



Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science
International Security Studies

PhD Dissertation

Insurgents, Rebel Governance and State-building in sub-Saharan Africa

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2025

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List of Abbreviations

ANSA: Armed Non-State Actor

AU: African Union

BCG: Bacille Calmette-Guérin Vaccine

CBP: Community-Based Participation

CDF: Civil Defence Force

CHAI: Clinton Health Access Initiative

CHD: Child Health Day

CHW: Community Health Worker

CM: Causal Mechanism

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration

DTP: Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis

EBI: Evidence-Based-Intervention

ELF: Eritrean Liberation Front

EPHS: Essential Package of Health Services

EPI: Expanded Programme on Immunisation

FAA: Angolan Armed Forces

FADM: Armed Forces of Defence of Mozambique

FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

FMLN: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and the

FRRA: Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association

GAM: Gerakan Aceh Merdekafree

GAVI: The Vaccine Alliance

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GNU: Government of National Unity

GPA: General Peace Accord

HEDIP: Health and Development for Displaced Populations

HEPB-BD: Hepatitis B Birth-Dose Vaccine

HI: Horizontal Inequality

HIV: Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus

HMIS: Health Management Information System

HPV: Human Papillomavirus

ICC: Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

IOM: International Organisation for Migration

IPV: Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine

IRC: International Rescue Committee

IRG: Internationally Recognised Government

IS: Islamic State

KNU: Karen National Union

KR: Khmer Rouge

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army

LS: Limited Statehood

MCH: Maternal and Child Health

MCV: Measles-Containing Vaccine

MDG 4: Millennium Development Goal 4

MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MINECOFIN: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

MOH: Ministry of Health

MR: Measles-Rubella

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières

NGO: Non-Government Organisation

NID: National Immunisation Day

NRA: National Resistance Army

NRM: National Resistance Movement

NSAG: Non-State Armed Group

NSE: Negative Spillover Effect

OLF: Oromo Liberation Front

OLS: Operation Lifeline Sudan

ONUMOZ: United Nations Operation in Mozambique

OPV: Oral Polio Vaccine

PAIGC: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde

PCV: Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine

PENTA: Pentavalent Vaccine

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organisation

PT: Process Tracing

RANU: Rwanda Alliance for National Unity

RASS: Relief Association for South Sudan

RCD: Rally for Congolese Democracy

RENAMO: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

RIS: Routine Immunisation Services

RUF: Revolutionary United Front

RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front

SIA: Supplementary Immunisation Activities

SNM: Somali National Movement

SPLM/A: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army

SRCS: Somali Red Crescent Society

SRRA: Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association

THF: The Hepatitis Fund

TPLF: Tigray People's Liberation Front

TT: Tetanus Toxoid

U5M: Under-Five Mortality

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNITA: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USC: United Somali Congress

VNSA: Violent Non-State Actor

VPD: Vaccine Preventable Disease

WHO: World Health Organisation

ZANLA: Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZANU: Zimbabwe African National Union

Acknowledgements

I dedicate this dissertation to my beloved parents, Bhekuyise Ntaka and Blanche Ntaka, as well as my sisters, nephews, niece, and extended family who have supported me since the beginning of the PhD journey. Their love, prayers, and words of encouragement have carried me to the finish line.

I extend my immense gratitude to my PhD supervisor Dr. Marton Péter whose advice, guidance and unwavering support have seen me through this challenging yet rewarding journey.

I would also like to thank the Professors in the Department of International Relations at Corvinus University of Budapest for their valuable contributions to my doctoral training.

A heartfelt thank you to my friends both near and far, especially my dear friend Grace Mwongeli, and to my doctoral school colleagues who have walked this journey with me.

I am grateful to the Department of Higher Education and Training in South Africa, along with the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for granting me the opportunity to pursue my PhD through the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship.

Above all, I give thanks to the Almighty, whose divine grace, strength, and unwavering presence have carried me through every step of this journey.

Abstract

The dissertation aimed to explore the impact that rebel governance has on post-conflict state-building, and to ascertain which groups—hierarchically organised, ideologically organised or ethnically homogenous groups, do better in nation-wide governance after conflict. The research also looked at rebel groups involvement in vaccination programmes as an indicator of interest in governance.

Using a case study design the research aimed to answer the following questions:

1. Is there a relationship between rebel governance and post-conflict state governance?
2. What factors influence rebel group's interest in governance, and which activities can be an indicator of group interest and readiness to govern?
3. Do hierarchically organised, ideologically organised or ethnically homogenous groups perform better in nation-wide governance?

The dissertation argued that a hierarchically or ideologically organised, state-like, ready and interested group posture on governance is predictive of the possibility of post-conflict involvement of the group in a demilitarised political process and ultimately, state-building. Furthermore, hierarchically or ideologically organised groups should be expected to do better in nationwide governance as opposed to ethnically homogenous groups. The selected cases of interest for the research were the Somaliland (SNM), Rwanda (RPF) and Mozambique (RENAMO).

The findings confirm that there is a link between rebel governance and state governance—rebels do indeed engage in governance through various structures, as highlighted by the case studies interaction with vaccination programs, and that the legacy of this governance carries over to state governance when rebels become victors. The research expected to find that hierarchically or ideologically organised groups do better in nationwide governance however, it found this to hold true only for one of the groups. From this research it was evident that the rebels that became state builders had a plan, committed to it and have stayed the course post-conflict, and that leadership matters.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter aims to lay down the foundation for this dissertation. It does this by providing a brief background to the topic and significance of the research in the space of rebel governance, raising the question of interest as to whether a rebel group's posture on governance during conflict is predictive of the group's involvement in the state-building process after conflict. The chapter also outlines the structure of the dissertation and provides an overview of the chapters that follow.

1.1 Background

The nature of global conflicts that we see nowadays, particularly intrastate armed conflicts, has cast a spotlight on the growing importance of the role and inclusion of non-state armed groups (NSAG) in post-conflict settlements. The term NSAG's is often used synonymously with armed non-state actors (ANSA) and in some instances violent non-state actors (VNSA). Mlambo (2023:3) notes that VNSA's are organisations or armed groups that adopt illegal violence to attain their goals. These actors emerge because of weak governance, corruption and shortcomings in the state (Mlambo, 2023:3). The term VNSA's was not used for this research because of the connotation of the word 'violent' as something that is bad. Certainly, armed non-state actors can use violence, but it is not necessarily their modus operandi as insinuated in the term VNSA. The research therefore opted to use the term NSAG's to inform the understanding of these actors.

NSAG's or ANSA's are defined as distinctive organisations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalised state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police, or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy regarding politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure (Hoffman and Schneckener, 2011:604). These groups can include: 1. rebel opposition groups (groups with a stated incompatibility with the government, generally concerning the control of government or the control of territory); 2. local militias (ethnically, clan, or otherwise based); 3. vigilantes; 4. warlords; 5. civil defence forces and paramilitary groups (when such are clearly beyond state control); and 6. private companies that provide military and security services (Clapham, 2009:4). The research makes a distinction between

vigilantes and civil defence forces (CDF). Vigilantism refers to a violent, extra-legal action by a group of persons; manifesting itself in areas of formal institutional failure (Kyei and Berckmoes, 2021:323-324). To put it simply, vigilantes take the law into their own hands without being authorised to do so. CDF's are made up mainly of civilians who undertake intelligence and limited combat roles to root out insurgents from their communities (Clayton and Thomson, 2016:499). While vigilantes and CDF's are mainly composed of civilians, they differ in that the former defend their communities from insurgents while the latter identify common thieves or enforce specific legal codes (Clayton and Thomson, 2016:501). Both are NSAG's when, as indicated by Clapham (2009), they are beyond state control. For the purposes of this research when referring to NSAG's the focus will primarily be on rebel oppositions groups.

Pearlman and Cunningham (2012) note that the leading form of violent conflict today occurs within states rather than between them. The comparative decline of conventional interstate war casts a spotlight on the myriad of conflicts involving non-state actors, be they in conflict with each other or with existing states (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). According to Cilliers and Schünemann (2013:2) civil wars remain the dominant form of conflict in Africa and although the number of wars has halved since the 1990s, the nature of the conflicts has changed considerably with the lines being increasingly blurred between criminal and political violence. They note that in modern day Africa, conflict seems to be increasingly fragmented and the number of actors, particularly non-state, involved in conflicts appears to be rising (Cilliers and Schünemann, 2013:3). This phenomenon (violence and emergence of insurgents) can be attributed to the existence of weak or failing states (Rotberg, 2003).

State-building therefore remains an important endeavour in Africa, not only because states should be able to sufficiently take care of their citizens and have the capacity to participate fully in international relations, but because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world's serious problems (Fukuyama, 2005:1). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2006) states that after decades of self-rule, African people have yet to see the fulfilment of their expectations of full citizenship rights following independence. The capacity of a state to deal with social development and human security has, thus, remained extremely weak (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2006).

Wolff (2011:1779) notes that before the building of state institutions can begin with a reasonable expectation of success, minimum levels of security need to be achieved. Not only is security a vital precondition for the success of state-building, but it is also intrinsically linked

to it through the notion of legitimacy. Security is more than just a state of affairs that individuals perceive; it implies a political claim of legitimacy—that is, "the transformation of coercion into security through the rule of law" (Wolff, 2011:1779). In this sense, the ability of a post-conflict state to provide security directly influences its perceived legitimacy, while political legitimacy, in turn, shapes the extent to which security measures are seen by citizens as protective or as a continuation of violence through other means (Wolff, 2011:1779).

A narrow focus on territorial control or regime-centric definitions of security risks neglecting the broader dimensions that shape people's everyday lives. As highlighted in the United Nations Development Programme's seminal report (UNDP, 1994), the concept of human security expands traditional, state-focused approaches to encompass a range of concerns, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. This perspective shifts the emphasis from protecting borders to safeguarding individuals (Owen, 2004). At its core, human security is people-centred: it considers how individuals experience life within society—how freely they can make choices, access social and economic opportunities, and whether they live in peace or under the threat of conflict (UNDP, 1994:23). In fragile or post-conflict settings, this broader understanding becomes particularly relevant. A state's legitimacy is no longer assessed solely by its capacity to maintain a monopoly on violence but also by its ability to provide essential services such as healthcare, education, and protection from poverty and disease. As such, the restoration and maintenance of security must be approached not only through institutional frameworks but also through a human security lens, as both are essential for building sustainable peace and long-term legitimacy.

Nowadays post-conflict state-building endeavours are confronted with multiple actors (state and non-state) which if not properly managed can complicate state reconstruction and sustained peace. Undoubtedly, state-building tends to be based on western liberal values, institutions and norms with an emphasis on reconstructing the state-society relations, state legitimacy and the political and social fabric of society (Podder, 2012:18-19). The focus is on the relational functions of state and society institutions in security. However, in fragile states and where there are competing conflict actors, the state-society interface tends to be complex, and this has implications for international engagement with armed groups (Podder, 2012:19).

Schneckener (2009:7) states that the debate around the role of armed groups is usually two-fold: the first perspective which dominates political discourse and literature on counterinsurgency is that armed groups are a problem, not only because they may cause and trigger conflicts, but also pose a challenge to ending wars and bringing about peace and

stability. After conflicts they still act as spoilers and can potentially disturb and undermine processes of post-conflict state-building which could lead to violent flare ups (Schneckener, 2009:7). The second perspective does not refer to armed groups as problems but rather questions whether, and under what conditions, these groups can serve as governance actors who are willing and able to provide basic services to the population at large. These services may work as functional equivalents to regular state activities and assure a certain degree of stability in areas of limited statehood, and as such a question may arise as to whether armed groups can be stabilisers during the rebuilding process (Schneckener, 2009:7). Indeed, certain groups in conflict settings have been shown to have the potential to provide stability for state-building (Ntaka and Csicsmann, 2021).

International efforts in peacebuilding and state-building tend to challenge the position of most non-state armed actors in conflicts because they aim to strengthen or reconstruct state structures and institutions (Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011:605). While the former works towards the resolution of violent conflict and the establishment of a sustainable peace in general, the latter specifically focuses on the construction of a functioning state. In each of these processes, armed actors usually become a factor that needs to be addressed to succeed (Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011:605). State-builders need to carefully consider their options in the post-conflict context, that is between confronting local powerbrokers, who may have provided some semblance of security in areas under their control during conflict and integrating them into the state-building effort (Wolff, 2011:1779). It is important to mention here that state-building should largely be an internal process¹ and external actors should not be the drivers of the process, but rather assist in facilitating it. The local dynamics matter in fragile environments, particularly post-conflict. Internationally driven state-building projects can fall short of their aims because one size does not fit all, and it is not just about re-building a state but about having a state that works for various actors. As noted by Lotz (2010:227) “Statebuilding is concerned with the institutions of states, which are limited by geography and must function in a local, cultural and historical context. Statebuilding must therefore build on local processes and must be led by national actors if it is to be sustainable and legitimate”.

According to Péclard (2019), although peace and state-building scholarship has significantly advanced, it has largely neglected how the survival of rebel modes of governance affects the stability of state trajectories after open hostilities end. He goes on to say that “if we are to

¹ as indicated in its definition provided by the OECD-DAC (2008)

understand how stable political institutions can be built in the aftermath of civil war, it is essential to study the institutions that regulate political life during conflict. This implies a need not only to look at how (and if) state institutions survive once war has broken out, but also to consider the institutions put in place in areas beyond the control of the state” (Péclard, 2019: 10-11).

The scholarship on rebel governance has largely focused on understanding how rebels govern during conflict. However, little is known about how rebel governance influences long-term state reconstruction after conflict. The main objective of this research is to address this gap. The research limited itself to looking at state-building trajectories independent of the type of postwar regime formed by former rebel rulers. Scholars such as Huang (2012) have already made valuable contributions in establishing that the variation in post-war regime outcomes has wartime origins. Therefore, this research was not focused on this but rather the impact of rebel governance on actual state-building processes.

The research also explores governance activities of rebel groups within two main periods: during conflict, and when groups transitioned to rulers, with a focus on the provision of public goods. Without delving too deeply into a discussion on goods, as this is not the focus of the dissertation, and without discussing every type of good, although they should be observed holistically, the research instead looks at the provision of health services. The research investigates rebel group cooperation with vaccination campaigns focusing on the selected cases during the periods indicated above as an indicator of “interest in governance”.² The analysis is based on documented empirical evidence.

Health is a very particular kind of good, belonging to a category of exceptional goods which are both private and public (Szymanowski, 2014:41). It is an important factor in the life span of an average citizen and influences the functioning of the whole society. Moreover, it is one of the most vital criteria that is used to assess the level of a state’s socio-economic development and the general well-being of its citizens (Szymanowski, 2014:41). The provision of health services is without a doubt imperative to any state because at the basic level healthy citizens are needed for a functioning state. Therefore, analysing rebel groups cooperation with vaccine campaigns as an indicator of interest in governance-mimicking a state- during conflict, and

² The choice to analyse provision of health services is based on previous research done collaboratively with Professor Péter Marton about insurgent group interaction with vaccination campaigns. This is presented in Chapter 5.

their approach to continued service provision when they turned state actors is relevant for this research.

Sub-Saharan Africa's performance on health outcomes is said to remain poor despite sub-Saharan African countries financial commitment and foreign aid (Mooketsane and Phirinyane, 2015:345). Poor service delivery, poor procurement systems marred by mismanagement and corruption, and poor health infrastructure plague the region. Additional challenges are resources, weak health systems in terms of access, quality, weak human and institutional capacities. These less-than-ideal conditions are further compounded by, amongst other things, war (Mooketsane and Phirinyane, 2015:345). In zones of armed conflict, where there is a heightened risk of the outbreak and spread of communicable diseases, vaccination drives may be particularly important, but they often fall short of targets due to the impediment effect of combat activity, even when vaccines are at hand in adequate supply (Marton and Ntaka, 2025).

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to unpack the history of all conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa up to date, as far as how each may have affected the provision of health services in rebel held territories. Instead, a brief history of the involvement of rebel groups in vaccination efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa is provided, followed by an exploration of such involvement in the three cases selected in later chapters.

1.2 Preliminary literature review

Rebel governance has become a key theme in conflict and post-conflict studies, especially as more NSAG's construct complex governing systems in contested territories. As research expands, certain patterns and gaps are emerging particularly around how rebel governance practices during wartime may (or may not) shape post-conflict governance outcomes. This section briefly reviews influential work that provides the foundation for this study's core inquiry into the link between wartime governance and post-conflict state-building.

Revkin (2021) talks about how rebels engage in competitive governance whereby they attempt to build local support by providing services and institutions that aspire to be perceived as more legitimate, fair, and effective than those offered by the incumbent state. The author also indicates that people evaluate the quality of rebel governance in relation to their prior experiences with state governance. (Revkin, 2021) This point is quite important because it can speak to the extent to which rebel groups become legitimated through the civilian population.

Baylouny (2014) investigates the governing priorities of some violent non state actors by analysing the civil administrations formed by four armed groups within a single national and temporal context. These militarised political parties consolidated territory and established administrative and public service institutions in Lebanon during the civil war. The author concluded that there are instances where the desire to govern and get civilian approval is a driving factor for NSAG's. On the other hand, these actors can have little aspiration to control the nation state or interact with it and instead just establish alternative governing bodies on the territory they control. The institutions that these actors establish have a critical implication not just for the civilians they rule but also for the legitimacy of the nation state and any attempts that may be made at disarmament, stabilisation and reconstruction. (Baylouny, 2014)

Mampilly and Stewart (2021) investigate what the different political institutions are that rebels create to engage captive civilian populations, and how do they arrive at distinct political arrangements. They identify a set of dimensions along which rebel political institutions vary leading to six ideal-typical forms of political arrangements. Their argument is that an iterative and dynamic stepwise process, determined by rebel group strategies and local conditions, produces one of these political institutional outcomes. They strongly emphasise that the type of rebel political institutions within one location can change throughout the war, and variation sometimes emerges across territories the same rebel group controls. They conclude that deeper thinking is required on the sequential construction of new institutions that form a wartime social order, and that future research should take into consideration the conditions under which some rebel groups shift from addressing shorter-term military concerns to longer-term political goals. (Mampilly and Stewart, 2021) This focus on evolving institutional arrangements during conflict directly informs questions about how prepared or willing and/or interested rebel groups may be to assume state governance roles after war.

For Arjona (2014), the existence of wartime institutions should therefore not be surprising because armed groups have incentive to create them. To support this assertion, she draws on the work of Tilly (1985) which notes that warring sides attempt to monopolise the means of violence, extract resources from local inhabitants and simultaneously promote capital accumulation. (Arjona, 2014)

This research also touches on the issue of legitimacy when it comes to armed groups and scholars such as Schlichte and Schneckener (2015) argue that the politics of legitimacy are paramount in understanding the activities of armed actors who want to exist in the long term, whether for personal, ideological, political or socio-economic reasons. Irrespective of what the

motivations are that lead to an armed group forming, the issue of legitimacy becomes one that must be addressed early on. As it is with other political actors, armed groups need to explain and justify their agendas and actions; they need material and moral support from communities both inside and outside the conflict region. Without minimal legitimacy, these groups will not be successful in trying to stay in power. (Schlichte and Schneckener, 2015) This supports the rationale for asking what indicators signal a group's interest in long-term governance.

The discussion of legitimacy will be essential for this research and as Gawthorpe (2017:843) notes “the extent of legitimacy enjoyed by a government or rebel group can only be understood by observing the population’s responses to their concrete actions.” It can be said that how the population responds can also be an indicator of whether certain armed actors’ transition to state actors; and the implications thereof on effective state-building after conflict.

At this point it is worthwhile to reflect on the inclusion of rebel parties in the political process and scholars such as Marshall and Ishiyama (2016) have addressed whether long-term inclusion into the process of governance leads to a durable peace after conflict. They indicate that this inclusion involves winning electoral office and governing. Their findings support much of the literature in that it reiterates that inclusion in the short run is good for peace duration. Furthermore, this is also the case in the long run in that including relevant rebel groups in representation in governing institutions (and perhaps more importantly not excluding significant groups) reduces the likelihood of civil war and conflict resumption. (Marshall and Ishiyama, 2016). Although Marshall and Ishiyama are essentially speaking about peacebuilding, this process usually precedes state-building and as such we can deduce that the inclusion of rebels in political life is also essential for effective state-building, however this is dependent on the type of rebel group that transitions to state actor.

Lastly, attention must be given to discussing how rebels become state-builders and for this the research reflects on the work of Duffield (2014) whose essay on state formation in Somalia gives some insight. The essay shows how the organisation, financing, and use of violence, as well as qualities about the violent actors themselves, influence state-building trajectories. Duffield draws on Charles Tilly’s “war makes states and states make war” to understand rebels’ transition to more peaceful arrangements for state-building to take place. A more in-depth discussion on this is done in a later chapter.

The role of armed non-state actors in the development process is one which has been largely overlooked (Perera, 2015:16). Particularly during periods of civil strife, armed groups can

provide much needed governance in areas of limited statehood. Understanding this governance better, and the form that it takes, needs to be incorporated into post-conflict political settlements. (Perera, 2015:16)

Taken together, the literature above reveals that while rebel governance is increasingly studied, its long-term political consequences, especially its role in shaping post-conflict state-building, remain insufficiently theorised. Moreover, there is little clarity on how specific group characteristics (such as ideological, ethnic, or hierarchical structures) interact with governance ambitions to influence post-war political inclusion. These gaps inform the research questions guiding this study, which seek to explore the relationship between rebel governance during conflict and participation in formal governance after war.

1.3 Scope of research

The research limited itself to the geographical scope of sub-Saharan Africa where three cases were selected. These were chosen as representing qualitatively different conflict profiles and different insurgent trajectories, with a look at *de facto* authorities in Somaliland/Somalia, insurgents-turned-government in Rwanda (Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF) and insurgents involved in government through power-sharing in Mozambique (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, RENAMO).

1.4 Significance of the research

Broadly this research is important because it will contribute to the existing body of literature pertaining to non-state armed actors in conflict and [non-state] governance. Narrowly this research is going to be delving into how rebel governance shapes post-conflict state-building long-term, which is currently understudied. We know this because according to Loyle, Cunningham, Huang and Jung (2023:271) the rebel governance literature has been mainly focused on the drivers of rebel governance rather than its outcomes. Little is known about the implications of war-time governance structures on the post-conflict environment. They note that conflict institutions affect many long-term governance outcomes in post-conflict states. However, there are many questions that remain unanswered such as what the lasting impacts of rebel governance are on societies, civilians and state governance post-conflict. They allude to the point that it is unclear how the process of post-conflict state-building will be affected by

the experience of rebel governance, particularly the long-term success of re-establishing robust institutions. (Loyle et al., 2023:270-272)

1.5 Argument and questions

In this research it is argued that a hierarchically or ideologically organised, state-like, ready and interested group posture on governance is predictive of the possibility of post-conflict involvement of the group in a demilitarised political process and ultimately, state-building. Furthermore, hierarchically or ideologically organised groups should be expected to do better in nationwide governance as opposed to ethnically homogenous groups.

The main research question is whether rebel groups posture on governance during conflict impacts group involvement in post-conflict state-building. The sub questions for the research were as follows:

1. Is there a relationship between rebel governance and post-conflict state governance?
2. What factors influence rebel group's interest in governance, and which activities can be an indicator of group interest and readiness to govern?
3. Do hierarchically organised, ideologically organised or ethnically homogenous groups perform better in nation-wide governance?

One of the questions asked is whether hierarchically organised, ideologically committed, or ethnically homogenous rebel groups perform better in post-conflict nation-wide governance. While these characteristics are often treated as analytically distinct, in practice they can overlap or diverge in important ways. For instance, a hierarchical structure typically refers to a centralised command-and-control system with clear lines of authority and decision-making. However, not all effective rebel organisations rely solely on this model. For example, despite the Taliban having a strong religious organisation and strong central leadership through the Quetta Shura, Siddique (2014) describes the Shura as the 'consultative council', they did not need close central control over operations in a largely fragmented insurgent battlespace between the smaller "fronts" (dilgay). This challenges the assumption that hierarchical command is necessary for maintaining strategic cohesion, as the Taliban relied more on ideological unity and shared religious narratives to coordinate action (Giustozzi, 2007; Jackson, 2018).

Likewise, the Rojava Kurds have taken on a decentralised governance model grounded in their ideological commitment to democratic confederalism. This model prioritises grassroots

participation and locally organised councils over a centralised authority, reflecting the movement's ideological values rather than a lack of capacity (Knapp, Flach and Ayboga, 2016; Wellbeing Economy Alliance, 2022). On the other hand, the Rohingya, operating under intense existential pressure from the Myanmar state, have tended to adopt fragmented and flat organisational structures that favour resilience and operational secrecy. Such configurations are consistent with insurgent adaptations to extreme repression, where decentralisation becomes a survival strategy (International Crisis Group, 2020; Staniland, 2014). These cases illustrate that hierarchical organisation does not always correlate with ideological or ethnic structures, nor is it inherently predictive of governance capacity. Therefore, this research treats hierarchy as a variable with both potential advantages (e.g., coherence, control) and limitations (e.g., inflexibility, exclusion), rather than as an inherently superior model. This approach allows for a more nuanced analysis of how rebel organisational forms shape post-conflict governance trajectories.

In the research methodology chapter (4) the abovementioned terms, that is hierarchically organised, ideologically organised and ethnically homogeneous, are discussed further and their application to the case types in this study is explained.

1.6 Research method

To address the research questions, the research adopted a qualitative approach using a case study design. The research drew on empirical studies and secondary data which entailed reading about the relevant rebel groups of the cases to find details about their attributes and activities particularly during conflict time, to investigate whether the nature of their rebel governance influenced post-conflict governance and ultimately state-building, and which groups did better in nationwide governance. The research methodology chapter (4) expands more on the data collection and analysis.

1.7 Structure of dissertation

The dissertation consists of seven chapters which are structured as follows: Chapter 1 is the introduction; Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework which outlines the theories that were used to understand the relationship between the key concepts of interests namely: state formation theory and the post conflict reconstruction framework. Chapter 3 deals with the literature review which focuses on rebel governance; what we know about it and the areas of inquiry that still need to be researched. Chapter 4 lays out the research methodology, detailing

the research design used, its justification and selection of case types. Chapter 5 delves into rebel movements in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 6 presents the findings from the case types. Chapter 7 provides the discussion and concludes the dissertation by summarising the study and suggesting directions for future research.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

The following chapter presents the key concepts of interest and their definitions, and the theoretical approaches that were used to understand the relationship between the concepts. This theoretical framework is premised on an interpretivist paradigm which not only allows the researcher to describe events but also to delve deeper into understanding the variables within a social context.

2.1 Definitions of key concepts for the research

2.1.1 Governance

Governance has been defined by scholars as far back as Weber (1946) who said that governance is concerned with the creation of order and shaping behaviour. Governance can be observed at different levels such as globally, nationally, and locally. Rosenau (1995:15) defined global governance as a "systems of rule at all levels of human activity...from the family to the international organization...in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions".

He stated that:

“The core of governance involves rule systems in which steering mechanisms are employed to frame and implement goals that move communities in the directions they wish to go or that enable them to maintain the institutions and policies they wish to maintain” (Rosenau, 1995:15)

Although Rosenau was referring to governance at the systemic level, Weiss (2000:801) states that his analytical lens aids us to highlight that all governance encompasses the above and as such agency is vital. Therefore, at the national level, governance would have to be conceptualised in terms inclusive (and transcending) the formal government apparatus (Weiss, 2000:801). Continuing with the national/state level of understanding of governance this research also turns to Bøås (1998:119-120) who refers to it as being embedded and interwoven with state-civil society interactions. It forms part of the public realm that encompasses both.

He writes that:

“The governance nexus has to do with whether there exists a civic public realm, how it is maintained by political actors both in state and society, and whether access to participation in the public realm is built on respected and legitimate rules. As such, governance is concerned with the regime which constitutes the set of fundamental rules for the organisation of the public realm, and not with government. Both

governance and government refer to goal-oriented activities and systems of rule, but whereas government suggests constituted policies backed by formal authority, governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formal authority” (Bøås, 1998:119-120).

For Rotberg (2009:113) “governance is the delivery of political goods to citizens.³ The better the quality of that delivery and the greater the quantity of the political good being delivered, the higher the level of governance...delivery and performance are synonymous in this context.” Continuing he notes that modern nation-states deliver these public goods to people within their designated borders. Whether states fail or succeed depends on their performance within the governance space (Rotberg, 2009:113-114) As such, stronger states can be differentiated from weaker states based on their levels of effective delivery of political goods. Public goods envelop the citizens expectations and bundles of obligations. Furthermore, they inform the local political culture and provide substance to the social contract between the ruler and the ruled which is the fundamental basis of state and citizen interactions. (Rotberg, 2009:114) For Börzel and Risse (2010:114) governance consists of both structure and process; as structure it relates to institutions and actor constellations and as process recognises the modes of social coordination by which actors engage in rulemaking and implementation and in the provision of collective goods.

For the purposes of this research, governance is understood as the creation of order and the provision of critical public goods.

The following section looks at what non-state governance is and what conditions in a state give rise to it and discusses mediated stateness as a form of multi-layered governance.

2.1.2 Non-state governance

Before delving into non-state governance, it is noteworthy to first touch on what statehood is as this will underpin the discussion of limited statehood which tends to give rise to this type of governance. According to Börzel and Risse (2010:118) the core of statehood is the state’s ability to enforce collectively binding decisions, ultimately through coercive means, via its monopoly over the means of violence. It is conceptualised (based on Marx Weber) as an institutional structure of authority which hierarchically steers and legitimately controls the means of violence. Although states do not govern hierarchically all the time, they at least possess the ability to assertively make, implement and enforce central decisions for a

³ “In Africa, as everywhere else, those political goods are security and safety, rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development” (Rotberg 2009)

collectivity. Therefore, the state commands domestic sovereignty and over and beyond this possesses international sovereignty. (Börzel and Risse, 2010:118)

Non-state governance can be understood as that which is provided by actors, other than the state, who can be internal or external actors and usually this happens in areas of limited statehood (LS). Krasner and Risse (2014:549) define LS as:

“Those areas of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking. The ability to enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be differentiated along two dimensions: (1) territorial, that is, parts of a country’s territorial space, and (2) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas”.

