimal interest in discussing politics according to Figure 11. The observed result suggests possible age-related social preferences or cultural patterns. The 45–54 age group stands out as the most active demographic in civic activities because they show high levels of engagement with official and secondary source political reports as well as political consumption and discussion. The research findings show that political information consumption patterns and political discussion frequencies change across different generations. The findings demonstrate that civic engagement strategies need to be adapted based on age group requirements.




Figure 12. Parliamentary media consumption and political talk frequency by age group

The final observation pertains to respondents' familiarity with the hour of the immediate questions. This is because the parliamentary segment was previously analysed through the large language model in the research preceding the questionnaire. A consideration of the chart reveals in Figure 12 that, 65+ age group exhibited the least familiarity with the segment, surpassed only by the 18–34 age group, who, in contrast, professed to consume

politics-related news through secondary sources primarily. The age groups of 45–54 and 55–64 demonstrate a marked propensity to engage with political discourse, as evidenced by their extensive knowledge of the parliamentary segment and their familiarity with the *hour of immediate questions*, which is slightly surprising due to the age group 45–54 had the second lowest interest in politics, after the group 65+.




Figure 13. Familiarity with the segment of hour of immediate questions in the Hungarian parliament by age group

In summary, interest in politics peaks at the early middle age (35–44), with a decline after around 55. On the contrary, official parliamentary broadcasting increases with age, while younger groups, especially those aged 18–34, prefer secondary, informal sources. Lastly, the frequency of political talk does not always match the interest in politics.

5.2.2 Emotional Responses and Interest in Politics in the Context of Incivility

The results of the Paul Ekman scale, utilised to measure respondents' emotions in cases of incivility, will be presented. Furthermore, the effect of incivility on political interest and any potential self-reported gender differences in the perception of incivility will be discussed. If such differences are identified, the root causes of these differences will be examined through the open-ended question responses.

With regard to the concept of political incivility, the respondents' self-definitions are summarised in the form of a word and theme frequency list, for which the complete list is available in Appendix K. Except for conjunctions, the most frequently occurring words were as follows: personalisation (*személyeskedő/és*, 148), disrespect/ful (*tiszteletlen*, 102), incivility (*udvariatlan/ság*, 96), insulting (*sértő*, 28), communication (*kommunikáció*, 30), tone (*hangnem*, 26). The automatic theme frequency analysis method, as implemented in NVivo, was employed to analyse the 614 received definitions. Of these, 323 were assigned a theme, while 291 were not assigned a theme due to their linguistic complexity, manifested in the use of unusual wording, metaphors, or roundabout expressions. The remaining non-theme definitions would require manual analysis. Concerning the thematic responses, it is essential to note that each response may be assigned multiple labels, depending on the number of themes it incorporates. The most common theme identified was personal attacks, consistent with the most frequent expression identified, personalisation (*személyeskedő/és*). In addition to the observations made regarding word frequency, the theme frequency chart (see Figure 14 below) reveals the presence of a recurrent theme, characterised by the avoidance of the designated topic, the manifestation of unprofessional conduct, the employment of manipulation, and the transgression of established social norms.




Figure 14. Thematic breakdown of how survey respondents define political incivility

Below, a quote for all of the observed themes is provided that were responses to the question *In your opinion, what is political incivility?*:

1. Personal attacks & avoiding the topic: Attacking the other person instead of focusing on professional content. (*“A szakmai tartalom fókuszba helyezése helyett a másik személyét támadó megszólalás.”*)
2. Disrespect; personal attacks & avoiding the topic: Impoliteness, disrespect towards others. Not dealing with the topic, but with the person in front of you. (*“Udvariatlanságot, tiszteletlenséget másokkal szemben. Nem a témával, hanem a szembenálló személyével foglalkozik.”*)
3. Disrespect & profanity: Interrupting each other, excessively vulgar language, and not showing enough respect towards the other party. (*“Egymás szavába vágás, túlzott vulgáris beszéd, a másik fél nem kellő tisztelete.”*)
4. Tone: They try to deflect responsibility with a sarcastic/jerky tone. (*“Gúnnyal/bunkó hangnemmél próbálják a felelősséget hárítani magukról.”*)
5. Unprofessionalism: Unprofessional, sexist behaviour. (*“Szakmaiatlan, szexista megnyilvánulások.”*)
6. Manipulation / populism: If they dodge the question and look at the people and each other as stupid, and also obvious lies. (*“Ha kikerüli a kérdést és hülyének nézik a népet, egymást + nyilvánvaló hazugságok.”*)
7. Breaking social norms: Behaviour that violates political "norms" and etiquette. (*“Olyan viselkedés, ami megsérti a politikai “normát”, illemeket.”*)

The potential reason for *tone* receiving a notable importance at both the word and theme frequency levels could be attributed to the structure of the survey, which presented verbally given speeches in a written form. Consequently, respondents lacked tone, which could have provided them with a deficiency in this aspect of communication.

As in previous literature (Muddiman, 2017; Sapiro, 1999; Sifianou, 2019) it has been a struggle to define political incivility, based on the responses of the survey, the word and theme frequency, the following definition can be suggested:

The Hungarian public perceives political incivility as communication in political settings that violates norms of respect and professionalism, most often through

personal attacks, disrespectful tone, profanity, or avoidance of substantive discussion.

This audience-based understanding also connects the survey findings to the dissertation’s working definition of incivility as perceived norm violation: the survey captures how recipients themselves identify and evaluate communicative acts as departures from expected political and interactional norms.

As for emotions, when political incivility is observed, the *Paul Ekman Basic Emotions Framework* (1992) has been applied. The most common emotions reported were disgust, surprise, or anger. This is also in line with previously cited literature (Goovaerts & Marien 2020; Mutz & Reeves 2005; Jamieson et al. 2017), where, along with negative emotions, positively characterizable, such as surprise, which could also be understood as a spark of interest, were observed.




Figure 15. Distribution of emotional responses to political content based on the Paul Ekman Basic Emotions Framework (Ekman, 1992)

The capacity for surprise to be conceptualised as a catalyst for interest in the context of those who have designated this as the emotion they experience when confronted with incivility, the results obtained from the survey, in which respondents were explicitly queried on their fluctuations in interest in politics in response to incivility in politics. The majority of participants (45%) lost their political interest when they observed a lack of

civility. The survey results showed that 24.5% of participants became more interested in politics. The remaining 32% either did not respond, indicated uncertainty, or selected the 'other' option, comprising a notable segment of ambivalent respondents. This group may be characterised as one that cannot provide a definitive response, or their position is contingent upon the speaker's identity, the recipient's, and the degree of discourtesy exhibited.

The survey asked participants to share their thoughts about how politicians receive different treatment based on their gender. The results are displayed in the chart in Figure 16. Interestingly, those who claimed to have observed a difference in perception based on the gender of the politician in question did so in cases where respondents did not state their gender. The proportion of respondents who perceived a difference was almost identical for male and female respondents, with the highest percentage of responses falling in the 66%–64% range. The majority of female participants chose "prefer not to say" when asked if gender affects how politicians are viewed by society although this response only appeared in 2% of answers. The selected response appeared infrequently in the survey results.




Figure 16. Perceived impact of politician's gender: Responses by gender of survey participant

The responses to the question were also controlled for age groups, and the results indicate that the 18–24 and 25–34 age groups selected the option that stated: 'yes', politicians are perceived differently based on their gender. In contrast, respondents aged 65 and over did not respond to the question, indicating a more reserved and potentially uncertain point of view on the topic.

Respondents, who indicated a difference in perception of the politician based on their gender, had the follow-up open-ended question where they had the chance to detail their opinion, see Appendix K. The themes in Table 14 are the observed ones with the appropriate percentages:

	Theme	Description	Percentage (%)
1.	Sexism / Discrimination	Women are seen as less competent or not taken seriously in politics.	42.53
2.	Double standards	Societal expectations for women to behave more polite than men.	22.99
3.	Gender stereotypes	Traditional views on femininity and masculinity affect judgment.	14.94
4.	Patriarchy / Male dominance	Politics is perceived as a male-dominated field with male privileges.	11.49
5.	Cultural socialisation	People are socialised to view assertiveness differently in women.	8.05

Table 14. Thematic breakdown of justifications for gendered perceptions of politicians

As the theme assignment has been executed utilising automatic topic modelling, responses employing synonyms or expressing concepts more indirectly were not deemed themes. Consequently, the presented results are not intended to represent the exact distribution of themes, but rather to illustrate the broad themes observed.

