

SODIP ROY

Exploring the Links between Camp governmentality and Agentic Responses of
Rohingya Refugee in Bangladesh

DOCTORAL SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE

CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST

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Supervisors:

Lehoczki Bernadett Judit, PhD
Giorgia Dona, PhD

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DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APBN	Armed Police Battalion
ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
BDT	Bangladeshi Taka (currency)
CiC	Camp in Charge
CXB	Cox's Bazar
FDMN	Forcibly Displaced Myanmar National
HRW	Human Rights Watch
GCR	Global Compact on Refugee
GoB	The Government of Bangladesh
GoM	The Government of Myanmar
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizations
INGO	International Non-government Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR	International Relations
IRR	International Refugee Regime
ISCG	Inter Sector Coordination Group
JRP	Joint Response Plan
LC	Learning Centre
LPG	Liquid Petroleum Gas
MCP	Myanmar Curriculum Pilot
MPC	Multi-Purpose Centre
MoDMR	Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-government Organization
NFI	Non-Food Items
NRC	National Registration Card
NSA	Non-state Actor
OCHA	UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRS	Protracted Refugee Situation
RSO	Rohingya Solidarity Organization
RRRC	Refugee, Relief and Repatriation Commission
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SA	State Actor
SMS	Site Management Service.
UMN	Undocumented Myanmar National
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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ABSTRACT

The debate is that a particular form of governmentality is acknowledged in the different studies on refugee camps governance but those studies consider only the power of state actors and humanitarian organizations. This thesis found that consideration incomplete and partial view of camp operations in protracted refugee situation (PRS). Rather the camp governmentality necessarily encompasses power of the refugees, their microphysics of power in the long-term camps. This understanding of governmentality result in an essential link with refugee agency with a view to operate the camps peacefully in extended period. This dissertation deals this aspect based on the empirical evidence from Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar of Bangladesh. The exploration of connection between these two phenomena of refugee camps resolves the research question that why and how the refugee agency emerges and sustain in the camp governmentality. This dissertation considers refugee, member of government organizations (state actors) and humanitarian organizations (non-state actors) as the main actors of the Rohingya refugee camps. In this hindsight, I ask here how camp governmentality in the form of exercising power by these three actors is (re)constructing ambivalent relationships-interactions and (un)linked them with emerging agencies of refugees in protracted situation (PRS). To that end, it takes up Michel Foucault's governmentality theory in discerning the camp governmentality while on the same ground it challenges the default understanding of refugees' agency from a sociopolitical lens rather than from a political lens or cultural perspectives alone. Put differently, the study extends the scope of camp governmentality investigation beyond the sovereignty-territorial, juridico-political narrative to microphysics of power of the actors in the 'state of exception' of refugee camp.

The empirical evidence from the six-month (August 2022 to January 2023) long ethnography in the Rohingya refugee camps unfold many meaningful actions and practices in terms of exercising power by the refugee in their everyday life. This PRS exposes a 'fragmented governmentality' in the camps in terms of exercising and circulation of power among the three actors. They are also an actor in this power plays. Here the refugee exhibits constant agencies in the form of microphysics of power. They maneuver for well-being and life-changing activities in the camps even after containment and surveillance. Living in the cramped and resource-poor camps, refugees encounter for continuous negotiations, participation, and bargaining with state actors and non-state actors (NGOs, IGOs). The refugees get some chances to demonstrate various sociopolitical practices in terms of community leadership,

representation in camp activities and demonstration for their rights as human being. Frequent transgression of law, trespassing of barbed wire fence, and online activism on refugee rights manifest in everyday exercise of power by the refugees. Since refugees have limited human rights, they show up agencies as ‘proxy tool’ of human rights in PRS. On the other hand, non-state actors encounter a dilemma between humanitarian principles and state mandate that expose to their interactions with the beneficiaries as well. However non-state actors apply liberal tactics and disciplinary power, they safeguard the basic tenant—refoulement—of Refugee Convention, and sometime shows up non-cooperation to state actors’ initiatives in case of repatriation, and relocations to a remote island. State actors as the supreme authority exercise their sovereign and disciplinary power to maintain checks and balances in managing the largest humanitarian action for an extended period.

The overall findings illustrate that supporting of refugee agency is a technique of camp governmentality in the PRS. State and non-state actors as International Refugee Regime (IRR) develop and exercise this strategy of governmentality to govern the huge number of Rohingya refugees without any chaos in indefinite temporary. Thus, every (Rohingya)camp is an ideal site for studying everyday IR (International Relations). And one can look at refugee camps as a smaller and marginal unit of the world to understand international politics and power system better. It is the refugee camps, it is the microstructure, and it is the camp governmentality that offers the view of just like an influential macro structure ever.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem statement

Refugees are the special categories of people and 'undesirable' to their destination (Agier, 2011; Malkki, 1996). Since there is chance of distortion of national and international order by refugees (Owens, 2009), state and non-state actors take the responsibility to manage and control them. Although designed as temporary, humanitarian responses in refugee camps often become indefinite, particularly in the Global South. There are hundreds of protracted refugee situation (PRS) across the globe. Stability of these refugee camps gets priority in ensuring peace and security of those regions until a durable solution for the forcibly displaced people (Jacobsen, 1999). International refugee regime (IRR) devises many formal and informal techniques, policies, strategies to hold the refugees in the camps (Lippert, 1999). Resultantly, the structure produces a particular type of governmentality, meaning that every actor including refugees exercises and circulates power among them. Power works both as containment and transformation of the refugees. Refugees (re)construct new relationship, skills, capacities and ambiguities or agencies in the camps (Turner, 2015; Omata, 2017; Oesch, 2017). Despite 'othering' measures operate in the everyday life of refugee camps, agency transforms among them in the time being. Activities like raising awareness and involvement in decision-making are encouraged to encounter prevalent risk in the encampment (Krause, 2021).

Refugees live in a constant interactions of governmentality or power plays and agency in the camps. Security and international cooperation about refugee crisis are influenced by the agency of the refugee to a great extent (Huysmans, Dobson & Prokhovnik, 2006). But the existing studies neither acknowledge refugees as power actor nor highlight any connection between these two aspects of long-term camp operation. In this hindsight, this research attempted to understand the mechanism of power dynamics as well as stability and existence of PRS. It argues refugee as an actor of the power plays, and refugee agency as an integral tool of camp governmentality of long-term encampments. To that end, it refers to the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, where the millions of Rohingya people are caught up in a protracted situation. Since the beginning of these camps in 1991, humanitarian government has been capable of maintaining a peaceful situation, most importantly it remains stable even after the largest influx in 2017.

Currently 1.3 million Rohingya people have sanctuary in the refugee camps in the Cox's Bazar (CXB) district of Bangladesh. It consists of four major exoduses from Burma/Myanmar¹ that occurred in 1978, 1991, 2012 and 2017 (Uddin, 2022). They are the victims of multiple forms of persecution such as physical torture, eviction, religious oppression, burning of houses, forced labor, rape and what not (Ibrahim, 2016). Citizenship of Rohingya people was revoked before this crime against humanity. During the biggest influx in 2017, approximately 700,000 Rohingya civilians crossed the Myanmar border to Bangladesh. Now there are thirty-one camps in the two sub-districts of CXB, and one in the *Bhasan Chor* of Noakhali district. Hundreds of national and international organizations operate the largest humanitarian response in this PRS. Broadly the actors of the camps are bifurcated into refugee and non-refugee actors. Every actor comprises of multiple categories within themselves. Camp in Charge (CiC) from Refugee, Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC), and Armed Police Battalion (APBN) comprises the main state actor in the camps. Similarly, local, national, international, and inter-governmental organization (e.g. UNHCR, WHO) work as humanitarian actors in the response. Refugees are another actors of this humanitarian government. And it can be assumed that there are mechanisms to ensure the stability of the camps in the extended situation. The study investigate the mechanism with regard to camp governmentality and refugee agency.

1.2 Rationale of the research

More than 10 million refugees live in protracted situation in the Global South. They are embedded in multifaceted social and political relationship with other actors in the camps. Different forms of power circulate among the actors as connecting threads of the camp governmentality. Power plays in the PRS and its connection to refugee actors is crucial to the peaceful existence of refugee camps. Humanitarian organizations (HO) along with state actors tend to manage the protracted refugee situation through many strategies such as of self-reliance and local integration (Oliver & Boyle, 2019). However, the fact remains unchanged in many cases. They cannot provide wider scope of neither of these programs nor other rights for refugee. Nation-state system as well as IRR (re)navigate their national, regional and international intervention back and forth based on the mundane dynamics of the camps.

However refugee encompasses a wider space in state and international perspective, International Relations (IR) as a discipline has paid little attention so far (Betts, 2014). This

¹Burma/Myanmar – Myanmar is the official name of present-day Burma since 1989. But the existing literatures also use Burma. Both of the names have been used here to refer to the same country.

thesis highlights the significance of state and non-state actors (humanitarian organizations) of International Relations as well as unveil the mode of interaction with refugees in the complex settings. Critical engagement of multiple actors (national and international) along with refugees' active participation warrants for an in-depth investigation of PRS. This research argues not only the non-refugee actors but also the refugee themselves support the stability and non-violent existence of refugee camps. Refugees are also an actor of the complex power plays of refugee camps. This ethnography unveils the power dynamics and refugee agency to that end. Accordingly it steers the focus on refugee camp in the Global South as an ideal site for IR especially for 'everyday IR' in understanding world politics through many micro-practices and micro-politics of international actors in the camps.

1.3 Objectives of the research

Governmentality in the camps evolves from complex interaction and power relations among the different actors in the camps. In this regard, majority of the research examining camp governmentality from the state sovereignty-territory perspective (Agamben, 1998; Arendt, 1979; Minca, 2015; Ramadan and Fregonese, 2017; Wahab, 2022). Wahab (2022) claims for governmentality as 'hybrid governmentality' particularly in the Rohingya camps while Laocharoenwong (2020) and McConnache (2014) argue for 'gusted sovereignty' in the autonomous refugee camps in Thai-Burma border. Accordingly, Turner (2005) outlines the camp governmentality as 'layered sovereignty' of the major actors of the refugee camps in Tanzania. Installation of sovereign power in the exception de-politicizes the camps (Bousfield, 2005) where the UNHCR-led governmentality utilizes the community tactics of the refugee (Hyndman, 2000; Lecadet, 2016; Bulley 2014). This dynamics transforms the camps into a hyperpolitical space in the long-run (Bousfield, 2005). Such situation and terrain of refugee camps have got many names so far: 'state of exception (Agamben, 1998), political space (Redclift, 2013), city (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000) and so on. Concomitantly, refugees are labelled as 'bare life' (Agamben, 1998), 'subhuman life' (Uddin, 2020), 'political subjects' (Czajka, 2008) and many case specific legal-political names (Roy, 2021). Both the naming of the refugee spaces and labelling of refugees indicate different dimension of subjectivities or growing agencies of refugees in the camps.

Likewise as a largest humanitarian response, Rohingya refugee camps settings cannot operate and work indefinitely in a monolithic paradigm. Saying in other words, how the state and non-state actors' response to the growing agency of refugee in PRS requires an in-depth investigation not only for better protection of refugee but also for a peaceful camp under

humanitarian government. Thus, this research wants to unveil an empirical connection between camp governmentality and refugee agencies in PRS. Succinctly, this study aims to (1) broaden the understanding of camp governmentality by discovering refugee as an integral part of fragmented camp governmentality; (2) unfold refugee agency as a proxy tool for refugee to survive in particular camp governmentality; (3) draw the importance of link between camp governmentality and refugee agency in IRR towards the stability and longevity of PRS; (4) widen the scope of application of ethnography in studying phenomena of IR.

1.4 Research questions

During setting the research objectives, it is prevalent that existing studies did not connect the two important phenomenon of long-term refugee camps. Thus this research deals with the overarching question of ‘what is the connection between camp governmentality and agentic responses of Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh’. With a view to better comprehension of burgeoning issues of refugee crisis, this research breaks down this questions into several sub-questions. They are: how does governmentality (formal and informal) operate in the Rohingya refugee camps?, how does the Rohingya refugees’ agency interact with the camp governmentality?, how do the state and non-state actors perceive refugees’ agencies in the camp governmentality?

1.5 Assumption of the research

Based on defined research objectives and research questions, this study moves forward with the following assumptions:

Assumption-1: refugee holds an inevitable space in the power plays of camp governmentality of the PRS

Assumption-2: non-refugee actors (state and non-state actors) counts refugee agency as an inevitable tool of camp governmentality

Assumption-3: refugees exercise their power and agency for their survival and well-being

Assumption-4: the connection between camp governmentality and refugee agency keep the camps stable in extended period.

Resultantly it has adopted a bottom-up approach in studying the links between camp governmentality, and agentic responses of Rohingya refugees in the camps in Bangladesh. Review of the ontology of the settings resolved me for a particular epistemology of the research too. Therefore, I investigate the issue by applying ethnographic methodology. I carried out in-depth interview, observation, and informal hangout with the three important actors—refugee,

humanitarian organizations, and state authority—of this PRS and the discipline of International Relations.

1.6 Research ethics

It is an ethical research. In the ethical issue, I strongly believe that refugee as human beings have every inalienable human rights. They are a vulnerable group of people. As a researcher it was my duty to make sure that my research in no way endangers their rights and lives. So, I used to bear in mind during interaction with refugee the great notion of Mary B. Anderson's 'do no harm' and saying of a refugee in Sri Lanka 'so many people are coming, asking and then going' (Anderson, 1996; Mackenzie et al. 2007; Rajaram 2002). Thus, the crucial ethical issue was not to harm them anyway- by speech, by promise or by action. Ethical guidelines and consultation with university committee for Ethical Approval (Annex-A) helped a lot to maintain ethical standard. From research design to drawing conclusion of the research, everything has been done under ethical consideration.

Every respondent of this study irrespective of refugee and non-refugee actors is adult. They are independent and capable of deciding themselves. I carried out their interviews with voluntary and verbal consent. At first the respondents were informed about the project; project aims and purpose in detail. Information Sheet (Annex-B) was presented or read out before them for informed consent. Most of the participants belongs to a complex and sensitive situation. Moreover, the refugees are vulnerable as well mostly illiterate or illegible in Bengali (written) or English. So, the ethnography was conducted on trustworthiness with the respondents rather than legal or written consent because written consent illustrates the legal issues but cannot ensure the ethical issues (Huber & Imeri, 2021). The respondents had full freedom to ask for further information before their participation decision. In addition, they were promised full freedom about their participation or withdrawal in the research until the data were analysed. Local culture, norms, values, and sociolinguistic issues (Briggs, 1986) have been considered sincerely during interaction with informants. Above all, respondents were paid full respect during the entire procedure and accepted politely the withdrawal of some respondents even in the middle of their interviews. Couple of refugees withdrew themselves from the interview process. I can say a refugee-centred approach (Dona, Esin and Lounasmaa, 2019) was exercised in conducting this study with Rohingya refugee.

Collected data (e.g. interview transcripts, fieldnotes, images) is stored in my personal and password-protected computer. The final data has been used anonymously in the thesis. Pseudo-

names for refugee participants and codenames such as ‘SA’ for State actors and ‘NSA’ for Non-state actors or respondents from NGOs and IGOs (Intergovernmental Organizations) were put to preserve their anonymity and confidentiality. Moreover, for technicality only the codenames of participants, that is ‘R’ for refugee, ‘SA’ for state actors and ‘NSA’ for non-state actors are used in NVivo software for data analysis. As the research contains many confidential data, I maintained research ethics and integrity in the data collection, storage, use, and reuse of the result. So, a master file (Babbie, 1995) has been created to maintain the accuracy of the data in the final report. Since it is an individual study, there is no chance of illegitimate use of data even in the long run. For the same reason, there is no obligation of data sharing with any NGOs or other entities. In other cases, I acknowledged all the stakeholders of my research project. I guarantee, the study procedure and findings do not allow/accept any exploitation and consequences (Halperin and Heath, 2012) to the study subjects. Importantly, I am even fine to supply a report to research participant upon request once that is ready. Thus, the interested participants can have a chance to look at the thesis.

1.7 Structure of the thesis

My thesis broadly tackles three claims. First, it argues refugee as an integral part of camp governmentality. Secondly, it unpacks agentic responses of Rohingya refugees in the prevailing camp governmentality that indirectly can portray refugees as human rights bearer rather than individual only with biological life. Thirdly, it claims that the relationship between camp governmentality and refugee agency support the stability and longevity of the camps. Likewise, the first chapter reviews the relevant literature to figure out the gap in existing studies. This section explored both the issue of studies on governmentality pattern as well as studies on refugee agencies from diverse perspectives. During this exploration disciplinary perspective of IR, epistemological, and methodological paradigms have also been considered for the onward flow of the thesis. A thorough review of the literature resolved to study the link between camp governmentality and agentic responses of the refugees because these issues mostly have been explored separately and partially from sovereignty perspective. The chapter that follows outlines the details procedure of the thesis. This part justifies the methodology of the thesis. Accordingly, it sheds light on why ethnography is effective for this kind of study in IR as well. The selected methods such as in-depth interviews, and informal conversation are found productive in garnering complex data from a transnational site. This part also clarifies about the ethical challenges of researching with the vulnerability of the vulnerable, and mechanism to address them.

The third chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. Since this thesis looks into two major phenomena of refugee camps: camp governmentality and refugee agency, this chapter justifies the application of the Governmentality theory of Michel Foucault and his interpretation of 'agency'. The governmentality theory of Foucault attracts diversified interpretation and myriad applications in different discipline. Henceforth, I consider the governmentality approach from the perspective of exercising power in a given setting. The fourth chapter touches upon the historical account of how the Rohingya refugee have been created all throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century. Considering the colonial trajectories, it highlights the instrumental legal framework and power plays of quasi-military government of Burma towards the indiscriminate statelessness and refugeehood of Rohingya people. It also provides some first-hand account of their last days in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. The first category of findings has been presented in the fifth chapter as 'structure and mechanism of camp governmentality'. Likewise, it presents the data in thematic excerpts. Here, I address the diverse settings and practices of the camps. Emerged themes of this section such as 'spatial technology', 'exclusionary bureaucracy', 'informal leadership', 'legal vacuum' are presented with analysis based on Governmentality approach of Michel Foucault. In fact, a robust governmentality mechanism operates in the camp with the ambiguous participation of three actors: state actors, non-state actors and refugees. And they are intertwined with the thread of multiple power plays. They exercise and circulate power in the form of sovereign power, disciplinary power, biopolitics/humanitarian assistance, and microphysics of power. Concomitantly narratives of dispersed power dynamics have been revealed in the sixth chapter.

In the next chapter, I focus the connection between governmentality and agency of refugee based on empirical evidence. The thematic presentation reveals that different forms of agencies emerge among the refugee in the protracted situation. They also constitute and exercise power along with other actors of the refugee camp. Refugee do not live a bare life rather they cooperate, coordinate, demonstrate their position, demand for rights, strengthen their identity in new relationships, and above all they adapt to the challenging situation of the camps. Net-like power dynamics of heterogenous actors necessarily produces subjectivities among the muted refugees in the long run, and thus keep the governmentality active for an indefinite period. Once the findings are analyzed and presented in a thematic format, I turn on to the conclusion and the eighth chapter of the thesis. This chapter discusses the findings and revisits the research questions whether they have adequately aided the answers or not. Drawing on the

most relevant literature, it touches upon the points of contribution of the thesis too. A recap of the findings contends that particular forms of governmentality create particular dimensions of agencies among the refugees. And emergence of agencies is obvious in the multiplicity of power relations. While agency is embedded in humanitarian government, it turns into an essential tool for refugees' well-being and stability of the camps. Succinctly, I tried to defend that 'refugee agency' is an integral tool of fragmented camp governmentality. Relationship between camp governmentality and refugee agency exist as a normal and everyday phenomenon of the Rohingya camps that support the peaceful existence of this PRS.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This chapter ascertains the research gap of the thesis by reviewing the most relevant existing studies systematically. The review has been carried out in three main steps: making a checklist of keywords/themes/concepts from the research proposal, mapping the source of relevant literature, and a review of the literature. The preliminary database was produced through a Boolean search process- open searching by keywords such as camp governmentality, refugee agency, politics of refugee governance, and life of refugees in protracted situation. A significant number of literature was managed from peer-reviewed journal such as the *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*, *Journal of Refugee Studies* and *Refugee Survey Quarterly* (Oxford), *Refuge* (York), *Journal of Human Geography* (Elsevier) and so on. This literature exploration has been presented here broadly in two sections as per the two main phenomena of this thesis- the nature of camp governance and refugee agency. This part looks at the heterogeneous apparatus, tactics, strategies, power, set-up, and assemblage, institutions that have been highlighted in the existing studies as part of the techniques of camp government or humanitarian government.

Refugee camps have been explored across the discipline in Social Science from multifaceted perspectives. Different empirical evidence confirms refugee and refugee camps as political space as well as a high interest in international politics (Haddad, 2008). Since the refugee problem is deeply connected with the ordering of the world and its populations into sovereign territorial states (Lui, 2000; Soguk, 1999), state and non-state actors take the responsibility to maintain the national and global ordering of nation-states. Every system produces some kind of governmentality. While some studies have illustrated the governmentality of the refugee camps from diverse angles, other studies unfolded refugee agencies discretely rather than demonstrating a link between them. Therefore, this part aims to identify what has been written on the topic; determine the extent of interpretable trends or patterns; aggregate empirical findings related to a precise research question to support evidence-based practices; generate new frameworks and theories; and identify topics or questions requiring more investigation (Paré et al., 2015). The following part also discovers the limitation of the existing relevant studies on camp governmentality, refugee agencies and the connection of the two narratives- if done so far any. To that end, I am outlining here how the existing literature has painted the operation of camp from the perspectives of different kinds of power circulation among the

actors in the camps. It categorizes the dimension and dynamics of powerplays and relations among the multiple actors in humanitarian government. Apart from state actors, a camp however may contain many other non-refugee actors such as NGOs, IGOs, militant groups, and civil society. Though they might not be equally present and influential in the camps. Refugee camps are the laboratory of the sovereign power of the state that declares camp as a ‘state of exception’ as well as a ‘zone of indistinction’. Most of the non-refugee actors support or remain silent to governmentality whether it offers agency or biological life to the refugees instead of human rights. Both production and failure to manage the refugee problem undermine the state system that immediately permeates to the international level. However, International Relations considers sovereign power as such that generates strangers and exclusion (Dillon, 1998). In this vein, my research aims to illuminate the politics of the camp governance and the exercise of power by different actors from different perspectives. A thorough review of those studies supports mapping the framework of this thesis onward. The literature exploration takes place from the global and regional level to the selected case of Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh.

2.2 Refugee camps: Governance with rationality

Refugeehood is primarily the outcome of state-making and remaking processes in an unending cycle of imagined communities in a territory (Soguk, 1999). They are embedded in the nation-state and international state system respectively by sovereign power and the so-called protection strategy of the international organization- UNHCR (Haddad, 2008; Loescher, 2001). Every state determines to protect their sovereignty and exclusive national identity in a political binary of insiders and outsiders of their territory while the international state system and global humanitarian organizations eventually oblige to work under that state jurisdiction. Such dynamics make refugee political and an international entity (Czajka, 2008; Betts & Loescher 2010). The state actors do not consider the refugee only as passive recipients of aid, but rather from a security perspective or a threat to sovereignty. Modern nation-states govern the flight of population both in exoduses and influxes. Failure to do so is a kind of (mis)conduct that causes national and international instability (Lui, 2000). This perception eventually generates an additional arrangement of control and surveillance from the state authority. On the other hand, humanitarian organizations or non-state actors need also funding to survive in this system. Two oppositional themes—refugee as a threat to state actors, and to humanitarian organizations victims in need of protection—prevail in camp operations (McConnachie, 2014). Nevertheless, in the protracted situation the interactions exceed the binary of aid provider and

receiver. The community engagement and self-reliance approach (Hyndmann, 2000; Bakewell, 2003) transmit some power to the refugees while refugees think of humanitarian support as their rights. Humanitarian organizations handed over more responsibilities to the refugee both to decrease refugees' boredom and the operational budget. Eventually this technique of engagement empowers the refugee by deciding about their services and gaining skills from the services. Whatever the ground of engagement, the everyday interaction of state and non-actors with refugees' protection turns 'camps' into a complex and ambivalent entity. Every actor possesses some kind of power, and all together generates a complex power dynamic. State actor operates the camps as a 'state of exception' from a sovereign authority perspective. While the non-state actor practices 'humanitarian government' and refugee seek better protection and rights in their enduring exile.

Arendt (1979) claims from her personal experiences in Europe in the post-WWII that refugees have no rights to have rights. Concomitantly, Agamben (1998) theorizes refugee as 'bare life' and camps as 'space of exception' having no political and legal jurisdiction of their rights. Referring to Aristotle's *zoe* (common life) and *bios* (meaningful life) for life, he identifies the refugee as *zoe* or just living a biological life without any meaning of political agenda and participation. Agamben argued this transformation of life as the result of the logic of sovereignty in the refugee camps or the state of exceptions because camp is a place where 'the inhabitants are stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life. Camp is also the most bio-political space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but bare life, without any mediation' (Agamben, 1998, p. 97). Agamben construes refugee camps as norms of the modern nation-state. This framing by Agamben has been influenced so pervasively that sometimes it becomes obligatory to refer to Agamben in studying refugee camps, refugees' life, and their agencies in the camps (Tuastad, 2017). But prototype Agambenian camps and the refugee camps in Global South differs explicitly in controlling the population. Later the camps those are not solely operated by state actors, contend well in Foucauldian perspectives (Lippert, 1999). Lippert (1999) asserts the application of special technologies, rationalities and practices of the refugee regime and it reminds the very core elements of 'governmentality'. In this domain, humanitarian government incorporates and practices participatory and community-based approach in their everyday programs for refugee. Lippert (1999) indicates a core shift that IRR has transformed into liberal tactics from a disciplinary power. From a top-down approach his study analyzes the governmentality of international refugee regime, not from ground level or refugee camps. His study connects well

and demonstrates the rationality of Foucault's Governmentality approach particularly in Refugee Studies and IR at large. Thus, a bottom-up study on camp governmentality seems to be complimentary to Lippert's (1999) study. In other words, while his study has drawn a chronological line of the different strategies of IRR as governmentality, my study captures their effects, multiplicity, and interactions on the ground. Without addressing the multiplicity of governance or just relying on state-centric narrative, camp governmentality cannot be truly grasped. Such multiplicity consists of state actors, local national, and international humanitarian organizations as non-state actors, local community, civil society, and refugees in encampment. However local and national NGOs join on an adhoc basis, international refugee regime of UNHCR remains standby to respond to any refugee crisis.

UNHCR and other international organizations (e.g. OCHA, WFP, WHO) take over the control of humanitarian response from local NGOs with a structured format, logistics, technologies, legal frameworks and so on to expedite the response. Resultantly, different categories of actors exercise various forms of power or produces hybrid power to operate the refugee camps. Other than state actors of this study, non-state entities (humanitarian organizations and refugees) are also considered highly important in (re)shaping and co-determining values, norms, processes, theories of state and other participating actors in the global arena or world politics (Price, 2003). Geographically these studies mostly have been conducted in the PRS of encampments in African, Palestinian, and South-Southeast Asian perspectives while makeshift and transit camps (e.g. in the Global North) offer a different type of narrative- not relevant to this thesis. Most of the refugee live in these zones of the globe and they have been in encampment for decades. However, some studies might partially take on the same narrative, not only geographically, but each of the cases also differs contextually from others.

Hyndman (2000) delineates the camp governance mostly based on the practices of UNHCR and geopolitical perspectives in African refugee camps. She draws some evidence of governmentality in the *Dadaab* refugee camps in Kenya that how UNHCR utilizes refugees as a community and collects necessary information-resources to operate the camps. However, being a humanitarian staff and researcher then, Hyndman also acknowledges the life-saving efforts of UNHCR. Bulley (2014) indicates the use of community labelling of refugee just as a tactic of governmentality by UNHCR. Based on three major cases in the African context, he highlights that such a community can overturn the spatial technology of camp governmentality too. This community tactic supports the authority to manage, direct and control a particular group of population. He mainly counters the Agambenian framing of refugee as bare life

through the lens of the community power of refugee. However, he failed to connect the refugee agency with the camp governmentality of other actors (e.g. state actors) in the camps. While they examine the issues more from socio-political perspectives, Lecadet (2016) unfolds the interaction of refugee politics and UNHCR-led governmentality of *Agame* camp in the African context. It goes on to analyze ambiguities between the politics of refugee (self) and the politics promoted by UNHCR which prescribes and organizes the platform of politics and representation but eventually withdraws themselves or dismantles the refugee politics under the host country's governmentality. Despite UNHCR advocates to increase the representation and participation of refugee in camp governance, eventually refugee go to protest to secure their rights in the camp. Lecadet highlights the process of the emergence of politics among the refugees rather than talking about governmentality or agency per se, moreover, by skipping the state actors from the power play, his study voids the actual scenario of camp governance.

From a mere governance perspective, Agier (2011) focuses on the categorizations of human beings into refugee or undesirables and their management under the nexus of government, NGOs, and international organizations. In this course of descriptive analyses, the author argues that however the management nexus turns to control from care, it cannot resist from reconstruction of social order and transformation of the site as a city or marketplaces. His study did not overlook the merger of humanitarian governance with host country's government to eliminate any kind of politics in the camps. It considers the general managerial perspective and its connection to refugee rather than carving out the nature of prevailing power dynamics among the actors in the camps. Influential studies by Malkki view camp as the 'technology of power' of state actors but produces new political subjectivities among the refugee even after entering the camp as bare lives (1992, p. 34; 1995; 2002). In her case, refugees enjoyed some sort of freedom to live even outside of the camps and mingled deeply with the host community people too. In this regard, Owens (2009) considers the camp as a paradigmatic site and victim who are governed and controlled under the 'governmentality' techniques of Foucault. She maintains that Foucault mainly devised this tool to interpret the governance of a particular category of people in organized practices and techniques. Turner (2005) demonstrates about the 'layered sovereignty' of three actors of the camps: the Tanzanian government, international organizations, and refugees. The different roles and angles oftentimes overlap in the camps. He argues that bio-politics by UNHCR does not stand thus refugees revive with their history and politics. His framing of 'layered sovereignty' or sharing of sovereign power by different actors bears some questions from the ideal perspective of state sovereignty.

In the case of Asia, after the Vietnam refugee crisis (now resolved), Burma or present-day Myanmar is the source of the largest number of refugees across the region of Southeast and South Asia. Most of the Burmese refugees escaped to Bangladesh and Thailand. The studies on refugee camps in the Thai-Burma border illustrate a different kind of camp governmentality that is based on ‘gusted sovereignty’ (Laocharoenwong, 2020; McConnache, 2014). Researchers unfolded refugee agency and micro-level governance of camp from a semi-autonomous Karen refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border. A camp committee is endorsed by the Thai government, and refugees enjoy a bit of freedom in operating the camps and leading their quotidian life. Indicating the influences and inputs to local distribution systems in other Thai-Burma border camps, Bochmann (2018) connects refugees’ microstructure with greater camp order. Importantly her study demonstrates how the micro level of power exercises particularly by refugees can articulate the power of camp governmentality. Since the refugee organizations and structure enjoyed much freedom in decision-making, his study did not portray the perception and reaction of state actors regarding this micro-structure of refugees in the camp. The author, after all, was able to contextualize such activities as agency of refugees in the Karen refugee camps under a ‘gusted sovereignty’ of the Thai government. Williams’ (2014) study in a different context of camp in Africa but dealt with similar kind of camp structure that was also operated by the exiles with limited oversight from hosts and donors. Refugees could forge significant agencies in that governmentality. Refugees in such a situation even can exercise some sort of sovereign power endorsed from the host country government, however such practice does not happen in this case of my thesis. In this regard, Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon offer an exceptional narrative of refugee agencies in the existing camp governmentality of refugee camps across the globe.

Oesch (2017) investigates the dynamics of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan wherever he finds three forms of power: sovereignty, disciplinary and government in the inclusion and exclusion of dwellers in the host country. Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East are the hallmark of studies on ‘refugee agency’ across the globe. National and local government as well as UN organisations along with other humanitarian bodies execute the state of exception in such a way that the process turns the camp into a political space (see also Sanyal, 2014; Ramadan, 2012). Internationally these camps are labelled in different ways, and they are managed by UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency) instead of UNHCR. Palestinian refugees are not only refugees but also refugee-citizens of the host country (Oesch, 2017), a kind of state in making in those camps (Hanafi, 2008). However, it highlighted the rationality of the

government of Foucault during discussion of political rights of the refugee, it overlooked the discursive and dispersed nature of power that can also be played by the refugees. A situation of 'graduated sovereignty' prevails in these camps and refugees exert political agency over other actors in the camp. It is an archetype/exceptional one compared to other refugee situations across the globe. Installation of different forms of power by multiple actors however paints a narrative of the 'zone of indistinction', this thesis cannot be referred to any cases such as the Rohingya refugee crisis in the Global South. Governmentality operates in the camp through the exercising of different forms of power by multiple actors including the refugee and their agentic response to governmentality. However, some scholars have investigated the camp governmentality of Rohingya refugee camps from different perspectives, yet to link refugee agencies with camp governmentality of such a state-enforced camp.

Wahab (2022) argues that the Rohingya camps maintain a hybrid governmentality of interplay between bio-political power and territorial practices of the host government. The host country government, however provided refugees a sanctuary to save their lives from genocide in Myanmar, now perceives Rohingya refugees as a threat to the territory and sovereignty of the country. By applying ethnography in human mobility studies, he reveals the historical and contemporary de- and reterritorialization of shaping the refugee camps area in Cox's Bazar. The study depicts mainly the physical demarcation of the camps and the social segregation of refugees from citizens. It emphasizes how the nation-state applies power and control strategies over the dwellers of the camp. But the study lacks a discussion on the interactions with the state and other actors of that governmentality, and drivers behind the geographical shaping of the camps. As per the governmentality concept of Foucault that the author also followed, not only the state actors but the refugees also have the scope to exercise power, meaning that the power circulates in ground level too. While Wahab (2022) portrayed territorial dynamics of governmentality, Poyil and Chowdhury (2020) shed light on the impact of biometrics registration or technological tactics of governmentality on the stateless Rohingya refugees in the camps in Bangladesh. Biometrics registration ensure the effective circulations of humanitarian aid whichever women are the household head. Thus, the process emerges agencies and empowerment of women to some extent as the authors argued. They identified biometrics as a technology and tool of governmentality to regulate and control the 'undesirable and maladapted people' in the refugee camps whilst it happens as 'quasi-identity' of the asylum seekers in the Global North. The study partakes the governmentality through biometrics registration. However, it did not trace how the non-refugee actors (state and humanitarian

organizations) interact with refugee regarding this registration and create subjectivities among the refugees in general rather than only the women. The study considers non-state actors as a part of the hybrid structure of sovereignty in the camps but discusses nothing about the manoeuvres of refugees in tackling the situation.

The studies explored above predominantly dealt with some aspects of camp governance, not much on the power dynamics of the governmentality. Most of the studies focused on sovereign power of the state actors in the camp and connection with the political agency of the dwellers, ignoring many other dimensions of agencies among the refugees. Most of the studies delineate refugee agencies independently rather than connecting with camp governmentality. Both the operation of camp governmentality and the growth of refugee agencies indicate a connection (supporting and conflicting) between these two narratives of protracted refugee camps. Exploration of such connection broadens the camp's understanding of why and how different actors act in particular dimensions other than something else.

2.3. Refugee agency or re-politicizing refugee?

In the post 1990s or the decaying age of repatriation, the ethnographies of Malkki (1995) and Hyndman (1997) accentuate the issue of agencies of refugee based on evidence from several protracted situations in Africa. Malkki (1995) investigates the agentive capacities of Hutu refugee from Burundi in Tanzania. To her, refugee demonstrate agency in reshaping and generating new spaces after displacement as emplacement with a sense of belonging and identity. On the other hand, Hyndman examined the self-governance capabilities of Somali refugees (women) that happen in a community; however, refugees are not a recognised community. A community-based approach to humanitarian aid gained momentum in the 1990s to avoid the 'dependency syndrome' of the refugee (Turner, 2001). Although community-based operations are advocated by non-state actors and highlight democratic practices among the refugees, they eventually pose a challenge for humanitarian actors (Hyndman, 1997). Humanitarian organisations cannot do what is needed for democratic leadership among refugees because of dissatisfaction with the host government. Agier (2011) in his extensive work elucidates several events of de-politicization in camps that foster the agency of refugee under humanitarian assistance. It touched upon the instances of political agency or demonstration that show how NGOs support the host government in reducing the political activities of refugees in the camps. It is one of the responsibilities of non-state actors to keep refugee as human being without any political involvement. Nonetheless, camps turn into consistent ones in the long run and inhabitants look for their economic, social, and cultural

agency within (Chaux, Hugh & Greenwood, 2018; Turner 2015). Recently, studies such as by Turner (2016), Ramadan (2013), and Oesch (2017) challenge Agamben's theory of bare life and claim that refugee can (re)produce a lot of ambiguities and agencies. In this regard, the abandonment of the Lebanese state has turned the Palestine camp into a de facto state in the making (Hanafi & Long, 2010). Palestinian refugees are exceptional in the world and live under a special arrangement of UNRWA in Lebanon and Jordan in the largest number. Palestinian refugee and their refuge have existed there for more than seven decades. They have quite better facilities for food provision, health, education, and so on. However, they have no political rights such as voting that can affect the shifting of power of the host government. Exceptionally, the Palestinian camps indicate a growing political agency of refugee that strengthens the narrative of state-making for refugee as a solution.

The protracted exile of Somali refugee has transformed the Northeastern part of Kenya into a city (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000) and grown as a strong commercial hub for refugees. Nyers (2005) illuminates similarly from a security context that non-status refugee also questions the monopoly of the state's sovereignty through forming political identity and agency in the long run. The study focuses on the articulation of the political agency of the non-status Algerian refugee in Canada from the refugees' moral and ethical claims, not from succoring to refugees. He shows how the refugees formed different political activities unitedly against their deportation decision or state sovereignty. Eventually non-status refugee obtained their human rights through continuous renegotiations and protest different policy implications of the Canadian Federal and Provincial government. Nyers' study elucidates an exemplary narrative of the political agency of the refugees but that they were in a resettlement set-up rather than in an encampment situation like in the global south. Furthermore, lip-sewing in Australian detention centres (Owens, 2009), protest against headcounts in Dadaab camp (Hyndman, 1997; 2000), signature in asylum paper of a child by own in Sweden (Ottosson, Eastmond and Cederborg, 2017), 'dugar'- a dangerous way of getting in lorries for UK from Calais refugee camp in France (Ravn and Hansen, 2017) are few examples of growing agencies of refugee and asylum seekers but not an exhausted list worldwide. Purportedly, studies of these kinds based on momentary agentic responses, failed to accentuate the remoulding process of agency in complex camp governmentality of the refugee camps.

Despite that, evidence from PRS constantly has been challenging the reductionist discourse of Agamben. De-politicization of refugees in the state of exception affects reversely; and can

transform the bare life into a life with agencies in the long run (Ranciere, 1999; Bousfield, 2005). About Agamben's logic of sovereignty, Bousfield (2005) claims that since there remains no sovereign power in the state of exception, there persists a chance of political space for refugee because they have no sovereign voice. Based on different interpretation of the logic of sovereignty, he claims there is space for politics and political agency of refugees within the critical foundation of the Agambenian concept. Beyond politico-juridical caricature, humanitarian actions remain the last resort for refugees' survival and living life. It is kind of a de facto durable solution (Roy, 2021). The history of their own forced displacement and mass knowledge production on PRS partially reinforced the refugees to accept extended exile. While the flow of refugees itself shows their agency (Arendt, 1951; Terry, 2002), in the prolonged exile they reconstruct complex interactions, resilience and capacity among them, from micro-level to macro-level of transnational mobility.

