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The Discursive Construction of the Concepts of LGBTQ and Roma People in Hungarian Online Political Communication

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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Approximately two decades ago, the use of social media platforms started to spread among political actors worldwide, who began using these platforms to achieve their political goals (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018). Hungarian political actors are no different; social media platforms, especially Facebook, play an essential part in their political communication (Bene & Somodi, 2018), as a growing number of Hungarian citizens are using Facebook to obtain information about politics (Bene, 2017).

Political actors often use minority issues as a central element of their ideology and communication. This is of particular importance in contemporary Hungarian public discourse due to the negative attitudes of Hungarian society toward minorities (see Néményi et al., 2019), which are often amplified or used by some Hungarian political parties to center their communication around minority issues (see Enyedi, 2015). In addition, from a discourse theoretical perspective, political actors in their minority-related social media communication not only portray minorities but also discursively construct the concepts of minorities, i.e., they define and separate minority groups from the Hungarian majority population and legitimize or question existing minority definitions. Thus, it is paramount to investigate how prominent Hungarian political actors construct the concepts of minorities in their social media communication and what definitions and meanings they attach to them. As such, this research project aims to analyze and compare how Hungarian political actors portray and, thus, construct the concepts of sexual and ethnic minorities, that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and trans (henceforth LGBTQ[1]) and Roma people on their official Facebook pages.

The research project relies on a discourse analytic approach and perceives politicians' minority-related communication as discourse. As such, it understands politicians' minority-related communication as constructive of social reality (Gee, 2010; Wetherell, 2001c), acknowledging that politicians, through their language use, discursively construct the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people in the Hungarian public discourse and, thus, in social reality. According to the theoretical notions of discourse analysis, discourse is situated in terms of contexts and cultural models, as its interpretation is tied to negotiation and social interactions (Gee, 2007). Therefore, discourses are formed through social

[1] The terms LGBTQ (~people) and sexual minorities are used as synonyms.

practices and interactions between social groups and actors, as well as the complex social, economic, political, historical, and cultural context and power structures in which they are produced and embedded (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Consequently, discourse is a social practice that shapes social reality and is simultaneously shaped by it (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Accordingly, this research project examines the meaning-making tools with which Hungarian politicians discursively construct the concepts of sexual and ethnic minorities, systematically comparing the meaning-making strategies applied to each minority group. The project also aims to explore the topics and, more importantly, dimensions of social exclusion and inclusion along which politicians separate sexual and ethnic minorities from the majority population.

The research project perceives political communication on social media as part of minority-related public discourse and, as such, a particularly important terrain of meaning-making on the concepts of minorities. Hence, the characteristics of political communication in social media will be examined, especially its potential effects on the balance of inter-party competition. While scholars agree that social media fundamentally differs from traditional media in several aspects (Klinger & Svensson, 2015), they disagree on its effect on political power balances (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020). Some argue that due to the characteristics of social media, such as being unmediated and relatively cheap and easy to use, such platforms increase the possibility of leveling the political playing field between major, established, well-resourced parties and their minor and less established counterparts, thus having an equalizing effect. Others argue for the normalization thesis when claiming that social media, due to several reasons, such as the advent of paid advertisements and professionalization of political communication on these sites, both of which make the platforms resource-intensive, merely reinforce the existing political power structures (Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Both approaches are crucial in understanding the Hungarian context, especially regarding opposition politicians' opportunities to meaningfully bypass the gatekeepers of mass media in a media landscape otherwise dominated by the governing parties Fidesz and KDNP (Bajomi-Lázár, 2019). Therefore, examining the network media logic and social media's potential to equalize or normalize political power balances can shed light on the aspects that influence how politicians construct the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people in social media.

Regarding the research's methodological approach, the corpus comprises 45 prominent Hungarian politicians' 2019 Facebook posts, of which those in connection with LGBTQ

and Roma people were selected for discourse analysis. The distinct social positions of the two marginalized groups are recognized through the varying social attitudes toward each minority group and the different modes and social costs that self-identifying as a marginalized group member imposes on minority individuals (see Barát, 2011). Thus, rather than understanding sexual and ethnic minorities as if they are interchangeable in the public discourse, the comparison seeks to explore the minority-group-specific meaning-making tools and dimensions of social exclusion and inclusion. 2019 was selected for analysis to examine minority-related political communication not only regarding a specific minority-related event, as is usually done, but throughout an entire year. As Hungary saw both the European Parliament elections and the Hungarian local elections in 2019, the year was particularly suitable for analyzing what non-minority-related events, such as political campaigns, trigger politicians to include minorities in their social media communication. Analyzing data from 2019 is also paramount in that it captures political communication on minorities right before 2020, when substantial changes took place in political communication and policy-making regarding the two minorities[2]. Therefore, it serves as a valuable basis for future research, as it enables the examination of shifts in political communication about minorities before and after 2020.

With a comprehensive approach, the Facebook posts of 45 Hungarian politicians published in 2019 will be analyzed to compare the meaning-making tools used in the discursive construction of the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people. The analysis will delve into four key aspects of discursive construction: identifying techniques, represented voices, portrayed minority actors, and the social roles assigned to LGBTQ and Roma through the examined meaning-making strategies (Gee, 2010; Tonkiss, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008). This thorough analysis will provide detailed insights into how the concepts of each minority group were discursively constructed, what events triggered Hungarian politicians to include minorities in their social media communication, and in which dimensions of social exclusion the concept of each minority was constructed.

In the following, the conceptual background of the research project will be introduced. Then, the methodological approach will be the focus, followed by the results of the discourse analysis. Finally, the results will be interpreted in light of the presented theoretical frameworks and the socio-political context of the research project.

[2] See, among others, the adoption of the so-called Article 33 (see Háttér Society, 2020) and the segregation case in Gyöngyöspata (see Cseke, 2020).

Chapter 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, three essential aspects of the research project will be presented. Firstly, the social and political context are discussed, highlighting the attitudes of Hungarian society toward LGBTQ and Roma people. This aims to shed light on the social context in which politicians discursively constructed the concepts of minorities, thus legitimizing or delegitimizing certain attitudes through their social media political communication. In addition, a concise summary of the political context will be presented, outlining the party-political specificities and events that characterized the analyzed period. Secondly, the two main theoretical concepts of the research project are introduced. Namely, discourse analysis, whereby communication on Roma and LGBTQ is interpreted as a field of minority-related meaning-making and, thus, as the discursive construction of the concepts of these minority groups. Theses on political communication on social media and its possible effects on political power balance are also presented. Thirdly, relevant previous research findings will be summarized, focusing on Hungarian analyses and research projects employing discourse analytic approaches, situating the current project within the broader academic discourse. By presenting these aspects, this chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the research project and its context and set the stage for the research questions introduced at the end of this chapter.

Section 2.1 Background

Section 2.1.1 Attitudes toward Roma and LGBTQ people

As the research project aims to analyze the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people in online political communication, highlighting social attitudes toward these minority groups is paramount in understanding the social context of the analyzed discourse. Several Hungarian studies have examined attitudes toward LGBTQ (see Takács, 2011; Takács et al., 2016; Takács & Szalma, 2013, 2014, 2020, 2022; Tóth, 1994) and Roma people (see Csepeli et al., 1998; Enyedi et al., 2004; Ligeti, 2006; Sik & Simonovits, 2008; Székelyi, Csepeli, et al., 2001; Székelyi, Örkény, et al., 2001) both in European and Hungarian contexts. However, as this section aims to present and compare social attitudes toward these two minority groups, it draws on research that examined both minority groups, measuring attitudes toward Roma and LGBTQ people with the same approach. Namely, the Special Eurobarometer 493 (2019) survey findings and a

study by Neményi, Ságvári, and Tardos (2019) will be used.

In 2019, a Special Eurobarometer survey was conducted to explore attitudes toward minority groups based on ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, religion, etc., in the European Union member countries. Parallelly, Neményi, Ságvári, and Tardos (2019) carried out the fourth wave of a longitudinal research project for the Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority. This research project, whose former waves were conducted in 2010, 2013 (Neményi et al., 2013), and 2017 (Neményi et al., 2017), aims to analyze various dimensions and manifestations of discrimination in Hungary. Neményi and colleagues included several different minority and disadvantaged groups in their research to reveal the characteristics and structures of personally experienced discrimination and the social perception of discrimination. The 2019 research report presents the fourth wave's findings and compares them to their previous findings (Neményi et al., 2019).

However, some methodological characteristics should be highlighted before presenting the results of the two research projects. In the Eurobarometer (2019) survey, sexual minorities were referred to as 'LGBTI,' standing for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people. Furthermore, in sexual minority-related questions, lesbians, gays, and bisexuals were presented as one group, while questions on transgender and intersex people were asked separately. Regarding Neményi and colleagues' (2019) survey, discrimination against LGBTQ people was referred to as discrimination "on the basis of sexual orientation"; therefore, it did not include transgender identities. In addition, in the case of subjectively experienced personal discrimination, the survey referred to discrimination on the basis of "skin color," not distinguishing between discrimination based on Roma origin and non-Roma origin, while in other topics, the survey addressed the difference between these categories.

Figure 1 shows the Eurobarometer respondents' answers regarding the prevalence of discrimination on the basis of belonging to the Roma, the gay, lesbian or bisexual, the transgender, or the intersex minority group. As data shows, discrimination against Roma was by far the highest of all minority groups (Figure 1). However, it should also be noted that the less discrimination was perceived about each group, the more 'Don't know' answers were given.



1. Figure. Perceptions of discrimination (%)
Source: Special Eurobarometer 493: Report on Discrimination in the European Union, 2019.

According to the study of Nemény and colleagues (2019), respondents reported experiencing discrimination most frequently against the Roma minority group (10%) within the last 12 months, compared to other minority groups studied. The study also found that discrimination based on Roma origin ranked among the top three reasons for discrimination in all four waves between 2010 and 2019. In 2019, 62% of respondents believed that discrimination based on Roma origin was highly or fairly prevalent, compared to 42% who reported the same for discrimination based on sexual orientation. Nemény and colleagues (2019) speculate that the increase in the prevalence of discrimination based on sexual orientation compared to their last data collection in 2017 could be due to increasing homophobia and a decrease in the concealment of one's sexual orientation. Their results underpin that both minority groups face discrimination; however, the discrimination against the Roma is more pronounced and has persisted over time.

Figure 2 presents the results of the Special Eurobarometer 493 (2019) regarding the inclusion of diversity materials in public school curricula, revealing the percentage of individuals comfortable with their child learning about minority groups. As these topics directly affect one’s children, the question brought the minority groups closer to the respondents’ personal lives and families. When interpreting the results, the topoi that learning about sexual minorities could influence children’s sexual orientation or gender identity is worth noting. As such, it is worth mentioning that 67% of respondents were in favor of teaching about sexual orientation, while only 60% agreed with teaching about Roma culture (Figure 2). Another significant finding is that 55% of respondents were opposed to teaching about intersex and transgender individuals, which was a higher percentage than those who opposed teaching about non-heterosexual orientations (27%).

This indicates a fragmented opinion on the matter of LGBTI groups, i.e., that transgender and intersex people face a higher rate of social rejection compared to lesbians, gays, and bisexuals (Figure 2).



2. Figure. School lessons and material on diversity (%)
Source: Special Eurobarometer 493: Report on Discrimination in the European Union, 2019.

Neményi, Ságvári, and Tardos (2019) explored personal perceptions with a specific focus on subjectively experienced personal discrimination among members of minority groups. In the study, discrimination was defined as a phenomenon in which members of a distinct minority group are subject to procedures and practices in different areas of life that adversely affect them. Their results concerning experienced discrimination based on skin color and sexual orientation are presented in Table 1.

1. Table. Rate of personally experienced discrimination between 2010 and 2019

	2010	2013	2017	2019	Change between 2017 and 2019	Change between 2010 and 2019
Skin color	5.8%	8.4%	11.8%	7.4%	-4.4%	+1.6%
Sexual orientation	1.4%	2%	5.5%	4.1%	-1.4%	+2.7%

Source: Neményi et al., 2019.

As data shows, in terms of the percentage of subjectively experienced personal discrimination, in 2019, 7.4% of all respondents mentioned experiencing discrimination on the basis of their skin color, while 4.1% experienced discrimination based on their sexual orientation in the same year (Table 1). Although the rate of personally experienced discrimination based on skin color and sexual orientation somewhat fell back between 2017 and 2019, compared to the data from 2010, there was an increase in the experienced discrimination based on these protected classes. However, none of these characteristics were among the most discriminated in 2019 (Neményi et al., 2019).

The scholars studied the distribution of personally experienced discrimination among minority groups only in the case of women, the elderly, people with disabilities, and the

Roma. Among Roma respondents, the rate of those personally experiencing discrimination was as strikingly high as 75% in 2019, making it the highest among the four studied groups. Hence, two-thirds of the Roma respondents personally experienced discrimination throughout their lives. Concerning suffered grievances (such as verbal harassment, humiliation, public embarrassment, etc.), Neményi and colleagues (2019) also mention that 2019 was the first year of the longitudinal research project in which grievance based on sexual orientation was mentioned. This affected 6.7% of the men and 7.7% of the women who suffered grievances among the respondents. In the case of grievances on the basis of ethnic belonging, this rate was 36.7% and 20%, respectively.

It is clear from the presented results that Hungarian society has strong negative biases against both minority groups. Social attitudes toward Roma and LGBTQ individuals had not become more positive between 2010 and 2019, although negative attitudes and discrimination decreased between 2017 and 2019 (Neményi et al., 2019). All in all, the presented data also clearly show that 1) discrimination was more prevalent against Roma; 2) Hungarian society was less open to learning about Roma culture and history than learning about lesbian, gay, and bisexual sexual orientations; and 3) the personally experienced discrimination was higher based on skin color than on sexual orientation. The overt existence of discrimination toward Roma and LGBTQ is a solid reason for analyzing the discursive construction of the concepts of these minority groups. Communication pertaining to socially marginalized groups not only highlights the topics through which their exclusion is discursively constructed and reconstructed but also uncovers the extent to which political communication legitimates or challenges such exclusions. This underscores the critical role of discourse analysis in examining how political actors conceive and communicate issues related to minority groups.

Additionally, it is crucial to stress that the research project recognizes the distinct social statuses and positions of these minority groups and acknowledges that meaning-making processes, whether inclusive or exclusionary, carry different personal and political consequences for each group. Drawing on the notions of Barát (2011), the research recognizes that in the case of racism and anti-Roma attitudes, the marginalized group's minority social position is "visibly inscribed by skin colour," while homophobia "involves a particularly salient use of language, in that members of the group discriminated against must define themselves linguistically by 'coming out'" (2011, p. 92). This highlights the unique social positions of different minority groups as targets of hate speech or inclusive utterances. The study acknowledges the particularity of

exclusionary and inclusive discursive meaning-making strategies regarding specific minority groups while avoiding posing a hierarchical differentiation among the discrimination of different minority groups. Hence, its focus is on the commonalities of Romaphobic and homo-, bi- and transphobic utterances or Roma and LGBTQ inclusive communication as well as the differences in the discursive construction of these minority categories to gain a deeper understanding of how the concepts of the particular minority groups are constructed in relation to each other.

Section 2.1.2 Political context

In addition to the social attitudes toward Roma and LGBTQ people in the period under study, the political landscape of the time period is also crucial to introduce. This section presents the general political context of the period, after which Hungarian political parties and their known positions regarding Roma and LGBTQ people are introduced. Finally, the personnel changes affecting the political parties present in the National Assembly will be discussed.