5.2.3 Speech scaling outcomes and observations

The third and final domain focuses on respondents' subjective evaluations measured through scaling questions and examines how these vary according to characteristics such as age and gender. Moreover, the aim is to provide additional validation of the conclusions that will be presented in the following section, in relation to the research questions and hypotheses.

The first finding to consider is the extent to which the outcomes of the speech scaling fall within the anticipated range. As a reminder, both studies (Study 1, three versions, Study 2 1 version) comprised six statements randomly presented and evaluated on a scale of 1 to 7. A score of 1 indicated that the statement was not uncivil, while a score of 7 indicated that the statement was uncivil. The three versions in Study 1 all included two civil, two negative civil, and two uncivil statements, with the manipulation of the gender of the speaker. In version 1 and 2. In contrast, version 3 was the control group, in which the politician's gender was not stated.

Study 2 incorporated six different categories of incivility; therefore all statements were uncivil. The anticipated range for civil statements was 1–3; for negative civil statements, it was 3–5; for uncivil statements, it was 5–7. The results for each survey version have been summarised in Table 15 below.

	Version 1 (gendered manipulation)	Version 2 (gendered manipulation)	Version 3 (control)
Civil 1	2.73	2.06	2.14
Civil 2	1.69	1.81	1.65
Negative civil 1	2.83	2.58	2.67
Negative civil 2	2.91	2.52	3
Uncivil 1	3.84	4.76	4.30
Uncivil 2	5.29	5.26	5.41

Table 15. Incivility 7-point Likert scale speech perception averaged results for versions 1, 2, and 3 of the questionnaire

	Version 4 (incivility manipulation)
Uncivil 1	2.17
Uncivil 2	3.42
Uncivil 3	4.39
Uncivil 4	3.66
Uncivil 5	5.08
Uncivil 6	2.94

Table 16. Incivility 7-point Likert scale speech perception averaged results for version 4 of the questionnaire

As illustrated in Table 15, an examination of the data reveals a consistent upward trend in the average scale points, categorised by speech type. However, the results do not align with the designated ideal ranges except for the civil category. Most negative civil statements rather align more closely with the civil category. This deviation can be rationalised by highlighting that negative civil category, while maintaining a civil tone, incorporates elements of criticism. In case of uncivil statements, number 1 is positioned below the anticipated range, while statement number 2 is within the expected range in case of all three versions in Study 1. This finding also demonstrates that the intensity and perception differ within the same category.

Furthermore, it is important to note that, as these are average results, which will include outliers, it is impossible to reach the highest or lowest results. These results would require uniformity among many respondents (170–230 per questionnaire version). Therefore, it is expected that results will fluctuate around the mean value. Nevertheless, the findings of this study indicate that the statements exhibit a variability in incivility levels, a phenomenon that the respondents themselves acknowledged.

As demonstrated in Table 16, respondents devised their unique scale in response to statements that exhibited incivility, albeit in diverse forms (e.g., mockery/sarcasm and character assassination). The mean scaling outcomes demonstrate a high similarity to those observed in versions incorporating all three primary levels (civil, negative civil, and uncivil), despite only uncivil statements in Study 2. This phenomenon may be attributable to respondents' psychological expectations and inclination to seek lower-intensity and higher-intensity stimuli. Moreover, this provides an opportunity to analyse the perception and acceptance of different manifestations of incivility compared to each other. Based on the results, it can be concluded from Study 2 that among all the categories mockery/sarcasm and character assassination are seen as most uncivil when all statements are uncivil.

The respondents' responses to each statement were also examined for dispersion using the standard deviation metric. This was undertaken to ascertain whether any statement resulted in a disproportionately large disparity between the responses. The standard deviation ranged between 0.99 and 1.82, with the two uncivil statements demonstrating the highest standard deviations. The argument can be made that incivility will invariably provoke greater controversy than an unquestionably civil statement. Furthermore,

incivility can be perceived as humorous or witty by some, which has the potential to reduce the perception of negativity and result in higher deviation. In conclusion, the standard deviation results can be regarded as satisfactory.

5.2.4 Inferential Statistical Analysis

Inferential statistical methods were used to test relationships, group differences, and experimental effects within the collected sample. Given the non-probability elements of recruitment and the demographic imbalances of the sample, these analyses should not be interpreted as establishing nationally representative population estimates. The analysis focused on identifying underlying patterns and relationships within the data. Factor analysis was used to reduce the complexity of the dataset by identifying latent variables that explain observed relationships between items.

The cluster analysis method organised similar cases into groups based on their shared characteristics which produced findings about different respondent profiles and behavioural patterns. Regression analysis assessed the strength of key variables' relationships and their direction to predict outcomes and determine statistical significance. These analytical techniques create a strong analytical framework to understand intricate data.

The evaluation of political speeches by participants depended on their perception of the speaker's gender (female, male or neutral) through an analysis of three experimental groups. The three experimental groups listened to identical political speech excerpts but received different information about the speakers' genders. The analysis examines if evaluative differences exist between age groups and whether particular respondent clusters show systematic variations in tone and incivility interpretation based on gendered cues.

The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed in SPSS for each questionnaire condition (female, male, neutral). The analysis aimed to discover hidden evaluative response dimensions which include tone, incivility and cooperativeness that explain participant rating differences. The analysis produced three distinct factors which served as inputs for k-means clustering in all three conditions.

The cluster analysis (see Table 17 below) revealed the presence of three factors from which two respondent clusters could be created for each condition, each representing a

distinct pattern of perception. These clusters were based on how respondents scored along the derived factors. The ANOVA tests confirmed that all three factors significantly contributed to the clustering in each condition ($p < .005$).

Condition	Cluster	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Female speaker	1	-0.18	0.43	-0.54
	2	0.20	-0.47	0.59
Male speaker	1	0.75	0.09	0.76
	2	-0.45	-0.05	-0.46
Neutral speaker	1	0.44	-0.27	0.20
	2	-0.87	0.54	-0.40

Table 17. Final Cluster Centers by Factor Score

To better understand the composition of the clusters, I analysed age distribution within each cluster using cross tabulations.

In the Female Speaker Condition (DF1), Cluster 1 is primarily composed of younger respondents, with 37.7% aged 25–34 and 27.4% aged 18–24. The second cluster demonstrates an even age distribution while showing a significant increase in participants aged 65 and above (15.5% compared to 7.5% in Cluster 1). The higher proportion of older participants in Cluster 2 indicates that these respondents were more likely to view the uncivil female speech critically. The age distribution of Cluster 1 shows that younger people tend to accept the same tone more easily.

In the Male Speaker Condition (DF2), Cluster 1 includes a disproportionately high number of older respondents aged 65 and above (19.2%), while this age group represents only 2.3% of Cluster 2. The second cluster contains mostly young people between 25 and 34 years old who make up 37.2% of the group while older participants remain scarce in this cluster. The data indicates that older participants tended to view confrontational male speech as belonging to Cluster 1. The findings indicate that older people maintain more rigid tone expectations and lower thresholds for incivility. The age-related differences in normative filters may cause older respondents to interpret male speech differently from younger respondents.

The age distribution between Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 shows identical patterns in the Neutral Speaker Condition (DF3) because the 25–34 age group represents 42.3% in Cluster 1 and 45.2% in Cluster 2. The age group 65 and above makes up less than 2% in both clusters. The uniformity in this distribution indicates that age-based differences in perception disappear when gender cues are removed from the analysis. The research indicates that gendered expectations strongly influence how people perceive incivility and tone in political content while the absence of gender cues reduces these perception differences.

The research supports the idea that political content receives different interpretations based on speaker gender perceptions while age group differences in interpretation exist. The factor and cluster analysis produced distinct evaluative profiles which showed that older participants responded with criticism toward female and male speakers when they perceived incivility. The absence of gender cues led evaluative patterns between different age groups to merge which demonstrates how gender influences political tone perception. The study indicates that biases may exist according to these findings. Cluster analysis is high level analysis, not all factors could be identified related to decision making, and other measured variables affecting perceived incivility are not taken into account. To further explore the interactions between all the variables I also carried out a regression analysis.