The opposite of LS is consolidated statehood (effective domestic sovereignty) which are those areas of a country in which the state enjoys the monopoly over the means of violence and/or the ability to make and enforce central decisions. Furthermore, there are degrees of statehood, and this is derived from three indicators namely: 1. failure of state authority; 2. portion of a country affected by fighting; and 3. fiscal extraction capacity (Krasner and Risse, 2014:549). The authors continue to say that in the contemporary international system only a handful of states can be characterised as having consolidated statehood, and at the opposite end are failed states. The majority of states in the system have what they term areas of LS meaning that in parts of the territory or in some policy areas the central government lacks the capacity to implement decisions and/or its monopoly over the means of violence is challenged. In areas of LS collective goods and services may be provided by various actors (internal and/or external). (Krasner and Risse, 2014: 549-550).

2.1.3 Multi-layered governance

In their article Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra (2017) aim to expand the academic debate on rebel governance by widening the notion of ‘rebels’ to ‘armed groups’ which helps to conceptualise governance by a multiplicity of non-state armed groups in conditions of civil war. The notion of ‘layering’ is introduced to improve understanding of how the multiplicity of armed actors, including states, external political actors and auxiliary forces created by higher level authorities, affect civilian governance. They introduce the idea of a multi-layered governance framework and although this concept has mostly been used to understand governance within constitutional rules and peaceful conditions, ‘mediated stateness’ (a form of multi-layered governance) is deemed to be an appropriate approach because it introduces the analysis of

instances of cooperation between rebels, other armed groups and the state with which they co-exist. Here, the adversarial interaction or use of violence is replaced by a pragmatic form of accommodation and compromise. (Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017:264).

Mediated stateness is a political concept introduced by Ken Menkhaus as a pragmatic state-building solution for Somalia. According to Menkhaus (2008:30) the concept of the mediated state is rooted in the study of pre-modern and early modern state formation in Europe, where ambitious monarchs with limited power were forced to manipulate, manoeuvre, and make deals with local rivals to their authority. Those rivals “often mediated state authority and did so both as over-powerful purveyors of royal prerogatives, as ‘private’ citizens exercising ‘public’ jurisdiction, or as members of extra-national bodies like the Catholic Church”. (Menkhaus, 2008:30). This produced situations in early modern Europe that sound oddly familiar in contemporary Somalia – France, for instance, was described as “a nation characterized by parcellized and overlapping jurisdictions, multiple legal codes, and a plethora of internal tariffs and taxes” (Menkhaus, 2008:30).

As such, the mediated state is considered by historians as a major obstacle to state-building, a syndrome to be overcome, usually by superior force of arms. Charles Tilly observed that European state formation “consisted of the states’ abridging, destroying, or absorbing rights previously lodged in other units.” [(Menkhaus, 2008:30) referencing Tilly, 1975]. Whether the mediated state is an obstacle to state-building or a possible route to state-building is an intriguing question in contemporary zones of weak and collapsed state authority (Menkhaus, 2008:30).

Menkhaus warned though that caution must be exercised when drawing historical parallels between state formation in early modern Europe and contemporary Africa. The general concept of a mediated state appears to have some utility in explaining actual politics on the ground from Kenya to the DRC to Mozambique, and mediated stateness is for the most part concentrated in, but not limited to, Africa. (Menkhaus, 2008:30).

The “mediated state” is one in which the government relies on partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse range of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core functions of public security, justice, and conflict management in much of the country (Menkhaus, 2006/07:78). Mediated states are intrinsically messy, contradictory, illiberal, and constantly renegotiated deals—not ideal choices for governments, but often the best of bad options for weak states. In this approach, the top-down project of building a central

government and the organic emergence of informal polities is not viewed as antithetical (though they are invariably political rivals, coexisting in uneasy partnership), but are instead harmonised or nested together in a negotiated division of labour. (Menkhaus, 2006/07:78).

The nascent central state limits itself to a few essential competencies not already provided by local, private sector, or voluntary sector actors. Central state authorities resist the temptation to insist on sovereign control over social and political realms and entire communities they cannot realistically exercise. For their part, local mediators gain recognition from the state through what today is called “good governance”—effectively providing core functions of public security or other services demanded by local communities, and earning legitimacy as a result (Menkhaus, 2006/07:103). A “thin” central government has the added advantage of reducing the threat it poses to opponents of the government in power, thereby reducing the likelihood of spoilers. Over time, of course, if the central government grows in capacity and resources, its reliance on local intermediaries to govern can be renegotiated. (Menkhaus, 2006/07:103)

Menkhaus [(2006/07:105) referencing Reinhard, 1999:1] goes on to say that the notion of a mediated state should not be confused with the neoliberal trend toward subcontracting out state functions to the private sector, though the two practices overlap in some ways. The key difference is that states’ opting to contract out functions (such as operating seaports) to private companies usually do so as a matter of public policy choice, and ostensibly with the objective of providing the service more efficiently. This is the choice of a state authority that “has acquired the competence to decide the limits of its own competence.” By contrast, a mediated state strategy is the recourse of a state authority that lacks options. It has no choice but to work through local intermediaries if it is to have even token jurisdiction in an area within its borders. (Menkhaus, 2006/07:105 [referencing Reinhard, 1999:1]).

State interest is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mediated governance. Whether a mediated state strategy is an option then depends on the presence of reasonably authoritative local actors which the state can accept (a secessionist polity, for instance, would not be acceptable; nor would a liberation or radical movement bent on the overthrow of the government or entire political system). (Menkhaus, 2008:32) Finally, for a mediated state strategy to succeed as a peacebuilding and governance strategy, the sources of local authority must be relatively legitimate and committed to peace and good governance, not predatory or corrupted local elites. In other words, the local actors who would be involved in the project

must have some legitimacy to give them authority. This can be empirical legitimacy where most of the local population recognises the local actors and ideally have some normative legitimacy because without this it may be challenging for the international community to see them as a local partner. Without such, the mediated strategy produces a patch-quilt of state-sponsored warlord fiefdoms (Menkhaus, 2008:32).

The application of the mediated state model will be discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter.

2.1.4 Rebel governance

Broadly rebel governance can be defined as organising civilians for a public purpose. According to Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly (2015) it refers to non-state actors who militarily oppose the state, create rules, and provide for social, political, as well as economic goods. Three scope conditions required for this type of governance are territorial control, a resident population, and violence or threat of violence (Kasfir, 2015). Only actors who meet these three conditions are capable of rebel governance and these conditions refer to the rebel group. Because rebel governance occurs during civil war, more often than not, it involves significant coercion for civilians, regardless of insurgents' pronouncements. Rebel governments sometimes insist that civilians' express enthusiasm for rebel goals. However, civilian interests tend to differ from those of insurgents and therefore encouraging civilian participation is likely to complicate rebels' decision-making. (Kasfir, 2015)

In summary rebel governance can be situated under the umbrella of non-state governance and for the purposes of this research will be understood as the way in which rebel groups organise the public realm specifically in their areas of control.

2.1.5 State-building

Chandler (2006:1) refers to state-building as the process of constructing or reconstructing state institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security. State-building is an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations (OECD-DAC, 2008). Positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state. Therefore, it is intimately connected to the political processes through which social/political relations and power

relationships between holders of state power and organised groups in society are negotiated and managed. This process can provide the basis for developing state capacity and legitimacy if the parties involved can identify common interests and negotiate arrangements to pursue them. (OECD-DAC, 2008)

For the purposes of this research, post-conflict state-building “refers to the development and implementation of institutions and arrangements to protect property rights, offer public goods and services, and manage social conflicts and external and internal threats, shocks, and volatility in ways that avoid violence, and emanate from and are consolidated by legitimate public authority” (Justino, 2022:3). This is essentially what is meant by governance - creating order and providing public goods - as defined earlier for this research.

Fukuyama (2007:10) said that the state-building process must commence with the creation of a coherent nation (this has seldom been achieved without violence in history). In his view state-building in the strict sense is concerned with creating the Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence over a defined territory and therefore has at its core the concentration of the means of coercion—in practical terms, armies and police—under the control of a central political authority (Fukuyama, 2007:11). Following this comes the development of other state institutions such as a taxing authority and agencies providing different types of public goods. Fukuyama notes that institutions matter, and the issues of state strength or capacity and institutional quality are imperative. (Fukuyama, 2007:11)

For state-building to be effective it is not simply about building or capacitating state institutions, but it is about forging a “social contract” between the state and its residents to shape and enforce a set of political, social, and economic rules that govern both society and the state itself (Valent, 2017). Ingram (2010:5-6) identifies the following as the building blocks of state functioning which are: 1. the political settlement, 2. essential capabilities which the state must have to survive and, 3. expected capabilities which citizens look to the state to provide, and which shore up its legitimacy. Ingram states that the political settlement is “the forging of a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power” and settlements are represented as spanning the continuum from negotiated peace agreements to long term accommodations, usually enshrined in a constitution. Essentially, the settlement spells out the rules of the game, providing the institutional underpinning for state functioning. (Ingram, 2010:5-6)

William Zartman places the state and the robustness of its institutions at the centre of the state-building process. He argues that the basic role of the state is to perform its functions as ‘sovereign authority; intangible symbol of authority; and as...the security guarantor for a populated territory.’ With the collapse of these functions, the state loses its ‘right to rule’ (Zartman, 1995:5) and this can lead to failed states.

In this research state-building is understood as a continuous state (re) construction project and focuses mainly on how internal actors engage with this project.

Linking governance and state-building

Governance and state-building are closely intertwined; linked by fundamentals such as rules which provide a basis for a social contract to govern both state and citizens to maintain order. States have obligations to their citizens such as the provision of political goods and this can enhance its legitimacy. Establishing vigorous institutions is also key for state-building which goes together with governance.

2.1.6 Power-sharing

Rothchild and Roeder (2005:30) define power-sharing institutions as formal institutions that distribute decision-making rights within the state and define decision-making procedures. Power-sharing institutions, especially, in ethnically diverse societies consist of rules that endeavour to guarantee inclusive decision-making, partitioned decision-making, predetermined decisions, or some combination of these. These rules provide what they call mandates, or relatively hard guarantees, and opportunities, or relatively soft guarantees. (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005:30) For Meng, Paine and Powell (2023:153) power-sharing entails not only sharing spoils between a ruler and challenger but also establishing an enforcement mechanism. An arrangement does not truly share power without reallocating power to make it costly for the ruler to pull out of it. (Meng, Paine and Powell, 2023:153)

The terms power-sharing and consociationalism have been used synonymously by scholars such as Arend Lijphart, but Lemarchand (2007) notes that there is a distinction. Although the latter refers to an elaborate technique of constitutional engineering, power sharing can best be seen as involving ad hoc concessions intended to give opposition groups a stake in transitions to democracy (Lemarchand, 2007:3). He goes on to say that:

“One is enshrined in a set of carefully calibrated constitutional norms; the other is more in the nature of an improvised bricolage, aimed at co-opting the bad guys. One underscores, among other characteristics,

the importance of elite cooperation, proportionality, and minority veto; the other makes unduly short shrift of all three". (Lemarchand, 2007:3)

Political power-sharing provides for power to be shared in political institutions among different groups and parties (PeaceRep, 2024). It can include enforced executive coalitions, proportional legislatures, forms of communal veto, proportionality in other political and legal institutions, segmental autonomy (for example different educational systems for different groups) and international involvement (PeaceRep, 2024). Furthermore, political power-sharing agreements can be temporary or indefinite, can be provided for at the level of the national government, or in sub-state regional or local governments (or both), and provide important security guarantees for state and opposition parties or rebel groups, by offering them a place in government. (PeaceRep, 2024)

Power sharing arrangements are often built into peace agreements to provide critical assurances to negotiating parties and prompt them to sign and implement them (Sriram and Zahar, 2009:12). These arrangements aim to provide incentives for warring parties to remain committed to the peace process and to alleviate their security concerns. Although they are used frequently, the efficacy and durability of power-sharing arrangements vary greatly (Sriram and Zahar, 2009:12). Moreover, even when power-sharing arrangements may assist to assure parties in the short run, they are not designed necessarily to create robust, sustainable, non-violent states in the longer run. (Sriram and Zahar, 2009:12)

Despite the diversity of settings in which power-sharing arrangements have been put in place, three critical factors seem to affect their ability to guarantee a sustainable transition from war to peace: 1. the nature of the state (the extent of its centralisation or power of repression), 2. the capacities and interests of armed group(s) involved in, and excluded from, the agreement, and 3. the nature and/or robustness of the involvement of external actors in either supporting or undermining the agreement. In many instances, these factors intersect to create situations that are not favourable to the success of power-sharing arrangements, but also in which such arrangements create new risks (Sriram and Zahar, 2009:13).

For this research, the focus will be on political power-sharing which will be understood as compromise made between various parties to share power within the state's political institutions.

2.2 Failed states and ungoverned spaces

At this point the dissertation briefly discusses state failure and ungoverned spaces as a preamble to the theoretical approaches.

State failure

Discourse on state failure or failed states has been very prominent in international relations over several years now as many states, in the ‘third’ or developing world have been victim to crises and at times the erosion of the state has led to widespread political violence (Eriksen, 2011). Based on their understanding of the state as mainly a service provider, scholars such as Zartman say that a state has collapsed when its basic functions are no longer performed; and Rotberg, that state failure occurs when states are unable to provide positive political goods for their citizens (Eriksen, 2011). For Rotberg (2003:3-4) there exists a hierarchy of political goods of which the provision of [human] security ranks as the most important. Therefore, first and foremost the state must provide security and when this has been reasonably done then the provision of other political goods can follow. Against this background of the ability to provide these political goods, states are deemed to be either strong, weak, or failed (Rotberg, 2003:3-4).

“Failed states lose control over the means of violence, and cannot create peace or stability for their populations or control their territories. They cannot ensure economic growth or any reasonable distribution of social goods. They are often characterized by massive economic inequities, warlordism, and violent competition for resources” (Brooks, 2005:1160-1161)

Another indicator of state failure mentioned by Rotberg is the inability to control borders, losing authority over sections of territory. This of course does not bode well for regional and global security especially when an internal conflict and/or armed actors can potentially spill over into neighbouring states and regions through porous borders. This is articulated (and perhaps supported) in the security-oriented definition of state failure offered by Marton (2008:88) that state failure occurs when an internationally recognised government (IRG) is not able to curb the negative spillover effects (NSEs) from its territory. Marton reconceptualises state failure to IRG failure and suggests that this is more useful in understanding this phenomenon firstly because it helps to avoid the error of seeing state and government as one, and secondly because of the accuracy of the latter i.e., governments fail not the state per se.

Similarly, scholars such as Robert Jackson also link state failure to a state’s inability to control its territory and uphold its monopoly of violence (Eriksen, 2011:232). The focus is on

sovereignty, specifically positive sovereignty, which many states lack. These states “do not control their territory, may be faced with armed insurgents and have very little ability to implement policies or promote economic development” (Eriksen, 2011:232). In spite of this these states continue to persist and be recognised as participants by the international system whilst lacking the empirical features of statehood (Eriksen, 2011:233). Schneckenner (2006) adds another element to state failure in that over and above the inability of a state to provide governance, a failed state is one where sub-national groups (internal and external) are providing order. This is particularly interesting for this research which investigates rebel governance which can exist alongside the state and/or when the state is unable to govern for any reason.

Ungoverned spaces

Rabasa et al. (2007: xv) define an ‘ungoverned territory’ as “an area in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control. Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not extend”. Reflecting on the theory of ungoverned spaces, Marsai and Tarrósy (2022:167) state that the theory is intertwined with failure and collapse of states theory. The concept of ungoverned spaces emerged as an alternative to the prevailing political and security narrative of failed states, which typically relied on a top-down perspective.

Keeping in mind Rotbergs hierarchy of political goods, the authors note (referencing Rotberg, 2004) that a key sign of state failure is the erosion and collapse of state authority, which creates room for the rise of criminal violence. As a result, in search of protection, people often turn to warlords who promise security during times when everything else—including the state—is falling apart. Against this backdrop, the theory of ungoverned spaces highlights the social, cultural, and governmental challenges of state-building by analysing the characteristics of territories where a central government is absent or lacks influence. (Marsai and Tarrósy, 2022:167)

According to Rabasa et al. (2007:8) in an ungoverned territory, authority does not primarily stem from the state. One of the attributes of an ungoverned territory is the lack of state penetration into society which can be measure by absent or non-functioning state institutions. The authors also note ungoverned territories are frequently located in challenging environments such as mountains, jungles, or deserts which can deter the state from developing the needed infrastructure to maintain a robust presence. Furthermore, the presence of NSAG’s and

criminal networks linked to terrorist or insurgent groups in as indication of the extent to which is territory is ungoverned. (Rabasa et al., 2007:8, 10) In such ungoverned spaces these non-state actors may fill the security vacuum and play a role of service provider instead of the state. This is discussed in the literature review section. Furthermore, the research unpacks how rebel groups in the case studies provided health service provision in territories where they governed. In summary, for the purposes of this research, it must be highlighted that states form, fail and re-build themselves differently. This is especially the case of post-colonial states as opposed to their western counterparts. The research was guided by the above summation against this backdrop.

2.3 Theoretical approaches

To understand the relationship between the concepts of interest the state formation theory was used combined with the post-conflict reconstruction framework.

2.3.1 State formation theory

According to Richmond (2013:301-302) the early historically oriented literature on state formation explored the traditional power systems and socio-historical patterns of politics in Europe, in order to portray how they formed the state as a natural and inevitable outcome of contests for power and wealth. These were then used to outline the dynamics of a progression from a traditional or colonial territory, or a post-conflict environment, to the modern state. (Richmond, 2013:301-302). The contestation of power in European states was viewed as a historical process of forming institutions, which was biased towards the elites, but could be rectified with the establishment of a contract between the ruled and rulers. As such, similar processes in colonial or conflicted environments were identified and viewed as a justification for various types of intervention whose objective was to move states further along the process of institution formation. (Richmond, 2013:301-302)

As Tilly (1985:172) stated state-building in Europe started with an effort to control the means of violence within a given territory. In his argument of war makes states in Europe (outlined in Leander, 2004), three main components were identified, namely:

1. centralised control over territory (increasing control and concentrating violence)
2. development of the state apparatus (bureaucratic developments arising from the financing and organising of violence through centralised administration)

3. process of civilianisation (extraction of financial resources required bargaining with those controlling these resources. Simultaneously, the expansion of the administrative state apparatus created a body of civil servants who also made claims on the state. Accountability and political identities were developed) (Leander, 2004:4-5)

For Tilly the above three processes led to state formation and the importance and outcome of these depend on time and context (Leander, 2004). However, Tilly's work has come under scrutiny by scholars and one of the obvious criticisms is that it is western oriented, which does not make it ideal to explain contemporary war and state making in non-western environments. Furthermore, others have also noted that it is limited in terms of not taking into consideration that contemporary wars can also break states. (Leander, 2004) Moreover, according to Müller (2012:793) "the process of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa was often a product of negotiated decolonisation, not the outcome of warfare".

Although the state formation theory, as articulated by Tilly, is based on historical state-building in Europe, studies have shown that the basics of Tilly's principles of warfare and state-making are applicable to the developing world - states that came into being after colonialism - (Taylor and Botea, 2008), and can be used to understand and explain how non-state armed actors become state-builders (Duffield, 2014). Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that whether war makes or breaks state in contemporary times is dependent on the dynamics of that state (internal and external), and this requires scholars to interrogate this dynamic for deeper understanding to draw conclusions based on theory. Therefore, a reflection on Tilly's principles, which in fact are related to governance and state-building, in this research was important and it allowed the research to trace their presence (and extent) or lack thereof in the identified case studies.

To illustrate how state formation can help to understand the link between rebel governance and state-building, the research looked to Duffield (2014) who drew on the work of Tilly.

He noted that:

"State-building at its most basic level is stimulated when violent specialists and elites consolidate security and thereby provide the first and most important public good: the control over the use of force. Once violence is successfully controlled through the licensing of force and the adjudication of disputes according to established rules, there can be expansion and maturation of economic and political institutions" (Duffield, 2004:3).

A comparative study of Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia is done by Duffield. For this research, however, the focus was on the case of Somaliland (as opposed to its counterparts)


which illustrates how rebels became state-builders. In Somaliland the Somali National Movement (SNM) became state-builders because they were the only organisation that had the capacity and authority to establish law and order, and the institutions established during conflict were transplanted to the newly formed government in 1991 (Duffield, 2004:6). Challengers to the state were eliminated through persuasion and where necessary force, and as such the political settlement withstood opposition to its coercion. Not only did these actors centralise coercion in the state and build an administration, but they also produced actors whose interests were tied to state-building, and this was key to igniting and sustaining a positive state-building trajectory. (Duffield, 2004:7)

2.3.2 Post-conflict reconstruction

According to Theron (2011:114) post conflict reconstruction (PCR) is “the process a state undergoes following a conflict to re-build and achieve sustainable peace.” This entails several features such as security, political governance, socio-economic development, gender, and justice to name a few (Theron, 2011:114). The development in a post-conflict environment differs to that of a non-conflict one because of the complexity, displacement, vulnerability, crowding out effect and the governance dilemma (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:895). As such, only planned coordination among different policy interventions can bring about successful PCR solutions. These types of PCR solutions reduce conflict by increasing the growth rate and level of income and stimulate development. Concurrently it is vital to ensure the safety of people, promote participation and address the root causes of the conflict during and after reconstruction. (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:895)

The authors develop the following conceptual framework to show the links between PCR interventions and their consequences noting that up until then the discourse on PCR research had failed to analyse in a comprehensive manner.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:899

Based on this framework they posit that the post-conflict space is characterised by failed states conditions, negative peace, presence of military forces, vulnerable communities, post war tension, poverty, displacement, corruption, and existence of war economies. Consequently, the PCR intervention happens within this context in the form of soft and hard infrastructure. The main stakeholders involved in implementing PCR projects are the state, foreign governments, international organisations, and NGOs. (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:899)

Consequences and linkages

Economic consequences

Although reconstruction is vital for development after war, there is no link between PCR and development therefore linking these two with strong policies is important. Interventions should encourage development forces. Whilst peace is a precondition to development, it will not be sustainable without appropriate policies towards economic development. Peace and economic stabilisation require strong state formation, which should be understood within the historical

and regional political analysis of the conflict. (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:896)

Environmental consequences

The authors note that the environmental impact of PCR is a subject that needs more attention in post conflict studies. The environment suffers immensely during war and often becomes a target during war operations. Even so, its significance is often underestimated in a post conflict agenda. It is imperative to consider the environmental effects before implementing a PCR project and take measures to minimise the damage. (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018: 897)

Social consequences

The people, who suffered from shattered identity, especially during protracted ethnic conflict, can further experience inequality of resource distribution among different communities after the conflict. This is referred to as horizontal inequality (HI). Understanding root causes of conflict and participatory approach to reconstruction may prevent HI and avoid future conflicts. PCR can be used in building and promoting social capital, and as a tool of distributing peace dividends through community-based participation (CBP). A participatory approach to reconstruction ensures that development is people centred rather than project centred, which in turn contributes towards sustainability. (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:897)

Political consequences

Post conflict societies and states suffer from corruption that prevails on a large scale, and it spreads to PCR (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:897-898). Corruption allows the political elites to tap the humanitarian and development aid into their own pockets and undermine peacekeeping activities. As a result, people may seek alternative means of power and form new conflicts (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018:898). Although PCR can yield community building, communication and development, it can at the same time forcefully impose the foreign neo-liberal concepts of what is or what ought to be the “good life” on the post conflict states. The idea of the ‘good life’ is premised on the neo-liberal thinking that “human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2007:22). Neo-liberalism encourages competition as something that leads to political good, however, rarely have the results of neo-

liberalism been satisfying for the critical masses particularly in post-conflict states. In fact, Friedman, 1987 [2017: 185] stated that part of the case for freedom is that we don't know what people ought to value because no one really knows what constitutes a good life; a free society is good as it allows people to test different ways of life to answer those questions themselves. Therefore, such imposing of external development models can disturb the progress of post conflict societies (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018: 898).

Long term impact

The abovementioned consequences have relationships to each other within this framework; and have linkages to long-term outcomes in the post-conflict sphere. Political solutions can be introduced to the stable society, which will lead to sustainable peace. On the contrary, the negative consequences may not be able to prevent violence, and instability may remain in the longer term. It is tough to introduce political reforms in such a context and therefore exclusion prevails. Thus, the society may revert to previous conflict or new conflicts may be created. (Sakalasuriyaa, Haigha and Amaratunga, 2018: 900)

The authors disclose that the conceptual framework had not been tested using actual data and therefore testing it in a post-conflict setting would be required; also, with regards to specific forms of intervention. Notwithstanding, this framework was useful to give insight into some of the things that former rebels turned state actors have to contend with in the post-conflict space and their performance against some of these dynamics. In addition to this the framework spoke to the research's concepts of interest and emphasised the need for strong state formation for peace and stability. As such the state formation theory and PCR framework complemented each other in this research.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

It can be said that Africa remains one of the regions that has been rife with armed conflicts post the cold war era and colonialism. One of the prevailing legacies of European colonialism was the creation of states (by artificial boundaries) that were weak and who could not control their territory due to the ethnically, religiously and tribally different compositions of their societies (Ogun and Aslan, 2013). In Africa states are weakened because of the enduring effects of partial state construction, that resulted from colonial practices which have contributed to deeply flawed states. Secondly, because of violence, this was characteristic of the colonial state, which continued after independence; and lastly partial state-building meant that only a portion of the territory supposedly under colonial rule was actually administered. (Heilbrunn, 2006) This left other areas in the territory ungoverned thereby undermining the colonial states legitimacy (Heilbrunn, 2006).

Weakened states tend to be vulnerable to non-state actors such as armed groups because of their fragility and this has also been a contributing factor to protracted conflict in certain African countries. Fragility arises from the bad governance of decolonised states without sound social and economic infrastructure. Armed conflict occurs as internal conflicts in states that became independent in the latter half of the 20th century on the tide of decolonisation. (Shinoda, 2018)

According to Péclard and Mechoulam (2015:6)

“War making since the end of the Cold War has not followed a single and uniform pattern and the reasons why groups or movements have decided to take up arms against the established order are extremely varied. One striking commonality across many civil wars, however, is the fact that rebel movements exert control over sometimes vast portions of a country’s territory over periods of time that can go from months to decades. Rebel movements represent the de facto public authority in the areas under their control and they perform acts of governance in the new ‘order’ they establish. Therefore, they need to be viewed not simply through the lens of their military strength, capacities and activities, but also as political actors exerting power over civilian populations”.

In this research, the term ‘rebel groups’ is used interchangeably with ‘insurgent groups’. These groups are organised non-state actors that challenge their host state through violent means to achieve a political objective (Loyle et al., 2023:265). Understanding the goals and nature of rebel groups is an important step in determining whether they can transition to state actors after conflict and if so, what impact their wartime governance has on post-conflict state-building.

This chapter provides a summation of prior research around rebel groups with a focus on their structures and how they govern, referred to as rebel governance, and the implications of this type of governance. Most of the research that has been done on rebel governance has largely focused on the wartime governance (how rebel groups control territory, create order (or do not), how they relate to civilians and their political agendas etc.) and only recently has the literature given insight into how rebel groups transition to rulers and how the nature of rebel governance can be a predictor of the type of post-conflict regimes that will be established. More research still needs to be done to dig deeper into the effects of rebel governance on post-conflict settings beyond regime types.

The first section of the chapter will look at what the literature tells us about the dynamics that shape rebel governance. The second section will look at the transition of groups from rebels to state actors and the last part will discuss the impact of rebel governance on state institutions, that is, how it can shape broad post-war developments such as post-conflict state-building efforts. Again, it must be emphasised that this research is concerned with group posture on governance as an indicator of the group's post-conflict involvement in state-building processes and not particularly the type of political regime that will follow based on war-time governance.

3.1 Rebel governance: what the literature tells us

From the previous chapter where the concept of rebel governance was introduced, it is understood that this phenomenon is essentially governance that is provided by rebel groups, generally through the creation of institutions and some type of order. As a comparatively small sub-discipline of International Peace and Conflict Studies and by extension, of International Relations, the interest and research into rebel governance has grown considerably since the beginning of the 21st century (Tiener, 2022:748). As such there is now a growing body of literature with studies that have covered rebel groups across most regions of the world, with varying ideologies and strategies for achieving their political goals (Tiener, 2022:748). The following summarises the relevant literature on rebel governance.

3.1.1 The nature of rebel governance

Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra (2017) state that in order to understand how rebel groups govern it is important to understand how armed groups relate to each other in certain conflicts. They pose the question of “who governs during civil war?” and argue that it is multiple actors with intersecting influences on governance of civilians. Not only is it the incumbent government

and those who rebel against it; but the uncertainties unleashed by civil war gives rise to different types of armed groups intent on civilian protection or predation, military advantage or an uneasy collusion with the state (Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017: 257). During the war, control over territory becomes divided between different warring actors with some territories being under the full control of government, rebels or their auxiliaries. Whereas in other territories control is contested, often shifting between several different actors. (Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017:257)

Another question they ask is “who rebels against whom?” and note that some armed groups oppose the government, while others fight on its behalf, have loose coalitions with both or multiple sides, or with none. Some armed groups rebel against the political order imposed by other rebel groups. Other armed actors flee to third states where they maintain an edgy co-existence. In addition, armed groups often switch alliances (Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017:259). Furthermore, to be able to govern, or influence governance by other actors, these armed groups need the capacity (or credible threat) to use violence, have some degree of territorial control and confront civilians living in that territory (Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017:259).

It is said that war often weakens and at times destroys state institutions; and that in situations where there is a lack of access to effective institutions, new informal institutions will likely emerge (Arjona, 2014:1361). The birth of a state itself has been explained as a process where one actor offers institutions and protection in exchange for taxation, therefore converting a situation of lawlessness to one where rules allow for higher predictability, productive activities and capital accumulation (Arjona, 2014:1361). However, it is evident that even when institutions do exist, at times actors try to provide private orderings in an effort to ‘re-align incentives and imbed transactions in more protective governance structures’ (Arjona, 2014:1361).