Black (2019) claims the political agency of refugees in *Buduburam* camps in Ghana, and the responses of state and humanitarian organisations to that political agency of the refugees. In prolonged exile, refugees organise themselves to protect and claim their rights from the host country (Omata, 2017). Both of these studies highlight political demonstrations but ignore many other meaningful practices through which refugees express agency such as social relationships and interactions within the refugee community, livelihood and everyday efforts of capacity building for well-being. So how does the governmentality aspects in assemblages of institutions, rules-regulations, control and surveillance work from refugee and non-refugee actors remain absent significantly. Ravn and Hansen (2017) delineate migrants' agency concerning the exercise of sovereign power. Their study mainly shed light on different actions and behaviour of refugee in a makeshift type of situated context in Calais, France. However, the state authority maintains control and surveillance, and refugees frequently apply different techniques (e.g. *dugar*) to move out from the camps. Eventually, most of the refugee manage to leave the temporary camps or the camps dissolved by the government. It is likely in the case of Calais camps in France because the refugee situation is different in the Global North than that of the Global South.

In the case of Rohingya refugee, Roy (2021) illustrates, based on Arendt's (1979) and Agamben's (1998) perspectives that the genealogy of nation-state, accordingly, sovereign power paved the way for the exclusion and persecution of Rohingya people in Myanmar. Agamben indicates the political rights of refugee from the perspective of sovereign power and nation-state in which sovereign control void them and turn the camp into a state of exception.

His theorising of 'bare life' is based on political proposition and empirical evidence from Nazi concentration camps in Europe. However, many scholars raised that Agamben is misread and oversimplified in refugee studies (Absushama, 2021). Nevertheless, some studies have so far illustrated the Rohingya refugee narrative from Agambenian perspective of 'bare life' too. Olivius (2014) identified Rohingya refugee from the 1990s influx being more passive; lacking community spirit than that of Karen refugees in the Thai-Burma border from Myanmar. That study focused on the participation of refugee in the camps in Thailand and Bangladesh in gender equality program and found Rohingya refugees were less participatory in such development activities than Karen refugee in Thailand. The study painted a partial view of refugee activities in the camps only from the humanitarian workers' perspective. It completely lacks the accounts of refugee, and the study process raises questions about whether they have a sufficient scope of participation and negotiation, what the other windows for wellbeing and challenges in protracted situations. The military government in Myanmar has been stripped of their political and human rights since its independence in 1948 (Ibrahim, 2016). In addition, the regional and international community could not fix anything so far in their favor, which ultimately dragged Rohingya into much insecurity (Roy, 2020). In the case of the Rohingya people, very actors seem unable to maintain the minimum norms of human dignity in treating them. After fleeing Myanmar, they found a sanctuary in Bangladesh for protection with some basic needs. An empirical study by Uddin (2020) framed those narratives of the Rohingya people during and after their flight from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Sketching about five hundred such inhuman narratives, he named this group of people as 'subhuman' who do not have a proper life as human being. Put differently, they demonstrate no agency, no voice and no rights about life and well-being. Since Uddin (2020) conducted the study immediately after their influx in Bangladesh, not even a camp now, it is obvious they are exposed to both psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. Contrarily, while refugee learn about the environment and resilience to adverse situation, they can regain some sort of agency too (Omata, 2017), which was not possible to capture in Uddin's study. Besides, different interest-based power blocks keep growing for the time being and (Rohingya) camps cannot be bare of politics as well (Farzana, 2016).

From a different perspective, Farzana (2016) indicates the revival of new identity and belongingness through everyday life in the 'state of exception' of the previous makeshift camps in Bangladesh. Refugee youth, however, carry trauma and Otherness; they produce and reproduce complex social relationships vertically and horizontally in their camp life by using

memories and artistic expressions. That is neither monolithic nor static. They endeavor to live within the granted condition of refugee camps. However, she did not argue the growing agencies among the refugee in general, focused only on the youth. She examined some actions of refugee in challenging the restrictions from sovereign power in the camps. Eventually, refugee people have been rebuilding a community among themselves in their decade-long life in exile. Rahman (2019) quite chimes with this claim of place-making and belonging of Rohingya women in the refugee camps. Being driven from persecution in Myanmar and the unlimited challenges of camp life, they find comfort in the women's prayer place- *Taleems* wherever they share grievances and try to heal their sufferings. Rohingya women thus consider this place as their very own and be spirited for their everyday challenging life. Women recall their identity, construct relationships, and ultimately gain agency among themselves for coping with camp life. *Taleems* is an excellent place for sharing the healing of their traumatic displacement, but it is not convincing how the refugee (Women) within a short period of displacement can create attachment and belongingness in the refugee camps. However, rebuilding family and home for women is easier in the flexible refugee scenario of Syrian refugee in Turkey (Kanal & Rottmann, 2021). Moreover, structural, and tactical issues of the camp governance remained disjoint in Rahman's (2019) study. Sengupta (2020) in her study on Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh illuminates the difference between the old and new refugees where the new and youth are more vocal and conscious about rights in the camp than the past refugees. As a sign of agency, an indefinite number of Rohingya refugees from the previous exodus have already unofficially assimilated with the host community (Ahmed et. al, 2020). The refugees from the latest influx stopped the inappropriate repatriation attempts two times in 2018 and 2019. In addition, Rohingya community leaders and volunteer conducted many responsibilities because of the massive shortage of humanitarian staff during the COVID-19 restrictions in the refugee camps. They succeeded in overcoming the nightmare of Coronavirus by building up necessary protection awareness (Islam and Yunus, 2020) and community services under the remote supervision of non-state actors. Above all, every camp and dwellers in the camps entail some sort of governmentality as well as different types of agentic responses. Therefore, it is important to examine the part of refugee to that governmentality and find out the link between these two phenomena of refugee camps. The above review finds some studies on camp governmentality as well as different manifestation of agency among the refugees but none of the studies illustrate the structure and mechanism of that governmentality and connects it with the agentic responses of (Rohingya) refugee. The following table indicates the summary of selected and most relevant studies that also helps to quickly discern the gap of the literature.

Table 2.1: Summary of Selective Studies on Camp Governance, and Refugee Agency

Geographical location	Author (selective)	Type of camps	Focused actors	Focus about governance /governmentality	Focus about agency
Africa	Hyndman (1997; 2000)	Encamped	UNHCR and refugee	Techniques of UNHCR	Used as community
	Agier (2011)	Encamped	State and non-state actors	Governance rather than power dynamics	Social transformation/agency
	Malkki (1995)	Encamped	Refugees	Power of State actors/sovereign power	Identity
	Turner (2005;2015)	Encamped	State, non-state and refugees	Sovereign power	Political agency
	Omata (2017) Black (2019)	Encamped	Refugee and state actors	Power of state actors	Political agency
Middle East/Palestinian Refugee camps	Owens (2009), Oesch (2017), Ramadan (2013) Hanafi (2008)	(almost) autonomous	State, non-state and refugees	Power dynamics in the camp	Political agency
South-Southeast Asia	McConnachie (2014), Laoscharoenwong (2020) Bochmann (2018)	Semi-autonomous	NGOs and refugee organizations	Self-governance and power exercise by refugees	Political as well as social agency
Rohingya camps, Bangladesh	Wahab (2022), Sengupta (2020), Poyil & Chowdhury (2021)	State enforced /institutional camp	State (sovereignty and territory)	governmentality	--
	Olivious (2014), Rahman (2019), Farzana (2016),	State enforced /institutional camp	Refugee (women, youth)	--	Socio-cultural agency
	Uddin (2020)	State enforced /institutional camp	Refugee	---	No agency at all/ vulnerability

The literature, those have been reviewed so far, highlighted partially camp governance, and camp governmentality, while some literature attempted to theorise the camp as a ‘state of exception’ and the exercise of sovereign power basically by the state and non-state actors across the geography. Such power relations are determined as ‘fractured sovereignty’ ‘hybrid governmentality’ ‘graduated sovereignty’ and so on. Some of them focused practices and activities of refugee while all practices do not indicate power of the subjects in the camps. Existing studies do not consider refugees as actors of the power plays in camp operation rather they are labelled as community or bare lives. Most of the studies overlooked the power-based

agency of the refugees. In some cases, governmentality and sovereignty have been conflated, thus, confusing the understanding of power operations in the camp among the actors. However existing debates and evidence contribute a bit to understanding the politics of camp governance and different forms of agencies, those are accomplished mostly in separate studies. As a result, there remains a grey area of camp governmentality and refugees' response to its operations. Dominant narratives label camp and camp dwellers as depoliticised, the counter-narrative in the above literature attempted to tackle it only from the perspective of political action or agencies of the refugees while many other individual and collective responses or power plays of the refugees have been ignored. Most importantly existing studies do not discover the power of refugee and modality of exercising power along with two other actors of the camps. The reviewed literature indicates for a connection. This thesis manoeuvre to fill in the gap that how do the refugee exercise power in fragmented camp governmentality and creates agency among them. In other words, unpacking the connection between two phenomenons helps to comprehend the stability and existence of PRS across the globe. To that end, this research has discovered the structure and mechanism of camp governmentality where it is orchestrated. Moreover, the studies are more state-centric to discuss the dispersed power relations in the camps. Therefore, this dissertation considers all the three actors and tends to unveil the comprehensive scenario of camp governmentality and the agentic response of refugees to the camp governmentality. It focuses on the power play at the micro level with an indication of link to macro level that refugees, state, and non-state actors are deeply integrated into the international order.

2.4. Operational definitions

Rohingya refugee

'Rohingya refugee' is a humanitarian labeling/naming of Rohingya people in the camps in Bangladesh. Their situation complies well with the 'refugee' definition of the UN Refugee Convention 1951 that any person who 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it' (Article 1.A.2). Since Bangladesh is not a state party of UN Refugee Convention, they are not granted refugee status. The GoB and UNHCR register them as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) (Roy, 2021).

Nevertheless, almost all the non-refugee actors identify them as Rohingya refugee in everyday camp operation and interaction with Rohingya people. Moreover, the term Rohingya refugee is more humanitarian and comprehensive for academic purpose. So, the term ‘Rohingya refugee’ has been used throughout the research.

Protracted refugee situation

In the Protracted Refugee Situation (PRS), refugee or refugee-like people remain in exile for longer period. Initially UNHCR defined it both in temporality and quantitatively (Milner, 2014) that in a situation where at least 25,000 refugees from the same country of origin live in a refuge consecutively for five or more than five years (UNHCR, 2004). But afterwards, UNHCR refers to PRS as a refugee situation where refugees have been in exile for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions (UNHCR, 2009). Only the UNHCR has the mandate to decide about humanitarian action and solutions of refugee crisis. PRS is a ‘long standing, chronic or recurring context and for which no immediate prospects for a solution’ (Loescher et al., 2008, p. 23). The Rohingya refugee crisis is one of the five largest refugee crises in the world. Since Bangladesh did not accede to the UN Refugee Convention 1951, they have no refugee status. But in humanitarian taxonomy, they are well known as refugee and indeed, a protracted refugee situation. The latest and largest influx has passed five years since 2017 while more than 200,000 refugee have been in sanctuary in the same location for more than three decades. Therefore, the Rohingya refugee crisis is not only a PRS but also a complex scenario of old and new stateless refugee in the camps in Bangladesh.

Actors: State and non-state actor

This is an actor-centric research rather than a focus on particular event of a structure. It considers all the major actors engaged in refugee camps. In doing so, my research emphasises the state actors, refugees, and non-state actors (NSA). However, identifying state actors is easy and simple, NSA cannot be demarcated that simply. Broadly, everything other than the state belongs to non-state categories. ‘The simplest definition of non-state actors is that they are entities other than nation-states that interact in the international political system’ (Taylor, 2018, p. 20). Thus, non-state actors consist of (a) institutions, (b) irregular militaries and militia groups, (c) fundamentalist groups, (d) ethnic groups, and (e) ‘states-to-be’ (Charountaki, 2022, p. 3; 2020). Refugee is a special category of population who attract much attention and influence in IR and other Social Sciences. Likewise, refugee is a non-state actor but more independent and exceptional than state and other non-state actors in the refugee camps. While

state actors label refugee as 'Other', humanitarian organisations consider refugee primarily as aid receiver (Feldman, 2015). They are not granted any decision-making power in the camp governance. So (Rohingya)refugee have been discussed here as an independent actor rather than conflating with other non-state actors for better precision of the study objectives. Every non-state actor possesses some sort of ability or capacity to influence the state actor. The mode of influence may be cooperating as well as conflicting.

Refugee is not just a migration issue rather it entails economic burden and security challenges for the host country. Countries in the global south contain 80% of the total refugee and they follow a similar kind of governing strategy. Specifically, refugee must stay inside the camps. Refugee becomes a priority concern of their domestic and foreign policy. Host countries establish authorities and offices for the coordination of this non-citizen of the state. In other words, camps maintain a specific governmentality or complex techniques of governance for refugee. It is controlled by state actors however the power relations are not linear, here the non-state actors can play a strong hold too. Accordingly, the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh are state-enforced camp and governed by the Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. Approximately fifty government officials play the main role of camp administration in different camps as 'Camp in Charge' (CiC) headed by a Commissioner (Additional Secretary of the GoB). Most of them are the mid-level officials of the government from the Administration Cadre Services of GoB. CiC represents the GoB in the refugee camps. A sufficient number of Armed Police Battalion (APBN) member looks after the security issues of the camps. APBN along with the CiCs ensure the governance, law and order of the camps. And they are the state actors (SA) of this thesis. Besides, there are various categories of humanitarian organisations engaged in the massive humanitarian action of the Rohingya refugee crisis. They can be broadly classified as local, national, and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs). However, IGOs have mandate from each of the UN member state, they are not part of the GoB. They are non-state actors (NSA) of this research. In such a state-enforced camp, civil society do not raise their voice strongly in favour of refugee. NGOs and IGOs such as UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, WFP belongs to this group. Thus, NGOs and humanitarian organizations are used here seamlessly as non-state actors without making any differences. Among the international organizations UNHCR and IOM directly engage with camp management. They manage half of the camps each. As per the IRR framework, UNHCR leads the response while IOM plays a quasi-leadership role in this humanitarian government.

They call upon approximately another hundred NGOs to partnering the responses for different services. The extent and multiplicity of actors turn the refugee camp into a complex space. Due to ‘empirical and conceptual complexity’ (Arts et, al. 2001, p. 300) studying non-state actors in IR is intriguing as well as toiling. Therefore, refugee camps offer an ideal scope for understanding the dynamics of non-state actors in global and complex governance.

Refugee camps

The refugee camp is a special spatial set up for sheltering refugees in the destination country. It entails divergent and contested definitions to academics as well as to other state and non-state actors. Refugee camps vary widely based on geography, socioeconomic conditions, political, legal, and cultural perspective of the host country. Nowadays, most of the discussions on refugee camps refer to Agamben (1998) who delineates camp as ‘state of exception’ and ‘zone of indistinction’ based on the perspective of Nazi ‘Concentration Camp’ in Europe under absolute control of the government. According to Agamben dwellers live a ‘bare life’ or just a biological life stripping off all their political rights (zoe) in the camps. But the present-day camp in Global South, more specifically the Rohingya refugee camps, differs from ‘Concentration Camp’ or Agambenian camps of bare lives. Instead, this thesis considers camp as the ‘sites for the creation and formulation of new politics’ (Sanyal, 2014, p. 558), and ‘arenas of particular types of governmentality that produce certain effects’ (Turner, 2010). Rohingya camp is an institutional or state-enforced camp where refugee live in (complete)encampments.

Most of the refugee live in the Global South. They live in a designated place under humanitarian action and remain as refugee in the host country sometime forever, whereas the status of the refugee changes in the time being in the Global North. Most of the refugee in the Global North are integrated into the resettled countries eventually (Gurer, 2019). In the Global North, refugees can live and mix with host community people from the beginning of their landing in the destination country. Here, the states have a monopoly over refugee management. However, some NGOs do some human rights advocacy for the refugee. Except for some deportation, central and provincial government look after refugee’s basic needs, education, safety, and security until their settlement. They live temporarily in the permanent structure of a transit camp in private accommodation under sponsorship (Hyndman, Payne, and Jimenez, 2017) or independently in the demarcated area. Importantly refugee can live in an urban area, but refugee in the Global South is placed in the remote corner of the country.

The extent of refugee camps is more visible and indefinitely temporary in this region. Camps are located in the under-developed and developing countries of Asia and Africa. Camps in the

Global South are mostly state enforced. The state is the authority of those camps but humanitarian organisations have a stake in the governance. They are governed mainly in a hybrid structure; however, governmentality is complex and fragmented (my argument). State actors hand over some authority to the IGOs to manage the camps (e.g. Rohingya camps). Sometimes partial authority is handed over to the refugee themselves (Laocharoenwong, 2020). It happens mostly to reduce the multiplicity of the burden of hosting refugees in the protracted situation. And in the protracted situations, refugee camps transform diversely. Camps become more securitised by the state in extended exile. Some of them turn into a ‘state of being’ (e.g. Palestinian camps in Jordan, Lebanon), or a city like situation (*Dadaab* in Kenya). This geographic difference of refugee management also embodies with socioeconomic, legal, and political scenario of the destination country. The largest host countries in the Global South are either non-signatory or do not oblige to the UN Refugee Convention 1951. For instance, hundreds of thousands of prima facie refugee live in the refugee camps in Kenya, Tanzania, Bangladesh for decades but they have no refugee status as well as human rights in the camps.

Agency

The concept ‘Agency’ has been interpreted widely across the discipline, in some cases with just slight differences. In Social Science literature, ‘agency broadly refers to people’s capacity to define their own choices, to devise strategies and to take initiatives to accomplish their objectives, even in the face of opposition from others’ (Long, 2001). Every human being entails agency (Hansson et al, 2015). As Narayan and Petesch define ‘agency... is about people’s ability to act individually or collectively to further *their interests*’ (Narayan & Petesch, 2007, p.15). But it depends on the structure or the system they interact with, particularly any kind of vulnerability affects or largely suppresses agency. So, this section outlines a justified concept of ‘agency’ for this thesis by gleaning insights of Foucault and other different thinkers from Social Sciences.

The debate on agency remains lively from the ancient to the postmodern period. Pioneer thoughts of agency encompass the common mood of action that it happens through habit or routinised activity. Aristotle uses the term ‘hexes’ to indicate any settled state leading to action. Hexis or habits turn into virtues or excellence of character that takes place with appropriate action as per the wisdom (Emibrbayer & Mische, 1998). In the later period, St Thomas Aquinas in his ‘Treatise on Habits’ refers ‘Virtue is habitus which is always for good . . . [It] is a habitus by which a person acts well’ (Aquinas, 1948, p. 822, 824 cited in Emibrbayer and Mische, 1998). Agency in IR is discussed from the perspective of state-centrism and non-state centrism,

while 'everyday IR' widens the scope for study and discussion of agency. In this regard, Realist define agency as the exercise of power by government or any institution of the state while non-realist or mainly liberalism understands agency as the action of an individual, in another sense exercise of power with morality, rationality and dignity. According to Realist perspective, Hans Morgenthau (2005) emphasises the exercise of power as determinant of man's agency. A group of scholars in the Enlightenment period showed a glimpse of the interpretation of human agency by embedding capacity and freedom to individual actions. Meantime, the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant highlights the dualism of human action between rationality and morality whichever he argues for moral action while freedom is imperative, grounded in individual will (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). In other words, Kantian perspective of agency emphasise individual's dignity and power rather than state-centrism (Teson, 1998).

In line with the hexis or habit of the Ancient and Medieval centuries, the Theory of Practice of Bourdieu remained dominant for decades as a concept of agency in modern period. Bourdieu (1977) pointed out social action as a diagonal process between structure and agency in which he challenged the static conceptions of society and focused on how the actors reproduce the social system. Bourdieu clarifies the agency through the concept of habitus, field, and capital. The agent evolves a set of roles and multi-layered relationships in the field or structure and develop a set of expectation for the future. However, the actions are not articulated, natural and taken for granted, they are mobilised according to a particular situation or context. Quite in a similar direction, Giddens (1984) denotes people's activity that happens continuously as a process with practical consciousness in a social setting. In this process, social actors monitor, and rationalise their activities (Tuker, 1998). Thus, in Structuration Theory, Giddens (1984) connects the structure and agency that are mutually dependent. In the duality of structure, agent become able to deploy causal or influential powers (Giddens, 1984). Structure determines and constrains the actions. Foucault argues for subjectivity of individual in a social system. The regime of power or governmentality bring forth changes and resistance among the subjects (Foucault, 1975). However, there is disagreement among scholars about the nature of the agent, the types of capabilities needed for and intention, as well as the extent of efficacy in producing outcomes (Coole, 2010) as Sen (1985) argues that agency aspects of a person are influenced by his/her well-being and freedom. It depends on the person's capability. Agent exercises 'effective power' and 'control' to achieve their goals or aims (Sen, 1985). It may be in the centre of a person considering his capacity to create those in a particular social arrangement. Agents by using resources and rules tend to reproduce or amend the system or structure for

their development, for instance poverty reduction (Sen, 1985). Their actions may be adaptive efforts over the environment or self-control (Barandiaran et al., 2009) or overcoming significant institutional and informal obstacles too (Smulovitz & Walton, 2003).

Despite the multiplicity of interpretation, chronological, and disciplinary analyses stand on a basic point: agentic action. Agency endorses actions embedded with goals, capacity, and power. Agentic individuals perform actions according to his/her particular structure and attributes of the community. Therefore, the action may be routinised or irregular, temporal or relational, intentional, or unconscious, influential, or ordinary and so on (Giddens, 1984; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Certeau, 2004).

2.5. Concluding remark

Since most of the studies have highlighted either only the common structure of governance or the governmentality or the (political) agency of the refugee discursively, this thesis endeavors to link between governmentality and the agentic response of the refugee particularly among the Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh. Furthermore, it offers a greater precision of the question why and how the power structure of the camp evolves in a particular dimension, and how the refugee, national and international non-state actors act in a particular direction to sustain the system. While the issue of the agency of refugee has attracted much attention in refugee scholarship, how the agency of refugee is articulated in the governmentality of camps and what elements under state and non-state actors respond to this agency is an under-researched area. Perception of the agency of refugee by the state and non-state actors is also unexplored in the studies that have been reviewed here so far. Thus, findings of the study may contribute to the scholarship of Forced Migration and IR. Moreover, little research has been carried out in the case of Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh, and it is difficult to presume that findings from different countries, settings, and refugee crises can be applied elsewhere. Thus, the context demands an intensive and in-depth analysis for appropriate and timely research intervention. I have attempted in the following chapters to give the above questions optimum focus and argue the interconnectedness of governmentality and the agentic response of refugees in the Rohingya camps. By doing so, I hope my study enrich this scholarship both in this case as well as Refugee Studies in general.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

The primary data for this thesis has been garnered from a six month-long ethnography in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh from August 2022 to January 2023. However, my academic connection with the Rohingya refugee crisis began five years back in this fieldwork. I wrote a dissertation at my Masters level based on secondary data on the crisis. Due to funds and time constraints, I could not collect primary data at that time from the camps. Later I designed a small-scale project on Rohingya refugees and host community relationship for which I visited the camps for a short time in 2018. As an academic I visited again two times the refugee camps and host community in 2019 too. Some changes in the spatial set-up and refugees' lived experiences were noticeable, which brought forth several ideas for further study. The experience and short research interaction with refugees supported me a lot designing this research and conducting the long-time fieldwork with the vulnerable Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Previous research experience in this humanitarian action resolved me that I need to gain their trust to collect the necessary data for this research. And that was possible through building a rapport with the respondents.

This thesis investigates the links between camp governmentality and agentic responses of Rohingya refugee in the camps in Bangladesh. They are in protracted exile, and their situation of living in the camps has changed to some extent, after their sanctuary in the camps. Refugees have been passing through a complex relationship among the different actors in the camps. Here the state actor is not the only entity that exercise her sovereign power, but non-state actors also apply disciplinary and liberal power in this 'state of exception'. According to the theoretical framework of this thesis, refugees are also essential actor of the respective governmentality, and power circulates also through refugee actors. They wage into continuous negotiation, bargaining and (re)constructing their community in the time being. Every actor has a part in this governmentality of ambiguous space of refugee camps. Therefore, it is attempted here to figure out apposite methods based on the research paradigm of the study.

3.2. Paradigm of the research

Research paradigm helps to look at the world and investigate the phenomena, subjects, and objects within it. It is a belief system and framework of research (Rehman & Alharthi, 2016). It assumes ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods. Guba and Lincoln (1994) define

paradigm as a basic set of beliefs or worldview that guides research action or an investigation. Every research has some basic elements such as reality, objectives, and process of attaining the goals. After a deep consideration of the paradigm, an effective approach has been determined to accomplish this research. It marshals empirical data from ethnography to unpack the issue of the operation of camp governmentality and its connection to agentic responses of the refugees.

3.2.1. Ontology of the thesis

Approximately 1.3 million Rohingya refugee have been living in the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar of Bangladesh (Uddin, 2022). They are the most persecuted and stateless ethnic group in the world (Ahsan Ullah, 2016). Rohingya were stripped of citizenship rights by the quasi-military government of Myanmar, and subsequently faced the first genocide of twenty-first century. The largest exodus of Rohingya people occurred in 2017. Their deplorable condition is beyond description. Myanmar government wants to clear the Rohingya people from their land, and the Bangladesh government offered them sanctuary. They have no human rights and dignity anywhere. They have no political or economic rights to lead a proper life. Considering their grappling narrative, they are identified as 'subhuman' (Uddin, 2020). Nevertheless, after spending a considerable period in exile in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, transformations are noticeable in their attitude and realisation about their life in the camps gradually.

3.2.2. Epistemology of the thesis

The study targets an in-depth understanding of the governmentality of Rohingya refugee camps and agencies among refugee in a humanitarian government. It is essential to discover the meaning of the lived experience that people have undergone from a particular event (Merriam, 1998). I considered the actors with priority those are directly involved in this humanitarian phenomenon. The three main actors of these refugee camps exercise and circulate power among them. A complex situation prevails in the camps. The action of these actors is driven by their purpose and interest, ultimately a stable and long-term existence of the camps. Accordingly apposite tools and techniques are required to unfold the dynamics of the camps. Thus, it applies the constructivist paradigm because it is based on the assumption that the human world is not simply a given one rather 'it is constructed through actions of actors themselves' (Kratochwil, 2015, p.17). This study unfolds the structure and mechanism of power, growing agencies, the interaction of different actors in the camps and changes thereafter. The targeted data about that particular socio-political circumstance can be well understood 'through the eyes of participants rather than the researcher' (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 21). Perception issues are related to the daily

events happening around the subjects. Therefore, the study applies the ethnography for deeper understanding of the phenomenon.

3.2.3. *Justification of ethnography*

This selection of methodology is also theory driven. Besides to discern the refugee camps governmentality better I employed bottom-up directions to connect it with the agentic responses of refugees. In this regard, I found ethnography as an effective mechanism for discovering the camp governmentality from the bottom or the ground. The governmentality of Michel Foucault differs from many state-centric approaches (Lippert, 1999). It equips the researcher to avoid state-centrism in empirical evidence. While Everyday IR has been at the forefront of investigation, ethnography comes up a tested mechanism to focus on such sites (everyday life) for international inquiry (Lamont, 2022; Lie, 2013). Generally, in the Constructivist perspective of IR, predominantly in Critical scholarship every human being matters whether located remotely or in the internationally influential hub. However, refugees belong to the bottom of a nation-state or society; they are hyper-visible nationally and internationally. In this regard, Bulley's (2014) review can be mentioned that ethnography can illustrate well the very nature and meaning of camp spaces, agency, and uncontrollability of the refugee community. Since ethnography takes up the bottom-up approach, it can carve out new elements for IR from these marginalised populations affected by very international politics, cross-border, and transnational processes too (Johnson, 2014). Furthermore, for a new understanding of pre-empirical views of IR, as a different method, ethnography can connect everyday life and global processes from the direct experiences of life and practitioners in the field. It embodies a range of methods to garner data from particular settings. Thus, ethnography helps to unfold sites of marginalised, practices and the production of IR irrespective of the practitioner (Montsion, 2018).

3.3. **Sampling technique**

There are total 32 Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. Among them 28 camps are in *Ukhiya* and 3 in *Teknaf Upazila*² (sub-district) of Cox's Bazar district while the other one is located in *Bhasan Chor* of *Nuakhali* district of Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2024). And 31 camps in CXB were in consideration for this thesis. During the six-month fieldwork the first month was spent mapping different attributes of the camps. During the phase, one or two camps were

²*Upazila* or sub-district refers to an administrative unit of local government of Bangladesh. Now there are 495 upazila in Bangladesh.

explored and observed daily based on a checklist of demographic information, spatial set-up, type of NGOs active, nature of community leadership (democratic or traditional), and formation of the camps. The density of refugees, labelling of refugees as new, old and mixture were also in consideration during the exploration. Regarding camp structure, it has been tried to select camp both from planned and unplanned camps. Since Site Management Service (SMS) coordinates the camp operation, they were categorised into national, international NGO and international organisations. Following an inclusive criterion, finally, six camps—five from *Ukhiya* and one from the *Teknaf* area—were in the sample for in-depth fieldwork.

Table 3.1: Category of Rohingya camps

Camp No	Density of refugee	Community leadership	SMS (Managerial Organizations)	Formation	Upazila (location)	Composition of refugee
2W	Moderate	Traditional	National	Unplanned	<i>Ukhiya</i>	Mixed
4Extension	Lowest	Mostly democratic	International	Planned	<i>Ukhiya</i>	Mixed
6	High density	Traditional	National	Unplanned	<i>Ukhiya</i>	New (since 2017)
11	High density	Traditional	IGO	Unplanned	<i>Ukhiya</i>	New (since 2017)
14	High density	Traditional	IGO	Unplanned	<i>Ukhiya</i>	New (since 2017)
26	Moderate	Mixed	International	Unplanned	<i>Teknaf</i>	Mixed

Source: Author, 2024.

The research applies purposive and cluster sampling in selection of research participants. This sampling technique is relevant and justified for this study since I am not drawing any statistical generalisation from the data (Robson, 2002). The sampling is carried out based on criteria regarding the categories of respondents: refugee, state, and non-state actors. Broadly the Rohingya refugee, Rohingya community leaders, Rohingya volunteers, NGO staff, camp management authority (RRRC), and security members are the participants of the research. In the case of the Rohingya refugee respondents, they have been selected from three clusters such as ordinary refugee, refugee leaders and working refugee or volunteers in the camps. Camp in-charge (CiC) were selected from the same camp, who have been working there for at least six months. In addition, the CiC who is in charge of more than one camp has been prioritised for interview. NGOs which provide service for education, community development and protection issues have been considered for interview about the Rohingya’s engagement in those services. Eventually, my study reaches out to the following number of respondents:

Table 3.2: Distribution of research participants

Type of Actors	Category of participants	Sub-category of participants	Number of respondents	Comments
Refugee	Refugee	Ordinary	36	
	Refugee	Working refugee /community leader		
State actor	Camp in Charge	Camp authority	05	
	Police member	Security	05	
Non-state actor	NGO staff	Service providers	11	
Non-state actor	IGO staff	Coordinator		
Total Respondents			57	

Table 3.3: Breakdown of refugee participants

Camp	Working	Ordinary/non-working	Community Leaders	Male	Female	Total
2W	2	3	1	5	1	6
4Extension	1	4	2	5	1	6
6	2	2	2	4	2	6
11	1	3	3	5	1	6
14	2	2	2	6	1	6
26	3	1	2	4	2	6
Total						36

3.4. Methods

The thesis examines the complex issue of camp governmentality and agency of refugee in general and of Rohingya refugee in particular. And it emphasizes digging out qualitative data that encompasses a complex set of observations, records, information, and narratives of a specific context, those are not limited to numbers (Richards, 2005). The governmentality of refugee camps is based on a plethora of tactics, strategies, legal framework, policies, and protocols. Beyond the IRR's intervention, the host country manages the humanitarian government as per the state's interest and positions. Here such accounts have been critically analysed to understand the nature and extent of the governmentality of the Rohingya refugee camps. It develops and employs different types of techniques, and different types of research material for different categories of research participants. Before the in-depth interview, I observed their socio-economic, political, and cultural context in the camps according to a checklist that includes the relevant narrative of the humanitarian set-up, the principles, legal framework, politics, and practices. Put differently, the research design entails the content analysis, in-depth interviews, informal hangout, and observation to garner the necessary data for the research.

3.4.1. Interviews and informal hangout

Participants of this research live in the complex situation for years. So it is rational to emphasize their thinking and perspective in terms of lived experience, interactions, and resilience. Using the one-to-one and face-to-face interview, it was effective to obtain the necessary data to understand the scenario. This type of interview allows the interviewee to think and express their challenges, needs, experiences and understanding (Nunkoosing, 2005). Much of the information of this research came in without asking the respondent leading questions rather it happened through opening them up for specialised and relevant information from a single respondent or a small sample size (Halperin & Heath, 2020). Informal hangouts were kind of informal interviews with the participants because it is not only ‘the most common among ethnographers’, but it also provides a ground for establishing ‘transparency’ between the researcher and the participants (Fetterman, 2019). Certain precautions were observed during the informal hangout. It was aimed to keep the research objective in focus during the conversation. There were some guidelines for mingling with the refugee participants indeed.

The Interview tool

Considering the research objectives and categories of respondents, I used a semi-structured protocol for interview. The interview schedule (Annex-C) contains open-ended and probing questions in different stages of the interview. Most of the relevant literature were reviewed before formulating the interview tools. It helped to understand about context and interlocutors. There were no leading and double-barreled questions. No jargon and no obtrusive language were included in the questions. The instruments follow five sequences: introduction, warm-up, the main body of the interview, cool-off and closure (Halperin & Heath, 2020). For refugee respondents, in the warm-up segments it was attempted to open up the participant by asking about their journey from Myanmar to Bangladesh and the very first condition of camp life. On the other hand, state and non-state actors were asked about their perception of working with in the settings of refugee population. Since the participant actors are involved in different roles and positions in the camps, the same set of questions was not feasible to garner appropriate data for the study. So, the interview protocols were customized according to the different categories of respondents. Interviews typically length between 45 and 90 min, were voice-recorded, fully transcribed, translated, and thematically coded using the qualitative analysis software NVivo.

3.4.2. Observation

The observation was carried out in two parts: context and activities of different categories of actors. In this respect, refugees were observed based on their category of refugee leaders, working refugee and non-working refugee. Focus of this study is to unfold the operation of governmentality and emerging agencies of refugees in that governmentality. So, observation of the situation and actions were essential for this research. Both refugee and non-refugee actors comprise a complex set of governmentality and are thus likely to create the agency of the refugee. Therefore, it observed all three actors in the selected refugee camps.

Sampling procedure

The place and participants for observation were selected purposively and randomly in the camps. However, observation mostly happened in the selected six refugee camps. Working refugee have been observed in their working area. Some of them were the same respondents interviewed/interacted during this fieldwork. Refugees, I observed them during their serving of other refugees in the Learning Centre, Multipurpose Centre and volunteers' interactions in the blocks of the camp. State and non-state actors were observed in their desk or office compound. Such events happened mostly from second visits as a way of informed consent and rapport building with the participants. It was conducted with a moderate interval between two or more occasions.

3.4.3. Content analysis


Content analysis is relevant to figure out the operation of governmentality in the refugee camps in general and especially the Rohingya refugee camps because many actions are influenced by policy. Thus, I am applying content analysis as a preliminary analytical strategy (Prior, 2014) for better insights into the empirical data. As a non-signatory state actors however primarily follow the national rules and regulations, they cannot ignore international humanitarian norms and legal framework. Bangladesh has acceded many documents of human rights covenants and protocols. The content analysis helped to understand the implication of those documents during the response to Rohingya refugee. On the other hand, non-state actors and NGOs focus on execution of international protocol and norms. Eventually, they are obliged to negotiate with state actors too. Sphere Handbook (2018), UN Refugee Convention 1951, Global Compact on Refugee (GCR), Refugee camp management related GoB Circulars, Joint Response Plan (JRP) (2021, 2022, 2023) are just indicative rather than an exhaustive list of policy documents by state and non-state actors. Moreover some NGO reports have been investigated for

understanding the humanitarian set up of the Rohingya refugee camps. Most of the documents were found in web searches. Some papers were explored in the respective offices too. *Kutupalong* information centre in *Ukhiya* of Cox's Bazar and RRRC office in Cox's Bazar showcase some documents for the visitors. I visited both places several times during my fieldwork. During communications and interviews with UNHCR's representatives, I got a chance to go through hard copies of different documents in the UNHCR office in Cox's Bazar. They displayed many updated policy documents on the Rohingya refugee response. Since they do not allow borrowing, short notes were taken from those documents and relevant excerpt or data have been incorporated and discussed mostly in the findings and discussion segments of the thesis. Some of those documents support both in empowering and directing the non-refugee actors in exercising their power in the refugee camps.

3.5. Process of data analysis

Except for the two respondents from UNHCR, all the research participants spoke in Bengali or *Chittagonian* Bengali during the interview. Observation and field notes are also taken in Bengali. I cleaned the data in two phases. Primarily I deleted all the redundancy of the transcripts and then completed readability from fractional segments into a formal write-up (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). In this phase, I was frequently connected with research assistants to confirm the context and meaning of the sentence. After completing the Bengali transcription, I translated them into English. The maximum accuracy of translation was ensured by reading and re-reading as well as asking for random check with my research assistants. In the next step, I imported all the interview transcript and field notes to the NVivo. It followed the seven steps of Creswell (2009) to sort out the data and find the emerging themes for analysis through data blending and a constructivist approach.

Figure 3.1: Process of Data Analysis



Source: Creswell (2009)

Data condensation

Cleaned and reviewed data has been condensed through primary and second cycle coding. This segment was carried out by exercising NVivo software. However, a draft codebook and group of keywords were developed manually during reading and reviewing different transcripts (interview, observation and fieldnotes). It comprises both words and short phrase from transcripts. A word search was run in NVivo to select the word or phrase in the primary cycle codebook. A chunk of second cycle codes is labelled from this primary codebook. Each of the codes or pattern contains a significant number of relevant and representative primary codes. The entire process took place back and forth, it did not end until the final analysis and write-up.

Identifying the nodes and pattern

Since these patterns developed from several threads or key information, eventually these patterns worked as analytical themes of the research. Several themes have emerged here in my research under the two broad concepts- camp governmentality and refugee agency. These

themes manifest different kinds of relationship, connections, matrices, and dimensions through inter and intra level. Relevant international documents on camp operation as well as notifications of Rohingya camps authority (e.g. RRRC) were also in consideration during the formations of themes for analysis. Different kinds of network displays and word frequencies have been operated before determining the final coding for analysis. However, the merger and deduction of component from the first cycle code took place during fixing the themes; they reappeared and weaved neatly in the later interpretation of themes.

3.6. Positionality, reliability, and validity

I belong between insider and outsider in this case, even having my Bangladeshi identity. Refugees are the major interlocutor of my research, those who differ from me in terms of language, culture, nationality and so on. Some of the actors (non-refugee) are from the inside or the same side of me that is supposed to create emic issues (Stake, 1995) to some extent. However, my position did not hamper in garnering objective data from the field. I manoeuvred to negotiate these differences between etic-emic status with maximum reflexivity (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010). To that end, I tried my best to engage actively in the entire research process that has been asserted in this methodology. It is neither possible nor desirable to overlook the researcher's subjectivity in qualitative research (van der Riet, 2012). Longtime fieldwork was effective in balancing and controlling my subjectivity during this study. Besides this continuous reviewing, and triangulation of findings supported the objectivity of analysis and reflexivity to a great extent too. Some small-scale previous research and knowledge in the same context helped me not only to reduce biases but also to increase research objectivity.

Research is not only conducted for an immediate contribution to the discipline but also for some humanistic or social value. The fruitfulness of a study depends on reliability and validity. However, 'attaining absolute reliability and validity is an impossible goal for any research' (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982, p. 55), I have attempted to establish the dependability and authenticity of my research from natural settings. I believe my research contains standard reliability. To maintain reliability, I followed several effective processes: extensive literature review, theoretical underpinning, long-term ethnography, methodological articulation, comprehensive and constant testing in NVivo. This issue has been taken care of since the developing of research proposal to analyzing of the findings. It has done academically and logistically. A maximum number of relevant studies were explored to find out the research gap as well as the methodology of studies in a similar context. Besides, the theoretical framework

also supported me to equip and navigate the study theoretically and empirically. Moreover, it helped me to devise proper fieldwork tools and techniques for research operation. Accordingly, I select my research informants and design category-wise interview tools for them. Most importantly, the collected data itself provided a great scope for cross checking within. Interviews were carried out separately from three different actors of the study. An intentional interval and intervention were maintained during conducting interviews with different categories of actors. So, it effectively allowed me to rethink some of the tools and techniques in fieldwork. I would say it was possible because of lengthy ethnographic fieldwork. On the other hand, observation and informal hangout not only enriched the database but also worked as a window for (interview) data verification back and forth. Henceforth, I think my research will be stable over time and other researchers can rely on the findings.