Inferential statistics, results of the regression analysis

The following section presents the findings from inferential statistical analysis through regression models which analyse key variable relationships. The analysis seeks to determine which variables significantly affect perceived incivility while investigating how speaker gender and respondent characteristics and tone impact audience evaluations. The regression analysis results enable this section to answer research questions while revealing patterns that extend past basic descriptive findings.

The intercept in all models represents the baseline for the reference category: most likely a female respondent, aged 18–24, rating a female speaker using a civil tone. All other variables in the models are interpreted relative to this reference group, see Appendix L.

Age Effects (Variables 1–5): Age significantly influences how respondents evaluate political speech. Respondents aged 65 and above rated speakers

significantly lower on sympathy ($-1.204, p < .001$), support ($-1.447, p < .001$), and competence ($-1.098, p < .01$), while also rating them significantly higher on perceived incivility ($+0.472, p < .01$). This indicates that older participants are more sensitive to perceived incivility, possibly due to generational differences in expectations regarding political tone and decorum.

Respondent Gender (Variable 6): Male respondents did not differ significantly from female respondents across most outcomes. While they rated competence slightly higher ($+0.167, p > .1$) and incivility slightly lower ($-0.171, p > .1$), these effects were not statistically significant. This suggests no strong evidence of overall gender bias in evaluations based solely on respondent gender.

Speaker Gender (Variable 7): Speakers perceived as male were rated significantly more uncivil than female or gender-neutral speakers ($+0.337, p < .05$). However, their scores on sympathy ($+0.197, p > .1$), support ($+0.169, p > .1$), and competence ($+0.093, p > .1$) were not significantly different. This indicates a perceptual bias: male speakers are judged more harshly on incivility, despite no penalty in overall evaluations.

Tone (Variable 8): An uncivil tone had the most substantial main effect across all models. It dramatically increased the perceived incivility score ($+2.323, p < .001$) and significantly decreased sympathy ($-1.047, p < .001$) and support ($-0.769, p < .001$), though not competence ($-0.175, p > .1$). This supports the idea that incivility is penalised by audiences, a critical element in understanding political communication bias.

The following analysis investigates interaction effects to determine how speaker gender interacts with respondent gender and tone to influence perceptions of incivility. The analysis investigates gender-based biases in political speech evaluation through the examination of these interactions. The research reveals how different groups react to incivility based on message origin and delivery style which deepens knowledge about gendered political communication standards.

Interactions with Respondent Gender (Variables 9–10): There was no significant interaction between speaker gender and respondent gender ($+0.026, p > .1$), nor between tone and respondent gender ($-0.213, p > .1$). This suggests there is no

broad in-group favouritism among male respondents toward male speakers, nor do men universally tolerate incivility more. However, deeper interaction patterns reveal more nuance.

Tone × Speaker Gender (Variable 11): Uncivil tone was not perceived significantly differently when coming from male speakers ($-0.251, p > .1$). This suggests that the penalty for incivility is not directly modulated by the speaker's gender in isolation.

Tone × Age Group (Variables 12–16): The uncivil tone interacted significantly with older age groups. For those aged 55–64, uncivil tone increased sympathy by $+1.148$ ($p < .05$), and for those 65+, by $+1.724$ ($p < .001$). These results may reflect instances where incivility is interpreted as justified or assertive, especially by older respondents. It also points to generational variation in tolerance of political tone.

Three-Way Interaction: Tone × Speaker Gender × Respondent Gender (Variable 17): This interaction reveals a key gendered bias: male respondents rated uncivil male speakers significantly higher in sympathy ($+0.561, p < .1$) and competence ($+0.610, p < .05$). This indicates a tolerance or even reward effect for incivility when it comes from male in-group members. In contrast, uncivil women do not benefit from such leniency, implying a double standard.

In the following I will examine the role of perceived incivility, measured by the Qvalue variable, and its effects on respondents' evaluations of political speech. The analysis focuses on how perceptions of incivility influence broader judgments, such as sympathy toward the speaker, perceived competence, and support. By investigating these relationships, the section sheds light on the potential consequences of uncivil communication and how audience reactions may vary depending on perceived tone and delivery.

Main Effect of Perceived Incivility (Variable 18): Perceived incivility (Qvalue) was a strong predictor of all evaluations. The Q-value was negatively related to sympathy ($-0.568, p < .001$), support ($-0.521, p < .001$), and competence ($-0.536, p < .001$), which confirmed its central role in shaping impressions of politicians.

Interactions with Qvalue (Variables 19–26): There were no significant interactions between Qvalue and speaker or respondent gender (e.g., $\text{Speaker_Gender} \times \text{Qvalue} = +0.048, p > .1$). This indicates that once incivility is perceived, it affects evaluations similarly across groups. The gender bias lies not in the consequence of incivility, but in its attribution: men are more likely to be seen as uncivil, and male respondents' judge male incivility more leniently.

In the following I aim to offer synthesis of the key findings from the preceding analyses, with a focus on identifying and interpreting evidence of gender bias in the perception of political incivility. The aim is to provide a coherent summary of how gender shapes audience responses, reinforcing the broader implications of the study for understanding bias in political communication.

First, there is bias in perception. Male speakers are perceived as more uncivil ($+0.337, p < .05$), even when using identical tones and content. This perception does not translate into harsher sympathy, support, or competence evaluations, suggesting that male incivility is more socially tolerated.

Second, there is bias in evaluation. Uncivil speech is penalised overall, but male respondents grant higher scores to uncivil male speakers, especially on competence ($+0.610, p < .05$) and sympathy ($+0.561, p < .1$). This subtle bias benefits men by allowing them to deviate from normative tone expectations with fewer consequences.

Third, there is bias in tolerance. Older respondents penalise incivility more harshly in general (e.g., Age 65+: -1.204 on sympathy, $p < .001$), but this does not vary by speaker gender, implying generational differences are about tone expectations rather than gender norms.

Fourth, there is bias against uncivil women. The penalty for incivility is asymmetric across genders. The main effect of Tone[Uncivil] is strongly negative for Sympathy ($-1.047, p < .001$), Support ($-0.769, p < .001$), and Competence ($-0.175, p > .1$). This means uncivil speech is penalised overall. However, uncivil male speakers receive leniency, and even rewards, from male respondents. The positive and significant 3-way interactions indicate that male respondents reward uncivil male speakers in terms of sympathy and competence. These benefits do not extend to uncivil female speakers, who experience the full negative effects of uncivil tone. The absence of a similar boost for women, alongside

the persistent penalties, offers indirect but strong evidence of gender bias, see results in Table 18.

Outcome	Coefficient	Significance	Interpretation
Incivility score	+0.270	not sig.	Male respondents slightly perceive uncivil male speakers as more uncivil, but not significantly
Sympathy	+0.561	$p < .1$	Male respondents rate uncivil male speakers as more sympathetic
Support	+0.416	not sig.	Directionally similar, but not statistically reliable
Competence	+0.610	$p < .05$	Male respondents find uncivil male speakers more competent

Table 18. Detailed 3-way interaction analysis: Tone[Negative-Uncivil] $\times$ Speaker_Gender[Male] $\times$ Respondent_Gender[Male]

Overall, the analysis reveals a gendered double standard in tone perception. While uncivil speech is generally penalised across outcomes, male respondents rate uncivil male speakers significantly more sympathetically ($p < .1$) and as more competent ($p < .05$). These benefits are not extended to female speakers, indicating that incivility is only tolerated, and in some cases rewarded, when expressed by men. The findings support the hypothesis that uncivil women are disproportionately penalised in political evaluations, particularly by male audiences.

5.3 Discussion of the survey experiment

The second method and its research question and hypotheses explored how gendered perceptions and individual characteristics shape Hungarian citizens' evaluations of political incivility. The research results demonstrate how demographic elements together with unspoken gender stereotypes affect political decision-making and emotional reactions to uncivil political speech.

5.3.1 Hypothesis 3: Gendered Perceptions of Incivility

The research examined how gendered perceptions relate to individual characteristics when people assess political incivility. Although all observed demographic factors have been considered, the results only revealed gender and age as significant factors in shaping perception of incivility.