Indeed, for Arjona, the existence of institutions established during war should not come as a surprise. For those fighting in war to overcome their competitors, they attempt to control the means of violence, extract resources from local civilians and simultaneously promote capital accumulation. For armed actors to fund their activities and further their ambitions, they need to create a system for resource extraction and such a system requires institutions (Arjona, 2014:1361). Another reason armed groups would be inclined to create institutions is connected to the type of warfare that they engage in. The nature of the civil conflicts that we see nowadays

is that of irregular warfare where strategy of the rebels involves taking control over certain areas of territory posing a direct challenge to the state. Even though violence is an instrumental way to getting and maintain control, putting in place institutions to rule civilians is also key to these actors. (Arjona, 2014:1361)

Following this logic, rebel groups may even provide public goods to civilians in certain contexts to varying degrees. For instance, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda put in place local representative councils, whereas other rebel groups consolidate governance within the rebel leadership (Cunningham and Loyle, 2021:5-6). The Maoists in Nepal institutionalised a wide-reaching network of People's Courts, while other groups implement once-off trials or adopt no legal systems at all (Cunningham and Loyle, 2021:6). Coming back to Africa, some examples of groups that provided public goods include The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia which provided services and implemented land reform; and the NRA and the Rwenzururu Kingdom Government in Uganda have also been described as insurgencies engaged with ruling civilians (Loyle et al., 2022:6). For Mampilly (2011:6) "the establishment of a police force followed by the development of a broader legal mechanism, either informal or formal, is the highest priority for any leadership and is often the key determinant as to whether the rebel group is able to make the transition from a roving insurgency to a stationary one". A discussion of roving and stationary insurgencies will be done in chapter 5.

Continuing to paint a picture of rebel governance and its institutions, Mampilly and Stewart (2021:16) note that "rebel political institutions—the structures and practices rebels design and implement to interface with civilian communities—vary considerably both across and within rebel organizations". Some insurgents create inclusive political arrangements, whilst others provide administration through their own operatives. This reiterates the assertion made by Gowrinathan and Mampilly (2019:19) that rebels may involve civilians in the [governance] project to fulfill essential roles within the civilian administration, or they may choose a form of governance in which civilian involvement is non-existent. With this said it should be noted that not all groups govern. For example, in her study Huang (2016) found that only 13% of rebel organisations establish complex administrative structures. However, for the purposes of this research more focus will be paid to armed groups that provided (even at a minimal level) governance and/or attempted to govern.

According to Loyle et al (2022:4) rebels occupy a different position within the international system, they function in a different territorial context and operate under different processes of legitimisation. Still, irrespective of these differences, rebel groups can and do govern. As such, often they diverge from their state counterparts in both their governance choices and the outcomes of those choices. Comprehending the specificities of rule by rebels paves the way for scholars to examine which governance outcomes stem from the unique operational conditions facing rebels, and which aspects are products of more universal inclinations on the part of actors who seek to wield power. (Loyle et al., 2022:4)

Subsequently, rebel governance offers a platform for exploring how and from where governance emerges, and how it evolves in places that seem to be “ungoverned.” Although they are mainly identified by their violent relationship with the state, rebel groups also interact with civilians, local authorities and formal and informal structures (Loyle et al., 2022:5). Because of this rebel groups must tackle the questions of governance i.e., whether and to what extent to engage in rule-making, how to enforce those rules, and how much to intervene in civilians’ daily lives through the provision of goods and services (Loyle et al., 2022:5).

Table 1: Empirical evidence on the variation in rebels’ willingness and ability to shoulder the cost of governance and differences in their nature of governance

Rebel group	Nature of governance
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda; Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone	<i>Minimal governance of civilians</i>
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka	<i>Establish themselves as a political authority and seek opportunities to display their governance capabilities domestically and internationally</i>

Source: authors own summary from Loyle et. al (2022:5)

The literature tells us that even though rebel service provision and other institutions might not directly translate into battlefield superiority, they can create other forms of strength that are just as important to civil war (Albert, 2023:240). This incentivises rebels to divert resources from building their fighting capacity to providing services to civilians. Rebel service provision wins civilian support and facilitates state-building, and rebel taxation gives rebels a steady base of resources for their fighters. (Albert, 2023:240) Rebel governance can solicit support

internationally through diplomatic missions and organise civilians domestically. These institutions also give rebels legitimacy, both domestically and internationally, while eating away at legitimacy from the government. Therefore, rebel governance and service provision translate into rebel capacity, which improves rebels' ability to bargain and increases the likelihood of a negotiated agreement. (Albert, 2023:240)

When thinking about rebel capacity, an example of this is the provision of health services (a key aspect of this research) in ungoverned spaces. For example, Rabasa et al. (2007:7) note that in some cases, state health and welfare institutions fail to extend their reach into large parts of rural regions or inner-city areas. This absence creates a vacuum where other actors can assume authority over daily life. As a result, people may rely on warlords, mullahs, or tribal leaders instead of official state institutions for judicial processes. Similarly, insurgent groups may become the sole providers of healthcare and other essential social services for those living in ungoverned areas.

In areas commonly referred to as 'ungoverned spaces', the provision of health and other essential services becomes both a security and governance challenge. These are zones where the state has limited or no presence, and where non-state actors, including violent extremist groups, often step in to fill the vacuum (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010; Marsai and Tarrósy, 2022). Such spaces are not necessarily devoid of order but are often governed by alternative forms of authority that may compete with or undermine the legitimacy of the state.

Ungoverned spaces are critical analytical categories when considering state failure, non-state governance, and the strategic positioning of groups like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, especially during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic created new opportunities for radical jihadist groups to undermine state authority and expand both their influence and local acceptance. These groups have historically leveraged state absence to provide services, assert control, and build legitimacy among local populations, often blurring the lines between governance and militancy. (Marsai and Tarrósy, 2022; Hansen, 2013; Thurston, 2017) This was illustrated by Boko Haram factions, in the Lake Chad basin, who were able to garner local support by providing basic healthcare services and promoting economic recovery in an area neglected by the central government in Abuja. Their efforts included facilitating a polio vaccination campaign and even participating in the construction of latrines (Marsai and Tarrósy, 2022:168)

3.1.2 Rebel and state governance

The following section looks at rebel governance and how it can be linked to state governance whether it is by mimicking it and/or co-existing with it.

3.1.2.1 The state-like nature of rebel governance

Loyle et al (2022:6) posit that rebels can and do occupy roles and perform many tasks associated with broader conceptions of (state) governance. However, the constraints that rebel groups face differ in fundamental ways from those of states. Furthermore, the political context within which rebels operate is very different to that of states, and this affects their governance choices and outcomes (Loyle et al., 2022:6). The authors highlight three factors that shape governance by the state and rebels namely: legitimacy, capacity and territorial rule. Legitimacy is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Thus, capacity and territorial control will be briefly unpacked here.

Capacity

In their essay on “Capacity and Governance: Lessons from Rebels and States” Reyko Huang and Danielle F. Jung argue that the relationship between rebel capacity and rebel governance is not straightforward (Loyle et al., 2022:11). They identify five core elements of rebel capacity namely: the military, economic, personnel, administrative/bureaucratic, and social dimensions of capacity. They note that theoretically these dimensions can be inter-related or independent (Loyle et al., 2022:11). Huang and Jung state that rebels can have multiple capacities and a complex mix of motives for engaging in governance, which together shape rebel governance choices (Loyle et al., 2022:14).

Territorial control

In their essay on “Rebel Territorial Control and Governance” Michael A. Rubin and Megan A. Stewart argue that dominant perspectives emphasising state-based territorial sovereignty obscure the complex relationship between territorial control and governance (Loyle et al., 2022:16-17). Touching on the relationship between territorial control and governance broadly, they note that while territorial control can facilitate governance, actors need not always establish territorial control before governing. Under a range of conditions governance may instead function as a precursor to territorial control. Moreover, while rebel governance in other

domains may shore up territorial control in many circumstances, in others it may, instead, erode territorial control. (Loyle et al., 2022:17)

3.1.2.2 Hybrid political orders

As alluded to in the previous chapter state and non-state actors can sometimes share the burden of governing civilians in the form of mediated stateness (a type of multi-layered/hybrid governance). A hybrid political order refers to a state model where ‘formal and informal elements co-exist, overlap and intertwine (Musa and Horst, 2019:39). Therefore, hybridity is not just a case of states operating alongside informal and other non-state forms of organisation in the exercise of public authority and service provision, but one where informal and formal institutions are intertwined (Musa and Horst, 2019:39). According to the authors Somaliland operates as a hybrid political order and they highlight the role of corporate actors (local and external) in post-war peacebuilding and state formation. A more in-depth discussion of the Somaliland case will be done in Chapter 6.

One example of mediated stateness in action is highlighted by Nora Stel’s (2017) article which refers to the case of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Lebanese state exploring the changing governance relations between the PLO and the Lebanese state. Stel (2017:348) notes that in many instances, the state is only but one governance actor and sometimes not even the most important one. The idea of mediated stateness has played a vital role in highlighting the overlaps, interdependencies and nuances of governance, paving the way for the notion of multi-layered governance (Stel, 2017:348-349).

Following the definition of mediated stateness (by Menkhaus) the article discusses the dominance of PLO governance over the Lebanese state in the 70s mostly because Lebanon was fragmented with weak institutions to govern, and the PLO came in strong as a revolutionary liberation movement after being expelled from Jordan. The PLO was driven out of Lebanon by Israel in 1986 and although they returned, they had lost much of the governance power as the Lebanese state had regained its power after drawing on its legitimate repertoire revolving around post-war sovereignty and state-building. Although its resources were still limited it outweighed the defeated PLO. Despite the power shifts the governance of each actor shaped the other. The author emphasises that state and non-state forms of governance here are thus importantly interdependent. (Stel, 2017:367).


Considering the above Stel suggests redefining Menkhaus' mediated stateness 'as a form of governance interaction whereby state and non-state governance actors are (partly) dependent on each other and therefore (partly) shape each other's governance projects' (Stel, 2017:368-369). According to the author this new approach to the mediated state, however, requires careful differentiation between non-state governance actors that rebel against the state that hosts them and those, like the PLO, that use their host state as a 'sanctuary' to wage a liberation struggle vis-à-vis a third state (Stel, 2017:369). Different situations before, during and after war are equally important in understanding the manifestations and implications of governance beyond the state.

Although the focus of this research will not be premised on exploring hybrid political orders, it is important to highlight that such governance orders can exist between rebel groups and states. However, for this research the primary focus will be on rebel governance independent (for the most part) of the state.

3.1.3 Classifications of rebel governance

Mampilly and Stewart (2021) advance the conceptualisation of rebel governance by developing a typology of rebel political institutional arrangements. They highlight a set of four key dimensions across which rebel political institutional arrangements vary: power sharing, integration, innovation, and inclusion. From these dimensions they develop the following typology of rebel institutional arrangements (Mampilly and Stewart, 2021:17).

Figure 2: Dimensions and range of variation of rebel political institutions



Source: Mampilly and Stewart (2021:21)

They provide ideal type cases for each type of rebel political institution namely: 1. Martial law-Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 2. Partial subjugation-Islamic State (IS), 3. Status quo (less

inclusive)- Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 3. Status quo (more inclusive)- Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), 4. Transformative (less inclusive)- Khmer Rouge (KR) and 5. Transformative (more inclusive)- African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). This research will delve into the RPF case in a later chapter, revisiting the above-mentioned rebel political institution.

Another worthwhile contribution is put forward by Furlan (2020) who provides the following multi-dimensional typology to classify governance by insurgent non-state actors. This typology allows to develop detailed and comparable assessments of the diverse patterns of rule implemented by different rebels (Furlan, 2020:478).

Figure 3: The dimensions of insurgent governance

Inclusivity	
Universality	Discrimination
Civilians	
Participants	Subjects
Generation of Compliance	
Coercion	Persuasion
Other Actors	
Inclusion	Exclusion
Institutions and Personnel	
Maintenance	Innovation
Bureaucratisation	
Formality	Informality
Executive Style	
Hierarchical	Non-Hierarchical

Source: Furlan (2020:479)

Furlan notes that although the typology is useful to understand rebel governance, it does have its limitations by “reducing a complex reality such as rebel governance to an abstract representation, the typology presents each dimension of insurgent rule as a binary distinction between opposite extremes”. In reality this is not always the case as some rebel groups can adopt a governance strategy that is a combination of the proposed extremes. (Furlan, 2020:506)

3.1.4 Rebel groups and legitimacy

Briefly, legitimacy can be understood as “the recognition of the right to govern” ... “To justify power and obedience simultaneously is the first issue involved in the question of legitimacy” (Coicaud, 2009:10). Krasner and Risse (2014:555) distinguish between empirical legitimacy (which is the extent to which those being ruled or governed accept the social and political order as fair and appropriate leading to voluntary compliance) and normative legitimacy (the degree

to which legitimacy can be justified according to external or universal moral and normative standards). Both arms of legitimacy are relevant for rebel groups as well, particularly empirical legitimacy. For the purposes of this research, legitimacy will be discussed from the basis of empirical legitimacy unless otherwise stated.

According to Schlichte and Schneckener (2015:409-410) the politics of legitimacy are integral to understanding the activities of armed actors who want to exist in the long term whether for personal, ideological, political or socio-economic reasons. They note that similarly to political actors, armed groups need to explain and justify their agendas and actions, and they need material and moral support from communities both within and outside of the conflict region. In the absence of some kind of legitimacy, an armed group is bound to fail in its attempt to stay in power. (Schlichte and Schneckener, 2015:410) Civilians often interact with NSAGs against the backdrop of the groups being the rulers and as with the case of any ruler, securing obedience is imperative to NSAGs rule (Arjona, 2017:770).

Empirically, in any case, if one studies armed groups – and in particular the more successful cases – it soon becomes very clear that these actors are largely aware of the relevance of legitimacy (Schlichte and Schneckener, 2015:414). Pamphlets, programmes, field manuals, names, symbols, gestures and public speeches – all these practices of armed groups indicate that the issue of legitimacy plays a significant role in their political thinking and manoeuvring (Schlichte and Schneckener, 2015:414). Worrall (2017: 710) writes:

“Few are the rebel groups which do not attempt to create and deploy their legitimacy to assist their rule, but too often studies of the uses of violence and/or the legitimacy of rebel groups neglect to fully recognise the trade-off required by the long- and short-term goals of rebel governance, and how, despite greater coercive power, insurgents who wish to govern must engage with other forms of power and other powerbrokers. In other words, rebels shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways, it is these negotiations over the written and unwritten rules which order everyday life that is the true crucible in which rebel governance is forged.”

Governance of civilians and the nature of support for insurgent movements during conflict constitute the basis for their post conflict legitimacy and the transition of NSAGs into electoral party politics (Podder, 2013:19). This evidence of commitment to wartime governance and institution building, and adherence to a clear political agenda, offers the strongest indicator of stabilising potential (Podder, 2013:19). It can be said then that insurgents being legitimate in the eyes of their constituencies is a necessary condition to build authority and consolidate

power, a sentiment echoed by Krasner and Risse (2014:555) when they say that legitimacy constitutes a necessary condition for the effectiveness of state-building or service delivery.

3.1.5 External dynamics influencing conflict and its outcomes

Before the chapter turns to a more in-depth discussion into rebel governance and the post-conflict setting, it is worth briefly reflecting on the role of external actors and how they can influence not only the legitimacy of rebel groups during a conflict, but also shape the post-conflict dynamics of insurgent victories and transition processes from rebels to state actors.

From a western peacemaking model, non-state legitimacy, especially that of traditional and local forms are celebrated in so far as they remain subservient to and instrumental for an international and normative understanding of legitimacy (Podder, 2017). In the case of armed groups, the reliance on political violence and terrorism means international actors rarely recognise them as legitimate political actors. Historically, groups that support national liberation goals with a view to transforming into a secular democratic government were successful in securing external recognition for e.g., South Sudan, Namibia and South Africa etc. States and other international actors such as diaspora communities, co-ethnics, and transnational terror networks routinely provide material, logistical and ideological support to armed groups. (Podder, 2017)

3.1.6 Legitimation of rebel groups by external actors pre and post conflict

Terpstra (2020) says that the dynamics of rebel governance and rebel legitimacy do not exist in isolation from other powerful actors and as such powerful external actors may also influence the relationship between armed groups and civilians. He examines how the external intervention in support of an incumbent government and withdrawal of external forces shape rebel legitimacy dynamics and rebels' opportunities to govern, looking at the case of the Taliban. He distinguishes between two forms of legitimacy: 1. pragmatic-delivery based legitimation and 2. moral-a broader set of social norms and moral codes in society. He found that moral forms of legitimacy resonated particularly during instances of external intervention, whereas pragmatic forms of legitimacy became more relevant after the withdrawal of external forces and during periods of the Taliban's opponents' ineffective governance. (Terpstra, 2020).

South and Joll (2016) looked at the peace processes involving Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, and the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar and one of the

factors they looked at was the role of international involvement as a key variable in the peace process. The authors noted that the peace process in the Philippines has largely involved international advocacy whereas the Myanmar process has been a more domestic affair. For the MILF the internationalisation of the peace process resulted in significantly enhanced legitimacy and political credibility on the national and regional stages. (South and Joll, 2016)

The following case (which brings it closer to the geographical scope of the research) illustrates how external support can influence the post-conflict dynamic. Leão (2007) examined the cases of Angola and Mozambique who both share a common colonial history being former Portuguese colonies, to add to debate about the dynamics of non-state actors, the environment within which they operate and the role of the leverage which the international community can or cannot apply. The author refers to the former rebel groups *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*-UNITA (Angola) and RENAMO (Mozambique) who were part of their respective country's liberation movements and note that neither could have progressed without the opportunities presented to them through the support of external actors which shaped their development, the legitimacy they enjoyed (or did not) and the choices they had available to them. UNITA sought support (financial and military) from China at the onset, then later the Western bloc; whilst RENAMO was supported mainly by South Africa and Rhodesia. (Leão, 2007)

The natural resources in each country played a decisive role in the decision-making of the movements and their endeavour for financial assistance and political legitimacy and the leverage the international community had in the peace processes. For RENAMO a peace settlement was more advantageous than a protracted conflict whilst for UNITA diamond wealth (and the revenues generated) overshadowed any foreseeable gain from a peace agreement. A resource poor Mozambique was dependent on external aid giving the international community leverage on the post-conflict outcome, whereas resource rich Angola accomplished the peace process without the involvement of the international community and its mineral wealth reduced the leverage the international community could apply. (Leão, 2007)

When it comes to the transition of rebel groups to political parties Soderberg Kovacs (2007) noted that external factors also played a role in that the transition depended on the rebel groups level of support (externally) at the time and the degree of legitimacy the international community is willing to grant rebels.

3.1.7 Impact of external actors on post-conflict settings

Berti (2016) notes that rebel groups (particularly when acting as alternative providers of governance) establish multi-layered relations with the state, the pre-existing institutions of society as well as with other domestic and international political actors. Lyons (2016; 2016a) looks at rebel victories in Africa and traces the link between war duration, the extent of external intervention, and whether the war was fought in a compact area with the nature of the post-war political parties. He argues that protracted wars in confined territories with minimal external assistance have different organisational legacies as opposed to rapid wars in vast territories with significant external involvement. The former is characterised by battle-hardened insurgents who transform into strong authoritarian parties such as seen in Rwanda and Uganda; whilst that latter saw great international involvement in overthrowing the incumbent but produced victors that found it difficult to consolidate power and overcome rivals for e.g., Libya. (Lyons, 2016;2016a)

3.2 Rebel governance and the post-conflict setting

3.2.1 Rebel governance and state formation [in Africa]

Müller (2012: 793-794) [in her article “*From rebel governance to state consolidation*” looking at the case of Eritrea] posits that successful state consolidation is positively connected to patterns of warfare. She notes that generally it has been alluded to that the categories of ‘liberation movement government’ or ‘post-liberation state’ are useful labels to understand the specific nature of African states consolidated after drawn out liberation wars or other armed insurgencies. (Müller, 2012:794).

Identifying similar cases to Eritrea such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Rwanda (to name a few), Müller says that while the concrete politics of each of these resulting states may be distinct, the underlying strategies of the post-rebel-government are based on the continuation of core features of rebel governance. At the forefront of these approaches are “extra-constitutional methods of governing based on mobilization or indoctrination combined with a drive by former rebel leaders to use war credentials to legitimize state ownership and ‘delegitimize others in competition for power and resources’”. (Müller, 2012:794)

3.2.2 Linking war termination and post-war politics

Scholars have looked at how war termination by insurgent victory shapes patterns of post-war politics and argue that civil wars that end in rebel victory are more inclined to produce democratic outcomes. This is because victorious insurgents have both the military capability to penalise spoilers and the incentives to govern justly in order to gain legitimacy from domestic constituencies and the international community (Toft, 2010). However, Fortna and Huang (2012) found little support in the quantitative data for the hypothesis that military victories—including insurgent victories—improve the prospects for democratisation. Lyons (2016) argues that the legacies of war and dynamics of the war-to-peace process following rebel victory make authoritarian regimes more likely. He notes that victorious rebellion and post-war authoritarian order are linked by a mechanism that includes the legacies of the war and the distinct imperatives of power consolidation after victory. Therefore, instead of building the conditions for more democratic regimes, path dependency will lead victorious insurgents to act as they did during the war and seize opportunities during the war-to-peace transition to consolidate their power (Lyons, 2016:168). Weinstein (2007) concluded that negotiated settlements are more likely to lead to renewed violence and to increased authoritarianism as weak governments crack down on the opposition.

Table 2: How war termination of insurgent victory shape patterns of post-war politics

Insurgent victory	Insurgent victory	Insurgent victory	Negotiated settlement
<i>more democratic inclined; most stable war outcome</i>	<i>more authoritarian inclined</i>	<i>little evidence to support more democratic inclined</i>	<i>renewed violence and increased authoritarianism</i>
Toft (2010)	Lyons (2016)	Fortna and Huang (2012)	Weinstein (2007)

Authors own summary based on reviewed literature.

It is evident from the above that there is a strong contradiction in how the different types of war termination shape post-war dynamics, particularly with regards to insurgent victory.

3.3 The impact of rebel governance on the post-conflict state

3.3.1 From “rebels to rulers”

de Zeeuw (2007:1) notes that “one of the key factors defining the success of civil war endings is the ability of former rebel movements to transform themselves into ‘normal’ political organisations... [but this] is arguably one of the hardest peace building challenges.” Postwar state-building is not easy as “war makers” pivot to become “state-makers” (Bakke, Linke, O’Loughlin and Toal, 2018:159). For armed groups, winning the war against the state is merely the beginning. At its core, the issue for former “war makers” is to illustrate to their citizens that they now can make good on their (implicit or explicit) commitment to be “state-makers”. They must convince their citizens that not only can they destroy but they can also build. (Bakke, Linke, O’Loughlin and Toal, 2018:159)

3.3.2 Transitioning from rebel groups to political parties

Whether or not former armed rebel movements are successful in their transition to legitimate political parties in a post-civil war context is strongly linked to their ability to construct their legitimacy during conflict. de Zeeuw (2007) argues that a successful conversion from rebel group to party depends on the motivation, structure and leadership of a rebel movement, but can also be influenced by other factors such as the way the conflict was settled (i.e. negotiations or military victory), and the local political and security context.

Indicators of a successful transformation from rebel group to political parties are disarmament and demobilisation of group fighters, renunciation of violence, a demonstrated commitment to implement the peace accords, and the acceptance of elections as the only legitimate means to political power. Some examples of this type of transformation are the NRM/A in Uganda and RENAMO in Mozambique. (Ishiyama and Batta, 2011:371) Partial transformation takes place when rebel leaders recognise that their movement has to change so as to be able to participate in political life, however they do not completely discontinue the armed struggle resulting in a hybrid political organisation, an example being Hamas (Ishiyama and Batta, 2011:371). A façade transformation is one where the group speaks the rhetoric of rebel-to-party transformation as a ploy to continue receiving money and support, putting up a façade military front to disguise their military activities. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia is an example of a façade transformation. (Ishiyama and Batta, 2011:371)

Cunningham et al (2021) note that rebel elections and rebel participation in elections during conflict may make their transition to participating in the post-conflict political system smoother, and the establishment of coherent, organised political parties easier. Ishiyama and Basnet (2022) find that former rebel parties are more clientelistic and personalistic in nature than any other parties.

3.3.3 The outcomes of rebel governance on the post-conflict setting

As mentioned at the beginning of the dissertation, the rebel governance literature has been primarily focused on the drivers of rebel governance rather than its outcomes. Notable exceptions suggest that rebel governance can have long-term impacts on state institutions. Huang (2016a), for example, demonstrates that postwar regimes are deeply rooted in wartime rebel governance experience. Looking at how rebel governance shapes post-conflict representation, Loyle (2020) demonstrates the presence of learning mechanisms which transfer skills and expectations from rebel judiciaries to post-conflict rule of law.

While observing that candidates who participated in rebel governance have a record to run on, leading to governance experience and potentially higher quality candidates, Dresden (2017) argues that certain rebel capacities will translate more easily into post-conflict political competition; and Horowitz and Starn (2014) show that of all heads of state, those who are former rebels are the most likely to use force, potentially implying that politicians with former experience in rebel governance may behave differently than non-former rebels. Müller (2012) highlights the continuity between core features of rebel governments during the war and their politics in resulting states, and the importance of war credentials for legitimising state ownership.

3.4 Rebel governance and state-building

3.4.1 Inclusion of former rebel groups in state-building

Legal issues

An important element in peace mediation work for the past two decades has been learning how to talk or deal with armed groups. Traditionally, however, a key difficulty in engaging with non-state armed groups is that they lack a legal “personality” and therefore official recognition within the main legal and normative frameworks governing the use of force. International

engagement with NSAGs within the framework of a legally-binding agreement is increasingly viewed as central to the planning of humanitarian and development assistance in conflict-affected areas. (Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011) Further to this, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has also recognised the importance of granting parallel and legitimate roles to non-state actors, such as rebel forces and militias, in peace agreements (UNSC, 2007).

Application of humanitarian and human rights legal instruments for both state and non-state violence

International humanitarian and human rights law is primarily binding on and applicable to states however there has been a growing need to apply legal norms equally to both states and non-state armed violence (Podder, 2012). Rebel leaders being indicted and going on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity, has resulted in stronger checks on the behaviour of non-state armed groups in fragile and conflicted states (Sriram, 2008). War crimes trials have become a significant development in how the international community has engaged with NSAGs. These issues provide an overarching framework for international policy responses to terrorism and state-building efforts (Podder, 2012).

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)

Lasting peace is often a result of successful DDR and a political transformation of rebel groups (Podder, 2012). International policymakers are proactive in the arena of ex-combatant reintegration and terrorist rehabilitation efforts. These have important linkages with the overall societal reconciliation process. Post-conflict terrorist rehabilitation and prevention of recidivism or further radicalisation is premised on effective reconciliation and elements of social and economic justice. (Podder, 2012). These processes range from the basic need for co-existence to the more complex stage of re-establishing trust to foster more cooperative and constructive relationships (Stovel, 2008). Institutionalisation of truth and reconciliation commissions and other mechanisms of transitional justice that can strengthen peace settlements have become increasingly popular. These truth-telling processes have both positive and negative consequences. They can encourage societal reconciliation through acceptance of wrongs, seeking forgiveness and punishing perpetrators. However, they are equally capable of excluding particular groups in society through identification and targeting (Podder, 2012).

3.4.2 State-building during and after conflict

The ability of armed groups to successfully institutionalise and turn their violent domination into political power can be related to their formation trajectory (Podder, 2013:34). Ad hoc groups are identified as possessing weaker social ties and can be more prone to fragmentation and decay. A further consideration is the rebel group's ability to access resources. The type of resources it can access determines the trajectory of its political and democratic transformation (Podder, 2013:34). Popular support, internal cohesion of the organisation, and international legitimacy are key variables underpinning the transition of rebel groups into constructive political roles. These factors are likely to influence the group's willingness to cooperate in state-building activities. Groups that exhibit these characteristics can play potentially stabilising roles in state building. (Podder, 2013:34)

In her PhD dissertation Huang (2012:47) talks about rebel state-building and notes that this phenomenon is a common feature in civil wars. It is how rebels establish their authority, secure war support from ordinary citizens, and prevent defections. During the conflict rebels may variously provide leadership, social organisation, ideology, physical security, and social services such as education and health care in return for civilian collaboration in the war. As they extract resources, overtime these groups become state-builders in areas where the state has failed, or was unable to exert a presence. (Huang, 2012:47-48). In Huang's words wartime state-building does bestow the rebels with governance capacity, institution-building experience, and a set of governance institutions, all of which are conducive to the building of a stronger postwar state (Huang, 2012:53). Looking at the type of rebels that tend to state-build, Huang adds that it is those [rebels] that depend on civilians for money and materiel. This suggest that rebel governance involves a two-way relationship between the rebel governors and the governed (Huang, 2012:93).

According to Bakke, Linke, O'Loughlin and Toal (2018:159) winning against the state is the first step but if armed groups are not able to convince the citizens that they will be credible rulers, the post-war era is likely to be plagued by distrust and potentially cycles of violence as no can afford to let their guard down. After the conflict has ended, an important task for armed groups to make credible their commitment to rule is for the new rulers to be good state builders. (Bakke, Linke, O'Loughlin and Toal, 2018:159)

The state-building process during and after conflict is slow and arduous (Blair, Moscoso-Rojas, Castillo and Weintraub, 2022:1258).