Some guidelines on qualitative and ethnographic studies supported me to defend the validity of the study too. Research case, research population and respondents have been selected rationally and systematically. All the research participants are adult. Thus, they could speak at their full capacity about the experience and events that occurred to them. The study design itself demanded diversified categories of respondents, and data were collected accordingly from the three main groups of participants. The participants have several intra and inter-categories. For instance, other than gender differences refugee respondents are categorised as ordinary refugee and working refugee, they are also geographically dispersed across the camps broadly from two distant locations. Regardless of the different categories of participants, data has been garnered by applying different methods- interviews, observation, informal conversation and field notes. In addition, prolonged fieldwork provided an opportunity to observe the same events, location, and participants repeatedly too as a way for the accuracy of the data. Most of the processes happened naturally rather than intentionally. So, there was no chance of preference of one group over another, which has also been dedicated through connecting data in comprehensive analysis as well as 'thick description' (Geertz, 1972). I believe the back and forth reviewing of data, and analysis reached a better authenticity of the study. Along with solid back up of literature and theoretical justification, empirical evidence moved the way forward for this research rather than any preconceived knowledge thereof. Me and my field assistants used to maintain separate field notes for observation and informal hangout. Moreover, I asked for a daily reflection about fieldwork every week by my assistants. Since both of my field assistants were trained in ethnography as an Anthropology graduate, I found their everyday query, notes effective and acceptable for the research. I considered their

rival observation too. This member checking and data blinding continues until the final write-up of the thesis. Moreover, I presented partial findings at several conferences and seminars (e.g. graduate research fellowship at Centre for Refugee Studies, York University; ISA Conference 2024), wherever I received significant peer comments and feedback. This debriefing filled in the lacking of original research participants' observation on the report to some extent. I responded onsite and considered them seamlessly in analysis. The 'backstage' experience and activities mentioned above were also worthy of enhancing the reliability and validity of this research. Therefore, I can ensure the reliability and validity of the research, and it can be replicable, and applicable in similar context of other state-enforced refugee camps or comparable settings across the globe.

3.7. Challenges during the fieldwork

Data collection in a refugee camp setting requires permission and official approval especially for access and security of the research team. For that purpose, I applied duly for permission from the respective refugee office in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh: RRRC. My past small-scale research and experience with Rohingya refugee accelerated the approval process this time. Besides, I utilised my Bangladeshi university references as well as some personal connections with the administrative personnel of the government to secure this permission. Research assistants were essential for this kind of ethnography because I was not that learnt about the cultural issues (e.g. language, religion) of the research participants. My local supervisor helped me with hiring two Research Assistant (RA) and local networking onsite, they were university graduate from the same locality. I oriented them about my research and techniques of data collections and guided them about their role while applying the methods of data collection such as interview, observation and informal hangout. They accompanied and helped me in conducting interviews and taking notes in detail. Since I led the interviews or other procedures of data collections, it was not possible for me to take notes verbatim. Thus, the techniques produced double noting of an event that offered an opportunity of accuracy, validity, and reliability too. Considering the monsoon season, I rented an apartment nearby the camps. Simultaneously, I began to strengthen my network of local gatekeepers and NGOs onsite for data collection support. Once everything about administrative and logistic issues was settled by July 2022, I entered the field of Rohingya refugee camps in August 2022 and continued fieldwork uninterruptedly until January 2023.

From my fieldwork, I assert that researching refugees encounters many challenges. There were some ethical, academic, administrative, and logistic challenges during the fieldwork. Rohingya camp is a state-enforced camp. Refugees cannot go outside of the camp without permission. One of the challenges of fieldwork was to access the sites and participants. I went through all the bureaucratic procedure for obtaining permission to enter the field, which took two weeks and several personal visits to the relevant Commissioner's Office in Cox's Bazar of Bangladesh. I had to negotiate for some time with several non-state actors before their consent and participation in my research. However refugees were more interested and flexible, some of them refused to participate in the study. Moreover, it was challenging to act according to the vulnerable situation of the refugees. I was in utmost care of preserving their dignity. They have no sufficient livelihood opportunity. State and non-state actors cannot provide a standard number of basic services to them as well (e.g. size of shelter, education, health services). They are vulnerable and people in constant need. Bearing these in mind, I can confirm, I did not harm them knowingly and consciously. Nonetheless, there were some issues of disheartening. In most cases, the refugee respondents requested me for work opportunity outside the camps. In some points, they expected something material considering us as aid workers. But in both situations, I politely replied about my position and limitation.

There were challenges about accessibility to the respondent. However I could reach out to refugee respondent in snowball sampling, it was time consuming to interview with state actors and IGO respondents. Cancelling schedule and rescheduling were quite frequent issue with interviewing them. It caused some extra expenses for travel because of the cancellation of the schedule onsite. In addition, sometimes I had to wait for a week to discuss some urgent issues with my fieldwork supervisor about different challenging aspects of my fieldwork. Eventually, it was manageable because of long-term fieldwork, I could rearrange and reschedule the agenda within the framework. Like other research, my study is also not devoid of limitation. From the outset, I comprehended the lack of a single case study for this kind of research questions that could be generalised more from multisite ethnography. Moreover, regarding the duration of fieldwork, I feel the longer the better. To say differently, conducting ethnography for at least a year instead of six months could offer better precision of the study. Lastly, I wish I could have nighttime experiences in refugee camps. But that was not possible because of administrative restrictions and security reasons. Fortunately, such an exploration was not even demanding for my study.

3.8. Concluding remark

As per the ontology and epistemology, this thesis followed the ethnography to investigate the research questions. I believe the above sections clarify well that why and how ethnography can support examining the refugee camp phenomena of governmentality and refugee agency. To that end, it has deployed the method of interviews, observation and informal hang out with the three important actors of the refugee camps. There were challenges as well as some limitation in conducting the research. Nevertheless, it has observed all the ethical issues in accomplishing the thesis.

CHAPTER 4: GOVERNING AS AN OBJECT AND SUBJECT

4.1. Introduction

‘take life or let or live with a power to foster life or disallow it’

(Foucault, 1978, p. 138)

Theory guides a study (Anfara and Mertz, 2015) and ‘there’s nothing as practical as a good theory’ (Lewin, 1943, p.118). In this chapter, I outline a brief but justified dimensions of the ‘governmentality’ theory of Michel Foucault. The circulation of power of among different actors is in the centre of this governmentality theory. Concomitantly, it has been attempted here to outline the theoretical framework in connection with agency. Since agency is a broad concept, this framework encompasses other major interpretation in Social Science too along with the understanding of agency by Foucault. Several theories are applied to discern the nature of camp governance across the disciplines. Most of the refugee camp governance resembles to global governance because of the engagement of many national and transnational institutions, organisations and authorities. This governance forms and relies on many state and non-state entities who make decisions, enforce them, and coordinate them to operate the system or structure. Refugees however do not have any decision-making power; they remain at the centre of decision outcomes. Resultantly, camp governance entails a wide ranges of study and research in International Relations (IR). But my intention here is not to delve into the mere governance of the camp but rather focus on the camp’s governmentality. Governance highlights different connected processes of a structure, roles, and responsibilities, it does not offer any lens to analyse those processes or the underlying dynamics of their interactions (Sending & Neumann, 2006). Multiple actors of this complex governance produce new relationships, interactions, power dynamics and communications among them. IR as a discipline also explore refugee camps and camp governance from several theoretical perspectives.

4.2. Refugee in International Relations and theoretical underpinning

Refugees reached at the forefront of international politics. It is directly linked with state (re)making process and the crisis begins from a state within (Soguk, 1999). Afterward the crisis can spread anywhere in the globe. This crisis and the process of analysis indicate a bottom-up approach whereas International Relations explain refugee phenomenon mainly from a top-down approach. Most of the crisis belongs to the cleavages of Colonialism and Post-colonial narrative. Resultantly, refugee and refugee crisis encompasses many overarching issue of IR such as international security, international cooperation (e.g. North-South Cooperation), global

governance and transnational turn (Betts, 2014). Likewise some of the scholars have undertaken more institutional and historical perspective in studying refugee crisis immediately after the genesis of international refugee regime (e.g. UNHCR). It has dealt with as a European agenda. But the Cold War effect provided a new extent and turn about refugee issue. State and many non-state actors (NGO and IGO) considered refugee as tackling the Communist block and production of a dependency narrative regard to refugee crisis in the Global South. Success in the classical durable solutions established the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations as stronger non-state actors, kind of proxy of state to some extent, in resolving many protracted situations. Having an exhausted possibility of repatriation, IRR along with state actors attempt only for resettlement and maintenance of PRS peacefully from a Post-colonial perspective. Host countries remained highly dependent on IRR and former colonial master in this system. The incident in 9/11 reshaped with world order differently and refugees are labelled as referent object in 'securitized' system. Refugees are treated as terrorist or security threat for the host country. It radically changed the perception of refugee as 'bare life', 'muted' 'dependent' instead they are labelled as 'political entity', 'weapon', 'agents', and so on. Resultantly, it became warranted to study the complex issue of refugee crisis not beyond the dominance of Anthropology, Sociology but also from many more new angles or theories. Some aspects of refugee crisis are now analysed in-depth using Critical School of thoughts. Constructivist places the non-state actors at the centre of interpretation of world system. Since every entities, belief system, culture matters in IR, likewise they claim for human rights-based solution of refugee crisis across the globe.

A number of theories are used in discerning the nature of camp governance across the disciplines. Coloniality, Postcoloniality and some other specialized theory such as Feminism, Securitization theories are widely used in analyzing humanitarian government and politics in refugee camps. Both in Coloniality and Post-coloniality, refugee crisis turns eventually into a 'problem solving discourse' (Nyers, 2006) that can only be solved by Western/European knowledge or power (e.g. IRR). Securitization theory refers to the governmentality techniques by the State actors from security perspective. In such cases investigation takes a top-down approach. Betts and Loescher (2011) claims that most of the state-centric theories focus on the supply side of the refugee and they cannot address many important aspects of refugee such as agency. Moreover, internal power dynamics among the actors and resilience and adaptation issues in case of climate refugee, transnational turns are making the issue more complex. Above all, refugee crisis is so pervasive that it has been affecting the international society rather the

state system. IR as a discipline has no scope to ignore this issue to understand and engage with challenges of the twenty-first century. Traditionally however it seems grappling for IR, engaging and importing some concepts, theories from other discipline can definitely support to better comprehension of complex world phenomena. Considering that my thesis emphasizes on the bottom-up approach of studying camp governmentality, it requires some mechanism or theory that can carve out well the ground level or endogenous phenomenon of the camps. And the preliminary and final review resolved me about the governmentality approach of Foucault akin better to my research.

The theoretical underpinning of ‘governmentality’ for this dissertation considers the arguments made by Casasampera (2021) that ‘it is inherently linked to the exercise of power – power as governmentality, or governmentality as the exercise of power’ (p. 2). Power is omnipresent, repressive, productive as well as effectual. It encompasses a particular structure and mechanism to manifest its nature (Foucault, 1982). Governmentality operates at micro, meso and macro level, also vertically and horizontally. For Foucault, ‘power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere’ (1978, p. 93). Thus, the subsequent paragraphs delineate the theoretical aspects of ‘governmentality’ as exercise of multifaceted forms of power, and how it interacts back and forth with agency. The refugee camp is a nomos of the modern world wherever the nation-state and humanitarian regime engage in complex relationship with refugees. Almost all non-refugee actors in the camp tend to de-politicize and strip of the human rights of the dwellers through a particular process of governance. The entire politics of management develop an assemblage of institutions, regulations, organisations, tactics, and strategies to make refugees apolitical. Different forms of power evolve in the centre of that camp governmentality. The operational structure and mechanism of the camps builds on that form of governmentality and agentic responses of the refugees. Moreover, Foucault’s concept of heterotopia resembles the refugee camps or site of displacements (Dionigi, 2024) that support to understand multiplicity of power (local, domestic and international) beyond the classical sovereignty-territorial places of state in IR. Foucault’s interpretation however originated in the Global North, many of his concept such as power/knowledge, biopolitics, discipline, strategy of normalization and control, postcolonialism are just universal and highly perpetuate in the Global South. Therefore, the exploration resolved that the governmentality theory of Michel Foucault can discern well the governmentality of refugee camps. I think the following interpretation underpins the selection of the theory of this thesis.

4.3. Governmentality of Foucault: Sovereign power to microphysics of power

Foucault's works have extended remarkably to a wide range of abstract and empirical issues of human experiences (Walters, 2015), and emerged new scholarship, research, and discipline too (Dean, 2002; Boditti, Bigo & Gros, 2017; Onuf, 2017). Nowadays, the 'governmentality' of Foucault is considered as an effective theory in analysing many phenomena of International Relations (IR) and Forced Migration. While IR focuses on investigating the meaning and process of interactions among different state and non-state actors across the globe, this dissertation looks at the complex relationship of power in the refugee camps in terms of camp governmentality and agentic responses of refugees. The protracted refugee situation portrays a complex governmentality that is considered significant for contemporary IR. Normative, empirical, and analytical grounds of refugee occupy a vital space in world politics or International Relations (Owens, 2009). Among the many scholars, Michael Dillon (1995) pioneered well about the complicity of the Foucauldian approach of modern power in international politics as well as in IR as a discipline. His analysis is mostly based on the Cold War-related refugees and asylum crises in Europe. However, initially it was considered appropriate only in the socio-cultural set-up, gradually Foucault and subsequent scholars demonstrated how establishments such as psychiatric centres, schools, jails and later the Concentration camps are governed as a symbol of power. Foucault himself touched upon the asylum issue from this perspective too (Edkins, 2000). Later the extension of governmentality to people and thing in a given territory (Jossep, 2017) supports for better understanding of world politics too (Walters, 2017). A significant number of people forcibly displaced mainly because of political changes in the international (nation)state system. Afterwards different other states contain these people as refugees with the support of the International Refugee Regime (IRR) to maintain both national and world orders (Soguk, 1991). However, Michel Foucault did not mention refugee camps; current exploration resolved that his governmentality approach can explain the politics of refugee camp governance well. Put differently, refugee-related governmentality determines many factors of the world system because the thesis and synthesis of power in the refugee camp impact inter states and regional relationships to a great extent.

Michael Foucault explains his theory of governmentality in different phases and forms. He traced the genealogy of governmentality in his first lecture in 1978 at College de France based on Classical Greek and Roman history while his second lecture in 1979 also extended the theory significantly with a connection to interpret the neo-liberal forms of government. It did

not necessarily refer to the structure of government as political tract rather he coined the discourse as part of the general context of control of the state or administration. It also signified problems of self-control, guidance for the family and children, management of the household, directing the soul, etc. (Lemke, 2001). Foucault defines government as ‘conduct of conduct’ that ranges from ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’. In governmentality, he asserts the continuum of government through the forms of self-regulations that Foucault calls ‘technologies of the self’. It is designed in a way that ‘people are not necessarily aware that their conduct is being conducted’ (Li, 2007, p. 275). In the later stage, Foucault annexed this ‘techniques of self’ with the formation of the subjectivity of the population that was produced in the time being (Macleod & Durrheim, 2002). Ultimately governmentality seeks to reform or manage the population in confined quarters (Li, 2007), in that sense refugee camps in the global south resemble well with such designated space. Scott (1995, see also Li, 2007) opt-out that the authority sets the conditions and situation in such a way that the targeted populations remain busy with their apparent self-interest rather than their ultimate goals. Put differently, governmentality deals with ‘the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations to others’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 88). The concept of governmentality comprises two terms: government and rationality. Here, government refers to activity to guide, shape and influence the conduct of other people while rationality sets the justification of those actions and why and how those practices ought to be. It also indicates the reasons or fixes agenda systematically for control and management of populations. In ideal term, rationalities are clearly defined before the populations however tactics and strategies always have ambiguities (Huff, 2020).

Governmentality works as an important tool for analysing the rationality, techniques, and procedures of power. It broadens the scope of rethinking power both in the case of the state and the rationalities for practices of government. It employs a power relation to govern populations through positive means rather than formulating of law by sovereign power. Thus, the ultimate interpretation of governmentality by Foucault (1991) indicates an explicit shift from managing or governing the population by using force and violence to applying some liberal tactics and strategies (Lanuza, 2013). It is not just a disciplinary mechanism but exercises power in the form of consent or participation of the governed (Huff, 2020). Foucault argues in his Two Lectures that power is not static and cannot be possessed or exercised solely by one agent or single authority homogenously over another individual indefinitely, rather it circulates from one person to another. It operates in the form of a chain, and employed in a net-like

organisation, circulates at the micro level too (Foucault, 1980). The agent can be doer or simultaneously victim of entailing this power. Individuals are the vehicles of power both as govern as well as point of exercise. Therefore, Foucault emphasises its exercise, application, and effects rather than possession (Joseph, 2012). It encompasses broadly four different forms of power as sovereignty, pastoral, disciplinary and liberal. Bio-power and microphysics of power are exercised in any of these forms on the techniques of the actors.

Governmentality rests on bio-power through bio-politics to a great extent. Precisely it indicates the 'power over life'. Here, the state focuses on the government of its population, population even from *outside* of its territory. Bio-power is applied as the 'regulatory technology of life' rather than the 'disciplinary technology of body' (Foucault, 2003, p. 249). In the normal state apparatus, the government links the population's health, hygiene, birth rate and other vital information with politics through different services of the government. On the other hand, in the humanitarian government, state actors as well as non-state actors, use humanitarian aid for refugee as a tool of politics. A nation-state prioritises its sovereignty, territory, and nation before anything external or alien. It exercises sovereign power to label non-nationals as 'Other' and securitises for surveillance and management. Concomitantly, Foucault, in political rationality, argues for governing the population rather than protecting the territory. It is optimising the relationship between 'men and thing' (Foucault, 2007), which is enacted by bio-politics or categorising the population into groups for governing (Elden, 2007). He never assumed the state as a universal entity rather he highlighted the multiplicity of actors, strategies, institutions, and circulations of power among the actors that support constituting a state as an entity (Jossep, 2007). Foucault illustrated bio-politics as 'a new technology of power...[that] exists at a different level, on a different scale, and [that] has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments' (Foucault, 1997a, p. 242). Foucault highlights the circulation of power among the different actors, both governor and governed, obviously accomplished with rationality, or at least accepted by the population who are governed or 'rationalities of government' (Gordon, 1991). Put differently, governmentality, as per Foucault, claims the micro-diversity of power relations even in dispersed sites.

However, Foucault in a later stage emphasised liberal tactics or representation as a governance technique that does not denounce the disciplinary power to manage the population. Bio-politics foregrounds the disciplinary power over other people. Control and surveillance might happen in asymmetric power relations among the actors wherever one group of individuals or

population face this form of power from another group. Disciplinary power in this form of the microphysics of power works in the convergence of force and consent that manifests the fullest form of governmentality (Walters, 2017; Han, 2018). So, it is likely that refugees will be controlled by non-refugee actors. Nevertheless, Foucault as well as later interpretations clarifies that it does not necessarily work just as a disciplinary power rather governmentality masquerades as a level of autonomy to individuals, group, or populations to reduce cost and increase their freedom (McKinlay & Pezet, 2018). Foucault argues further that, in liberal democracies, effective government functions in a way that it cannot crush the agency of subjects into submission, but rather foster their agency in particular ways (Foucault, 1992 cited in Gallagher, 2008). The distribution of power is important in exercising agency, it disperses to any individual or groups and creates the inequality. Thus, one has to exercise power in shaping and controlling one's own life (Luke, 2002; Morriss, 1987). Put differently, Foucault endeavored to illustrate the governmental mechanism of a structure based on power circulation which was ultimately viewed as a complex network.

Power, even if it is exercised at the macro level or by the government, it happens through the ensemble of institutions, organisations, procedure, analyses, reflections, calculations, and techniques that ultimately transcend the power in capillary form (Walters, 2017). Eventually, power in governmentality occurs in everyday life, interactions, and relationships of people. Even if the body of the vulnerable can be powerful, the individual body can also demonstrate power. Thus, Foucault neatly developed this complementary tool to grasp the maximum dimensions of power dispersed onsite (Walters, 2017). However, the microphysics of power is not always the individual's body rather it refers to every source of power itself wherever it installed and applied (Foucault, 1980). To Foucault the strategies of the microphysics of power exercised on the body are attributed to 'dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings...in a network of relations, constantly in tension...a perpetual battle...exercised rather than possessed' (p. 26). And his theory of governmentality turns the human being into a subject with agency. Walters (2017) claims further, microphysics impetus for considering even trivial and peripheral things that often says a lot about the governance of the world. The diagram below comprises essential components or different forms of power embedded in Governmentality.




Figure 4.1: Toolbox of Foucault’s Governmentality

Source: Author, 2024

4.4. Governmentality of Foucault: Power and agency

Power is ubiquitous. Every subject is constituted under the regime of power/knowledge. It is likely that an individual will gain agency in this power regime of governmentality. Meaning that agency directly or indirectly indicates a connection with power (Spencer & Doull, 2015). It evolves through different kinds of activities in particular structures (Giddens, 1984), practices (Bourdieu, 1977) or negotiations (Denaro, 2016), making something happen (Schlosser, 2019), subjectivity (Foucault, 1975), or changes with capability (Sen, 1985). The agents or actors are engaged in continuous actions. While people practice and act in normal situation in their everyday lives, refugees act and reconstruct their relationship in a specially designed space- the camps. Foucault’s (1977) perspective of power encompasses such discursive practices well, especially the micro-physics of power works in everyday interactions of a structure. A particular governmentality is installed in the camps comprised of bio-politics and bio-power in which refugees act in a different way than in their place before displacements. The rationality of governing the refugees in the camps also evolves with power relations among the refugee and non-refugee actors. Foucault maintains that power is ‘a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise (1983, p, 220). It is inherently linked to the exercise of power – power as governmentality, or governmentality as the exercise of power (Casasampera, 2021). To that end, the possible field of action is to design a complex set of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics (Foucault,

1982). Foucault furthermore conceded the deployment of language and practices of strategy by subjects to demonstrate their agency and authority even in many constraint situations (McKinlay & Pezet, 2018). Power is the cornerstone of Foucault’s governmentality thesis. Agency and power converge in this governmentality through continuous interactions of different actors.

In the structure of governmentality, whatever the causes of the adverse situation, individuals with the agentic capacity endeavor to overcome the odds as fast as possible. Agents not only intend to define their own choices and find appropriate strategies for achieving those targets but also utilise resources and rules to reproduce or be resilient in the system or structure for their improvement. In a complex system (e.g. refugee camps), agents engage in diversified interactions that enable the system as well as the actors to adopt and transform the structures, rules, functionality, and importantly, living conditions (Holland, 2014). However, Certeau’s (2004) notion of tactics expands agency also as subconscious, silent or implicit practices. Such efforts exist even in adverse situations while the notion of efforts (Parson, 1968) of the individual is oriented toward the past, the future and the present (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Robert Unger asserts ‘negative capability’ beyond the dual capacity of compliance or rebellion that motivate the individual to participate in self-empowerment activities (Unger, 2004). Efforts are not something like rebellion but ordinary practices in a ‘state of exception’ are also agentic (Das, 2007). Thus, an agent deliberately strives to achieve his objectives and goals (Sen, 1985). Sen (1985, p. 204) highlights, ‘the need for careful assessment of aims, allegiances, objectives, etc., and of the conception of the good, may be important and exacting’. Foucault’s interpretation of agency evolves with the response, change and resistance of subject in a (social)system (Bevir, 1999). However, he initially advocates for autonomous agent, nobody can be autonomous in a system or structure. In his earlier account Foucault conceptualizes agency as agonistic struggle too (Vintges, 2012).

To say differently, the actions or practices of the agents manifest sometime as resistance and sometime as resilience in a system. The following chart shows how the governmentality or circulation of power can support to grow agency among the individual that belongs to that system.




Figure 4.2: Flow Chart of Governmentality and Agency (constructed by author)

As Allen claims, ‘if power is a condition for the possibility of subjectivity, for Foucault, then it will follow that it would be a condition for the possibility of agency as well’ (Allen, 2002, p,135). However, Foucault’s initial analysis and thoughts referred to state authority, afterwards this exercising of power includes of all disciplinary controls by an authority or institutions (Oesch, 2017; Hanafi & Long, 2010; Ramadan, 2012), for which authorities apply the notion of ‘bio-politics’ through different techniques, technology, rules, institutions and so on (Lemke, 2001). Power and authority exist in the camps from a wide range of state and non-state actors in a dispersed way.

4.5. Concluding remark

It is prevalent from the above discussion that governmentality of Michel Foucault can grasp well the power dynamics of any governance (local/global). Initially Foucault however indicates the exercise of power as repressive one, later he deviates, and formulates power as productive one to govern the population in optimum way. And liberal tactics got importance in this form of liberal governmentality which can map the power relation of any complex macro and micro settings. According to Foucault’s thesis of power, it produces an agent (Lukes, 2002). The power and agency are connected reciprocally/vice-versa. A refugee is the inevitable carrier of power in the camps and eventually can transform agency among them. Thus, it is rational to investigate how the authority, power, support, cooperation, or humanitarian principles are intertwined with refugee in the camps to dig out the articulation of refugee agencies and their perceptions of the different non-refugee actors in the camps. This epistemology has driven the thesis onward. The methodology and tools for data collections of this dissertation also reflect the governmentality lens. Concomitantly this theoretical framework helps to produce ontological as well as empirical evidence of the thesis. It has been weighed up in constructing themes, matrices, connections, and relationship among the diversified evidence of the research.

Refugees in state-enforced camps live in an exceptional space without their due human rights, but normatively as human being they cannot remain bare lives or speechless emissaries for decades. They manoeuvre to reconstruct their community, adapting to adversity and to fight for human rights. Non-refugee actors—state and non-state actors—act intensively from particular interest and purposes. Extent of agency of the refugees determines different actions of the non-refugee actors across the refugee camps or vice-versa. Only a comprehensive approach to agency can grasp better their agency in the complex governmentality of refugee camps. Agency here in connection with governmentality of Michel Foucault indicates the phenomena of

exercising power, making a difference, bringing forth changes and showing up resistance. Therefore, this theoretical outline on agency forges a framework of ‘resilience and resistance’ to carve out agentic responses of refugee. In a camp setting, refugees belong to the lowest tier of the power ladder. So, the governmentality of Michel Foucault fits well for this purpose since it looks into the exercise of power from the bottom (Jessop, 2017). By skipping the narrow understanding of governmentality, it can improve our understanding about liberal norms of present-day international order (Neuman & Sending, 2007). Therefore, I believe my thesis based on this theoretical framework can contribute at least a bit to mainstream IR theoretically and methodologically.

CHAPTER 5: MAKING OF ROHINGYA REFUGEE

5.1. Introduction

Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh are completely a state-enforced refugee camp. They have limited human rights; refugees live on basic entitlements for their survival. No refugee camps, anywhere in the world, can be an option for living a proper life. Nevertheless, refugees must live there. Camp is a norm of a nation-state (Agamben, 1998) and synonymous with refugee. Refugees enter the camps by fleeing from persecution, leaving their agencies behind. They begin a precarious life in the camps. Shortly, refugees compare their life in the camp and their country of origin. Everyone becomes influenced in the long run by their past identity, disposition, brutal history and marginalisation (Wacquant, 2016). Trajectories both in the past and present, and nature of camp governance induce their growth of agencies in indefinite uncertainties of the refugee camps. So, this chapter touches upon the history of marginalisation of Rohingya people in Myanmar to better comprehend of their life in the governmentality of Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh.

Rohingya Muslims who used to live in the Rakhine state of Myanmar- bordering the south-eastern part of Bangladesh are the most vulnerable ethnic group in the world (Ahsan Ullah, 2016; Shah, 2018). During the 'clearing operation', *Tatmadaw*- the Myanmar military has destroyed 300 villages in Rakhine state in August-September 2017 with a loss of about 10,000 lives (HRW, 2017; MSF, 2018). *Tatmadaw* claims that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 police posts on 25 August 2017, and they retaliated to secure the region from so-called terrorists coming from outside. Resultantly, 700,000 *Rohingya* people escaped Myanmar and took shelter adjacent to the previous makeshift camps in Cox's Bazar of Bangladesh in 2017. Myanmar is predominantly a Buddhist country of about 58 million people, and approximately 15% of them follow Islam (Pugh, 2013). A Government statistic in 2010 shows that Rakhine state has the largest number of Muslim people, who are about 35.6% of the total population of the state (Alam, 2011). The percentage has decreased to 30% in the recent population census. It has ignored the Rakhine Muslims or the Rohingya Muslims because they are not citizens of the country. The denial of citizenship rights to Rohingya Muslims triggered violence more pervasively than the previous conflicts in Myanmar. The military regime began its nation-building process through the identification of citizens of the territory according to ethnic identities based on 'national race' and later through Citizenship Law 1982. The sovereign authority of the state turned the ethnic identities of Rohingya people into political identities in

the subsequent period, denying the historical existence of this minority group in Myanmar (Bjornberg, 2016).




Figure 5.1: A Map of Myanmar-Bangladesh

Source: Bepler, 2018

Refugees are vulnerable people, and Rohingya refugees are doubly vulnerable because of their statelessness. It is normal in the modern-day (nation)state system that everyone will belong to a state having their human rights. Only a few percent of total refugees are stateless globally. Rohingyas are the glaring example of trajectories of the trilogy—territory, nation, sovereignty—of a nation-state. It is a new phenomenon to revoke the inalienable human rights based on a political decision (Arendt, 1951). Targeted groups of the population are victimised by the dominant political framing based on natural attributes such as race, colour, culture, mobility, and livelihood. The plot for persecution and marginalisation of Rohingya people also began by turning their identity and belongingness into contested ones by the state. Such an experience impacts the group of people from generation to generation while the extent and category of agency also evolves based on the historical trajectory of a group of people.

5.2. Rohingya in the pre-British colonial period

The term 'Rohingya' is related to colonial and pre-colonial terms *Rooinga* and *Rwangya* and the modern term Rohingya refers to the *Arakan State* (British Foreign Office, 1952, p. 3). While there is no doubt about the existence of Muslims and Islams in Rakhine, the distinct ethnicity 'Rohingya' was also evident even before the British colonialization. Most of the Muslims inhabitants of Rakhine identified them as 'Rovingaw' or 'Rooinga' (Buchanan, 1799 cited in Ibrahim, 2016), and *Ruinga* (Vateri, 1815 cited in Ibrahim, 2016) at that time. The narrative of Rohingya Muslims comprises of two perspectives of the Burmese authoritarian government. Firstly, the military government do not acknowledge the Muslims settlement in Arakan for centuries. Secondly, it rejects Rohingya Muslims as distinct groups in Myanmar rather claim and label them as 'illegal Bengali migrants' since the 1950s. The contention on Rohingya ethnicity and identity politics began from these framing by state and state patronised entities in Burma. Concomitantly, two blocks have emerged about Rohingya identity and their human rights across the globe: pro-Rohingya and contra-Rohingya.

While the state narrative ignores Muslims as well as Rohingya's belongingness in Arakan or present-day Rakhine state and labelled them as illegal immigrants from Bengal in recent times, pro-Rohingya blocks have demonstrated convincing historical evidence to defend the existence of Rohingya and Muslims even before the British conquest of Burma. Among the many narratives and trace of Muslim in Arakan, Uddin (2020) highlights five historical legends as the most convincing and factual. According to the first legend of Muslims arrival, Hazrat Mohammad Bin Hanafi [R], the son of the fourth Khalifa in Islam set foot in Arakan in 680 CE after his loss in the historical *Karabala* war. The then queen of Arakan Kheyapari did not accept his arrival and waged a fight with him. Kheyapari's defeat turned up a marital tie between them. *Kheyapari* also converted to Islam. Thus, Muslims rule began for the first time in Arakan. However, there is no authentic academic source for this claim, two hill peaks are called *Kheyapari* and *Hanafifi* to date marked in the Maungdaw of Rakhine state (Uddin, 2020). Secondly, a group of Arab traders took shelter near the Rumbi river of Arakan after their ship got wrecked. They achieved the sympathy of the King Mohathaing Sandia (788–810 CE) and started their new lives in Arakan. These Arab traders got married in Arakan and increased their lineage. It is claimed that they are the predecessors' of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine. The third batch of Muslims came along with the overthrown King of Arakan- *Normikhla* from Bengal in the fifteenth century. There was an antagonistic relation between the Arakan Muslim and the Upper Kingdom of Burma. *Bamar* King ruled Arakan only for 66 years before to British

colonialisation (Uddin, 2020). Most of the time, it remained independent with the support of Mughal or other rulers in Bengal who were predominantly Muslims. Buddhist ruler *Normikhla* returned to Arakan in 1430 with 30,000 Muslims soldiers from Sultan Jalal Uddin Mohammad Shah of Bengal to protect his throne from the *Bamar* King. This relationship of trust and support attracted the fourth group of Muslim people in Arakan in the seventeenth century. The then king of Bengal *Shah Suja* was defeated by the Mughal Commander in Chief *Mir Jumla*. Having failed to travel to Mecca because of worse weather, *Shah Suja* approached the Arakan king and got the shelter thereafter. He fled there with his family, necessary soldiers and other staff for his services.

Uddin (2020) further cited that *Shah Suja* and his family members were murdered by the Arakanese king from a love affair with his daughter *Amena Begum*. Nevertheless, a group of five hundred to thousands of mercenaries of *Shah Suja* settled well in Arakan who were later labelled as *Kamanchi*. These combinations of Arakan Buddhist and Muslim ruled the kingdom independently until 1784 when *Bodawpaya* intervened and captured Arakan for the next 40 years. Consequently, thousands of Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims fled to Bengal during the entire period of his rule until the British colonisation in 1824. During this period, a British survey conducted by Charles Paton also indicated the existence of a group of Muslims population in the northern Rakhine mostly similar to present-day Rohingya ethnic group (Paton, 1826). Ibrahim (2016) asserts that Muslims and Rohingya Arakanese lived there even before the migration of Rakhine Buddhists. This back and forth migration of the Muslims population in the then Arakan kingdom established a strong connection of Islam and Muslims in Rakhine. Therefore, it is plausible from the history of Muslims existence in Rakhine that Rohingyas are the mixture of Arab, Persian, Pathan, Mughals and Bengalis for centuries. They are a large demography of Myanmar with distinct language, culture, physical texture and so on for a distinct ethnicity in terms of the junta ruler of Myanmar. Nonetheless, Rohingyas are not counted in the official 135 ethnic groups and stripped of their political as well as human rights over the years of authoritarian government in Myanmar (Cheesman, 2017).

5.3. Rohingya Muslims in British Burma

The British Coloniser stepped their footprint in 1824, and it took 66 years to take control of the entire Burma in 1886. They ruled this multiethnic land until 1948. It was mainly a province of British India until 1937. However, it was maintained by a separate arrangement in the last ten years of British Imperial power. Here, the coloniser also followed the ‘divide and rule’ policy in Burma and promoted different minority groups over the majority Buddhist people of the

then Bamar Kingdom. During the British rule, they destroyed the traditional monarchy of Burma and introduced a limited form of parliamentary Home Rule (Farzana, 2017). In addition, British changed the demographic scenario of Burma by importing a lot of labour from British India for their extended rice and rubber plantations. They preferred non-Buddhist and Muslims for their farming. Since minorities were tortured and discriminated against by the previous regime, Rohingya Muslims of the Arakan province also supported the British administration. This group of Muslim people gained their dominance again in Rakhine and, in overall, Burma during the British administration. The leadership of Rohingya Muslim students in the Rangoon University Student Union along with Buddhist students mark a clear sign of their position during that administration. Consequently, the colonial period witnessed the rupture of previous harmony among different ethnicities in Arakan. Since they were loyal to the British coloniser, they were provided better opportunity in the colonial service. Resultantly, Rohingya people directly supported the British in the Second World War, while the Buddhist Rakhine supported the Japanese for their independence. Rohingya Muslims fought for the British who promised the self-autonomy of Arakan for Rohingya upon their victory. However, the British coloniser did not keep their word because of the ensuing (ethnic)complexity during their withdrawal and the vulnerability of the Rohingya people being rooted therein (Wade, 2017).

5.4. Rohingya Muslims in post-Independent Burma

The national identity of the populace is significant for the nation-building of a nation-state (Penrose & Mole, 2008). Burmese sovereign power of the state focused on this issue soon after its inception in 1948. Burmese leader of independence Aung San envisioned an all-inclusive Burma, but he was murdered before the independence in 1947. However, the Constitution of 1947 was not annulled immediately after independence; it could not maintain Aung San's principle of 'unity in diversity'. The state narrative denounced the name 'Rohingya' straightforwardly in the subsequent legal framework of the country. They argue that Muslims in the Rakhine state take on this naming just for political gain that began recently in the 1990s (Leider, 2014). The Rohingya people are victims of long-term marginalisation in an uneven power structure of Myanmar. As a newly independent country, the Burmese authority had obtained the total allegiance of the Burmese people to protect and to provide their rights as the central authority who could make decisions about them. However, the regime was busy in defining national identity for a nation-state defying the distinct identity of other ethnic groups (Silverstein, 1980; Zarni & Cowley, 2014). They imposed the policy of exclusion of minority groups other than Buddhist.

Nevertheless, it was not that bad until 1962. Democratic government, in the post-colonial period, attempted to build up a nation-state consisting of all ethnic groups living in the country. Rohingya ethnicity was also recognised by the then government of U Nu. They were recorded as Rohingya ethnic group in the post independent census in 1961 (Wade, 2017). Rohingya people voted, got membership in the parliament, served in civil administration, and moved freely during the democratic rule. Rohingya and other Muslims in Myanmar considered themselves as naturalised or sons of the soil by living there for centuries. As a result, they were not ready for any further proof and humiliation under the citizenship procedure (Gilmore, 2019 cited in Rhoads, 2023). However, the situation drastically changed after the military takeover in 1962 by Ne Win who was the prolonged military ruler in Myanmar so far. He continued his dictatorship until 1988 as the greatest dissonance of all minority ethnic groups in Myanmar.

The anti-Rohingya discourse promoted by Ne Win excluded this minority group from the nation-building process and made Rohingya identity very contested in Myanmar. They even changed the administrative title of Arakan to Rakhine after independence (Ibrahim, 2016) because the name 'Arakan' was formerly called '*Rohang*' while the Rakhine had a completely Buddhist connotation. The Consitution of 1974 of the Union of Burma struck the Rohingya identity decisively for the first time by removing their 'Rohingya' identity and determining them as 'Foreigners'. It argues that Rohingya people are Bangali and illegal in Myanmar; their religion is Islam and language resembles to *Chittagonian* Bangali of Bangladesh (Chan, 2005). The same physical texture, lingual affinity, and Islam as the common religion with Bengali were highlighted to strengthen the Burmese government's justification of anti-Rohingya discourse. This discourse demanded that a large number of Bengalis infiltrated Myanmar during the colonial period, and they mingled with the local Arakan Muslims and formed their unity in the Second World War, whenever they fought against other Burmese. They are accused of denial of loyalty to Burma (Yegar, 1972). Defending the anti-Rohingya discourse, U Nu claimed that a faction of these intruders formed the *Mujahedin*- a rebel group and demanded the self-autonomy of the Rakhine state immediately after the national independence of Burma in 1978. Labelling them as a traitor and disloyal to the Union, thus marginalisation began in their every sphere of life. They witnessed a radical politicisation of identity under the military takeover of Ne Win. He launched the 'Burmanization' project in 1962, constructing a 'National Race' or *taingyintha* for the so-called solidarity among the races in the Union (Cheesman, 2017, p. 464). And the greatest blow came for Rohingya through the Burmese Citizenship Law in 1982. Rohingya Muslims have revoked their citizenship in Burma and identified as illegal

Bengali migrants from Bangladesh or the then East Pakistan. Political leadership followed the path of hegemony in the Kingdom of diverse religions, languages and other cultural attributes that turned the state into a tyranny (Walton, 2015).