Results showed the same correlations for hypothesis three, this proposed that respondents will perceive the same uncivil statement as more uncivil when believed to be attributed by a female politician compared to when believed to be attributed by a male politician. The findings provide only partial support for H3. Contrary to the predicted direction, male speakers received significantly higher perceived-incivility ratings overall, while the interaction between tone and speaker gender was not statistically significant. However, the three-way interaction between tone, speaker gender, and respondent gender indicated that male respondents evaluated uncivil male speakers more positively on competence, with a weaker positive pattern for sympathy. These findings therefore do not demonstrate a uniform penalty against female speakers, but suggest that gendered evaluations may emerge conditionally, depending on the interaction between speaker gender, respondent gender, and communicative tone.

This pattern can be interpreted in relation to Role Congruity Theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), which proposes that women may face more negative evaluations when their behaviour conflicts with traditional gender-role expectations. In the present study, however, the evidence points to a conditional rather than universal gender bias.

This finding resonates with Lakoff's (1973a) foundational work on "women's language," which emphasised how female speakers are judged more harshly when they deviate from expectations of politeness and restraint. It also reflects Cameron's (2022) observation that gendered communicative norms still regulate women's language, even in formalised arenas such as politics. The harsher evaluations of women's incivility suggest that, in line with Smith-Hefner (1988), communicative transgressions by women are read not only as rhetorical violations but also as symbolic failures to perform appropriate femininity.

The evaluation results demonstrated that male politicians exhibited higher levels of incivility but still managed to obtain higher scores regarding sympathy support and competence mainly from male respondents. According to Hegemonic Masculinity Theory (Connell, 1995) dominance together with assertiveness receive institutional approval in men when they use norm-violating methods such as incivility. In public and official spaces like parliamentary discourse women encounter greater expectations regarding their behaviour.

The process described in Butler's Gender Performativity Theory (1990) shows how gender develops through continuous actions which adhere to cultural norms or break them. The public may perceive female politicians' uncivil behaviour as a failure to display appropriate feminine conduct thus sparking backlash against them. This backlash dynamic is consistent with Fairclough's (1995) argument that discourse is a site of ideological struggle: uncivil acts are not judged neutrally but through embedded power structures that privilege male-coded assertiveness while sanctioning female-coded deviance. In addition, the results confirm Bentivegna and Rega's (2022) findings that political incivility in mediated contexts is often framed in gendered terms, reinforcing double standards in audience reception. The survey results show that more than 60% of participants believe politicians of both genders face different treatment due to sexism and dual standards. Social life operates through power dynamics that influence language usage thus these findings show political speech evaluations cannot be separated from social hierarchies and ideologies (Bourdieu; Fairclough).

5.3.2 Hypothesis 4: Demographic Predictors of Incivility Tolerance

Hypothesis 4 proposed that age, gender and education level would predict respondents' tolerance for political incivility. The findings provide partial support for H4. Age emerged as a significant predictor of several evaluations, whereas respondent gender did not show a consistent significant main effect across outcomes. The evidence for demographic predictors was therefore uneven rather than uniform across the characteristics specified in the hypothesis. The oldest age group of 65 years and above showed the lowest interest in politics and the least political discussion engagement and they provided the highest ratings of incivility. The analysis showed that respondents aged 55 and above exhibited higher levels of sympathy as they perceived more incivility which indicates an intricate link between political standards of different ages and their tolerance levels. The evaluation patterns remained consistent when gender cues were absent across different age groups which indicates gender cues serve as the main trigger for political judgment differences.

According to sociolinguistic theories (Labov, 1972; Culpeper, 2005) language evaluation depends on the context in which it occurs. In situations without gender indicators age-based interpretation frameworks tend to fade out which implies that offensive content exists as a social construct based on speaker identity and audience expectations. This

aligns with Gervais (2017), who showed that perceptions of incivility are audience-dependent and shaped by pre-existing interpretive frameworks, and with Boda and Sebők's (2019) findings on Hungarian politics, where citizens' evaluation of political speech often depends on partisan cues more than the utterance itself. Age-related differences may thus reflect generational exposure to media framings of politics: as Strömbäck and Esser (2014) argue, political mediatisation shapes interpretive habits differently across cohorts.

The evaluation patterns developed through cluster and factor analysis demonstrated distinct segments that corresponded to age groups with younger respondents (18-44) using secondary sources and older respondents (45+) depending on official parliamentary broadcasts. The understanding of the "hour of immediate questions" in Parliament reached its lowest point among the youngest and oldest respondents which proves that political procedure understanding influences how people interpret speech within its institutional framework. According to Goffman (1967) face-work theory and Rawls (1971) civility theory for democratic participation those who are unfamiliar with political discourse rules tend to react intensively to what they perceive as rule violations. This also supports Ilie's (2010) observation that parliamentary procedures themselves carry implicit communicative norms: those less familiar with institutionalised adversarial discourse may interpret strategic interruptions or confrontational language not as routine but as norm violations.

5.3.3 Broader Implications of Gendered and Demographic Effects

The study demonstrates how gender stereotypes interact with demographic factors to influence public evaluations regarding political incivility. Male politicians can utilise a broader range of behaviours which include incivility while maintaining positive reputation outcomes. Women operate under tighter social restrictions. Incivility operates as a strategic linguistic act according to politeness and impoliteness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Culpeper, 2005) because its meaning depends on both the context and the speaker's identity. Audience expectations and institutional power structures determine how listeners interpret speech as either assertive or offensive between different speakers.

These dynamics can be interpreted in relation to Bourdieu's (1991) notion of linguistic capital: political incivility may operate as a communicative resource that is evaluated differently across speakers and audiences, rather than as a uniformly available form of

symbolic power. Moreover, the Hungarian context echoes Poljak's (2022) findings in Croatia, where women's uncivil interventions were judged more negatively than men's, despite functional similarities.

The research data also support the broader argument that political incivility extends beyond questions of etiquette and can operate as a boundary-setting communicative practice within parliamentary and wider social contexts. As Bentivegna and Rega (2022) stress, incivility is best understood not simply as deviance from civility norms but as a performative practice embedded in power relations. In this sense, the Hungarian case suggests that gender and demographic characteristics can interact with audience perceptions of norm violations, although these patterns remain context-dependent and should not be treated as universally generalizable.

6 CONCLUSION

This dissertation examined how political incivility manifests in Hungarian parliamentary discourse and how it is perceived by Hungarian audiences. The corpus analysis identified variation across parties, genders, individual speakers, and policy areas, while the survey showed that evaluations can also vary according to speaker and respondent characteristics. Taken together, the findings suggest that political incivility is a context-dependent and socially interpreted phenomenon rather than a purely linguistic property, consistent with research emphasising the role of context, audience interpretation, and gendered expectations in political communication (Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022; Erikson & Josefsson, 2022; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Butler, 1990).

The combined findings support the dissertation's analytical framework by linking the production of political incivility with its audience evaluation. They also point to a nuanced relationship between gender, institutional context, and perceptions of incivility, while not establishing speaker motivation or a uniform gender effect. These patterns remain relevant to broader discussions of gendered expectations, institutional power, and audience evaluation (Connell, 1995; Bourdieu, 1991; Fairclough, 1995). The following sections summarise the theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions of the research, its applicability and limitations, and directions for future research.

6.1 Novelties and contributions of the research

The dissertation makes three main contributions to political incivility research: theoretical, empirical, and methodological.

Theoretical contribution

The dissertation contributes to conceptual clarity by treating impoliteness and political incivility as overlapping but analytically distinct concepts and by integrating discourse production and audience perception within a norm-dependent framework. The findings suggest that political incivility cannot be understood solely as a property of linguistic content, as its meaning and evaluation emerge through the interaction of speakers, audiences, institutional settings, and culturally situated political norms. The etic–emic distinction further connects researcher-defined classification with audience evaluation, reinforcing the importance of perception within the dissertation's working definition of political incivility as perceived norm violation. From a pragmatic perspective, this is also

consistent with hearer-oriented approaches that emphasise recipient interpretation and support the view that political incivility cannot be reduced to presumed speaker intention (Hansen & Terkourafi, 2023; Terkourafi & Hansen, 2026).

The research also adds contextual knowledge about gender and political communication in Hungary. Rather than demonstrating a universal gender effect, the findings identify context-dependent patterns that generate theoretical mechanisms and hypotheses that can be tested in other institutional and cultural settings.