“States transitioning out of civil war typically struggle to (re)establish authority in areas previously governed by armed groups. They usually have limited physical infrastructure and operate under severe financial and human capital constraints. These constraints are compounded by citizens’ distrust, which is often the result of years of state repression or neglect. If states remain weak, then governance gaps that emerge as rebel groups demobilize may exacerbate crime and conflict at the local level”. (Blair, Moscoso-Rojas, Castillo and Weintraub, 2022:1258)

3.4.3 Impact of rebel institutions on post-conflict state-building

Earlier in this chapter it was mentioned that up to now not a lot is known about the long-term impact of rebel governance institutions on post-conflict state-building (Loyle et al., 2023). However, scholars are starting to investigate this dynamic, for e.g., Bateson, 2020; Jung and Cohen, 2020; Moncada, 2017 observe that there is evidence that criminal governance complicates state-building, but the political nature of rebel governance may facilitate state-building if rebel governance institutions could be co-opted. While there is mounting evidence that civilians prefer harsh governance (by the state or the rebels) to ambiguous control (Revkin, 2021); Justino et al. (2019) identify a positive relation between exposure to wartime rebel rule and the ability of households to cope with adverse weather shocks in the post-war period, explained by the provision of public goods in wartime by armed groups and their levels of interaction with local populations.

In her paper Justino (2022:4) also sets out to understand the impact of wartime governance on state-building trajectories and offers a new theoretical framing to explore six distinct state-building trajectories of post-conflict countries—stable democracy, weak democracy, stable autocracy, fragmented rule, contested autocracy, and durable disorder—each shaped by variation in forms of wartime governance. The author identifies two mechanisms that may shape these various state-building trajectories namely: a. how armed groups compete during wartime to gain authority and institutional capacity to rule over territories that may convey them power and military advantage and b. how armed groups rule and interact with civilian populations in areas they control during wartime, and subsequent civilian responses in conveying legitimacy and support to (or resist and repel) the armed group, effectively shaping ‘wartime social contracts’. (Justino, 2022:4) She proposes the following typology which shows how variation in wartime governance pushes a country towards a certain type of state-building trajectory.

Table 3: Typology of post-war state-building and regime trajectories

	Wartime Institutional Capacity	
Wartime civilian rule	<i>Strong</i>	<i>Limited</i>
<i>Inclusive rule</i>	Stable democracy	Weak democracy
<i>Exclusive rule</i>	Stable autocracy	Fragmented rule
<i>Violent rule</i>	Contested autocracy	Durable disorder

Source: Justino (2022:15)

Armed groups build their institutional and organisational capacity in various ways. Some groups replace the state in the control of prior government institutions and keep them for similar purposes, such as revenue extraction, social service provision, and security provision, among others (Justino, 2022:16). Whereas other groups implement institutions and organisations that run in parallel with the state apparatus and sometimes in collusion with (or at least without being contested by) state organisations. Secession movements are likely to favour this strategy to signal their ability to govern in the post-war period. In other cases, armed groups destroy previous institutions and bureaucracies and implement new ones that better serve their wartime objectives (Justino, 2022:16-17). The author notes that choices made by armed groups with respect to institution building in wartime have implications for state-building trajectories in the post-conflict period (Justino, 2022:17).

In ‘Governing After War’ Lui (2024:12) seeks to explain how victors stay in power after war and how their governing choices can be situated within a broader state-building process. The book theorises about state-building after civil war where the victor pursues a logic of internal conquest.

“Such conquest entails expanding state power from the victors sub-national strong-hold into uncontrolled terrain-where loyalty is weak or fractured and rivals may easily arise. To consolidate control over the state, the victor must maintain stability within (and throughout) the country to provide for citizens while preventing violent rivals, which involves not only eliminating armed groups, but also establishing the bureaucratic and development capacity to reduce the population’s appetite for rebellion in the first place.” (Lui, 2024:13)

Lui links rebel governance literature to state-building literature to argue that the ties that rebels form with civilians can (in part) help us understand where and why co-optation of civilians is possible and how the victor can spend resources to co-opt and win new supporters, without

generating dissent from its strong-hold. These rebel-civilian ties provide the organisational capacity to rebels during war, and after war they can give the victor the capacity to exercise control on the ground in different ways (Lui, 2024:14). Lui theorises that it is social control during war that matters for understanding post-war state-building, control and stability. In other words, the geographical coverage of the rebels' territorial control during the war, does not matter as much as the actual ties that rebels form with civilians for consolidating post-war power. (Lui, 2024:14)

Lui presents the cases of the Zimbabwe Liberation War (1972-1979) and the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1996) to demonstrate how political survival shapes post-war resource allocation strategies, and although both war dynamics were different both rebel groups used cooperation and coercion to achieve their aims. Furthermore, their post-war governing strategies were both similar in that they emphasised surviving an internal challenge to their rule (Lui, 2024:19). The author notes that these cases highlight the importance of understanding how wartime dynamics condition rebel behaviour and cooperation with civilians independently of rebel aims, and how such cooperation empowers new classes of local supporters to help the victors consolidate power (Lui, 2024:19). A noteworthy take-away (which this research pays close attention to) from both Justino and Lui is the implications of the choices made by rebel groups regarding governing and institution building on post-conflict state-building.

The above review of literature provides a synopsis of the relevant literature pertaining to some important aspects of what my research will delve into namely: rebel governance and linking it to [post-conflict] state-building. This research distinguishes between a secessionist rebel victory (in the case of Somaliland), rebel victors becoming the ruling party (in the case of Rwanda) and rebel group becoming main opposition party (in the case of Mozambique). Against the backdrop of the existing literature, this research unpacks each case and examine the evidence that may give us an indication of a groups posture on governance and how this can predict if a group will be involved in demilitarisation, nationwide governance and ultimately state-building; and which groups do better in governance after conflict.

These research goals and case study choices are directly informed by the central research questions guiding this study. The first question: whether there is a relationship between rebel governance and post-conflict state governance, aligns with the broader objective of exploring how wartime governance postures influence later political roles, including ruling, opposing, or separating from the state. The second question: what factors influence a group's interest in governance, and which activities signal readiness, guides the unpacking of institutional,

ideological, and organisational elements across the three cases. The third question: whether hierarchically, ideologically, or ethnically organised groups perform better in governance, is addressed by comparing the outcomes and capabilities of the case study actors in terms of their governance performance and roles in state-building. Together, the questions anchor the comparative logic of the study and provide a framework for interpreting each group's transition from rebellion to political actor.

Chapter 4: Research Methodology

The following chapter presents the research design and methods that were used for undertaking this study. It explains the research design, study variables, research method, case selection, data collection and analysis, the study limitations and research ethics.

4.1 Research design

The overarching aim of the study was to look at the long-term impact of rebel governance structures on the process of post-conflict state-building.

To address the above research statement the study used a qualitative research design. Qualitative research is concerned with the collection and analysis of non-numerical data with the aim of gaining an understanding of the social reality of individuals, groups and cultures (McLeod, 2019). Qualitative data take the form of words and are analysed and presented in the form of case studies, critiques and sometimes verbal reports (Frey, Botan, and Friedman, 1992). For this study the qualitative research design was preferred over a quantitative design as it would provide an opportunity for in-depth analysis and explanations that could reveal more about the data. Furthermore, due to the nature of the population of interest for the study (which is rebel groups turned state actors) the qualitative design was more suitable.

4.2 Key variables

The dependent variable in the research was the process of state-building. This was understood in terms of state capacity where the following attributes were observed:

1. Legitimacy — whether the state is accepted by its citizens (empirical legitimacy)
2. Capacity — whether the state can perform in its core functions: administrative, rule of law and the provision of public goods
3. Territorial control — whether the state has established territorial rule
4. Government effectiveness — whether the state has been effective in governance

The main independent variable was group posture on governance. Group posture on governance was operationalised and measured as follows:

1. Group organisation and goals — how rebel groups are organised and what their ideology (if applicable) and aims were

2. Interest in governance — whether they communicate (explicitly or implicitly) an interest in governing (including vaccine campaign cooperation) and demonstrate a readiness for taking over governance of all or a part of the state
3. State-like governance — whether they set up parallel institutions to either perform some governance functions or at least mimic the organisation of the state during conflict

To analyse the variables and their relationship to each other the research used a case study method mainly through process tracing (PT).

4.3 Research method

The case study method enables a researcher to closely examine the data within a specific context. Case studies are fundamentally designed to explore and investigate contemporary real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships. (Zainal, 2007) By using a case study design the researcher can go beyond the quantitative statistical results and understand the behavioural conditions through the actor's perspective. Furthermore, case study helps explain both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction, and analysis of the cases under investigation. (Zainal, 2007)

The case study method was adopted as it is valuable for several reasons. Firstly, it is ideal for generalising using the type of test that Karl Popper (1959) called “falsification” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). “Falsification is one of the most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected: if just one observation does not fit with the proposition, it is considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 228). Secondly, the case study is useful for both the generation and testing of hypotheses, but it is not limited to these research activities alone. Thirdly, it does not have a greater bias toward verification of the researcher's preconceived notions than other methods of enquiry; rather, it often reveals a bias toward falsification of such notions. Lastly, although it may be difficult to summarise case studies due to the complexity of the reality studied, the case study method can contribute meaningfully to the cumulative development of knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229; 237; 241).

However, it is important to acknowledge that the case study method has its limitations, particularly concerning the issue of generalisability. While Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that generalisation can occur through strategic case selection and that richly detailed cases can yield powerful theoretical insights, other scholars highlight the challenges of extrapolating from

single cases to broader populations. For instance, Yin (2014) distinguishes between statistical generalisation, which is often inappropriate for single case studies, and analytic generalisation, wherein case study findings are compared to theoretical propositions. Yin (2013) further cautions that case studies require careful attention to validity and transparency if they are to support broader generalisations.

Similarly, Maoz (2002) critiques single case studies in international relations for their limited external validity and suggests that their findings should be interpreted with caution when applied beyond the specific context under study. Willis (2014) also discusses how single case study analysis, while providing depth and contextual richness, may lack the representativeness needed for generalising conclusions. Nonetheless, he notes that such studies can still inform theory-building, especially when cases are selected purposively to illuminate particular phenomena.

While this study adopts the case study approach for its capacity to offer deep explanatory insight, it also remains mindful of the method's inherent limitations, especially concerning generalisability. As such, the aim is to explain variations in outcomes within the selected cases, rather than to produce findings that are broadly generalisable.

The research sought to contrast rebel group's behaviour through two distinct periods of time namely: 1. the conflict period-emergence of the rebel group and its governance during the civil war was analysed) and 2. the post-conflict period-rebel group behaviour during the transition and its governance when turned state actor. This set the grounds for the PT analysis as it allowed the researcher to trace causal meanings in these two periods.

PT is a key technique for capturing causal mechanisms in action and it usually proceeds through a combination of induction and deduction (Bennett and Checkel, 2015). PT is considered a tool for data collection and analysis (UNDP, 2022). There are two overall types of PT namely: theory-centric and case centric (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). Theory centric PT aims to contribute to broader theoretical debates by tracing mechanisms in single cases with the purpose of generalising to small populations; whereas case-centric PT's goal is to formulate comprehensive explanations of historical cases to better understand them instead of generalising to broader populations (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). In this research case centric PT was the focus to explain an outcome. Through case centric PT this study was able to trace the variation in post-conflict state-building trajectories having identified specific causal mechanisms that were observed in this research.

4.4 The causal mechanisms

Falleti and Lynch (2009:1143) define causal mechanisms (CM) “as portable concepts that explain how and why a hypothesized cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular outcome”. “Outcomes of causal mechanisms are not fixed but dependent on the contexts within which they occur” (Falleti and Lynch, 2009:1152). The following were identified as the potential causal mechanisms in action that can explain how rebel governance impacts the process of state-building post-conflict.

- CM 1: Exclusionary or inclusionary governance in relation to the local population
Hypothesis- Rebel groups that are inclusionary in their administration of civilians have better prospects of a reliable role in governance as opposed to the rebel groups that are exclusionary.
- CM 2: Type of group organisation
 - Hierarchically organised groups
Hypothesis: Hierarchical rebel groups will be better for post-conflict governance because of better command structures as opposed to non-hierarchical groups
 - Ideologically organised groups
Hypothesis: A strong ideology and group coherence can increase a rebel group’s will to commit to governance and readiness to compromise.
 - Ethnically homogenous groups
Hypothesis: Ethnic homogeneity in rebel groups improves coherence and ability to credibly commit to agreements and there is a less likelihood of splinter groups emerging.
- CM 3: Establishment of governance structures during conflict
Hypothesis: Rebel groups that set up governance structures during conflict are more likely to carry these structures over to the post-conflict setting if they become rulers

Identification of the above causal mechanisms:

For CM 1: Through the review of literature, the research identified and relied on credible sources that gave insight into rebel groups type of governance (if there was) in relation to the local population during conflict.

For CM 2: The following criteria were used to identify and label each rebel group:

- Hierarchically organised group — the rebel group has a clear chain of command
- Ideologically organised group — 1. the rebel group explicitly articulated its ideology and/or 2. the group was created based on an ideology
- Ethnically homogenous group — whether the group was predominantly made up of members who shared the same ethnicity.

In applying the above characteristics to hierarchical organisation, ideologically based organisation, and ethnically homogenous organisation to the case types, this research adopts a flexible and context-aware approach. These variables are not treated as static or mutually exclusive categories, but as organisational tendencies that can manifest differently depending on historical, social, and strategic contexts.

For CM 3: Through the review of literature, the research identified and relied on credible sources that gave insight into the governance structures that were set-up (if any) by rebel groups and whether these governance structures were carried over to the post-conflict setting.

Because this research relied on scholarly literature it was limited to the information that was available in the sources used. Having the above criteria for identifying the causal mechanisms was useful in not only managing the information found but also navigating where there were gaps, for example, lack of clarity on whether a rebel group was ideologically organised or not if there was no explicit information found indicating this.

4.5 Case type selection

The following case types were selected based on information-oriented selection, the purpose of which is to maximise the utility of information from small samples and single cases (Flyvberg, 2006:230). The case types selected illustrated maximum variation cases and these serve the purpose of obtaining information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome (Flyvberg, 2006:230).

1. Somaliland: this served as an illustrative case to show how the SNM rebels became state-builders and why a positive state-building trajectory can be observed.
2. Rwanda: this served as an explanatory case to show how the transition to state actors of the RPF rebels was successful and how Paul Kagame (former commander of the RPF

rebel force turned statesman) has played an integral role in the countries state-building trajectory.

3. Mozambique: this served as an instrumental case showing why the RENAMO rebels transition to state actors has been successful on paper but has been met with challenges; and as such it can be said that this has been a contributing factor (amongst others) to stifled state-building in the state due to the difficulties of power-sharing.

The research limited itself to the discussion of these three cases which individually can be sub-categorised as follows:

1. Somaliland: Secessionists/Separatists (rebel led state)
2. Rwanda: Change of regime (rebel victors become governing party)
3. Mozambique: Power-sharing agreement (rebel group becomes main opposition party)

The cases allowed the researcher to explain an observable variation in both the dependent and independent variables.

4.6 Data collection and analysis

Analysis of the case studies is based on primary and secondary information drawn from scholarly works, official documents and relevant material of rebel groups and other relevant actors where necessary. The sources that were used were limited to English mainly using search words such as insurgent groups in Africa, rebel governance and state-building. The research did an extensive literature review to understand the historical context of each case study and used process tracing to connect it to the contemporary state to better understand the trajectory of state-building post-conflict. The research also extracted and analysed data from the World Bank. The World Bank data was suitable because of the longer time series, data was available from as far back as 1996 up to 2022.

The data that was extracted from the World Bank databank, looked at the World Development Indicators. For the purposes of this research the focus was on the category of 'Public Sector: Policy and Institutions' indicators presenting select aggregate governance indicators; and 'Health' with a focus on Disease Prevention.

4.7 Study limitations

The major limitation of the study was the lack of primary data collection. Due to the nature of the target population, it was impractical to gain access to former rebels turned leaders to collect

data. However, the qualitative approach to the study was still very useful as it enabled the researcher to draw implications from the case study findings.

4.8 Research Ethics

The research has not used human subjects therefore there was no need to acquire ethical clearance. The study has relied on secondary data which is available to the public and therefore there are generally no sensitivity issues around this data.

Chapter 5: Rebellion in Africa

The following chapter explores the history of rebellion in Africa and examines the stationary v roving bandits' distinction. The chapter discusses the provision of health services under the umbrella of rebel governance with regards to vaccination campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa.

5.1 Rebel movements in Africa

According to Bøås and Dunn (2007:1-2) guerrilla movements occupy the centre stage of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, but they are not a new phenomenon. Many African states have experienced armed nationalist struggles for independence and/or post-independence civil wars. During much of the twentieth century these conflicts were often fuelled by the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union treated Africa as part of their zero-sum global geopolitical competition. (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:2) Several of these Cold War era conflicts ceased (through collapse or resolution) following the fall of the Soviet Union, such as the Mozambique civil war which was resolved through political negotiations. In other cases, however, some of the prolonged conflicts on the continent are entering their second or third decade. These conflicts tended to be on the periphery of the Cold War and received little attention from the Cold War powers, such as the armed conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the central government in northern Uganda. (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:2)

Reflecting on Mkandawire (2002:191) he noted that "three types of post-colonial rebel movements have dominated the armed conflict scene in post-colonial Africa." The first type is the secessionists/regionalist movements, or those that are aiming for greater autonomy for a certain area which is usually inhabited by a particular ethnic group. The second type are those that, after being defeated in urban areas, retreat into and become based in rural areas. The third type are those that are externally funded returning from exile, going through the countryside on their way to urban areas. What all these movements (apart from secessionists) had in common was that they were driven by urban issues, few of which had much resonance in the countryside. For Mkandawire one could surmise that urban crisis, as opposed to agrarian crisis, was the source of rebel movements in Africa. (Mkandawire, 2002:191)

Mkandawire asserted that there were two major sources of urban conflict that resulted in crises. The first being ethnic conflict, which was often a result of intra-elite conflict. These conflicts are more often than not a result of the failure of the political system to manage social pluralism

of their respective countries and the erosion of the political pacts that nationalist have made to achieve national unity. The second source of conflict arose from the prolonged economic crisis, and the structural adjustment measures adopted to address the crisis, which put immense pressure on the African body politic. (Mkandawire, 2002:191-192). Referring to structural adjustment measures, he noted:

“They have, as elsewhere, increased income inequality and favoured dramatic increases in luxury consumption among the *nouveaux riches*, the international businessmen and employees of international organisations and NGOs that have multiplied in numbers. This has intensified the sense of ‘relative deprivation’. The dramatic increase in conspicuous consumption in the cities juxtaposed against deepening squalor has led to unravelling of the ‘social pacts’ - be they populist, corporatist or patron-clientelist-that until then provided a modicum of peace in the post-colonial era” (Mkandawire, 2002:192).

5.2 Stationary and roving rebel movements

Mkandawire went on to discuss the two major forms that rebellions take in Africa by using the distinction between ‘stationary’ and ‘roving’ bandits as explained by Mancur Olson. Before laying out Mkandawire’s thoughts, it is important to turn to Olson’s work on dictatorship, democracy and development which informed the distinction between roving and stationary insurgents.

Olson tried to make sense of how heavily populated societies in history avoided anarchy, in addition to how warlord rule was overcome in Chinese history. To address this, he starts with making a distinction between stationary and roving bandits. Stationary bandits have an interest in the administration of the territory they control, and, because of this provide domestic order and other public goods (Olson, 1993:568). Fundamentally, when a stationary bandit has monopoly on theft (income pocketed from the taxation of subjects) in his territory, the victims do not have to be concerned about theft from others. The argument is similar to that of Charles Tilly’s thesis about the role the “protection racket” played in state formation in European history (Tilly, 1985: 170-181). The victims are aware that they can keep whatever is left from their income after being taxed, and this may encourage them to save and invest, increasing future taxable income. The bandits are subsequently inclined to protect the victims as they are a source of income for them (Olson, 1993:568). Roving bandits, on the other hand, are more inclined to nomadic plunder and do not stimulate any incentive in the subjects in these territories to produce anything that can be stolen and therefore the bandits have little to steal. Because of this, roving bandits are inherently destructive, as their focus is on occasional

plunder rather than tax theft (Olson, 1993:568). Through the monopolisation of theft and protecting the population that is being taxed, anarchy is warded off.

To better understand rebel behaviour and governance, scholars have reflected on Olson's work on stationary v roving bandits. Florea (2020:1012) suggests that in de facto states, where separatists control local assets that are not mobile, they will likely foresee on-going streams of revenue and develop an interest in not only becoming stationary but also in supporting productive economic activities. de la Sierra (2020:70) notes that although armed actors can randomly be violent, these actors can paradoxically establish a monopoly of violence, tax, and provide protection if there is excess that they can continuously expropriate; building the essential functions of a state. Likewise, Stewart and Liou (2017:286) assess the two strategies that insurgents may use to extract resources: either through governance, to secure resources through cooperation, or the coercive extraction of resources. They argue that violent coercion may bring about short-term benefits, but it comes with higher long-term costs. Haas (2020:2,10-11) expands on the extractive behaviour of rebels arguing that insurgents extract resources because of their armed struggle against a government over the rule of territory. When rebels do not have control over territory, they also do not have an ideal market access to extract resources and have to rely of revenue sources that are limited. Once they can consolidate rule over a given territory, they may behave in a manner that mimics the state, be more likely to diversify their income sources and engage in governance.

Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo (2015:505) develop a theory to distinguish between the "more roving" and the "more stationary" rebels in civil wars by looking at the incentives faced by both rebel groups and governments. They highlight the effects of rebels having a local constituency, which can incentivise them to develop a social contract with that constituency, and the relative strength of the actors involved in the conflict. They concluded that rebel groups that do not have strong local ties and sufficient strength (when compared with government forces) must be mobile and be in different geographic location for them to remain viable in order to continue fighting. Stewart (2018:207) agrees that the strength of the rebel group relative to the state might significantly impact on the incentives to become either predatory or stationary. For Arjona (2017:17) the stationary and roving bandits concepts (by Olson) assist in explaining why social contracts are not appealing for rebels with short-term goals: while stationary bandits maximise long-term benefits by cutting back on their violence, roving bandits tend to have no limits in what they can do to maximise short-term gains.

Going back to Mkandawire (2002:200-201), he organises African rebel movements into stationary and roving rebels while emphasising that no movement completely fits into one category. He suggests that the rebel movements that emerged in Africa post-colonialism, have been more inclined to be the roving type influenced by factors such as the peculiarities of their agenda, leadership problems and the ethnic fragmentation of the African countryside. On the other hand, stationary rebels in Africa tend to be secessionist or regionalist in nature often arising in environments where historical grievances against central authority are deeply entrenched and tied to identity formation. These types of groups tend to root themselves in specific regions where they may enjoy support of certain ethnic constituencies. Outside of these areas however, the movement may not receive the same level of support from other ethnic groups resulting in different group behaviour. (Mkandawire, 2002:200-201)

Table 4: Overview of literature on roving and stationary groups

Summary of literature		African cases as examples (offered by the source)	
Source	Variables of interest in the source	Roving	Stationary
Arjona (2017)	Time horizon in the group's strategy Groups that have a short-term horizon are unlikely to form a social contract; this is conducive to disorder/lack of governance. Groups that have a long-term horizon will be inclined to form a social contract with the populace.	Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)	
Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo (2015)	Having a strong local constituency, e.g., an ethnic base Rebels that do not share goals with a local ethnic base benefit less from remaining stationary, are weaker, and have a greater need to stay mobile as a means of survival.	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A)
Florea (2020)	Access to lootable mineral resources Receiving external support Presence of peacekeepers Marxist ideology Long-established territorial control Rebels less likely to provide governance if they have access to lootable mineral resources. Rebels more likely to provide governance if: (a) they receive external military support; (b) peacekeepers are present; (c) have access to relatively immobile assets; (d) adopt a Marxist ideology; and (e) control the territory for a long time.	Rally for Congolese Democracy	Somaliland
Haas (2020)	Extractive behaviour of rebels Lack of territorial control equals less possibility to extract resources. Active competition with government for political authority over territory induces the intensification of resource extraction.	Revolutionary United Front (RUF, Sierra Leone); early União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL, tentatively referenced)	
Mkandawire (2002)	Secessionism/regionalism The social structures of the specific region in which groups operate may be conducive to historically long-running secessionist/regionalist aspirations and matching group conduct.	Early RPF in Rwanda, anti-Mobutu movements, anti-Kabila movements, early RENAMO in Mozambique	RUF in Sierra Leone, UNITA in Angola, sessionist/regionalist movements i.e., Eritrea or Bafria

Stewart and Liou (2017)	Methods by which insurgents extract resources Through governance and service provision: indicative of stationary bandits/rebel rulers). Through coercion/violence: indicative of roving bandits/rebel raiders.		Oromo Liberation Front (OLF, Ethiopia)
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Authors own summary.

In summary the literature indicates that groups that are secessionist/regionalist (or have a Marxist ideology), have a strong ethnic base, have access to immovable assets, and engage in governance and service provision, tend to be more stationary in nature. However, this research reiterates what Mkandawire said that no group completely fits into either category.

5.3 Rebel groups and vaccine campaign cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa

The following section turns to the service provision element of rebel governance and looking at health services. The research provides a picture of how armed groups have been involved in vaccination campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa.

A history of the involvement of non-state armed groups in vaccination efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa⁴

The period immediately after decolonisation coincided with the global campaign to eradicate smallpox. This global effort is well documented in the World Health Organisation's (WHO) commissioned history of the smallpox eradication campaign (Fenner et al., 1988), which offers a number of important examples of how challenges posed by armed conflicts were addressed i.e., very often involving NSAGs in various places in one way or another.

An early example of such cooperation featured the Anyanya separatist insurgent movement in what was then southern Sudan. The group independently conducted a vaccination campaign transporting vaccines on foot to remote areas. The Anyanya were unofficially assisted in this by the WHO itself, which provided vaccine stocks reported by its staff as "lost from inventory" (Fenner et al., 1988: 938). Likewise, during the 1973-1974 civil war in Guinea-Bissau,

⁴ This section is premised on research that was done collaboratively with my supervisor and published as a book chapter. See Marton and Ntaka (2024) in the reference list. To avoid self-plagiarism, I have used an AI tool to assist in rephrasing the text.

vaccination teams were allowed to enter by insurgents in anticipation of a role in post-colonial government (Fenner et al., 1988: 880). In Ethiopia, where Eritrea was still considered its province, a local official by the name of Ato Tadesse Fissehay managed to secure cooperation of Eritrean “dissident groups”. As a result, he was able to contain as many as 65 outbreaks with reactive measures in otherwise out of reach areas (Fenner et al., 1988: 1017). In other parts of Ethiopia, helicopters were chartered by the WHO to reach areas outside government control. However, one the helicopters was destroyed, another damaged, and a third captured, with its staff held captive for ransom, illustrating the challenges in operating in civil conflict environments (Fenner et al., 1988: 1023-1024).

Once smallpox was eradicated, post-colonial wars persisted giving rise repeatedly to the difficulties of vaccination repeatedly. Operation Rainbow, which commenced in 1986, was the new framework in which vaccination was to be carried out in Sudan by the international community. The main plan was to deliver aid by air to both government-controlled areas in northern Sudan and rebel-held regions by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) with the aim of eliminating government perceptions of a hostile or one-sided or biased beneficial intervention. However, this approach failed and in 1989 Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was launched which placed more emphasis on open cooperation with the SPLM/A for distributing humanitarian aid. The SPLM had its own humanitarian wing, including organisations like the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the Relief Association for South Sudan (RASS), and the Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association (FRRA), which were involved in vaccination and public health initiatives. The movement also had local and national-level veterinary coordinators (Jones et al., 2010:14-16) who played a role in the successful eradication of Rinderpest ("cattle plague").

Given the challenge of reaching remote and difficult-to-access areas, there was no choice but to think outside the usual constraints of international law by working with the insurgent group. As Hopkins and Withers describe, “The land (...) is vast, much of it is flooded (...) and there are few roads or other infrastructure” (Hopkins and Withers Jr., 2002: S21). They also stress the need for the international community to be flexible regarding the SPLM/A to access most of the 2,500 villages unreachable by road in Sudan.

The 1990s offered more opportunities to encourage peace agreements in Sub-Saharan African conflicts, as the influence of Cold War proxy dynamics had diminished. However, more violent

conflicts emerged, and several ongoing ones intensified, creating significant challenges for humanitarian efforts.

For example, the Lord's Resistance Army caused devastation in northern Uganda, where an Amnesty International study revealed that most remote health centres had been destroyed there by 1997, severely hindering vaccination efforts (Amnesty, 1997). In Angola, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that the ongoing civil war was severely disrupting humanitarian services and causing disease outbreaks among displaced populations, including severe illnesses like Pellagra (a Vitamin B3 deficiency) due to malnutrition. Neither the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) nor the rebel group UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) consistently cooperated to address these issues (MSF, 2001). Another MSF study observed the health impact of the 1997-2003 Congo war in parts of western and central DRC, and found that problems such as the looting of health facilities, large refugee inflows, continued conflict, and a health impact that stretched to reduced vaccination coverage in programs like the Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), particularly for tuberculosis and measles (Van Herp, Parqué, Rackley, and Ford, 2003). While conflicting parties did agree to allow immunisation campaigns under specific conditions, such as during National Immunisation Days (NIDs), consistent cooperation was only encouraged following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1234 (UNSC 1234, 1999; Levine and WWWG, 2004:4).

Despite its negative reputation, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone occasionally allowed government vaccination teams access after the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord, though fighting briefly resumed afterward. The RUF's cooperation, noted by a WHO representative, included providing bicycles for logistical support, filling in trenches to improve access to certain areas, and even having interim leader Brigadier Issa Sesay personally administer the first dose of the Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV). This was significant, as there were many "zero-dose" children in RUF-controlled regions (Aldis, 2000). A study by Senessie, Gage, and Elm (2007) found that only about half of children under the age of three received full age-appropriate immunisation, despite immunisation programs not being entirely halted. The study itself faced challenges due to the conflict, with rebel attacks on eastern parts of the Greater Freetown area in early 1999 partially destroying research records.