Myanmar military, like other military regimes (e. g. in Bangladesh, and Pakistan), established political parties, and formulated legal frameworks- most importantly the constitution and every necessary institutional set-up to exert their long-term control over people and resources. Burmese Socialist Program Party of Ne Win extensively confiscated private property and other state resources in the name of Socialism, which resulted in the economic crisis in the 1980s (Bunte, 2016). The Military continued their repression and extortion under their hybrid political parties and civil-military bodies like the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). They extinguished all the protest movements brutally and killed thousands of demonstrators (Bunte, 2016; Linter, 1990). Random torture and zero tolerance for democratic practices ostracised the military while it needed some public support to remain in power. Thus, the military government approached the nation-building process based on the triad of ‘one ethnicity, one language and one religion’ in a multi-ethnic society (Sakhong, 2012, p. 11; Gravers, 2014, pp. 305-307). They manipulated the ethno-religious diversity of Myanmar and added the Burmese language to political identity with the ‘one religion policy’ of Ne Win and Saw Muang renamed Burma to Myanmar in 1989. The name originates from ‘Myanma’, which had exclusively Burman implication (Cheesman, 2017). Consequently, Buddhist radicalism developed heavily from Buddhist monasteries under military patronage (Kipgen, 2014). The military junta accepted and exploited the monk’s demand that ‘to be Burman is to be Buddhist’ which escalated the injustice and discrimination against the Rohingya people. It adopted a new Constitution in 2008 with the backup of monkhood, which was devoid of the rights of the many ethnic minority groups. Moreover, the ‘969’³ and ‘Ma-Ba-Tha’ movement of Buddhist monks in 2012 played a crucial role in inflaming the anti-Rohingya sentiment all over the country (SEGL, 2018).

The one religion-based nationalism campaign by the military expanded the sphere of these anti-Rohingya attitudes of ordinary Burmese Buddhists as well. Leaders of this movement were successful in pressuring the military to formulate policies and take brutal actions against the

³‘969’ movement is a Buddhist nationalist activism by Buddhist monks and other Buddhist leaders. The main targets of the movement were to stop the expansion of Islam in Myanmar. *Ma-Ba-Tha* is kind of similar type of movement in Myanmar.

Muslims in Myanmar. They importantly thwarted and prevented the Rohingya from registering their ethnicity in 2014 in the first census funded by the UN Population Fund in three decades (Szep, 2013; Zin, 2015). Military dictator Than Shwe handed over the power to a civilian government headed by Thein Sein as president of Myanmar in 2010 but the military regime had meantime entrenched their political prerogatives as well as the radical monkhood ideology in Myanmar politics. While the hardliners and moderates in the military were engaged in a power struggle, quasi-civilian government permitted political activities on a limited scale and political prisoners were also released from jail. The military wanted to exercise their control over politics with some kind of public support; they noticed the strength of Buddhist monasteries, especially in the Saffron Revolution in 2007. Thus, military and Buddhist monks cooperated to wield their power, and persecuted the Rohingya Muslims together. Scholars like Guhathakurta (2017) and Zin (2015) claim the transition of democracy in an immature political and nationalist set-up has contributed to triggering the violence since 2012, as an essential move for political liberalisation and nation-building. Buddhist groups had been used as a political tool for the military ruler to gain victory against the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi (Zin, 2015). Even after the 2012 violence against the Rohingya Muslims, then President Thein Sein enacted four contested laws named 'Four Race and Religion Protection Laws' specifically aiming at the Rohingya people (Kyaw, 2015).

In this regard, the sovereign authority exercised both legal instruments and military action to ethnic cleansing against the minority people. The 2014 Census and Amendments by the Union Parliament in 2015 repealed many rights of Rohingya Muslims and declared all the previous facilities unconstitutional (Ibrahim, 2016; Kyaw, 2017). Subsequently, Political Party Registration and Election Laws ended the scope of participation for Rohingya people in political activities. The historical discrimination has increased massively even while the state proclaimed its democratic transition and nation-building in the 2010s. Thus, the Rohingya people turned into a constitutive 'Other' in Myanmar legally under the authoritarian government that displayed excessive sovereign power in the repeated ethnic clearing operation thereof. Framing of this Rohingya identity by the sovereign power of Myanmar, determines its role, policies, stands and actions towards the Rohingya people to a great extent (Bjornberg 2016; Yegar, 1972). Accordingly, the state as well as other political forces demonstrated their power in persecuting and oppressing to Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar at large (Ibrahim, 2016).

5.5. Horrendous life in Myanmar: No rights, limited agencies

However, Rohingyas were not in the camps in Rakhine state they used to live in a camp-like situation in Rakhine under the strict surveillance of their Buddhist neighbour, *Tatmadaw*/military, *Nasaka* (border force) and police. Since the decolonisation in 1948, Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar were considered as pariah. Union government however was a bit flexible about them, never accepting them as citizens. They could enjoy some rights better until than 1960s, but without proper citizenship, they faced continuous barriers to education, professions, and better civic life (Rhoads, 2023). While their national registration card (NRC) was replaced with a ‘white card’ they had no human rights of free movement, education, treatment, or livelihood since their citizenship were as stripped in 1960 and finally in 1982. Francis Wade (2017) also highlights the situation of Rohingya Muslims that the continuous discrimination, marginalisation and persecution have removed their collective agency from generations. The following testimonies of refugee in the Rohingya camps offer a vivid narrative of persecution against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar before their forcible displacement. And their testimonies here provide some background to understand their changes in the refugee camps in Bangladesh.

Case/Testimony-1: A Refugee from the Influx in 2017

I am 48 years old. I came here five years ago in August 2017 from *Buthiadaung* of Rakhine state. We used to live far away from the main township. However, I crossed an international border then, I could not cross the border of my district before coming here. I wanted to go to the town several times, but I was scared of harassment or arrest by the Burmese military or *Nasaka* (Burmese Border and Immigration Force). We could not think of visiting ‘Station Hospital’ (district hospital), we even dared to go to the Sub-Rural Health Centre for medical services at the Village Tract (Union level). Most of the Rohingya people used to go to NGO-operated health service centre at the Union level or in township. There were some fishermen in our village; they turned to village farming in the last couple of years before being forcibly displaced from the homestead. Since 2012, thousands of Rohingya people have been forcibly transferred to different IDP (internally displaced population) camps in Rakhine state. My father died sometime in 2009, but my mother died from trauma during the violence in 2012. We went hide out from our home and returned there two weeks later. Until 2017, we a group of twelve members of the joint family could pass our days somehow peacefully. Always we were frightened and faced some sort of harassment by different government agencies or Buddhist terrorists. Every time we saved our lives hiding and consequently losing our money or other

properties. We could manage ourselves well in farming and other agricultural activities but there was a lack of security. Oftentimes military raided our villages and forced many of the youth to work in the cantonment or other development projects. But they did not pay properly, often tortured brutally. Thus, many of the Rohingya people used to flee to Bangladesh even before the genocide in 2017. I can remember well that the military attacked our village in one afternoon in August 2017. I was working in the nearby field. The military raped one of my sisters and killed my brother while wanted to stop them. We ran away immediately with the rest of the family members, and saw our house was burning. We spent two nights in the jungles on the way to these camps in Bangladesh. It took three days to arrive here in the camps [Conversation with Karima⁴, 2022].

Case/Testimony-2: A Senior refugee from a previous influx

All most all the communities and ethnic groups could participate in elections during the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) regime. I was a Chairman of Village Tract in Maungdaw districts. We both had fisheries as well as huge farming lands. I completed high school study. We had quite a normal life in Rakhine until 1990. My eldest son started to go to a local primary school in 1988. A General Election was held in that year, we voted, and some candidates were also elected to Parliament. The military was taken over by the State Law and Restoration Council (SLRC) and spoiled the systems. There was no democratic legislature, moreover, they cracked down against the so-called illegal Rohingya people across the state. SLRC asked us in 1989 to deposit our National Registration Card (NRC) for further verification for completion of the citizenship procedure instead they provided us with a ‘white card’ for an interim period. But in 1991, they also returned our ‘white card’ and handed over paper documents. Afterward, they declared these paper documents as well as white cardholder Rohingya people are illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Military started brutal verification drive against us, they killed some of us while many of us were arrested. Since I was a chairman, I wanted to discuss the whereabouts of the verification process, but they tortured me a lot. The next day military raided our area and raped several of our community members. I had two young sisters. We decided immediately to go for hide out for several days.

But I noticed that the situation getting worse every day and there was no scope to return home in a few days. Then I went home one night and collected some valuable stuff such as gold ornaments and fled my birthplace forever. A large number of people ran away from Maungdaw

⁴All names are pseudo names for anonymity and confidentiality purpose

with me, but I asked them to split in several small groups. In my group we were fourteen people from our family. Later I found many of them reached the *Teknaf* except one died on the way. Eventually we moved into this *Kutupalong* camp after a couple of weeks [Conversation with Foyez Ullah (62), 2022].



Figure 5.2: Rohingya Influx (Credit: Daily Star Newspaper)

Source: Author, 2024

5.6 Concluding remark

The above sections pinpointed a picture that how the Rohingya people have been revoked their political rights and existence from Burma. The Rohingya people turned into a constitutive ‘Other’ in Myanmar under the authoritarian government that displayed excessive sovereign power in repeated ethnic clearing thereof. They have been systematically evicted from their soil by securitizing them for building a so-called nation-state solely with the Buddhist people. Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state become the victims of all kinds of persecutions and marginalisation of the military and authoritarian regime of the Myanmar. Rohingya failed to protest against the misdeed of Myanmar government. They lost their belongings and agency as

well. They used to live in such a situation where they could not exercise any power too. After being stateless, majority of the Rohingya people fled to Bangladesh from Rakhine state of Myanmar in face of several clearing operations and genocides against them. Most of the refugees have been grateful to the GoB for this sanctuary for decades. At least they can live in a safe place with their basic needs. Rohingya people have some scope to revisit their disposition, memory, and identity in reconstructing their community and lives in a new dimension.

CHAPTER 6: ROHINGYA CAMP GOVERNMENTALITY: STRUCTURE AND MECHANISM

6.1. Introduction

This chapter has examined the structure and mechanism of Rohingya camp governmentality. The entire camp system is constituted of particular structure and mechanism that circulates power in the operation of camp governmentality. Such governmentality requires to ‘structure of possible field of actions’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 790). Before digging out the governmentality of the camps, it has been weaved here the verbatim account of the camp structure from empirical evidence. This chapter also investigates the dimensions of effects of the supreme power of state actors as well as politics of camp geography. The three main actors of the refugee camps—refugee, state actors and non-state actors—exercise different forms of power among them. It addresses one of the objectives of my research that the overall apparatus of refugee camps (e.g. spatial set up, bureaucracy) is not so simple and an instantaneous development. It is generated in every day because of the constant effect of governmentality in the vein of power. Eventually, it proceeds to ‘care and control’ (Malkki, 1992) or manage undesirable (Agier, 2011) and here I discover how this dynamic creates a particular structure and plethora of mechanism to govern the space.

6.2. Rohingya camps: An empirical overview

Rohingya refugee camp is one of the largest and oldest camps in the world. The entire set up is divided into 32 camps in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh. It is located in the remote corner of the southeast border of Bangladesh. Approximately 1.3 million Rohingya people live in these camps. In a refugee camp, refugees are the most essential but the most marginal actor of the camp set up. Almost every refugee respondent thinks that they are victim and forced to live in the camps. Some of the Rohingya refugee found the camp is identical to the last days in Rakhine state wherever they have no freedom of movement, no security of their lives and limited human rights. Besides most of the refugees consider camps as their destiny because they do not see any durable solution in near future. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugee live in the cramped condition of approximately 50,000 people per square kilometers with limited facilities for water, sanitation, health, and recreation. Not only the shelters are congested but also on an average seven people live in ten by fifteen feet shelter. While the number of members in the household keep increasing, the camp authority cannot provide new shelter to the refugees. Women and girls feel vulnerable and suffer from privacy crisis. Since camps are

sprung in hilly reserve forest area, shelters are located both on stiff slopes of the hills. There are no more trees or greeneries left in the hills. To say differently, refugees live in a natural disaster-prone situation of landslides.

Actors of the Rohingya camps are broadly categorized into three groups as refugee, state actors, and non-state actors. However, there is a binary that non-refugees are service provider, and refugees are (passive) service receiver, each of them has distinct parts and power in the camp operation.

Table 6.1: Actors in the Rohingya Refugee Camps

Category of Actors	Entities or Organizations	Roles/Comments
Refugee	Volunteers, non-volunteers (ordinary), community leaders, criminal gangs etc.	Volunteer refugees work both for state actors as well as non-state actors. Some of the ordinary refugee participate in occasional activities and activism in the camps while community leaders support other refugee on various issues of camp life.
State actors	Camp in Charge (CiC)	Principal authority of camp governance
	Bangladesh Armed Police Battalion (open and covert),	Maintain law and order of the camp
	Bangladesh Army (mostly remotely)	Supervise the camp security
	Health Department	Conduct occasional health activities (e.g. vaccination)
	Fire Service and Rescue Department	Rescue in case of fire and landslide in the camps
Non-state actors/ Humanitarian Organizations	Local NGOs (indicative): Mukti, YPSA, Codec, Coast Foundation, Nongor, Nabolok, Nandonik, Nice Foundation etc.	The implementing partners of the donor NGOs and IGOs. They only conduct operation on specific services, camps, or blocks of the camps.
	National NGOs (indicative): Brac, Jagoroni Chakra Foundation, FIVDB, Gonsastho Kendra, Caritas, Friendship, NGO Forum, Hope Foundation etc.	Mainly the implementing partners of the donor NGOs and IGOs. However, some of them also coordinate the response in different camps.
	International NGOs (indicative): Action Aid, Helvetas, World Vision, RTM, Rescue International, Save the Children, Acted, Danish Refugee Council, Action Against Hunger, MSF, Oxfam etc.	Donor NGOs and gain mandate to implement and coordinate the humanitarian responses here in the Rohingya camps.
	Intergovernmental Organizations: UNHCR, WFP, WHO, IOM, Unicef etc.	Organizations with mandate to handle refugees and humanitarian situation alike.

Source: Author, 2024

Non-state actors contend that refugee camps are temporary but the last resort of people in high need of protection and basic needs. Rohingya camps are governed and operated under the direct jurisdiction of the government of the host country here the Government of Bangladesh. Taking the ontological set-up of the camp into consideration, non-state actors or humanitarian organisations under the UNHCR and IOM provide necessary support to the refugees for their survival. UNHCR and IOM joined in the Rohingya response in 1979 and 2014 respectively. They coordinate and operate the response on the ground while other UN organisations such as WHO, WFP also looks after the health and food provision respectively for the refugees. The entire response is supervised by the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) of the UN instead of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in most other humanitarian responses. UN organizations are intergovernmental organizations, but they are not the part of the state of Bangladesh. They are here the non-state actors too, like other NGOs working in the camps. Approximately, one hundred local, national, and international NGOs provide different services to refugee in the camps as implementing partner of UNHCR and IOM. The UNHCR and IOM work as a powerhouse for the implementing partners. They take part and negotiate with state actors and refugee based on the authority of UNHCR. IOM directly conducts the camp operation. So, the camps are divided into UNHCR camps and IOM camps. Site Management and Site Development (SMSD or SMS) coordinates the camp management and support refugees and state actors to keep the camp livable and safe for the dwellers. However, there are resource crises, and the water and sanitation sector has set up a certain number of common toilet and wash facilities for the dwellers. Being a hilly area, the wash sector cannot provide the refugee with a sufficient amount of water for their daily usage (Interview and Observation, 2022-23). Fieldwork comprehends that the camp is not built but is growing every day from previous makeshifts camps. For administrative and service delivery reasons, every camp is divided into blocks and sub-blocks which have been provided with learning centres, women-friendly space or multipurpose community centre, site management cluster, health post and so on. Since they (NGOs) cannot decide but negotiate with state actors constantly, they like to arrange the maximum facilities with minimum resources for huge number of population.

Like the non-state actors, state actors also consider this response completely as a temporary one, and it is neither their mandate to provide refugee the rights nor those in their capacity. Rohingya people do not belong to Bangladesh; they are not Bangladeshi people. Thus, they are treated differently, and there is no scope to mix and compare them with Bangladeshi citizen rampantly (Interview with SA2, 2023). There should be a demarcation between these two

groups of population. Therefore, the camps have been given a particular set-up with barbwire fence, temporary structure, high-security apparatus, and only emergency facilities. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) just wants to save their lives until a durable solution is devised. One of the state actors (CiC) understand (the Rohingya)camp as a “special set up for special demands” (Interview with SA7, 2023).




Figure-6.1: Actors of Camp Governmentality

Source: Author, 2024.

6.3. Structure and mechanism of the camp governmentality

This sections mainly articulates the scenario of Rohingya camps governmentality in Bangladesh. Camp governmentality operates spanning from shielding sovereignty to the issues of livelihood of the refugees. However, it might seem only the operation of humanitarian governance. This sections sheds light on how this governance is not merely the management, but it manifests a complex field of power dynamics among the actors in the camps. Multifaceted structure, mechanism, institutions, and techniques coalesce this governmentality of the camps. Every possible form of power such as sovereign power, disciplinary power, bio-power, and microphysics of power circulates in this camp structure. Put differently, camp governmentality passes through the socio-cultural, economic, and political spheres of refugee lives. Some empirical evidence have been illustrated in the following NVivo table to way forward of discussion.

Table 6.2: Nvivo Codebook of Structure and Mechanism of Governmentality

Name	Description
Camp Governmentality: Structure and Mechanism	Spatiality, Surveillance and Humanitarian Services (HS)
Spatiality and Segregation	Physical structure, condition and geography of the camps.
Camp Bureaucracy	Lingering camp administration as a way of governmentality
Legal Vacuum	Rules, regulations, actions and institutions are so fluid and vague that those can be exercised otherwise for different actors based on the context. Dichotomies are created and faced by every actor. Particularly state and non-state actors conflate them between humanitarian principles and state mandate.
Humanitarian Services, No Rights just Entitlement	Refugees hardly have rights in the camps. Use of humanitarian service as tools of politics and governmentality
Informal Refugee Leadership	Refugee representatives are selected by CiC rather than the refugees.

6.3.1. Spatiality and segregation of the camp

The spatiality of Rohingya refugee camps denotes the supreme power of the state that is installed and exercised in the camp settings. It is the GoB who decides about the space and place for refugee shelter that forms the spatial geography of the camps. A particular physical set-up/structure is essential for the proper management of the population (Foucault 1982, p.790), importantly for non-nationals. The state defines and determines the attributes of that physical structure. Shelter structure, surroundings, camp boundary, road network, movement, structure of facilities and shape of the camps are developed with proper jurisdiction of the state actors. Non-state actors and refugee themselves follow and develop those apparatus accordingly.

Camp is a hypervisible terrain because of its special and spatial structure. This setup of the camps exposes the signs of the power of governmentality. Rohingya refugee camps are ‘state-enforced camps’ indeed (Minca, 2015, p. 91). All these camps are controlled by the GoB with support of the NGOs and IGOs. Humanitarian organizations however are provided with some authority, they are not free to manage the camps. Every element of spatial configuration such as location, radius, design, connectivity, and infrastructure of the camps are decided and approved by the GoB. Camp is a dynamic place. It changes gradually in line with the interactions of the actors, as if the spatial setting is a living being. It grows, damages, changes

in shapes, constructs, and reconstructs both in planned and unplanned ways. These processes happen through underlying practices of power by the three actors: state, non-state actors, and refugee. Sometimes they decide, they react, and respond to each other in this spatial setup.




Figure 6.2: Spatial Set Up of Rohingya Refugee Camps

Source: Author, 2024

Total areas of the Rohingya camps are cordoned by barbwire with frequent watch tower all through the boundary. After setting up the watch tower in the barbwire fence, the camps are easily visible for security purpose like a ‘panopticon’. Whenever people pass over the camp area or follow a drone view of the locality, it strikes their attention because of its different types of shelter and arrangement of accommodation for the residents. The structure of the camps and shelters is different from the adjacent host community set-up. There are entry and exit points for the camps in particular distance. Refugees, however, are not allowed to go out from the camps they frequently move out from the camps for shopping in nearby markets. Police allow very few of them to exit for essential purposes but eventually, it becomes a huge number, and the outside market turns into a crowded place. It attracts outsiders with something different. The marketplaces are not well developed. Refugees buy and sell different types of items that are distributed to them in the camps. Their shabby dresses, banal appearance and movement in

the market offer a different view of these markets compared to other markets in the host community (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23). It is not the overall view of every entry and exit points but noticeable in most of the points, there are informal markets. It is a kind of spatial apparatus that gives a notion of refugee camps from outside of the camps. Once someone approaches the camps, they have to face the police to enter the camps and are required to submit identity, whereabouts, and purpose of the entry. Other than the check post, bad road conditions start immediately after the ending of host community road. The road networks of the camps are poor, even the roads of the three decades old camps are also poor, which are just brick-soling road, rough, and muddy. It also gives a different impression because it clearly differs from the host community road. The camp sites offer a physical and visible connotation of a 'state of exception' and 'dispositif' of governmentality. The mobility, outfit, physical texture of the people, inside and outside (host community) are notified differently when someone has a look. Since the camp contains the highest number of dwellers in a smaller area, it also produces additional noise than the host community area. The overall condition of the camps offers a perception of the miserable living condition of refugees in the camps, and thus also provide a narrative of an exceptional space (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23).

Camp structure and spatial configuration differ based on many sociopolitical conditions and geographic locations of the camps. The mechanism is more subjective than the structure of the camps. Shelter, tap stands, clinics, learning centre etc. are designed and set up as like a 'master plan' (Bulley, 2014) in which refugees have no participation. Refugees at the outset cannot decide and impact the plan. However, UNHCR follows the guidelines of the *Sphere Project*⁵ particularly for the physical configuration of refugee camps, policies and actions on the grounds change a lot during the interaction with refugees and state actors. The UNHCR however provides every humanitarian support under a MoU; it cannot interfere with the 'territorial' issues of the camp (Interview with NSA8, 2023). Camp in Charge (CiC) is the foci of all state actors as well as other non-refugee actors in the camps. Humanitarian organisations, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) conduct their activities under the authority of CiC. CiC offices are spacious even in congested camp settings away from the refugee blocks or outside of the camp boundary. Both UNHCR and Site Management Service (SMS) also have individual room to prompt coordination with CiC, however SMS conducts its camp managerial

⁵The *Sphere Project* was initiated in 1997 by a group of NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to develop a set of universal minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian response: the *Sphere Handbook*.

activities from separate and large office nearby the refugee blocks too. CiC and the Police office compound are better connected to the main road of the host community. It is well secured with a separate barbwire fence in strong metal gate. Moreover, there are security staff for CiC too. Every CiC has at least two *Ansar*⁶ member (para-police force). From every perspective, CiC office represents something distinguished in the camps. Some of the offices have nice seating areas, a small garden, and a parking lot. The parking lot is only allowed for CiC or government officials while the humanitarian organisations park their vehicles here and there on the roadside of the camps (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23).

The makeshift nature of the camps illustrates the constant temporariness of their existence. Shelters are made of bamboo, tarpaulin, and rope. But their exile remains no longer temporary. Even the latest influx is now in a protracted situation while the previous flows have passed several decades. Their place and type of accommodation remain the same. Though there is nothing black and white, refugee cannot have any permanent structure of shelter, resource centres, service points etc. The structure that are directly used by the refugee have to have temporary in configuration. It becomes more congested every day. They have a high need for new shelter and every new shelter occupies the last open space of the camps (Interview and Observation, 2022-23). So, the entire set-up is getting more cramped and crowded day by day, resultantly their scope of wash-sanitation and privacy fall gradually. Such spatial set-up refers to the precarity and uncertainty of the dwellers. Even if humanitarian actors think holistically about expanding the camps, it is not possible because the total area is demarcated with a barbwire fence. The government is already exhausted of providing thousands of acres of land and forest area for the Rohingya. The only option that remains for the Rohingya in Cox's Bazar is to move out to *Bhasan Chor*- a new place for Rohingya refugee at an Island in the *Noakhali* district. But Rohingya people do not want to move to that place because of further displacement and alienation from the existing larger community. Therefore, they cannot strongly ask for new shelter in the existing camp that might cause their indirect forced transfer from these camps to Cox's Bazar. They want to stay in these camps until their repatriation. Resultantly, it turns into a strategy to control their demand for shelter and wash-sanitation facilities.

⁶*Ansar* is the parapolice force of the Government of Bangladesh. They support the police to maintain security, and law and order situation of country.

The road networks are poor and muddy in the camps. Interestingly some of the drainage has bamboo structures instead of concrete. Slopes of the hills have also been treated or made staircases there with bamboo poles and bamboo sheets. Recently some of the slopes have been repaired with concrete. There is no electricity for the refugees in the camps, even for the NGO offices. Only the government offices or CiC and Police camp have electricity (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23). The ontological set-up of the camps exposes the temporariness and absolute power of the sovereign. It designs the particular spatial set-up to segregate and tame the refugee. State actors sometime reconfigure the security apparatus, particularly the camp borders and check post because of direct contravention of state sovereignty through regular trespassing of the camp fences. However, refugees do trespass for their fundamental reasons of livelihood or medical treatment. The global nation-state system here the Bangladeshi nation-state, consider such movement of refugee as a security threat to her national order (Interviews with State Actors, 2023).

While state actors control over the allocation or lease of the land for refugee camps, non-state actors do the internal design of the camps. They decide about the block for shelters, spots for community services, distribution points, health posts etc. But CiC seeks regular reports on such developments. Thus, non-state actors also exercise some power over refugee life by determining the camp's geography (Hyndman, 2000). Refugee camps are located 'on the margin of the world' (Agier, 2008) and are included in an exclusionary paradigm (Agamben, 1998). Separation and exclusion of non-citizen is an essential field of exercising the supreme power of the state actors. State actors gain this power from their nationals, and such practice is kind of defending their consent. Once there is set up, the camp structure itself controls and limits the movement of refugees (Bulley, 2014). The system of control and surveillance is not something static rather it transforms a lot in the time being. It changes like the changes happen in the case of human interaction. The set-up, instrument, apparatus or strategies for encampment and containment has also been going through remarkable changes in the Rohingya refugee camps. These changes occur and symbolise the power effect of, predominantly, refugee and state actors. The non-state actors apparently and most often reluctantly agree to the state actors. There was no barbwire fence in the first three years of makeshift camps of the new influx rather state actors—Bangladesh army, police, and civil administration—attempted to keep the refugee in the camps only through human surveillance or regular checking on different outgoing locations. But the GoB decided to barbwire fencing eventually to keep the refugee and the national order intact.




Figure 6.3: Fence and Refugee Response

Source: HRW, 2021

‘Camp is a camp’, commented by a non-state actor during his interview. A camp cannot be compared with some other entities. Every camp has diverse form of exceptionalities and complexities in terms of practices of institutions and power. Rohingya camps are physically and politically segregated from the local community or Bangladeshi nationals of the area. ‘Camp is a designated place where refugees are placed separately from the host community, with a view to that there will be no scope of contact or communication between them’ (Interview with SA1, 2023). Refugees live a suspended life in the secluded site of refugee camps (concerning Tanzanian camp, Turner, 2005). Every entry and exit point is controlled by the APBN. Sometimes it seems entry is okay, but exit is difficult for the Rohingya people. They have to show proper reasons and document in favor of their mobility. In case of emergency, they can go out upon CiC’s permission. Refugee must have to apply for exit pass well before their mobility. Their application should contain all the necessary information wanted in the ‘Exit Pass’ form (fig. below). They submit application with relevant documents, attachment with proper endorsement of the SMS and block *mahji*. CiC issues this pass with his signature and stamp. It is well practised that they can only seek and get such pass in case of medical complicity. In other cases, as per the camp practices (or according to Bangladeshi law) they

do not have any need to go outside of the camps (Interview with SA, 2023). If they want to go far from the camp vicinity, they have to deposit their ID card with exit pass and must have to return before the dawn. Unless there is a critical medical condition there is no scope to get permission to move out from the camps, this system, as Peetet (2015) claims in the case of the Gaza strip, is kind of ‘a bureaucratic wall’ rather than the visible barbwire fence. There is not much patrolling inside the camp during the daytime. But it is an open secret that different other intelligence units along with Armed Police Battalion (APBN) members are active inside the camp in civil dress.



Figure/ 6.4: Exit Pass for Refugee

Source: Author, 2024

Since there is no individual boundary among the camps, refugees can traverse from one camp to another camp through the intra-camps road network. Sometimes, they face difficulties during random police patrolling. Police install check posts anywhere anytime inside the camp. Police asks to return to their camp and sometime interrogate a lot as well as confiscate mobile phones. Police ask for money from the refugee to release their mobile phones (Interview with Refugees and Observation, 2022-23).

All the mechanisms have been developed from power interaction among the different actors. And this power is not limited in capacity, space, and time. State actors are by default at the forefront of exercising power, it is counterproductive for other actors too. The spatial structure as well as security mechanism of the camps are continuously changing because refugees' actions are perceived as threat for the state. Whatever it is, state actors rationalise their power and want to contain the microphysics of power of the refugees. Camp governmentality operates in such complex, ambiguous, and subjective dimensions that no one can trace its objectivity. 'Exit pass' is such an ambiguous thing that indicates the scope for refugee to go outside of the camps but eventually they very few of them can avail it. If someone becomes aggrieved or deteriorates the camps' law and order, he/she might not have provided this pass. This same pass system simultaneously refers to that territory outside the camps is different and not for their access. Agnew (2005) asserts that being territory a mandatory element of sovereignty, it is subject to spatialization and re-spatialization. State actors exercise their supreme power with regard to spatiality by designating a place at the margin of national territory, deciding about the structure of the camps inside, confining them inside, and configuring security apparatus for segregation and exposure of Rohingya's everyday banality.

6.3.2. Camp bureaucracy: 'Arts of government'

'Power and governance is exercised with a plethora of institutions and organisations in the refugee camps' (Hanafi & Long, 2010). Whenever the spatial technology lack of any component or mechanism of containment, diverse bureaucratic interventions are exercised thereof. Bureaucratic intervention grows both from state and non-state actors. The office of the Camp in Charge (CiC) holds the supreme authority of the camp. While bureaucracy in regular governance oftentimes suffers from 'red tapism', it is also obvious in the complex/global governance of Rohingya refugee camps. However, CiC is all in all in the camps, different other state, and non-state actors of Rohingya camps have turned it into a multilayered and multifaceted administrative zone. State actors in the camps are ultimately controlled by several ministries of the government, importantly the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR), Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Health Services. The MoDMR established their outreach Office- Refugee, Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) in Cox's Bazar to look after and coordinate the humanitarian action for Rohingya refugee. RRRC performs their job with regular cooperation with the local administration. The Armed Police Battalion (APBN) has been deployed in the camps to maintain law and order situation. Security is maintained through intensive localisation of police

camp (station) inside the camps. The RRRC representatives or the Camp in Charge (CiC) manage the camp 24/7, jointly with APBN. However, there are other state actors but these two entities—CiC and APBN— hold the ground responsibilities of Rohingya camps.

CiC is the front-line representative of camp government. CiC has many supporting staff or officer in his office. Some camps also have assistant CiC to support the CiC. Refugees cannot submit their files directly to the CiC. At first, they submit their application to respective staff of the CiC. If he/she finds the documents appropriate, the files are forwarded to next officer/staff. After several check and scrutiny, the files are proceeded to the CiC for approval. Oftentimes, files are returned without approval on many grounds. In that case, refugees have to submit the file again with desired documents. In case of the non-state actors, Site Management Service (SMS) coordinates the NGOs related issues as well as make a bridge with the CiC. SMS directly cannot provide any services such as food ration, health, or education services to the refugees, rather refugees get their services from the respective NGOs. But whenever they need to transfer, upgrade, and apply for new services, refugees have to go through several organizations or offices to complete the documentation. For instance, if a new couple wants to make a separate data card, they have to upgrade their status in every NGOs. Once they get clearance from every office, they can apply for final upgradation of their data card. Similarly, in case of changing any service points, they need to justify their demands both in the existing offices (state and non-state actors).

Without some exception refugees do not get their documentation on time. They face a lot of sufferings about birth registration and marriage permission. They wait a long time during data card upgradation, data correction, camp transfer, cancellation of data card and so on (Interview with Refugees, 2022-23). Every data card requires several verification and endorsement before their delivery to the beneficiaries. It must contain the stamp and signature of UNHCR and CiC. Since Rohingya refugees have high birth rate, they oftentimes need to add newborn in the data card for their food ration and other services. Refugees have to submit the data card upgradation with required information and necessary signature from the blocks and the management services. Once all the necessary information and documents are ready, they visit the respective centre to provide biometric data. Respective CiC office verifies all the information directly as well as through NGOs channel. Eventually it takes days to months to get the updated or new data card for necessary service in the camp. The average time for a marriage permission is three

months. If the parties of the marriage are from two different camps, it takes more than a year too.

“It takes 2-3 months to get feedback from CiC office. For example, someone must wait these 2-3 months for marriage permission. I along with *majhi* requested several times to accelerate the process but that does not work. Some of us request SMS as well but cannot help enough us in this regard.” (Refugee Participant Nur Haba, 2023).

The procedure follows several verifications by different NGOs. Until and unless the CiC office is convinced with the information, refugees do not get permission for marriage. However, 'refugees are also responsible for the delay. They cannot apply properly with appropriate documents” (Interview with SA5, 2023). The CiC office takes more time to verify the documents and the whereabouts of the documents. Most of the time office staff becomes slow in preparing and forwarding the file to the CiC. Beneficiaries him/herself are not encouraged to visit the CiC directly in person. On the other hand, *majhi* has some access to CiC and mediate the file on behalf of the beneficiaries. But *majhi* does not come forward for such help without money, they demand for 500-1000 BDT for such support (Interview with Kadir, 2022). It is also noticed that *majhi* sometime slow the process by manipulating the information or file attachments. Such practices indirectly encourage the unregistered marriage that has spillover effect on the newborn to face more bureaucracy. Even in case of a medical emergency, refugee go through the same bureaucratic procedure. However they can manage medical prescription for treatment in the district hospital, the entire formalities take longer time. Once they are endorsed by the UNHCR, refugee patient can admit in the host community hospital upon the approval from CiC. “But if the hospitals are in overflow at that time or already filled up the stipulated quota for refugees, CiC does not approve their referral” (Interview with NSA, 2023). The Camp in Charge sometimes verifies the documents further and oftentimes direct the patient to camp health post too.

Refugee can hardly meet CiC due to both structural as well as bureaucratic restrictions. Every CiC office maintains a strict security system. On some occasions, there are Rohingya volunteers as security in the CiC offices. From my informal conversation, observation, and experience in the CiC compound, Rohingya volunteers ask everyone about the whereabouts of the visitors to the CiC office. Only the visitors with ID card on their shoulder can access to the office compound. Visitors require necessary documents as such as permission to enter in the

refugee camps, permission to conduct research in the camps, prior contact, or references to meet him. If there is no direct contact or schedule with CiC, one needs to ask for appointment and schedule to his office staff. The mechanism of the CiC office oftentimes depends on the individual preference of the CiC. Refugees can mostly meet with their office staff or wait in the compound for someone’s attraction (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23).




Figure 6.5: Rohingya Household Data card

Source: Author, 2024.

Some CiC offices are located at a proximate distance to Cox’s Bazar-Ukhiya-Teknaf highway. Every office has a separate boundary and security system other than the camp boundary. Refugees have to cross their camp boundary check post first, then to the gate of the CiC office. Thus, they face double check to enter the CiC office. First one, the police check post is more difficult than the check in the CiC office. Otherwise, they have to return from the police check post at the camp boundary. They can come out for CiC while they can properly convince the police with documents or other reasons. Moreover, one CiC looks after several camps at a time. Resultantly they can serve only a couple of hours at each office or camp in a day. They are frequently rotated or transferred within or outside the camps. Both the non-state actors and

refugees admit the problems of services because of frequent changes in camp authority (Interview with NSA and Refugee, 2022). *Majhi* and different community leaders know the system well, or they have the confidence or the capacity to present their issue before the officials of the CiC office. They can meet with office staff or the assistant CiC frequently, but not with the CiC. In case of a serious issue, if his staff wish or can convince CiC, then refugee can talk with CiC directly. CiC and CiC offices are supreme something in the refugee camps, which manifests in formalities and spatial set-up of the office too. CiC is all in all of the camp that is also noticeable in their action. Besides, the SMS office works as a filtering one to have access for refugees to CiC. They convey the instruction of CiC to check refugees' queries before sending them to his office (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23). So, most of the time the SMS office convinces the refugee about the said query or service, and the refugees return to their shelter. In most of the cases they have replied, it is the system of the office. Otherwise, CiC directly does not provide any services; it is the responsibility of the NGOs to look after the refugees. CiC coordinates the entire response with the government mandates.

Camp transfer of refugee is a regular job of the camp operations. Most often refugee apply for such camp transfer for marital purpose, family unification, and community unification (same neighbour as in Rakhine). Refugees need to update their data card as per the camp for which they require clearance from the former camp and acceptance from the receiving camp. The entire process is completed upon the endorsement of CiC from both camps. Sometimes refugees are transferred from one camp to another camp for security and safety purpose too. Except for this type of transfer, refugees are hung up in-between two camps. Sometimes it takes several months. During this period, they face a lot of sufferings about receiving humanitarian services. They have to go to a former camp far away to collect rations (rice packets, LPG, oil etc). Both refugee and CiC acknowledge the issues of sufferings. The process is accomplished when only they receive clearance as well from the respective service providers in the camps.

Most of the NSA wistfully comments that now it is difficult to implement project timely in the camps. The first challenge starts from the short time ceiling of a project from the donor or donor NGOs while the second round of hassle begins from RRRC and CiC. "After overcoming many hurdles in different phases, we only have two months for implementation of a six month project" (Interview with NSA4, 2022). Such bureaucratic deadlock has a trickle-down effect on the overall responses. Sometimes it happens from both ends, the approval delays due to a shortage of necessary documents for the project proposal itself. Humanitarian organisations

to governmentality that necessarily used to violence or force to manage dwelling system or population (Lanuza, 2013). Some bureaucratic instruments here are clear-cut substitution of violent disciplinary power that argues strongly for Foucauldian governmentality. Both state and non-state actors legitimize their actions and solutions over refugee in different ways. Therefore, whatever the status of refugee and the attributes of the camps, refugees remain under the fine-grained (planned) modes of government (Turner, 2015).

6.3.3. Legal Vacuum but Strong Customary Legal Practices

Refugees are stagnant in the junction of UNHCR-led international law and host community law during their crying need for fundamental rights (Holzer, 2013). In governmentality, policies, strategies are used as tactics instead of law. It is easy for the administrator to work out in legal vacuum or paradox. They can achieve their ultimate goal of control and management of people as per their intention/purpose. Bangladesh has a long history of refugee connections. More than 10 million of Bangladeshi took sanctuary in the West Bengal, Tripura, and Assam of India during her liberation war in 1971. Most of them were repatriated to newly independent Bangladesh by 1972. The young state and war-ravaged Bangladesh welcomed thousands of Rohingya refugee from Burma in 1978. Since then, Bangladesh has been turned into a constant sanctuary for the Rohingya people and their flight continue to take shelter in Bangladesh in 1991-1992, 2012, 2014. The largest ever influx entered Bangladesh in 2017. Now Bangladesh is hosting more than one million refugees for more than six years of the last influx. Bangladesh neither have signed the UN Refugee Convention 1951 nor enacted any legal framework for such an operation. Fact and laws are completely confused in the refugee camps (Agamben, 1998, p. 170), similar situation prevails also in the Rohingya camps.