2019, the year in focus of this research, was the second year of the 2018-2022 political term in Hungary. In 2018, the long-standing party alliance of *Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség* ("Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance," henceforth Fidesz) and Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt ("Christian Democratic People's Party," henceforth KDNP) won the Hungarian general elections. These two parties have been in a parliamentary group alliance since 2005. In the alliance, Fidesz, a right-wing conservative populist party (Enyedi, 2015), is the more prominent party. In contrast, the KDNP is often characterized as lacking political significance and electoral support (see, for example, Tóka, 2018, 2019). The parties won a supermajority in the 2018 general elections for the third time in a row since 2010. This is crucial as in Hungary, any law can be passed or changed with the support of a qualified majority (the votes of two-thirds of all MPs), even the Fundamental Law of Hungary (Hungary's constitution). Therefore, in the 2018-2022 term, just as in the previous two terms, MPs of the Fidesz-KDNP alliance, without the support of opposition parties, could, by a single decision, change any Hungarian law or the constitution (Tóka, 2018).

While a detailed description of changes in the Hungarian political system and the rule of law since 2010 would go beyond the scope of the dissertation, describing the nature of these systemic changes is paramount. Researchers differ in their grasping of the essence and depth of changes in the democratic system brought on since the second government

of Viktor Orbán in 2010 (Gyulai, 2017), which is aptly illustrated by the various labels used to describe it, such as populist democracy (Pappas, 2014), simulated democracy (Lengyel & Ilonszki, 2012), broken democracy (Bozóki, 2015), or hybrid regime (Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018; Gyulai, 2017), and so forth. While scholars differ on whether the systemic changes and, more importantly, the current political system can be best described as a deficient democracy or as a kind of hybrid regime, most agree that Hungarian democracy has been backsliding, at least since the Fidesz-KDNP takeover in 2010 (see, among others, Ágh, 2016; Bátory, 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022; Gyulai, 2017; Horváth & Soós, 2015; Tóka, 2018), or even suggest that the current Hungarian political system can be considered a fully developed hybrid regime (Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018). The disintegration of (liberal) democracy in Hungary, also referred to as hybridization, is most tangible, among other things, in the compromised electoral integrity (Gyulai, 2017; OSCE/ODIHR, 2018), e.g., changes to the electoral system that favor the governing parties (Ágh, 2016), in the limited and compromised horizontal checks-and-balances on government power within the institutional system, in the curtailment of the Constitutional Court's power (Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018; Gyulai, 2017), and the radical changes in the Hungarian media system (Gyulai, 2017). The latter is crucial in light of this analysis, as changes in Hungarian media contextualize politicians', especially opposition politicians', use of social media platforms for communicating with the public (Bene & Somodi, 2018).

The Hungarian media landscape has undergone significant changes since Viktor Orbán's second government took office in 2010 (Bajomi-Lázár, 2019; Bátorfy & Urbán, 2020). Radical state interventions in the media system implemented by Fidesz and KDNP (Bajomi-Lázár, 2017) effectively resulted in single-party clientelism in the Hungarian media, in which the ruling parties have "taken control of almost the entire public sphere, while rival parties have been almost completely excluded" (Bajomi-Lázár, 2019, p. 43). In building the post-2010 media system, the governing parties heavily relied on the re-distribution of media resources (Bajomi-Lázár, 2017; Bátorfy & Urbán, 2020; Szeidl & Szűcs, 2021). The practices of Fidesz and KDNP used for shaping the Hungarian media include, for example, expanding public media by creating new public television stations and radios that broadcast government-friendly content and allocating never-seen-before amounts of money to the public service media organization (Bajomi-Lázár, 2017). The government has also taken steps to shape the landscape of commercial media, partly

through ownership[3] and partly by allocating state advertising to pro-government commercial media outlets (Bajomi-Lázár, 2017; Bátorfy & Urbán, 2020; Szeidl & Szűcs, 2021). These practices have led to the dominance of pro-government media outlets and the erosion of media critical of the government (Bajomi-Lázár, 2019; Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, 2019, 2021) and thus to the overwhelming domination of uncritically government-friendly views and the marginalization of typically government-critical views in the Hungarian media (Bajomi-Lázár, 2017). So much so that according to Bátorfy's (2017) analysis, by 2017, only 20% of all Hungarian media could be defined as neutral, and 21% as opposition, while 59% of all Hungarian media was pro-government. As Bajomi-Lázár (2019) notes, this further deteriorated after the 2018 national election, which was won by Fidesz again. In such an unbalanced media landscape, it is the well-understood interest of opposition politicians to rely heavily on social media platforms for communicating with the public (Bene & Somodi, 2018).

Besides Fidesz and KDNP, six parties won mandates in the 2018 general elections. These are as follows in descending order of the number of mandates won: *Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* ("Movement for a Better Hungary," henceforth Jobbik)[4], *Magyar Szocialista Párt* ("Hungarian Socialist Party," henceforth MSZP) in an electoral alliance with *Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt* ("Dialogue for Hungary Party," henceforth Párbeszéd)[5], *Demokratikus Koalíció* ("Democratic Coalition," henceforth DK), *Lehet Más a Politika* ("Politics Can Be Different," henceforth LMP)[6], and *Együtt – a Korszakváltók Pártja* ("Together - Party for a New Era," henceforth Együtt) (NVI, 2018a). Other noteworthy parties running in the 2018 general elections are *Momentum Mozgalom* ("Momentum Movement," henceforth Momentum), Magyar Kétfarkú Kutyapárt ("Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party," henceforth MKKP), Magyar Munkáspárt ("Hungarian Workers Party," henceforth Munkáspárt). The *Mi Hazánk Mozgalom* ("Our Homeland Movement," henceforth Mi Hazánk) was founded during the term; however, its founding members were MPs in the National Assembly. Hence, the party was somewhat represented in the Parliament, although they did not have a parliamentary group during the term. One candidate won a seat in the 2018 general elections running as an independent, and one as a minority representative, namely as the candidate of the

[3] More than 400 media outlets are owned by the Central European Press and Media Foundation, whose board members and chairman are closely tied to the government (Bajomi-Lázár, 2019).
[4] In 2023, the party was renamed *Jobbik – Konzervatívok* ("Jobbik – Conservatives").
[5] In 2023, the party's name was changed to *Párbeszéd – A Zöldek Pártja* ("Dialogue – The Greens' Party").
[6] As of 2020, the party is called *LMP – Magyarország Zöld Pártja* ("LMP – Hungary's Green Party").

National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary.

The above-introduced opposition parties could be divided into several groups. On the one hand, MSZP, Párbeszéd, DK, LMP, Együtt, and Momentum are generally left-leaning parties with different ideological emphases and embracing liberalism to varying degrees. At the time of the research, these parties formed a more or less united opposition to the governing parties regarding their political activities. After the 2010 general elections, the MSZP sought to make a strong left-turn in character, with little success; however, they remained a somewhat left-wing party (Lakner, 2017). LMP and its splinter party Párbeszéd can be characterized as Green New Left parties (Lakner, 2017; Tóka, 2019), while Momentum is a relatively young, liberal party at the time of the research (Tóka, 2019). DK is the splinter party of MSZP and is considered a social liberal party at the time of the analysis. On the other hand, Jobbik is a far-right opposition party that has been trying to become or at least to be perceived as a right-wing moderate instead of radical since 2013 (Róna & Molnár, 2017). After the 2018 general elections, several of Jobbik's explicitly radical members left the party and formed the radical right-wing party Mi Hazánk. Mi Hazánk and Munkáspárt, a communist micro party, are considered by scholars to be explicitly pro-government or even satellites of the governing parties; thus, their opposition position is questionable (Tóka, 2019). At the time, MKKP was a Dadaist joke party that equally mocked Fidesz-KDNP and the opposition parties (Tóka, 2019).

Considering the focus of this research on the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people in politicians' social media communication, the political parties' attitudes toward these minority groups prior to the analyzed period are essential to introduce. However, their positions will be presented only briefly due to space constraints. The Fidesz-KDNP alliance, the ruling parties of Hungary since 2010, have a history of arguing that the equality of LGBTQ people is incompatible with Hungarian culture and its religious roots (Enyedi, 2015; Tamássy, 2019). A significant measure affecting LGBTQ people prior to the analysis was the adoption of the new constitution, the Fundamental Law in 2011, with the exclusive support of the ruling parties, defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman, thus prohibiting same-sex marriage at a constitutional level (Magyarország Alaptörvénye, 2011b)[7]. Furthermore, Viktor Orbán, leader of Fidesz, has emphasized several times that he perceives the legal equality of LGBTQ people as incompatible with Hungarian culture and religious traditions (Fábián

[7] Same-sex marriage was not legal before 2010 either, but it was not prohibited by the then-Hungarian Constitution.

& Szilli, 2015; Tamássy, 2019). The governing parties' position toward the Roma minority is ambivalent. Fidesz was the first party to form a political alliance with a Roma minority party in Hungary (Terestyéni, 2004), namely with Lungo Drom in 2002, which is still in existence during the period under review. Moreover, the European Roma Strategy was created in 2011 during the Hungarian EU Presidency under the Fidesz-KDNP government led by Orbán. However, the party never voiced a strong anti-racist stance (Vidra & Fox, 2014). Furthermore, analyses of the Fidesz-KDNP policies showed that the transformation of education and social policies had a negative impact on social mobility and affected Roma people negatively (Lugosi, 2018; IDEA, n.d., cited in Policy Solutions, 2012, p. 31; Szikra, 2014). Additionally, media outlets in close connection with Fidesz, such as *HírTV* and *Magyar Hírlap*, have been providing space to and even promoting racist, anti-Roma portrayals (like Zsolt Bayer Fidesz-member journalist's anti-Roma articles, e.g., Bayer, 2013) and opinions (Bernáth & Messing, 2012). Therefore, one could argue that the governing parties have been 'outsourcing' their less moderate anti-Roma and homophobic positions to their media outlets.

Jobbik, the biggest opposition party in 2018, has close connections to several radical right-wing organizations. One of them is *Magyar Gárda* ("Hungarian Guard"), a paramilitary organization that held several demonstrations in various Hungarian cities, threatening Roma people. Jobbik did not 'outsource' its anti-Roma activities but made anti-Roma rhetoric its centerpiece (Vidra & Fox, 2014): members of the party openly promoted segregation and other anti-Roma policies in the Parliament, as well as in their official political campaigns (Policy Solutions, 2012; Róna & Molnár, 2017). Jobbik is also openly anti-LGBTQ (Enyedi, 2015); members of the party, among other things, frequently demanded to ban the Pride March, organized counterdemonstrations, as well as participated in the physical attack of Pride attendees (Tóth, 2013). Although after 2013, the Jobbik party set out to become a people's party or at least to be perceived as more moderate, they did not alter their anti-Roma and homophobic views substantially but started to express these views less radically instead (Enyedi, 2015; Róna & Molnár, 2017). Since the founders of Mi Hazánk were the explicitly more radical members of Jobbik, a realistic guess of Mi Hazánk's approach to ethnic and sexual minorities would be radical and vocal racism, homo-, bi-, and transphobia.

The left-leaning opposition parties, i.e., MSZP, Párbeszéd, DK, LMP, Együtt, and Momentum, are generally advocating for the equality of sexual minorities, which is the most visible in their support for and continuous party-level participation in the Budapest

Pride Marches (Tóth, 2013). Regarding Roma people, these parties typically also voice and support anti-discriminatory and egalitarian positions and emphasize the importance of social inclusion. The LMP, for example, had the most elaborate Roma-related political program among parties that reached parliament in 2010 and actively participated in addressing the Roma segregation case in Gyöngyöspata (Policy Solutions, 2012). However, the parties' level of commitment to minority issues has fluctuated over the years; furthermore, some of them have different approaches regarding minority issues (Policy Solutions, 2012).

Regarding minority representation, of the two minority groups selected for analysis, only one had a dedicated minority advocate in the Hungarian Assembly in the 2018-2022 term. Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality advocate, was delegated by the National Roma Self-Government as he did not win a mandate from the minority voting list. Nationality advocates, unlike nationality representatives, could not vote in Parliament but had the right to speak and represent their respective minority groups. Farkas is a member of the Roma minority party Lungo Drom, an official alliance of Fidesz. LGBTQ people had no official advocate or representative in Parliament.

In 2019, Hungary saw two significant elections: the European Parliament elections on May 26 and the Hungarian local elections on October 13. Regarding the latter, some opposition parties coordinated their efforts in certain cities and villages, even conducting a primary election to select their candidate for the Mayor of Budapest. It is worth noting that these two electoral events could have significantly impacted the online political communication of politicians during the year, given the dominant use of social media as a tool for political campaigns, as has been previously observed (Jungherr, 2016).

In addition to the general political landscape, personnel changes in the party and political group memberships that happened between the 2018 parliamentary election and 2019 should also be addressed. Firstly, the only independent candidate who won a seat in the 2018 general elections, Tamás Mellár, joined the parliamentary group of Párbeszéd later that year. Mellár claimed he did not join the party and was not subject to the parliamentary group's voting discipline; hence, he was free to work representing his "own beliefs and conscience" (Mellár, 2018). Szabolcs Szabó was the only candidate of the Együtt party who won a mandate in the 2018 parliamentary elections. As his party dissolved later that year, he started 2019, the year in focus, as an independent representative in the National Assembly, and his status did not change until the end of the term. Both politicians are

regarded as independent representatives throughout the research project.

Other noteworthy changes concern the parties Jobbik and LMP. In both cases, leaders and prominent members of the parties left due to Fidesz-KDNP's third win in a row and the internal conflicts it induced in the parties. Regarding Jobbik, Gábor Vona, leader of the party and the first person on the party's general election party list, immediately resigned and left politics without accepting his mandate. In addition, both the second and third politicians on the party's list, János Volner and Dóra Dúró, left Jobbik in 2018. Even though neither of them joined any parliamentary groups until the end of the term and thus were officially independent representatives, they both had strong ties to Mi Hazánk. Dóra Dúró was among the founders of the party in 2018, while János Volner was 'close' to Mi Hazánk up until late 2019 and even helped one of the media campaigns of the party but claimed he was never a member of Mi Hazánk (Volner, 2019)[8]. Therefore, the analysis considers both Volner and Dúró as Mi Hazánk politicians.

Major changes in LMP concern two politicians, Bernadett Szél and Ákos Hadházy, co-leaders of LMP, both of whom left the party in 2018 and were independent representatives until the end of the term. In addition, György Gémesi also won a place in the National Assembly from the LMP's 2018 general elections party list. However, Gémesi was not a party member, only an alliance of the LMP, and resigned his mandate on the grounds of him being the mayor of Gödöllő. He has never been a member of LMP[9] but is still politically active to this day. Therefore, of those elected to parliament in 2018, five politicians can be considered independent in total: Tamás Mellár, Szabolcs Szabó, Bernadett Szél, Ákos Hadházy, and György Gémesi. Although these politicians are independent in their party status, it is crucial to note that concerning their political activities, they are opposition politicians to the governing parties, Fiszed and KDNP.

After introducing the political context, the next section will focus on the theoretical approaches applied.

[8] In 2020, Volner founded a political party called the *Volner Party*, which he later renamed the *Huxit Party*.
[9] Gémesi founded his political party, *Új Kezdet,* in 2017.