Empirical contributions

The dissertation provides original empirical evidence on both the production and perception of political incivility in Hungary. The parliamentary corpus identifies variation in incivility across political parties, genders, individual speakers, policy areas, and two consecutive parliamentary cycles. The survey experiment complements these findings by examining how authentic parliamentary statements are evaluated when speaker characteristics are experimentally manipulated.

The survey results reveal a nuanced rather than uniform gender effect. Male speakers received higher perceived-incivility ratings overall, while interaction effects indicated that some male respondents evaluated uncivil male speakers more favourably on competence and, more weakly on sympathy. These findings therefore do not establish a general penalty against female speakers but indicate that evaluations of political incivility can depend on interactions between communicative tone, speaker gender, and audience characteristics.

Methodological contributions

A central methodological contribution of the dissertation is the development of a replicable multi-method framework combining AI-assisted corpus annotation, quantitative pattern analysis, qualitative contextual interpretation, and a survey experiment based on authentic parliamentary stimuli. AI-assisted annotation enables scalable analysis of large volumes of Hungarian parliamentary discourse, while human validation and contextual interpretation address ambiguity, model dependence, and culturally specific meanings.

The thesis also adapts the Hill et al. (2015) classification system to the Hungarian parliamentary context and adds lying accusation as an empirically recurring

manifestation. The classification is functional rather than hierarchical and is intended as a replicable analytical tool rather than a universal taxonomy.

The survey design provides a further replicable component by connecting corpus-derived stimuli with experimental manipulations of speaker gender and audience evaluation. The AT/TACTICNESS scale additionally provides a standardised measure of the density of negative and uncivil communication relative to speech length, enabling comparison across speakers and parties without inferring speaker motivation.

The strongest methodological contribution therefore lies in replicability: while the empirical distributions observed in Hungary may change in other contexts, the analytical framework can be applied to different countries, parliamentary periods, political institutions, and communicative settings to enable comparative research.

6.2 Applicability

The research results have several potential applications. Female politicians and other political actors may benefit from understanding how tone, speaker characteristics, and audience characteristics can shape perceptions of political incivility when developing rhetorical approaches and media communication strategies. The findings may contribute to political communication and media literacy by showing how gender and demographic characteristics can shape the way political incivility is perceived and evaluated. Political analysts and journalists may similarly benefit from contextualising incivility and remaining attentive to potential gendered differences in the interpretation and reporting of parliamentary speech. The findings may also be relevant for policymakers and parliamentary bodies when considering institutional responses to disruptive speech and reviewing internal codes of conduct.

Civil society organisations may draw on the findings when developing civic education or media-literacy initiatives concerned with political communication and norm violations. Educational institutions, debate programmes, and civic engagement workshops may also use the results to illustrate how political speech can be evaluated differently across speakers and audiences. Finally, the experimental design and coding framework offer a replicable approach that could be applied in other countries and political settings where incivility remains under-researched.

6.3 Limitations and generalizability

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings. First, the scope of the corpus is limited to two consecutive parliamentary cycles, 2014–2018 and 2018–2022. As discussed in Section 4.1.4, these cycles were selected partly because they operate within the same post-2014 institutional framework, providing greater comparability between the two periods. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the partly transitional 2010–2014 cycle and earlier periods limits the study’s ability to examine longer-term changes in parliamentary incivility and communicative norms. The findings should therefore be interpreted as evidence of patterns within the 2014–2022 period rather than as evidence of longitudinal historical trends. Extending the analysis to earlier and subsequent parliamentary cycles could reveal whether these patterns persist or change over time, particularly when political actors move between government and opposition roles.

Second, the research examines a single national and institutional context. Hungarian parliamentary norms, party competition, political culture, and the substantial gender imbalance in political representation provide a specific environment in which political incivility is produced and interpreted. The observed effect sizes, distributions, and gender patterns should therefore not be assumed to transfer directly to other countries or political systems.

Third, although the final survey sample was substantial ($N = 780$), recruitment was not based on strict probability sampling and was affected by demographic imbalances and participant self-selection. Respondents aged 18–34 were overrepresented, while older age groups were underrepresented. Survey findings therefore permit controlled comparisons within the experiment but should not be interpreted as nationally representative estimates of Hungarian public opinion.

Fourth, the experimental stimuli consisted of written parliamentary excerpts. Written text allows linguistic content and speaker-gender cues to be controlled, but it cannot reproduce prosody, facial expression, gesture, audience reactions in the chamber, or audiovisual framing. These elements may influence perceptions of political incivility in naturally occurring communication.

Fifth, perceptions of incivility are inherently context-sensitive. Respondents’ assessments may be influenced by humour, ideology, political agreement, personal expectations, or

familiarity with adversarial political discourse. Rather than representing only methodological noise, this variation also reflects the dissertation's theoretical position that incivility is partly constituted through socially situated norm perception.

Finally, AI-assisted annotation introduces limitations related to model dependence, ambiguity, cultural nuance, and potential classification error. Human oversight, inter-annotator reliability assessment, and validation procedures reduce these risks but cannot eliminate them completely.

These limitations distinguish empirical generalizability from methodological replicability. The empirical findings of the dissertation are context-bound and should be generalised cautiously. The stronger international contribution lies in the replicability of the framework: the corpus coding procedure, AI-assisted annotation, linguistic classification, and corpus-derived survey experiment can be applied in other countries, parliamentary periods, and political or social contexts. Such replication would make it possible to test whether the mechanisms and relationships identified in the Hungarian context also emerge under different institutional and cultural conditions, thereby contributing to theoretical generalisation without assuming that the specific effect sizes or empirical distributions observed here are transferable to other contexts.

6.4 Recommendations for further research

Future research should directly address these limitations. Extending the corpus to earlier and subsequent parliamentary cycles, including the 2010–2014 period, would allow longitudinal analysis of changes in political incivility and communicative norms over time. Particular attention could be paid to periods in which parties move between government and opposition, enabling comparison of whether rhetorical patterns are associated with party identity, institutional position, or changes between the two. Cross-national replication, particularly across post-socialist and similarly, or on the contrary, differently gender-balanced parliaments, would test which findings are specific to Hungary and which mechanisms recur across institutional contexts.

Survey experiments using video and audio stimuli could examine the contribution of prosody, gesture, facial expression, audience reactions, and audiovisual framing to perceptions of incivility. Cross-national survey experiments using equivalent stimuli would further allow comparative analysis of cultural and institutional norm perception.

Finally, the proposed meta level of the theoretical framework should also be investigated empirically by examining how parliamentary incivility is recontextualised through news media, social media, political commentary, and audience discussion. Such research could establish whether repeated norm violations become normalised or legitimised as they move between parliamentary, media, and public contexts.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A. *The distribution of the number of speeches given in the hour of immediate questions by cycle, party and gender*

2014–2018		
Party	Women	Men
Fidesz	28	237
KDNP	15	143
Jobbik	31	390
MSZP	82	363
LMP	164	206

2018–2022		
Party	Women	Men
Fidesz	60	254
KDNP	26	221
Jobbik	28	443
MSZP	147	241
LMP	105	160
DK	55	249
Párbeszéd	38	218

Appendix B. Coding Framework, Instructions and Validation

B.1 Coding instructions and procedure

Each parliamentary speech was evaluated using a two-level coding framework. At the first level, the overall tone was classified as civil, negative civil, or uncivil. Where a speech contained negative civil or uncivil language, the relevant segment was subsequently classified according to the second-level framework. The second level identified the communicative manifestation through which negativity or incivility was expressed. The categories comprised name-calling, aspersion, exaggeration/hyperbole, mockery/sarcasm, character assassination, contrast, excerpts, and lying accusation. The latter category was added to the original framework because accusations of lying occurred repeatedly in the Hungarian parliamentary corpus and were not adequately captured by the existing categories.

B.2 First-level coding framework

Code	Definition	Decision rule
Civil	Objective, polite, and appropriate in tone, without negative qualifications.	No criticism, negative qualification, personal attack, or offensive expression.
Negative civil	Expresses criticism but remains within the conventions of civil interaction.	Criticism or negative evaluation is present without a direct personal attack, insult, or explicitly offensive expression.
Uncivil	Contains negative qualification expressed in a more personal and offensive tone.	Criticism includes a direct personal attack, insult, derogatory qualification, or explicitly offensive expression.