Rohingya people in Bangladesh have been labelled in many terms since the first exodus (Roy, 2020). Their labelling is broadly divided into two blocks: humanitarian block and governmental block. Humanitarian actors as usually use the term 'refugee' while state actors use two terms 'Undocumented Myanmar Nationals (UMNs)' and 'Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs)'. UNHCR also accepts this labeling since GoB maintains the principle of non-refoulment on the grounds and approves necessary support for the Rohingya people. Mode of treatment to refugee or refugee-like population has no differences in many cases in terms of signatory and non-signatory of the UN Refugee Convention (Interview with NSA8, 2023). The GoB always claims to apply Bangladeshi law for any person present on Bangladeshi soil. The Foreigners Act of 1946 and The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPc) are the dominant laws that are applied to treat the Rohingya people in Bangladesh. In case of any punishment or criminal

activities of the Rohingya refugees, the GoB exercises such laws to bring them before laws. Rohingya refugees have access to legal system only through different NGOs in case of severe torture or violence in the camps. But they cannot claim any rights as per Bangladeshi law and the Constitution. In case of protection issue, none of the Bangladeshi law and international covenant are applied to them. Bangladesh is a state party to many human rights Convention and Covenants on Child Protection, Violence Against Women and so on. But those conventions are only applied to Bangladeshi citizens, not any person residing in Bangladesh as alien-like Rohingya people. So, the Rohingya people live in a legal vacuum which source the power of governmentality to them too some extent.

The refugee camp is a ‘state of exception’. In this space of exception, the law of the sovereign is not necessarily defined or practised rather heterogenous tactics or managerial apparatus are used to govern the target population (Agamben, 1998; Foucault, 2007). Rohingya people are registered under the auspicious of the Ministry of Home Affairs. RRRC office and UNHCR jointly complete their registration and new entry to refugees’ family card. CiC controls everything about data collection, verification and management through approval processes including marriage and birth registration. Bangladeshi Marriage Registration Act is practiced for this purpose. The bride and bridegroom need to be an adult of 18 and 21 years respectively. The same law is practised as custom in restricting dowry in marriage. During the fieldwork, it is widely noticed that refugee ignore these legal practices or customs rampantly and engage in polygamy and child marriage across the camp. Most of the CiC as well as the Police officer agree to some legal vacuum. They could not speak or show any specific legal framework or some agreed rules and regulations (practices) for the residents of the camps. They maintain the bureaucratic and security issues according to Bangladeshi law on their favour, do not necessarily support the refugee. There are many ambiguities about the camp operation. Since there is no clear-cut policy for camp management, it runs on many ad hoc decisions. Most of the camps are connected under the same fence of the vast area and the refugees have the scope to move from one camp to other camps even after restrictions. But there is no transport for such refugee mobility. Exceptionally very few vehicles—owned by local influential—run across the camp. Transport operation is controlled by the police.

6.3.4. Humanitarian service: No rights just basic entitlements

Not only Bangladesh but many other countries also have no experience in handling such a large number of refugees at once. Thus, the GoB calls on UNHCR for necessary support as a specialized organization and mandate for looking after refugee or refugee-like population

across the globe (Interview with NSA8, 2023). It refers to the particular knowledge structure to govern the refugee, even if the state lacks such expertise as well as capacities to manage the prima facie refugee. And it is prevalent that they are not manageable through force and violence rather they require both moral character and special techniques of governance with proper rationalities. Whatever the condition of target groups (weak/strong), the humanitarian regime possesses those capacities and deploys them in the camp to control the dwellers in (indefinite)temporality. Every space of the camp is considered as a point of care and control (Malkki, 1995). Humanitarian services are obvious in humanitarian response, but it does not provide mere services or support for the beneficiaries eventually. Intentionally or unintentionally the provided basic services work as pastoral power to the refugee. The non-state actor or NGOs gain the necessary obedience to control the refugee with some other disciplinary power or tactics. Since refugees are dependent on humanitarian aid, they are controlled through aid mechanism. Only the good refugees can be entitled to the humanitarian services such as food, shelter, medical or other available facilities. Having no other alternatives to survival, without some exception, refugee try to keep them shut up. In case of protest or complaint they are delayed or face other kinds of harassment in receiving services further. Ration cards are confiscated for the time being in case of violation of any rules and instructions.

The refugee camp is a state within a state (Ramadan, 2009). From the mandate of GoB, UNHCR has invited IOM, WFP, WHO, and diffused its mandate to other international and national organisations to support different services for refugees. Refugees get almost all the basic needs and services in the camps. They receive support on basic needs such as food, health, shelter, education and so on. But they have a lot of complaints about the services. Humanitarian aid is the main means of survival in the camps. Refugees received a particular amount of food ration or credits in their smart card to collect other stuffs from the super shops. They are provided mainly with food items. Sometime different humanitarian organisations distribute non-food items (NFI) such as clothing, crookeries irregularly or seasonally (Interviews and Observation, 2022-23). Most of the refugee talked about the shortage of food items; they can hardly run the family. But while interviewing the non-state actors (SMS), they mention the international standard of distribution that is approved by the UN and Sphere Project. Refugees are distributed a sufficient amount of calorie they need per month (Interview with NSA5, 2023). Moreover, a significant number of refugees work in different services of the response, they support running the largest humanitarian action as well as refugee receive a certain amount of money to fulfill their other needs. All the capable refugees look for job and request for any kind of work

opportunity. However, NGOs cannot offer everyone a work in the camps. Some humanitarian respondents admit about the less amount of rations as well as mentioned about the previous practice that there was no discipline in distribution system. There was overlapping in distribution. Thus, some refugees got an extra amount while others did not even receive a minimum amount. The state actors (CiC) also mention the fulfilment of all their basic needs, even refugee get LPG for cooking which is impossible in the case of a host community in Bangladesh. They receive everything—shelter, education, health facilities—and there is no need to earn extra. Rohingya people are not citizens of Bangladesh, so they should not think of the same livelihood opportunities and rights as the host community enjoys. Refugees can work in the camp activities and receive an amount of money too. Moreover, they go outside for work, which affects the host community severely (Interview with SA7, 2023).

Rohingya refugee cannot buy the necessary amount of associate food items with the given credits in their cards. They are not provided with non-food items. NGOs do the field study and regular focus group discussion with refugee about the quality and quantity of the distributions. During my fieldwork it is noticed that some of the items have been reduced significantly from their distribution lists. It does not always happen for fund crisis. At the beginning, humanitarian organizations distributed more amount than the refugee needed. Nowadays almost every refugee participant talked about the shortage of food rations. They cannot save any of the items to sell, by which they could buy other essential non-food items. There is no scope to meet minimum protein demands. Refugee labelled the health services as ‘paracetamol treatment’. Paracetamol is prescribed and provided for every case from the hospital (Interview with Refugee Participants, 2022-23). Overall, refugees think that humanitarian organisations intentionally do not provide sufficient ration.

“I think NGOs and the government are not doing enough for us. They can do more for us by providing better education, health, and accommodation facilities in the camps. I see NGOs receive a good amount of money by presenting us but they do not spend enough for us. It is kind of a business” (Interview with Shorif-23, 2022).

They think that NGOs are developing themselves rather than improving the lives of refugee. In this regard they can understand their powerlessness about their well-being. There are many projects, but refugee cannot decide about the appropriate one. Refugees have started talking these days about power and management of the camps. There are an adequate number of learning centres (LC) in the camps with minimum teachers there. Some of the learning centres have state of the art infrastructure in the camps. Some of them are spacious with small yard for

kids playing and wash facilities. They also have quality teacher both from the Rohingya community and from the host community at least to teach up to tenth grade. But the problem is that there is no system of proper education. Teachers are asked to teach the same and limited volume for day after day rather than completion of a particular syllabus. Most of the time, there is no class system to upgrade their level of grade, their learning, and their achievement. Teachers are not free to teach and support the kids independently (Informal Conversation with Refugee, 2022-23). Both the humanitarian actors and state actors like to call it learning rather than education. A significant number of refugee guardians are aggrieved of such education. Kids receive some biscuits in the LC. A refugee, Mohammed Ismail, lamented that “there is no proper education. It is just for biscuit, a ‘biscuit education’” (Interview with Refugee, 2022-23). Nevertheless, they send their kids to the learning centre because the kids can spend some time, can play with others. LCs are the best place for kids in the camps context.

Whatever the outcome, humanitarian organizations arrange different kinds of life skills training for refugees in almost every camp. They engage the young male and female refugee for vocational training on tailoring, handicrafts, mobile mechanic, solar panel repairing, net weaving, gardening, cap preparing etc. on regular basis. Though they have limited capacity, NGOs train a lot of refugees in a year. Sometime refugees transcend their knowledge with fellow community members. But most often their training ended in smoke since they are not provided with sewing machines and raw materials. Moreover there is no commercial opportunity to harness their skills.



Figure 6.7: Training of Tailoring for Refugee

Some of them continue their skills by practicing in the training centre on irregular basis. The trained refugees can use the machine in training centre for their household purpose. Eventually some of them lost the interest on their skills because they have to walk a long way to go to the training centre from one end to other end of the camp. Trained refugees are interested about their skills but they cannot utilize it for the above reasons. They expect to the NGOs to provide them respective equipment as well. A non-state actor shared during interview that

“our program is designed just to provide them some life skills training, it is not approved or our mandate to support the full utility of the skills in the camps. The main target of such activities is to increase their engagement and decrease their idle time” (Interview with NSA3, 2023).

However, there is no legal restrictions for facilities, state actors do not approve such livelihood opportunities in the camps.

6.3.5. Informal refugee leadership: Power instrument of state actors

Informal refugee leadership works as an informal tool of governmentality in the refugee camps. Both state and non-state actors use them for their purpose in camp governance. State actors (CiC and Police) engage them both controlling and managing the ordinary refugees in the camps. UNHCR speaks of ‘*democratic leadership*’⁷ among the refugee in the camps across the globe but eventually they cannot materialise their provisions. Only in three camps out of the thirty one camps in Cox’s Bazar, refugees have a structure of democratic community leadership for refugees.

An explicit struggle for power (conflict) is visible in those camps because state actors simultaneously establish informal leadership of *majhi* while ordinary refugee demonstrate a mixed perception. IOM has no say in the community leadership of the camps. It neither rejects nor accepts *majhi* as representatives of the refugees (Interview with NSA5, 2023). Some of the refugee support *majhi* while some of them go to the Camp leader or Block leader. *Majhi* is the de facto leader of the refugee community in the camps. Initially this leadership was developed by the Bangladesh Army and the system continues today under the civil administration of the camps. Before this present camps or block numbering, refugees were identified according to the head *majhi* of the block.

By ⁷*Democratic Leadership of refugee*, UNHCR means the participation of refugee in community leadership through proper consent of the community. In this regard, UNHCR suggests for election/other mechanism to select the representative of the refugee in camp governance.

For instance, if any refugee belongs to 'X' *majhi* then the block would be called as 'X' block. Now the blocks have alphabetic order such as block A, block B, block C. Nevertheless, those old labelling still are used by the residents because whenever they visit the SMS office and CiC, they are mostly asked about the name of the *majhi*. CiC ask the refugee to come along with *majhi* or ask *majhi* to visit him instead of the beneficiaries. Thus, refugee oftentimes become reluctant to visit CiC. *Majhi* is selected by CiC. He is normally obedient to CiC and has no accountability to the community.

Even if *majhi* does something wrong to the community or anyone, refugee do not complain against him" (Interview with Tofayel-29, 2022). Most of the time neither the CiC office nor SMS receive such complaints. Only in case of serious issues, such complaints are received or heard. Most of the time those complaints ended in smoke. In the same vein, informally a lot of refugees asked, 'whose travesty is it'? Moreover, the complainer faces many problems from the *majhi*. Every *majhi* has a particular group in the block. His group member punishes the complainer eventually. *Majhi* is changed only in case of strong allegation and protest from the community. NGOs play a neutral role in such community leadership. Sometimes they become obliged to welcome the *majhi* on different mobilisation issues such as disaster management or distribution of services.

While police and CiC or state actors use *majhi* to manage the refugee, non-state actors recruit volunteers and elected community leaders for a similar purpose. Besides, serving in distribution and other service posts, they collect the everyday whereabouts of the blocks. These are kind of informal and community technique of surveillance of the population. It was noticed frequently during my fieldwork in different camps too. We were asked for information several times about our visit by the volunteers. Without some exception, volunteers politely justified their reason for a query that it is part of their job. They are obliged to submit a report on everything happening in the block, particularly a visit from an outsider. The UN organisations submit regular report as well to their headquarters abroad. Put differently, everyone in the camp is under surveillance. As a bearer of sovereign power, state actors deploy *majhi* to collect information about both ordinary refugees as well as NGOs. Whenever *majhi* or any particular NGOs cross their limit of influence, ordinary refugee protest or move together towards the CiC or UNHCR office too. Therefore, power circulates every moment in this refugee camp with a global effect.

6.4. Concluding remark

It is prevalent in the above findings that a particular set of structure and mechanism has been evolving in the Rohingya refugee camps. It is both formal and informal as well as visible and invisible. Spatial set up, segregation of the refugees, camp bureaucracy, mechanism of humanitarian aids, legal paradoxes, informal community leadership consist of significant structure and mechanism of the Rohingya camp governmentality. One of the non-state actors opined that 'it is now a matured response of this kind'. But some attributes of camp formation do not comply with his observation. A complex set-up like refugee camps has no scope to reach at saturation point in their governance and dynamics. It keeps changing and remains lively because of the constant circulation of power among the heterogenous actors. This governmentality casts a view of discursive and material sites of power among the three actors of humanitarian government in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. The apparatus of camp governmentality is not completely a top-down one or entirely ascribed from somewhere else rather it forms through everyday practices. The knowledge regime of IRR obviously triggers this formation of multiple and diverse institutions, organisations, tactics but it is the actors on the ground who decide the scale and level of operation. Rohingya camp is completely a refugee-centred entity. And none of the actors know what the ultimate shape of this governmentality will be. It takes such kind of complex shape because of refugee responses to the nascent set-up. The collective and corporeal effect of refugee determines the entire spatial technology. Prior knowledge of and from IRR even cannot fix the growth and transformation of such structure.

Both the spatial set-up and disciplinary intervention changes in the time being that denote the collective power of refugee. The transformation of makeshift camps to organised camps mark the responses and reactions of different actors in the camp. The basic infrastructure is erected as per guidelines and the support of the non-state actors. Since state actors have no such experiences in handling a huge number of refugees, non-state actors or the IGOs submit details plans and layout of different service points. State actors want to keep the camp vicinity as small as possible. Refugees feel an exclusionary attitude from spatial technology, managerial set-up, practices, humanitarian services and so on. The structure and mechanism remind their status of temporariness and non-membership of host countries. Thus, refugee camps turn into 'confined quarters as governmentality effect' (Li, 2007, p.275). Non-state actors support or keep silent the state actor about applying such power over refugee. Rather non-state actors accept some claims or speak about new projects for the refugee. Non-state actors through biopolitical aids or biopower tend to justify their actions including responses from that of the state actors. Aid

is the most powerful tools here to maintain both state actors, refugees as well as local communities. So, it is distributed oftentimes among the local community too, sometime in more visible ways of big infrastructural developments (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23). Improvements in roads, schools, colleges, and livelihood supports are few to name. It happens in such a seamless way that state actor cannot deny despite deeming these activities as backdoor policy of local integration (Hurrell, 2011). It is kind of a great support for refugee from non-state actors. It is eventually difficult to ascertain whether the non-state actors in the camps are either defenders or silent tormentors of refugee. Their system, institutions, strategies, and mode of their operation cannot easily be discernible onsite. Overall, informal techniques are more prevalent than formal techniques in this governmentality.

This part, above all, attempted to unfold the stake and actions of the three actors into that structure, however, it paid special attention to how the entire procedure connects refugees who oftentimes remain obscure in the investigation. The overall international (state)system prefers the national ordering of things to human rights violations. So, whenever a group of people or ethnic group is persecuted, the neighboring state tends to close their border or leave the non-nationals in refugee camps meeting both ends of security of the state and lifesaving of the vulnerable. Every member of the nation-state system is concerned about the purity of their national settings. While the host country deploys its power and resources to stop the spreading of alien across the country, the international community emphasizes stopping further border crossings of the refugee. All the non-refugee actors develop necessary mechanism and set up to that end. Structure to mechanism or spatiality to governance has transformed significantly in the Rohingya camps since the influx in 2017. The naming and the labelling as a refugee come up with the installation of sovereign and biopolitical power from the state and non-state actors. In this camp governmentality even a 'good refugee' exerts some amount of power in a dimension of microphysics of power that gradually heightens. Space is fundamental in any exercise of power (Foucault, 1984, p. 252). The multiplicity of power by divergent actors manifests in the entire structure of the camp or vice versa. But structure partially as a tangible thing characterises well the dynamics of camp governmentality- an effect of refugee's power. So, while this chapter illustrated the structure and mechanism of camp governmentality the following part unfolds how the actors interact and exert their power at that ground in their everyday practices and actions. They exercise different forms of power: sovereign power, disciplinary, liberal tactics, and microphysics of power, strongly intertwining with constitutive structure and mechanism.

CHAPTER 7: FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENTALITY: PARADOXES AND PERMEATION OF POWER

7.1. Introduction

I argue here based on empirical evidence that (Rohingya)refugee camps manifest an exercise of power at the micro level of fragmented governmentality, having a strong national and international or macro level effects. The three actors—refugee, state, and non-state actors—of this research interact at the ground level. Local and national level humanitarian organizations execute the responsibility of international refugee regime, and at the bottom line, state actors exercise the sovereign power on behalf of the supreme authority. Both state and non-state actors engage with refugee at the ground level from an individual to the entire community. Non-refugee actors apply the strategy to mix up with refugee deeply for better management and keep the refugee a good refugee. To that end, the GoB also deploys significant number of officials in the response while the national and international organizations provide services, collect information for every moment of the camps. Their mode of engagement differs based on mandate, rules of the GoB and humanitarian principle. Normally interaction to refugee crisis evolves with two primary discursive characteristics of threatening elements to host government, and a victim in need of protection (McConnachie, 2014). I aim to analyze the power dynamics of these actors in the camps looking at the already examined structure and mechanism of the response such as spatial set up, bureaucratic apparatus, humanitarian services and so on. It sheds lights on diverse engagement of different actors as essential elements of IR. In other words, camps being a ‘space of ambiguity’ (Oesch, 2017), it argues that the ambiguity and subjectivity of the camp and camp dwellers are produced from the fragmented governmentality of the camps. This chapter unfolds the development of such ambivalent relationship of the refugee from being part of incessant power play of the actors including refugee themselves at micro level.

The previous chapter has highlighted structure and mechanism of camp governmentality as prerequisite of camp operation that simultaneously indicate myriads of power and powerplay of these three actors. However sometimes it is hard to differentiate between power and agency, particularly population in extra-legal status. Three actors of these camps exercise different form of power while sometime some power cross each other. Refugees are contained in a place with a particular spatial set-up. The first and foremost power of such space is sovereignty, to keep the ‘national order of things’ intact (Malkki, 1995; Turner, 2015). Except for some differences

(here the Rohingya camps in *Bhasan Chor*), a constellation of camps resembles a maze-like informal set-up (Oesch, 2017) too, designed with a disciplinary focus. Both sovereign and disciplinary power are exercised to consolidate a particular space of the camp which afterward provides the necessary support for the containment of the refugees or maintaining their discipline (Peteet, 2016). Refugees are both source and medium of power circulation in the camps. Even a vulnerable and marginal refugee in the camp exert some power over other actors in such as state actor and non-state actors (humanitarian organizations). Their power has been considered as microphysics of power that exist everywhere and can be exercised by anyone. This chapter focus on how these actors exercises different forms of power that leads to agentic responses of refugee which have been illustrated in the next chapter.

7.2. Rohingya refugee: Camp as a device of power

It is evident that camp governmentality encompasses constellation of structure and mechanism all of which actually evolves from different kinds of power exercise by the actors. Governmentality of any structure evolves with much apparatus of techniques, practices, strategies, institutions and so on but power remains in the foci of governmentality (Casasampera, 2021). Modalities of power differ according to the actor. State and non-state actors sometime share and exercise same power jointly. Refugees gain and act according to the power circulates through them from the other two actors- state actors and non-state actors. Although refugees are oftentimes empowered by the non-state actors, it is not shared at all. The following table have been developed based on the data collected from the camps. It shows the dynamics and dimensions of exercising power in the camps. In most of the cases, non-refugee actors have some defined power to exercise over the refugees whereas refugees' power is more fluid and diversified. Refugees exercise power both individually and collectively, their power circulates more discretely than that of power of the state and non-state actors. Michel Foucault defines these forms as microphysics of power that can be exercised by anybody and anywhere. This perspective of power acknowledges the power of vulnerable and marginal too here the power of Rohingya refugee.

Table 7.1: NVivo Codebook on Power Dynamics in the Camp

Paradoxes and Power	Fragmented governmentality and complex relationships among the actors
Refugee and Interplay with Sovereignty	how does refugee presence challenge and interact with state sovereignty
Transformation of Spatial set up	how does refugee change the spatial set up of the camps fixed by state actors
Negotiation and Bargaining	the capacity and extant of negotiating rights and amenities with state and non-state actors in the camp
Activism of Young Refugee	the way of demanding human rights for refugee community in a situation of containment
State Actors-Quest for Rationalities	rationalities behind the actions, strategies, rules and regulations of the state actors. Dynamics of interaction with refugee and non-state actors.
Non-state actors-Power in Dilemma	non-state actors (NGOs) are in the crossroad of state sovereignty and humanitarian principles. Dilemma of non-state actors in their everyday humanitarian responses.

Source: Author, 2024

Based on the above table, the following sections highlight the different dimensions of the microphysics of power of the refugee as well as discuss the power of the state and non-state actors of Rohingya refugee camps.

7.2.1. (Rohingya)Refugees and interplay with sovereignty

Refugee naming itself has an inherent power (Arendt, 1951). Refugees exercise and show up microphysics of power, that is literary originate from their corporeal existence in foreign land as refugee. They do not enter or move in foregin land intentionally, but they have to flee, even if they are stopped or deterred on any point of their flight. It is the matter of saving their biological life. This physique left with meagre power, but their alien status collectively helps them empowering. The apparatus of entering in the Bangladeshi nation-state perceive them as powerful enough to tarnish the trilogy of the host country. The phenomenon remains no more case sensitive, it is global and universal. People with prima facie refugee or alien status face the same treatment or inculcate power to the bare lives. Refugees' flight to any nation-state, primarily strikes its sovereignty and territory. Though host country allows them on many grounds, it is considered as undermining to state sovereignty from aliens and non-national of the state. Even a single refugee or non-citizen affect the national ordering of things or the state sovereignty while the refugee flow [traumatized and calm] itself exert agency over state actors

(Terry, 2002). Power play between the state and the refugee begin from the very trilogy of nation-state: sovereignty-nation-territory. It happens both in macro and micro level. On the other hand, state actors at any level eventually represents the state, exercise supreme power on behalf of the state. And the refugee gain power collectively from their labeling as refugee. Here the savior or national and international humanitarian organization as non-state actors retrieve power from humanitarian norms and mode of engagement.

Refugee and refugee camps is like a scar in the cartography of nation-state. State actors strive to keep refugee as less as visible and provide less space in her territory. State actors or here GoB also applied different mechanisms in maintaining Rohingyas attachment to country of origin rather than attachment with the host country. Resultantly, they are offered minimum space close to the border of their country of displacement. Whatever they are vulnerable or aggressive, refugee challenge the nation-state apparatus with their presence. Rohingya refugee got their shelter in the remotest place of Bangladesh, close to the Rakhine state border of Myanmar. Territorially it places almost in an invisible and insignificant place but due to high number of refugees, the GoB also deployed its maximum efforts to control and keep them managed or good refugee. Refugee camps turn into a practical field of sovereignty of nation-state. The government along with civil administration has engaged the highest symbol of state sovereignty—the Bangladesh Army—to maintain the security of the camps. Even refugee community leaders regularly join in the meeting with Bangladesh Army too. They share their concern and challenges in the camps. Here the state actors work at the ground level, they exercise their power and authority over other actors to protect the state's sovereignty and territory. One of the APBN members opines that security of these camps is the highest concern of the government. Camp situation is monitored by the highest authority of the state. 'Government is there always to provide us necessary support to keep the camps peaceful' (Interview with SA7, 2023). Much of the refugee studies literature claim that refugees are bare lives, passive, speechless and also powerless. But the prevailing situation of refugee camps, definitely also the Rohingya camps, offer an impression, as if the most powerful entities live there. Spatial, legal, administrative, logistic and security mechanism are installed to contain them in the camps. Refugees not only contest the state sovereignty inside the camps but also by sneaking out of the camps sometimes in a group, and by claiming their normal life. They like to work freely in the host community, take part in sports in the fields in host community as well as avail other facilities. During my fieldwork, a group of Rohingya youth faced mobile court and light punishment for playing football in a host community fields in *Ukhiya*. They

were handed over to the respective CiC upon an undertaking of not crossing such limit in future (Observation and Fieldnotes, 2022-23). The responses of state actors and reaction from local community framed the incident both as contested for the state security as well as refugee as ‘other’ in Bangladesh. It is kind of challenging the sovereignty of host country however refugees do not act thus intentionally. Their existence and mobility for survival challenge the political boundary of a state. And the state continues to exercise power and adopt different strategies to control this inherent power of the refugee and human being alike.

7.2.2. Transformation of spatial set up

There is a transformation or changes in the spatial set up of the camps. It is happening because of the continuous demands and interactions of refugees with state and non-state actors. They put pressure directly and indirectly for their facilities. Sometime non-refugee actors respond in favor of the refugee, and it develops a particular spatial change such as new service points. But while they cannot act for the refugee, it creates different types of spatiality in the camps such as barbwire fences. To say in other words, different forms of power underlie this transformation of power in the camps. As per the increasing needs of the refugee, the radius as well as internal structure of the camps have been changing gradually. The government and the state actors however want to strictly maintain a fix area of land for them, authority cannot ignore the humanistic and logical demand of shelter and services of the refugees. Eventually, the spatiality of the camp spread here and there outside of the main space. After placing a demand to SMS for new shelter, normally the applicant does not remain inactive rather he/she tries from all means, meet with UNHCR/IOM and CiC to remind and negotiate their needs. Refugees also stick to their demand for their minimum comfort and well-being in the camps. Concomitantly, other services also expand according to the ratio of the population. State actor needs to compromise with the border of the camps and new space add to the ‘extra-territory’ or to the ‘state of exception’. Thus, refugees exert their power over the core elements of nation-state sovereignty and territory continuously. However state wants to offer them minimum space, the minimum facilities for a big influx exert a pressure over the state entities and national of the country. Day by day the camp activities have been expanding towards the host community. Thousands of local community people are in fear of forced eviction or their forcible inclusion in the camp boundary (Informal hangout with host community, 2022-23). But the GoB agreed to UNHCR in the memorandum to provide such entitlement and basic needs of the refugee. It is not only humanitarian services but also responsibility under refugee regime, even without being a party of UN Refugee Convention 1951.

7.2.3. Negotiation and bargaining

Refugees live in an asymmetric power relation of the camps. They become subjected to the sovereign and bio-power of the humanitarian government. Nevertheless, individual can negotiate the process to which they are subjected (Inda, 2008). Though Rohingya refugees also most often align to the governmental process of the camps, they also live there through continuous negotiation. They negotiate both with state and non-state actors regard to their basic needs and demands of human rights. Nowadays a significant number of refugees negotiate continuously against their relocation in the *Bhasan Chor* and almost no involuntary relocations happen to them. Refugee act unitedly and collectively on their basic issues of camp life. They move along with their community leader or community people on any decision against them (Interview and Observation, 2022-23). Ordinary refugee put pressure on *majhi* to support them on particular service or documentation in the CiC office or other NGOs. Sometime the community leaders agree to go to that particular office but oftentimes they ask some favor or money in return from the refugees. In that case, refugee themselves visit the CiC office, even for day after day until they receive any update or the service. However, it is difficult to meet the CiC they can manage to meet the assistant CiC or other staff there. During my observation, I found many refugees were trying to convince the office staff with their all efforts. Refugee request as well as challenge for their services. A refugee named Hafizur Rahman said that after a several meeting with CiC, he stopped their transfer from one camp to another. His main argument was that they feel comfort to live in the current camp location because many of his neighbours were from the same village of Rakhine state (Interview, 2022).

Rohingya refugee themselves also think repatriation as the best solution of their crisis and want to decide about their return. To that end, they like to negotiate and work together with different actors in the camps. But in the first two attempts of repatriation in 2018 and 2019, state actors did not ask for refugees' opinion on the initiatives. However, the Myanmar had no good intention for a successful repatriation, refugee unitedly denied the call for repatriation. So, during the third attempt in 2023, community leaders were called in for repatriation decision and preparation. Refugee representative managed the scope for 'go and check' visit in Myanmar to decide repatriation for their community. They gained the decision-making power and got the opportunity to visit Rakhine state before their repatriation. The visiting representatives shared the onsite situation in Myanmar with other refugee in the camps. And they decided in a group not to repatriate because none of their conditions were addressed from Myanmar in favor of their repatriation. Thus, the initiative ended in smoke as well in the third

time. Despite refugees could not repatriate, this time they find themselves worthy of decision on their basic issues.

Regular claims of refugee to the UN and state actors about repatriation and resettlement strengthen their identity as Rohingya as well as international subject for protection. Protesting or negotiating about repatriation scheme inevitably expose the capacity of refugees with state actors and international organizations (Bradley, 2014). Likewise frequent organized-unorganized and approved-precipitous demonstrations reveal their subject-making capacity both as refugees, individual(citizen) from Myanmar or concern of international community. Refugees negotiate many critical aspects at micro-level individually or in free style just by ignoring the policy of the state actor. Frequent demands, boycott, negotiation-bargaining with state actors and non-state actors reminds everyone in the humanitarian response that refugees are also universal human rights bearer, they cannot be devoid of human rights.

7.2.4. (Online)Activism of young refugee: Hard to penetration for disciplinary power

Refugees are frustrated and resentful about many actions of state and non-state actors. However, they consider non-state actors as their well-wisher or rights defenders, nowadays NGOs are slow in listening their sufferings or to intervene in times of human rights violations in the camps. “Refugees are already here for more than five years. Now they demand some rights other than entitlement” (Interview with NSA5, 2023). During my fieldwork almost all the respondents shared with me about the police harassment in the camps. Refugees are affected by the bribery, extortion, and torture of police. It is quite open secret. There were a lot of complaints to NGOs, UNHCR or to CiCs but the situation remained the same. Moreover, refugees cannot protest or demonstrate frequently against those activities of the state or non-state actors. There are strict surveillance and control mechanism in the camps. But the educated youth want to do something for the remedy of the sufferings. Such scenario of the Rohingya camps was reported in the several international media particularly the Guardian, the Al-Jazeera (Stepansky, 2022). Simultaneously, several human rights organizations also forwarded it to UNHCR and UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Young refugee randomly reports in social and news media about restriction, control and surveillance, bribery, and corruption in the camp operations. They voluntarily supply camp update to human rights advocates such as ‘Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and so on. Such activities have both immediate and long-term impact on the refugees’ life in the camps. Oftentimes the UNHCR protection team investigates and reports to high level of the GoB. In response, it withdraws, reshuffles, or punishes officials on case by case. Accordingly higher authority

pressurizes the state actors to address any kind of ill treatment against refugee in the camps. In other words, refugee live in a marginal position but always remain at the centre of camp governmentality.

7.3. State actors: Quest for rationalities in governance

As investigated in the previous chapter that a form of structure and mechanism develops in the refugee camp due to power circulation and exercise of power among the actors. State actors apply explicit power in the forms of spatial technology of the camp, camp bureaucracy, legal paradoxes, and disciplinary technique in the camps. State and the state actors are used to show up power against the non-nationals in the territory. They possess the sole power to decide and categorize aliens like Rohingya people in Bangladesh. Neither the NGOs nor the refugee could stop state actors in fencing the camps. State actors not only maintain the spatial segregation but also cultural alienation of Rohingya people from Bangladeshi nationals. They do not allow Bangladeshi education/learning system for the Rohingya people. To that end, it determines the curriculum and language of learning in the camps. Rohingya people receive education through Burmese curriculum.

It is the state actors who declare the camp as ‘state of exception’ where state’s law is not equally applicable to refugee for their rights, and surveillance. Since the Government of Bangladesh has offered them haven, now it is providing them necessary life-saving needs and security of the refugee. But Bangladesh does not guarantee Rohingya’s rights. The available facilities are given as their entitlement for life saving. They cannot claim for rights because they are neither citizen of the country nor with refugee status. Hundreds of NGOs or non-state actors work in the camps to provide the basic needs of the refugee. They need to receive approval of the state actors particularly from RRRC to engage in the humanitarian action. State actors control, monitor, and supervise every action of different actors in the camps. Among the many state actors, Camp in Charge (CiC) and Armed Police Battalion serve to manage the camps while other state actors such as Intelligence Unit, Fire Service, and Health Department work under the CiC and Police for other technical supports. CiC presides over the key meetings of camp operations. There are some forums where only the non-refugee actors can take part and decide for the refugees. CiC can accept and reject any projects in the camps. They have magistracy power, but APBN has no such power. Nevertheless, Police exercises such power and settle many disputes and issues of the refugees, that should be tried in the (mobile)court. Spatial technology of refugee camp is developed, maintained, and practiced both by state and non-

state actors ultimately for security mechanism to control the Rohingya refugees in the camps. Various statistics of refugees, biometric data can be used both as security mechanism as well in optimizing the state of life (Foucault, 1997a). All the non-refugee actors are obliged to share refugee data with state actors. The extent of surveillance mechanism, installing of strategies or tactics oftentimes depends on the interaction between SMS manager and CiC. SMS manager however is employed by NGOs, CiC can complain against him to higher authority (Govt. or NGO). Resultantly, he/she can loss the job. Say in other words, CiC acts as de facto employer of some NGO staff too in the camp.

Refugees find that unexpected sufferings are produced from state and non-state actors in the camps. Most of the distribution centres are far away from their shelters. Without some exception, most of the refugee need to walk a kilometer to collect their food ration as well as buy other necessary items from the super shop. Regard to food ration every household carry on head more than 60 kilograms of rice and oil during distribution. Single women and physically challenged refugee hire porter by 50 BDT (half USD) or more based on the distance to deliver their stuff in the shelter (Interview with Hossain Miah, 2022). Formal and informal interviews with refugee and other actors resolved that it happens primarily from security purpose and secondly to logistic purpose. Most of the distribution turns into a crowded and chaotic situation of hundreds of refugees at a time. In case of any mismanagement, the situation goes uncontrolled for a while. So, the distribution centres are located nearby the CiC offices or adjacent to national highway side. These spots are easily accessible from outside but far away from inside the refugee shelters. From the same perception of security risk, in-camp transport is also restricted. It is another point of showing up of power by the state actors.

Camp in Charges operate mobile court frequently to manage law and orders of the camps. It helps to avoid the lengthy process of the legal system. It is applied to every sphere of refugee camp issues such as disputes among the refugees, eviction of unauthorised shops or shelter, disputes with host communities etc. In case of noticing unauthorised marriage, dowry on marriage, or domestic violence, CiC conduct mobile courts. Refugees often do not understand the ongoing situation. Moreover, they have no knowledge or orientation about the procedure of such an ad hoc legal actions. Importantly, whenever CiC convene such court, legal aid NGOs are not involved in the procedure as legal support for refugee. Nonetheless, a CiC defends mobile court as the best option in the camps because they have no sufficient logistic support. The court in Cox's Bazar is overwhelmed with refugee cases. Refugees do not get the minimum

opportunity for their self-defense in this mobile court system. Rohingya refugee mentioned many complaints of not receiving desired or fair judgement from the legal system of the refugee camps. During my fieldwork, refugee mainly indicated harassment of APBN but in very few cases they received feedback or sought some legal steps (Interviews with Refugee and Informal Conversation, 2022-23). Some of the CiC opines that they operate this court lawfully and refugee have the scope to appeal in case of injustice. Sometime refugees have misunderstanding about the system. They had no legal access rather, they were harassed by the Burmese legal system.

CiC uses community leaders *majhi* in the daytime, Police use them at nighttime—for night patrolling along with police. As per the police, self-protection is the best protection, meaning that refugee will ensure their security. Police mostly distribute and coordinate the responsibilities among the refugees. Block *majhi* makes the list of eligible male refugee for night patrolling, police check the list and finalise the team members for night patrolling. Sub *majhi* or block *majhi* maintains the list by a weekly rotation among the eligible refugees. However, it worked well at the beginning, now refugees are worried about this night patrolling because when a team goes through a life risk, police cannot protect them from the miscreants. Some refugee respondents wistfully shared that they are at the crossroads of multiple power administration. They have to abide by the rules and regulation of the CiC and NGOs while Police, and militant groups pressurize them with different agenda. Police want to maintain a peaceful environment in the camps but the militant groups extort ordinary refugee for their gain or sometime in the name of the autonomy movement in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Ordinary refugee come face to face with militant refugee mostly at night during patrolling in the camps along with police (Informal Hangout with Refugees, 2022-23). Refugees have no logistics to protect themselves from the attack of the terrorists and bandits at night. But police force the refugee to counter the militant groups. Therefore, many of the refugees are killed before the police arrived on the spot. Moreover, it is also painful for some refugee to go for night duty twice or thrice a week. They are physically and mentally tortured because of night patrolling (Interview with Refugee Respondents, 2022-23).

As it mentioned in the previous chapter that *majhi* is one of the tools of power for the state actors. Informal community leadership is not a tool for power mechanism but a field of exercising power over refugees. State actors hold the provision of democratic community leadership of the refugees in the camp. However both state and non-state actors speak about the democratic process of refugee leadership, none of them strive for the proper leadership of

the Rohingya people. With a series of negotiation, humanitarian organizations formed democratically elected community leaders in the four camps. Eventually they could not work or remain defunct now. State actors think that Rohingya people are here to save their lives, nothing to do about political activities in the camps. It hampers the stability of the camps.

Case: Frequent Crackdown on in-Camp Transport

Electric three-wheeler (Easy bike) is the only transport for refugees in the camps. Refugee and non-refugee people alike can move comfortably across the camps using this vehicle. Since camp is a temporary set up, camp authority oftentimes halt running of such transport now and then in the camps. Ironically, Rohingya people cannot possess any Easy bike, and these are belonged to host community people. Drivers are from the Rohingya people, and they earn a minimum amount. During the fieldwork it seems some kind of transport is essential for the people living and working in the camps. But state actors, mostly APBN, restrict operation of such transport on security grounds. They argue that miscreant easily run-away using transport in the camps. Moreover, APBN claims that a lot of accident occurs because of rampant driving of such Easy bike in the camps. However, most of the refugee respondent begrudgingly mentioned that such restrictions target to halt the mobility of refugee within the camps in two ways: creating crisis of transports and increasing fare because of the very few illegal transports. But refugee can do very little to convince the state actors because everything is legitimate to them.

Whether hosting refugee is beneficial or disadvantageous for host country attracts many contradictory responses from different non-state actors, the state actors found no advantages of hosting refugees. Almost all the state actors of the camps mentioned about the myriad negative effects of having Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh. Refugees demand for more facilities and services. But the state actors comments that they are not able to offer them more space for shelter, more opportunity for livelihood, health, and education. They are already a burden for a country like Bangladesh by all aspects. RRRC as well as CiCs have many justifications to exercise their power and responsibilities in this humanitarian government. Problematization of the issue result in many governmentality instruments both for refugee and non-state actors. State actors deploy mechanism of surveillance both for refugee and non-state actors in the camps whether they are deteriorating the problem further or not. On the other hand, the non-state actors tend to highlight some positive facts of hosting refugees in terms of available cheap labor, employment of nationals as well as huge flow of foreign funding (Interview with NSA8,

2023; Oesch, 2017). Moreover, considering the overwhelming burden and other challenges, state actors share some authority with the non-state actors. Resultantly, non-state actors gain some power along with their immanent power from refugee regime. It poses a boomerang effect on state actors and oblige for continuous negotiation with them. Bangladesh, even as a non-signatory of UN Refugee Convention, maintains many basic tenets in treating the Rohingya refugee. State actors observe them as norms of international politics and foreign policy. Initially it enhanced the image of Bangladesh globally.