Section 2.2 Theoretical approaches

Section 2.2.1 Meaning-making in discourse

The primary theoretical approach of this research is the interpretation of political communication about minorities as the discursive construction of the concepts of minority groups, as a meaning-making process that defines and constructs the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people in the public discourse and thus in social reality. In the following, first, the comparison of two constructivist approaches, namely frame and discourse analysis, is presented. Second, different definitions of discourse will be discussed, followed by a general introduction of discourse analysis as a theoretical approach to analyzing the dynamics of social construction through language. Subsequently, the various approaches to discourse analysis will be introduced briefly, after which the discourse analytic approach of this research project will be presented.

Section 2.2.1.1 Comparison of approaches

Since the 1970s-1980s, two closely related concepts, discourse and frame, and their respective analytic approaches, namely, discourse analysis and frame analysis, have significantly influenced the field of social sciences (Bergström et al., 2017; Entman, 1993; Lindekilde, 2014; Snow & Vliegenthart, 2023) and its various disciplines. The proliferation of these concepts and approaches is particularly noticeable in the terrain of (social) media analysis (see I. Benczes & Benczes, 2018; Richardson, 2007; Tamássy & Géring, 2022; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011) and political communication (see Cacciatore et al., 2016; Chilton, 2004; Gradečak & Benczes, 2020; Tileagă et al., 2020; van Dijk, 1997). The popularity of the approaches probably stems from, among others, their shared aim to unveil and understand „the discursive battles over meaning and definition of reality" (Lindekilde, 2014, p. 196).

It is important to point out that both concepts have a large number of varieties (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). In the case of framing and frame analysis, theoretical and methodological approaches vary per the different disciplines in which they are applied (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Lindekilde, 2014). Framing in sociology and social sciences is mostly, but not exclusively, grounded in the notions of Goffman (1974) (I. Benczes & Benczes, 2018; Fisher, 1997; Snow & Vliegenthart, 2023; van Dijk, 2023). Similarly, approaches to discourse analysis are often, but not exclusively, rooted in the works of Foucault (such as Foucault, 1971, 1972, 1980) and Austin (1962). While the

different discourse analysis types typically vary per the disciplines they were developed in (Potter, 2004), some common discourse analysis approaches overarch research fields and thus are not so much discipline-specific in their application. These common kinds of discourse analysis have, regardless of their field of application, different underlying theoretical approaches; that is, they focus on context, power, and ideology to various degrees (Phillips & Hardy, 2002).

Concerning their similarities, both approaches have social constructivist roots, and both focus (theoretically and thus methodologically) on how social phenomena and social texts acquire their meaning, how they participate in the construction of social reality as well as intend to grasp the discursive practices of particular actors (Lindekilde, 2014). That is to say, they are grounded in the notion that texts (in their broadest sense) both reflect and construct the social world and set out to grasp how this construction, and within it, meaning-making, takes place (Entman, 1993; Gee, 2010, 2018). In addition, both discourse analysis and frame analysis conceive meaning-making, and through that, the discursive construction of social reality, as a process that can be traced in the characteristics of the text analyzed (such as wording, grammar, textual structure, literary tropes, portrayed actors, argumentations, visual metaphors, etc.) (Semino et al., 2018 cited in R. Benczes & Szabó, 2020; Chalaby, 1996 cited in Phillips & Hardy, 2002) when interpreted with the context of the text which can include the immediate context of the utterance analyzed, the social practice in which the text was employed, the context of production and distribution, or the historical-, political-, social context, etc. (Fairclough, 2003; Lindekilde, 2014; Reisigl, 2017). Hence, both of these approaches place particular emphasis on the importance of context in the analysis and interpretation of texts (Gee, 2010; Lindekilde, 2014).

However, academics disagree on the relationship between the two approaches. The differences of opinions vary as researchers and theoretical approaches. Some understand discourse analysis and frame analysis as neighboring (van Dijk, 2023), indeed, partly overlapping disciplines (Snow & Vliegenthart, 2023), while others understand the analysis of discourse as part of frame analysis and argue that a frame analysis partly involves the analysis of discourse (Skillington, 2023), or vice versa, suggest that discursive structures contain frames (van Dijk, 1980 cited in Fisher, 1997; Tabrizi & Behnam, 2014) and thus, that framing analysis is a part of the discourse analytic process. Researchers have also argued that the concept of framing goes beyond the field of social sciences and, as it is older and more transversal, it cannot be subsumed under the

discourse analytic framework (Snow & Vliegenthart, 2023). In debates surrounding the two analytic frameworks, van Dijk (2023) goes as far as suggesting that frame and frame analysis should be abolished altogether, arguing that from a theoretical perspective, they are "vague and ill-defined" and thus are also methodologically "inadequate" (2023, p. 154) and "analytically superfluous" (2023, p. 160). Van Dijk (2023) concludes, among other things, that the notion of framing, as derived from Goffman (1974), glosses over empirically studied phenomena, such as themes, arguments, and other discursive strategies.

Refraining from questioning the theoretical and methodological adequacy and relevance of either frame or discourse analysis, I will argue for the use of a discourse analytical approach in this research, drawing on the notions of Lindekilde (2014), who interprets frame analysis as a specific type, a sub-variant of discourse analysis while also highlighting that the two analytical frameworks are hard to differentiate. Acknowledging the previously stressed theoretical similarities of the two approaches, Lindekilde grasps the main difference between discourse analysis and frame analysis in that the former is interested in "how an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception bring an object into being", while the latter "looks at how existing »objects« or »topics« are framed by different actors" (Lindekilde, 2014, p. 200). In further explaining the difference between the two analytic frameworks, Lindekilde argues that discourse analysis is a process that sets out to reveal and understand the social construction of reality, while frame analysis is rather determined to understand and explain the effects of linguistic and visual portrayals. The latter is also reflected in the conceptualization of framing in the field of communication theory (Entman, 1993), where there is a strong emphasis on receivers' responses to different framings, as well as in the research field of media effects (Cacciatore et al., 2016), that is, the understanding of framing as a (sometimes deliberatively used) means to provoke a reaction from the recipients of communication (I. Benczes & Benczes, 2018; R. Benczes & Ságvári, 2022; Lindekilde, 2014).

Consequentially, as this research project aims to understand how the social categories of Roma and LGBTQ people come into existence in Hungarian politicians' social media communication and does not conceptualize receivers' responses nor study the possible reactions of the audiences to these texts, it approaches its research topic with a discourse analytic framework.

Section 2.2.1.2 Introducing discourse analysis

In relying on contemporary discourse analysis as a theoretical background, first, it is necessary to introduce the term *discourse*, which has several definitions (Géring, 2008a; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) that vary depending on their discipline of origin (Potter, 2004; Schriffin et al., 2015). Schriffin and colleagues (2015) classify the numerous existing definitions of discourse into three categories. The first category includes those definitions, generally favored by linguists, in which discourse refers to anything beyond the level of the sentence. According to the definitions of the second category, discourse is language in use (see, among others, Gee, 2010; Gill, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), i.e., all forms of text and talk. The third category encompasses definitions in which discourse refers to a broad range of interrelated linguistic and non-linguistic social practices. Critical analysts' discourse definitions usually fall into the third category, with the addition that in their definitions, discourse also comprises ideological assumptions that, together with the set of linguistic and non-linguistic practices, legitimize and reinforce existing power structures (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Schriffin et al., 2015). Of these categories, this research project turns to the third: it perceives discourse as an interrelated set of texts (written or spoken utterances, still images, music, audiovisual contents, etc.) and their context of production and dissemination (Phillips & Hardy, 2002).

As noted above, discourse analysis is an umbrella term for different discourse analytic approaches rather than one specific approach to analyzing meaning-making in language use (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Therefore, first, the discourse analytic approach will be introduced in general, highlighting the key theoretical assumptions of the framework that are similar across the wide variety of types of discourse analysis and that are paramount in this particular research project.

One of the main theoretical assumptions of contemporary discourse analytic approaches is that language use and, thus, discourse is *constructive*. Namely, they are not merely transparent mediums or neutral tools for communication through which one can gain knowledge of 'real-world' phenomena but social practices that construct social reality (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Gee, 2010; Géring, 2008a; Wetherell, 2001c). Austin's (1962) Speech Act Theory plays a crucial role in this assumption. Gee (2007, 2010), who draws on Austin's theory, describes language as capable of *saying*, *doing*, and *being* things. In Gee's understanding, *saying* refers to the informative property of language, *doing* refers to the action, the social practice that is done by language use, such as setting

up a meeting or getting married, and *being* is concerned with the socially significant and situated identities enacted and taken on through language use. Additionally, the assumption is based on a constructivist epistemological understanding that meaning and knowledge are produced through discourse, which rejects the view of language as a mere medium or neutral tool for communication. According to this theoretical notion, knowledge and meaning are constructed through language use, i.e., discourse, and therefore, texts and talk about any given phenomenon or concept also form, define, construct, and re-construct the phenomenon or concept itself (Gill, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Richardson, 2007). This is especially true for *social categories* – such as minorities – and identities (Bergström et al., 2017; Gee, 2010; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), but also for any other social phenomena, such as social practices (Gee, 2010), psychological entities or settings (Potter, 2004). In other words, "The world as described comes into existence at that moment" (Wetherell, 2001c, p. 16). This aspect of discourse analysis theory makes this approach particularly suitable for studying minorities, as it acknowledges that the concepts of certain social categories, LGBTQ people and Roma people in this case, are constructed and defined by discourse. This does not mean, however, that theorists of the field deny the existence of non-linguistic spheres; instead, that even non-linguistic phenomena can only acquire their meaning and their role in social reality through language use (Laclau and Mouffe, 1990, cited in Bergström et al., 2017).

Another paramount notion in contemporary discourse analytic approaches is that discourse is *constructed* (Gill, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), i.e., it "involves work" (Wetherell, 2001c, p. 17). This aspect highlights that language use is not self-evident and discourse is not a given, but speakers make choices when formulating their utterances. This notion makes two assumptions regarding discourse. Firstly, discourse is constructed from existing linguistic elements (words, idioms, etc.). Secondly, as an account, it is constructed by the decisions made between the already existing elements and all possible phrasings and modes of speaking. Therefore, the construction of discourse is the outcome of the conscious or unconscious choices of the 'speaker' (Gill, 2000). Scholars also note that in this sense, discourse is constructed with an aim from the perspective of the speaker: it is often designed to persuade, to win arguments, to assign identities and roles, and to stabilize and construct certain versions of the world (Gill, 1996; Potter, 2004; Wetherell, 2001c). Regarding the role of actors, Potter views that in discourse analysis, "the way versions are constructed and stabilized as independent of the speaker is treated as an analyzable feature of the production of discourse" (2004, p. 610). That is, although in

discourse analysis, the identity and the role of the speaker are of crucial importance as they provide context for the interpretation of the text, discourse analysis as a process is not focused on assuming the thoughts or goals of the speaker (Gill, 2000) but is concentrating on what versions of the world and how they are constructing, legitimizing or delegitimizing through language use (Richardson, 2007). Conceiving discourse as constructed also underpins the notion previously presented that meaning-making and discursive construction are processes that can be studied through the analysis of language use, that is, through the analysis of choices of wording, grammar, textual structure, idioms, etc. (Gee, 2018; Chalaby, 1996 cited in Phillips & Hardy, 2002), which are the outcome of the actor's choices in the construction of discourse. Furthermore, it highlights an additional feature of the discourse analytic theoretical and methodological approach. Namely, discourse analysis is typically less invested in studying the truth or falsity of the utterances analyzed. Instead, it focuses on how specific versions of the world are constructed through discourse, how truths, identities, categories, and social roles are built in discourse, and even the consequences of these specific versions of reality (Wetherell, 2001c).

The discourse analytic theoretical approach also underscores discourse's *situated* and *occasioned* nature (Gee, 2010; Gill, 2000; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Firstly, as Gee (2010) argues, language derives its meaning from the social practices in which it is used, enacted, and understood. Therefore, language use is contextually situated, and the specific meaning of a given utterance is determined by the context of its use, including the material setting, textual context, ethnic, gendered, and sexual identities of those involved, and the cultural and institutional factors (Gee, 2004; Gee & Green, 1998), i.e., the *local* or *proximate* context (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Secondly, discourse is also situated in the meaning of contexts and cultural models, as its interpretation is tied to negotiation and social interactions (Gee, 2007). This perspective underscores the importance of social context in meaning-making, viewing texts as interconnected phenomena that acquire their meaning through their connection to other texts, the circumstances of production and distribution, and, in general, the social, economic, political, historical, and cultural context in which they are produced, disseminated and interpreted (Fairclough, 1992; Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Reisigl, 2017). Therefore, discourses do not emerge and exist in a social vacuum but rather are formed through social practices and interactions between social groups and actors and the complex socio-political context and power structures in which they are embedded (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Mitten & Wodak, 1993). It is

imperative to consider this *broader* or *social* context in the analysis and interpretation of any discourse analysis process (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). To sum up, the meanings of texts are co-produced and do not stand alone nor are unchangeable but are relational and indexical in that they are a joint production of both cultural contexts, including other existing texts, and the participants and their specific interaction (Wetherell, 2001c).

Discourse analysis thus regards discourse as a *social practice* that shapes social reality and is simultaneously shaped by it (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Gee & Handford, 2023; Géring, 2008a; Wetherell, 2001c). This is what makes discourse analysis, as a theoretical approach, relevant and widely used in social sciences. Since discourse is a crucial act of meaning-making (Fairclough, 2003; Gee, 2010; Géring, 2008a; Wetherell, 2001c), identity formation and enaction (Bergström et al., 2017; Gee, 2007), legitimation (van Leeuwen, 2007), and construction and reinforcement of social attitudes on the given topic, discourse analysis is not primarily concerned with understanding the impact of discourse on its recipients (Lindekilde, 2014) but with the discourse itself (Gill, 2000), i.e., the way language is used to communicate a particular content and enact a particular social action and the context in which the communicative act occurs. As such, discourse analysis seeks to study the lexical and textual tools that form the discursive strategies constructing social reality, the ways of discursive meaning-making, and what social actions are performed through discourse (Gee, 2004; Gill, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This makes discourse analysis a valuable approach to understanding how language shapes our social reality and how social reality shapes language use.

Furthermore, as discourse is a social practice, discourse analysis is inherently concerned with *the distribution of social goods* and *power dynamics*, although to varying degrees and perspectives per specific discourse analysis approaches (Anderson & Holloway, 2020; Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Wetherell, 2001a). There are several factors contributing to this aspect of discourse analysis. Firstly, discourse analytic approaches generally conceptualize language as incapable of being neutral (Gee, 2010; Gill, 2000). Language use, through meaning-making, is capable of giving or accepting social goods, such as identity, status, power, acceptance, and financial capital (Gee, 2010, p. 7), but it can also deny social goods to people or groups. Therefore, language use is always political due to its role in distributing social goods.

Secondly, the critical aspect of discourse analysis can also be grasped in its stance toward discourse as a constructed phenomenon. Namely, discourse analysis acknowledges that

no discourse or meaning-making strategy is given, but they are outcomes of decisions. In this sense, discourse analysis is not only concerned with what is said and how it is said but also with what is not said and why it is not said; that is, it takes into account not only the decision taken but also all the conceivable variations discarded by the decision taken. As no linguistic construction and no constructed social reality are self-evident, in this sense, discourse analysis is critical not in a value-oriented meaning but in its criticism of the givenness of the constructed social reality (Chilton et al., 2010). This notion views power as a discursively constructed and normalized "product of systems of knowledge" (Anderson & Holloway, 2020, p. 6) and focuses on the discursive tools and strategies – decisions made – through which power is established (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Furthermore, it is worth noting that discourse is intricately linked with social groups and institutions. This implies that engaging in a particular discourse serves to uphold and validate the group or institution whose discourse is being employed. Consequently, engaging in such discourse embeds within these structures and reinforces and perpetuates the prevailing power dynamics (Gee, 2007).