B.3 First-level coding examples

Civil

„Köszönöm a szót, elnök úr. Tisztelt Képviselőtársam! Tisztelt Ház!”
[“Thank you for the floor, Mr Speaker. Honourable Fellow Member! Honourable House!”]

Negative

civil

„Ebből a felszólalásból is látszik, hogy Andersent nem a KSH-ban kell keresni, hanem a Jobbik-frakció soraiban.”
[“This speech also shows that Andersen is not to be found at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, but among the ranks of the Jobbik parliamentary group.”]

Uncivil

„Észnél van?! Vagy észnél volt, aki ezt a dzsuvát leírta magának?”
[“Are you out of your mind?! Or was the person who wrote this rubbish for you out of their mind?”]

Note. The Negative civil and Uncivil examples both represent mockery/sarcasm at the second coding level. They were selected deliberately to facilitate comparison and to illustrate how the same manifestation can differ in intensity and first-level classification.

B.4 Second-level coding framework

Category	Operational definition
Name-calling	Derogatory or demeaning labels, nicknames, or qualifications applied to a person or group.
Aspersions	Statements that cast doubt on a person's honesty, integrity, conduct, or reputation through accusation or insinuation.
Exaggeration/hyperbole	Rhetorical amplification or overstatement presenting a person, action, or situation in unusually extreme terms.
Mockery/sarcasm	Ridiculing or derisive expression; mockery is generally explicit, while sarcasm conveys criticism more indirectly.
Character assassination	Severe negative claims or allegations attacking a person's character, credibility, or moral standing.
Contrast	Negative evaluation constructed through an explicit comparison or contrast between persons, actions, positions, periods, or outcomes.
Excerpts	Use of a quotation or reported previous statement to support or frame a negative evaluation.
Lying accusation	Explicit accusation that a person or group is lying or presenting false information.

B.5 Second-level coding examples

Name-calling

„Ezért váltotta fel a régi daliás idők menetelését a jobbikos törpejárásuk. Gratulálok! Köszönöm szépen.”

[“This is why the marching of the old heroic days has been replaced by your Jobbik dwarf march. Congratulations! Thank you very much.”]

Aspersions

„Kedélyeket borzoló kép- és hangfelvételek kerültek nyilvánosságra a sajtóban azzal kapcsolatban, hogy a kispesti kerületi önkormányzatban néhányan, főként egy bizonyos képviselő, miként vélekednek a közéleti szerepvállalásból eredő haszonszerzést illetően.”

[“Disturbing video and audio recordings were made public in the press concerning how some individuals in the Kispest district municipality, particularly one specific representative, view deriving personal gain from holding public office.”]

Exaggeration/hyperbole

„Az, hogy nem volt szerencsés, igen eufemisztikus kifejezés. Egyenesen felháborító és botrányos, és a kormány munkáját minősíti az, hogy ilyen képviselők ülhetnek itt a magyar parlamentben.”

[“To say that it was unfortunate is highly euphemistic. It is downright outrageous and scandalous, and the fact that such representatives can sit here in the Hungarian Parliament reflects on the work of the government.”]

Mockery/sarcasm

„Ön már régen kiürült, miniszterelnök úr, olyan, mint egy kiszáradt mákgubó, pedig Magyarországon most a szél sem fúj. Már valamikori önmagához nem is hasonlít, miniszterelnök úr.”

[“You have long since become empty, Prime Minister; you are like a dried-out poppy pod, even though there is not even any wind blowing in Hungary now. You no longer even resemble your former self, Prime Minister.”]

Character assassination

„Emlékszünk az MTVA székházában az erőszakos, bohózatba, tragikomédiába nyúló viselkedésére, amikor lógott a korláton, akrobatikus mutatványokat mutatott be. De nem ez a legnagyobb probléma. Aláírásgyűjtésbe kezdett, amely aláírásgyűjtés igazából adatgyűjtés célját szolgálta, és homályos háttérű külföldi szervezetekhez kerültek a magyar állampolgárok kényes személyes adatai.”

[“We remember your aggressive behaviour at the MTVA headquarters, which descended into farce and tragicomedy, when you were hanging from the railing and performing acrobatic stunts. But that is not the biggest problem. You launched a petition which, in reality, served the purpose of collecting data, and sensitive personal data of Hungarian citizens ended up with foreign organisations of obscure background.”]

Contrast

„Ön említette, hogy a mienk Európa leggyengébb Kurzarbeitja. Nem tudom, mennyire ismeri a Kurzarbeit struktúráját, csak azért nem gondolom, hogy gyenge lenne, mert 2008-ban nem volt ilyen, és amit most létrehoztunk, ez nagyjából olyan, mint a német.”

[“You mentioned that ours is Europe’s weakest Kurzarbeit scheme. I do not know how familiar you are with the structure of Kurzarbeit, but I do not consider it weak, because there was no such scheme in 2008, and what we have now created is broadly similar to the German one.”]

Excerpts

„A másik meg: önök elég kényesek és finnyások lettek az elmúlt nyolc évben, amikor, emlékezzünk vissza, maga Lázár János 2007-ben hódmezővásárhelyi polgármesterként egy mentőben meghalt mindszeri lakos kapcsán az alábbiakat mondta: az egészségügyi reform első áldozata ez a férfi.”

[“Another point is that you have become rather sensitive and fussy over the past eight years, when, let us remember, János Lázár himself, as mayor of Hódmezővásárhely in 2007, said the following regarding a resident of Mindszent who died in an ambulance: this man is the first victim of the healthcare reform.”]

Lying accusation

„Most mindaz, amit itt összezagyvált, e tekintetben, ha bármilyen bűncselekményről tudomása van, tegyen feljelentést, egyébként pedig ne hazudozzon!”

[“As for everything you have just rambled on about here, if you are aware of any criminal offence, file a report; otherwise, stop lying!”]

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Hungarian into English are the author’s own.

B.6 AI prompts and model settings

Model: ChatGPT-4o

Analysis period: January 2025

Unit of analysis: individual parliamentary speech

Input language: Hungarian

Context: speeches submitted individually

First-level output: civil / negative civil / uncivil

Second-level output: applicable manifestation(s)

B.7 ChatGPT command introducing the first and second layer of political incivility based on Hill et al. (2015)

Hello, I would like to ask you to annotate some texts for me. The annotation will have a first, general layer, which includes the options and their descriptions:

First layer

Civil: objective, polite, appropriate tone for the situation, free from negative qualifications
Negative civil: expresses criticism, but in accordance with the rules of human conversation.
Uncivil: the qualification appears in the speech, with a more personal and offensive tone.

The annotation will also have a second, more specific layer, which includes the options and their descriptions:

Second level

Name-calling: hurtful nicknames, qualifications (e.g., traitor, liar, uninformed)
Aspersions: accusations, questioning honesty, truth, attacking reputation
Exaggeration/hyperbole: exaggeration, distortion, big talk
Contrast: comparison with another person
Excerpts: the use of quotations
Character assassination: the goal is to attack or destroy the reputation
Lying accusation: accusation of lying
Mockery/sarcasm: the two are used differently; mockery is more explicit, while sarcasm is more implicit, remarks that clearly mean the opposite of what the speaker says, made to criticize or hurt someone in a humorous way.

In your analysis, highlight ALL sentences from the speech that have the first layer of negative civil or uncivil and also provide their most relevant second layer. Do not highlight any sentences that have the first layer as civil. Present the information in a table.

B.8 Validation and inter-annotator agreement

Two validation procedures were used to assess coding reliability. First, one-third of the ChatGPT-4o annotations were re-evaluated in a new chat using the same codebook, resulting in 87.0% first-level agreement and 77.0% second-level agreement. Second, independent human coders applied the same coding framework, producing 74.8% first-level agreement and 70.4% second-level agreement. Cohen's kappa was $\kappa = .38$ for the first level and $\kappa = .63$ for the second level.

Validation	First-level agreement	κ	Second-level agreement	κ
ChatGPT-4o re-check	87.0%	—	77.0%	—
Human coders	74.8%	.38	70.4%	.63

Note: For second-level coding, absence of a manifestation was treated as a valid coding outcome; disagreements were retained rather than excluded.

B.9 Fine-Tuned Hungarian Language Models

To complement the ChatGPT-assisted annotation, Hungarian language models were fine-tuned using a training dataset of over 600 parliamentary speeches drawn from parliamentary cycles outside the corpus analysed in the dissertation. Four annotators prepared the training material; each speech was independently annotated by two annotators and was included only where agreement was reached.