In the period following 2001, the jihadi movement expanded into parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, sparking several Islamist insurgencies that were particularly resistant to vaccination campaigns. A study by Kennedy, McKee, and King (2015) highlights that while the connection

between non-Islamist insurgencies and polio is less clear, since 2011, Islamist insurgencies have significantly influenced where polio cases have emerged. When the COVID-19 pandemic reached Africa, some of these groups used both the virus and vaccines as tools for hostile propaganda. For instance, Somalia's Al-Shabaab claimed that COVID-19 was spread by "crusader forces", and Boko Haram framed social distancing and lockdown measures by the Nigerian government as acts of war against Muslims. However, the actual behaviour of these groups may not have changed as much as their rhetoric suggests (Berlingozzi, 2020). Shire (2020: 14-15) even mentions that Al-Shabaab reportedly formed a committee to control the virus's spread and established a treatment facility, though these claims remain unverified. Marsai and Tarrósy (2022) also noted the presence of COVID-propaganda by VEO's which threatened to jeopardise the official narratives by governments. Furthermore, extremist organisations like al-Shabaab and Boko Haram exploited the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in regions lacking effective governmental control. The authors highlight that these ungoverned spaces provided fertile ground for VEOs to expand their influence by stepping in as alternative service providers amid the crisis.

In various parts of the continent, several insurgent groups responded to UN Secretary General António Guterres' call for a global ceasefire, urging both state and non-state actors to cooperate in addressing the pandemic (UN Global Ceasefire, 2020). Initially, many insurgent groups showed some degree of cooperation, though there were exceptions and limitations (Breslawski, 2021: 4-5). However, major gaps in vaccination coverage during the COVID era were primarily due to other factors, especially the widespread disruption caused by the pandemic, which diverted already limited resources from pre-existing challenges.

In the following chapter the vaccination campaign cooperation of the rebel groups in the selected cases, during and post-conflict, will be presented.

Chapter 6: Case Studies

The following chapter will present the three case types in the research namely: Somaliland, Rwanda and Mozambique. The chapter provides a historical background for each case study from two key historical points: 1. the civil war years and, 2. the post-conflict period. It traces each groups governance trajectory during and after conflict. Secondary data is also presented and interpreted in the ‘government performance’ sections for each case. The definitions of governance indicators are provided in Appendix A.

6.1 Somaliland



Map of Somaliland, Source: Nations Online Project

6.1.1 Brief history of Somaliland

The former British Somaliland Protectorate gained its independence from the United Kingdom on 26 June 1960. On 1 July 1960, the state of Somaliland reunited with Somalia forming the Somali republic (The Republic of Somaliland Government, 2024). This was done on the basis that Somalis are the same people, speak the same language, and have a common religion

(Mesfin, 2009:3). The leaders of this emerging state wanted to create a supra-state, a Greater Somalia, an idea that would potentially serve as a unifying purpose for the consolidation of the different clan families into one Somali nation. Moreover, it was meant to serve as the most suitable means to displace the deep-rooted internal divisions between the former Italian and British colonies. (Mesfin, 2009:3)

After the fall of General Mohamed Siyad Barre in 1991 the Somali state effectively ceased to function as an administrative, ideological, juridical and territorial entity (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003:456). The Somaliland Republic broke away from the Somali state on 18 May 1991. The breakaway decision was made by the Congress of Council of Clan Elders held in Burao from 27 April to 15 May 1991 (The Republic of Somaliland Government, 2024). Most people in Somaliland belong to one of three main clan families: the Isaaq, the Dir (which includes the Gadabuursi and Ciise clans), and the Harti/Darood (which includes the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans), with the Isaaq being the largest group (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003:457). Somaliland is, however, not internationally recognised as a country.

6.1.2 The civil war and formation of the Somali National Movement

The Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in 1981 with the primary objective of removing the Barre government from power, envisioning a united Somalia albeit with a more devolved form of government (Bradbury, Obokor and Yusuf, 2003:457). The Somali civil war effectively commenced in 1982 when the SNM moved its operations to Ethiopia. Commanded by the Isaaq clan, the SNM developed ties with a number of other insurgent groups over the course of the conflict (Walls, 2009:377). The conflict drastically escalated in 1988 when the SNM captured the major northern towns, and the government responded with a hard campaign that left tens of thousands of civilians dead and forced nearly half a million into neighbouring Ethiopia as refugees (Bryden, 2004:23).

One of the groups that the SNM collaborated and had an agreement with on the plans of the period post-Barre, was the United Somali Congress (USC). General Barre also tried to use clan affiliation to his favour by co-opting the support of non-Isaaq clans from the North in his fight against the SNM. To a certain extent this was successful as many, although not all the Harti and Gadabuursi, identified with the government. (Walls, 2009:377)

Growing repression by the state and the destruction of key towns in the north-west, brought together the opposition amongst the Isaaq and it was evident in early 1990 that the regime had

lost control of much of this territory (Walls, 2009:377). Toward the end of 1990, the Somali state was in the final stages of complete state collapse (US Department of State n.d). In the beginning of December 1990, Barre declared a state of emergency as the USC and SNM forces advanced towards Mogadishu. Finally, in January 1991 armed opposition factions drove Barre out of power, resulting in the complete collapse of the central government (US Department of State, n.d).

Following the fall of the Barre regime the Dhulbahante re-established contact with the SNM and following several meetings, they agreed on a ceasefire (Walls, 2009:377-378). The SNM had never publicly vocalised that its aim was secession but the war against Barre, the experience of persecution by the regime and life as refugees, provided the foundation for the formation of a political identity among the Isaaq from whom the SNM drew most of its support (Bradbury, Obokor and Yusuf, 2003:457). After the government was declared in Mogadishu by the USC, the Isaaq fears of domination by the South were reignited and this prompted the SNM to declare, supported by elders representing the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and Gadabuursi, that Somaliland was severing ties with the south and the 'Republic of Somaliland' was founded in 1991. (Bradbury, Obokor and Yusuf, 2003:457)

6.1.3 The Somali National Movement insurgency

Origins of the SNM

The SNM was founded in 1981 in London, as an opposition political organisation, by various Somali diaspora groups from Saudi Arabia and the UK who had banded together due to their shared concerns about the activities of the Barre regime back home in Somalia (Ali, 2022:89). In 1982 the SNM started to rebel against the regime in the north of Somalia. The group had an external base of operation in Dire-Dawa, Ethiopia. Its attacks were organised in Hargeisa, Borama, Burco, and Tug Wajale (GTD 2017). The SNM is given credit for the establishment of Somaliland, a self-declared sovereign state. Although Somaliland is not recognised as a state, it exists as a de facto state (Ali, 2022:89).

The SNM's organisational structure and agenda

The group was funded through diaspora donations from Isaaq's living abroad. The group had a political and military wing (Schmid and Jongman, 1988:655; Gleditsch et al., 2011:491). It had approximately 10,000 fighters in 1991 (Gleditsch et al., 2011: 491). Members of the group were primarily Isaaq (DADM n.d.). Sheikh Yusuf Ali Sheikh Madar led the group (Gleditsch

et al., 2011: 491). The main agenda of the group was to overthrow the Barre regime. No explicit information was found pertaining to the group's ideology.

The SNM's wartime governance

Reflecting on Tilly's principles of warfare and state-making, Duffield (2014:4) states that the establishing and centralising control over violence was the SNM's first task, and one which it excelled in until the independence of Somaliland. The progression of the SNM becoming the ruling player in Somaliland's sphere of violence was a result of skilful organisation and tactical success, hence minimising the possibility of the rise of competitors and doing away with any viable alternative but to participate in peace talks with them. Furthermore, the group was able to change into a part-time, widespread, decentralised guerrilla force, tightly controlled by elders and their communities. As such it therefore removed opportunities for wartime economic activities, like plunder and extortion. (Duffield, 2014:4)

The second and third tasks were the bureaucratisation of the SNM and the civilianisation, which is the bargaining process between actors and rulers that leads to the development of accountability and the production of political identities. Political structures were put in place, particularly for securing the support of important stakeholders such as elders and financiers. Additionally, obtaining finance to sustain the fight against the Barre regime became a challenge because the SNM did not have foreign sponsorship. However, the SNM succeeded in this aspect by forming a relationship with commercial intermediaries, by encouraging entrepreneurialism but also containing it, and lastly, by taxing constituents themselves. (Duffield, 2014:4-5)

The above processes produced a negotiation between the ruler and the ruled in which the opinions of ordinary Isaaq kin mattered since they provided the resources to continue the fight. Lastly, the group mimicked a government in waiting (Duffield, 2014:4-5). The group was run by six distinct elected civilians, circumventing the challenge of military strongmen. The group developed into a highly democratic political unit, premised on the clan-based system of power-sharing which became the basis of government in Somaliland. The security of minorities that supported the Barre regime was also prioritised and reconciliation pursued. The politics of state reconstruction was notably structured by the SNM and the Somaliland state that emerged resembled the SNM in many ways, illustrating how rebels can become state-builders following the process conceptualised by Tilly. (Duffield, 2014:4-5)

Reflecting on the SNM's cooperation on vaccination campaigns during the conflict period (1982-1991), and since Somaliland is not recognised as an independent territory for Somalia, there is no information found regarding the SNM rebel's specific relation to vaccination campaigns in the country during this period. The following table summarises the SNM's structure, agenda and wartime governance.

Table 5: The Somali National Movement during conflict

Group nature and agenda	Opposition political organisation, the group wanted regime change
Organisational structure/ethnic make-up	Unitary/clan based (mainly Isaaq)
Type of rebel governance	Generally inclusive
Use of violence	SNM undertook violent attacks in its offensives
Interest in governance/readiness to govern	Yes/Yes SNM initiated state formation processes
State-like governance	Yes
Roving or Stationary	Stationary
Rebel group cooperation on vaccination (health governance)	No explicit information found on the group's activities during this period

Authors own summary based on the analysis of literature.

6.1.4 The cessation of the conflict and independence

In April 1991, the leaders of the SNM and elders from Northern Somalia met in Bur'o with the intention to conclude a lasting ceasefire and establish a transitional administration for Somalia's north-western regions (Bryden, 2004:24). The elders are said to have met for a week and agreed on a list of six resolutions, the most unexpected of which was the first: a declaration that the northern regions would establish a separate administration without links to Mogadishu (Walls, 2009: 379). However, according to Walls it had never been a SNM policy to establish an independent state in the north and many members of the leadership were against the idea because they believed that the regions were too war-torn and weak to survive on their own.

Despite this, there had been a long budding sentiment for the notion amongst the grassroots (Walls, 2009:379).

On 18 May the decision was taken to dissolve Somaliland's 1960 union with Somalia and restore its sovereignty as an independent state (Bryden, 2004:24). The then Chair of the SNM, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali 'Tuur,' took on the role of President of Somaliland for a period of two years (Walls, 2009:380), and the SNM central committee became the first parliament of Somaliland (Mesfin, 2009:4).

6.1.5 Somaliland's post-independence transition period

The SNM leadership was given the powers to draft a constitution and prepare Somaliland for elections (Mesfin, 2009:4). The interim administration was also mandated to accommodate non-Isaaq clans by enlisting their participation in the new administration. Tuur's administration faced grave political problems causing the administration and an opposition faction to be at odds. The rift within the SNM grew and in January 1992 political consensus began to break down and a conflict between two SNM factions broke out. (Mesfin, 2009:4) A resolution was achieved through mediation, but this was not enough to curb the development of a more drawn-out crisis in Berbera where the political conflict took on a clan characteristic (Walls, 2009: 381). When President Tuur, through a militia from the Isaaq clan, tried to take control of the port of Berbera, which belonged to one of the other clans of the Isaaq, fighting broke out as the clans refused to fight each other. Anti-government militias eventually succeeded in driving the government forces out of the area (Walls, 2009:381), however, later the port reverted to the Tuur administration.

After being ousted from office by a rival faction in the SNM, in 1994 Tuur declared himself in favour of federation with Somalia and joined the Somali government of General Mohamed Farah Aydiid in Mogadishu (Bryden, 2004:24) becoming Vice President after being co-opted. He became He became Civil war broke out in Somaliland, but the state survived the federalist challenge in one peace and with its commitment to separate statehood still undeterred (Bryden, 2004:24).

6.1.6 Somali National Movement Government post 1991

The Boroma Conference

The Boroma conference was a pivotal moment in Somaliland's political development. It was attended by various actors such as politicians, elders, religious leaders, businessmen, intellectuals and civil servants (Mesfin, 2009:4-5). The conference facilitated the peaceful transition of power in May 1993 from the SNM to the new civilian administration headed by Mohammed HajiIbrahim Egal, a widely respected Isaaq statesman (Mesfin, 2009:5). It also created a Transitional National Charter and an Interim Peace Charter. The National Charter outlined the political and institutional structures of a three-year administration until a constitution was enacted. The Peace Charter entrenched the use of the *Xeer* - a type of an unwritten traditional law of social conduct among the clans of Somaliland in accordance with their traditions and Islamic principles as the basis for law and order. (Mesfin, 2009:5)

The Boroma conference was crucial for the way in which it dealt with issues of representation and power-sharing by institutionalising clans and their leadership into the system of governance (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003:460). The National Charter initiated a system of government referred to as *beel* (clan or community), a system described as a dynamic hybrid of Western form and traditional substance, consisting of an Executive (*Golaha Xukuumadda*) with a President, Vice President and Council of Ministers, a Legislature, comprising a bicameral parliament with an Upper House of Elders (*Golaha Guurtida*) and a House of Representatives (*Golaha Wakiillada*) and an independent Judiciary (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003:460). By giving the elders the responsibility to select a president, ensure state security (through the management of internal conflicts and demobilising the militia), and by incorporating the *guurti* into the Upper House of the new legislature, their roles were formally recognised. By formalising the elder's role, they would function as a check on the executive and representatives. (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003:460)

The *beel* system of government recognised kinship as the organising principle of Somali society. Essentially, the government became a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland's main clans (Mesfin, 2009:5). From the president to the executive, appointments were made to ensure a clan balance (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003:460-461). In the upper and lower houses seats were proportionally allocated to clans according to a formula created by the SNM. Within this system minority clans were also given seats in parliament. Simultaneously, the patrilineal clan system meant that women were excluded from representative politics, because it was

ambiguous whether a woman would represent the clan of her husband or that of her father (Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003:461). Conversely, the *beel* system appeared to have limited the development of a fully representative and effective democracy and to have given rise to the marginalisation of the Harti clan, creating a sense of alienation among members of that clan (Mesfin, 2009:5). Furthermore, it was also criticised for lack of transparency, nepotism and corruption, with individuals from more powerful lineages favoured in government appointments (Mesfin, 2009:5).

6.1.7 The Somali National Movement as a ruling party

The members of the SNM leadership transformed themselves into state-builders for Somaliland's first government in 1991 as they were the only organisation in Somaliland with sufficient authority to establish law and order (Duffield, 2014:6). The chairman and vice-chairman of the SNM transitioned into formal politicians after 1991 and the institutions created during wartime were transplanted into Somaliland's government. However, in 1992 the progress was setback following an outbreak of violence. The SNM had become factionalised without the threat of a common enemy, thereby reminding violent specialists of potential opportunities elsewhere and lowering the cost of exiting the SNM. (Duffield, 2014:6) Furthermore, the transaction costs of fragmenting were reduced as militias were organised autonomously during wartime and each clan militia amassed and held onto its own weapons in case other violent actors emerged. The number of confrontations that flared up between the state and clan militias were over strategic assets, especially those in proximity to groups making claims of ownership, but which also justified the state in accruing the cost of organising, fighting, and claiming control over territories such as the port of Berbera. (Duffield, 2014:6) Despite these conflicts, Somaliland (SNM) was able to eliminate opponents to state-building in the following ways:

1. The state formation processes, as noted by Tilly, paved the way for the centralisation of coercion in the state, building an administration, and producing actors whose interests were tied to state-building. By laying claim lay claim to resources essential for state-building or territory, opponents were deterred, by force if necessary. Groups were disarmed and the distribution of rents and power were re-organised to accommodate those that could be co-opted. Furthermore, these processes also influenced the formation of constituencies led by elites with an interest in state-building. These groups,

whose status or positions were linked with the state-building project, thus had reasons to step in to settle disputes and see state-building continue. (Duffield, 2014:7)

2. Minority groups intervened to settle disputes between former SNM members of the same Isaaq kin. This may not have been possible had the SNM, during their insurgency, not developed a respect for the autonomy of separate clans. Minority groups also had incentive of enhancing their status and securing governmental positions through contributing to dispute resolution. (Duffield, 2014:7)
3. The president during this critical period was able to raise significant revenue from key businesspeople connected with his clan to pay for the government militia and support state-building efforts to increase state capacity. The SNM initiated this relationship with businesspeople and continued into state-building, where they provided loans and expected benefits in return, such as a stable business climate to export goods. (Duffield, 2014:7)

6.1.8 Hybrid governance: has it been effective in Somaliland?

Hoehne (2013:201) asserts that while traditional authorities were considered anachronistic institutions by post-colonial African elites and most external observers, they resurfaced as important actors in the early 1990s. This was largely due to the failure of the Weberian model of the rational-bureaucratic state to take hold in Africa (Hoehne, 2013:201). Since then, a substantial body of literature has been produced on the resurgence of traditional authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Hoehne the literature found that chiefs, elders and other traditional authorities had never ceased to be important and came to the fore again in light of state weakness, state collapse and/or state reconstruction after crisis. While the relationship between state and traditional leaders can be uneasy in many contemporary African settings, it is usually shown to be a success in Somaliland. (Hoehne, 2013:201)

The success of peacebuilding and state-building in Somaliland was primarily due to the involvement of traditional actors and customary institutions that are rooted in the traditional clan based Somali society (Boege, Browns, Clements and Nolan, 2008:13). The clan leaders and their councils were the decisive actors in the peacebuilding process, utilising customary forms and mechanisms of conflict resolution. In view of the positive role which the councils of elders played in peacebuilding, they were also delegated with important roles in the successive process of building political order, and today they are constitutionally embedded in the political system of Somaliland. They form key parts of governance, particularly regarding

conflict resolution but also with functions in the broader sphere of government and administration. Simultaneously, they are embedded in a political system that is modelled along the lines of western statehood. Somaliland is an example of an emerging state grounded in a hybrid political order. (Boege, Browns, Clements and Nolan, 2008:13)

Even though Somaliland has proven to be a functioning, effective and legitimate political entity, it has nevertheless not yet been recognised as a ‘state’ by the international community of states and its peacebuilding and state-building project has been based on the strength and resilience of the local communities. The state-building project has been a bottom-up approach and has taken place without a central monopoly of violence (post-conflict). The government does not hold the monopoly of violence. Security in Somaliland is dealt with in a decentralised manner and is mostly guaranteed by local politicians and elders. This has resulted in an indigenous type of statehood that combines customary and statutory norms and practices, enjoying high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. (Boege, Browns, Clements and Nolan, 2008:13)

Despite the above, the system based on traditional authority and consensus formation at extensive clan meetings has outlived its success. With the emergence of an increasingly powerful government under former President Cigaal (President of Somaliland from 1993 to 2002) and the transition to a (at least formally) democratic system, the hybrid political order became imbalanced to the other extreme (Hoehne, 2013:212). Two factors drove this process: firstly, many members of the Guurti became urbanised and lost contact with their local, traditional constituencies (in the Weberian sense). Their claim to legitimate traditional authority became hollow. Secondly, the Guurti was co-opted and manipulated by the successive presidents of Somaliland from the second half of the 1990s onward (Hoehne, 2013:212). Hoehne notes that:

“The case of Somaliland rather illustrates that the traditional system based on local communities and customary law and the state system based on democratic principles and statutory law merge at best for the sake of convenience on a temporary basis. While such blending of systems of authority may in fact lead to an increase in legitimacy of the hybrid political order for some time, such orders never are in balance for long. Usually one side takes the lead to the detriment of the other. In Somaliland, once the Guurti members had become the weaker partner they became vulnerable to corruption. The constitution awarded them powers which they then used to spoil the political system as a whole” (Hoehne, 2013:213).

Hoehne concludes from the Somaliland case that hybrid political orders may be effective in assisting the transition from a war-torn or very fragile context into a more stable form of

political existence. However, such hybrids are almost always imbalanced to a certain extent. (Hoehne, 2013:213-214)

Hoehne's observations are insightful because they show how combining traditional and modern ways of governing can help bring stability to countries recovering from conflict. On the other hand, the idea that these systems are "almost always imbalanced" is important to think about. Although these systems may be helpful at first, the unequal distribution of power or representation could create new problems down the line. To make these systems work long-term, it is important to have ways to fix these imbalances as they happen, so the system becomes fairer and more inclusive over time.

6.1.9 Government performance in Somaliland post 1991

Government performance data for Somaliland is tremendously limited because it is conflated with Somalia. Therefore, the dissertation has relied on official documents and scholarly literature that have reported on Somaliland's governance progress post 1991.

Somaliland, post-independence, has developed its own structures and systems of governance, drawing on elements of a clan-based system that provided the organising structure for social, economic and political activity (Harris and Foresti, 2011:6). Following the civil war, Somaliland has emerged as a state progressively capable of providing for its citizens. The progress of governance in the context of Somaliland is complicated by the fact that several key institutions look different to dominant models of state formation (Harris and Foresti, 2011:7). This is especially true when taking into consideration what a government ought to look like and how it ought to function. As such Somaliland is best understood by looking at it like a 'mediated state' in which the government relies on a coexistence with multiple actors to provide core functions. Therefore, even if the presence of formal state actors is limited or absent, governance can be analysed by considering the broader range of public actors that are involved in shaping Somaliland's rule-governed arrangements. (Harris and Foresti, 2011:7)

Rule based governance

The establishment of 'home grown' institutions in Somaliland, such as those based on clan-based institutions, and their incorporation into the new institutional arrangements, were critical in ensuring adoption and relatively wide acceptance of common rule-based norms (Harris and Foresti, 2011:7). An example of this is the *beel* system (discussed earlier in this chapter). Somaliland's adoption of a wide range of governance practices, from the formation of

ministries responsible for various tasks of the state to the recognition of separate branches of government and the separation of powers among them, has allowed it to cultivate a sense of external legitimacy, an important part of the quest for recognition. These institutions are connected to traditional institutions in a hybrid political order. (Harris and Foresti, 2011:8-9)

Provision of public goods

Peacebuilding and the provision of basic security

Somaliland's growing monopoly on the use of force constitutes a major contribution not only to its claims of being a state but also in its ability to provide key public goods to its population (Harris and Foresti, 2011:10). Although the geographically incomplete monopoly remains a work in progress, the Somaliland state is now the recognised authority responsible for the legitimate use of force. The earliest efforts to re-establish basic security in Somaliland relied on a series of peace conferences in the wake of the civil war and these conferences provided a peace-building mechanism, rooted in traditional Somali dispute settlement mechanisms, to achieve reconciliation among the various clans that had participated in the conflict. Clan militias were disarmed and demobilised largely through their incorporation into the national army, which provided them with a steady wage. Together with a newly established civilian police force, this constituted a national security force, consolidated under centralised national control rather than clan control. (Harris and Foresti, 2011:10-11)

Service delivery: health, education and utilities

The provision of public services, including health, education and utilities, is often assumed to be a necessary condition to overcoming fragility, as service delivery is linked closely to citizens' perceptions of state legitimacy (Harris and Foresti, 2011:12). While the processes and structures of public administration in Somaliland are preoccupied largely with security, service provision has improved significantly since the late 1990s, through a combination of limited government provision (particularly at the municipal level), contributions from NGOs, religious groups, the international community (including both governments and the Diaspora) and a growing private sector. The local and municipal governments can support the provision of key public services directly. The key role played by non-state actors in ensuring provision of those services that are currently available seems likely to be necessary for some time, given the lack of financial resources available to the state. (Harris and Foresti, 2011:12-13)

Economic recovery

Somaliland's post-conflict economic recovery was led by the private sector, as the Somaliland government did not have the necessary internal resources to conduct basic governance functions (Musa and Horst, 2019:39). Livestock, telecommunications and remittances are three key pillars of the economy, and they are all in the hands of the private sector. The first sector depends on trade with the Gulf states, whereas the last two sectors heavily depend on the large community of Somalis abroad and the extensive transnational exchanges that this diaspora engages in. (Musa and Horst, 2019:39)

Despite some of the limitations on the government, Somaliland has made significant progress in governance through rule-based institutions, the provision of essential public goods and fostering an environment for economic recovery.

Health governance post-independence: cooperation on vaccination campaigns

Historically the state of Somalia has been characterised by poor vaccination coverage. Regardless of the vaccination efforts that started in 1979 through the WHO Expanded Programme on Immunisation, a survey that was conducted in Mogadishu and Hargeisa (the current day capital of Somaliland) found that only 19% of children were fully immunised. (Oldfield, Rodier and Gray, 1993: S139). At the time, the poor vaccination coverage led to a high level of vaccine preventable diseases, even in the cities and during periods of relative stability. In the National health Plan for 1980-1985, 180 000 cases of measles were reported, and an estimated 90% of 1 year old cohorts had been infected. The population also suffered a reported 9,970 cases of tetanus neonatorum with a mortality rate greater than 90% with an estimated 5% of all live-born infants being affected. Considering the social disruption (because of the civil war) that was happening in Somalia, vaccine coverage was near zero except when it was provided by relief agencies. (Oldfield, Rodier and Gray, 1993: S139)

Decades of civil war and factional fighting have had a negative impact on all spheres of life in Somalia. The political landscape has been dominated by instability and insecurity, although there has been some semblance of stability in Puntland and Somaliland (Kamadjeu et al., 2011: S313). The country's Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS) strategy was launched in 2014 and an important new scheme for providing a comprehensive range of health services, delivered through maternal and child health (MCH) centres and health posts (IFRC, 2020:4).

However, because of the limited supply of trained human capacity, changing work hours and other obstacles, there is still a wide range in the quality of Somalia's health services (IFRC, 2020:4). Across Somalia coverage of basic health services is low with health care service delivery being fragmented and delivered through national and international NGOs with the support of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the WHO and other UN and aid agencies (Kamadjeu et al., 2011: S313). In spite of these challenges, the country has been able to implement accelerated measles control activities since 2005 (a key health problem in Somalia), subsequently reducing the reported number of measles cases and deaths (Kamadjeu et al., 2011: S313).

Somalia's polio and immunisation programs are supported exclusively by Gavi and GPEI funds, routed mainly through WHO and UNICEF. Humanitarian organisations that operate in Hargeisa include the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS), the International Rescue Committee (IRC). International CSO's present are Save the Children; and a coordination forum called the NGO consortium which was established in 1999 made up of a network of NGOs working together to improve international aid coordination. (IFRC, 2020)

The administration of disease control activities in Somalia have required the adoption of distinctive strategies, one of them being collaborating with de facto local authorities. Following the collapse of the central government, numerous local authorities have filled the gap in the control of localities including districts, regions, and zones (Kamadjeu et al., 2011: S314). Adjusting to the changing political landscape and maintaining political neutrality by working with the de facto local authorities, notwithstanding their political or ideological affiliation has been crucial. Another key strategy has been the involvement of community elders; from the experience of Polio supplementary immunisation activities (SIAs), community elders participate in all campaign preparatory and implementation activities including: provision of security to vaccinators, selection of volunteers, selections of vehicles for car rentals etc. This element of participation and community ownership of SIAs has made it possible for measles campaigns to be conducted in most part of Somalia regardless of who controls specific localities. (Kamadjeu et al., 2014: S314)

Somalia is today still a fragile state where large scale displacement and insufficient access to functioning health care service has left children vulnerable to morbidity and mortality from vaccine preventable disease, this is also the case for the children living in the autonomous zone of Somaliland (Kinuthia et al., 2014:11). As reported in the Kinuthia et al. paper a survey done

in Somaliland⁵ showed that one third of the resident children have access to immunisation services (based on DTP1 coverage) and less than one-in-four children receive the recommended 3 doses of DTP (Kinuthia et al., 2014:12). Some of the reasons for not receiving immunisations through the RIS in Hargeisa were lack of motivation, lack of information and lack of availability of vaccines. Likewise, outside of Hargeisa lack of motivation and lack of information were the common reasons for not received immunisations, followed by the place of vaccination being too far (Kinuthia et al., 2014: 14).

Despite the above, in Hargeisa 81% of children aged 0-59 months had received at least one routine vaccination (diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis [DTP] vaccine, oral poliovirus [OPV] vaccine and/or measles-containing vaccine [MCV] in their lifetime either through child health days (CHDs), routine immunisation services (RIS), or both. Outside of Hargeisa, 84% of children aged 0-59 months had received at least one routine vaccination in their lifetime from CHDs and/or RIS. But, unlike Hargeisa, caregivers outside of the city were less likely to use RIS only, instead more likely to use CHD only. (Kinuthia et al., 2014:14,16)

In 2014 the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), working with the government of Somaliland and in partnership with UN agencies, opened a new Digaale permanent settlement in Hargeisa for 500 displaced families who previously lived in temporary settlements (IOM, 2014). The IOM was collaborating closely with the Ministry of Health to provide free primary healthcare services at the new settlement which included ante-natal and post-natal care, immunisation, day treatment and stabilisation prior to hospital referral and medication. An IOM-supported health post in the settlement received donations of primary healthcare kits and vaccines for routine immunisation of children and pregnant/lactating women (IOM, 2014).

The Somaliland Demographic Health Survey 2020 (SDHS-2020) showed that approximately 13% of children between the ages of 12 and 23 months were fully vaccinated, while 68% of children had not received any vaccination (Abdilahe et al., 2023:2). Regarding specific vaccines, 31% of children under-five had received BCG vaccine, 32% had pentavalent 1, 15% pentavalent 2, and 13% of children had received Pentavalent 3. On the other hand, 32% of children had received polio 0 vaccines, 32% had received polio 1 vaccines, 16% had received the polio 2 vaccine and 15% of children had received polio 3 vaccines. On the other hand, around 15% of children had received measles vaccination at any time before the survey.