Thirdly, as emphasized earlier, discourse does not occur in a social vacuum but in a socio-political context that is paramount in its formation and interpretation. Discourse is also central to the construction of social life: it always constructs a particular social reality and, thus, it argues for and legitimizes a specific kind of world, enacts a power relation that is in line with a social group's interests, and aims, and is contrary to the aims and interests of other people or social groups (Fairclough, 2003; Gee, 2004; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Richardson, 2007). That is, discourse is rhetorically organized to be as persuasive as possible to win among competing worldviews (Gill, 2000). Thus, some approaches to discourse analysis specifically focus on linking the textual elements of a given text or groups of texts to the power dynamics and ideologies of macro-level structures, such as race, class, gender, or sexuality (Anderson & Holloway, 2020, p. 5) and provide a value-oriented critique of discourse, focusing on how social inequalities are produced and reproduced through language use (Chilton et al., 2010; Géring, 2008b; van Dijk, 1995).

Section 2.2.1.3 Different approaches to discourse analysis

The presented theoretical assumptions are shared to some extent by most discourse analytic approaches. As already noted, numerous such approaches exist (Phillips & Hardy, 2002), of which some are particularly hard to separate due to similarities in their theoretical roots and perspectives on discourse (Géring, 2008a; Wetherell, 2001b). The

categorizations of discourse analytic approaches are also numerous and differ in where they draw the boundaries of discourse analysis as a discipline: while some perceive conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, or narrative analysis as sub-types of discourse analysis (such as Potter, 2004; Wetherell, 2001a), others consider these separate approaches and thus do not categorize them under the discourse analytic umbrella (e.g., Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Although there are several categorizations of discourse analysis types, there are some forms of approaches that researchers usually distinguish. Given the space constraints of the dissertation, only a few types of discourse analysis are presented below.

Foucauldian discourse analytic research refers to approaches rooted in Foucault's works and theories (Wetherell, 2001a). These approaches generally pay less attention to the linguistic, lexico-grammatical analysis of the text and instead concentrate on the historical changes in discourse and the power relations constructed and normalized through discourse (Gill, 2018; Potter, 2004).

Another typically distinguished stream of research is conversation analysis (Gill, 2018), which is sometimes categorized alongside ethnomethodology (Wetherell, 2001a). It focuses on systematically analyzing actual conversations and organizing social interactions (Potter, 2004). While some consider these to be sub-types of discourse analysis rooted in Austin's (1962) Speech Act Theory (Gill, 2018), others perceive them as separate disciplines (Phillips & Hardy, 2002).

Critical approaches to discourse analysis, such as critical discourse analysis, discourse-historical approach, critical linguistics, and social semiotics, all study the relationship between language use, politics, ideology, and power dynamics (Géring, 2008b; Gill, 2018; Wetherell, 2001a). These approaches concentrate on the linguistic construction, enaction, and legitimation of social control and social inequalities, such as racism (e.g., van Dijk, 2008), anti-Semitism (see, for example, Wodak, 2011), homophobia (such as Clarke, 2006), and a myriad of other social issues. Such discourse analytic approaches are closely connected to linguistics and often involve detailed linguistic and lexico-grammatical analysis (see, for example, van Leeuwen, 2008).

Discursive psychology and related approaches build on the theoretical foundations of various types of discourse analysis and, thus, sometimes rely on vastly different methodologies (such as conversation analysis and Foucauldian analysis) (Wetherell, 2001a, p. 382); however, their disciplinary focus on psychological topics in language use

and interaction that binds them together and differentiates them from the other discourse analytic approaches (Géring, 2008a; Humă & Potter, 2023).

In multimodal discourse analysis and its various types, the focus is on the different formats of texts, their interaction, and their coherence in constituting discourse (Kress & Bezemer, 2023). That is, these approaches perceive texts as multimodal semiotic entities, including "gesture, speech, image (still or moving), writing, music (on a website or in a film)" (Kress & Bezemer, 2023, p. 140). Others do not see multimodal approaches to discourse analysis as distinct sub-types but argue that every kind of discourse analysis (critical or interpretive) can entail a multimodal approach and extend its theoretical approach and analytical framework to various visual and audio content (van Leeuwen, 2008).

Although such categorizations usually emphasize that different types of discourse analysis may be difficult to separate (Wetherell, 2001a), they still try to capture the difference between them by establishing distinct categories. In contrast, Phillips and Hardy (2002) approach the issue by defining two axes that can help grasp the differences between discourse analytic approaches (see Appendix A). The first axis shows the relative importance of the broad context of the text under analysis in the research process, while the second shows the degree to which power dynamics are the focus of the research (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Phillips and Hardy define Weberian ideal types of discourse analytic approaches along these axes, which encompass several specific approaches. However, the scholars also emphasize that actual empirical discourse analytic research projects often do not fall into one or another ideal type, but every approach is slightly different and can be placed somewhere along the two defined continuums.

In this understanding, there are no discourse analytic research projects that do not address the context of the text analyzed; rather, discourse analytic approaches differ in the extent to which they address the broad context. Some analytical approaches tend to concentrate on the *local* or *proximate context*, as Schegloff (1992, cited in Wetherell, 2001a, p. 388) put it. According to Phillips & Hardy (2002), these approaches fall into the Weberian ideal types of *social linguistic analysis* and *critical linguistic analysis* (see Appendix A). These approaches integrate components such as the occasion, the temporal sequencing of discourse events within specific speech contexts, and the roles and capacities in which individuals engage in communicative acts when analyzing discourse. Other approaches, labeled as *interpretive structuralism* and *critical discourse analysis* by Phillips and Hardy

(2002), although incorporating the local context as well to a degree, rather focus on the *broad* or *distant context* in their analysis, i.e., the social, political, and historical context, the ethnic, gender and class composition of the participants and the sites of occurrence (Schegloff, 1992, cited in Wetherell, 2001a, p. 388).

Phillips and Hardy (2002) also perceive the second axis, the degree of focus on power dynamics, as a continuum. In their view, constructivist or interpretive approaches (*interpretive structuralism* and *social linguistic analysis*) are not insensitive to power but choose to focus on the processes of the discursive construction of social reality. On the other hand, critical approaches (*critical discourse analysis* and *critical linguistic analysis*) also address the very processes of social construction but concentrate explicitly on the dynamics of power and ideology legitimized and enacted through discourse.

The main aim of this research project is to explore and study the exact discursive practices and processes of constructing the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people in Hungarian political communication on social media. Therefore, although the theoretical background and the analytical framework address the social and political context of the political communication analyzed and interpret minority-related political communication in light of these contexts, the primary focus is on the actual linguistic tools and strategies of meaning-making in which politicians engage and through which the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people come into being in political communication.

If we were to position the theoretical and the resulting methodological approach to discourse analysis of this research project along the key dimensions defined by Phillips and Hardy (2002) in terms of broad context, it would fall almost in the middle of the axis. However, it leans slightly closer to approaches that place greater emphasis on the linguistic tools of discursive construction in the particular piece of text. It's important to note that the analysis also takes into account and reflects on the broad context, though not to the same extent. As for the degree to which power dynamics and ideology are in focus, the research project falls into the interpretive or constructivist side of the axis. While it acknowledges the power structures that surround the discursive construction of social reality, it focuses more directly on the processes of constructing the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma.

This section introduced the main theoretical assumptions of discourse analysis and the discourse analytic approach of this particular research. The following section will discuss political communication on social media.

Section 2.2.2 Political communication on social media

Another crucial theoretical approach of the research project is understanding political communication on social media as a particular type and terrain of public discourse, namely, as a critical field for the discursive construction of social reality with its specific logic and mechanisms.[10] In introducing this field, the emphasis first will be on the definition of political communication as applied in this research project, after which the concept of social media will be presented. Finally, different conceptual approaches that characterize political communication on social media will be introduced.

Political communication is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that poses challenges to its definition (McNair, 2011). Bene (2019) distinguishes three categories of definitions based on how each seeks to capture the political nature of communicative acts. The first category of definitions defines the 'political' in terms of its impact, focusing on communicative actions that exert a political effect (such as Graber & Smith, 2005). While such definitions may be helpful in certain contexts, they are often inadequate for empirical research in political communication because such studies usually aim precisely to identify and determine the political impact of a communicative act (Bene, 2019, p. 19). Definitions in the second category capture the political nature of communicative acts by defining the relevant actors whose communication can be categorized as 'political' (see, for example, Elishar-Malka et al., 2020; Perloff, 2017). Some of these definitions also consider other contextual information, such as the place and time of the communication act (e.g., van Dijk, 1997). Although empirically applicable and adequate, these approaches pose difficulties in that they put great emphasis on the precise identification of participating actor groups, which are often not clear-cut and, thus, sometimes inherently exclude certain communicative acts with political impact from the definition of political communication. The third category contains definitions that define communication as 'political' based on its content and generally rely on the relationship of the content of the communication act to institutional politics. To avoid the definitional pitfalls described by Bene (2019), McNair's (2011, p. 4) definition of political communication as "purposeful communication about politics" will be adopted in the present study. This definition carries both the characteristics of Bene's (2019) second and third category, as it encompasses purposeful communication by politicians and political actors as well as any

[10] Consequently, instead of studying political discourse as a way of interrelated texts constituting politics (Szabó, 1997, 2003), with respect to the constructed and legitimized ideology and power structures (van Dijk, 1997), the present research focuses on political communication as part of the public discourse.

communication that, in its content, is addressed to political actors or is about political actors or their activities (McNair, 2011, p. 4). The study seeks to provide a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of political communication by adopting this definition.

Defining the phenomena of social media has raised a number of complex questions in the field of social sciences, so much so that there is no single accepted definition; instead, different but sometimes overlapping definitions and characterizations (boyd & Ellison, 2007; Kietzmann et al., 2011). Researchers tend to agree that social media is fundamentally different from traditional media in its operation and impact (Bouvier, 2019; Bouvier & Machin, 2018), especially regarding the "inherent communication norms and practices related to media production, distribution, and usage" (Klinger & Svensson, 2015, pp. 1245–1246). Although different social media platforms operate with different rules and practices (Vaidhyanathan, 2018), most of them can be characterized by their unmediated nature, the blurring of the roles of 'producer' and 'consumer,'[11] and their network-based mode of operation (boyd & Ellison, 2007; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). Thus, this research project understands social media as a set of online platforms and related practices (boyd, 2015) optimized for computers, smartphones, or other mobile devices, where users can publish content (texts, images, videos, audio content, and a mixture of these) directly reaching each other, i.e., unmediated and bypassing gatekeepers of mass media (editors, journalists, etc.); where users can create, consume and interact with contents, often simultaneously; and where users can connect with each other unilaterally or reciprocally, on a permanent or ad hoc basis, creating a user network through which the published content can be consumed, interacted with and shared with others.

The literature on the relationship between social media and political communication often focuses on the potential impacts of social media on political change and democratization. Despite this area's extensive research, length limitations constrain the full discussion of this topic. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that the emergence of the Internet and later social media was initially perceived by many as a facilitator of democratization and deliberative democracy due to its fast, unmediated nature and wider communication reach (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020; Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Kabanov & Romanov, 2017). This cyber-optimism toward social media was further reinforced by, among other things, the uprisings of the First Arab Spring in the early 2010s, which seemed to prove that

[11] However, perceiving social media users partly as consumers has its critique in the field of social media research (see Vaidhyanathan, 2018).

social networking sites could significantly contribute to social and political mobilization (Kabanov & Romanov, 2017; Vaidhyanathan, 2018). Conversely, cyber-pessimists argue that relying on such platforms exposes social movements and politically active citizens to private companies' monitoring and tracking of their users. Additionally, these platforms are subject to severe pressure from democratic and authoritarian governments to disclose their users' records (MacAskill et al., 2013, cited in Vaidhyanathan, 2018), making them instruments of citizen surveillance (Kabanov & Romanov, 2017). Moreover, while the unmediated nature of social media platforms presents the potential for citizens, activists, and politicians to bypass mass media gatekeepers, removing media professionals from the equation could also result in the proliferation of disinformation and misinformation on social media platforms and potentially harming citizens' democratic interests (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020).

The forthcoming paragraphs aim to present an overview of political communication on social media, highlighting its distinguishing features and potential impacts from the perspective of political actors and the rebalancing (or lack thereof) of political power among them. While the analysis encompasses the broader landscape of social media, emphasis will be placed on Facebook, which is widely acknowledged as one of the most prominent platforms for political communication both internationally and in Europe (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018; Bene, 2023), and especially in Hungary where it enjoys significant popularity among citizens and politicians alike (Bene & Somodi, 2018; Merkovity, 2014). Therefore, in some instances, such as regarding the impact of paid political advertisements, Facebook will serve as a focal point to explore the specificities of the production, distribution, and usage of political content on social media.

Dichotomous approaches are common when conceptualizing political communication on social media. These posit that social media can either have an equalizing effect, leveling the playing field between established mainstream political parties and smaller political parties, and thus are a tool that can transform the existing political landscape, or a normalizing effect, merely reproducing the existing power imbalances between larger, well-resourced political actors and their minor counterparts (Bene, 2023; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Larsson, 2016). Some researchers, such as Gibson and McAllister (2015) and Jacobs and Spierings (2016), go beyond purely dichotomous approaches and theorize that equalizing and normalizing effects are successive steps in using social media in political communication. According to these theses, the emergence of social media use among political actors first levels the political playing field to a certain extent, as smaller

parties are more motivated to use and master these platforms. However, after a while, major parties start to use social media platforms as well, and as political communication on these platforms becomes more professionalized, the same power and resource imbalances that parties have to contend with in the offline world will be reflected in social media. Others, like Klinger and Svensson (2015), instead focus on the unique characteristics of network media logic, especially the networking nature and the consequent viral spread of content, to comprehend political communication on these platforms. In the following, the features of politicians' social media communication will be outlined, considering in parallel both the normalization and the equalization theses, as well as the network media logic and the specific Hungarian political and media context.

The phenomenon of social media platforms has brought about a significant shift in the production and distribution of political content. As opposed to traditional mass media and online news media, social media platforms are unmediated, allowing for direct communication between politicians or political actors and citizens (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). This direct mode of communication has increased political actors' control over the content they publish, giving them the power to decide what is deemed worthy of publication instead of media professionals (journalists, editors, etc.) (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Furthermore, political actors gain control over the way their content is constructed and communicated, including language use, images, and videos, as well as the immediate interpretative context of their posts, especially on Facebook, where posts appear on the political actors' own curated Facebook pages (Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). This has paramount relevance in the Hungarian context, where, as described earlier (see Section 2.1.2), the majority of media outlets convey only pro-government messages, offering little to no platform for government-critical political actors or opinions (Bajomi-Lázár, 2019; Bene & Somodi, 2018). Thus, the emergence of social media presents an opportunity for smaller political actors, often overlooked by the mass media, to express their views on issues they consider important in their own way to their supporters or potential voters without external gatekeepers influencing the content. This argument supports the equalization thesis, which suggests that social media has the potential to decrease minor political actors' structural disadvantages (Gibson & McAllister, 2015).