Model	Fine-tuning method	Main settings	Accuracy (%)
HuBERT	Hugging Face	seq. length = 512; LR = 5e-6; batch = 16; epochs = 10	73.33
PULI BERT-Large	Hugging Face	seq. length = 512; LR = 5e-6; batch = 16; epochs = 10	74.82
PULI Llumix	LoRA	$\alpha = 16$; dropout = .05; r = 16; LR = 1e-4; batch = 8; epochs = 10	65.93
PULI Trio	LoRA	$\alpha = 16$; dropout = .05; r = 16; LR = 1e-4; batch = 8; epochs = 10	61.48
ChatGPT	—	—	71.11
PULI-Llumix-Llama-3.1-Chat	—	—	65.93
PULI Trio Q Chat	—	—	68.89

Note: For the LoRA fine-tuning, the task type was SEQ_CLS. The full-dataset analysis used PULI-Llumix-Llama-3.1-Chat and PULI Trio Q Chat, as described in Chapter 4.

Appendix C. An example of the scoring of the AT/TACTICNESS scale

The transcribed speech:

Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Tisztelt Ház! Az MSZP alapszabálya szerint, akit jogerősen elítélnék, az nem vállalhat szerepet a pártban, erről beszélt Tóbiás József megbízott frakcióvezető azután, hogy az első és másodfokon elítélt Hunvald Györgyöt választották meg a VII. kerület elnökének. A kijelentés azért is érdekes, mert a párt elnökségi tagjáról, Kunhalmi Ágnesről a minap derült ki, hogy jogerősen elítélték közokirat-hamisításért. De ennek, úgy tűnik, nincs következménye a szocialistáknál. 2005 novemberében Kunhalmi Ágneset egyébként azért ítélték el, mert lejárt gimnáziumi diákigazolványára szerzett matricát, hogy olcsóbban vehessen közlekedési bérletet. Tudomásom szerint az akkor már a Miniszterelnöki Hivatalban foglalkoztatott Kunhalmi Ágnes tettét alacsony jövedelmére hivatkozva magyarázta.

Az eltitkolt cselekmény elkövetése után igencsak cinikus az a válasza a képviselő asszonynak, hogy majd a választók eldöntik, kinek adnak bizalmat. Joggal merül fel a kérdés, van-e még bármilyen erkölcsi, etikai zsinórmérték, amit a szocialisták összeegyeztethetetlennek tartanak a felelős politizálással. Az elhangzottakra tekintettel kérdezem miniszter urat, mit jelenthet a szocialistáknál a közbizalom. Várom megtisztelő válaszát. (Szórványos taps a kormánypárti padsorokban.)

The analysis:

1. A kijelentés azért is érdekes, mert a párt elnökségi tagjáról, Kunhalmi Ágnesről a minap derült ki, hogy jogerősen elítélték közokirat-hamisításért. (1. Negative civil, 2. Aspersion) – *1 score*
2. Az eltitkolt cselekmény elkövetése után igencsak cinikus az a válasza a képviselő asszonynak, hogy majd a választók eldöntik, kinek adnak bizalmat. (1. Uncivil, 2. Mockery/sarcasm) – *2 score*
3. Joggal merül fel a kérdés, van-e még bármilyen erkölcsi, etikai zsinórmérték, amit a szocialisták összeegyeztethetetlennek tartanak a felelős politizálással. (1. Negative civil, 2. Character assassination) – *1 score*

Appendix D. *AT/TACTICNESS scale scoring and weighing method*

$$final\ score_x = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n uncivil\ score + \sum_{i=1}^n negative\ civil\ score \right) \div \frac{length\ of\ speech_x}{average\ length\ of\ speech\ in\ the\ cycle}$$

final score_x where

x = the specific speech,

n = number of layers in the speech and

i = 1, summing from the first layer up to n

Appendix E. *Average character length of speeches in the hour of immediate questions in the Hungarian parliament from the parliamentary cycle of 2014–2018 and 2018–2022, with spaces included*

Cycle	Average length of speech
2014–2018	1363,8
2018–2022	1337,1

Appendix F. Research Ethics Committee approval



Corvinus University of Budapest
Vice-Rector for Faculty and Research
Research Ethics Committee
H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8.

File number: KRH/20/2025
Administrator: Nándor Petrovics
nandor.petrovics@uni-corvinus.hu
Attachment: -

Principal Researcher: Tekla ILLÉS
Email: tekla.illes2@stud.uni-corvinus.hu
Unit: CUB Institute of Marketing and Communication Sciences
Project title: Incivility of Influence? Exploring the perception of gender and political incivility in Hungary.

DECLARATION

On the basis of the fully completed review questionnaire and the supporting professional documents relating to the submitted request for research ethics approval the Committee grants the request and

grants the research ethics approval for the research.
The research shall be conducted in accordance with the review questionnaire.

JUSTIFICATION

The Committee's assessment is as follows:

The attached documents such as the project plan worked out for the referred application, the declaration form designed for this purpose and fully completed by the applicant are compliant with the principles formulated in article (6) of the *Provisions of the Rector No 2/2020. (V. 26.) on setting up the CUB Ad Hoc Research Ethics Committee, and on issuing research ethics permissions*, which governs these provisions, and the planned research is in accordance with the CUB's research strategy and institution building plan. *Please note that the declaration forms issued in the annexes 2.a, 2.b and 2.c of the referred Provisions of the Rector shall be completed and signed in all cases during the course of the research.* The decision set out in the operative part was made by the Committee on its meeting of January 19th, 2025.

Budapest, January 19th, 2025



Prof. Dr. Tamás Bartus
Vice Rector for Faculty and Research
Chair of the Research Ethics Committee

Appendix G. Passages Included in Study 1 and Experimental Mapping

G.1 Passages and Original Corpus Classification

Civil (expected rating 1–2)

1. “Tehát ha ön szeretné ezeket a szektorokat és ezeket a szereplőket helyzetbe hozni, akkor arra kérem, támogassa a kormány politikáját.” [“So if you would like to empower these sectors and these actors, then I ask you to support the government’s policy.”]
2. “Szeretném elmondani, képviselő úr, hogy tájékoztatlanságról inkább ön tesz tanúbizonyságot. Hiszen a kérdés az számunkra, hogy hogyan vezessük be az iskolai étkeztetésbe az almasűrítményt.” [“Allow me to say, Mr Representative, that it is rather you who is demonstrating ignorance. The question for us is how to introduce apple concentrate into school catering.”]

Negative civil (expected rating 2–3)

1. “Ha önök egyenes válaszokat adnának, és világosan elmondanák, hogy miről van szó, akkor nem kellene találgatnom, és nem kellene kérdéseket feltennem és feltartanom az ön drága idejében.” [“If you gave straightforward answers and clearly explained what this is about, I would not have to guess, ask questions, or waste your valuable time.”]
2. “Szeretném elmondani, képviselő úr, hogy tájékoztatlanságról inkább ön tesz tanúbizonyságot. Hiszen a kérdés az számunkra, hogy hogyan vezessük be az iskolai étkeztetésbe az almasűrítményt.” (*Allow me to say, Mr. Representative, that it is rather you who is demonstrating ignorance. The question for us is how to introduce apple concentrate into school catering.*)

Uncivil (expected rating 3–5)

1. “Bár, tudja, fogalmam sincs, hogy ön hogyan főz, azt viszont pontosan tudom, hogy hogyan kormányoz. Ha azt mondom, hogy csapnivalóan, akkor még finom voltam és nőies.” [“Well, you know, I have no idea how you cook, but I do know exactly how you govern. And if I say terribly, I am still being polite and ladylike.”]
2. “Ha már elment Kínába, hogy fényesre törölgesse Putyin hátsó felét, akkor legyen annyi magában, hogy ad egy egyenes választ!” [“If you went all the way to China to polish Putin’s backside to a shine, then at least have the decency to give a straight answer!”]

Note. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Hungarian into English are the author’s own.