7.4. Non-state actors: Power and authority in dilemma

Humanitarian organizations are the non-state actors in the Rohingya refugee camps. Approximately hundreds of local, national, and international NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) work in the response in different types of services. Here the IGOs and NGOs work in the same direction, however IGO's power and authority differ significantly to NGOs. UNHCR even does not call the NGOs as implementing partner, consider them just as partner (Interview with NSA8, 2023). Power dilemma persists among the non-state actors regard to their superiority, hierarchy, and categories of organizations. Relief agencies cannot operate outside the networks of power in the refugee camps and war zones in which they work (Hyndman, 2000). They have both their own authority and mandate from the Government of Bangladesh. Local and national NGOs mainly work as implementing partners of international NGOs. They are the majority humanitarian organizations in the camps. While local NGOs belong to the lowest ladder, the UN Organizations lead the project/operation. UN/INGOs finance different projects for different sectors. UN employees are supracitizen. But staff from local NGOs are supposed to exercise power over them based on local cultural and political status in the field. However, IGOs control most the basic service of Rohingya response as well the maximum non-state actors.

Humanitarian organizations necessarily conduct all forms of registration, beneficiaries' whereabouts in the camps, categories them in different groups. NGOs sort out the needs and entitlement for the camp dwellers. State actors neither have the capacity nor the intention to conduct these activities by themselves. Rather the GoB depends on NGOs for such managerial works. State actors are dependent on non-state actors for most of the technical support in the camps. There are specialized NGOs to sort out the people with special needs, women, and children across the camps. Services to refugee people depend on the different categorization of the people. They select Rohingya people for voluntary activities, reporting and monitoring their

fellow people in the camps. Humanitarian organizations mainly allocate the resources and services to the refugees. Sometimes they are the sole authority to determine a service based on different criteria. They have different policies and projects guidelines for the refugee, but the demand and scarcity of the resources motivate them for subjective decision in the camps. Quality of services sometime differ from camp to camp, sometime from community to community. The refugees who have experiences of living under more than one SMS during their refugeehood, they deliberately compared the quality of services during the interviews. They exercise bio-power and charge disciplinary things over the Rohingya people in the camps. NGOs both have the liberal and disciplinary techniques to control the refugees. The refugees are bound to listen to the service provider. Refugees do not have alternative in the camps. Whatever the quality and quantity of the service, Rohingya people have no scope of choice and reject any of the services.

All the 32 camps are divided between two UN organization- UNHCR and IOM. UNHCR and other IGOs maintain strong relations with local and national NGOs. Implementing partners are actively engaged in the camps and directly keep in touch with the refugee. Since UNHCR was established and provided international jurisdiction for handling refugee as well as refugee like population. The GoB also bilaterally granted some authority or some sovereign power (according to gusted sovereignty approach) to UNHCR as per the memorandum of understanding signed in 2018 (Kapur, 2018). This authority transcends to other non-state actors as a main source of their liberal and disciplinary power in the camps.

“We work in Bangladesh, it is the responsibility of the government to ensure security for everyone irrespective of nationals or non-nationals, while working in the camp that is Bangladeshi soil, we are obliged to abide by Bangladeshi justice system. We handle the protection issue in our day to day program. We have separate protection wing in every camp on protection. And I think our advocacy is working.” (Interview with NSA8, 2023).

Non-state actors join in the response upon acceptance of government’s mandate and approval from it. Similarly, any donor NGOs can terminate their contract with implementing partners or NGOs beyond the approval of CiC. State actor preserves the right to cancellation or stop the approval at any time of the project. State actors are there to monitor and support the NGOs to maintain state’s mandate. Thus, non-state actors also get empowered over refugees. It is their responsibility to report the CiC monthly or as per the wish of the CiC about their activities and the situation of their working area. NGOs conduct registration, maintain statistics, analyse them

in tables and graphs. They do this apparently for distribution purpose, but refugees are remained obedient for this data management. Mostly IGOs/INGOs operate sophisticated technology, drone, and share some of the information to CiC/state actors. They report to the top authority and maintain frequent correspondence to UNHCR headquarter. For instance, though, it was not possible to verify, one of the staff from CiC office commented “humanitarian organizations send thousands of emails every day to Geneva (UNHCR Headquarter) and they act accordingly, not according to our directions” (Fieldnotes, 2023). If we focus on the indication of his comments rather than the text, it is prevalent that different actors exercise power and strategies at the margin and micro level, but it connects them globally. Besides, IGOs prepare and forward different reports on the camps situation and international community respond accordingly in the JRP. State actors always keep a sharp eye on these reports. As a host, GoB wants the reports in their favour. They also pursue to keep the fund flow active.

Refugee and NGOs network is the vibrant medium of interactions and demonstration in the camps. Mostly Bangladeshi NGOs as partners, they play the visible role of succoring to the beneficiaries. NGOs follow both the humanitarian principles as well as the mandate of the GoB- here the conditions from CiC. According to the mandate of the response, NGOs cannot guarantee or support for human rights of the refugees; “refugees can claim entitlement, not for human rights” comments from an NSA. Non-state actors work in a predesigned and stereotypical structure where they cannot exercise their humanitarian principle sufficiently. Most of the non-state actor respondents opine that nowadays it is difficult to continue operation because of refugee’s demand for their rights. As per humanitarian principle, non-state actors have the obligations to listen to beneficiaries and to assuage their sufferings with proper support. But NGOs do not have full capacity and jurisdiction to do so. They provide the approved services to refugee, but their concern remains to keep the refugee as ‘good refugee’. Refugee do not get remedy of their request or demand timely irrespective of state actors or non-state actors. Every issue goes through for an investigation and verification- a lengthy bureaucratic intervention. One of the refugee respondents commented “there is no simple and easy service here; we need to wait for long time to get them” (Interview with Abdul Hai, 2022). Even if NGOs have capacity and resources, they must practice such tracks to keep them in safe side to their authority and to show up the refugees about the value and scarcity of the services (Observation and Informal Talk, 2022-23).

Some of the non-state respondents unequivocally acknowledge their power dilemma during engagement with other actors. It is not only because of sovereign and non-sovereign power between state and non-state actors but also for many other structural issues.

“We mainly work according to regular instructions and correspondence with our higher authority. Otherwise, programs and activities are clearly outlined in the project proposal. As humanitarian workers we are trained and asked to ensure human rights as well as humanitarian principle, but we cannot follow them” (Interview with NSA1, 2022).

In addition, it is evident that humanitarian staff are in more dilemma of legal and normative framework than the state actors. They cannot act properly neither as per *Sphere Project* guidelines nor in policy effect of state actors, though NGOs are the ‘norms entrepreneur’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). For instance, UNHCR suggests for 3.5 m² covered living space per person in the tropical region whereas three persons live in the same space of the shelter of Rohingya camps. However here the Bangladeshi state actors highlights the space and resources scarcity, there is no refugee policy to govern these millions of Rohingya people. They are lost in the complex legal vacuum and dilemma. There are lot of life skills training for refugee, but they cannot apply their skills for livelihood purpose. One of the non-state actors confidently share with me that he attempted to align with the humanitarian and human rights principle at his best capacity. They can hardly manage the state actors. Nonetheless, they try to present the fact and needs of the beneficiaries with justification. It was more convincing during the initial emergency in the first few years. The response is now in a matured form. Structural complexities have increased manifold in the protracted refugee situations that makes the humanitarian organizations more perplexing in handling the operation. They encounter manifold dilemma because of legal vacuum and transgression of (customary)law by the refugee in the camps. Legal vacuum and transgression of law is deeply connected in the Rohingya camps settings.




Figure 7.1: Dilemma of Non-state actors

Source: Author, 2024

Other than *refoulement*, UNHCR and other NGOs engage in emergency to preserve the human rights of beneficiaries. Most of the NGOs avoid bargaining about protection and human rights issues of refugee with the state actors rather they forwarded such cases to UN organizations. Most of the time they do this straightway, without any exploration of evidence of violations. Even in case of a trivial police harassment, SMS offices do not discuss or share with CiCs. If the victim asks for their support, at best they advise them to go to UNHCR protection office. Sometime only legal aid NGOs allow or listen to them about illegitimate police action. The process of referral happens through back and forth communication among the three parties: refugees/victim, referee and receiving NGOs. So, a complex bureaucracy is also practised across the NGOs.

“I lodged a complaint against a staff. I requested SMS office several times to settle the issue as soon as possible. Now my situation is like a football, visit several offices, but nothing happened mentionable” (Interview with Hosna Begum, 2022).

Aid and services are the main tool for non-state actors in exercising their power. And it is very sensitive to apply in everyday practices. Nowadays refugee protest and report much about any misbehaviour and deprivation that result in termination of the particular service provider or stopping of the project. Both the state actors and non-state actors prioritize the silence of the camp rather than any kind of utterance from the refugee. Polyhierarchical mechanism of disciplinary power works with active participation of every actor in the camp. Non-state actors play an essential role in overall surveillance of the refugee and camp. Humanitarian (international) assistance is truly biopolitical in nature (Hyndman, 2000). It conflates disciplinary power and liberal tactics of providing aid, induces refugee for self-regulation only in the designated area. Liberal tactics include artificial leadership, light freedom of choice during shopping in the super shop or receiving training within several trades, empowering women etc. Humanitarian organizations collect both service and safety related information from every corner of the camps. Multiple interviews and conversation with SMS office revealed that such information is collected for better management of the camp and services. Sensitive information such as factionalism in the camps or blocks, disputes among the refugee, unauthorized marriage or activities, bribery to any refugee for any kind of services are gathered for security mechanism. Oftentimes information is filtered in several level. Refugee volunteers do not report some incidents such as unauthorized marriage or factionalism among the refugee, for many reasons, but mainly for their safety and community blindness. SMS office also filter some information. If any issue is manageable from their end, they avoid reporting to CiC too.

But CiC also has both exclusive state and non-state actors' support to collect information from the ground. So, SMS also keeps an eye on this whereabouts. If they delay or intentionally do not provide any information to CiC, SMS manager face some difficulties from the CiC.

Non-state actors not only serve the refugee but also provide support and conduct development work from the same aid to nationals in the outside of the camps. It has embedded as a norm in humanitarian responses because humanitarian aids help to assuage the loss and sufferings of local community as well to a great extent. However, some local people want refugees' quick return instead of such assistance. Therefore, non-state actors simultaneously serve the nation-state as well as international state system. They maneuver together to sustain refugee in the camps by taming the possible conflict between refugee and local community. During the fieldwork, IOM conducted several awareness meeting and seminars, and campaign with the refugees about human trafficking through Bay of Bengal as boat people to other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. One of the non-state actors commented: "it is one of the mandates of IOM to prevent illegal mobility of people across the globe. It has both individual and global consequences" (Interview with NSA5, 2023). They save the refugees from immediate consequences, but refugees spend their generations in the permanent uncertainties of refugee camps. Humanitarian bodies have no such power in resolving the crisis.

7.5. Concluding remark

It is evident that refugee camp is a space of asymmetric power play among the three major actors: state actors, non-state actors, and refugee. Since the Westphalian treaty, nation-states have ascribed uncontested power over population in her territory. It exposes fully in case of controlling the non-members of a state. In the post-Cold war period, nation-states witness tremendous shakes and undertake a transformation in its juridico territorial paradigm of sovereignty in terms of population management (Dean, 2002; Oksala, 2013). And it seeks for more institutions, rules, regulations, strategies, and tactics, and above all, rationalities in her actions. To say differently, the assemblage of governmentality tools recognizes the range of different actors live in a system or set up (Li, 2007). However, refugees live in the marginal position their existence is notified easily in terms of governmentality or circulation of power in the camp governance. A leeway of liberal power comes to the fore along with sovereign and disciplinary power. This rationalities of governance and liberal power of non-state actors (here the NGOs and IGOs) release some power for refugee other than refugees' immanent corporeal

power. Refugee also acquire some power from the new relationship, institution, and organizations. Resultantly, not only state, and non-state actors exercise power in the space of exception but also refugee exert power over other actors. They receive humanitarian aids, some extent they are structurally silent but not a passive actor. Refugees are supposed to be apolitical and mute. Such exercising of multiple forms of power over refugee happens because of pretending them as political entities with tremendous power. Refugees also respond and exercise power individually, dispersedly both in cooperation and challenges. It is exercised in the form of microphysics of power and challenges the sovereign power. Every actor of the camp influence and responses to the effects of everyone's multiple dimensions of power. In this dimension, every refugee here the 1.3 million Rohingya refugee inherently conceive power as a threat, burden, distortion of national purity and so on. Their mobile body show down this power at the marginal and micro-level as obtrusive presence (Tazzioli, 2014; Walters, 2017). Thus, refugee in the time being changes and transform entire humanitarian government every day. Besides bodily presence and power, their disposition and knowledge about the system opens up a materialistic scope of bargaining with state and non-state actors. For example, they know well about their entitlements, procedure, quantity, and quality of the items and services. Primarily the relief workers then the Rohingya themselves mobilize other refugee about their rights to basic services. So, whenever there is otherwise about the services or distribution, sometimes they not only complain but also protest.

While state actors seek for rationalities in their governance or powerplays, non-state actors undergo a persistent dilemma between sovereign power, and power of norms and values from human rights and humanitarian principle. The notion of 'technology of domination' is prevalent during the interaction of refugees and non-refugee actors in the camps. Both state and non-state actors deploy many techniques such as check posts, limited humanitarian aids, and camp bureaucracy towards that domination over refugees. Apparently both state and non-state actors perform seamlessly to the encampment, however oftentimes conflict and competition are noticeable to some standpoints between them. State actors exercise power in the form of deciding the spatial technology and segregation of refugees, creating bureaucratic wall, legal paradoxes, limiting the livelihood opportunities, and controlling the democratic community leadership of the Rohingya people. Their power fall in the form of sovereign power, disciplinary power as sole authority of the 'state of exeption'.

Non-state actors show up power in categorising the beneficiaries, determines the needs of refugee and the mode of distribution. Their power can be categorized as biopower and disciplinary power through providing aids and service to the refugee. For instance, none of the NGOs so far participate in the repatriation process of Rohingya refugee. Importantly UNHCR did not show any interest to those repatriation efforts. However, state actors managed to convince them in relocation initiatives to some extent. Actors are engaged consistently on a negotiation and bargaining process based on their interest and power across the response. Eventually state actors as supreme authority make some space for non-refugee actors too for extended management of the refugee. Thus, diversity and transformation of power produce a fragmented governmentality in the camps. Fragmented camp governmentality exists and operates indefinitely not only for refugee but also for the purpose of international state system. So, IRR is not similarly active and present on the merit of the crisis itself but because of something else and changes the extent of engagement based on purpose and interest.

The above findings confirm the multiplicity of power dynamics exercised among the different actors of the camps. Saying in other words, while the state actors take on domination, influence, policing, negotiation, bargaining; the non-state actors do influence, persuasion, negotiation, bargaining, advocacy, and in case of refugee manoeuvre for cooperation, persuasion, negotiation, bargaining, changes, resistance in camp governmentality. Here the power does not shift from non-refugee actors to refugees, but it circulates among them asymmetrically. 'Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere' (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). Such power structure develops and operates in a system that refugee impose kind of self-regulations upon them as if they are also free subjects. At least with a label of 'refugee', they cannot be free individual, after all no one is free. Hence, camp governmentality is inexorably fragmented to these three actors, and it shows 'how different agent are assembled with specific power' (Dean, 2009, p. 40). Accordingly, the power of state and non-state actors however is more dominating and influential, it can no way foreclose the power and agency of refugee.

CHAPTER 8: AGENTIC RESPONSES TO CAMP GOVERNMENTALITY: CO-OPERATION, RESISTANCE, AND RESILIENCE

8.1. Introduction

Considering the unfolded camp governmentality in previous chapters, this chapter manoeuvred to link up the agentic responses of the refugee with that existing governmentality of Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. It has presented the empirical evidence that how different apparatus of governmentality generates different forms of agencies among the refugee in the extended exile, thus support the stability of the camps. 'Instead of sovereign power to take life, this new biopower is the power to make, sustain or remove life' (Elden, 2009, p. 48). In this power game and by product of power, refugee also exercise power in limited scale at micro level. However, it is produced from corporeality, this microphysics of power influence enough the total governmentality of the camp. Effect and impact of such power relationships among the actors manifest as different forms of agencies from refugee ends. Oftentimes agency equates to power (Spencer and Doull, 2015), importantly it is difficult to differentiate between power and agency in the case of refugee.

Being an integral part of camp governmentality refugee interact with diversified actors of the camp. Refugees live in the marginal and bottom layer of that governmentality, nevertheless they cooperate, bargain, negotiate, and adapt with the multilayered apparatus of governmental techniques, strategies, organizations significantly. While they are governed under the sovereign and disciplinary power, they also exert power minimally in the form of corporeality. Their existence and minimum demands produce subjectivities, influences, relationship and so on in the form of agency. It is the transformation of power for agency as an innate attribute of human being, that they have lost such agency to a great extent during their forced displacements. They challenge, question, resist, subvert, conform, bypass governmentality techniques in their quotidian life. The following figure elucidated that multiple forms of power are exercised in the camps that produces different kinds of activities among the refugees. Refugees cannot avail sovereign power in the Rohingya camps. However Rohingya refugees exercise power dispersedly or microphysics of power, they generate agency both in positive and negative way.




Figure 8.1: Mind map: Camp Governmentality and Refugee Agency

Source: Author, 2024

8.2. Agentic responses of refugee: Setting the scene

A middle-aged refugee coming from *Maungdaw* of Rakhine state commented that

“some part of *Teknaf* and *Ukhiya* are very much familiar to us. We used to travel and cross *Naf* river previously on many occasions and purposes. We have some relatives also here in the host community. If I can manage, I visit them sometimes from the camp too” (Refugee Respondent Tofayel, 2022).

Beyond some illicit businesses, this part of Cox’s Bazar was their last resort for medical treatment, livelihood opportunities and education. They exploit the maximum chance of porous

border between Rakhine state and Bangladesh. Moreover, experiences from previous exoduses, many of the interlocutors started believing that camp is their ultimate destination. There is no scope of repatriation because the Government of Myanmar (GoM) is waged in an all-out clearing mission against Rohingya people from their homeland. So, whatever the form of government in Myanmar, Rohingya refugee might not be accepted anymore once they are ousted from the country. Despite the Rohingya people eagerly wants to return in Myanmar, international community could not bring forth any outcome on the issue so far. A significant number of delegates from UN and other donor countries visit camps and sit in dialogue with GoB every month but such efforts are not happening with Myanmar government (Roy, 2020).

Compared to last couple of years in Rakhine state, refugee in the camps have better access to some of their basic needs such as food, shelter, health services, education and so on. However, these are not at sufficient level for a standard life, they have so far guarantee of many services in the camp. Their life is more secure here in the camps than their life in Rakhine state. There are some protection nets for refugee as well. At least they can claim for some protection from state actors and non-state actors. Importantly, refugees are so grateful having freedom of religious practices. They consider the mosque, *motktob*, *taleem* as the safest and peaceful places in life also in the camp in materialistic sense. Normally even the criminal groups do not attack someone while in the mosque. The faith leaders manoeuvre to convince the youth to go to mosque regularly both for peace and spending some quality time in the camps.

“We are living almost a different life here in the refugee camps. Here I have no future and personal space, but I am safe here. On the other hand, last days in Rakhine state was perilous, could not enjoy our wellness/happiness. Now I am used to with this life and know well how to act with whom (CiC or NGOs) (Refugee Participants Taleb Ullah, 2022).

State actors exercise supreme power of the state-sovereignty; it becomes effective at the ultimate situations of camp governance. CiC demolishes some of the shops of refugees. Police stop refugee movement inside and outside the camps. However, there are different scenario on ground too. It resolves from interview and observation that state actors in the camp or at micro level engage in continuous negotiation and persuasion with refugee. CiC and police in charge consider refugees' situation from humanistic perspective too. They overlook many activities of refugee that should not be conducted by the refugee in the camps. A significant number of refugees do small business, form different association among them, continue frequent mobility

in the camps vicinity. State actors treat them as human being who also should have such facilities (Interview with State Actors, 2022-23).

Normatively as well as apparently NGOs or non-state actors provide humanitarian support to ensure refugees' human rights/saving lives. A form of global governance operates in the Rohingya response with a view to peace, and human rights of refugee. While CiC or state actor remain on the highest level of camp governance, camp managers (SMS) from different humanitarian organizations work directly both with CiC and refugees on the ground. SMS manager (in my case they were from IOM, Brac, Helvetas, Action Aid) act as a bridge between state actors and refugee. During the long fieldwork, SMS managers were found to defend their humanitarian role or saving life and safeguard human rights of refugees. IOM's strong and new form of engagement with (Rohingya)refugee crisis indicate something for advocacy on human trafficking at the regional level. Before the largest influx of Rohingya people in Bangladesh, several mass grave of Rohingya people were found out in Thailand. Most of them were travelled there as boat people through the Bay of Bengal. So, stopping refugee in the refuge is one of the purposes of humanitarian action in refugee camps too. During deeper and informal interactions, many of the non-state actors expose their limitation for Rohingya's better life and solution of the crisis. Their views also reminded the already narrated consequences of humanitarian action that it cannot save life just keep waiting for death. Nevertheless, such apparatus is taken for granted for every actor in the camps, importantly by the refugee as well. Along with many factors, recurring refugeehood or repeated persecution obliges the refugee to accept the precarious life in the refugee camps. And the non-state actors, authorized by the robust quasi-sovereign organization (UN agencies), attempt to make the temporariness as normal as possible through different agency reviving programmes/events. Ethnographic data illuminates the following manifestation of agencies among the Rohingya refugee in the camp in Bangladesh. Thematic presentation of agentic responses entails in three blocks: Co-operation, Resistance, and Resilience.

This is Everyday agency that relates and responds to the governmentality significantly. It works at the micro level. Before presenting the evidence and linkages in-depth, the following overview table can be useful for better apprehension of the responses of camp inhabitants in the existing governmentality:

Table 8.1: Some Nodes of Camp Governmentality and Agentic Responses of Refugee

Camp Governmentality	⇔ Agentic Responses of Rohingya Refugee
Spatial Technology/techniques (Barbwire fence, Check posts, limited entry-exit points)	Trespassing, Damaging the fence
	Telling lie, Mobility in disguise/pretend as Bangladeshi, Bribing the police, Taking alternative routes
Extra bureaucracy	Unauthorized marriage, forging documents, uninformed camp transfer
Recruitment of Rohingya Volunteers	Better services, power balance, community ownership
Informal community leaders	Not accepted warmly or silently boycott of the <i>Majhi</i>
Crisis of livelihood opportunity	Do volunteering for community, not just for money
	Operating small shops inside the shelter
	Working in the host community (illegal), Drug peddling (illegal)
Security Patrolling by Rohingya	Prevent criminal activities and other violence, killing
Lack of Quality Education	Community schools, private education,
	Private tuition, home learning, Online education
Restrictions on transport	Make new entry-exit points, Put pressure on NGOs for ambulance, Run some illegal vehicles
Restrictions on extension of shelter	Redesign the rooms, Extend shelter quietly,

Source: Author, 2024

The nature and extent of refugees' interaction differ based on the category of actors as well as their level of agency. However, level of agency is difficult to determine but their interaction expose a clear phenomenon that their agencies have been in rise gradually. Now in the PRS, refugees think before participation or any kind of action with other actors. It is not only need based but also agency based that has grown in the time being. They have not enough scope to be selective about camp services, but they attempt to influence, modify, or reject some of them too through their everyday actions. I argue that the fragmented governmentality expedites the 'refugees' recognition as social and political actors (Agier, 2014; cited in Fresia & Kanel, 2015, p. 254).

8.3. Cooperation and compromise: Obvious dimension of refugee agency

Everyday humanitarian activities depend on refugee actors to a great extent. They have acquired some sort of capacity and skill to support the everyday services for Rohingya people. From distribution to teaching their kids, refugees take part effectively and enthusiastically in everyday activity. With this hindsight, the scale of interactions and participation in power game of the camps, refugee go through an exorable inculcation of agency in the long-term, that agencies reflect through their responses in lived experience of the camps. Whatever the changes or effects occur to an individual that is because of repressive and productive power of the system (Allen, 2002). The changes or the present-day situation of Rohingya refugee manifest

the enabling and constraining nature of the power in the camp setting. It is prevalent that refugee is an essential actor of the power regime of the camps. They both cooperate and resist the operation of the camp governance. Except the sovereign power of state, the extent and circulation of other forms of power (e.g. disciplinary power, bio-power, microphysics of power) depend on the interactions of the actors. They gain and circulate them incessantly in the complex system. To that end, every actor cooperates and conflicts each other in the structure. In this 'matured humanitarian response' refugee themselves conduct many activities and take care their daily lives in the camps. It is the refugees who operate camps activities at ground level, they are guided by themselves. In the protracted situation both state and non-state actors have developed a culture of 'technologies of self' among the refugees. They are controlled in such a way that they are free subject. Refugees' 'technology of self' works both as cooperation and compromise with every non-refugee actor in the camps.

8.3.1. Volunteering in humanitarian activities: Participation is power

“And it amazes us that how positive came to us that refugees who are volunteering they are empowered, they feel productive, happier, they are stronger, they feel connected, they feel informed, they feel more connected to us and the CiC, this is kind of fostering their agency.” (Interview with NSA8, 2023)

Humanitarian activities are getting more dependent on Rohingya volunteers day by day. Thousands of volunteers help the different service providers from site management to health services. However, these activities cannot engage all the eligible Rohingya people, at least half of them can work with different NGOs in the year round (Interview with NSA5, 2022). This ethnographic fieldwork discovered that refugees are mobilized about their camp lives. They become used to about their daily activities and well-being. Refugees maintain their family within limited resources and facilities. Though, they live in small shelter, refugee celebrate their cultural and social rituals without fear. They utilize the community centre or multi-purpose centre for bigger arrangements upon permission from camp authority (Interview with NSA4, 2022). Rohingya people rarely would receive vaccine in Myanmar because of superstition and lack of accessibility to such facilities. But community leaders, faith leaders and the volunteers mobilized them within short period for COVID-19 vaccination (Interview with NSA3, 2022). Thus, almost ninety percent roll out was possible on time. They play protagonist role during any kind of emergency situation such as natural disaster. Refugees are aware of their goal of repatriation. None of the refugees shown interest to return Myanmar without political rights or

citizenship. They put pressure systematically to every platform particularly to different UN delegates and Bangladeshi officials during any kind of meetings. Refugee occasionally hold meetings, processions and seminars demanding repatriation. These efforts of Rohingya people also exhibit every element of agency- intentionality, power, and rationality as human beings in normal settings (Hewson, 2010). A significant number of refugee volunteers try to forget their perilous situation through professional etiquette (e.g. wearing vest, staying assigned block, managing timetable and requirements,) during serving their community. “It is my moral duty to serve them, assuage them until I am in volunteering. I do my best in the capacity” (Refugee Participant Shorif, 2023).

A significant number of young refugee work as volunteers with different humanitarian organizations all the year round. They do not have decision making power, but they exercise power both over their community and their employer. Most of the non-state actors depend on the volunteers to provide their services to the doorstep of the refugees. The entire efforts of the refugee volunteer contribute to their overall well-being in the camps to a great extent. Humanitarian organizations decide and design many of their project as per the feedback of the volunteers too (Interview with NSA, 2023). These techniques of camp governance not only reduce the cost of the operation but also offer freedom to the individual (McKinlay & Pezet, 2018). Such participation of the refugee empowers their entire community as well as create a wider support base for state and non-state actors at large. This process develops a feelings of ownership among the refugees. Thus refugees play a protagonist role in peaceful environment of the camps.

8.3.2. (*De facto*) Community leadership

Administratively, every camp consists of blocks and sub-blocks. On an average every camp consists of six blocks and more than thirty sub-blocks in which thirty to forty thousand refugees live in those blocks (Fieldwork, 2022-23). A community leader is selected from every block and similarly from sub-blocks. This system continues from the 1991-92 influx of Rohingya people in Bangladesh. In public perception, *majhi* is a captain of small boat who support other people to cross a river. The same thing happened in case of the Rohingya during every exodus of Rakhine state. A ‘majhi’ helped them to cross the *Naf* river to reach in Bangladesh from Myanmar however those ‘*Majhis*’ are not obviously the *majhi* of the Rohingya camps these days. But the *mahji* here in general refers to leadership to some extent, who can save lives. In this sense, at the beginning Bangladesh Army recruited some pro-active Rohingya refugee as ‘*majhi*’ from their community in the 1991-92. Now the civil administration of the camps uses

the same term to indicate the community leaders of the refugee in the camps. They are called as *majhi* and sub-*majhi*. In this regard a Camp in Charge (CiC) opines:

“since there is no scope of democratic election for leadership, we use our mechanism to select the popular person as their leader- *majhi*. They look after many everyday issues of the refugee community.” (Interview with SA3, 2023).

They are not selected as per the UNHCR guidelines, but they are the de facto community leaders of the camps. And it develops a large community of leadership network in the camps. Community leaders support registration, distribution, protection issues and so on for their fellow people. Refugees go to their community leader in case of any domestic matter or police related issues. However, ultimate decision comes from the CiC, it is the *majhi* who continuously negotiate with CiC and other actors on a particular issue. Peaceful situation of the camps depends on the effective interaction between refugee, refugee leaders and the CiC. Humanitarian organizations do not deal with security, and law and order issues. So, the ordinary refugee either keep silent or go to *majhi* for support. Since NGOs follow some protocol to reach CiC or Police for protection issues, refugee inform their leaders to reach CiC quickly. And the community leaders attempt to convince and influence the state actors (both administrative and security) towards their interest. This structure of community leadership functions like both as proxy and collective agency of the refugee in the camps. Faith leaders or Imam of the mosques demonstrate their efforts to community peace through religious practices. Importantly, they have built up necessary mosques and other establishment with their own efforts. A faith leader Taher (47) comment:

“practicing Islam in the camps without restriction and fear ameliorates our pain to a great extent. We manoeuvre to keep the youth in track from criminal activities through our Islamic invitation and sermon” (in 2022-23).

NGOs do not provide any support to set up mosque and conducting *Moktob*⁸, refugees are doing this practice deliberately. Faith leaders possess much capacity-intellect to mobilize and influence the community as well as the management authority. They can convince and control the community in case of peace and protest. Thus, they are called on regularly by the camp authority in different mobilization meetings of the camp (Observation, 2022-23).

⁸*Moktob* is a mosque based religious education system for kids. It is mainly facilitated by the faith leaders (*Imam and Muajjin*) of the mosque. Most of the mosque of the Rohingya camps have such *Moktob* for religious education.

8.3.3. *Capacity building and community development*

Some goals are clear-cut among the refugee (Interview and Informal Conversation, 2022-23). Education and obtaining more skills are in their priority list too. Most of the respondents claimed that whenever they realized that their repatriation might delay, both the ordinary refugee and community leaders urged the GoB and UNHCR for a better education system for their children. Gradually, Myanmar Curriculum Pilot (MCP) has been adopted in the Learning Centres (LC). Previously they had no concrete curriculum, and refugee had a lot of complaints about the learning system (e. g. no class system, no grading). It was the result of constant negotiation of Rohingya refugees with the other actors in the refugee camps (Refugee Participant Faruk, 2022-23). Non-state actors supported their demand for better education. However, refugees are not satisfied about the overall education services, they consider the new system as better than previous one. At least their children can learn something. Though GoB prefers basic learning to proper education because it is neither the government's mandate nor in capacity. Simultaneously, educated Rohingya youth put their efforts for educating their future generation. A significant number of them offer private tuition to their kids voluntarily or with minimum cost.

They used to operate several community schools in own capacity in the many camps in *Ukhiya*. During the fieldwork, many youths shared their dream and challenges about those schools. They aimed to fill up the gaps of quality education in the camps for which Rohingya youth widely use online platform for their learning materials. Furthermore, they connect among the peers through 'WhatsApp' or 'Messenger' groups and share available learning materials (Refugee Participants Imad, 2022). Using of social media and demonstration of agency in de-politicized context is not a new phenomenon where refugee can raise their agency strongly (Godin and Dona, 2016) by avoiding physical surveillance. Camp authority does not allow those schools on security reasons. Nevertheless, some of the youths are confident about their commitments and they offer home teaching for community children.

As part of community development, there are many trainings and awareness building session for the refugee from different NGOs. Most of the youth and women get priority in the session, they are not forced for anything. Interested refugee are provided training on tailoring, handicraft, waste management, health and hygiene, disaster management, basic health training, basic computer training (stopped during my fieldwork), nursing children, and so on. Besides, volunteers received professional training on regular basis such as teaching and learning training

for LC tutors, maternity and first aid training for volunteers in health services. Both state and non-state actors refer all kinds of training and learning as life skills. In the last five years, almost every youth and female refugee attended many vocational and awareness sessions. Now some of the refugees also work as facilitators in the sessions (Interview with NSA7, 2022-23). Life skills are offered from community centres as well as from different training centres. Managers and trainers of such programs appreciated the enthusiasm of the beneficiaries. However, refugees cannot widely practice those skills for their livelihood, they can do apply for their family needs and learning. It increases the well-being of the refugee community. Some of the refugees have got sewing machines of their own, who also teach their relatives. They make clothes for their family and relatives instead of buying from outside markets (Refugee Participants Ayesha, 2023). NGOs sometimes provide them some raw materials and buy their final products too. The following NVivo illustration confirms such support from across the actors especially from non-state actors to their development. A significant number of refugees work together with non-state actors to their community development. It indicates the active role of non-state actors to the community development of refugees. State actors hardly participate directly to the efforts of non-state actors. Rather state actors fix the *modus operandi*, scope and implications of activities. Non-state actors cannot operate any of these events without the approval of the state actors. They design and implement many need-based projects for refugees in the camps.

However, refugee cannot be said a community in ideal sense (Hyndman, 2000) the Rohingya refugees are one of the homogenous refugees in camp settings. They are connected with their past, present, and future in the camps. As a result, Rohingya refugees struggle less for 'we feeling' than other refugee groups in the world. They did not lose their pre-camp identities rather it has enhanced in the challenging situation of camp life. But the process recast their previous social hierarchies of Rakhine state in this egalitarian set up of the camps. They manage their needs with community relationship and cooperation among them, support each other in case of crisis of food and fuel as well as during natural disaster. Meantime they have adopted many other repertoires from camp life. Moreover, refugees have been nourishing their history, culture, and identities from first ever Rohingya Cultural Exhibition centre in the camps. The centre is set up and operated by IOM.

8.4. Resistance: blur the line between power and agency

Two different entities, state and non-states actors, oftentimes have different standpoints, and NGOs exercise more mobilizing efforts for refugee. At this level, non-state actors and refugee sometime act on the same directions (such as advocacy of human rights, awareness about living standard). But at micro level, refugees demonstrate for their individual interest and attempt to resist both state and non-state actors. They prioritize their (basic) needs for well-being. For instance, some of the refugees keep extending their shelter even after objections from Site Management Services (SMS). Refugees are forced to stay apolitical, and any kind of subversion is wiped out immediately. But this is counterproductive. Refugees produces subjectivities that triggers many actions including their political being in different forms. They try to resist rather than demonstration, they bargain and negotiate to stop and change particular action of the camp apparatus. They both fight for and stop camp transfer of their fellow dwellers. Put differently, asymmetric power relations among the actors/agents cannot stop resistance in the camps. Encamped refugees are bound in unequal power relations with state and non-state actors, in that sense there is frequent resistance against that power. Where there is power, there is resistance (Foucault, 1978, p.95)

Refugee themselves consist of power and show up in resistance in different issues. So far, they demonstrated their strong resistance against inappropriate repatriation and relocation to *Bhasan Chor*. In both of the issues, refugees are united and state actors have failed to repatriate them as per Myanmar's plan. Refugee have been showing their inherent power against the inappropriate repatriation. They demanded some lawful condition to Myanmar, and they do not

want to repatriate until and unless their conditions are met. Likewise, from the beginning, they denied the call for their transfer to a remote island *Bhasan Chor*. Relocation decisions are made at macro level where both state and non-state actors oblige to follow refugee related rules and practices. Refugees persuade the CiC in case of any family or group selected for relocation. They inquire the UNHCR against involuntary relocation, sometimes they protest in small scale too. However, UNHCR does not handle any individual case about relocation to *Bhasan Chor*, they have clarified their position through stakeholder meetings against this relocation. It emphasizes any ‘involuntary’ thing against refugees across the globe. Since the refugees are not interested about *Bhasan Chor*, the state actors cannot force them to move there but transfer refugee through special techniques and arrangements. Non-state actors play a vital role in mobilizing the refugee on many issues. Refugees thus maintain a distance with state actors whereas there is less gap with non-state actors. They try to cross check different decision on them.

8.4.1. Transgression of legal and customary practices

The primary aim of the legal enforcement is to preserve the law and order of the camps. Both state and non-state actors attempt to install a law and order system in the camps. Refugees are an integral part of these complex system. There are CiCs and Police other than intelligence unit from state actors. Some NGOs also assist state actors to establish the legal services for Rohingya refugee. Most of the CiCs have magisterial power while Police also mitigate some disputes among the Rohingya in the camps. Every camp has a legal service point for the Rohingya, operated by NGOs that motivate the refugee to ask for legal support in case of violence or other human rights issues. However, refugees are encouraged to go for legal aids, they are reluctant to approach to respective authorities for legal help rather they try to fix many cases themselves. Most of the refugees opined about the unproductive procedure of the legal services. They do not get any support or that takes longer time to settle any issue. They go to CiC or Police at the eleventh hour only when they alone cannot solve their problem. Transgression of law occur from both state and the refugees. It begins from declaration of ‘state of exception’ by state actors then refugees violate laws in their everyday life in the camps. But the basis of their power differs explicitly, refugees just apply the techniques of microphysics of power that embodies in the body itself. On the other hand, power for state actors originate from sovereignty.

“I frequently go outside of the camps for work and to meet some host community people, sometimes we are punished. Local people seems now more

hostile to us. I was in jail for few days on false allegation from the host community too” (Refugee Participant Samad, 2022).

Nowadays, neither refugees care about punishment of transgression of law nor the state authority have that capacity of legal action against them. Most of the state actors commented, they cannot be so harsh or strict about Rohingya people by considering their vulnerable condition.

Most of the camps have a designated marketplace. The shops and gathering are permitted there. But there are shops also in every main road of the camps. These are not approved but open secret and the camp authority (CiC) can demolish anytime. However, demolition takes place upon prior notice. The shop owners do not want to withdraw their shops themselves. They neither request to stop or protest the demolition, because once the decision is taken it will be demolished anytime, anyhow. It oftentimes depends on the CiC and it varies from camp to camp. Some camps have large marketplace while some of them have small and few shops in the main road of the camps. Nevertheless, the number of shops is increasing day by day. Similarly, state actors allow some small-scale marketplaces in the camps because whenever they restrict on particular marketplace, refugees start small shops inside their shelter.

There are some negative agentic responses too in the camps, but such agencies cannot sustain or support the community at last. Several terrorist groups are active in the camps. Among them Ali Yakin, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Munna group, Nobi Hossen groups dominate many of the camps. They have different types of agenda too, but the immediate effect of their activities is that they extort and kill other Rohingya refugee in the camp. They wage into frequent killing among each other. Other than extortion, they kill the refugee or Rohingya leader who intend to work for the well-being of the fellow Rohingya refugee. Some ordinary refugees opined during informal conversation that those groups operate criminal activities mainly for money making, continuation of drug trading etc however they pressurize ordinary refugees to support them in the name of fighting for autonomy of Rakhine state in Myanmar (Interview and Informal Hangout, 2022-23). Both ARSA and RSO claim for autonomy struggle of Rakhine state and seek for so called support from Rohingya refugee in the camps. There is no uniform leadership among the Rohingya people. There is no one to convince them for their repatriation or other kind of protection negotiation in the camps. They rely on informal community leadership who sometime work for the repatriation related negotiation with GoB, UN organizations and Myanmar representatives.

But the terrorist groups do not want repatriation. So, they kill many active community leaders or *majhi* of the camps.