Nevertheless, the direct 'from politician to citizen' nature of social media communication is far from undoubted. Although members of some Hungarian political parties previously claimed that their politicians create and edit their own social media posts, thereby

promoting direct communication with their constituents (Bene & Somodi, 2018), political communication in social media is becoming increasingly professionalized (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Additionally, most parties established central guidelines for their members to manage their Facebook pages (Bene & Somodi, 2018). It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that prominent politicians are likely to enlist the help of media and communication professionals rather than managing their Facebook pages alone. Thus, political actors' aim to bypass media professionals applies only to certain media professionals and not others (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020). Furthermore, the perceived independence of social media from broadcast media programming and mass media coverage has been questioned by several studies (such as Bene & Somodi, 2018; Klinger, 2013; Larsson, 2016), claiming that social media communication typically reflects the movements and themes of mass media and offline events in general. Namely, rather than providing an alternative and possibly independent content flow, social media content tends to mirror, comment on, disseminate, interpret, and react to content published in traditional and online news media (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). As such, while gatekeepers of mass media may not have direct control over what events and views reach citizens via social media, they can still exert an indirect influence over public discourse.

Another potentially equalizing effect of social media should be noted: as well-resourced parties and minor political actors communicate on the same social media platforms, their online presence is not directly dependent on the amount each actor can spend on developers, web designers, and other professionals. Thus, the preset designs and uniform visual layouts may restore some parity to small parties' online presence (Gibson & McAllister, 2015). However, it is important to acknowledge that these platforms also exert significant influence over what can be said and displayed. The platforms' 'Terms of Use' impose restrictions on content, with Facebook, for example, prohibiting hate speech and deleting content deemed problematic either by employees of Facebook or a large number of users. Furthermore, the design and appearance of the platforms can significantly impact communication strategy and the display of the content published. In fact, a sudden change in the layout of the platforms may require a complete redesign of a politician's communication strategy (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018). Such reliance on social media can leave politicians vulnerable to the opaque operations of private companies that own and operate these platforms.

Content production's relatively low financial costs have been identified as a key factor impacting political communication on social media. This observation is supported by the

network media logic theory proposed by Klinger and Svensson (2015) and the equalization and normalization theses (Bene, 2023; Gibson & McAllister, 2015). To understand the implications of the low economic burden of adopting and maintaining social media platforms, various facets must be considered. On the one hand, creating an account on almost any social media platform is relatively cheap, as it only requires a capable digital device, Internet connection, and registration, the latter of which is free on most platforms (boyd & Ellison, 2007; Gibson & McAllister, 2015). Since some political actors create their own content, they do not pay for content production (Bene & Somodi, 2018). In return, political actors can potentially reach millions of citizens directly through social media platforms. As minor political parties with typically much smaller resources can access citizens through the platforms already frequently visited by their possible voters in the same way and at the same cost as larger parties, the relatively low cost of adoption and maintenance can be considered a factor underpinning the equalizing impact of social media (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018; Gibson & McAllister, 2015).

On the other hand, the cost of maintaining social media pages can increase significantly when political communication on such platforms becomes professionalized (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Hiring communication consultants, copywriters, professional photographers, videographers, and page administrators to respond to comments and remove unwanted comments can be costly, which bigger parties with larger budgets can afford, while smaller parties can hardly allocate the same amount of money to maintain their social media pages. Thus, although the cost of adopting social media platforms is relatively low, professionalized maintenance should also be considered, especially in light of the emergence of permanent campaigning on social media platforms (Larsson, 2016). These can leave smaller parties lagging behind larger parties with professionalized social media communications, thus reproducing offline inequalities.

For a while, Web enthusiasts claimed that social media could revolutionize political communication by facilitating two-way communication between politicians and citizens, which has been classically one-sided in traditional media. The hope was that social media's unmediated, interactive, and network-based nature and its allowing of user-generated content would help politicians connect with citizens and thus promote a more inclusive and deliberative democracy (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020). However, recent research supports the normalization thesis in that politicians' use of social media is more akin to unidirectional broadcast media communication (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018), and interactions between politicians and citizens do not seem to have a meaningful impact on

political work or strategy (Bene & Somodi, 2018; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016).

The advent of social media has also impacted the way content is distributed and reached (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). On Facebook, political actors can reach citizens with their content directly or indirectly (Bene, 2023). In the case of direct reach, the political actor's Facebook posts will appear directly on those users' news feeds who subscribed to the politician's or political party's Facebook page. In the case of indirect reach, political content appears on users' news feeds without their consent, which can happen either through paid advertising or Facebook's viral dissemination logic (Klinger & Svensson, 2015).

Regarding the direct reach of citizens, its success depends mainly on the number of followers a certain Facebook page has. Research has shown that larger parties with more voters have a higher number of followers on Facebook (Bene, 2023), achieving a higher direct reach and shoring up the power of existing political elites. However, as Bene and Somodi (2018) emphasized, if considering the size of their voter base, smaller Hungarian political parties are not lagging in their number of followers, which can be interpreted as social media being a relative equalizing force.

Concerning the indirect reach of citizens, some argue that paid advertising, i.e., when political actors pay Facebook so that their posts appear on the news feeds of members of a pre-defined target group whether or not they are following the political actors' Facebook page, has a normalizing effect. This is because the scale of the use of paid advertising depends to a large extent on the financial resources available to political actors, of whom established political elites tend to be more well-resourced (Bene & Somodi, 2018; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). However, posts can also go viral, i.e., appear on the news feeds of users who are not followers of the politician without any payment. A Facebook post can go viral if it triggers many reactions from Facebook users, in which case the post will also appear on the news feeds of the friends of those who reacted to it in the first place. In the case of a particularly large number of reactions, the post will also appear on others' Facebook news feeds. Therefore, the more citizens engage with a Facebook post (through liking, commenting, or sharing), the more others see it on their news feeds. The viral spread of posts is facilitated by Facebook's network-based operating logic; however, there is no ready-made recipe yet available for creating a viral post (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Bene (2017) found that in the Hungarian context, posts with a negative emotional charge, expressing anger or resentment, conveying moral criticism, and accusations of

corruption go viral the most likely. Politicians have a vested interest in creating such viral posts, as this allows their political messages to directly reach a much wider audience than their followers without extra financial outlay. Since virality is technically open to all, it can have an equalizing effect on political competition. It is also important to emphasize that compared to the geographically organized nature of traditional media, the distribution and reach of social media content is based on "communities of peers and like-minded others" (Klinger & Svensson, 2015, p. 1250). As such, it allows politicians to try to reach specific social groups that are ideologically important to them, such as specific ethnic minority groups or LGBTQ people (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016).

Additionally, politicians aim to reach their followers, a wider range of possible voters, and media professionals as well with their social media content (Bene & Somodi, 2018). Approaching their followers and a wide range of possible voters is intended to retain the attention and support of already committed supporters and to reach and win over citizens who do not yet support them, i.e., to persuade and mobilize citizens, reach volunteers, and collect donations (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018). In addition, reaching media professionals can help spread the politicians' content as they share and review it in other media outlets, such as online newspapers (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that political actors will craft their posts in such a way as to maximize their chances of going viral and attracting the attention of journalists as well. This can moderate the equalizing effect of virality, as established parties usually have stronger media relations (Gibson & McAllister, 2015) and perhaps their own media outlets that share their social media content, perpetuating existing power imbalances (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). Researchers also note that with the viral spread of Facebook posts, politicians may lose control over the interpretative context of their content as users' comments and shares can hijack the original content (Stromer-Galley, 2014, cited in Bene, 2017). However, this does not seem relevant in the Hungarian context since users sharing politicians' content usually do not comment on the shared post (Bene, 2017).

Concerning the reception of political communication on social media, one of the most salient aspects is that users encounter political content in a non-political context (Bene, 2017; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). This means that the platforms on which political content is created and received are primarily spaces for personal life, where users spend their free time anyway, connecting with their friends and family (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018), especially in the case of Facebook, where users tend to have offline acquaintances, relatives, friends, and colleagues as their 'friends' (boyd, 2014). As a result, political

communication on Facebook blurs the boundaries between the personal and public spheres (Heller & Rényi, 1996). Citizens often experience 'accidental exposure' to political content on Facebook without being prepared to judge its ideological content or veracity, as they expect to encounter content about their friends' personal lives (Bene, 2017). Additionally, users often encounter political content through their friends as they react to political posts or share them, making the content seem even more personal and less subject to critical reading (Bene, 2017). The blurring of personal and public spheres (Heller & Rényi, 1996) also affects content production, as politicians incorporate this characteristic of Facebook into their communication strategy and post a plethora of personal content on their pages among political content, public issues, and political advertisements. This reinforces the personalization of politics as politicians' political personas merge with their private personas and increase focus on "the private lives of politicians rather than on their policy and ideological positions" (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016, p. 26).

In sum, it can be concluded that political communication on social media is fundamentally different from that in traditional media in various aspects, such as political content production, distribution, and the context in which citizens encounter this content (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2015). The impact of these on political power dynamics is dependent on the socio-political context and time; hence, there is a constant fluctuation of whether the equalizing or normalizing effects are more pronounced (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020; Gibson & McAllister, 2015; Kabanov & Romanov, 2017). However, when comparing the equalizing and the normalizing theses, it is important to distinguish between absolute and relative equalization/normalization. According to Bene (2023), research so far supports the idea of relative equalization, indicating that smaller parties can generate greater reach and response relative to their support base through social media. This appears to level the playing field and reduce the gaps between larger and minor parties in the political competition. However, the normalization thesis holds true in absolute terms, meaning that offline power relations are reproduced and perpetuated in social media communication, with larger parties having more followers and generating more reactions.

Some characteristics of politicians' social media usage, summarized below, are particularly relevant to the present research. Politicians aim to reach both citizens (supporters and non-supporters alike) and media professionals through Facebook posts in order to convey their political content to a wider audience (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016).

Additionally, the current Hungarian media system has a significant influence on how politicians of both larger and smaller Hungarian parties may use social media. Smaller parties rely on these platforms to connect with a broader audience due to the imbalanced media system (Bene & Somodi, 2018), while for larger parties, social media can be a means to avoid communicating with government-critical media (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Although social media allows for two-way communication between politicians and citizens, political actors' communication style is still similar to that of broadcast media (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018). Furthermore, in aiming to reach a larger audience organically, the politicians' implied goal in social media communications is to go viral, which is often achieved in the Hungarian context by posting negative, morally judging content (Bene, 2017). While social media enables independent content flow from that of mass media, research supports that politicians' activity on social media often reflects, disseminates, and comments on news media content as well as prepares for political events (Larsson, 2016). Lastly, the blurring of public and private spheres is worth mentioning, as political communication on Facebook takes place in the private online sphere of the users. This blurs not only the citizens' private and public spheres but also perpetuates personalized politics and the merging of politicians' public and private personas (Heller & Rényi, 1996).

This section introduced the unique characteristics and potential effects of political communication in social media. The following section presents the previous research findings on LGBTQ and Roma representation.

Section 2.3 Previous research findings

Three aspects were important in finding relevant research projects in the field of minority-related meaning-making. On the one hand, research projects carried out in the Hungarian context were favored, given the importance of social context in minority portrayal (see Section 2.2.1). On the other hand, research projects with a discourse analytic approach and those analyzing social media content were favored, given the comparability arising from the similarity of the approaches.

Since Hungarian research on the selected minority groups with a discourse analytic approach is scarce, previous research findings presented in the following on Roma portrayal mainly consist of analyses of Hungarian texts with different approaches (e.g., quantitative and qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis). In the case of

previous research findings on LGBTQ portrayal, international research projects with a discourse analytic approach will be the focus apart from a few Hungarian findings on the topic (e.g., Janky et al., 2018; Rédai, 2012; Takács, 2004; Tamássy, 2019).

Section 2.3.1 Roma portrayal

The analysis of the portrayal of Roma in different media has a long-standing tradition in Hungary, both in the field of communication and media studies and sociology. This allows for examining the changes, or lack thereof, in the depiction of the Roma people, as seen in the systematic literature reviews of Munk (2013) and Messing and Bernáth (Messing & Bernáth, 2017). Regarding the approach of the reviewed studies, most employ content analysis with a few exceptions (such as Glózer, 2013; Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Vidra & Fox, 2014). In terms of their data source, all of the reviewed research projects analyzed news media content; only one study relied on social media content partly (i.e., Glózer, 2013), while others analyzed newspaper articles, either print (among others, Bernáth, 2003; Terestyéni, 2004; Vicsek, 1997) or online (among others, Bernáth & Messing, 2012; Glózer, 2013; Vidra & Fox, 2014) and television programs (see Bernáth & Messing, 2012).

In terms of the extent and frequency of portraying Roma people in Hungarian news media, although the rate of underrepresentation seems to have improved compared to before the regime change (Munk, 2013), Messing and Bernáth (2017) point out, citing the Hungarian Media Authority (NMHH, 2013), that the Roma were still underrepresented in the news in the 2010s. That is to say, compared to their share in the Hungarian population, which is approximately 7-8%, only 1.1% of the total news flow discusses news in connection with the minority group.

Regarding Roma portrayal in Hungarian news media, four topics can be defined as characteristic of their representation in the last thirty years: “mainstream politics targeting or affecting Roma, or those that fit the stereotypes about Roma—such as crime, poverty and culture (mainly music)” (Messing & Bernáth, 2017, p. 655; Munk, 2013).

The most frequently mentioned and analyzed in depth by scholars is the topic of crime and the portrayal of Roma people in the news in connection with crime or even as criminals. Studies since the 1990s, such as the quantitative content analysis of Vicsek (1997) analyzing print newspaper articles and the content analysis of Bernáth and Messing (1998) analyzing dailies, emphasize that Roma are portrayed stereotypically as

criminals and problematic and that conflicts between members of the minority and the majority population are highlighted in the media. The percentage of news connecting Roma with crime lowered in the early 2000s, according to Munk (2013), but it did not disappear. Terestyéni's (2004) content analysis in the early 2000s analyzed daily and weekly newspapers' portrayal of Roma before and during the 2002 Hungarian national elections. In this research, Terestyéni (2004) found a radical reduction in the portrayal of Roma people as criminals compared to previous levels. Conversely, Bernáth's (2003) content analysis of six national dailies found a much less pronounced, although existing, reduction in news depicting Roma in connection with crimes.

However, the late 2000s and early 2010s saw a resurgence in the portrayal of Roma as criminals (Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Munk, 2013), and some scholars date this period as a change in the portrayal of Roma as criminals as well. With the rise of far-right political groups, and particularly Jobbik's online campaign following the murder of a teacher in Olaszliszka in 2006, the terms *cigánybűnözés* ("Gypsy crime") and *cigányterror* ("Gypsy terror") have become part of everyday public discourse (Vidra & Fox, 2014). Juhász (2010) grasps the substantial change in the perception of Roma in the public discourse in that "the stereotype of Gypsies in the media, which had previously suggested stupidity, skiver, chicken stealing, but overall harmlessness, changed, and the image of the aggressive, dangerous, murderous Gypsy unfolded in the public mind" (Juhász, 2010, p. 14). As such, the terms 'Gypsy crime' and 'Gypsy terror' suggest "that Roma are innate criminals" (Vidra & Fox, 2014, p. 453) and that they inherently differ from non-Roma offenders for whom specific distinctive expressions, such as *magyarbűnözés* ("Hungarian crime") do not exist (Juhász, 2010; Messing, 2003, p. 60). Some studies examined the portrayal of Roma as innately violent criminals specifically. Pócsik (2007) analyzed the portrayal of Roma people in commercial and public television programs at the time of the Olaszliszka lynching and a few weeks after and concluded that after the murder and the following right-wing political statements, every Roma-related news or event was contextualized in relation to the brutal murder and thus, non-criminalized Roma portrayal became almost impossible. Vidra and Fox (2014) also studied the media representation of Roma regarding the Olaszliszka murder to find out how racist anti-Roma discourses entered the mainstream media. The scholars carried out discourse analysis in three mainstream online news sites and on a radical right-wing site, completing their focus with the representation of the racially motivated Roma murders of 2008-2009 and the so-called 'Roma integration debate' of the late 2000s as well. Vidra and Fox (2014) found that the

mainstream right-wing media was quick to adopt the far-right's discourse about 'Gypsy crime' and 'Gypsy terror,' depicting Roma people as "innately brutal and aggressive" (Vidra & Fox, 2014, p. 444). So much so that this racist, anti-Roma discourse was also employed in the articles about the Roma murders of 2008-2009, suggesting that Roma people murdered other Roma people and that the real victims of the murders were Hungarians subjected to 'anti-Hungarian' rhetoric when the racist motifs of the murders were brought up. With the foundation of Jobbik's radical right-wing paramilitary organization Hungarian Guard in 2007, their anti-Roma demonstrations in rural towns, and with Jobbik entering the Hungarian mainstream political scene, "openly racist, primarily anti-Gypsy racist speech became widely accepted" (Munk, 2013, p. 96), which most often appeared together with the portrayal of Roma as aggressive criminals (Vidra & Fox, 2014).