⁵ UNICEF, “Preliminary Results 2011 Multiple Indicator Survey-Somaliland,” United Nations Children’s Fund, 3 United Nations Plaza, New York. www.childinfo.org/mics4.html

(Abdilahi et al., 2023:2) In their study, conducted at Mohamed Mooge Health Center in Mohamed Mooge district that is located south-eastern part of the Hargeisa, Abdilahi et al. assessed the prevalence of immunisation coverage and found that 55% of children were fully immunised that is having received nine basic vaccines. The rate of oral polio and measles vaccine coverage was higher than that of the SDHS-2020, this being attributed to the likeliness of a high level of vaccine awareness in the given study area. (Abdilahi et al., 2023:3,5)

In 2021 the WHO provided support to the Somalia health ministry in planning and implementing of coverage of vaccine-preventable diseases at health facilities. The survey used a questionnaire where parents visiting health facilities were asked about the vaccination status of their children (WHO Somalia, 2023). The table below (reproduced from the WHO document) shows the results of the survey and shows how Somaliland has generally performed well in vaccine coverage compared to other areas in Somalia.

Table 6: Vaccine coverage based on questionnaire Somalia, 2021

Location	No.	% of children covered							
		BCG	OPV1	OPV3	Penta 1	Penta 3	IPV	Measles	Fully vaccinated
Country level	408	71.4	73.3	68.0	69.5	61.5	62.0	71.8	55.5
Banadir State	70	80.0	84.3	81.4	84.3	82.9	82.9	81.4	74.3
Galmudug State	31	55.4	51.4	44.6	48.6	29.1	39.2	54.1	25.7
Hirshabelle State	39	67.3	70.3	61.4	70.3	55.3	62.1	68.0	44.9
Jubaland State	46	71.3	73.1	66.9	69.0	66.9	66.9	77.4	64.9
Puntland State	54	55.7	53.3	47.8	51.2	46.9	46.9	53.3	45.7
Somaliland	98	85.4	87.2	83.3	86.0	72.7	69.3	85.0	61.7
Southwest State	70	67.1	71.7	65.8	59.6	54.2	55.3	67.6	51.2

* BCG: bacille Calmette-Guérin vaccine; OPV: oral poliovirus vaccine; Penta: pentavalent vaccine; IPV: inactivated poliovirus vaccine.

In 2022 Somaliland was facing an outbreak of measles and while measles is endemic in Somalia and Somaliland, and numerous vaccination campaigns have been conducted, outbreaks persisted. The numbers of children with measles in MSF-supported continued to rise, consequently affecting children above 5 years (MSF, 2022). In May 2022 MSF teams set up measles patient management facilities in Somaliland, with a total of 110 beds at two isolation rooms in Hargeisa and Burao, in an effort to provide medical care to children with measles complications. A mass vaccination campaign conducted in collaboration with Somaliland's Ministry of Health Development in Burao and Oodweyne districts followed. MSF also donated vaccines to the health authorities to conduct measles vaccination campaigns in Aynabo and Buuhoodle. The campaign reached 106 000 children under the age of five against measles in Somaliland in July, covering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities. (MSF, 2022) Earlier in 2022 the MSF had been calling on health authorities and partners in Somaliland to urgently implement a wide coverage reactive vaccination campaign, and additionally enhanced routine measles vaccinations for children, to slow down the transmission of measles infections and reduce mortality (MSF, 2022).


Reflecting on some challenges to vaccine coverage in Somaliland A MSF medical director noted that “there is low-base coverage in Somalia and Somaliland. It is challenging to conduct vaccinations because people are dispersed, so there are a lot of complex logistics involved...our teams really have to go from house to house. Some of these houses are far from each other and most people have moved so they are not in one place” (MSF, 2022). It can be deduced that reaching remote communities is a challenge to vaccination coverage in Somaliland.

In December 2022 the Ministry of Health in Somaliland launched a nationwide integrated Campaign of Measles, Poli, Vit A. Albendazole and MUAC in Hargeisa. The campaign was meant to be implemented from 20th-31st December 2022. Dr Mohammed Abdi Hergeye, Director General of Ministry launched the campaign at the ministry's compound, and emphasised the integrated campaigns aims to reach more than 888, 811 of eligible children under the age of five across Somaliland by mobilising 1064 vaccination teams with 6025 frontline health personnel that will provide measles, polio vaccines, vit A for supplementation and Albendazole for de-worming at every doorstep. It was envisaged that the integrated campaign would be delivered through integrated communication strategies to expand to reach as many children under five as possible. (Republic of Somaliland Ministry of Health Development, 2022)

Somaliland has put in place a capable health service since it separated from Somalia (Devi, 2015). Post the civil war Somaliland has enjoyed political stability and peace for the past thirty years and focused on rebuilding security, infrastructure, and healthcare systems including the EPI program (Osman, Waits and Chien, 2024:10). Notable strides have been made when it comes to vaccination campaigns such as containing the threat of polio. In May 2013, the first case of polio seen in Somalia in more than six years was announced in Mogadishu. Plans for mass vaccination campaigns were drawn up. The authorities in Hargeisa, in Somalia's northern region of Somaliland announced a high alert. Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central regions launched an emergency vaccination campaign in June. The vaccination campaigns were organised by Somali authorities in Somaliland, with the support of WHO and UNICEF. The success of the campaign has not only been attributed to volunteer polio vaccinators but also to the leadership of government. (Reliefweb, 2022) The cold chain facility in Hargeisa is said to supply polio, measles and other vaccines to large parts of the region. This facility, along with other cold storage facilities in different areas of the territory support nationwide campaigns that takes place 3-4 times a year (UNICEF Somalia, 2019).

Comparatively (within all of Somalia) higher levels of vaccination, along with the existence and maintenance of infrastructure (e.g., the cold chain) in Somaliland shows decent health governance which is vital because this is the central thread in the inquiry of this research.

6.2 Rwanda



Map of Rwanda, Source: Nations Online Project

6.2.1 Brief history of Rwanda

Pre-colonisation, Rwanda is said to have been first inhabited by the Twa, who were followed by the Hutu and then later by the Tutsi. Undoubtedly there were social differences between the Hutu and Tutsi, however the identification of either was fluid (Lemarchand, 2024). Rwanda was under German rule from the year 1894-1918. Thereafter, Belgium became the administering authority from 1920 until the end of the Belgian trusteeship in 1962 (Lemarchand, 2024). During colonial times, Germany assumed that ethnicity could be distinguished by physical traits, and then used the ethnic differences that existed in their own countries as models to create a system whereby the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were not fluid anymore. The German colonial administration followed a policy of indirect rule that strengthened the hegemony of the Tutsi, an approach continued later by the Belgian government. Following the events of the 1959 Revolution, Rwanda gained its independence in 1962. (Lemarchand, 2024)

6.2.2 The Rwanda civil war and rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front

Initially introduced by the Tutsi king in the 1800's and later reinforced and institutionalised by Belgian colonial authorities, enforced labour systems and stereotypes of physical beauty contributed to a society divided along perceptions of ethnicity (Alluri, 2009:13). The structures ensured that Tutsi had higher access to employment opportunities, power, land and resources such as cattle, whilst Hutu were mostly confined to physical labour and agricultural cultivation, and the Twa were isolated in forests for hunting and pottery. As a result of these entrenched patron-client relationships, ethnic identities were created and perpetuated by the local elite. The monopolisation of power within a small elite ruling class led to the 1959 social revolution as rural grievances from both Hutu and Tutsi were expressed. The revolution saw the Tutsi monarchy abolished and the inter-ethnic killing and expulsion of hundreds of thousands of (mostly, but not exclusively) Tutsi to neighbouring countries. (Alluri, 2009:13)

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) came into being in Kampala Uganda as a political and military movement aimed at repatriating Rwandans in exile and taking control of the Rwandan government (Cheeseman, Bertrand and Husaini 2019). Most of the members of the RPF (who were of Tutsi origin) had been living in exile in Uganda following the King being overthrown and other events in the late 1950's and 1960's (Reed, 1995). The RPF entered Rwanda in 1990 which saw the start of the Rwandan civil war between the group and the Rwandan Armed forces who represented the government. According to Lyons (2016b) at its inception the RPF began with an already established set of seasoned military leaders who had fought together in Uganda. In the face of increased landlessness, unemployment, population growth, poverty and the RPF threat, President Habyarima used the vulnerability of the rural population to push Hutu extremist ideologies that blamed Tutsi dominance for Hutu suffering (Alluri, 2009:13). It can be said that this set the tone for the horrific genocide that was to follow. In 1994, the downing of the plane carrying President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira, triggered the Rwandan genocide as the RPF and its supporters were accused of killing the president. Hutu extremist political parties called on the population to seek revenge, resulting in the massacre of Tutsi's (Alluri, 2009:14). In July 1994, the RPF captured Kigali and set up a government of national unity.

6.2.3 The Rwandan Patriotic Front insurgency

Origins of the RPF

In precolonial and colonial times, the politics of Rwanda were dominated by the Tutsi (Kuperman, 2004:63). In 1959 there was a surge in conflict in Southern Rwanda which would be known as the Hutu Peasant revolution. Fatal attacks against the Tutsi's were led by the Hutu ethnic group in a bid to regain lost land and power (Worldwatch Institute, 2002). The increase in violence saw many Rwandan Tutsi refugees pouring into neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania (Kuperman, 2004:63). Starting in 1961 some of these Tutsi refugees, who called themselves *inyenzi* (meaning 'cockroaches') tried to return to power in Rwanda and launched attacks from bases in Uganda and Burundi. The nationalist Hutu government retaliated by not only escalating the oppression of Tutsi's but also the attacks against them. (Kuperman, 2004:63)

The Obote regime in Uganda fell in 1971 after a successful coup staged by Idi Amin, who then took power. In 1972 Amin began persecuting the Tutsi refugees over Kigali's backing of Obote's rebel forces. Following the coup by Habyarimana in 1973, Amin changed his tune towards the Tutsi refugees and began recruiting them to join his army and security forces. However, in the late 1970's he turned on them yet again, blaming them for the problems in Uganda. (Kuperman, 2004:65)

After Amin was overthrown in 1979 at the hands of Yoweri Museveni and his group of rebels, the Tutsi refugees slowly organised themselves, forming the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU) with an agenda to return to Rwanda (Kuperman, 2004:66). RANU's first order of business was to foster a sense of national identity amongst the Rwandan exile community which it could later develop into a political base (Reed, 1995:49). In order to achieve this RANU adopted a two-pronged strategy: 1. Above ground it organised semi-autonomous cultural and self-help groups, whose activities became venues for fostering a sense of nationalism among the participants and 2. Underground RANU expanded its organisational structure into each of Rwanda's neighbours as well as those countries with large Rwandan communities inside and outside of Africa. (Reed, 1995:66)

RANU had ties to Museveni through a Tutsi refugee by the name of Fred Rwigyema who had joined Museveni's anti-Amin rebel group, joining RANU in 1979. When Museveni returned to the bush and to guerrilla warfare in 1981 two of the rebels who joined him were Rwigyema

and fellow Tutsi refugee Paul Kagame (Kuperman, 2004:65). In 1986 President Habyarimana formally banned the return of refugees to Rwanda. This, coupled with Museveni and his rebel group capturing Kampala in 1987 prompted the creation of a military option by the Tutsi refugees (Kuperman, 2004:65). In December 1987 Ruan's congress decided to change the movements name to the RPF (Reed, 1996:485).

RPF's structural organisation and political aims

Fred Rwigyema was the Chairman of the RPF and later the Commander of the Rwandan Patriotic Army. When he was killed in the first RPF attack on Rwanda in 1990, Paul Kagame (then General) succeeded him. Kagame transformed the RPF from a traditional military front to a coalition of guerilla groups (NSA Archives, 1994:2). The RPF's success was mainly a result of the shift to guerilla warfare, which were easier to operate in Ugandan bases than the previous conventional military. The high-ranking officials of the RPF were predominantly Tutsi (with some moderate Hutu members) and the RPF consisted of an estimated 15,000 combat troops and 5,000 administrative personnel in total. (NSA Archives, 1994:2)

Primarily the RPF sought to topple the Hutu-led regime in Rwanda. It did however outline a political programme which aimed to include the widest range of followers. Therefore, instead of calling for the abolition of the monarchy, the RPF articulated a broader platform in its 'Eight Point Programme' (Reed, 1995:49). The goal of this programme was to present a clear and concise message which would be understood by even those who had little or no education, and around which Rwandans could mobilise for a common cause (Reed, 1996:485).

The RPF's agenda

The core themes of the Eight Point Programme called for "national unity, democracy, an end to corruption and nepotism, a self-sustaining economy, improved social services, a national military, a progressive foreign policy and an end to the system which generates refugees" (Reed, 1995:49). The RPF also clearly articulated its intention to fight to achieve its goals and began to prepare itself militarily in several ways. Lastly, it set up political/military schools in Tanzania and Uganda where cadres learned about the goals of the RPF and received military training, though without weapons (Reed, 1995:49). At its inception the RPF was a reform insurgency (Waldorf, 2017:75). No explicit information was found pertaining to a RPF ideology.

The RPF's wartime governance

After war broke out in 1990, the RPF came to control much of Northern Rwanda by 1992. The RPF signed a cease-fire (the Arusha Accords) in 1993 which solidified its control over Northern Rwanda (Mampilly and Stewart, 2021:31). The group adopted a martial law approach which according to Mampilly and Stewart, by definition, translates to no role for civilians in the governance system (Mampilly and Stewart, 2021:19). The RPF engaged minimally with the unfamiliar civilian population they came to control in the territory, opting instead to leave these to the control of the military command. As the group encountered little opposition to their control, they had no need to share power to control the population. (Mampilly and Stewart, 2021:31)

Two factors came into play: 1. when the RPF took the territory, its leaders (most of whom grew up outside Rwanda) ordered the expulsion of the Hutu population who constituted much of the population. At the peak of its rule in the north, close to 1 million mostly Hutus were displaced and the remaining population, a mixture of disempowered Tutsi and Hutu, was subjected to harsh direct rule by military cadre (Mampilly and Stewart, 2021:31); and 2. the RPF's military advantage and strategic objective of capturing power in Kigali combined with the lack of a revolutionary agenda left little incentive to engage with the remaining local population. The only political institutions established were completely under the control of the command. What little civilian governance took place was left to the discretion of individual military commanders. (Mampilly and Stewart, 2021:31-32)

Reflecting on the group's cooperation on vaccination during the conflict period (1990-1994) the role of the RPF is not clear. However, what is known is that the war and genocide that happened in 1994 completely disrupted the country's health care system including immunisation service delivery. National immunisation coverage was incredibly low, and the incidence of vaccine preventable diseases was high. Only six traditional vaccines were provided in routine immunisation program in 1994 (WHO Africa 2018). The following table summarises the RPF's structure, agenda and wartime governance.

Table 7: The Rwandan Patriotic Front during conflict

Group nature and agenda	Centre-seeking and wanted a regime change
Organisational structure/ethnic make-up	Hierarchical/predominantly ethnically homogenous (Tutsi)
Type of rebel governance	Autocratic (martial law), less inclusionary
Use of violence	RPF military offensives resulted in Tusti and Hutu casualties
Interest in governance/ readiness to govern	Yes (wanted to take control of Rwandan Government >> 'Eight-point plan')/Yes
State-like governance	Yes (limited)
Roving or Stationary	Roving in its early stages
Rebel group cooperation on vaccination (health governance)	The role of the RPF is not clear. What the literature tells us is that immunisation service delivery was interrupted by the war.

Authors own summary based on the analysis of literature.

6.2.4 The cessation of the conflict: The Arusha Accords

According to Reed (1996:492) President Habyarimana was not able to maintain his diplomatic strategy of refusing direct contact with the RPF, which was gaining the upper hand militarily. In July 1992, the RPF and the government of Rwanda signed a peace agreement, scheduled to take effect a week later. Not only did the peace agreement call for a ceasefire, but it also called for ending the provision of munitions to both sides, for freeing all prisoners of war, and for the withdrawal of foreign troops (except for France which maintained a bilateral security agreement with Rwanda) and the creation of a unified national army. (Reed, 1996:492) Regarding the political institutions both sides agreed to the rule of law, democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights - though the specifics of each were not enumerated - and to a system of power-sharing after the formation of an enlarged transitional government (Reed, 1996:492). Subsequent agreements would be signed in the following months, collectively known as the Arusha Accords.

Following the attacks on Tutsi civilians in Northern Rwanda February 1993, the RPF mounted a military offensive, which saw the group rapidly expanding there are of control and inching

very close to Kigali (Reed, 1996:492). The government's army was only able to stop the RPF advance to the capital with the assistance of the French troops. Peace talks started again, and a final peace agreement was signed in August 1993 (Waldorf, 2017:71). The Arusha Accords saw the creation of a broad-based transitional government, with Habyarimana remaining as president, but sharing power with the RPF and other opposition parties (Waldorf, 2017:71).

Between 1997 and 2001, the RPF underwent partial demilitarisation through a disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) program. The majority of the 19,000 fighters involved in the DDR process were privates who had served in the RPF during and after the genocide. Compared to the recruits from the NRA and the civil war, these fighters were less committed, experienced, and disciplined. (Waldorf, 2017:76)

6.2.5 Rwanda's post-civil war transition

After the RPF's entry into Kigali in 1994, its leaders said that they would abide by the terms of the Arusha Accords, which was modified, considering the genocide, with their amendments endorsed and accepted by the remaining internal opposition (Reed, 1996: 497). There was an agreement that the allocation of ministries would remain, although most posts were taken up by the RPF, and Paul Kagame became the minister of Defence and took up the newly created post of Vice President. The RPF established the broad-based coalition government as proposed by the Arusha Accords (Reed, 1996:497-498).

The Arusha Accords put in place a civil service which was accountable to ministers, an independent judiciary, and a national army whose members are prohibited from being affiliated with any party, and which is accountable for its action (Reed, 1996:498). Although the RPF maintained no civilian administrative structures, almost all the skilled manpower which was available in Rwanda at the time, came from the exiled community which gave birth to the rebel movement (Reed, 1996:498). The RPF also unilaterally made amendments to the Fundamental law which significantly changed the political regime agreed upon in Arusha (Reyntjens, 2006:1105). These amendments initiated a strong executive presidency, imposed the dominance of the RPF in government, and redrew the composition of parliament (Reyntjens, 2006:1105).

The RPF also brought together its military and political wings and as such was able to avoid internal rifts that afflicted similar organisations in other parts of Africa. In creating a clear political line within the military, the RPF managed to sustain its morale and enforce strict

internal discipline. However, separating the military and the state proved to be quite difficult. (Reed, 1996:498)

6.2.6 Rwanda after 1994

Rwanda post 1994 adopted a developmental state agenda. According to Uwizeyimana (2016:41) a developmental state generally refers to a model followed by many of the East-Asian Tigers after World War II to hastily modernise their economies. This framework is premised on the state (at the national level) setting specific development goals and then mobilising the society to achieve industrial modernisation (Uwizeyimana, 2016:41). The government prioritises the development of national firms, limits foreign involvement, and cultivates "spillovers" from the constrained foreign investment...the model is a hegemonic project whereby the state develops and nurtures the social capital that is underproduced by the market. (Matfess, 2015:185-186).

The Rwandan state adopted this model with the aim of making the country a lower middle-income country by 2020 (Waldorf, 2017:73). This was articulated in Rwanda's Vision 2020 (which was launched in 2000 and revised in 2012) wherein the objectives were presented underpinned by the following pillars: 1. Good governance and a capable state; 2. Human resource development and a knowledge-based economy; 3. A private sector-led economy; 4. Infrastructure development; 5. Productive and market-oriented agriculture and 6. Regional and international economic integration. (Republic of Rwanda, 2000 revised in 2012). According to Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012:391) the vision assumes that rapid economic and social development will foster a new generation that embraces a unified Rwandan national identity, moving beyond the divisions of the past. Through a strategic prioritisation of sectors (Kelsall, 2013) this endeavour involved replacing small-scale and subsistence agriculture with larger agribusiness and ranching ventures, while also building up the service industry, particularly in information technology. The government has been able to attract foreign investment by reducing bureaucratic red tape, lowering corporate tax rates, and fighting corruption. Rwanda's annual growth rate averaged 8% between 2007 and 2012, and Per capita GDP rose from \$202 in 2003 to \$620 in 2012 and inequality has declined since 2006. Rwanda has, for the most part, met the Millenium Development Goals on maternal health and universal primary education. (Waldorf, 2017:73).

According to the World Bank (2024) The economy of Rwanda has remained resilient and adaptable despite challenging external and domestic factors, achieving a 7.6% growth rate in

the first three quarters of 2023. GDP growth is expected to regain momentum in 2024–26, with a projected average growth of 7.2%. The services sector sustained domestic demand, and the rebound of the industrial sector contributed to the robust growth and the positive economic trajectory. Building on Vision 2020, Vision 2050 sets out the direction for long term economic transformation, modernising the lives of Rwandans and sustainability (MINECOFIN, 2020).

However, amidst these positive strides there are apparent issues which are related to the RPF's iron fist control over the country's economy. The RPF intervenes in the country's most critical sectors through a private holding company, Tri-Star Investments/CVL, which the RPF owns entirely (Matfess, 2015:189). The holding company has consistently operated under the governance of a board of directors appointed by the RPF leadership, with oversight provided by an executive chairperson or CEO. Profits generated by its subsidiary companies are subject to taxation and subsequently either reinvested or distributed to the RPF in the form of dividends. (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012:389) The authors argue that this arrangement can be described as a system to centralise the management of economic rents. Kelsall (2013) also highlights the ruling elites' control over rents in Rwanda. While it can be argued that the holding company has maintained monopoly over certain sectors, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012:396) contend that it is playing an important role in getting capitalism started in Rwanda which was necessary, initially, to meet pressing social or political needs. Overall, the authors describe Rwanda as form of developmental patrimonialism centred on long-horizon rent management.

Alongside the RPF's intervention in the economy, its control of sociopolitical space is also notable where for e.g. in 2010 certain opposition parties were prevented from registering leading up to the elections and their organiser were subjected to physical violence if the attempted to register voters (Matfess, 2015:189). Straus (2023: e28) also notes while Rwanda's post-genocide achievements have been impressive, the regime is authoritarian, referring to its style of governance as transformative authoritarianism. Similarly, Kelsall (2013) alludes to how states like Rwanda combine authoritarian governance with market-based reforms, illustrating the political settlements and state-business relations that drive transformation.

6.2.7 The Rwandan Patriotic Front as a ruling party

Although the RPF was formed by civilian refugees in the late 1980's, it was shaped by Kagame and his armed rebels during the civil war (Waldorf, 2017:75). With Kagame at the helm, the RPF became a hierarchical, disciplined and effective fighting force. The RPF started its

transition into a political party during the peace negotiations so that it could assume ministerial posts and legislative seats in the transitional government promised by the Arusha Accords. Kagame's high command continued to dominate the executive committee, with the RPF being described as highly centralised with little internal democracy. Following the military victory, Kagame sought to remake the RPF into a ruling political party, but this did not entail meaningful demilitarisation, democratised party organisation and decision-making, or adapted political goals that is real power-sharing. (Waldorf, 2017:75)

According to Reyntjens (2013: xvi) Rwanda has been commended for its good technocratic/bureaucratic governance. The achievements of the regime are undeniable and well documented in the literature. Undoubtedly the RPF has a vision that it has successfully implemented, particularly in economic development, and an ambitious modernisation drive more generally (Reyntjens, 2013: xvi). The RPF has taken on several political, economic and social projects, which aimed to not only alter Rwanda's governance and economic structures, but also looked to change social identities, cultural norms and individual behaviour (Waldorf, 2017:73).

Rwanda, however, still faces a challenge of ethnic differences which continue to be an 'unspoken' source of tension in the country. According to Herath (2018) the Rwandan government claims to be trying to build "one nation", without ethnic divides—for example, the Rwandan government has banned the use of ethnic labels such as Hutu, Tutsi and citizens are forced to identify themselves as "Rwandans"—in an attempt to build cooperation between formerly antagonistic groups through grassroots cooperative activities. Purdeková (2015:6) talks about 'ubumwe' in Rwanda—meaning 'building unity'—founded on activities engineered by the state to fight divisionism and promote the building of "Rwandanness and Rwandicity". This unity is presented as vital for stability and long-lasting peace, as such this legitimises authoritarian rule in Rwanda as Purdeková notes. Supporting the assertion that Rwanda remains ethnically divided, Buckley-Zistel (2006:131) illustrates how Rwanda's post-conflict transformation is reflected in collective memory. People recall the 1994 genocide and the 1990–1994 civil war differently, shaped by their roles and current positions. While society includes victims, perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers, public memory often suppresses past Hutu-Tutsi tensions. This selective amnesia, though promoting surface-level peace, risks leaving deep ethnic divisions unaddressed, allowing them to persist beneath the surface. Likewise, Thomson (2013) highlights how state driven reconciliation [in Rwanda] has silenced alternative narratives. "The government maintains a tight rein on political expression, and in

2003, banned any public manifestation of ‘ethnic divisionism’ (between Tutsi and Hutu), ‘promoting genocide ideology’ (against Tutsi) or ‘preaching genocide negationism’ (that is, questioning claims that only Tutsi died in 1994). These laws are vaguely worded and arbitrarily applied...they also have the effect of removing ethnic Hutu from the public sphere as the genocide ideology and negationist laws represent a near total and ‘undifferentiated accusation’ of presumed Hutu participation in the 1994 genocide”. (Thomson, 2013:12-13) Against this backdrop, it is not difficult to fathom how ethnicity remains a politically sensitive issue in post-genocide Rwanda. This is also alluded to by Straus (2023: e28) where he notes that although there is an official stance against ethnic identification, underlying ethnic loyalties and resentment continue to persist beneath the surface.

Although the Rwandan government continues to downplay the social and political significance of ethnic diversity, division along ethnic lines remains strong in Rwanda, and the matter requires political space for citizens to speak about and negotiate these differences (Herath, 2018). Moreover, Reyntjens (2004: 187) suggests that the government's downplaying of ethnic differences helps to conceal the current dominance of military and political power by the Tutsi.

While Rwanda has achieved some successes in its post-conflict state-building efforts, these deeply rooted challenges, if left unaddressed, risk undermining the progress made thus far.

6.2.8 President Paul Kagame: Kagame’s Rwanda or Rwanda’s Kagame?

It is said that in modern day Africa (and perhaps the world), no country divides opinions among scholars and commentators as strongly as Rwanda does (McNamee, 2021:380). On the one hand some see Rwanda as an extraordinary development success, risen from the ashes of genocide, steered and safeguarded by a visionary leader. Whereas others see Rwanda as a case of autocratic recidivism, concealed by questionably auspicious statistics and a misleading narrative of national unity, orchestrated by a strongman intent on staying in power forever. At the centre of these polarising opinions is one man, President Paul Kagame. (McNamee, 2021:380) The question then is who is Paul Kagame? A documentary about Paul Kagame, by African Biographics (2023), sheds some light on the man, highlighting the distinct stages of Kagame’s life that have shaped the leader we see today. The Waldorf (2017) text is also drawn upon to add to the picture of Paul Kagame.

Paul Kagame: the refugee

Paul Kagame was born into a Tusti family in 1957. Following the Hutu Peasant Revolution, and the rise of ethnic tensions, his family fled their home in Rwanda and with little prospect of security returning at that time for Tutsi's, his family moved to Uganda in 1961, where they lived in refugee camps set up for Rwanda exiles for 30 years. Life as a refugee in Uganda was not easy and the camps were poorly equipped and infrequently supplied. The refugees found themselves working as cheap labour for local farmers to make ends meet. During Kagame's time in the refugee camp he befriended fellow Rwandan Fred Rwigyema, becoming best friends. (African Biographics, 2023)

Throughout his childhood Kagame had not been able to return to his homeland and he started to develop a curiosity about Rwanda and the reasons why they were refugees. In 1977 he visited Rwanda for the first time since they were exiled and again 1978. His trips to Rwanda (albeit for short periods each time) are said to have significantly influenced his thinking and expanded his knowledge of Rwanda's economic and political challenges and the idea of returning to Rwanda one day and participating in the country's political life was firmly planted in Kagame's mind. (African Biographics, 2023)

Paul Kagame: the rebel and top military official

Fred Rwigyema was part of the rebel group that helped Yoweri Museveni overthrow Idi Amin in 1979. Rwigyema had trained with Museveni in Tanzania and Mozambique. Inspired by Rwigyema, Paul Kagame and other Rwandan refugees pledged allegiance to Museveni who became a cabinet member in the transitional government of Rwanda, signing up for Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). After he joined the NRA, Kagame travelled to Tanzania where he was trained to be a spy. During his time in the NRA Kagame served as an intelligence officer, gathering information in rural areas which is a pivotal role in a guerilla warfare, assessing potential targets and figuring out enemy strengths and military operations. After six years he became head of intelligence in Museveni's army after Milton Obote was overthrown. (African Biographics, 2023)

In 1990 Paul Kagame was sent for military training by Museveni to Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, on the heels of the RPF planning a military push into Rwanda orchestrated from Uganda. Later that year the RPF moved into Rwanda igniting the 4year civil war. Rwigyema was killed on the second day of the invasion, prompting Kagame to return to take over the

reigns of the RPF. He turned the RPF into a disciplined guerilla force. (African Biographics, 2023)

Paul Kagame: the statesman

The GNU was installed by the RPF in 1994 grouping together all the non-extremist political parties, while ensuring that it held the balance of power in the presidency, cabinet and parliament. Kagame assumed the post of Vice President and Minister of Defence, as such he controlled the army and with it the state (Waldorf, 2017:72). Kagame became president in 2000 after the resignation of then President Pasteur Bizimungu. In 2003 Rwanda held its first national elections and Kagame won the presidency with 95% and with 93% in 2010. As the President Kagame has overseen a highly ambitious policy of state-building and social engineering. (Waldorf, 2017:72)


Ironically while Kagame is seen as a peacekeeper in Africa, having sent Rwandan troops to UN and AU Peacekeeping mission in different parts of Africa, he is said to have supported proxy militias in eastern Congo to fight Hutu rebels and exploit natural resources. Kagame has been dubbed as the CEO of Rwanda, widely hailed for building peace in Rwanda but as the country has shifted to competitive authoritarianism so too has Kagame become a more personalistic leader (Waldorf, 2017:73, 74,76-77,84).