Some of the groups collect donations from global Rohingya diaspora and extort the camp dwellers as well. The Rohingya refugee however want to live happily within the camp limitation, they cannot do that. They cannot even sleep at night properly. Refugees as well as the humanitarian actors see the failure of the government to maintain the safety and security of the camps. And this creates a way of suppressing the normal actions and activities of the refugee in the camps. So, most of the ordinary refugee remain quiet and silent because of the rival terrorist groups. Moreover, terrorist groups recruit the youth through intimidation and exploiting their vulnerable situation in the camps. One of the respondents commented “despite we suffer from hunger and health, we want a peaceful camp. We cannot sleep at night; every night is a nightmare because a different administration (terrorist groups) begins at night” (Refugee Respondent Karima, 2022). Besides this, a significant number of refugees instigate other refugee from their dissatisfaction and deprivation of human rights in the camp. The service provider, therefore, faces more protest and resistance these days. Resistance is kind of an unending process; it is another form of negotiation, and it continues forever in a relationship. No resistance means one group has reached its peak of absolute power over another groups. Power is displayed mostly because of its relational characteristics, so as the existence of resistance inside this relationship (Foucault, 1978, pp. 94-95).

8.4.2. Embodied resistance: Non-cooperation and reaction

An early account of Rohingya refugee situation has been contextualized through ‘subhuman life’ theory that unfolded the vulnerability of Rohingya people immediately after their forced displacement in 2017 (Uddin, 2020). But in the extended exile, it is the refugees who manage their life in stringent livelihood opportunities, low safety, and protection. Refugee can gain and exercise their agency from limited to extended scale in the long run (Omata, 2017). Every actor in the camp acknowledges about the systematic changes of camp management and larger participation of refugees both in implementation and decision-making activities. Community leaders attend in sectoral meetings and leave their opinion in planning and implementation of a project. If any NGO fails to accommodate refugees’ feedback in a project, that obviously result a low turnout (Interview with NSA1, 2022). Thus, almost every service providers emphasize Complaint, Feedback and Response Mechanism (CFRM) and Feedback and Information Centre (FIC). Non-refugee actors welcome complaint and grievances from

refugees, whether those are addressed or not. One Rohingya guardian, Bacchu (34) shared with me:

“in the previous learning system, we the refugees were not happy about the service and outcome thus we were reluctant to send our kids. Resultantly, we started own community schools in many camps” (in 2022).

While majority of the refugees cooperate with NGOs and the camp authorities, some of them also disagree with state and non-state actors too. They show their dissonance with services offered by particular organizations or projects. Learning service is one of them that refugees have a lot of complaints against the previous system. However, Myanmar Curriculum Pilot (MCP) has been started in selected camps, refugees showed their resentment heavily about the previous system. They want immediate implementation of MCP in every camp. During the interview and observation, it was evident that refugee guardians are reluctant to send their children in the LC and the educated youth opened several community schools in the camps. Most importantly they keep operating some of the community schools in different camps even in the challenging situation of the camps. Whenever state or non-state actors forcibly close their schools, they continue them online and in home-based system. In that case, they teach students in a small group in their shelter.

Similarly, refugees do not cooperate the patrolling with police at night. There is strong resentment against the patrolling at night. Some of the ordinary refugee complain that *mahji* force and misbehave with them to go for patrolling at night. Police also torture on silly matter during the patrolling. Some of the ordinary refugee opine this patrolling just as security of the *mahji* because they are afraid of their opposition and misdeed to the community members. They apply every technique such as illness, hiding or auditing to avoid the community policing. Although they accompany with police, they attempt to remain inactive during the patrolling. And most of the time, they do not disclose any information to police. One of the state actors (police officer) comments that:

“we are in challenging situation to find out criminals because refugees do not share any information with us. They always say, we do not know anything, did not see anything, did not hear *anything* (*amra kisu noh jani, noh dehi, no shuni*). We cannot rely on their information too.” (*Interview with SA11, 2022*).

Rohingya refugees are sincere about their culture and religion. They follow Islami and Shariah-based values and norms in their daily life. According to them, Islam does not allow birth control

measures. State and non-state actors emphasize family planning to cut their birth rate. But refugees are reluctant to accept any birth control measure. Especially the male Rohingya strongly oppose such measures and boycott any kind of activities in this regard. This is another form of non-cooperation to the camp governance. They believe that following any kind of birth control measure is a killing. It is a great sin to them. And whatever the number of children (currently average five in a Rohingya family), Allah (God) will provide their food.

8.4.3. Public gathering, procession and demonstration

Refugees do not want to clash against the state actors rather they follow different techniques such as using irregular exit points, telling lie to police, using fake documents, using two mobiles etc. While most of them are disappointed and they think that there is no remedy of these challenges. Nevertheless, sometimes they show demonstrations against some decision or action of the non-refugee actors (GO or NGO). Clearing space or demolition of shelters and shops is one of the points of conflicts between state actor and refugee in the camps. Once during my fieldwork, a momentary protest took place in one of the camps in *Balukhali* range. For the first time in my first fifteen days of fieldwork, I saw an aggressive demonstration of the Rohingya people. An aggrieved women wanted to stop the magistrate. She protested the demolition of and got injured, her family members raged and ran to the UNHCR official instead of seeking help from other government staff or police. They were complaining against the CiC. They resisted not to go to hospital for treatment. They demanded action against the CiC blaming that CiC hit her. That incident precipitated a serious protest, hundreds of refugees gathered in front of the CiC compound within a few moments. Demonstration continued for a couple of hours. Resultantly, CiC called upon additional police to disperse refugee and clear the premise. Refugee left the compound eventually in several minutes. They got a chance to complaint together and loudly in front of the main administrative corner of the camps. The protest attracted the attention of many media and human rights NGOs working in the camps. Importantly some of the refugee openly criticize the different actions of the APBN and CiC. Since the beginning of refugees' exile, they observe 'Genocide Day', 'Refugee Day' and organize human chain for repatriation. State actors strictly control the gathering of refugees, nevertheless showdown takes place across the camps. Jabri (2006) mentions, 'prohibition itself generates a condition of transgressive act and thus manifest agency among the refugee' (p.151). A section of Rohingya refugees constantly challenges the security and sovereignty of Bangladesh through their different types of activities inside and outside the camps (Interviews and Fieldnotes, 2022-23).

Case-1: Genocide day observation

Rohingya refugees observe the 25th of August as their Genocide Day. Different reports claim that approximately 10,000 Rohingya people were killed during this genocide in Rakhine state in 2017 in Myanmar while 700,000 of them fled to Bangladesh. That was a nightmare for the survival of genocide. On an average every family faced death or any kind of torture by the Myanmar military- *Tatmadaw*. Therefore, they mark the day not only to commemorate their fellow but also to notice the attention of international community about the durable solutions of their sufferings. The very first gathering in 2018 was so huge that GoB perceived such assembly as a security threat for the country. Hundreds of thousands of refugees gathered in a camp in *Ukhiya*. That was spontaneous and unorganized, in case of any chaos or violence among the refugees would cost a lot both for refugees as well as for Bangladesh. Since then, government maintain extra caution about any kind of large gathering of Rohingya refugees anywhere in Bangladesh. Now such gathering is organized with prior permission and approval of the camp authority. CiC however permit for such gathering, carefully monitor the demonstration to maintain law and order in the camps. During my fieldwork, refugees also observed the Genocide Day on 25th August 2022 simultaneously in different camps. Almost in every camp, refugees were permitted for such events but in some camps the permission was withdrew at the last moment of the occasion due to security reasons. I observed the occasion in one camp. The community leaders and other refugee representatives from various blocks gathered near the CiC office. Refugees followed the instruction of the camp authority and other agencies of the state actors. Camp authority controlled the venue, banner, time, speech and number of participants in the procession. Whatever the size or duration of the program, refugees were successful to attract the media and convey their message to the world. They again urged to international community for their safe return and justice for them.

Case-2: Demand for better salary/stipend

Small scale spontaneous protest frequently occurs in the camps in case of any mistreatment by the service providers. A Camp in Charge (CiC) in *Kutupalong* area reported one demonstration that happened few months ago (before starting this fieldwork in August 2022). At that time refugee demanded for high up their compensation for voluntary work as well as to increase refugee quota in camp jobs. Some forty to fifty FDMNs gathered and kept shouting in front of the CiC office (Interview with SA1, 2023). Some of the volunteer respondents begrudgingly shouted that they are poorly paid compared to their workload and responsibility. Moreover, they do not get the salary on time. They cannot plan anything with their salary. Refugee

volunteers find themselves sometime valueless because if they request or ask about their stipend (salary) or the amount of salary, they are suggested to leave the job. They are used to with this practice but cannot be so vocal about it. Above all, they need a job or some work to utilize their time.

Dissatisfactions are noticeable among the refugee about insufficient service, and they repeatedly knock at the NGO offices. Several respondents shared their experience of protest in different service centres in the camps. Most of the health posts witness such resistance frequently from refugees. Refugees protest there in case of any misbehave or mistreatment of those service centres. Refugees are at least assured of transfer of alleged staff irrespective of NGOs belong to. One of the non-state actors opines:

“it is obvious in long run that refugees will demand basic rights rather than just emergency entitlement. We work regularly to make them understand the scarcity of resources” (Interview with NSA5, 2022-23).

8.5. Resilience: ‘Left no such worse cannot be endured’

My in-depth conversation with refugee interlocutor reveals that refugees are ready to go back to Myanmar. They can realize the situation and foresee no light of repatriation. Everything in the camps manifest the temporariness of their camp life but it is not possible to live in temporary indefinitely. Thus, most of them have accepted camp life as their destiny and manoeuvre to recuperate at their best capacity. Refugees just grasp every opportunity of training, livelihood opportunity, awareness, or voluntary activities in the camp. They also think about their future and future generation. Refugees live in deep uncertainty, but they want their future generation ready for life. It is however difficult to keep them in track without any hope, they try their all means.

7.5.1. Strengthening ‘Rohingya’ identity

Myanmar deliberately rejected ‘Rohingya identity’ in the approved 135 ethnic groups of the country (Cheesman, 2017), they could not introduce themselves there as Rohingya Muslim at all. But in the Rohingya camps they can proudly identify themselves with Rohingya ethnicity. Almost every Rohingya participants opines that their ‘Rohingya identity’ has been strengthened while in the camps. According to Ismail (50), a Rohingya refugee:

“however the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) identified us as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs), now it is globally accepted that we are

the Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar. We like to live with our Rohingya identity, not as Bangali” (Interview in 2022-23).

Both the state and non-state actor use the term ‘Rohingya’ to refer these marginalized people. They are well documented in the UNHCR ‘ProGres’ software too. Rohingya refugee interact and communicate each other through this identity that upholds their community feelings for achieving common goal- repatriation. Their relationship turns for well-being and rights. Thus, it can create a better chance of their ethnic and political identity (citizenship) in Myanmar after their return. Put differently, the present narrative of Rohingya identity in the camps confirm them both as Rohingya ethnic minority as well as nationals from Myanmar. Establishing collective identity in the camps (Malkki, 1995) is endorsed by international community. Simultaneously the extended exile and historical transnational mobility of Rohingya people between Rakhine state and Bangladesh resulted in a trans-local network in the post exodus period in Bangladesh. Until in recent times, Rohingya refugees gained an unconditional sympathy of the local community and offered their maximum support to this persecuted people. Rohingya Muslim has a long history of belongingness in Myanmar as a distinct ethnic group for their language, culture, religion, and practices of livelihood. They could not enjoy their culture and religion fearlessly while in Rakhine state of Myanmar. But Rohingya people irrespective of man and women can practice their culture here wholeheartedly. They are provided with animals (cow and goat) during every Eid festival (biggest religious event of Muslims) for sacrifice (slaughter) by NGOs. Furthermore, everyone has access to mosque and seasonal religious congregation across the camps. During the winter, a significant number of refugees are busy with these kind of religious event across the camps (Observation, 2022-23). It was amazing to notice during my fieldwork that newly married women use traditional and beautiful umbrella on their outing as part of their culture. Furthermore, IOM is supporting them a lot in their cultural practices and identity formation through a vibrant Rohingya Cultural Exhibition Centre in the camp. Refugees make different replicas and artefacts for the Centre voluntarily and enthusiastically. They are motivated to visit the Centre and share their opinion on the collection and development. Sometime the refugees are paid for their contribution to the Centre.

8.5.2. Transformation of Rohingya women

Rohingya women were marginalized and vulnerable because of restrictions and socio-cultural stigma in Rakhine state of Myanmar (Abdelkader, 2014). They could not study and come out

of the house for work while in Myanmar. Since half of the refugees are women in the camps, humanitarian organizations emphasize their participation in camp activities and development of their structural situation. Non-state actors provide better opportunity to women mitigating their vulnerability in the camps comparison to men.

“Most of the NGOs preserve and maintain one third of their volunteer position for women. We offer awareness and livelihood programs for different age group women in the camps. Almost every interested woman can engage in different types of camp activities” (Interview with NSA10, 2022-23).

Capacity building workshop and training prioritize the women and girls. Most importantly, household is headed by a woman in their food ration card. Access to resources and facilities opens a gateway to empowerment for women (Jejeebhoy, 1997), Rohingya women in the camps too get priority and control over the available resources in the camps, thus transform their life to a great extent. Multiple teams from different non-state actors lead awareness and mobilization activities targeting women that also inevitably capacitate them in everyday practices. One of the Rohingya female volunteers Raisa (30) shared that:

“I was sitting idle for first two years of camp life. That was painful and difficult to pass my days. But when I started working as volunteers in the Site Management Office, I got at least some peace in life. Now I can contribute for myself, family, eventually for my community”.

However, this is not the total scenario of women in the camps, inevitably a significant number of Rohingya women take part in many new, non-traditional roles and responsibilities in the crisis. They support and motivate each other in transforming their lives. Since state actors as well as the humanitarian actors believe in the gender equality, they have been working on the challenging issues of women’s participation in camp activities. Initially women faced a lot of hurdles from the family and community. Even some of them got life threat but they have overcome the situation with concerted effort of refugee leaders, state, and non-state actors. Individual narrative of many Rohingya women refugees have been illustrated in the following word cloud. It revealed that women and girls are highlighted in the camps regard to jobs, tailoring, training, empowerment and awareness. They are enthusiastic about learning and serving the fellow femal members of their community.




Figure 8.3: Word Cloud: Changes in the life of women in refugee camps

Source: Author, 2024

Now the changes are accepted, their agencies prevail against all odds. A community leader (women) opines that it is only the woman who can realize their helplessness and vulnerable situation after losing their spouses, child or during their pregnancy or divorce (Refugee Participant Nur Haba, 2023). Eventually Rohingya women have created some spaces-places (Rahman, 2021) by exhibiting their agency in everyday coping up strategies, negotiations and bargaining within the constrained structure. Thus, the women are enhancing the well-being of women refugee themselves.

8.5.3. Coping mechanism

As refugee have no other options, they focus on adaptation and resilience capacities in the camp situation. They apply their limited resources, knowledge, gained skills and community relationship for a better life. Crisis of essential items such as food and fuel is a regular issue of many households. Now refugee can map their monthly needs and available resources. Sometimes they get additional income by working outside or working in the camps in ‘Cash for Work’ project. Meantime they cooperate each other about food and other items. They borrow and lend different items among them. They sell some of their rations or exchange among them too. They rear poultry and take care of roof top vegetable gardens. Their means

of well-being are not fixed rather 'inventions of every day' (Agier, 2002). Beneficiaries, predominantly the women, are shopping in a disciplined way from the designated outlet with their own choice by using the card. It seemed they are confident about their choice and capacity. Lot of volunteers also work in the outlets.

Volunteers from Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP) demonstrate their esteem agency during natural and man-made disaster in the camps. There are thousands of CPP volunteers across the camps. They jump in for community support during Cyclone and Fire accident. While in fieldwork, I witnessed their efficacy and dedication to their community during the cyclone- 'Sitran'. They become busy in various activities in disaster: awareness campaign, rescue mission and damage calculation. Most of the volunteers seems confident about announcement and observing their responsibilities during the campaign. Refugees were scary partly because of pre-cyclone heavy wind. Some of the refugees were busy in repairing their shelter with bamboo and rope themselves. There were few refugees in the roads than usual days. Announcement was repeated to stay inside the shelter. Some volunteers said that now refugees know their duty well during cyclone or disaster situation. Besides natural disaster, refugees suffer from frequent fire accident too. Other than monsoon, most of the seasons are dry and hot in Bangladesh. Every year thousands of refugees loss their shelters and properties because of fire accident. Therefore, IOM and UNHCR with the support of Bangladesh Fire Service Department organize awareness and training program for refugees all the year round. A special team of fire fighters have been built up in every camps. Several youth refugees got training in driving a three-wheeler (local name *tuktuk*) with small water tank for immediate responses. They also know how to operate a water pump and fight in fire before the Fire Service Unit intervening. After receiving training, refugees also keep some sand ready at nearby their household blocks. Moreover, they try to follow the safe evacuation process during fire incident. They have learnt some effective technique to protect themselves and properties during fire. One *tuktuk* driver enthusiastically shared with me that he is wondered that he can drive a car.

According to a Site Management Manager, wash and health sector prioritize the maxim: 'prevention is better than cure'. Since humanitarian organizations cannot provide refugees the sufficient health services, they emphasize proper sanitation and waste management. Different categories of trash bins have been supplied for a particular number of households, and refugees deposit their trashes in the respective bins. During the entire fieldwork it was observed that refugees across the camps and blocks maintain this waste management. There are plenty of

limitation and challenges in wash and sanitation. NGOs have set up latrines in standard quantity, but they cannot provide minimum water supply for the refugee. Nevertheless, refugees are encouraged and provided additional containers to store water for their essential hand wash purposes. “We are taught and trained how to maintain our hygiene, but we have water crisis. We try to wash our hands before meals and after using toilets” (Interview with refugee participant Riya, 2023). Actually, resilience also reflects the power of these group of people, they adapt against adverse actors of the authorities who are responsible for their protection. Since the camp authority cannot provide them sufficient support, resilience remains the only power or agency of the vulnerable. I think Rohingya refugee illustrated their highest agency by fighting the COVID-19 in an impossible situation of the most densely populated camp in the world.

8.5.4. Fighting covid-19: a special case of agentic response

COVID-19 posed multifaceted challenges of mental, economic, and health crisis at large. There was a perception that majority of the people might be infected and eventually died from Coronavirus. The first-ever lockdown in Bangladesh from March to May 2020 scared the people with extra shock. Rohingya people were equally worried about the disruption of humanitarian services as well as the spreading of Coronavirus. Number of state actors and non-state actors decreased in person duties to the lowest instead they passed their command and instruction remotely. Humanitarian activities as well as fighting against Coronavirus in the camps were much dependent on the Rohingya refugee. The limited humanitarian staff were successful to deploy the Rohingya volunteer teams, faith leaders, Imam of the mosque, GBV (gender-based violence) teams to keep up COVID-19 awareness among the mass Rohingya women and girls. Rohingya people realized the importance of managing their good themselves. Despite their life risk, assigned refugees accomplished many essential services in person and visited door to door of Rohingya households.

There were strict directives from the GoB to maintain the rules and regulations of COVID-19 nationwide. Both national and international NGOs were briefed seriously about the government's position. In this regard, it followed a proper top-down approach. Since only selective NGOs and programs could work during the epidemic, they prepared their concise action plan to implement decisions (Interview with NSA2, 2022). And at the bottom level, they engaged the Imam of mosque, faith leaders, *mahji*, volunteer coordinators and volunteers. Gradually it extended to household from blocks too. They disseminated the basic prevention information from door to door. A Rohingya Imam Noor Mohammad stated that

“We counted prevention measures seriously against COVID-19. I announced messages during and after prayers in the mosque and encouraged others to do the same” (Interview, 2022-23).

Rohingya people live in cramped and dire condition. It was challenging to maintain social distance among them. Nevertheless, they were motivated and instructed to observe the distance at least among the household members, several patrolling teams were also deployed from the camp administration (Interview with SA7, 2023). Imam of the mosque and *mahji* with the support from camp authority also monitored whether the Rohingya people unnecessarily roam around in the camps. Rohingya volunteers helped to draw signs and symbols of social distances in the blocks, roads, mosques, and other assembly points. Several informants opined that since they follow religious beliefs strictly, women and girl mostly remained inside the house. They oftentimes went out for collecting food and groceries where there were proper arrangements for social distancing. In the first couple of months, Rohingya people maintained the COVID-19 guidelines very well.

The pious Rohingya people have faith to their Imams. Rohingya people accepted it as their challenge of protection from the unknown Coronavirus. They were sincere about their welfare during the crisis. Rohingya volunteers did produce more announcements and programs on the community radio in Rohingya camps. With regards to these awareness campaigns, participation of Rohingya people was inevitable for the quick and effective dissemination of the information. Community programs are a regular feature of radio but during the lockdown frequency of COVID-19 related programs had increased significantly. Tellingly, there were several types of awareness campaigns by the Rohingya people for their community (Islam and Yunus 2020), that made the prevention of virus easier even in such a crowded place. Since most of the Rohingya people are illiterate, conservative in their cultural practices, one NGO respondent surprised about the high acceptance of COVID-19 related instructions by the Rohingya people (Interview with NSA3, 2022).

Agency manifests in some purposeful goals (Ortner, 2006). During COVID-19 lockdown, Rohingya refugee were involved actively with the humanitarian staff to save them from the unknown devastation of virus. Although, the overall participation was not that huge in number because of pandemic measures, it was mentionable considering the havoc of COVID-19. Tellingly, they enjoyed freedom to a great extent in executing assigned activities at that time. Position and role of some Rohingya refugee during the COVID-19 reminded their self-

motivated life in Myanmar. The natural and latent agency of human being shows up in relation to context, structure, and their social capital (Hansson et al., 2014). Rohingya refugee also manifested such agencies in the do or die situation of COVID-19 in the inclusively excluded system of the refugee camps. They have imbued with some sort of confidence and motivation from their performances. They have called the refugee notion—‘things are always done to them, not by them’ (Walters, 2008, p.188)—into question by fighting against COVID-19.

8.6. Concluding remark

From the above-mentioned evidence, it is said that Rohingya refugees respond significantly to the existing power dynamics of the camp governmentality. Non-refugee actors however exercise multiple forms of power; refugees mainly exercise microphysics of power and gain agency in the camps in the long run. To say differently, refugees apply this power both in case of the sovereign power of state actors as well as biopower of the non-state actors. Resultantly it grows diversified agencies among them. It is evident that Rohingya people tackle the different forms of restrictions and confinement from state actors through protest and transgression of law in the camps. They non-cooperate as well as boycott decisions of state and non-state actors. In case of limited services, they adjust with the situation, and find out for alternative opportunities. Some of their actions seem happens in ‘predefined ways’ (Omata, 2017) but irrespective of refugees, everybody is influenced by their situation. So, it is important to note that Rohingya people act at least for their well-being in the precarious situation. They work outside, they seek for health services from local community hospitals as well. Refugees are well known about the power and consequence. Eventually, refugees turn into a subject rather than an object of study in the PRS. Nevertheless, they act as such they have also the rights for those facilities as human being. Refugees are controlled and confined in the encampment, but it seems complete confinement is impossible. They also have power and agencies. During the fieldwork it is comprehend that refugees know well that they are entitled for many rights in the ‘state of exception’, they want those facilities even beyond the legal framework.

It is argued that refugee camps cannot be operated only by applying sovereign power. It entails many normative and legal limitations in the camp settings. As per the advocates of ‘graduated sovereignty’, sovereign power is transferred to humanitarian organizations but it is not happening in case of Rohingya refugees in the camps. Nevertheless, power circulates to every actor in diverse and dispersed way from non-refugee to refugee of the camps because of many

liberal tactics such as humanitarian aids or care mechanisms. They are essential for an indefinite period of ‘state of exception’. Thus, refugees are allowed to take part and talk in different meetings and workshop organized by the camp operators: NGOs or IGOs. Governing through representations (Casasampera, 2021) left some space for refugee to exercise their power and manifest agencies. Agency indeed articulates through explicit and implicit negotiations with stakeholders and authorities (Denaro, 2016). Forms of engagement depend on the extent of power that exert over each other. However, refugees belong to the marginal level of power cycle, they set back and show up their resistance and non-cooperation oftentimes. Such manifestation and subjectivities of the refugees are construed as agentic responses of refugees that are produced by the complex power relations with state and non-state actors. Above all, a person act at the very end in a relation of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, result, and possible interventions may open up (Foucault, 1983, p. 222).




Figure 8.4: Dimensions of Agentic Responses of Rohingya Refugee

Source: Author, 2024

Agentic responses of the Rohingya refugee have been illustrated in the above dimension in NVivo. This 'Group Query' is centred by the one of the research questions that how the refugee responds to the existing camp governmentality. And it shows that almost all the nodes and themes produced from empirical evidence are connected significantly towards the link between refugee agency and camp governmentality. To elaborate it a bit, these two phenomena of the camps are interrelated to the structure of the camps, strategies, and mechanism exercised in the camps, and to different forms of power dynamics of these three actors of this research.

Refugee camp is not only a spatial set up for refugee but also for national and international non-refugee actors. They also plan and act in this place twenty-four by seven along with the refugees according to their individual mandate, interest, and purpose. It is physically located at the margin but belong to the global perimeter. Refugees become highly visible by being placed in the camps and becoming the objects of state of the art of humanitarian programmes (Turner, 2015). Binary of powerful and powerless does not work in this complex structure. It is a mandatory reading and observation subject for international politics and international relations. Refugees interact with many of the governmentality tactics of state and non-state actors through agentic responses. IRR under UNHCR provides the scope of diverse agentic responses of refugee across the camps. Humanitarian organizations however have some disciplinary as well as bio-political power, they offer the protection and safety of refugees in the camps. Thus, camps become a space of interactions of refugees with state and non-state actors in the form of cooperation and contradiction, unexpected and unconditional relationship within the community of displaced people, incessant striving, and countering of bare lives for well-being. Most often their actions take place dispersedly to maintain their existence and well-being in the camp. Refugees in the camps are governed as a group of people. Michel Foucault too indicates these micro-practices by which persons were drilled, trained, segmented, and recombined so, as to become productive individuals and collective energies (Walters, 2017, p.71). Eventually camp turn into a locus of various dimension of refugee agencies. These roles and actions of the refugee manifest their strengths, competencies, and initiatives for well-being (Fingerle & Wink, 2020). Rohingya refugees cooperate, resist, and demonstrate in the camps that is not possible for bare lives. However, they have no political rights in the camps and in Bangladesh, they show down many political activities in the camps.

Humanitarian assistance is not always biopolitical rather to some extent it is rights-coated entitlement for survival of refugee. As a result, refugee can claim and query about those rights

whenever entitlements or services distorted. Refugees adopt and gain new skills, occupations, organizations, networks, social relationship, and invisible strategies to response camp governmentality. They adopt survival strategies based on the contex. Despite of humanitarian politics, non-state actors inculcate many of the unsustainable/unwelcoming/unmanageable international norms such as human rights, participation, empowerment, gender equality, spirit of democracy in their daily interactions to host country and refugee alike. It reflects here the extent of human rights advocacy of the non-state actors that motivate the refugee to demand for better education and seek legal assistance in the camps too.

Non-refugee actors construct a complex set up of humanitarian government through spatial technology, bureaucratic or administrative exclusion, legal paradoxes, and so on. Every actor is essential in operating this apparatus of governmentality. It has been evident that state actors exercise multiple forms of power emanating from sovereign power and then transform to disciplinary power with biopolitics. Non-state actors become empowered under some pacts or MoU; thus, they exercise both disciplinary power by installing numerous techniques and technology through the medium of humanitarian services or in pastoral form. Refugees are falling short of power in-between these two actors, they demonstrate their corporeality and refugee tag as microphysics of power both dispersedly and collectively. Rohingya refugees engage in frequent small-scale resistance in their everyday life in the camps. Their microphysics of power manifest among the refugees across the camps. As per Foucault, everyone's body is potentially powerful because it embodies some sort of agency (Caldwell, 2007). Eventually, it influences and opens avenues for constant negotiation and sharing with other actors. In such a protracted situation, liberal tactics of non-state actors reenergizes the refugees for survival and well-being. It is more remarkable for refugees that they are getting new skills, occupations, organizations, networks, and social relationship rather the question of whoever is empowering or elevating them. Rohingya refugees have different socio-economic condition in the camps compare to their situation in Rakhine state. They were almost unknown with 'job culture'. Non-state actors or the humanitarian organizations oblige to infuse such empowering tonic in the situation of decreasing fund as well as reducing the huge operating cost of the complex governance. Ultimately such interactions strengthen refugees' disposition for present and future. Once they adapted with the context, refugees continuously engage in bargaining and claiming their rights even in entitlement format. Having no classical solution ready on ground as well as the current policy shift of the IRR moves forward the non-state actors (NGOs/IGOs) for further negotiation with state actors about livelihood and other rights

of the refugee (Interview with SA and NSA, 2022-23). Beyond conflict and competition, camp governmentality also develops some common understandings and mutual expectation among the actors. The proactive transformation of the refugees generates community feelings and builds up new relationship within and between refugee and non-refugee in the camp space. Non-state actors while exercise some power directly from the state actors, the refugee apply their resistance and resilience in a form of microphysics of power. Resistance and power are articulated into a micro-physics (Bigo, 2017).

However, Rohingya camp is a complete institutional camp, it constitutes as an assemblage of people, divergent institutions, and organizations. It produces an exceptional space wherever refugees incessantly respond to other actors with their agentic actions. Rohingya refugees in protracted exile consider camp as their destiny, and shape their life in different ways that actually articulate different forms of agencies among them. They establish new power structure within and between different actors of the camps. As refugee or non-citizen, they possess and exercise agency for their well-being. It is the only alternative to them, it is a proxy tool for them, and the only medium of their political essence as human being. Citizen (non-refugee actors) can respond to governmentality based on their human rights, most importantly by their political rights but refugees or refugee like displaced population or non-citizen or stateless population do not have rights. Resultantly, they exhibit agency to the (state)governmentality. The agency of the Rohingya refugee has been moulding in three dimensions: cooperation, resistance, and resilience in the existing camp governmentality. They make this temporariness normal through this vibrant interactions with non-refugee actors. Power in governmentality not only control but also empower to help them live (Rozaku, 2012). Refugees like to spend their lives in the PRS without any violence and chaos. Thus, this empirical evidence of agencies of Rohingya refugee offer an extended understanding of refugee agencies from the perspective of complex governance.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

Considering the context of protracted situation of Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh, I applied the governmentality lens of Michel Foucault and a framework of agency. As I already mentioned in literature review, except some studies on Palestinian cases, only a few studies have considered Foucauldian lens from juridico-territorial perspective of sovereignty, and obviously such studies left many aspects of camp governmentality unfolded. Instead, for better and broaden the understanding of camp governmentality, the Foucauldian perspective empirically shows that not only the state and non-state actors but refugees also have an essential segment in the power relations of camp governmentality. It resultantly creates agency among refugees. The overall interactions and links help the stability and longevity of protracted situation.

9.1. Discussion on findings

The findings of this study reveals the share of refugees in exercising power and emergence of their agencies in long-term camps. The research puts the power play among different actors in the centre of camp governmentality where the refugees have been justified as an actor. There is no scope to conflate them with non-state actors particularly in case of stateless refugees like Rohingya people in Bangladesh.

Bochmann (2018) while argues about the role of different micro structures of the camp dwellers to camp stability, this thesis argued that exercise of power and different power based activities of the refugee keep the camps less chaotic. They live and pass their protractedness in a systematic way under the ‘technology of self’ principle of governmentality. However they live freely inside the camps, they have no freedom in camp operation like refugees in Thai-Burma border. Karen refugee enjoy autonomy from Thai government in operating their camps (Laocharoenwong, 2020; McConnachie, 2014). But Rohingya refugee mostly depend on the humanitarian aids and different governmentality techniques of the non-refugee actors. Nonetheless they exert significant amount of power over them through participation in camp activities. They challenge many decision of the camp authority, engage in continuous negotiation in case of repatriation and relocation. This study brings forth a different perspective of camp governmentality than the study by Turner (2005). He highlighted the exercise of different forms of power by state and humanitarian actors but overlooked the power of the refugees in camp governmentality. Rohingya refugee keep exercising microphysics of power

against the sovereign power, biopolitical power and disciplinary power of other actors in the camps.

Sovereign power in the refugee camps drives the refugee for multiple subjectivities and ambiguities, different actions and strategies in the camps (Oesch, 2017; Owens, 2009). But this power itself cannot produce agency among the refugee, agency emerge due to the interaction of microphysics of power of the refugee. Palestinian refugees enjoy some sort of autonomy or sovereignty in the refugee camps (Ramadan, 2013; Hanafi, 2008). This research shows that Rohingya refugee live in a very different governmentality. I argued hereby exploring governmentality that state actors do not handover sovereign power partially or completely to other entities. The non-state actors and Rohingya refugee do not have access to it rather they exercise other types of power such as disciplinary, liberal tactics and microphysics of power. NGOs cannot decide about space and area of the Rohingya camps. They do not endorse or bargain about security issues too. Only the dedicated legal aid service NGOs support very selected cases of the refugees. Protection unit of the UNHCR also do the advocacy to protect the camp dwellers, do not deal about security and criminal cases about the camps. Reversely refugee frequently transgress the legal apparatus of the host country. They frequently cross the limit of their radius in Bangladeshi territory. State actors manage the entry-exit points as well as do many check post towards the Cox's Bazar city. They exert power over every other actors however non-state actors enjoys freedom to some extent in managing the refugee on the grounds. It is the humanitarian organizations who interact directly with refugees. They apply many liberal tactics as the state sometime become liberal to humanitarian organization regarding refugees' appeasement. Put differently state actors also practice the notion of liberalism and does not intervene upto a level as a phenomenon of governmentality there too.

Disciplinary power include as well as exclude the refugee. Rohingya refugee are forced to apply many techniques and tactics in the set up. Counting refugee as 'community' is one of the regular techniques in the camps. However state and non-state actors have the monopoly to this power (Hyndman, 2000; Turner, 2005, 2015) community leaders and faith leaders applies disciplinary power over their community as well. Refugee leaders use it for the peace and stability of the camps. Many ordinary refugee claims that Rohingya volunteers oftentimes work against the Rohingya community. They provide many community sensitive information to the humanitarian organizations. Besides, they are not used to about the 'community' tag of non-state actors rather they always say '*koum*' or society in standard translation of Rohingya word.

Rohingya people accept this vulnerable life because of their continuous exodus from Myanmar and having no chance of return in Rakhine. So they live like a society in the camps. However their status does not comply with the concept of society. Their societal feelings indicate their stronger agency in the PRS. Since they live in encampment, Rohingya do not get any other identities as happened in many other refugee situation (i.e. Malkki, 1995). Most often disciplinary power circulates from non-refugee actors to refugee actors. A significant number of studies highlight the spatial set up of refugees camp in controlling them (Minca, 2015; Wahab, 2022) whereas this study finds physical apparatus of camps become weaker than other non-visible techniques of governmentality in PRS. Every day control and empowerment tonic by non-state actors infuse new forms of agency among them. Refugees remain self-controlled in particular radius until solution of their crisis otherwise. Thus refugee camps remain peaceful even in extended period.

While several studies drawn a chronological line of the different strategies of IRR as governmentality (Lippert, 1999), my study captures their effects, multiplicity, and interactions on the ground. Meaning that without addressing the multiplicity of governance or just relying on state-centric narrative, camp governmentality couldn't be truly grasped. Such multiplicity consists of state actors, local national, and international humanitarian organizations as non-state actors, local community, civil society, and refugees in encampment. However local and national NGOs join on an adhoc basis, international refugee regime of UNHCR remains standby to respond to any refugee crisis across the globe. They devise many policies and strategies to control the refugee in extended period, here the refugee agency is one of the vital tools of camp governmentality. Exit pass, biometrics, and referral system are some of the mechanisms of non-refugee actors in confining the refugees in the camps. Humanitarian organizations follow various techniques such as creating agencies among the refugees to manage the camps. Most importantly this thesis connects the camp governmentality with refugee agency as new dimension of camp operation in the long run. The thesis broadens the knowledge of governmentality techniques of IRR for national and international security. It is the state and humanitarian actors who support to grow refugee agency to a certain extent for containment purpose. Power and actions of the humanitarian actors confirms the agency creation agenda of recent IRR policies such as Global Compact for Refugee (GCR).

Chaux, Haugh and Greenwood (2018) argue the mutual dependence between refugee and camp officials resembles to organizational behaviours thus it ensure the social stability of refugee

camps. But Rohingya refugees have no clear-cut position and portfolio in camp governance. They exercise power diversely and dispersedly during interaction with other actors. Perpetuation of camps remain the priority, having no other alternative for refugees. Refugees exercise some power and take part in some of the decision-making forum of the camp activities. This is neither self-governance nor the democratization of refugee camps (Bender, 2021) but different tactics of governing the refugee camps peacefully in the long run.

Non-refugee actors provide some space in the power plays in creating agency among the refugees rather than more programs for their self-dependence. This study also finds that overdependence on self-reliance cannot be a mechanism for exit from humanitarian response (Calabria and Omata, 2018) in the near future. Humanitarian organizations advocate here that camp dwellers need to be engaged in the decision-making regard to management and security of the camps (Hoque and Salleh, 2022). Community leaders as well the faith leaders play vital role in settling many community disputes those are neither in concern nor in capacity of the state actors, refugees exercise power through these activities. Some of their actions seem happened in 'predefined ways' (Omata, 2017) but irrespective of refugees, everybody is influenced by their situation in the Rohingya camps. They act and exercise power mostly in countering power of other actors in the camps. Thus, it is difficult to predict the move of refugees in camp governmentality. Empirical evidence show that they always seek for their wellbeing and changes of the situation. Fresia and Kanel (2015) finds refugee agency as a 'device' for new subjectivities while this study discovered it as an essential tool of camp governmentality as well for camp stability and longevity. Put differently, refugees got wellbeing spirits, changes in their community, transform their lives in the banality of refugee camps. They navigate their everyday life with continuous interactions with other actors, ambiguities and subjectivities of power dynamics. To say differently, this research focuses on power play based agency of refugees but does not ignore the economic or livelihood based growth of agency of refugees in PRS (Alloush et al., 2017; Kibreab, 1993).

Importantly, this agency emerges from their every day practices and actions rather than momentary agency of refugees in Global North settings (Ottosson, Eastmond and Cederborg, 2017; Owens, 2009). They have no scope to remain 'subhuman life' (Uddin, 2020) or 'bare life' (Agamben, 1998). Oblivious (2014) identified Rohingya women as less participatory or having less agency in her comparative study with previous influx of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. This study finds the refugees from 2017 influx have got a lot of support from the

humanitarian organizations as well as they have learnt this refugeehood as their '*nosib*' (luck). Refugee is an actor in the PRS. They normalize their temporariness, they live as an independent society in the state of exception. Poyil and Chowdhury (2021) as well this study however argues biometrics as a formal governmentality tool, Rohingya people got an identity document that they are the people from Myanmar. The Government of Bangladesh actually forward this data to Myanmar to accept their identity and receive them as their citizen. Thus it cannot be just a governmentality technique but also an agency making tool for refugee too. Moreover, Rohingya women enlisted as the household head under this biometric family profiling by the UNHCR. This a great transformation of Rohingya women. Such an identity making helps Rohingya to refute their statelessness too (Sengupta, 2021). Thus, particularly Rohingya women found more active than Olivous (2014) marked their situation in her investigation. Rahman (2019) examined this psycho-social spirit of transformation of Rohingya women partially in her study too. Not necessarily non-refugee actors create the ground for protest, forging documents and deception of refugees but they are tolerated to a limit. Most of the state actors shared that they can understand refugees' deception or violation of camp rules. Nevertheless, refugees are not put in jail or punished all in a row. Most of the time refugees are allowed to go outside of the camps for valid reasons. Such attitude of the state actors helps to keep the refugee and camp quiet.

While exercise of power refers to a realist narrative (Morgenthau, 2005), by grasping the power of marginalized and vulnerable people this study broadens the scope of studying IR from diversified perspective. Governmentality lens of Michel Foucault helped doubly to dig out the power in micropractices and dispersed forms of the refugee camps. This exploration comprehends that theories such as realism, securitization cannot be effective in unveiling the power play in this complex situations of refugee camps. Refugee camps in Global South are considered as the terrain of former colonial masters under the mechanism of IRR (Fonkem, 2020). Both the western countries as well as the humanitarian organizations exercise power over the host country that is mostly a former colony. They continue their colonial legacy, belief system, dominance through their knowledge and power. The postcolonial or neocolonialist lens eyes more on humanitarian organizations than state and refugee actors in PRS settings of the Global South.