Following the 2009 murder of Marian Cozma, a Romanian handball player, studies carried out by the National Radio and Television Commission found that anti-Roma media representation emphasizing that Roma people are inherently violent criminals, incapable of integration, further strengthened (ORTT, 2010a, 2010b). Glózer (2013) applied a critical discourse analytic approach and qualitative content analysis in her research about the discursive construction of Roma people as 'enemies' on two far-right online news media and the content of their respective YouTube channels. On one of the analyzed news sites, *Barikád*, which is closely connected to Jobbik, the concept of Roma as enemies was constructed by portraying physically aggressive crimes, the conflicts between Roma and non-Roma members of society, and white-collar crimes committed by members of the Roma minority. Regarding the other radical right-wing news site analyzed, *kuruc.info*, Roma as 'enemies' were constructed as one-dimensional, that is, as people who commit physically aggressive crimes against members of the majority population. Thus, Glózer's (2013) findings underpin the importance of the topic of crime and violence in the construction of the concept of the minority group.

Bernáth and Messing's (2012) content analysis of daily newspapers, online websites, and television programs underpins the above-presented escalation, finding depictions of Roma people as criminals in Hungarian news media to a greater extent than in any of their previous studies. The theme is so prevalent that Messing and Bernáth (2017), who reviewed their quantitative content analysis dataset of twenty years (see Bernáth, 2003, 2014; Bernáth & Messing, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2012; Messing, 2008) with critical discursive approach, concluded that crime is a dominant and overarching theme of the

last twenty years in the representation of the Roma minority. The scholars also note that changes in the portrayal of Roma people as criminals are minor, if any, and are rooted in the changes in the political discourse of the time (Messing & Bernáth, 2017).

As for the prevalence of news articles portraying Roma people along the topics of mainstream politics, such portrayals were not only frequent but also contained representation regarding mainstream political actors' measures and policies affecting the Roma (Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Terestyéni, 2004) and articles about Roma people's electoral behavior (Terestyéni, 2004), thus represented the Roma both as passive and as active political actors. Nevertheless, according to Messing and Bernáth (2017), the portrayal of Roma in the social role of politicians fell from 17% (1997) to 0% by 2015.

Another frequently appearing topic in the representation of the Roma minority in Hungarian news media, according to Messing and Bernáth (2017), is poverty. Between 1993 and 2015, the ratio of articles depicting Roma in the context of poverty rose from 15% to 31%, although there were up-and-down fluctuations between the years. Thus, this is one of the most significant themes in the representation of the Roma of the twenty years analyzed. Terestyéni (2004) also found that in the early 2000s, 31% of the articles analyzed portrayed Roma in connection to social status, of which 27% were concerned with poverty. These portrayals, although they could elicit sympathy toward the minority group, often concentrated on "governmental and local welfare programmes, from a top-down angle" (Messing & Bernáth, 2017, p. 662), therefore contributing to the anti-Roma discourse of Roma people not working and passively waiting for and living off welfare. Messing and Bernáth also note that depictions of Roma in connection to poverty frequently linked their social status to deviant behavior such as alcoholism and neglect of children (2017, p. 662), making it more difficult to elicit empathy toward Roma people living in destitution at best and suggesting that members of the Roma minority are 'undeserving' poor at worst.

In the early 2000s, the representation of the Roma minority was often embodied in presenting Roma musicians, athletes, and artists (Bernáth, 2003; Hammer, 2007; Terestyéni, 2004). Compared to the crime-related portrayal, this change can be deemed positive (Munk, 2013). However, the overrepresentation of Roma as musicians, artists, etc., is also stereotypical and essentializing as it suggests innate Roma characteristics that fundamentally set the minority group apart from the majority population. According to Messing and Bernáth's (2017) review, appointing Roma people the role of artists in news

media fluctuated between 11% and 20% between 1997 and 2015, while depicting Roma in the context of culture ranged between 15% and 29% between 1993 and 2015, making the role and the topic one of the most prevalent ones.

Moreover, Messing and Bernáth (2017) also emphasize that the portrayal of Roma people in the last two decades neglected their everyday issues and topics in connection with social inclusion, such as "employment, education, housing, and health, as well as the empowerment of the Roma community" (2017, p. 655). The researchers found that the topics through which Roma people are represented have not changed dramatically since 1997.

In addition to the topics through which the Roma minority was often depicted, some studies also examined the employed tools of representation, i.e., the active or passive portrayal, the various social roles appointed to the Roma, and whether or not minority voices and opinions were represented in the analyzed articles or programs. Bernáth and Messing repeatedly examined the social roles in which Roma people were portrayed, as well as specifically addressed whether or not members of the minority were portrayed individualistically or in general and stereotypically. As such, according to Bernáth and Messing's (1998) study in the 1990s, 60% of the articles analyzed portrayed Roma people without any dedicated roles or individualistic characteristics but almost as a 'faceless mass.' By the early 2000s, a somewhat more individualistic portrayal appeared (Bernáth, 2003). According to Terestyéni's (2004) study of the same era, Roma people's voices were represented in 25% of Roma-related articles. After the above-emphasized change in the Roma portrayal in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the portrayal of Roma people became somewhat more individualistic again (Bernáth & Messing, 2012). As Messing and Bernáth (2017) note in their review, Roma were portrayed mainly passively and had no voice in their own representation in Hungarian news media between the early 1990s and 2015. Furthermore, the proportion of Roma voices, that is, directly interviewed Roma people in Roma-related news, declined between the analyzed periods of 2010-2011 and 2014-2015. The visual representation of the Roma throughout the years also fits into this mode of portrayal. Namely, the presentation of Roma distanced the members of the minority group from the viewers and deprived the minority of individuality. Regarding the portrayed social roles, Roma civic leaders and advocacy groups were missing from the analyzed media texts, while artists and musicians, as well as Roma politicians, were overrepresented throughout the years (Messing & Bernáth, 2017).

Concerning the findings of discourse analytic studies, Glózer (2013) found that the right-wing online news site *Barikád* used a rather distant, almost objective voice but employed provocative titles for their articles, while its Romaphobic stance and construction of Roma people as enemies were embodied through the selection of published news. According to Vidra and Fox (2014), both far-right and mainstream right-wing mediums constructed an in-group containing 'us,' the 'peaceful, victimized and threatened Hungarians,' and an out-group containing Roma people, left-liberals, left-liberal press, and human rights activists, while nonradical mainstream media used almost the same nomination strategy, only not perceiving Roma people as part of the out-group. Regarding the 'Roma integration debate,' the scholars found that radical and non-radical right-wing mediums discursively constructed the difference between Roma and non-Roma people as a biological and genetic difference, while non-radical mainstream media coded such differences as 'cultural,' which was "not openly, but still inherently racist" (Vidra & Fox, 2014, p. 449). All the while, left-wing news media, *Népszabadság*, employed a human rights discourse and depicted "racists, far-right, anti-PC proponents" (2014, p. 451) as the out-group (the 'other').

In sum, four main aspects dominated the portrayal of Roma in Hungarian news media, whose prevalence hasn't changed significantly in the last two decades: politics, crime, poverty, and culture. Of these, the representation of Roma as violent criminals is paramount as it directly contributed to the mainstreaming of racist and anti-Roma discourses (Juhász, 2010; Munk, 2013; Vidra & Fox, 2014). Furthermore, according to Messing and Bernáth (2017), the slight fluctuations in the depictions of Roma depended on changes in the political discourse, such as the rise of the far-right party Jobbik, which went hand in hand with the proliferation and mainstreaming of racist discourses (Juhász, 2010; Munk, 2013; Vidra & Fox, 2014).

Section 2.3.2 LGBTQ portrayal

In contrast to the analysis of the portrayal of Roma, Hungarian research projects on the portrayal of the LGBTQ minority are scarce. Conversely, analyzing the discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ people is a rather popular field of study internationally. Therefore, the following review of previous research findings on the portrayal of LGBTQ people draws partly on the few Hungarian research projects on the subjects, i.e., the works of Janky and colleagues (2018), Rédai (2012), Takács (2004), and Tamássy (2019) and mostly on international research projects that either applied a

discourse analytic approach or focused on social media content.

Regarding the approaches of the 15 reviewed studies, 12 applied some discourse analytic approach, like discourse analysis (e.g., Cheng & Yang, 2015; Darakchi, 2019), critical discourse analysis (such as Barrett & Bound, 2015; Bartley & Hidalgo-Tenorio, 2015; Browne et al., 2018; Clarke, 2006), or some variants of these (such as Bartoş et al., 2014; Darwin, 2017; Day, 2018; Janky et al., 2018; Tamássy, 2019). Other approaches include grounded theory (Asakura & Craig, 2014), content analysis (Chen, 2019), and a mixture of content and thematic analysis (Takács, 2004), while some did not specify (Rédai, 2012). Concerning their data sources, six research projects analyzed social media content (e.g., Asakura & Craig, 2014; Chen, 2019; Day, 2018), seven analyzed texts from traditional media, i.e., print newspapers or television programs (e.g., Bartley & Hidalgo-Tenorio, 2015; Clarke, 2006; Takács, 2004; Tamássy, 2019), while Rédai (2012) turned to online newspapers and blogs and Barrett and Bound (2015) analyzed official policies. Hence, the reviewed research projects cover both Hungarian and international habits of LGBTQ portrayal and a wide range of approaches to textual analysis and data sources.

The reviewed studies usually defined 3-6 discursive strategies or themes regarding the discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ people. Thus, findings will be presented along the frequently defined categories of politics, national identity, sexuality, exotic representation, and in-group identity construction.

Politics entered the realm of minority-related discourse on the one hand, through politicians who support or oppose certain gay rights (Bartoş et al., 2014; Janky et al., 2018; Tamássy, 2019) and on the other hand, by employing political discourse addressing "human rights, democracy, freedom, and citizenship" (Bartoş et al., 2014, p. 275). Bartoş et al. (2014), Janky et al. (2018), Takács (2004), and Tamássy (2019) all identified politics in LGBTQ representation as the field of the legitimized construction of the concept of the LGBTQ minority in their respective studies, emphasizing that the portrayal of the minority group often happens through representing politicians' LGBTQ-related opinions and, in general, depicting LGBTQ-related issues as inherently political. These findings underpin that political beliefs polarize LGBTQ portrayal. In focusing on the discourses around the Bulgarian non-ratification of the Istanbul Convention, Darakchi (2019) applied discourse analysis to analyze political speeches and comments on social media platforms. Although the researcher focused foremost on women's rights and the concept of gender and not specifically on LGBTQ portrayal, the study emphasized the importance

of politics in constructing the concept of LGBTQ people. In Takács's (2004) findings, politics not only appeared through the representation of politicians' opinions but also as a ground for discrimination against LGBTQ people. Chen (2019) analyzed argumentative schemes in Facebook groups regarding legalizing same-sex marriage in Australia. The scholar found schemes regarding child-rearing by same-sex parents (the general question of the family), freedom of speech, and religious freedom, thus identifying political themes in the argumentative schemes.

National identity was also identified as paramount in the LGBTQ-related discourse in several research projects. Darakchi (2019), Bartoș and colleagues (2014), and Browne and colleagues (2018) found national and LGBTQ identities to be constructed as mutually exclusive in their respective analyzed texts. Especially in the study of Bartoș and colleagues (2014, p. 277), who, in their analysis of online news articles about the 2010 GayFest in Bucharest, found that heterosexuality was portrayed as "essential for national identity" and that "gay and Romanian identities are mutually exclusive". Browne and colleagues (2018), who analyzed the 'Vote No' campaign in the 2015 Irish referendum on same-sex marriage, noted that "hegemonic heteronormativities are core to the construction of national identities (Bell and Binnie, 2000, cited in Browne et al., 2018, p. 528). As the result of their discourse and visual analysis, the scholars concluded that "heteroactivist discourses relied on key underpinning tropes … [which are] the figure of an innocent *Irish* child … in need of protection from … predatory gay men for the … good of the nation/common good and the future" (Browne et al., 2018, p. 532 emphasis in original). According to these findings, LGBTQ identity was positioned as antagonistic to national identities as the latter are 'pure' to which the former brings 'disgrace' and are a 'threat.' Rédai (2012) also found national identity to be of decisive importance in the portrayal of the 2008 Budapest Pride March, during which counterdemonstrators brutally assaulted March attendees. According to the scholar, in leftist and liberal media (such as *Népszabadság Online*), Pride attendees and LGBTQ people were portrayed as 'good Hungarians,' while extremists were constructed as 'bad Hungarians,' disgracing the country, both in general and in the eye of '(Western) Europe.' In contrast, in mainstream and radical right-wing media (*Magyar Nemzet* and *kuruc.info*, respectively), LGBTQ people were portrayed as 'non-Hungarians' "penetrating the body of virtuous Hungary" (Rédai, 2012, p. 59), while counter-demonstrators were positioned as 'good Hungarians,' 'protecting' the national identity and the majority population.

The third mutual topic in the portrayal of the LGBTQ minority is *sexuality*. Even though

sexual minorities are a minority group on the basis of their sexual preferences, identity, sexual practices, and/or gender identity, constructing them as merely sexual beings is not self-evident. Portrayals like these base the 'otherness,' the 'deviance' of the depicted on their sexual preferences or practices (see Barrett & Bound, 2015; Cheng & Yang, 2015; Clarke, 2006; Janky et al., 2018; Takács, 2004; Tamássy, 2019). As Clarke (2006) highlights in her research on HIV/AIDS representation, LGBTQ people were portrayed as undeserving victims of the disease, as if they had done something inherently wrong, which led to their health status. Takács (2004) found the recurring discursive construction of the concept of the sexual minority along the topics of HIV/AIDS when analyzing news articles of the late 1990s mentioning homosexuals and gays. The scholar also noted that themes of sexual practices and promiscuity were connected to HIV/AIDS in Hungarian media. Barrett and Bound (2015) found LGBTQ people to be represented solely through their sexual practices in school policies in the United States, which prohibit the 'advertisement' of 'alternative' sexual practices. Cheng and Yang (2015) analyzed the portrayal of gender and LGBTQ people on a social media platform regularly used by medical students in Taiwan. Albeit the scholars focused on gender as a topic and women's representation, they found that LGBTQ people were often depicted in hidden medical curricula merely as sexual beings whose medical condition or body is highly affected and determined by their sexual practices. The studies of Janky et al. (2018) and Tamássy (2019) revealed that LGBTQ people are often depicted as deviant sexual beings in Hungarian media, a portrayal achieved by ridiculing and emphasizing gender non-conforming dresses worn by participants of the Budapest Pride March. Rédai (2012), analyzing media discourse around the 2008 Budapest Pride March, noted that Hungarian public discourses about homosexuality frequently focus on the imagined sexual lives and activities of LGBTQ people, therefore contributing to a sexualized discursive construction of the concept of the sexual minority.