Paul Kagame, a man who has worn different hats in his life, will continue to steer the Rwandan ship following a landslide victory at the polls on 15 July 2024, extending his 24-year rule. And therefore, it begs the question, is it Kagame's Rwanda or Rwanda's Kagame? It is left to the reader to decide.

6.2.9 Government performance in Rwanda from 1996-2022

This section will provide an overview of governance in Rwanda post 1994. The RPF has been in power since 1994, and the observation will show the group's performance as state actor in nationwide governance with a discussion on the government's approach to health governance in relation to vaccine coverage.


Figure 4: Government Effectiveness-Rwanda



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

The above figure is indicative of state capacity in Rwanda post 1994. We can see that government effectiveness was at its weakest in 2002 at -1.2. However, between 2002 and 2022 there has been a general incline in state capacity, with government effectiveness peaking at around 0.3 in 2020.

Figure 5: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism-Rwanda



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

The above figure gives us an indication of whether there is good governance in the country and the state's ability to control territory and means of violence. 1998 marked the lowest score (-2)

for political stability and absence of violence/terrorism in Rwanda. However, there has been a general incline in his index since 1998, peaking above 0 from 2017-2022.


Figure 6: Voice and Accountability-Rwanda



Source: World Development Indicators (2024)

The above figure gives us an indication if the citizens capacity to express their views, interests and demand action from the state. While accountability indicates the states capacity and will to respond to citizen demands. The estimate for the voice and accountability index for Rwanda has generally been below the 0 mark, with the lowest being -1.5 in 2000 and around -0.9 in 2022.

Figure 7: Control of Corruption-Rwanda



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

The above figure gauges the extent to which public power is used for private gain. Here we can see that Rwanda post 2002 has witnessed a significant increase in the control of corruption,

peaking at around 0.8 in 2014. Although there has been a slight decline from 2016-2022, it has hovered around 0.6.

The indicators above show that Rwanda, with the exception of the ‘voice and accountability’ index, has performed well when it comes to governance which supports the often-echoed sentiment of it being one of Africa’s success stories of post-conflict reconstruction. For example, while Rwanda has maintained some political stability and avoided a resurgence of conflict post 1994, seems to be doing well in rooting out corruption (as evidenced above), and there has been economic development, what we may not see in the data is the effects of ethnic polarisation (which still exists in Rwanda) on the perception of governance performance. The quality of the data may very much be influenced by the perceptions of the ethnic group that may have an advantageous standing in Rwandan society, introducing a bias and in this sense skewing reality. The government control of politics and civilian life, the downplaying of ethnic identities (between Tutsi and Hutu) are features of a flawed political transition and reconstruction agenda. This may explain the low levels of voice and accountability in Rwanda. Not only are the findings on par with the discourse around Rwanda being an authoritarian state, but the index can be interpreted as the government working for a few and not the many.

Health governance in the governing period: cooperation on vaccine campaigns

Rwanda’s Expanded Program on Immunisation (EPI) was established in 1978, following the WHO’s global EPI policies and targets set the previous year. By 1980, Rwanda had introduced three vaccines for children nationwide: Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (BCG), diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis combination vaccine (DTP), and measles, along with maternal tetanus toxoid (TT). Following the genocide, the national vaccination program was revitalised in 1996 with the creation of an inter-agency coordinating committee (ICC) in partnership with development organisations. This committee continues to oversee all national immunisation efforts (Gatera et al., 2016:3421).

The RPF came into power in 1994 and has shown a commitment to vaccination programs and creating a successful national immunisation program. Some of the post-conflict challenges factors identified which accounted for poor vaccination coverage were lack of immunisation program infrastructure, and lack of population level knowledge and demand for childhood vaccinations (Robson et al., 2020). However, post the genocide life expectancy more than doubled between 1995-2011, while HIV, tuberculosis and malaria related deaths went down by more than 75% from peak levels. Between 2000 and 2011, Rwanda’s child mortality rate

dropped 70.4%, more than any country in the world above 500,000 population. The vaccine uptake was rapid across Africa and around the world with the support of Gavi and other organisations. (Gatera et al., 2016:3421). Key partners of the Rwanda national EPI are Gavi, UNICEF, WHO and USAID (Republic of Rwanda MoH, 2021).

Factors that have shaped and strengthened the Rwandan vaccine program include political will, a culture of accountability, local ownership and a firm health value chain (Robson et al., 2020).

Political will

It is said that the success of Rwanda's immunisation program is rooted in a political landscape shaped by unique aspects of Rwanda's history and culture. Rwanda has a strong central government and a hierarchical chain of command that extends down to the local level. The government's strong political will begins with a top-level commitment to equity in all aspects of service delivery, motivated by the legacy of the genocide. The government has expressed its commitment to equitable service delivery that reaches all citizens, even in the hardest to reach places. (Robson et al., 2020:57)

Culture of accountability

There is a culture of accountability that runs through the whole health system in Rwanda. All government personnel to levels of authority above and along the whole chain of decentralised implementation are bound by a performance contract, called '*imihigo*' which translates to 'vow to deliver'. With regards to Rwanda's immunisation, central ministries are bound by these contracts with the president, the district mayors with central ministries, and the health centres with district mayors. As such, the health system is represented at all levels of government to ensure the effective delivery of vaccinations and other health services. (Robson et al., 2020:58)

The Rwandan government does a yearly Imihigo evaluation to examine whether Imihigo targets have been achieved. Furthermore, areas of strengths and weaknesses are identified as best practices and lessons learned for future improvement (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2022).

Without going into extensive detail about the 2021/2022 evaluation report, the following were identified as key drivers of good performance:

1. Good coordination and engagement of Imihigo stakeholders—strong coordination of various district partners including the private sector, NGOs and citizens, as a key role

in strategically channelling their contributions in planning and implementation of Imihigo.

2. Enhanced mechanisms and innovations for regular monitoring of Imihigo implementation—Regular monitoring and continuous follow-up of Imihigo implementation at all levels
3. Strong collaboration and teamwork spirit—the implementation of joint Imihigo is the result of close collaboration between all implementation structures
4. Early implementation of procedure plan—starting the implementation of Imihigo timeously to avoid working under pressure
5. Innovations culture in the implementation and monitoring of Imihigo—use of innovative approaches to foster implementation and regular monitoring of Imihigo
6. Competitive spirit—the culture of excellence and the attitude of accountability as driving factors to speed up the implementation of Imihigo

The following were identified as challenges of Imihigo implementation:

1. Understaffed organisation structures of implementing institutions negatively affected implementation of Imihigo.
2. Delays in delivering the required equipment affected the timely implementation of Imihigo

What the above shows is that while systems and structures can be put in place for smoother implementation of health service delivery, there are challenges that Rwanda faces in its health governance. However, evaluations of different levels of health service institutions enables Rwanda to identify where the gaps are and strengthen the implementation of Imihigo for effective (health) service delivery.

Local ownership

Another contributing factor to Rwanda's success is the local level ownership of the immunisation programme. Community Health Workers (CHWs) are elected representatives of the health system at the local level. The CHWs responsibilities include comprehensive childhood vaccination education and ensuring that the children in the community get their vaccines through mobilising communities to get children vaccinated. (Robson et al., 2020:58)

Strong health value chain

Rwanda has a national health information system which means that every single child can potentially be tracked so that they can get their vaccines. Rwanda has also implemented a national monitoring system which can identify children that require vaccination and facilitate an efficient supply chain ensuring that the vaccinations reliably reach where they need to be. By means of a bottom-up approach, data from the CHWs forms the basis of this effort. (Robson et al., 2020:58)

The combination of the above factors, and with certain campaigns done in partnership with international donors, has resulted in the following milestones in Rwanda's vaccination coverage post the 1994:

PCV vaccine

In 2007, the WHO recommended the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) as part of routine childhood immunizations to combat *Streptococcus pneumoniae*, which at the time caused around one million child deaths annually worldwide. In response, a technical committee—including Ministry of Health policymakers and advisors from Gavi and the WHO—assessed the feasibility of introducing PCV in Rwanda. Health Management Information System (HMIS) data identified pneumonia as the leading cause of death in children under five. In April 2009, Rwanda became the first low-income country to launch a nationwide rollout of PCV. Gavi funded the vaccine, while the Ministry of Health covered costs for transportation, training, outreach, and monitoring, with additional support from NGOs and private donors. (Gatera et al., 2016:3422)

Rwanda completed the rollout in just five months, and vaccination coverage levels have remained steady at approximately 97% since 2010. PCV is now included in the routine pediatric vaccination schedule, and CHWs compile monthly data to identify any coverage gaps. (Exemplars in Global Health, 2024).

Measles vaccine

Rwanda's efforts to combat measles marked one of the country's first interventions aimed at reducing under-five mortality (U5M) and later served as a model for successful vaccine delivery initiatives (Exemplars in Global Health, 2024). Introduced in 1980, the measles vaccine achieved national coverage levels between 74% and 89% before the 1994 genocide.

However, after the genocide and the devastation of the health sector, measles emerged as a leading cause of death among children under five in 1995 (Exemplars in Global Health, 2024).

1. In 2002, measles vaccination rates had recovered to just below pre-genocide levels (69% to 74%), although a huge number of cases were still occurring each year.
2. In 2003, the vaccination rate increased to 90% and the vaccination rate has remained in this range since 2006.

With the rapid expansion of Rwanda's vaccination program, measles cases dropped significantly—from over 3,000 deaths in 2000 to hundreds annually by 2004, and then to just six cases nationwide by 2008 (Exemplars in Global Health, 2024).

The national government established a technical committee to evaluate new vaccines, leading to the approval of a combined measles-rubella (MR) vaccine in 2012. In 2013, the Ministry of Health (MOH) launched an initiative to administer the MR vaccine to all children aged nine months to fifteen years old, targeting locations such as schools, community centres, border stations, hospitals, and clinics. By the end of the campaign, 93% of Rwandan children had received complete vaccination against measles and rubella. As a result, measles deaths fell dramatically, from a rate of 155 per 100,000 children under five in 2000 to 4 per 100,000 in 2015. The success of the measles vaccination campaign has given Rwanda an evidence-based-intervention (EBI) template for maintain high vaccination coverage for other diseases (Exemplars in Global Health, 2024).

HPV vaccine

Human papillomavirus (HPV) is a leading cause of cervical cancer. The vaccines Gardasil and Cervarix, both approved by the WHO, provide protection against HPV types 16 and 18. It is recommended that girls in their pre-adolescent and adolescent years receive three doses of the vaccine before becoming sexually active. This target group differs from those receiving routine infant vaccinations or participating in once-off campaigns. (Torres-Rueda et al., 2016:46).

In 2011, Rwanda's Ministry of Health introduced the HPV vaccine nationwide for the first time using Gardasil, marking a pioneering effort in Africa. This was made possible through a three-year donation from Merck of 2 million doses, with the Rwandan government covering delivery expenses. By 2013, the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi) pledged to fund vaccine costs from 2014 to 2017, totaling nearly \$8.9 million (Torres-Rueda et al., 2016:46). The vaccine was primarily administered to girls on school premises through two-day campaigns held three times a year,

conducted by staff from nearby health facilities. This initiative extended the immunisation program to a new target group using a largely school-based approach. Additionally, the vaccine was offered at health facilities for 12-year-old girls who were out of school or missed vaccination days. Coverage rates were significant, with 92,107 girls receiving all three doses in 2011, representing a 92% coverage rate (Torres-Rueda et al., 2016:47).

Rotavirus vaccine

The PCV campaign gave Rwanda the cold chain capacity, the monitoring capacity, and the institutional expertise to carry out similar large-scale vaccine introductions (Exemplars in Global health 2024). In 2012 Rwanda became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to introduce the pentavalent rotavirus (RV5), RotaTeq (Merck) into its routine immunisation program with 3 doses recommended at 6, 10, and 14 weeks of age (Tate et al., 2016: S208). Rotavirus vaccination rates in children under one year rose significantly, from 50% in 2012 to 98% in 2013. Hospital admissions for severe diarrhea in children under five dropped by 49% between 2011 and 2013. Diarrhea-related hospitalizations declined shortly after the vaccine was introduced, not only among eligible children but also among older, non-eligible age groups. This suggests a collective protection effect through reduced transmission, adding a valuable public health benefit to Rwanda's rotavirus vaccine rollout (Exemplar in Global Health, 2024).

Hepatitis B vaccine

Africa accounted for 23% of global cervical cancer mortality in 2022, making HPV vaccinations very important. In spite of the potential of the HPV vaccines to save lives, coverage in African countries varies significantly. Rolling out HPV vaccination programs to out-of-school girls face many barriers including socio-cultural, logistical and systemic barriers (Lin and Liang, 2024). Despite these challenges, Rwanda has achieved 98% coverage through a school-based program supported by an effective communication campaign led by community health workers and local leaders (Lin and Liang, 2024).

Each year in Rwanda, around 10,000 newborns are at risk of hepatitis B exposure at birth. The country has reached a 96% vaccination coverage for children by age five and has also successfully implemented routine vaccination for adults. However, the hepatitis B birth-dose vaccine (HepB-BD), which should be administered within 24 hours of birth, has not yet been introduced. Rwanda is now ready to tackle this gap and implement the birth-dose vaccine with the support of key stakeholders. (The Hepatitis Fund, 2024)

In collaboration with the Canton of Geneva, The Hepatitis Fund (THF) is sponsoring a three-year initiative in Rwanda aimed at eliminating the vertical transmission of hepatitis B. The Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), a global health organization dedicated to partnering with governments to save lives and reduce disease burdens in low- and middle-income countries, is implementing the program. Since 2002, CHAI has supported the Rwandan government in achieving numerous ambitious public health objectives, including the elimination of viral hepatitis. (The Hepatitis Fund, 2024)

The successful introduction of new vaccines can be largely attributed to Rwanda's strong governance and leadership in pursuing Millennium Development Goal 4 (MDG 4), which aimed to reduce under-five mortality by two-thirds by 2015. Results from the 2010 Demographic Health Survey suggested that achieving MDG 4 was within reach, with the under-five mortality rate decreasing from 103 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2008 to 76 per 1,000 in 2010, and under-one mortality dropping from 62 to 50 during the same period. (WHO Rwanda, 2012)

Barriers to immunisation coverage in Rwanda

It is beyond the scope of this research to unpack every barrier to full vaccine coverage in Rwanda, however a summary of some of the issues is highlighted next.


According to an assessment report done by the Rwandan MoH, inequalities in childhood vaccination exist in many forms. The core determinants of the variances in coverage were household wealth and birth order. Geographic location was also a key predictor of inequity. Moreover, immunisation coverage differed by sex of child, education, parental level of awareness, access to services and other gender and system-based barriers. (Republic of Rwanda MoH, 2021)

While inequity in immunisation coverage has slowly narrowed down due to the expansion of services and continuous increase of coverage, irrespective of economic or parental education, the place of residence is still a major determinant of inequity as gaps in coverage by province and district remains widespread in Rwanda. Reaching under-served communities in low performing districts, identifying missed settlements, involving local communities to stimulate demand for immunisation and expand outreach services to reach missed children for vaccination is key to addressing these coverage gaps. (Republic of Rwanda MoH, 2021)

Although Rwanda has a history of authoritarian actions, the RPF as the ruling party is said to have considerably altered Rwandan healthcare for the better (Yarlagadda, 2022). Not only has it prioritised the training and provision of locally based health-care providers, but vaccination rates have also increased from less than 30% in 1995 to 94% in 2015 (Yarlagadda, 2022).

The figure below shows that overall Rwanda has had an immunisation coverage of between 60%-100% of children for DPT and measles from 1996-2022, and HepB3 from year 2002-2022. HepB3 immunisation coverage for 1 year old children was at 0% from 1996-2001. There was a significant increase in coverage from 2001-2022, being above 80% from 2002-2022.

Figure 8: Health-Immunisation (Disease Prevention)-Rwanda



Source: World Development Indicators (2024)

Overall Rwanda has displayed an impressive immunisation coverage nationwide (in the 80%-100% range from 2001-2022). This is perhaps not surprising considering the factors that have shaped and strengthened the Rwandan vaccination programmes (discussed earlier).

6.3 Mozambique



Map of Mozambique, Source: Nations Online Project

6.3.1 Brief history of Mozambique

Mozambique was a colony of Portugal, which did not want to follow the decolonisation strategies of France and Britain (Hanlon, 2010: 79). Consequently, liberation in all its African colonies in 1964, eventually leading to the fascist government in Portugal being overthrown in 1974 (Hanlon, 2010: 79). When the Portuguese withdrew [after being brought to the edge of collapse by the Frelimo⁶] from Mozambique this paved the way for the first Marxist-inspired regime to take power in Southern Africa (Graham, 2010:133-134). In 1974 an agreement was

⁶ FRELIMO: the abbreviation used to refer to the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or Mozambique Liberation Front. Frelimo is the ruling political party since independence

signed to form a transitional government which was headed by Frelimo who took control of the country. In 1975 Mozambique formally gained its independence from Portugal.

6.3.2 The civil war

Waterhouse (1996:10) states that Frelimo inherited a fragmented nation which was governed by colonial laws and a weak state administrative system. As the Portuguese left (taking with them what they could in valuables and capital; and destroying what they couldn't take) Frelimo found itself facing economic chaos (Waterhouse, 1996:10). During this time Frelimo labelled itself as a party of the masses and adopted a Marxist-Leninist stance and as such land, healthcare and education were nationalised and the government took over running abandoned farms, companies, and shops (Waterhouse, 1996:10).

Against this backdrop, things took a turn for the worst when, in 1976, the anti-communist rebel group, RENAMO, violently began to resist Frelimo with the aid of the then white minority-led South African and Rhodesian governments. In 1977 the civil war commenced when RENAMO launched a guerrilla campaign against the Frelimo government in opposition of its Marxist ideologies and policies (Faleg, 2019:2). RENAMO was at the onset of the civil war supported by the secret services of the Rhodesia and South Africa in an effort to put an end to Mozambican support for the liberation movements in these countries, however later it put down social roots in central-northern Mozambique— amidst a rural society in crisis, partly because of the Frelimo State policy of “rapid authoritarian modernisation” (Alberdi and Barosso, 2021:235). The civil war lasted for sixteen years which collapsed the state in large parts of the country, left almost one million dead and between six and seven million people dead (Alberdi and Barosso, 2021:235).

6.3.3 The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana insurgency

Origins of RENAMO

The rebel Group RENAMO was created by Southern Rhodesia's security forces as a response to Frelimo's support for the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) [the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)] guerilla's that were fighting an independent Zimbabwe (Waterhouse, 1996:12). By 1977 there were some Mozambican recruits in RENAMO, including a former Frelimo commander, Andre Matsangaissa, who later became RENAMO's first president (Waterhouse, 1996:12). Following the rebel groups training

in Rhodesia they began their activities inside Mozambique and established base camps there (Morgan, 1990:75). Initially under the Rhodesian military wing the rebels attacked Frelimo and ZANLA bases inside Mozambique. The attacks involved setting villages on fire, destroying infrastructure, such as clinics, shops and railways, and vandalising commerce (Waterhouse, 1996:12).

In 1979 Andre Matsangaissa was replaced as leader by Afonso Dhlakama. At the time, the organisation had about 500 armed rebels and limited independence as it was tightly controlled by the Rhodesian security forces (Morgan, 1990:75). Things changed however when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, and a ZANU government was elected led by Robert Mugabe who was friendly to Frelimo. South Africa then stepped in and took over as the driving force behind RENAMO (Morgan, 1990:75).

In the following years RENAMO was funded, trained and equipped by South Africa's apartheid government as part of its regional policy of destabilisation (Waterhouse, 1996:12). The aim of this policy was to weaken the socialist governments which were progressively replacing the colonial regimes throughout Southern Africa and oppose any support they may give to those that rival the apartheid regime. Up to 1989 (under South Africa's training) RENAMO mainly targeted economic infrastructure in Mozambique, but also Frelimo's social symbols like state-run schools, health centres, and local administrations, and the people who staffed them. RENAMO documents that were captured (and as reported by its members) revealed that the group saw civilians as legitimate targets and in the early years their tactics included brutalising civilians. (Waterhouse, 1996:12).

RENAMO's structural organisation and political aims

According to Manning (1998:162)-based on extensive interviews done with RENAMO officials, published and documentary sources-when South Africa took up the responsibility of supporting RENAMO between 1982-1985, RENAMO's internal structure was mainly a military one. The groups political aims were set out in its Manifest and Programme which was adopted in August 1991. The document called, amongst other things, for a Government of National Unity, and an army based on RENAMO, as well as democratic elections and a mixed economy (Hall, 1990:43). In 1982 the groups National Council was formed, comprised of Afonso Dhlakama as president, a secretary general and minor Mozambican exiles. In addition to the National Council, RENAMO had external representation in the form of its offices abroad in offices in Lisbon, Washington, Paris and Bonn (Hall, 1990:43). In 1988 a new programme

came to fruition, which strongly emphasised economic and political freedom and stressed freeing Mozambique from Soviet colonialism, expansionism and imperialism, indicating some input from the US backers (Young, 1990:501-502).

In 1985 RENAMO's then Secretary General alluded to a conventional military structure made up of the Commander in chief (President Dhlakama), and generals. The generals had military commanders under them. The regional commanders had sector commanders, and the sector commanders had zone commanders under them. There were then battalions and platoons. RENAMO was a hierarchical military organisation centralised organisation. (Hall, 1990:45-45)

RENAMO's agenda and ideology

RENAMO's main strategy entailed terrorising rural populations as well as sabotaging governmental infrastructure (Darch, 2018). Later, the rebel group changed its strategy to begin exploiting the dissatisfaction of the locals over governmental policies. This strategy helped to build a base of popular support for RENAMO, particularly in the central provinces. (Darch, 2018)

RENAMO was described as anti-communist and anti-Frelimo. Having its external image being promoted by its foreign backers as an anti-communist liberation movement during the Cold War, helped RENAMO to win backing from right-wing and religious groups in the West (Waterhouse, 1996:12). There were however accounts of RENAMO being motivated by specific grievances which were resentment at Frelimo's suppression of traditional chiefly authority and repressive attitude towards religion and religious practitioners, and rejection of Frelimo's economic and agrarian policies, which are perceived as having brought ruination (Hall, 1990:47).

In 1984 Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati accord. This was a friendship agreement whereby South Africa pledged to end its support for RENAMO, in return Mozambique promised not to allow the African National Congress (ANC)⁷ to have a military base on its territory (Waterhouse, 1996:13). RENAMO headquarters were transferred by South Africa to the forest of the Gorongosa mountains in central Mozambique, where it stockpiled

⁷ The ANC originated as a liberation movement opposing the apartheid regime in South Africa. It is now a political party and has been the ruling party since 1994.

weapons and supplies. The South African government secretly continued to support RENAMO, but from then on RENAMO was on its own resources (Waterhouse, 1996:13).

RENAMO's wartime governance

There was a strict division between RENAMO military structures and the civilian population. When RENAMO has established a presence in an area, they ensured local provision of food and labour through traditional mechanisms (Waterhouse, 1996:49). *Mujiba's* who were civilian collaborators of the guerrillas, were appointed to oversee the system and report those that did not tow the line, forming an effective spy and surveillance network (Waterhouse, 1996:49). Traditional chiefs, known as *regulos*, ruled civilian affairs (Arjona, 2014:1376). Arjona categorised RENAMO's governance as *aliocracy* which occurs when:

“rebel groups control a territory and behave like a minimal state, only regulating public order and taxation. Other spheres of life are regulated by rules that come from various sources, including the state, traditional authorities, and local leaders. Cases in which a group establishes an indirect form of rule fall into this category: an underlying agreement between the armed group and the community—or its ruler—leads the group not to interfere in civilians' affairs, as far as locals meet a set of obligations” (Arjona, 2014:1376).

From its base in Gorongosa, RENAMO made money from illegal ivory trading. However, it did not occupy any towns and when the war ended, it controlled no significant economic enterprise. Basic healthcare and education in areas controlled by RENAMO, were carried out by workers trained by Frelimo or by captured Frelimo supporters (Waterhouse, 1996:13).

Health governance during conflict: cooperation on vaccination campaigns

After independence the government made significant strides in increasing access and use of clinics (1979-1981); launching the Expanded Program on Immunisation in 1979 (aimed at reducing mortality and morbidity from diseases that can be prevented by vaccination); and training health-care workers (Garenne, Coninx and Dupuy, 1997). From 1975 to 1981, 593 peripheral health units were built with popular support, taking the total from 446 to 1039 units. A large number of medical staff were trained, and mass vaccination campaigns were executed (Kanji, 1990:105). The percentage of the state budget allocated to health went up from 3.3% in 1974 to a high of 11.2% in 1982. The Directorate for Social Action was established within the Ministry of Health and priority was given to children's programmes making them a focus of social policy and planning in the health, education and welfare sectors (Kanji, 1990:105).

Following the establishment of the EPI, in 1980 immunisation became part of the routine child health services, providing vaccines against tuberculosis (BCG), poliomyelitis (OPV), measles and diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DTP). This was implemented in rural and urban areas, and it was expanded to larger cities in 1983 (Cassocera et al., 2020:3)

During the conflict Mozambique's health care system became a target for RENAMO, with the rural districts being the hardest hit (Collins, 2006:14). The destruction of health facilities hindered the governments focus on preventative medicine such as vaccine and public health facilities (Collins, 2006:14) and immunisation stopped in many areas (Gareme, Conix and Dupuy, 1997). The targeting of health facilities by RENAMO resulted in the destruction of 25% of the total primary health care network and by the end of 1986, more than 2 million people had lost access to the normal health service due to the closure of facilities or people being displaced. During the war the infant mortality rate was estimated to have been 200 per thousand live births and the child mortality rate between 325 and 375 per thousand, one of the highest in the world at the time. Malnutrition also increased because of the combination of the effects of low food production, displacement and infectious diseases. (Kanji, 1990:106)

In 1985 the UN sponsored a vaccination campaign for children in south-central Mozambique. The under-five mortality rate had drastically risen because of the war and a significant number of children were dying each year from preventable diseases like measles (Finnegan, 1992:24). The area radio would be the platform through which the campaign announcement would be made however there was concern that an announcement would provoke RENAMO attacks. The campaign was done in secret; through the Frelimo party structure word would reach the masses about vaccination points where people would be gathered, vaccinated and quickly dispersed. (Finnegan, 1992:24)

Health governance in Resistência Nacional Moçambicana held territories

Available information on the quality of RENAMO's health governance during the conflict period is very limited. In 1992 the Health and Development for Displaced Populations (Hedip) program of the WHO was launched in the Zambezia province of Mozambique. The first vaccination campaign was organised in a RENAMO held territory of Milange District (in Zambezia) with the support of Hedip (Swartz, 1996:39). Within the district a committee supported by the WHO/Hedip was composed of representatives of the district government, RENAMO civilian officers, religious organisations, local businessmen, local NGOs and traditional leaders. By consensus the committee made decisions on which activities to support.

Furthermore, the committee took decisions on who would participate in training courses for health activists, how to organise vaccination campaigns in RENAMO areas, where to put new health centres or which centres needed rehabilitating which had strong political implications in the Milange district. Through this approach, RENAMO controlled areas were gradually opened for health outreach activities carried out in partnership with health workers and government personnel from the District Health Office. (Swartz, 1996:39)

A nurse from the District Health Office reported that he was afraid of being a part of the vaccination campaign, in the RENAMO controlled Milange district, because he had always thought of them as violent bandits although he did not know them. He noted that he and a RENAMO health worker had discussed the campaign with the RENAMO representative, who had sensitised their leaders on how important it was to vaccinate children. Together with the Hedip project officer the nurse had arrived with the vaccines, talked to the RENAMO vaccinators and did some informal training with them. The nurse said everything went all right and he and the RENAMO vaccinators continued to vaccinate together. (Swartz, 1996:39)

RENAMO's cooperation with the vaccine campaign may be explained by how the group managed the Zambezia province. According to Wilson (1992:530) RENAMO was known to be more selective in its use of violence in Zambezia than in other places. In Zambezia RENAMO emphasised coercive administrative control with a political veneer, instead of violence for the purpose of intimidation. This signalled RENAMO's switch away from pure terrorism towards a more political line and in its meeting with people of Zambezia it emphasised that it was different from other groups operating in the South of Mozambique in that it did not kill people in villages—in comparison to Frelimo aligned groups did. (Wilson, 1992:530) In the North of Mozambique (where Zambezia is located) RENAMO was able to establish more permanent base and popular support due to the people's higher discontent with Frelimo (Jentzch, 2018:330)

In 1992 a general peace accord was signed between RENAMO and Frelimo initiating a transition from civil war to peace. The UN played a role in mediating and monitoring which included overseeing the deconstruction of the rival government and armies; and the country's first ever multi-party elections (Waterhouse, 1996). UN agencies also played their parts like the UNHCR which set up a transit camp in Tete province as vaccinations of children returned to Mozambique after the civil war. Demobilised RENAMO soldiers also helped rebuild health infrastructure in rural towns like Nauela (a district in Zambezia), a former strong-hold during

the war. (Waterhouse, 1996) The following table summarises RENAMO's structure, agenda and war-time governance.

Table 8: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana during conflict

Group nature and ideology	Anti-communist and anti-Frelimo
Organisational structure/ethnic make-up	Military and centralised/predominantly ethnically homogenous (Shona Rhodesians)
Type of rebel governance	Aliocracy
Use of violence	Brutalised civilians in the early years
Interest in governance/readiness to govern	Yes: more involved in governance in the Northern regions and called for a GNU >>> indication of interest in participating in governance/no
State-like governance	Yes (very minimal)
Roving or Stationary	Roving in its early stages
Rebel group cooperation on vaccination (health governance)	While RENAMO destroyed health facilities in different parts of Mozambique, there was cooperation in vaccine campaign in Zambezia province (a RENAMO held territory)

Authors own summary based on the analysis of literature.