G.2 Mapping of Study 1 Stimuli and Experimental Conditions

Stimuli	Original classification	Expected rating	Experimental conditions	Measured outcomes
Passages 1–2	Civil	1–2	Female / Male / Neutral speaker	Perceived incivility and politician evaluations
Passages 3–4	Negative civil	2–3	Female / Male / Neutral speaker	Perceived incivility and politician evaluations
Passages 5–6	Uncivil	3–5	Female / Male / Neutral speaker	Perceived incivility and politician evaluations

Note. The same six corpus-derived passages were presented across the experimental conditions; speaker-gender information was manipulated between the female, male, and neutral questionnaire versions.

G.3 Questionnaire Versions and Manipulation

Questionnaire version	Passages	Speaker information	Manipulation
Female-speaker version	Same six passages	Female	Speaker gender
Male-speaker version	Same six passages	Male	Speaker gender
Neutral version	Same six passages	Not specified	No gender cue

Appendix H. Passages Included in Study 2 and Their Original Corpus Classification

H.1 Passages and Original Corpus Classification

Uncivil

Aspersions

“A napnál is világosabb, hogy önök az idegengyűlölet felkorbácsolásából igyekeznek politikai tőkét kovácsolni úgy, hogy eközben pénzért árulják a magyarországi letelepedési jogot.” [“It is as clear as day that you are trying to gain political capital by whipping up xenophobia while simultaneously selling the right to settle in Hungary for money.”]

Lying accusation

“Röviddel utána, hogy lezárták ezt a felületet, önök már feljelentést tettek az ügyészségen, és elkezdtek arcátlan módon hazudozni.” [“Shortly after shutting down that platform, you filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office and shamelessly started lying.”]

Character assassination

“Ha ön ezt most nem teszi meg a következő egy percben, akkor ön szégyene ennek az országnak!” [“If you do not do this in the next minute, you are a disgrace to this country!”]

Mockery/sarcasm

“Örülök neki, hogy negyedszerre, de végre betalált a magyar parlamentbe, és válaszol arra, amire már régóta kellett volna válaszolnia.” [“I am glad that on your fourth try, you finally hit the mark in the Hungarian Parliament and are answering something you should have addressed a long time ago.”]

Name-calling

“Krumplis államtitkár úr láthatóan szövegértési problémákkal küszködik.” [“Mr Potato State Secretary is clearly struggling with reading comprehension.”]

Exaggeration/hyperbole

“Önöknek már rég nem számít a kamat nagysága, nem számít az, hogy eladósodunk, nem számít semmi, a túlélésért küzdenek, és láthatóan az sem számít, hogy teljesen idióta magyarázatokat mondanak bele az egész magyar médiába.” [“You no longer care about interest rates, you do not care that we are going into debt, you do not care about anything—you are fighting for survival, and clearly, not even the fact that you are giving utterly idiotic explanations across the entire Hungarian media seems to matter anymore.”]

H.2 Mapping of Study 2 Stimuli

Stimulus	First-level classification	Second-level classification
1	Uncivil	Aspersions
2	Uncivil	Lying accusation
3	Uncivil	Character assassination
4	Uncivil	Mockery/sarcasm
5	Uncivil	Name-calling
6	Uncivil	Exaggeration/hyperbole

Appendix I. *The mean negative civil and uncivil categories identified with the use of ChatGPT within a single speech in the randomly selected, equal distribution of parties and genders from the observed cycles combined*

	Gender	Mean negative category	Mean negative civil	Mean uncivil
All parties	Male	3.313	2.253	1.060
	Female	3.186	2.003	1.182
	Mean total	3.250	2.130	1.120
Exclusion of Fidesz and KDNP	Male	4.045	2.575	1.470
	Female	3.995	2.535	1.460
	Mean total	4.020	2.555	1.465

Appendix J. *ChatGPT, LLM: The average incivility and negativity score based on cycle, party and gender summary tables. Number of speeches, average incivility and negativity score based on cycle, party and gender per speaker summary tables.*

<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1LQ-FXIYVeVtYFOvVPA6d0iKdmUMU6cKeUj21GUpS0RI/edit?usp=sharing>

Appendix K. *Survey results of the open ended questions*

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1vekPbnNnTXye8oPIK0--jgxyJJgsuh50?usp=drive_link

Appendix L. OLS regression results

OLS Regression Results

	Incivility Score (1)	Sympathy (2)	Support (3)	Competence (4)
0. Intercept	2.258*** (0.121)	2.631*** (0.179)	2.950*** (0.175)	2.425*** (0.165)
1. Age_group[25-34]	-0.026 (0.114)	0.360** (0.174)	0.383** (0.170)	0.523*** (0.160)
2. Age_group[35-44]	0.101 (0.142)	0.390* (0.213)	0.352* (0.208)	0.814*** (0.196)
3. Age_group[45-54]	-0.012 (0.181)	-0.409 (0.264)	-0.523** (0.258)	0.014 (0.243)
4. Age_group[55-64]	-0.162 (0.279)	-0.079 (0.429)	-0.735* (0.420)	-0.187 (0.396)
5. Age_group[65+]	0.472*** (0.164)	-1.204*** (0.262)	-1.447*** (0.257)	-1.098*** (0.242)
6. Respondent_Gender[Male]	-0.171 (0.132)	-0.014 (0.164)	-0.035 (0.160)	0.167 (0.151)
7. Speaker_Gender[Male]	0.337** (0.132)	0.197 (0.171)	0.169 (0.168)	0.093 (0.158)
8. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]	2.323*** (0.214)	-1.047*** (0.301)	-0.769*** (0.294)	-0.175 (0.277)
9. Speaker_Gender[Male]:Respondent_Gender[Male]	0.026 (0.180)	-0.179 (0.177)	-0.094 (0.173)	-0.173 (0.163)
10. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Respondent_Gender[Male]	-0.213 (0.231)	0.086 (0.252)	0.101 (0.247)	-0.085 (0.233)
11. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Speaker_Gender[Male]	-0.051 (0.229)	-0.222 (0.248)	-0.086 (0.242)	-0.249 (0.228)
12. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Age_group[25-34]	0.083 (0.199)	-0.095 (0.235)	-0.129 (0.229)	-0.060 (0.216)
13. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Age_group[35-44]	0.113 (0.246)	0.651** (0.286)	0.259 (0.280)	0.472* (0.264)
14. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Age_group[45-54]	0.374 (0.315)	0.187 (0.374)	0.020 (0.366)	-0.282 (0.345)
15. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Age_group[55-64]	1.148** (0.484)	0.228 (0.696)	-0.298 (0.681)	-0.028 (0.642)
16. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Age_group[65+]	0.253 (0.284)	1.724*** (0.338)	1.260*** (0.330)	1.058*** (0.311)
17. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Speaker_Gender[Male]:Respondent_Gender[Male]	0.270 (0.314)	0.561* (0.303)	0.416 (0.297)	0.610** (0.280)
18. Perceived_incivility - Qvalue		0.568*** (0.060)	0.521*** (0.059)	0.536*** (0.055)
19. Tone[Negative-Uncivil]:Perceived_incivility		0.025 (0.045)	0.001 (0.044)	-0.039 (0.042)
20. Perceived_incivility:Age_group[25-34]		-0.068 (0.058)	-0.106* (0.057)	-0.122** (0.054)
21. Perceived_incivility:Age_group[35-44]		-0.096 (0.068)	-0.115* (0.067)	-0.191*** (0.063)
22. Perceived_incivility:Age_group[45-54]		0.106 (0.085)	0.088 (0.083)	0.059 (0.078)
23. Perceived_incivility:Age_group[55-64]		-0.119 (0.152)	0.016 (0.149)	-0.059 (0.140)
24. Perceived_incivility:Age_group[65+]		-0.092 (0.079)	-0.051 (0.077)	-0.047 (0.073)
25. Perceived_incivility:Respondent_Gender[Male]		0.003 (0.048)	0.017 (0.047)	0.009 (0.045)
26. Speaker_Gender[Male]:Perceived_incivility		0.020 (0.045)	0.013 (0.044)	0.036 (0.041)
Observations	1914	1880	1880	1880
R ²	0.352	0.318	0.289	0.323
Adjusted R ²	0.347	0.309	0.279	0.314
Residual Std. Error	1.600 (df=1896)	1.535 (df=1853)	1.502 (df=1853)	1.415 (df=1853)
F Statistic	60.666*** (df=17; 1896)	33.307*** (df=26; 1853)	29.018*** (df=26; 1853)	34.036*** (df=26; 1853)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			