Exotic representation as a category refers to those discourses that focus on the 'unknown,' 'unusual,' and 'otherness' of the LGBTQ minority. These findings suggest that the minority group inherently differs from the majority due to its exoticness, and its members should be avoided by 'normal' people. Exotic representation often appeared by portraying an LGBTQ event as a spectacle (Bartoş et al., 2014; Janky et al., 2018; Tamássy, 2019). Bartley and Hidalgo-Tenorio (2015) also found LGBTQ people to be portrayed as essentially different in Irish tabloids and a national broadsheet. Moreover, Barrett and Bound's (2015) and Cheng and Yang's (2015) formerly presented findings on sexualized

representation also underpin the essential 'otherness' of LGBTQ people, as such portrayals implicate that the so-called 'LGBTQ lifestyle' is fundamentally and significantly differ from non-LGBTQ people's.

In-group representation as a category is radically different from every other theme introduced previously as it concentrates on the discursive performance of LGBTQ sexual orientations and/or identities. These research projects mainly relied on social media content, which frequently functions as a place and tool for identity construction and enaction (Bouvier, 2015). Such studies focus on how LGBTQ individuals construct themselves as part of the LGBTQ community. As such, these studies significantly differ from those analyzing out-group representations of the minority group in that they analyze the self-portrayal of minority individuals, often addressed to other members of the minority group. Although Darwin (2017) and Day (2018) examined different LGBTQ groups, i.e., non-binary people and black lesbian identities, respectively, both found minority sexual identity representation and performance to appear relative to traditional gender roles. That is, whether by obeying these gender roles or questioning them, LGBTQ social media users and content creators found LGBTQ self-portrayal hard to define without reflecting on the cisgender, heterosexual identities and traditional gender roles. Asakura and Craig (2014) analyzed videos of LGBTQ people telling their coming-out stories. Their main finding suggests that although coming out can be highly beneficial for one to accept one's sexuality and to reduce mental and psychological pressure, this positive effect is highly influenced by the person's economic and family status, as well as chances for seeking financial or psychological help if needed.

In sum, five main themes were identified in the portrayal of the LGBTQ minority: politics, national identity, sexuality, exotic representation, and in-group identity construction. Some of these themes were the terrain of inclusive and exclusionary representation (such as politics and national identity), while others were employed merely as dimensions of social exclusion (like exotic representation).

The review of previous research findings on Roma and LGBTQ portrayal highlights several important aspects of this research project. First, both minority groups are frequently portrayed negatively and stereotypically in (social) media. Although the studies in this section applied different theoretical and methodological approaches, they all argued for the significance of minority portrayal, either by perceiving language as a transparent medium or understanding language use as the terrain of social reality

construction. Either way, revealing the discursive strategies and meaning-making tools of minority portrayal contributes to the understanding of discrimination, as it points out the dimensions, topics, and linguistic tools of separating the minority from the majority population.

However, the review of the previous research projects also pointed out some gaps in the research field. Namely, there is a lack of analysis examining minority representation in political communication, especially in social media, which would be crucial due to the prominent social positions of political actors. Additionally, there is a scarcity of discourse analytic approaches focusing on wider timeframes that could examine language use regarding different events and their impact on minority portrayal. Furthermore, it also underpinned the scarcity of comparative research projects between minority groups' portrayals. This lack of systematic comparison between the (media) portrayal of specific minority groups impedes the ability to reflect on the potential similarities and differences in the portrayal of ethnic and sexual minorities. The present research project aims to fill these gaps.

Section 2.4 Research questions

The research questions, derived from established theoretical approaches and previous research, delve into the discursive construction of the concepts of chosen minorities in online political communication (RQ 1), the embeddedness of minority construction in its socio-political context (RQ 2), and the dimensions of social exclusion and inclusion of LGBTQ and Roma people (RQ 3). These questions are as follows:

> RQ 1. How does minority-related political communication discursively construct the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people, and what are the main similarities and differences in the online portrayal of these minorities?
>
> RQ 2. What topics and events trigger Hungarian politicians to include these minorities in their Facebook communication?
>
> RQ 3. To what extent do the online political portrayals of ethnic and sexual minorities differ in terms of the dimensions of social exclusion?

The first research question explores the meaning-making processes involved in the discursive construction of the concepts of the LGBTQ and Roma minority. As the discourse theoretical background of the research emphasized, every utterance about

minorities is a defining and constructing action toward the concepts of minorities (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), which shapes, questions, or legitimizes the existing minority-related discourses and social attitudes toward them. The comparison of the discursive construction of the concepts of the two minority groups is relevant due to the different social positions of sexual and ethnic minorities (addressed in Section 2.1; see, for example, Barát, 2011; Dombos et al., 2011; Neményi et al., 2019). This comparative aspect is one of the uniqueness of the research, which does not perceive the two minority groups as interchangeable but seeks to answer the question of how the linguistic representation of different types of minority groups is realized in Hungarian online political communication. Moreover, it also aims to unveil the similarities and differences in the linguistic inclusion and exclusion of different types of minorities.

Research question 2 reflects on the embeddedness of Roma- and LGBTQ-related events in Hungarian public and political discourse. As another uniqueness of the research, due to the length of the period analyzed (one calendar year), the research project can reveal what kind of political or non-political, minority-related or non-minority-related events trigger politicians to include minorities in their social media communication. Therefore, answering the research question will show whether minority issues remain separated from non-minority events or are integral to other public issues discussed. Furthermore, it will shed light on the social roles attributed to minorities through the events mentioned in connection with them. The research question also points out the extent to which politicians regard minorities as politically active citizens by reflecting on the municipal and European Parliament elections held in 2019.

The third research question focuses on the dimensional differences in the discursive construction of the concepts of the two minority groups that emerge from the systematic differences in the meaning-making tools used for representation, as well as from the interpretation of these meaning-making tools in their connection to the public discourse and the socio-political context of the texts (Fairclough, 1989, 2003). Hence, this research question addresses the dimensions of social exclusion and inclusion of selected minority groups concerning the social practices and social constructions in relation to which minorities are portrayed in Hungarian online political communication. Furthermore, similarities in the dimensions of social exclusion may shed light on the general discursive strategies and dimensions of exclusion that politicians apply irrespective of the different minority groups.

Chapter 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To answer the research questions presented, the discourse analysis of Hungarian politicians' social media content was conducted. Specifically, the focus was on the 2019 Facebook posts of Hungarian politicians. This chapter will outline the decisions made regarding data gathering and sampling, the methodological approach of the research, which draws heavily on the theoretical framework for understanding language use and meaning-making (Gee, 2010; Géring, 2008a; Potter, 2004), and the particular steps of analysis.

Section 3.1 Corpus-building strategy and data gathering

The data source of the analysis was the social media platform Facebook. Although scholars in the field of political communication often turn to other social media platforms, such as Instagram (see Larsson, 2023), TikTok (see Marquart, 2023), and X/Twitter (see Jungherr, 2016), this research relies on Facebook due to Hungarian citizens' and politicians' preference for the use of this site over any other social media platform (Bene, 2017; Bene & Somodi, 2018; Merkovity, 2014). Due to the personalized nature of social media platforms, especially Facebook, which specifically favors the communication of individual politicians (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016), individual politicians' official Facebook pages were selected for analysis instead of party pages.

The present study adopts a timeframe-based data collection method to uncover the events and topics that trigger the inclusion of minorities in online political communication, thus shedding light on the themes and events that shape and influence the discursive construction of the concepts of the Roma and LGBTQ minority. Consequently, this approach helps answer the study's second research question (see Section 2.4). In contrast, studies applying event-based data collection, which enjoys popularity in research projects with a discourse analytic approach and, in general, among studies analyzing the portrayal of minorities, such as many previously reviewed studies on the portrayal of sexual and ethnic minorities (see, for example, Bartoş et al., 2014; Browne et al., 2018; Pócsik, 2007; Tamássy, 2019; Terestyéni, 2004; Vidra & Fox, 2014), limit the possibility of revealing events that shape the minority-related discourse as they focus on one or another minority-related event.

The study's timeframe-based data-gathering approach spanned the entire year, from

January 1st to December 31st of 2019. 2019 was chosen because it was the first full year of the 2018-2022 political term (since the then-government was inaugurated in May 2018) and because during the year, the country saw two elections: the European Parliament elections and the Hungarian local elections. As such, 2019 was particularly suitable for analyzing what non-minority-related events, such as political campaigns, trigger politicians to include minorities in their social media communication. From the subsequent year onwards, heightened political attention and communication have been aimed toward both minority groups[12]. Therefore, the study is also able to present the minority-related discourse prior to this heightened political attention and communication.

Concerning the selection of politicians, the political parties to be included in the analysis had to be selected first. In the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary election, due to earlier changes in electoral legislation, an unprecedented number of 23 political parties were featured on the party list ballots (NVI, 2018b). Many of these parties were called 'fake parties' or 'instant parties' by scholars and journalists alike, meaning they did not participate in any visible political activities apart from running in the elections; instead, the primary motivation behind their candidacy was to exploit the national financial campaign support provided by the state (Schmidt, 2018; Tóka, 2018). To circumvent including candidates who were not genuinely involved in political activities, the selection of political parties was based on the list of political parties contesting in the 2019 European Parliament election. As there was no national financial campaign support for the European Parliament election, it is reasonable to assume that only those political parties were interested in the run, whose primary objective was to acquire political power rather than financial campaign support. Consequently, the number of political parties included in the analysis was reduced from 23 to those of 10[13] parties that ran in the European Parliament elections (see Appendix B for a list of selected parties). Thus, most of the politicians analyzed were members of these ten parties.

Politicians of these ten parties were selected for analysis if they were among the top five

[12] Regarding sexual minorities, among others, in May 2020, the Hungarian Parliament accepted a proposal prohibiting the legal recognition of gender reassignment; in November, a proposal submitted by Fidesz-KDNP was accepted, making it technically impossible for same-sex couples to adopt children. Concerning the Roma minority, among others, Viktor Orbán, Prime minister, suggested in 2020 that victims of the Gyöngyöspata segregation case, where Roma children were segregated in a public school, do not 'deserve' the compensation awarded to them by the court because they 'did not work' for the money (Cseke, 2020).

[13] Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt, which ran both in the 2018 national elections and the 2019 European elections, was excluded from the analysis because both the party and scholars (Tóka, 2019) identified it as a joke party; therefore, its political aims and communication are incomparable with those of all other chosen parties.

candidates on the parties' party lists for the 2018 general election. In the Hungarian general election, the first five politicians on the parties' party lists are indicated on the party list voting sheets. Hence, these politicians become the names and faces primarily associated with the political parties. Additionally, these politicians are more likely to secure a seat in the Parliament if their party receives sufficient votes. The selection process did not consider the efficacy of the candidate's performance in the 2018 parliamentary election. In addition, politicians who won a seat in the Parliament in the 2018 general election as minority representatives or independent representatives, as well as the Roma nationality advocate, were also included in the analysis.

Adjustments were made when compiling the final list of selected politicians, considering the politicians' political activity in 2019 and Facebook presence. In the case of politicians who did not have official Facebook pages, the next person on the parties' 2018 parliamentary election list was chosen in their place. Consequently, the sixth (or seventh, etc.) person on the parties' 2018 party list was selected. The same approach was taken if a politician listed in the first five running representatives for a party in 2018 left the Hungarian political scene before 2019. These two circumstances affected most parties[14]. Parties running in the 2018 parliamentary election with joint lists also had to be accounted for. Concerning the four parties that ran with joint lists (Fidesz and KDNP, and MSZP and Párbeszéd), the first five listed members of each party were selected, even if some of them were not named on the party list ballot per se. Personnel changes in the parties' parliamentary groups did not affect the list of selected politicians; however, they were accounted for during the analysis (see Section 2.1.2). These criteria and adjustments resulted in the selection of 45 politicians from 10 officially registered Hungarian political parties, including independent politicians and minority representatives, from whose official, public Facebook pages the data was gathered (see Appendix C for a list of selected politicians).

To gather all text posts published by the 45 politicians in 2019, a free data scraping software, ScrapeStrom, was used. Data was collected in two waves: June 2019 and June 2020. The automated data collection needed manual verification and further manual collection as well. The manual verification process ensured that every post had been downloaded and none had been included in the database more than once. After the verification process, the corpus included 18683 posts. The compiled database consists of

[14] A unique case is Munkáspárt, where out of the party's top ten candidates, only the first, Gyula Thürmer, had an official Facebook page. As such, he is the only politician included in the corpus from that party.

the posts' technical identifying details (such as direct link, publisher of the post, etc.), the unique textual content (the text the politician published as their own content, not shared content from other Facebook pages or sites outside of Facebook), and the still image(s) posted. The analysis relied on these characteristics and the contents of the posts.

Section 3.2 Sampling

The sampling procedure is particularly important in discourse analysis (Tonkiss, 2012), especially in this research project, given the amount of data and the aim of the research to unravel what prompts Hungarian politicians to include minorities or minority-related topics in their online communication. The aim to analyze the meaning-making tools politicians employed to construct the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people necessitates the selection of Facebook posts in connection with either sexual, ethnic, or both minority groups, containing the politicians' own unique published contents, including text, symbols, emojis, and still images. Three selection procedures were applied to the corpus of 18683 posts to achieve this and find posts relevant for the analysis. Namely, 1) a content-based selection with keywords, 2) an event calendar-based selection rooted in the public and media discourse of the time, and 3) an extended event calendar-based selection focusing on the most frequently mentioned minority-related events.

The first sampling step involved a content-based selection with keywords based on the notion that certain words and phrases in a text signify the presence of a particular subject matter. In the context of the present study, if a post included a word such as 'homosexual,' it would suggest that the given post contains an expression of opinion about the LGBTQ minority. Given the Hungarian origin of the data and the fact that the analysis was conducted in Hungarian, Hungarian keywords were defined and utilized to identify relevant posts. Therefore, Hungarian terms commonly used in the public discourse for Roma and LGBTQ people were chosen as keywords. A total of ten keywords were employed in this selection step to find relevant Facebook posts. These keywords were *roma* ("Roma") and *cigány* ("Gypsy") for Roma people, and *leszbikus* ("lesbian"), *meleg* ("gay"), *biszexuális* ("bisexual"), *transz** ("trans*"), queer, *homoszexuális* ("homosexual"), *LMBT** ("LGBT*") and LGBT* for the LGBTQ minority (for an English-Hungarian dictionary containing minority-related expressions relevant to the present study, see Appendix D). In this selection method, any post containing at least one previously listed keyword was automatically selected for analysis. In addition, the two preceding and following posts were also reviewed for relevancy, even if they did not

contain the keywords.