6.3.4. The cessation of the conflict: General Peace Accord

By the late 1980s it had become apparent to both sides that the war was not going to be won by military means, and the government and the rebels reluctantly sat down to negotiate a mediated end to the fighting (Wilson, 1992:6). In 1992 the conflict ended, and a peace agreement was eventually signed between Frelimo and RENAMO in Rome, Italy.

The overarching objective of the General Peace Accord (GPA) was to end what had been prolonged fighting between Frelimo and RENAMO and, subsequently, facilitate a multiple-party political system (Ntaka, 2023:28). The Accord recognised the existing constitution as well as the Frelimo-led government as legitimate but called for new elections and support for RENAMO transitioning into a political party. As a result, multiple party elections have taken

place since 1994 to date – all of which have been won by Frelimo, with RENAMO remaining the primary opposition party (Ntaka, 2023:28) Although scholars agree that the GPA was successful in ending the civil war and bringing peace and democracy (characterised by populace voting) to Mozambique, it did not provide for a firm base for processes that could constitute positive peace in the full sense. As such, the GPA has been unable to effectively aid in the democratisation of the state, the promotion of political accountability and transparency, the process of decentralisation, and/or the assurance of a better life for the majority of Mozambicans. (Ntaka, 2023:28).

The end of the conflict under the GPA also relied on the DDR process for 90 000 combatants from both RENAMO and the Mozambican Armed Forces, overseen by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (Faleg, 2019:2). Although the GPA first and foremost served to end the conflict between Frelimo and RENAMO and promote stability, the roots of the many persisting political problems in Mozambique can be traced back to end of the civil war and the deployment of ONUMOZ and particularly to issues relating to disarmament and decentralisation (Faleg, 2019:2).

Disarmament was not prioritised in the DDR process out of concern that it would undermine the peace process in light of the mistrust between the government and the opposition party, and their reluctance to surrender arms and reintegrate troops. Often RENAMO combatants handed over old weapons and hid other arms across the country as ‘insurance policy’. As such RENAMO always kept the military option open during peacetime and exploit it for political gain. (Faleg, 2019:2)

Demobilisation began in March 1994 and the government and RENAMO initially adopted different approaches to it. The government maintained a slow pace of cantonment and a moderate rate of demobilisation; whereas RENAMO maintained a high rate of cantonment while not demobilising its men (Vines, 2013:379). The creation of a new Mozambican army, the Armed Forces of Defence of Mozambique (FADM), was integral to the peace process. After a discussion on the number of soldiers that would make up the army in the peace negotiations in Rome, both the government and RENAMO settled for 30 000 soldiers of which each side would bring to the table 15 000 (Vines, 2013:379). The FADM and other security services were to be guided by internationally accepted democratic principles and respect the civil and political rights of all Mozambican citizens (Sambo, 2023:103).

Decentralisation was introduced as part of the institutional reforms following the GPA as a means to make political space for RENAMO. Decentralisation was seen by the government as a way to improve relations with rural populations (Sambo, 2023:103). However, the 1994 presidential election showed that RENAMO had extensive support in the rural areas, and this threatened Frelimo. Because of this the parliament declared the devolution law unconstitutional in 1995, amended the constitution to create a parallel system of local governance. The provinces and districts were accountable to central government and the municipalities with devolved autonomous powers. Frelimo's control at the local level was further enhanced by this system, consolidating Frelimo's position as the country's dominant political force. (Sambo, 2023:103). This situation has been a contributing factor to RENAMO's resurgence which will be discussed further below.

6.3.5 Mozambique's post-civil war transition

Mozambique's two-year transition for civil war was funded by the international community, which paid about one million US dollars a day for the supervision of the peace process (Waterhouse, 1996:15). The UN was primarily tasked with the role of mediating and monitoring. The UN oversaw the dismantling of the rival government and guerilla armies, seek out undeclared weapons and clear landmines, the formation of a new national army which would combine former government and RENAMO forces. (Waterhouse, 1996:15)

Following the GPA and its requirements, and prior to the first democratic elections, Frelimo (the ruling party) was to keep being responsible for the public administration of the country (Ntaka, 2023:28). Foreign agencies also worked in collaboration with the Mozambican government to reconstruct the country and move it towards the elections, which formed the initial steps in consolidating peace. Such activities ranged from humanitarian relief, demobilisation, refugee repatriation, physical reconstruction, and several other institutional reforms at the political level. (Ntaka, 2023:28).

6.3.6 Mozambique after 1992

The years immediately following 1992 were deemed by many as 'the golden years', and Mozambique was widely regarded as a post-conflict success story and a model for post-conflict reconciliation and economic growth (Waterhouse, 1996:28-29). This situation, however, became unstable as soon as multi-party politics and market economics were adopted (i.e., from

the time Mozambique departed from its socialist modernisation endeavours). These changes brought out social disruptions despite simultaneously marking the end of the armed conflict. (Waterhouse, 1996:29)

Although Mozambique has seen regular elections since 1992, along with a relative level of decentralisation of power and on-going economic growth, bouts of conflict at separate times have also occurred. Such conflicts have often included a resurgence of armed conflict between the Frelimo government and the opposition RENAMO party. Furthermore, the country's economic growth has not, in essence, benefitted the most impoverished in the society (Waterhouse, 1996:29).

Governance has also been a challenge for Mozambique post-1992 in so far as how the current political system has impacted development. For example, Frelimo has maintained control of the country's power structures since 1992, and Mozambique has essentially become an unconsolidated democracy built on a fragile economic foundation. (Waterhouse, 1996:29)

The Frelimo government has also been noted as being rife with corruption stemming from the extractive political and economic institutions that were characteristic of the colonial period and the shift from authoritarian to democratic rule. Democratic governments are mandated to serve their constituencies, but corruption undermines the promotion of democratic citizenship and inclusivity; thereby reducing accountability and transparency in the political constituency. Not only do corrupt governments become a source of insecurity to their citizens, but they also stifle the development of democratic institutions Mozambique's governance trajectory became dependent on aid (due in large part to economic and political reforms undertaken when the socialist project was rejected in favour of democratic institutions). Such aid-reliance has facilitated corruption and promoted elite capitalism to the detriment of the country's citizens. (Waterhouse, 1996:29)

6.3.7 Resurgence of conflict

According to Faleg (2019:3) the re-establishment of wartime military bases in the Gorongosa mountains by RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama in 2012 and RENAMO's attack on a police station in the Manica province in 2013 (in retaliation for a police raid of RENAMO's local headquarters in the province) were the occurrences that triggered the return of insurgency in Mozambique. The following have been noted as the causes of the insurgency: 1. the shortcomings of an incomplete DDR process, 2. RENAMO's only partial transition to a

political party, 3. Frelimo's monopoly of political power and authoritarianism and 4. the emergence of younger, post-civil war RENAMO generation who believe that the use of force is the only means that Frelimo can be forced to relinquish power. (Faleg, 2019:3).

Mozambique is now seen as a new gas and resource rich country and the political balance has changed since the inception of the GPA in 1992 (Regalia, 2017:12). The country's contemporary political landscape is marred by a combination of continuities i.e., Frelimo's stronghold on power and RENAMO's unchanged leadership and changes i.e., the emergence of new opposition party (ending RENAMO's position as the only opposition party), Frelimo's increasing corruption and new rent-seeking strategies regarding natural resources (Regalia, 2017:12). The tension between the consolidated dynamics and new opportunities plays a key role in RENAMO's return to arms and return to its old confrontation strategy. The resurgence of conflict is indicative of RENAMO's fear of marginalisation and its old leadership style, but also the consequences of Frelimo's unending grip on power. (Regalia, 2017:12) Furthermore, it can be said that RENAMO's wartime behaviour continues today.

6.3.8 Resistência Nacional Moçambicana as a 'partial' political party


According to Waterhouse (1996:23) no post-war election would have been meaningful without RENAMO, however when the peace talks began in Rome, RENAMO was ill-prepared for political contest. The parties that mediated stepped in to assist in transforming it from a guerilla movement to a political party. There were three parts to the transformation process: military, material and political. RENAMO however was mainly focused on the material aspect and its leaders argued that they could not exchange war politics without houses, offices, cars and fax machines. (Waterhouse, 1996:23)

Even though a multi-party democracy post-war, both Frelimo and RENAMO have for the most part remained trapped in their own pasts (Darch, 2018:8). RENAMO has had difficulty acquiring the necessary political skill set of an opposition party, continuing to think and behave in many ways like the guerilla force that it once was (Darch, 2018:8).

6.3.9 Government performance in Mozambique from 1996-2022

This section will provide an overview of governance in Mozambique post 1992. Because RENAMO has never governed, in the sense of being a ruling party, the data is based on the governance performance of the Frelimo government.


Figure 9: Government Effectiveness-Mozambique



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

The above figure is indicative of state capacity in Mozambique post 1992. Overall, we can see that Mozambique has witnessed a general decline in government effectiveness from 1996, going from 0 in 2001 to 0.7 in 2022.

Figure 10: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism-Mozambique




Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

The above figure gives us indication of whether there is good governance in the country and the state's ability to control territory and means of violence. Mozambique, although having

periods of high political stability from the 2000's, has seen a general decline in political stability and absence of violence/terrorism from 2012-2022.


Figure 11: Voice and Accountability-Mozambique



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

The above figure gives us an indication if the citizens capacity to express their views, interests and demand action from the state. While accountability indicates the states capacity and will to respond to citizen demands. The estimate for the voice and accountability index for Mozambique has generally been less than 0, declining from 2005 and coming in at around .06 in 2022.

Figure 12: Control of corruption-Mozambique



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)


The above figure gauges the extent to which public power is used for private gain. Here we can see that Mozambique generally had weakened control of corruption capacity, hovering at around the 0 point since 1996, dipping to around 0.9 (lowest) in 2015.

Health governance post 1992: cooperation on vaccination campaigns

According to Cassocera et.al (2020:13) Mozambique has seen notable improvements in the national immunisation which has been characterised by the introduction of strategic vaccines, an overall increase in the national and provincial coverage, a decrease in the number of children that did not receive any of the basic vaccines, implementation of strategies to increase the immunisation coverage and the establishment of monitoring system of the vaccine preventable disease (VPD) as an important tool to detected outbreaks and to respond appropriately to these events. Furthermore, less than 25% of the budget of total immunisation services is provided by the government, the bulk of funding comes from external support. (Cassocera et al., 2020:13).

Frelimo remains the governing party in Mozambique with RENAMO as the main opposition party and part of the legislature. This body can guide governing actions, but it is not easy to ascertain how the RENAMO party has related to vaccination drives as a state actor in this sense.

Figure 13: Health-Immunisation (Disease Prevention)-Mozambique



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

The above figure shows us that Mozambique has generally had an immunisation coverage of over 60% for children ages 12-23 months for DPT and measles from 1996-2022. HepB3 immunisation coverage for 1 year old children was at 0% from 1996-2000. There was a significant increase in coverage from 2000-2022, generally being above 60% from 2001-2022.

Taking into consideration the above data and findings, it was possible to make some inferences about the state of Mozambique post 1992. There is a trend of weakened governance across the highlighted governance indicators. For example, with regards to political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, the significant drop from 2012 to 2022, is an indication of existing security threats in Mozambique. We know that since 2017 the Mozambican government has been fighting an insurgency led by extremist militants in the Cabo Delgado province which, at time, has seen the government lose control over territory and the means of violence. With the on-going security challenges, we can assert that other functions of the state can and will be negatively affected.

Government effectiveness has also been on the decline over the years, and it can be asserted that the states intended outcomes related to government effectiveness have generally not been met. Notably corruption remains an on-going challenge. Corruption tends to reduce transparency and accountability, and the steady decline in citizens voices being heard, also concerning. Regulatory quality and confidence in the rule of law have also been on a general decline (with some improvements here and there) since 2002 (see Appendix B). Overall nationwide governance in Mozambique from 1996-2002 has not been strong, and this corresponds to the state of Mozambique as discussed in the section 'Mozambique after 1992'. One final consideration is the generally steady immunisation coverage (in the 60%-80% range from 2002-2022). It can be said that overall, there has been great strides made by Mozambique in this aspect.

Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusion

This dissertation aimed to explore the impact that rebel governance has on post-conflict state-building, and also to ascertain which groups—hierarchically organised, ideologically organised or ethnically homogenous groups, do better in nation-wide governance after conflict. The research also looked at rebel groups involvement in vaccination programmes as an indicator of interest in governance.

To recap, the research questions were as follows:

4. Is there a relationship between rebel governance and post-conflict state governance?
5. What factors influence rebel group's interest in governance, and which activities can be an indicator of group interest and readiness to govern?
6. Do hierarchically organised, ideologically organised or ethnically homogenous groups perform better in nation-wide governance?

The main argument of the dissertation was that a hierarchically or ideologically organised, state-like, ready and interested group posture on governance is predictive of the possibility of post-conflict involvement of the group in a demilitarised political process and ultimately, state-building. Furthermore, hierarchically or ideologically organised groups should be expected to do better in nationwide governance as opposed to ethnically homogenous groups.

7.1 Summary of research findings

The research found that there is a relationship between rebel governance and post-conflict state governance, and this relationship can be interpreted as 'two sides of the same coin'. Although there are various factors that can influence rebel groups interest in state governance, the overarching factor usually is a dissatisfaction (in one way or another) with an incumbent state, driving the group to rebel against such as the case of the SNM in Somalia, the RPF in Rwanda and to a certain extent RENAMO in Mozambique. Indeed, certain groups perform state-like activities as they exhibit elements that can be interpreted as being interested in and ready to govern i.e., they may have a plan outlined, they may control the means of violence, have some control of territory, administer civilians and provide public goods such as facilitating health service provision as illustrated by the cases. In all three of the cases of interest the RPF and RENAMO are ethnically homogenous while the SNM is largely clan-based. The RPF and RENAMO were roving groups in their early stages whereas the SNM was stationary from the

onset. Neither the RPF nor SNM were ideologically organised, but it can be said that RENAMO was. Out of the three groups the RPF and RENAMO were more hierarchically organised. All three groups used violence during wartime. The secondary data shows that Somaliland and Rwanda have fared much better than Mozambique in terms of government effectiveness. It should however be noted that development indicators do have their limitations, for one in that they are averages, and the figures may not show any existing inequalities in a country for example in Rwanda. Somaliland and Rwanda exhibit a more upward state-building trajectory as opposed to Mozambique. All three groups have cooperated with vaccination campaigns at different stages. Overall, what can be observed from the case studies is that the SNM and RPF, as rebels turned rulers, have done better in nationwide governance although neither were ideologically organised. While the former is clan-based and was more unitary in nature, the latter is hierarchical and ethnically homogenous and, in this case, supporting the expectation that a hierarchical group would fare better in nationwide governance and also that as an ethnically homogenous group the likelihood of splinter groups occurring has been avoided.

7.2 Discussion of research questions

Q.1. Is there a relationship between rebel governance and state governance?

The literature certainly indicates a presence of a link between rebel and state governance. Although the former may be considered as an informal form of governance and the latter formal, governance in both spheres requires the governor to have control over territory, a population to govern and control over the means of violence, as highlighted by Kasfir (2015) and Loyle et al. (2022) which are the fundamentals of state formation as articulated by Tilly (1985). In both cases, states and rebels can offer citizens public goods, such as security, in exchange for taxation which can be used to enable the state and rebel groups to enhance their defence capacity and continue the provision of services for the population (encouraging state-building), as alluded to by Arjona (2014) and Albert (2023). How the offer is packaged and how citizens are taxed will vary of course depending on the type of regime and rebel group and their agendas.

Similarly to a state, empirical legitimacy is vital for a rebel group to stay in power. Without the buy-in from those being ruled, rebel groups will likely struggle to enforce law and order, a sentiment echoed by Schlichte and Schneckener (2015) and Arjona (2017). Rebel governance and state governance can also work hand in hand in the case of hybrid political orders, where

animosities between the incumbent and rebel group/s can be put aside to enable cooperation in governing civilians, as indicated by Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra (2017).

Q.2. What factors influence rebel groups interest in governance, and which activities can be an indicator of group interest and readiness to govern?

Some groups are driven by a desire to govern and get approval from citizens, although these groups may not necessarily aspire to state governance, as indicated by Baylouny (2014). Compelling factors such as grievances (economic, social and political) tend to be the driving force of rebellion in Africa. This leads to some groups opposing the political order imposed by the state with the aim of regime change. This was the case of the SNM and RPF and perhaps less so for RENAMO. The SNM and RPF aimed to take control over all the territory and administer civilians. To do this, they put in place institutions in their areas of control, an activity that is indicative of a groups readiness to govern and they were explicit about replacing the incumbent and long-term governance of their respective territories. By establishing themselves as political actors with rule over a territory, they could seek legitimacy (empirical and in the RPF's case normative), making them more state-like with better prospects to govern after conflict.

In this research one of the activities presented was rebel groups involvement in health service provision, as an indicator of a groups interest in governance, by looking at how groups in the case studies cooperated with vaccination campaigns at different time periods. From the literature presented in chapter 5 it is evident that it is not uncommon for rebel groups to participate in vaccination programmes. This research found that RENAMO, while having been destructive of health facilities, leading to interrupted vaccine campaigns during the conflict, in certain parts of Mozambique, in Zambezia province (mostly RENAMO held territory) worked with District health officials to vaccinate children. Furthermore, the group facilitated the delivery of this service in former strong-hold areas during the transition period. Of course, different motivations can drive a group to cooperate, but it can be deduced that after the conflict and peace agreement, RENAMO's actions were indicative of a group interested, at least, in participating in governance considering it was not the victor post-conflict. The SNM and RPF cooperated in vaccine campaigns post conflict as victors and rulers and have more or less had fairly high levels of vaccination cooperation which is a testament to their commitment, readiness and ability to govern.

Q.3. Do hierarchically organised, ideologically organised or ethnically homogenous groups perform better in nation-wide governance?

Table 9: Comparative summary of key findings from the case types

Nature of group	Type of Rebel Group		
	SNM (secession)	RPF (regime change)	RENAMO (power-sharing)
Hierarchical and/or Ideological	Neither it was more unitary	Hierarchical	Hierarchical and Ideological
Ethnically homogenous	No (clan based)	Yes (Tutsi)	Yes (Shona)
Type of rebel governance	Generally inclusionary	Autocratic (martial law), limited inclusion of civilians	Aliocratic, limited inclusion of civilians
Interest in governance/readiness to govern	Yes/Yes	Yes/Yes	Yes/No
State-like governance during conflict	Yes (direct civilian governance)	Yes (minimal civilian governance)	Yes (indirect rule)
Groups participation in vaccination campaigns (health governance)	Yes (post-conflict)	Yes (post-conflict)	Yes (during the conflict and in transition period)
Demilitarisation of rebel group after conflict	Clan militias disarmed and demobilised	Yes (partial)	Yes (partial)
Rebel group had a state-building plan	Yes	Yes	No
Government effectiveness after conflict	Effective	Effective	Less Effective (for the Frelimo led government)

Authors own summary from the analysis of literature and descriptive data.

From the above it can be observed that the SNM and RPF have done better in nation-wide governance based on the empirical evidence extracted from the literature and data of select governance indicators. Following from the above summary, and the argument of this dissertation, what is certain is that a group exhibiting interest in governance, readiness to govern, state-like governance with a commitment to a state-building agenda is likely to participate in a demilitarised process and ultimately state-building. The expectation of a hierarchically organised group doing better in governance is supported by the RPF—evidenced by how the group governs post-conflict Rwanda and even in their management of health governance, with clear command structures. On top of this the RPF is predominantly an ethnically homogenous group and as such it can be said that the group has been able to avoid dissent, enabling it to maintain a strong-hold in Rwanda. On the other hand, the SNM was not strictly hierarchical nor ideologically organised, and it lacked the ethnic homogeneity found in the RPF and RENAMO. Instead, the SNM was organised along clan lines, with authority often

decentralised and negotiated among elders and commanders. Despite, or perhaps because of, this structure, the SNM successfully transitioned into a governing authority in Somaliland. Both the SNM and RPF have seen a generally upward trajectory in state-building (as evidenced by the literature). This research also hypothesised that a strong ideology and group coherence can increase a rebel group's will to commit to governance and readiness to compromise. Of the three groups RENAMO was more ideologically organised (founded on an anti-communist ideology), and while this may have been a compelling factor to compromise and enter into a power-sharing agreement with Frelimo, RENAMO has been unable to fully transform into a formidable opposition party in Mozambique able to challenge and take power from the Frelimo led government.

There are, however, some caveats to the above that must be noted. Somaliland was a break-away state, and the Isaaq led SNM did not necessarily have to participate in a demilitarised process as they were the main 'owners' of the means of violence. However, other clan militias were disarmed and demobilised. Furthermore, the hybrid political order (while having its challenges) has shown to be effective in building the Somaliland state. This research does not intend to claim that Somaliland has had the perfect state-building process post 1991, but rather that it has been successful in establishing a relatively stable and secure state. Musa and Horst (2019:35) note that "it is generally agreed that governance in Somaliland involves a range of state and non-state actors with a long history of contributions to peacebuilding and state formation". Furthermore, the clan-based governance model enabled power-sharing that was inclusive and balanced, as noted by Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf (2003). The combination of these factors has fostered an environment of checks and balances, ensuring that the SNM leadership does not deviate from the rebuilding agenda. Moreover, the members of the SNM were very committed to state-building from the onset (as noted by Duffield, 2014) and this without a doubt has contributed positively to the rebuilding process.

Rwanda saw a change in regime post the civil war and genocide where the RPF took over. Although the RPF also agreed to a power-sharing arrangement, through the peace agreement after 1994, in reality this did not materialise as the RPF sought to have sole authority and power in Rwanda. The Eight-point plan and their ability to control territory before and during the conflict can be seen as an indicator of the RPF's interest and readiness to govern in Rwanda. Rwanda's success story can be traced to the RPF's wartime organisation which, under Kagame, was hierarchical, disciplined and effective (Waldorf, 2017), which carried over to state governance. The drive for Kagame to rebuild the Rwanda nation can be said to have been a

catalyst for state-building in the country. As Robson et al. (2020:59) note “it cannot be denied that under the leadership of former rebel leader President Paul Kagame, Rwanda has transformed from a dysfunctional post-conflict nation in the late 1990s into one of the more productive and stable economies in Africa”. Keating (2015) states that Paul Kagame’s tight grip on power has helped create much of Rwanda’s stability. When asked by Keating why Rwanda has successfully been able to reform, Kagame said “political will...political will is the one thing that holds the rest together” (Keating, 2015).

Much can be said about Rwanda’s current political regime, a discussion and debate for another dissertation, however, but one thing that is clear from this case is that who leads matters. The RPF has been in power since 2000 with Paul Kagame winning the presidential election in July 2024 thrusting him into his third term as the commander-in-chief. Indeed, allegations of authoritarian rule, oppression of opposition parties, human rights abuses, to name a few, have plagued Kagame over the years. Is the political landscape in Rwanda ideal? Not likely, but the outcome of Rwanda’s state-building policy, essentially premised on centralised political control while executing development goal, is undeniable. On paper, if nothing else, it can be said that the RPF’s post-conflict governance approach has succeeded in turning a collapsed state and society into a functional state post 1994.

The case of Mozambique is one where the group became the main opposition party in what was supposed to be a power-sharing arrangement. Although RENAMO has contested the presidential and parliamentary elections since 1992, and its former leader the late Afonso Dhlakama came close to winning the presidency in 1999 national elections, it has not been successful in ‘de-throning’ the Frelimo government and has thus remained an opposition party ever since. Frelimo’s hold on power, marginalisation of RENAMO and other opposition parties and limited commitment to state reconstruction has not only stifled the consolidation of democracy, but Mozambique has experienced a downward state-building trajectory. RENAMO struggled to fully transition into a political party, its partial demilitarisation meant that there always room to take up arms again, as it did in 2013 in response to Frelimo’s authoritarian rule amongst other things. As Waterhouse (1996) noted that after the conflict RENAMO was not ready for political contest; and has remained captive to its initial identity as an insurgent group rather than fully transitioning to a political party, as iterated by Darch (2018).

The Rwanda and Mozambique case also illustrates that political power-sharing, while offering opposition groups or rebel groups a place in government, does not mean that actual sharing of

power will occur. Primarily these types of arrangements function to end conflict but are not sustainable and are not a long-term solution in post-conflict settings, as highlighted by Sriram and Zahar (2009). The resurgence of conflict in Mozambique is an example of the pitfalls of this type of power-sharing.

7.3 Post-conflict reconstruction

As stated by Theron (2011) post-conflict reconstruction entails the state re-building itself after conflict and achieving sustainable peace. This encompasses security, governance and socio-economic development etc. Although Somaliland currently enjoys little international legitimacy, it has emerged as a state that can provide for its citizens and through its clan rule-based governance has been able to enjoy empirical legitimacy. Service provision has improved remarkably post the conflict era and notably health systems are strong, with great strides made in vaccination campaigns. Somaliland has also been able to foster an environment for economic recovery based on trade and support from diaspora communities. On the downside, one of the things that may undermine progress in Somaliland in the future is power imbalances, a potential long-term negative according to the PCR framework, because the Isaaq remain the dominant clan.

Rwanda, having adopted a developmental state model, has shown considerable economic recovery and growth post 1994, and its economy remains resilient. Rwanda's government effectiveness has improved since the early 2000's and the country has remained stable with no reported conflict outbreak since 1994. According to the development indicators while voice and accountability has significantly weakened, the government has been able to weed out corruption. Most notably Rwanda has excelled in health service provision, particularly regarding vaccination campaigns, because of political will, culture of accountability, local ownership and a strong health value chain. On the downside, political exclusion (a potential long-term negative as indicated in the PCR framework) opposition parties may eventually lead to conflict resurgence in the future if the (Tutsi) RPF continues to monopolise the political landscape in Rwanda.

The international community supported Mozambique's post-conflict transition. While it was seen as a success story in the years following 1992, multi-party politics and market economics began the unravelling of the state. The governance project has been challenged by, amongst other things, Frelimo's hold on power since 1992 which has led to a situation of exclusionary politics in Mozambique. The tensions between Frelimo and RENAMO have never really

disappeared, and RENAMO being half party half insurgent group further complicates the situation. Mozambique is marred by elevated levels of corruption. Security remains a challenge. With the on-going insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province, and economic growth that has not really translated into uplifting the lives of ordinary Mozambicans, Mozambique is showing signs of slipping into state failure, going by Rotberg's (2003) definition of failed states. This situation may also prompt RENAMO to 'go back to the bush' yet again in the future. On a positive note, Mozambique has shown a steady immunisation coverage from the early 2000s. During the conflict and in the transition period RENAMO supported vaccination campaigns and the re-building of health infrastructure. On some level it can be said that this was a display of interest in governance, albeit only limited to their strong-hold areas. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether this would have translated to a willingness and ability to take on nationwide governance, given an opportunity.

In summary, the following variables were considered and analysed in the case studies: nature and structure of rebel groups, type of rebel governance, interest in governance and readiness to govern nation-wide as part of groups posture on governance. The internal characteristics of an insurgency (whether it is cohesive/unitary or fragmented) can be an important source of variability in rebel governance (Florea, 2020:1011). Naturally, cohesive/unitary rebel movements should be more successful at institutionalising alternative orders. A cohesive movement typically "enjoys the organisational power to mobilise mass participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain disruptive content" (Florea, 2020:1011). The SNM (as a unitary movement) has been very successful in transplanting its wartime governance structures into the post-conflict space and demobilising other clan militia to control the means of violence. The RPF, as a typically hierarchical group, is also a case of successful rebel to ruler transition and commitment to state reconstruction. The SNM had the more inclusionary governance while the RPF was less inclusive during conflict, but both Somaliland and Rwanda are cases of upward state-building trajectories post-conflict. RENAMO (as a partial political party) has faced challenges in the post-conflict space, but perhaps more than anything else the power-sharing agreement and Frelimo crippled it, rendering it unable to fully transition from rebel movement to political party and has not emerged as a 'winner' post-conflict (as opposed to the SNM and RPF). Mozambique has been the least effective in post-conflict governance, presenting with a downward state-building trajectory.

7.4 Conclusion

By analysing rebel group posture on governance during conflict, this research has given insight into how this can impact groups involvement in the post-conflict demilitarisation process and ultimately state-building.

By using a case study design, it was possible to observe and explain the outcomes of each case type. The research expected to find that hierarchically or ideologically organised groups do better in nationwide governance however, it found this to hold true only for the former group (the RPF). In this research the group that was more ideologically organised (RENAMO) did not emerge a ruler post conflict therefore the expectation for this category was not proven nor could be disputed. The SNM being the least centralised of the three, operated through clan-based governance, with leadership often negotiated rather than imposed. While the SNM lacked strong hierarchy in the traditional sense, its governance success in Somaliland suggests an alternative model of legitimacy and coordination. Two groups illustrated better governance performance with a positive state-building trajectory post-conflict, one being more unitary (the SNM) and the other more hierarchical (the RPF).

Although the findings of case study research are based on the available information about the case and can include limited generalisability, the approach allowed the researcher to understand the topic holistically and make inferences from the cases that can be tested in future investigation.

The research sought to add to a gap where little is yet known about the outcomes of rebel governance implications for post-conflict state-building. The findings confirm that rebels do indeed engage in governance through various structures, as highlighted by the case studies interaction with vaccination programs, and that the legacy of this governance carries over to state governance when rebels become victors. What was also clear is that the rebels that became state builders had a plan, committed to it and have stayed the course post-conflict, and that leadership matters.

Future research can look at the impact of rebel governance on the robustness of institutions post-conflict, particularly in countries where the former rebel leaders have become 'strong man' leaders refusing to let go of power. This would enrich the research on long term effects of rebel governance.

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Appendix A

Worldwide Governance Indicators

There are six aggregate governance indicators namely: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption

These indicators are based on over 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide.

Definitions:

Government Effectiveness

Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).

Voice and Accountability

Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).

Control of Corruption

Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the

state by elites and private interests. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).

Regulatory Quality


Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).

Rule of Law

Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).


Appendix B

Rwanda: Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)

Mozambique: Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law



Source: World Development Indicators Data (2024)