Nevertheless this research adopt the governmentality lens of Michel Foucault because his analysis indicate to power dynamics of a system where population are managed both with

consent and violence. Humanitarian organizations played strong role in managing the powerful bodies or the refugees but they are also the part of entire power game of the camps. So the postcolonial perspective of refugee camps cannot unpack the power plays of these space of exception. Nonetheless exploration of this power dynamics obviously can benefit the postcolonial and realist angles of IR too. Extrapolating these findings, questions can be raised about the existence and necessity of refugee camps in Global South while encampments are not a practice in Global North. Poststructuralist perspective of refugee camps can offer an alternative of refugee camps across the globe. Power dynamics or the camp governmentality helps to emerge agency among the refugees. However Rohingya refugees are marginalized and vulnerable in the state of exception, everyone matters for the world system from a constructivist perspective. This study emphasize refugee as an actor in international politics since their powerful bodies or obtrusive presence (Tazzioli, 2014) influence the state and their alliance across the globe. Refugees in the camp share their values, norms and interest with global actors. Power sharing by refugees create their identities and interest. While refugee camps are norms of the modern nation-state (Agamben, 1998), creation of refugee agency is turning to a new norms of camp governance and stability of PRS in Global South.

Collected data however can be analysed with other couple of IR theories this study adopted and found the governmentality lens more appropriate to interpret refugee camps power dynamics in international relations and politics. Most importantly primary data reveals the dynamics of state actors, non-state actors as well as the refugee actors. They have different and a combined agenda too. State actors exercise power and negotiate with other actors to repatriate the refugees or at least to keep the camp peaceful until their repatriation. Non-state actors finds and exercise power in stabilizing refugee camps. Their way of employing power and knowledge both serve their colonial purpose as well as western liberalism of saving the humanity. Refugees seek and exercise power primarily for their wellbeing while gaining of political agency is the ultimate goal of these stateless refugees. Interest of state and non-state actor converge as well as diverse on many points of refugee camps operation. Non-state actors however support a bit in preserving the nation-state system ultimately state actors remain alert about the political agency or local integration or citizenship of the refugees in their land. Particularly Bangladeshi state actors deploy most of their power in preserving sovereignty and deterring refugee in acquiring citizenship in Bangladesh. They employ policy, techniques and strategy to send back refugees in Myanmar. Importantly, governmentality of Foucault

acknowledge such plurality of power (Walter, 2015) in the global space such as the Rohingya camps.

9.2. Research questions and responses

Before drawing a conclusion of this thesis, I like to revisit the research questions. The overarching question of the thesis was ‘what is the connection between camp governmentality and agentic responses of the Rohingya refugee?’ and the underlying question was why and how refugee agencies emerge among the refugees in protracted exile. To say differently, how does the refugees interact with state and non-state actors in the complex power plays. I designed and conducted this research to unfold the patchwork of three different actors in two strands, first unveiling the asymmetrical power relations of immanent structure and mechanism of camp governmentality then how do the refugee respond to that camp governmentality. The preceding chapters have analyzed empirical evidence collected from the field. The thematic presentation followed the direction of ‘structure and mechanism of camp governmentality’ ‘power in fragmented camp governmentality’ and interactions of refugees or ‘agentic responses of Rohingya refugee to that governmentality’. The findings resolved the research questions as well as enrich the relevant literature.

This thesis discovers the comprehensive structure and mechanism of camp governmentality of the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. This structure and mechanism differ from those set up on which Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality is founded on. This research provides distinctively a complete account of operation of an institutional camp. Sovereign notion of ‘state of exception’ constitutes a spatial technology in particular territory located in the margin nationally and globally. But the space neither remain overlooked nor neglected rather it turns into a locus of political interest for all non-refugee actors. Refugees are obliged to live a controlled life in the camps being used to with ‘technology of self’. Thus, the (politicized)refugee, and non-refugee actors practice and innovate different tactics, rules-regulations, strategies in their everyday operation. My investigation finds spatial technology, exclusionary bureaucracy, biopolitical and purposive humanitarian services, informal refugee leadership, and legal vacuum as the pillars of this governmentality structure. I claimed from empirical evidence that such structure and tools of governmentality are developed from long term practices and pattern of power circulation among the actors of the refugee camp rather than pre-conceived something. This governmentality also includes some normative power that transcends from a facet of international humanitarian and human rights regimes. However state

and non-state actors demonstrate power in sovereign and quasi-sovereign mode, refugees have no source of these types of power. They exercise power in the form of microphysics of power—an inherent power coming from their refugee labelling. It is the same body of the refugee that is affected by bio-power (Caldwell, 2007) and circulates power as refugee. Microphysics of power of refugees become more prevalent in the protracted exile while they gain much agency in the camps or vice versa.

State actors exercise sovereign power and set up multilayered security in the camps. As mentioned in the previous chapters state actors deploy different categories of intelligent units in the camps to surveil the activities of the refugees. Moreover the non-state actors also oblige to provide necessary information to CiC and Police members. State actors directly use community leaders- *majhi* to collect information from the community. All the volunteers provide everyday information from their designated blocks of the camps to the SMS manager. If there is anything sensitive and something necessary for CiC, they are also obliged to pass those information to the CiC. Sometime refugee volunteers disclose many life threatening information of their community. But the set up is designed in such a way in the governmentality that Rohingya people sometime willingly provide many sensitive information of their community. In other words, control and surveillance are not the only mechanism to the stability of the refugee camps.

Almost all the biggest role-playing organizations as well as states are looking after the Rohingya camps. Bangladeshi state actors are the gatekeeper of this ‘space of exception’. Spatial technology entails boundary of the camps, barbed wire fences, entry-exit gates, frequent check post, localization of many police posts and so on. On the site of intangible technology state and non-state actors install exclusionary bureaucratic practices, rules, tactics, legal paradoxes. Moreover, the main means of survival- the humanitarian aids are also used as a tool of control. Camp has indeed some juridico-political imperatives, but multiple forms of power operate beyond this shape of the camp or zone of indistinction (Oesch, 2017). Though sovereign power of the state and state actors remains in the centre of camp governmentality, eventually the liberal tactics of non-state actors and indigenous power of the refugee challenge that sovereign power in everyday camp governmentality. Non-state actors or the international organization or the entire refugee regime works and supports the state actors with different underlying purposes rather than only saving the lives of people in need. To this parlance, non-state actors follow and promote the liberal tactics of power and technology (Bulley, 2014). Put

differently, this is the point of shifting of the dimension of exercising power, here the power is exercised in a pattern of empowerment and participation, representation rather than in a disciplinary form. It does not mean that disciplinary mechanism/power does not exist in the camps at all. This thesis confirms as well that discipline is highly blended with the aid (Oesch, 2017) because maintaining discipline remains one of the important medium of exercising power that is exercised by all the actors, as per their positionality in the camp settings. Camp bureaucracy and informal community leadership are two significant mechanisms of Rohingya camp governmentality. Non-refugee actors apply many informal techniques than formal techniques in camp operation. The most advantage of such exercises of power or governmentality is that it works effectively for longer time than governing through violence and repression. As a result, millions of displaced people have been living in protracted exile, stranded in encampment in the Global South for decades without any major chaos. Thus, a particular visible and invisible structure and mechanism emerges in refugee camp governmentality.

This thesis not only unveil the structure and mechanism but also discover the circulation of power among the different actors of camp governmentality. However some studies reviewed in the literature discussed about different forms of power in the refugee camps, this thesis clarified the dynamics of their powers. Especially it highlights how the microphysics of power works across the refugee camps and generates their agency. For smooth governance, the same 'technology of domination' leaves some space for refugees to sustain in the system. Refugees design their life pattern and produce subjectivities according to their everyday life in the camps. These attributes of the refugee both cooperate and collide with the dominator in the structure, but they are seasoned enough for so called challenges from the refugees. The findings resolved that Rohingya refugees are utilizing those space of technologies of self and generating agencies across the structure. Their present-day quotidian perspective distinct a lot from their life in immediate settlement in the camps in 2017. Different opportunities in the camps are technique of governmentality, and refugees acquire many avenues of agencies except absolute political emancipation. They gain many skills and knowledge as resources, some change making initiatives back and forth, modifications in the rules and practices of governmentality. Unauthorized moving out from the camps question the sovereign power of the state as well as individual power of refugee or refugee labelling. However, some studies argue that non-state actors (humanitarian organizations) do not consider refugees as people with agencies (Kibreab, 2004). Rohingya refugees have a strong 'we feeling' to their well-being. A significant number

of refugees contributes and maneuvers for their changes in the exasperating situation of the camp life. Thus, it confirms that Rohingya refugees also cannot remain a 'bare life' indefinitely rather they transform gradually as human being. We neither can denounce their community existence nor their agency. It is 'refugee community' rather than a community in general because refugees are not a free subject indeed. Furthermore, someone's agency does not always depend on how other people consider them. Skills, knowledge, relationships, dispositions as resources are creating agency among the Rohingya refugee.

Agency depends on the structure or (social)system that it interacts with, so, it cannot be purely natural (Bevir, 1999). Creating as well as emergence of refugee agency in the camp is essential for long time operation of the camps. Mass participation in camp activities as well interaction and interrelationship among refugee transcend agencies into bare lives. Here refugee agency is embedded as governmentality both for state and non-state actors, but it works as a proxy tool for non-citizen to tackle or survive in the exceptional situation. In an asymmetric set up like refugee camps, refugee hold and exercise little power over non-refugee actors. Thus, agency is a must for their well-being in this precarious environment. Lot of constrains and suppression come in their daily life, they manoeuvre to tackle them with maximum efforts in the forms of cooperation, compromise, resistance, and resilience to anomalous situation. As Agier (2011) argues, the everyday existence of refugees is kind of political, it is political in the sense that they notify their existence through many practical actions, mobilizations, collision, and speech. Therefore, even the mundane agency of the refugee can transcend them eventually into a political being. Refugee agency, however, grow through a cooperation and competing relations, albeit an integrated techniques of camp governmentality. Rohingya refugee's agency cannot be defined as fully intentional rather it is need-based.

Considering different narratives of refugee camps such as 'state of exception' (Agamben, 1998), extraterritoriality (Agier, 2014), humanitarian government (Hyndman, 2000), graduated sovereignty (Ong, 2000), layered sovereignty (Hanafi, 2010), but not taken for granted, this thesis broadens these sovereign power dominated studies by grasping the myriad powerplays under the Foucault's governmentality theory as part of the first objective of the thesis, and connecting the generative agency of the refugee in this power based ambiguous space to respond the second objective of this thesis. In that regard, Rohingya refugee camp is an ideal example of global governance where the three different actors (e.g. refugee, state, and non-state actors) are engaged in complex interaction. Despite many non-state interlocutors admit

refugees' agencies in their everyday intervention, non-refugee actors or the humanitarian actors cannot endorse refugee agencies in full scale. Important thing behind this stereotype about refugee agency is that if done so, that might encounter a boomerang effect to their superiority in camp governmentality. So, briefly the findings of this ethnography are as follows:

1. Rohingya refugees in protracted situation are not subhuman or bare life but people with diverse agencies.
2. Refugee camp governmentality is a complex power play of heterogeneous actors in the camp, mainly among the three actors: state actors, non-state actors and refugee. And refugees are an integral part of this fragmented camp governmentality.
3. Refugee agency is reciprocally linked with camp governmentality, meaning that particular apparatus of governmentality produces particular form of agency among the refugees or vice versa. The level and dimensions of refugee agency depends on the governmentality of the camps.
4. International refugee regime consolidates the structure of the governmentality and maintain a mandatory balance between the camp governmentality and refugee agency for the stability and existence of PRS.
5. Everyday services of the humanitarian organizations support more than the support from state actors to grow agencies among the refugees. It is the (camp)governmentality that leaves space for growing agencies among the refugees for a long-term operation of refugee camps.
6. Refugees apply agency as 'proxy tool' of human rights. (Human)rights of refugee depends on the interactions between camp governmentality and agency. Whenever they will have human rights, there will be significant changes or may be no governmentality as such.

During the conversation with refugee, they begrudgingly shared that, in case of having their freedom of movement, freedom of livelihood and so on they would not trespass the barbwire fence or transgress Bangladeshi law or forfeit Bangladeshi identity documents. The firsthand narrative of refugee comprehends that agency accomplishes to rights. Where there are rights, there might be no question of agencies. Rights are politically granted by the nation-states while agency articulates in the constellation of power relations in a particular structure or governmentality. Some rights are partially endorsed by the norms and value of non-state actors but whenever norms cannot transcend to state actors, fostering agency remains the last resort for survival of a particular group of people.

9.3. Contribution: discipline and methodology

9.3.1. Camp governmentality, refugee agency, and IR

While refugee camp is considered as a state within a state (Ramadan, 2009), this thesis understands refugee camp as more complex than a state. Refugee camps get highly noticed in overall international politics and in the discipline of International Relations. Governance of refugee camps and holding up refugees in the camp are prioritized by the state and non-state actors. It is the matter of concern for global power and leaders to tackle the flow of refugee and refugee-like population across the globe. Here my thesis attempted to unfold the technique of refugee agency along with mandatory governmentality of the refugee camps. Governmentality as ‘technology of domination’ and ‘technology of self’ is important for all the three actors of the camps. All of them connected with multiple forms of power that circulates through them. Interplay of power among diverse actors, particularly at micro level, not necessarily always attract or influence the streams of IR but while essential elements of a Discipline (here IR) are engaged directly, it cannot avoid the scholarly and policy level intervention from that Discipline. Put differently, not only in the number of displaced population but also in terms of engagement of global actors, Rohingya refugee crisis seeks for a critical analysis in IR. Such a phenomenon is not a single case currently, but the extent of engagement of multiple actors provides a distinct perspective globally. Global mobility of prima facie refugee show that the lowest number of Rohingya refugee have been harboured so far in the Global North compared to other refugee crises across the globe. It is ideal to raise the issue that ‘is it just because of geographic positioning/containment or anything else’? My research confirms that it is neither because of geographic containment nor resource scarcity of the Rohingya people rather it has been possible through proper management of the refugee population or governmentality in the camps. The notion of ‘refugee as weapon’ (Greenhill, 2011) sends a clear message that host countries are happy to get rid of the crisis by moving them out anywhere except their territory. And the neighbouring countries and donor of the responses always attempt to assuage the host countries with different dividend of hosting refugee. However, refugees’ admission took place with a propaganda of temporary shelter, then it becomes an indefinite temporality. Henceforth, a particular type of governmentality (as Foucault outlined) is installed for refugee governance in the PRS.

This thesis illustrates the everyday interactions and power dynamics of different actors in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. By elucidating an ontological relation between camp governmentality and refugee agency, I believe this study has enriched the ‘Everyday’ site of IR

(Björkdahl, Hall, and Svensson, 2019), at least a bit that was also my inclination to this research. Camp governmentality has been explored here critically from an IR perspective. Refugee camp is a place and space of complex relationship of diverse national and international actors, they interact based on their purpose and interest. It produces a lot of subjectivities and relationships that affects local, national, and international dynamics. State and non-state actors maintain their mandate and principle to influence and cooperate each other. They develop a structure and mechanism to govern the space for extended period. It has been evident from Rohingya camps that non-state actors such as NGOs-IGOs play a strong role in maintain international cooperation and security. But the non-state actors are yet to get importance in the dominant state-centric narrative of IR (Charountaki, 2022). Operations of complex situation, like refugee camps, has been widening the space of non-state actors in IR.

It is identified in the literature review that the lens of sovereignty alone cannot unfold the comprehensive nature of camp governmentality. Most of those studies ignore the power of refugees whereas the governmentality framework of Michel Foucault being based on power mechanism; it carves out the maximum dynamics of camp governmentality. The notion of microphysics of power offers a distinct tool to grasp the power production and play by the refugee in the camp too. Apparently, camps look like a space of repression and containment but a large number of population cannot be managed using force and violence. For sustainable and effective governance of population or refugees in the camp, three actors exercise a bit productive power rather than a repressive type. The fragmented governmentality forges new relationships, quality, knowledge, tensions, and changes among the refugees as agentic responses in their lifetime in the camps.

Although Rohingya refugees gain some agencies in the protracted situation, there is no guarantee of their human rights in the camps. Liberal values, human rights, rule of law, welfare narrative of the Global North are now in stark questions, those are some IR narratives indeed. Here the refugee are either taking a litmus test or shifting the world system significantly. Nowadays, even the capable states manoeuvre more on governmentality or population management (Foucault, 2007) than the welfare of population. To that end, normative and legal framework prefers new institutions, organizations, super biometrics, regimes (e.g. OCHA, GCR) to human rights. Regard to Rohingya response, non-state actors play a significant role in maintaining national and international peace. The claim of returning or practicing colonialism in the former colonies are a well-known phenomenon of present-day global system. An

institutional refugee camp or the entire host community can be an ideal example or a laboratory of such claim. It is clear that Rohingya refugees are completely depended on humanitarian aids, nay the host country as well. Thus, the existence and operation of refugee camps produces a dependency cycle or interdependence both at national and international level. Overwhelming burden and tremendous power of refugee breaks down the capacity of host country. Thus it cannot highlight the spirit of de-colonization and liberal values. However, hosting Rohingya refugee has increased the bargaining and negotiation options for Bangladesh with her international counterpart and communities in the time being. But extent of the crisis in such a scale world-wide, nobody knows how long the refugee regime can sustain the balance between camp governmentality and refugee agency. A reverse proportionality (extreme/absolute political agency) between these two phenomena might change the current (international) nation-state order unsurprisingly in near future.

9.3.2. Ethnography in institutional refugee Camps and IR

Refugee and refugee camps are international entities. An in-depth study of refugee camps is important to maintain national, regional, and international security and peace. Since appropriateness of ethnography is tested for deeper investigation of a phenomenon, I applied ethnography to demonstrate how does the complex power relations can be theorized/unveiled from micro-level. This thesis required to grasp the everyday practices and politics of the camps. Ethnography provided the techniques and strategies of mingling with the actors for a longer period to garner empirical data that has international importance in a format of research outcome. Ethnography is one of the effective procedures to get in touch with the practitioner from any disciplines or fields but not that frequent in International Relations (Rio, 2024). This thesis accentuates the connection between refugee camp governmentality and agencies of the refugee in the long run in Rohingya camps in Bangladesh. Acknowledging the gravity of sovereign power about refugee camps governmentality, it unfolded the complex governmentality of sovereign power, disciplinary power, liberal tactics as well as microphysics of power of the refugee. In these categories of power all the three dominant actors—state, non-state, and refugee—exercise power during their interactions. They play the power game in the margin of the world or at the very ground of refugee camps, but it affects the supreme authority of the camps or the head of GoB as well as UNHCR headquarters in Geneva. I believe these two poles of governmentality that are ‘technologies of domination’ and ‘technologies of self’ offer a comprehensive capturing of a system through political and subjective lens. The actors of the refugee camps generated a fragmented governmentality and everyday agencies among

the refugees. Therefore, it has been possible to unfold the power and agency dynamics of the refugee camp appropriately through ethnographic data in the lens of governmentality of Foucault. This is just not another research following ethnography rather no other techniques are found effective in examining such phenomena of refugee camps as an international site.

This thesis helps to justify 'ethnography' further as an effective methodology in studying IR phenomenon. It is prevalent here that refugee camp is a significant 'everyday' site of IR. Refugee camp is located at the margin, but it is free of 'sitedness' labelling of ethnography. It belongs to the 'international'. By studying similar other international spaces through this methodology, ethnography can largely reduce its 'local' tag. There is especially a demonstration that how 'informal hangout' as a method of ethnography can obtain data from international site and actors in the refugee camps. The research has been conducted a bottom-up approach whichever interviewed and observed actors mainly at the ground level of the largest international response. This particular methodology of the study offered a scope to avoid the dependency on state-centrist and actor-sourced data for research outcome. Instead the empirical evidence has been garnered directly from actors in the ground of an everyday sites (refugee camp) of International Relations. Thus, ethnographic methodology can enrich IR to a great extent.

9.4. Recommendation

Refugee camps in protracted situation reach almost in normalcy or consider the situation as a status-quo. In the PRS, refugee exercise microphysics of power and gain some agencies. There is no way to remain merely a raw biological figure forever. However agency emerges naturally to some extent, it is definitely an instruments for governing the refugee for indefinite period. This thesis did not attempt to unfold a mechanism for better life of refugee in the camps. Moreover, an ethnography can rarely generalize and recommend at policy level. Nonetheless, an excerpt from a refugee (Taleb Ullha-37) can be mentioned here that 'we have no future here without human rights but at least have a guarantee of life, no one is killing me and my child in point blank'. They survive and manoeuvre to live well by exhibiting agencies. Ultimately there is no solution without proper human rights, importantly political rights. Neither refugeehood nor humanitarian actions can offer political rights. The crisis of Rohingya people only can be settled through their repatriation with political rights, not simply with return. Until then the humanitarian government can do more needful for their minimum living of a life.

Refugee agency should be recognized at micro level by handing over them more responsibilities and initiating refugee-led camp activities that can ensure their participation at decision-making forums of the responses. Power circulates through refugee as well but asymmetrically, power is exercised unproportionally by non-refugee actors who should consider it seriously. And some mechanisms are needed to make a balance. Non-state actors can advocate more for refugees' better access to formal legal system. Along with these initiatives, empowering of UNHCR is essential to decide about the rights of refugee and solution of refugee crisis. UNHCR must have to come out from statist orientation (Hathway, 1991) in determining the resettlement and just burden sharing for refugee. Besides, a true global governance rather an international response is required whichever state, non-state and private sector will engage to reinstall the inalienable rights of human kind. Until then state actors should consider the basic human rights of Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh such as better education, livelihood opportunities. Some immediate attention can be given on strengthening livelihood opportunities in the camps such as block based vegetables farming, recycle industries to manage and produce plastic commodities, offering better education, enhancing community based tailoring industries and so on. Refugee can show up agency more in claiming their rights, rights for repatriation, rights for third country settlement and reparation of human rights in Myanmar under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework.

This research neither conducted nor drawn findings from an alien terrain rather from some universalistic phenomenon of encamped refugee camps across the globe. Thorough review of existing studies marked the gap about ontological connection between camp governmentality and agentic responses of refugee. And this research has attempted to fill in as such contributing to the subfield of IR- Forced Migration both in the discipline as well as in methodology.

9.5. Directions for future research

Every case is different from other. It can differ based on multifaceted categories of refugee and management such as types of camp (encamped, semi-encampment or flexible camps), level of camp governmentality, aspects of the camp dwellers (ethnical, geographical and so on) etc. Evidences of this case and secondary exploration of other cases resolved that these phenomena of camp studies can vary based on the categories of camps too. For instance, governmentality for people with political rights or proper human rights can differ than governmentality with refugee. Refugee however show up their agencies in different modalities they cannot get rid of the asymmetric power relations in the PRS. So, a multisite study can be conducted by

extrapolating the findings of this thesis to draw a more precise line of correlation between camp governmentality and refugee agency. Different methods or different lenses of analysis can also be deployed to that end. Moreover, there is ample scope of research to ground a theory (possibly) on connection of camp governmentality and refugee agency at large. In addition, an empirical study on how does refugee agency influence traditional and non-traditional security of host country can provide a prominent insights for IR too.

9.6. Concluding remark

All these three strands of findings—structure and mechanism of camp governmentality, power dynamics of camp governmentality, agentic responses to governmentality— have culminated to the arguments that (particular)camp governmentality operates because of purposive intervention of international (state)system and the international refugee regime. Governmentality lens of Foucault has grasped well at the micro level complexities of multiple actors in the camp situations. By putting the power into centre, governmentality work as ‘panoptican’ in understanding the dynamics of power relations in the camps. Power is exercised by state actors, refugee and non-state actors or humanitarian organizations in the refugee camps. Most importantly this research counts the refugee as an essential medium of power circulation. Thus, refugee agency is just another tool of this governmentality. And this fragmented camp governmentality produce particular agentic responses of refugees in encampment. While asymmetric power relations become obvious in this structure, refugees leave no alternative of exhibiting their agency for survival and well-being. To that end, they (re)construct the stronger sense of identity among them, cooperate with the humanitarian organizations, resist the exploitation and torture as well as coping up both man-made and natural challenges in the camps. Rohingya refugees have no legal status, thus no human rights as such. In this governmentality of exceptional space, refugee only can exert agency, everyday agency instead of human rights.

It can be drawn further from this thesis that political agency is an illusion for refugee until and unless they have freedom. Rohingya people even had no political agency in their source country, while everyday agency was also lost through their forcible displacement from Myanmar. Otherwise, politics cannot be a priori to show up one’s agency in daily lives for well-being. Nevertheless, Rohingya refugee perform political activities of protest, democratic leadership, process and claim making efforts across the camp and authorities. Refugees in encampment cannot gain and enjoy absolute political agency at all. However

(Rohingya)refugees are a politicized group of people as alien in the territory of Bangladesh. If refugee can obtain political agency, his/her agency regime might over immediately. Thus, they can enter into the regimes of political rights or become a complete member of a political society or nation-state. Until then they produce variety of agencies that have unpacked in this study but there is no guarantee that such agency will move them forward to political agency in future. Nonetheless, these agencies can support them to live a better life today or tomorrow, even without ultimate political agency. Sometime they do not manoeuvre for political agency to make their life more perilous in extended exile rather refugee attempt for everyday agency for their well-being. At least refugee can make some differences in the PRS. Otherwise less protest does not always refer to less agency, and agency might emerge through loving the law of the land too (Turner, 2015). Therefore, the sum of empirical evidence can label their agency as demonstration of ‘resistance and resilience’.

This study forges a connection between camp governmentality and refugee agency that challenges ‘bare life’ fallacy of refugeehood at least a bit. The emergence of agency is obvious in the juncture of power. While only state determines the ‘state of exception’, refugee create their space and fragment the power structure along with non-state actors. Refugee and refugee camp expose the nature of power structure of the international society and state system. State actors remain in the axis of international relationships. Non-state actors or NGOs and IGOs monitor the state actors and influence its action to a great extent (Davies, 2019; Reinalda, 2016). It can be said that an institutional camp such as Rohingya camps demonstrate enough why and how it is mutated by IRR, as well as contest and transform the subjects (Rohingya refugee). So, to understand international politics and power system better, one can look at refugee camp as a smaller and marginal unit of the world. It is the refugee camps, it is the micro structure, and it is the camp governmentality that offers the view of just like a macro structure ever. In this regard, I conclude that refugee agency is developed both by three actors as a governmentality techniques of refugee camps where refugee portray their agencies as ‘proxy tool’ for their well-being in protracted exile. Therefore, governmentality and refugee agency work as a binary to the stability and existence of PRS, particularly in the Rohingya camps.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix A



Budapest, 21st July 2022

Mr. Sodip Roy
PhD Candidate
International and Security Studies
Doctoral School of IR and Political Science



Dear Sodip Roy,

I am happy to inform you that the respective Ethical Approval Committee (EAC) at Corvinus University of Budapest has reviewed your research proposal titled **“Protracted Exile and Refugees’ Agencies: The Case of Rohingya Refugee in Bangladesh”** and reached a decision on it. Your proposal is approved considering its academic significance, feasibility and importantly the ethical issues. From now on you can proceed your empirical research.

Your approval is valid until your final submission or registration period of your study. This approval obliges you to maintain the following conditions:

1. operate the project in accordance with the proposal submitted and ethical issues promised,
2. report every technical change of the project and seek approval thereof,
3. consult adverse ethical situation of research participants immediately with your supervisor,
4. submit a progress report of your fieldwork in every three months,
5. external funding is not allowed for this project without the permission of the Doctoral School.

Yours sincerely



Zoltan BALAZS
Head of the Doctoral School of IR and Political Science

Institute of International, Political and Regional Studies
Department of International Relations
H-1093 Budapest, Közvartár u. 4-6. Room C 503
Phone: +36 1 482 7241
www.uni-corvinus.hu
nkt@uni-corvinus.hu

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General Information Sheet (originally in Bengali)

Appendix B



Exploring the links between Camp Governmentality and Agentic Responses of Rohingya Refugee in Bangladesh

You are requested to participate in this academic research under the Doctoral School of IR and Political Science of Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. Prior to your engagement to my study, it is important and ethical to know the reasons and respondents involved with this research. Possible information is provided in this sheet.

Please take your time to carefully read the following information. Please ask me if there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information. Please think about it carefully and then decide whether you would like to take part or not.

What are the aims of the research?

My research investigates the connection between camp governmentality and agentic responses of refugees in these camps. This research believe that refugee get a transformation in their camp lives in extended exile, where they maneuver to live a meaningful life depending on the existing humanitarian government. To that end it examines the nature of camp governance, power relations and interactions among the different actors of the camps. This study asks about the lived experience of refugees, mode of interactions with non-refugee actors, and how they cope up with the challenging situation of the camps as well as what transformation and relationship have been emerged so far in the camps.

Who are the participants of the research?

The study respondents are refugee, members of government organizations as well as different humanitarian organizations. It will collect data from NGOs staff, Camp in Charge (CiC), Armed Police Battalion (APBN) members, representatives from UNHCR and IOM. In brief, almost

every categories of people engage in this camp operation will be approached for interviews. Mainly this research categories participants as refugee, state actors and non-state actors. They will be interviewed, talked with them informally and observed them in their daily activities.

Why have you been selected?

For my research, you are an essential respondent. The study focuses on the agentic responses of the refugee to the existing camp governmentality. Put differently how do you act and interact with other actors in your everyday life is very important for the study. Therefore, without data from different categories of respondent, the study cannot be accomplished.

What are you being asked to do?

You are being asked to be interviewed, audio-taped and given permission for the researchers to use your responses on the interview.

Will my participation in this study be kept confidential?

The data I am collecting will be treated confidentially, and only members of the research team will have access to the raw data. Every information collected for this the study will be stored on a database which is password protected and strictly confidential. The digital and textual data will be kept in a secure and confidential location. Your name will not appear on any database or any information which is then published. Instead, the informant will be marked by numeric code as identifier on all data associated with you. The master copy of the names associated with each number will be kept in a separate, secured, and confidential location.

I shall report the results anonymously. When results are reported all individuals and institutions (e.g., NGOs, Offices, Blocks) will be anonymized, so neither you nor your references will be identifiable. I am committed to carrying out my research according to the ethical guidelines provided by my Corvinus University of Budapest.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

Collected data and result will be used primarily to produce a PhD thesis which may be published in academic journal or in other academic format eventually. It is an ethnography or pure qualitative study based on this Rohingya refugee camps. Resultantly, there will be no

specific policy recommendation, but it can produce some general recommendation for different actors of the response.

Do you have to take part?

Your participation is entirely voluntary but if you take part in this study, it will be a great support for my research. It is important for you to understand that you do not have to participate in the project at all, and nevertheless if you decide to take part you are still free to stop at any time and without giving a reason.

What are the possible disadvantages of taking part?

The study is about nature of the camp governance and interactions among the different actors of the camps. A significant part of the study focuses on the changes in camp lives of the refugees in connection to camp operation. You will share your everyday experience of your life/service in the camps. Your mode of engagement as well as relationships with other actors such as refugee, CiC, Police and NGOs. And it is up to you to what extent you are going to share with me, but I shall request you to share as much as you can. Whatever the information you shared, it is promised to keep confidential each of your words. The information will be end to end encrypted, none of them will be exchanged with other respondents. There is no risk or disadvantages of such participation. The tentative length of the interview is one hour min that may be tiring for some participant. Some questions may have long answer and counter questions too. But you are free to withdraw or take a break during interaction with me.

What are the possible benefits to me of taking part?

This research will produce no material benefits for any parties. But I believe it will help immensely to create new knowledge in the scholarship of Refugee Studies and other Disciplines. The collective views and knowledge of the participants can provide better insight for policy making to operate the camp effectively and bringing forth some changes to refugee lives.

Who is paying for this research and who is carrying it out?

I am a PhD student at the Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. The research is conducting for the fulfillment of my Doctoral Study. My study is funded by Hungarian

Government but there is no funding for this fieldwork here in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. The research is being carried out by myself. I am being locally and voluntarily guided by Nasir Uddin- a professor from University of Chittagong. If you have any questions or concerns about the research, you can contact me or my supervisor:

Sodip Roy
sodip.roy@stud.uni-corvinus.hu

Prof. Lehoczki Bernadett
bernadett.lohoczki@uni-corvinus.hu

Appendix C

Interview Tool

Checklist for Refugee (originally in Bengali)

- * How are you? Can you share something about your journey to Bangladesh?
- * To what extent the life has changed so far in the camps in five years? What are the factors behind these changes?
- * What are the rules and regulations you have to follow here?
- * What are the services/support available for you? To what extent you can take part in camp activities?
- * Are you satisfied with the support for you? How do you evaluate the learning and training activities offered for you? How do you report your opinion or response about any services?
- * What are the activities you perform for your well-being? Are any initiatives or efforts from your ends, other than NGO supported services?
- * What are the challenges you face in living your life in the camps? if any, what are the coping mechanisms?
- * How do you evaluate your role regard to deal with COVID-19 in the camps?

Checklist for Non-state Actors (NGO and IGOs) (originally in Bengali)

- * How long have you been with this Rohingya response?
- * How will you explain/define refugee camp or Rohingya camps?
- * How are these camps operated/governed? What are the rules and regulations you have to follow in camp operations?
- * What are the mandatory rules and regulations for Rohingya people?
- * What are the services you provide for Rohingya people? Are they pleased about that? What is their reaction, in case of their dissatisfaction?
- * To what extent Rohingya people can take part in camp activities and their opinions are considered in the case of operating camps?
- * To what extent you can receive Rohingya refugees complain and act to that end?
- * Do you notice any self-motivated initiative among the Rohingya people? What is your observation about their life?

- * To what extent humanitarian actions in the camps has changed so far since 2017? What are the factors behind these changes?
- * How do you protect the human rights of Rohingya people? Can you negotiate the human rights issues with other partners/actors?
- * How do you interact or coordinate with RRRC, and law-and-order enforcement team? Is there any scope for Rohingya people to evaluate the role of CiC, and law and order force?
- * What are the challenges of your operation?
- * How do you evaluate the role of Rohingya people regard to deal with COVID-19 in the camps?

Checklist for State Actors (CiC/APBN) (originally in Bengali)

- * How long have you been serving in the Rohingya response?
- * How do you explain refugee camps (Rohingya)? What is your role and responsibility in the camp?
- * What is your perception about Rohingya people?
- * What are the mandatory rules and regulations for FDMN/Rohingya refugee? What is the procedure or source of such legal framework of the camps?
- * To what extent Rohingya refugees can take part in camp activities? To what extent their opinions are considered in case of operating camps and humanitarian activities?
- * How do you evaluate the learning and training activities offered for them? Do you think, Rohingyas are serious for their well-being?
- * What do they do for their self-reliance or what is your policy to that end?
- * How do you perceive the public events of Rohingya people in the camps such as procession, protest, or assembly?
- * How do you interact or coordinate with other government organizations (APBN/CiC) and NGO-IGO?
- * To what extent the humanitarian activities/camp operation has changed so far in five years? What are the factors behind these changes?
- * How do you evaluate Rohingya refugee's role regard to deal with COVID-19 in the camps?

Appendix D

NVivo Illustration, Tables

Word Cloud: Demonstration



Diagram: Camp Governmentality (Power Circulation) and Refugee Agency




Diagram: Participation as Power




Diagram: Refugee Agency




Table: Rohingya Influxes in Bangladesh

	Year of Influx	Number of Forcibly Displaced Population	Comments
1	1978	220,000	Operation <i>Nagamin</i>
2	1991-92	250,000	-
3	2012	140,000	-
4	2017	700,000	Genocide

Appendix- E: Background of Research Participants

1. Background of State Actors (SA) Interviewees

Camp in Charge (CiCs) are the main state actor and research participant of this research. CiCs are mostly from the Administrative Cadre officers. They are the permanent and decision-making authority of the camps and government of Bangladesh. Most of the junior level officer however RRRC office have some mid-level officers too. Their job is transferable. They get posting as CiC temporarily in the camps. Their length of service in the camps vary from several months to several years.

Armed Police Batalion (APBN) members are one of state actors and research participants of my research. They are member of the police force of government. Officers belong to Police (cadre) of Civil Service of Bangladesh. However they serve different types of purpose for the government of Bangladesh they are the permanent employee officers and staff of GoB. While APBN members comprise of both Police cadre officer as well as simply police staff.

2. Background of Non-state actors Interviewees

Non-state actors are the member of different humanitarian organizations. HO comprises of various NGO and IGO. There are hundreds of local, national and international NGOs. IGO means the different UN organization. Most of the staff are Bangladeshi and graduated from colleges and university in Cox's Bazar.

3. Background of Refugee Interviewees (only mentioned in quotation)

Abdul Hai is 32 year old. Now they live in a refugee camp in the Kutupalong range of the upazila. He is unemployed with two children. Hai came from *Maungdaw* area of the Rakhine state. He is illiterate and used to fishing there. He could flee with his full family safely and quite early during the exodus in August in 2017. He does some irregular 'cash for work' or some illegal day labourship in the host community. He complained a lot about police harassment.

Nur Haba is a 45 years old community leader. She is from a refugee camp in Balukhali area of the upazila. She takes care of her fellow women in the camps. She helps other refugees about their training, self-reliance activities in the camp. Nur Haba has some poultry in ther shelter.

Shorif is young volunteers in the Balukhali camps. He works for an IGO in the camp. Some he mobilizes other refugees about their rights. Especially he does some part time private tution after his regular job duties in the camps.

Hafizur Rahman is an ordinary refugee in a camp in Teknaf area. He has no job right now in the camps. His family depends completely on humanitarian aids. He mentioned about some police complaint against him.

Hossain Miah is 50 years old refugee in the extension camps of Kutupalong range. He works for an NGO in the camp. He does some porter services for the fellow refugees. Sometime he gets extra money (incentive) by carrying rations for the refugee.

Hosna Begum is an ordinary refugee in refugee camp in Balukhali range. She is 36 years old. She came from Budiadaung area of Rakhine state. She was desperately looking for a job.

Tofayel is community leader. He was elected by the UNHCR. But they are not counted by the CiC. He has lot of complaint against the mahji system in the camps.

Taleb Ullah is a refugee in Teknaf area refugee camp. He works for an international NGO. He used to live in the host community before their recent move in the camp. He can conduct survey by using some data collection software. He was found very confident during the interview.

Taher is a faith leader. He conducts five time prayers in the mosque. He performs this duty since 2016. He mobilizes the community towards peace and safety of the people.

Faruk is 45 years old refugee in Teknaf area camp. He is shopkeeper and father two children. He is scared about the night time criminal activities of the camp. He got life threats from several groups in the camps.

Imad is 39 years old and a community leader or head mahji of a camp in Kutupalong. He came in the camps in 2012. He supported a lot of refugees during the 2017 influx.

Ayesha is 28 years old. She lives in a camp in Teknaf area. She works in NGOs and maintains a family of two children. Ayesha is single mother.

Samad lives in a camp in *Kutupalong* area. He is 35 and no job right now. He spends most of the time sitting in the shops. He came from *Maungdaw* of Rakhine state.

Karima is 48 years old. She came here five years ago in August 2017 from *Buthiadaung* of Rakhine state. Now she lives in a camp in Kutupalong area and works for the development of girls and women in the camps.

Ismail is a community leader or head mahji in a camp in Kutupalong area. He worked day-night with Bangladesh Army to help for making shelter of the newcomer in Kutupalong area. He is threatened several times by different militant groups in the camps.

Raisa is a thirty years old refugee in a camp in the Ukhiya-Balukahli area. She works for an UN organizations in the camps. She and his family had some superstition about working outside the household. She studied to grade nine in Rakhine state. So she decided to work in the camps. Her husband also work for an NGO. Other than camp life she is happy about her life.

Riya is 45 years old. She is a leader, selected by the humanitarian organizations. But they are not recognized by CiC. They work mutually with camp mahji. She is a widow and lives in a camp in Teknaf area.

Noor Mohammad is an Imam in a camp in the Balukhali range. He studied *Alim* in Madrasa in Bangladesh. He used to live in Cox's Bazar or Chittagong area before this influx 2017. At that time all of his family member fled to the camps from Myanmar. He moved from host community to the camps in 2018 to live with family.