The second step of the sampling is based on the public and media discourse of the time. This selection draws on previous research findings suggesting that political communication on social media platforms is largely influenced by events and journalistic content from mass media (Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Larsson, 2016). Therefore, an event calendar was created. Based on the articles published on the three most-read Hungarian news sites of 2019, *24.hu*, *Index*, and *Origo* (Gemius-DKT, 2019), the calendar serves as a comprehensive record of the minority-related events that shaped the public discourse in that year. The online newspapers' political affiliations are crucial, especially given the changes in the Hungarian media landscape since the 2010s (see Section 2.1.2). As reported by Mérték Médielemző Műhely (2019, 2021), *24.hu* and *Index* can be considered independent online news media in the year under review, 2019[15], while *Origo* was owned by the Central European Press and Media Foundation, a foundation with close links to the government (as, for example, its board members and chair are people closely connected to the governing parties) therefore, it is considered a pro-government media. Assuming that these most frequently visited news sites mirror the mainstream public discourse and that they report on issues of public interest, an event calendar was created with the help of their articles. For the event calendar to comprise 2019 events that concern LGBTQ and Roma people, those articles were collected from *24.hu*, *Index*, and *Origo*, which were published in 2019 and used at least one of the previously presented minority-related keywords as tags[16]. Table 2 shows the number of articles found on each news site.

2. Table. Distribution of minority-related articles among news sites

	24.hu	***Index***	***Origo***	***Sum***
No. of LGBTQ-related articles	134	89	32	*255*
No. of Roma-related articles	22	39	8	*69*
Sum	*156*	*128*	*40*	*324*

Source: Author's own elaboration.

On the three news sites, 324 articles were discovered with previously defined keywords (Table 2). These articles were then reviewed and categorized based on their reported events. To ensure that only events of significant public interest were taken into account,

[15] In 2024, *24.hu* is still owned by a Hungarian investor independent of the government. However, as a result of acquisitions in 2020 and subsequent interventions, *Index* can no longer be considered independent but a pro-government news site as of 2020 due to its close links to Fidesz-KDNP (Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, 2021). The journalists who left *Index* due to the acquisition have since founded a new, independent news site called *Telex*.

[16] All three sites use so-called tags to categorize their articles. The tags are to help find and identify the articles; therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that they reflect the articles' topics and content.

only those mentioned in at least two articles or explicitly related to Hungarian politicians were included in the calendar. Minority-related events mentioned in the already-found relevant posts of politicians were also incorporated into the finalized event calendar. The resulting calendar contained 79 minority-related events (see Appendix E), which were used to search for minority-related posts in the corpus. Subsequently, all posts published on the same date as the events and the following two days were examined for their textual and visual relevance to minority-related issues.

Finally, a third selection method was applied in the sampling procedure. This step quasi-extended the second step by reviewing all Facebook posts published seven days after each of the three most mentioned LGBTQ-related and Roma-related events (see Appendix E). This method was implemented to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the events and their impact on social media discourse.

With these three selection steps, a subcorpus was built containing the minority-related posts of the 45 politicians. These sampling procedures selected relevant posts considering the prevailing public and media discourse on LGBTQ and Roma minorities. The size of the subcorpus adds significant value to the research as it shows how frequently politicians mention either minority groups or address minority-related issues. Additionally, these selection steps allowed for the discovery of Facebook posts that engaged in meaning-making about these minority groups without explicitly naming Roma or LGBTQ people. Furthermore, the comprehensive nature of the second and third selection procedures helped identify minority-related events not covered by the media during the same time period.

After having presented the corpus-building strategy, data-gathering process, and applied sampling procedures, the following section discusses the research's methodological approach.

Section 3.3 Methodological approach of the research

This section will present the methodological approaches and considerations of discourse analysis as applied in this research, arising from the theoretical framework previously outlined (see Section 2.2) and in correspondence with the research questions presented (see Section 2.4).

Discourse analysis as a methodology exists in numerous varieties (Phillips & Hardy,

2002; Tamássy & Géring, 2022), and researchers in the field agree that there is no singular correct way of doing it (Gee, 2010; Gill, 2000; Potter, 2004). Some discourse analytic approaches prioritize asking adequate questions when analyzing text rather than strictly categorizing units of analysis and linguistic and grammatical details (Potter, 2004). For the present research project, Tonkiss (2012), Gee (2010, 2018), and Gill (2000) represent these approaches. Other approaches, such as Halliday's (1994) Systemic Functional Linguistics and the critical discourse analysis scholars whose approaches are rooted in Halliday's work, e.g., Fairclough (2003) and van Leeuwen (2007, 2008) both provide precisely detailed schemata for analyzing discourse that is based on the grammatical characteristics of texts. The methodological approach of this research project is grounded in the former approaches to discourse analysis while also relying on the latter approaches in questions related to operationalization. Namely, the research seeks answers to questions regarding the discursive construction of the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people while providing a comprehensive, detailed analysis of the linguistic tools of meaning-making and the discursive strategies employed in the Facebook posts. The following paragraphs outline the methodological frameworks that heavily influenced the methodology of this research project.

According to Gee (2010), every act of language use is an act of social reality construction in which seven different areas of 'reality' are constructed. These are what Gee calls the "» seven building tasks « of language" (2010, p. 17): *significance*, *practices (activities)*, *identities*, *relationships*, *politics (the distribution of social goods)*, *connections*, and *sign systems and knowledge*. However, Gee (2010, 2018) also stresses that actual discourse analytic research, in its very nature of providing detailed analysis, cannot study every building task in its entirety; thus, one should focus on specific building tasks of language. Therefore, in this research project, in line with the research questions previously presented (see Section 2.4), the building tasks of language under investigation are *significance*, *identities*, *politics (the distribution of social goods)*, and *connections.* The Discourse Analysis Questions assigned to these building tasks are as follows, in the same order:

- *How is this piece of language being used to make certain things significant or not and in what ways?*
- *What identity or identities is this piece of language being used to enact (i.e., get others to recognize as operative)? What identity or identities is this piece of language attributing to others and how does this help the speaker or writer enact his or her own identity?*
- *What perspective on social goods is this piece of language communicating (i.e.,*

what is being communicated as to what is taken to be "normal," "right," "good," "correct," "proper," "appropriate," "valuable," "the ways things are," "the way things ought to be," "high status or low status," "like me or not like me," and so forth)?

- *How does this piece of language connect or disconnect things; how does it make one thing relevant or irrelevant to another?* (Gee, 2010, pp. 17–19)

These building tasks were selected for study as they and the questions assigned to them grasp the very areas of social reality whose meaning-making tools and processes the research aims to explore. That is, what details (including events) are deemed significant and non-significant in the discursive construction of Roma and LGBTQ people (RQ1 and RQ2), what identities are assigned to these minority groups in the politicians' online communication (RQ1), how do politicians connect or disconnect things in the portrayal of Roma and LGBTQ people (RQ1) with emphasis on connecting or disconnecting these minority groups to events (RQ2), what are the similarities and differences in the discursive construction of the concepts of these minority groups along these aspects (RQ1), and what social goods are granted to or denied from these minority groups, the latter of which emerges from the previous questions (RQ3). Thus, these building tasks of language and their questions determine the methodological approach of the research.

To increase the validity and reliability of the analysis, the Discourse Analysis Questions of Gee (2010) are operationalized by relying primarily on the steps of analysis outlined by Tonkiss (2012) and van Leeuwen (2008). Tonkiss (2012) shares the constructionist perceptions of scholars in the field of discourse analysis and understands discourse as constructing social reality and discourse analysis as the study of the production of meaning. Tonkiss (2012) represents the interpretive approach to discourse analysis and proposes four steps to carry out such a thorough analysis: *identifying key themes and arguments*, *looking for association and variation*, *characterization and agency*, and *attending to emphasis and silences*. The scholar also formulates analytic questions around these four steps of analysis. The interrogating questions of the first step address the ideas and representations clustered around key themes and the particular meanings and images used to represent the key themes and arguments. In the second step, questions interrogate the associations between certain actors, groups, or problems, the text's internal inconsistencies, and the exclusion of differing accounts. The third step of Tonkiss's (2012) methodological framework emphasizes how social actors are portrayed, including their positions, characteristics, and the problems connected to them. Analyzing the agency assigned to the portrayed social actors is essential in this step. Interrogating questions concerning the fourth step focus on what is present in the text and, more importantly, on

what is missing from it. This step also addresses the importance of quantitative logic in analyzing the frequency or consistency of given terms, modes of portrayal, etc.

In developing the steps of analysis, van Leeuwen's (2007, 2008) critical discourse analytic tools are also utilized, especially regarding social actors' portrayal and discursive construction. Van Leeuwen's approach to discourse analysis emerged from Halliday's (1994) Systemic Functional Linguistics and is part of the Critical Discourse Studies. As such, its focal point is the grammatical analysis of texts. Since this research project's foremost aim is to reveal how the concepts of different minorities are constructed in online political communication, the analysis has to address the specific grammatical tools used to define and portray Roma and LGBTQ people. Therefore, the study draws on van Leeuwen's (2008) methodological approach. Van Leeuwen's (2008) system network for the analysis of social actor representation covers the categorization and socio-politic interpretation of a vast spectrum of linguistic occurrences; however, the present study primarily focuses on the discursive strategies of *substitutions* and *deletions*, and in particular on *inclusion/exclusion* (the representation of social actors in given texts or the lack thereof), *role allocation* (also referred to as [sociological] agency allocation, that is, the portrayal of social actors as active agents or passive patients), and the categories of *referencing* (i.e., how a social actor is referred to or represented in the text) with a distinguished focus on the branch of *categorization* (van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 40–41). This sub-system provides analytical categories for phenomena such as *functionalization* (the representation of a social actor with their function, i.e., their role, occupation, or other activity, that is presented as their social function) or *classification* (such as being referred to as Roma or lesbian).

Lastly, the importance of multimodal analysis is emphasized in various approaches to discourse analysis, such as critical discourse analysis (van Leeuwen, 2008), multimodal discourse analysis (Kress & Bezemer, 2023), and their intersecting approaches (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). Multimodality in this research gains importance due to one of Facebook's core features: pictures, if attached to a text post, are inseparable from the text as users simultaneously interact with the two. Regarding multimodality, the research applies two analytic approaches. On the one hand, images were subject to the sampling procedure introduced in Section 3.2 and provided interpretative context for analyzing minority-related online political communication. That is, the contents of images were examined in terms of minority-related symbols (e.g., rainbow or Roma flags), well-known minority individuals in the pictures, as well as other visual references to minority-

related events (such as a can of Coca-Cola at the time of the 2019 Coca-Cola campaign) (Rasmussen Pennington, 2017). Such image contents helped determine whether the post containing the picture was minority-related and whether it referred to a minority-related event. On the other hand, textual content on the posted image, if any, is analyzed just as any other textual content, i.e., along the previously presented methodological concepts and following the specific steps of analysis outlined in the upcoming Section 3.4. The images, however, were not the foci of a multimodal discourse analysis per se but were embedded in the discourse analysis as the interpretative context of the analyzed texts.

Section 3.4 Steps of the analysis

This section introduces the steps of the discourse analytic methods applied. As the subjects of the analysis were politicians' original textual contents, while the published non-text images provided interpretative context for the analysis, the discourse analytic methods applied focus on textual analysis. To provide an in-depth analysis of the discursive construction of the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people, the minority-related posts were analyzed from four aspects. These are 1) identifying techniques with which the minorities were separated from the majority, 2) voices and opinions represented in the posts, 3) the represented actors and agency allocation, and 4) assigned roles. The steps of analysis reflect on the Discourse Analysis Questions outlined by Gee (2010) regarding the four building tasks of language use analyzed in this research, thereby contributing to answering the research questions.

The first step in analyzing the minority-related posts focused on finding the techniques with which politicians indicated that the given post was in connection with one or both of the minority groups analyzed. The analysis of these techniques highlights how these minorities were referred to (van Leeuwen, 2008), i.e., which of their characteristics were deemed significant by the politicians, what identities were attributed to them, what events and well-known Roma or LGBTQ persons their representation was *connected* (Gee, 2010) to and the patterns of association and dissociation (Tonkiss, 2012). These indicating techniques are also identifying techniques in that the ways social actors are represented in the discourse contribute to the discursive construction of the social actor (van Leeuwen, 2008).

This step examined explicit and implicit identifying techniques (van Leeuwen, 2008). The importance of analyzing naming techniques stems from the concept that by using one

name or identifying technique instead of another, the addressed member or minority group is placed in a social category (Richardson, 2007), which serves the "psychological, social, or political purposes or interests on the side of the speakers or writers" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 47). This process relies on van Leeuwen's (2008) schema of social actor representation. In this step, the evoked minority-related events and mentioned well-known members of these minority groups were also examined. The former sheds light on those events that politicians *connected* to Roma and LGBTQ minorities (Gee, 2010), thus casting the events' socio-political context on the concepts of these minority groups and engaging in minority-related meaning-making. In addition, this step is also crucial in answering the second research question of the research project. Regarding the latter, mentioning well-known members of these minorities contributes to a personalized and individualized portrayal (van Leeuwen, 2008) of the given minority group while also building a *connection* between the well-known Roma or LGBTQ person and these minority groups (Gee, 2010) hence playing a part in the discursive construction of the concepts of these minority groups.

In the second step, the focus was on the source of the opinions portrayed in the Facebook posts. Reported speech, its forms, and sources are frequently analyzed in discourse analytic approaches (Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 2001, 2008), as they highlight which actors are provided with the opportunity to voice their opinions and, by that, deemed and constructed as legitimate sources of information in a given topic. Van Dijk (2001) emphasizes that controlling a minority group's access to communication events, namely *censoring* their voices and not providing space for their opinions and perspectives, creates a *segregated* discourse structure in which minorities are *silenced*. In other approaches to discourse analysis, this characteristic of texts is scrutinized frequently in the framework of intertextuality, i.e., the cross-references in a text to another text (Fairclough, 2003; Gee, 2010). Moreover, Tonkiss's (2012) analytic approach *attending to emphasis and silences* can also be interpreted as pointing to the significance of quoting and paraphrasing minorities in terms of whether minority voices are emphasized or silenced in the discourse. To examine the use of this meaning-making tool in online political communication, the second step of the analysis focuses on whether politicians' minority-related original text posts contain any reference to whose opinions or thoughts they present. I.e., whether there is anybody (a person, an organization, or a group of people) named as the source of the published text, whether there are punctuation marks or other linguistic tools (like pronouns) indicating a source other than the politician posting the

opinion, and if yes, whether these are minorities or minority-related sources.

The third analytic step focuses on actor portrayal and agency allocation. The representation of actors (or lack thereof) and their agency is especially emphasized in many critical discourse analysts' and critical linguists' analytic frameworks, such as Kress and Hodge (1979) or Fairclough (1989). In the present study, actor and agency portrayal is analyzed based on van Leeuwen's (2008) approach to *social actor* representation and Tonkiss's (2012) analysis step of *characterization and agency*, both of which reflect on the *identities* attributed to these minority groups through language use (Gee, 2010). Accordingly, the minority actors portrayed and the agency allocated to them are identified not strictly based on grammatical analysis (that is, deciding whether, in a minority-related sentence, a minority actor is grammatically active or passive) but also on a sociological approach that considers the social practice in connection with the minority as an interpretive context. This step focuses on three aspects. First, which actors are included in or excluded from the minority-related Facebook posts, that is, who are deemed relevant and irrelevant actors in the minority-related discourse and who are purposefully erased (van Leeuwen, 2008). Second, "who is represented as an »agent« (»actor«), who as »patient« (»goal«) with respect to a given action" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 32) in Facebook posts about LGBTQ and Roma people. In other words, whether minority actors were depicted as the "dynamic forces" behind an activity or as "»undergoing« the activity" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 33). Third, how minority actors were characterized based on the qualities emphasized, the kind of phrases in their portrayal, and how these minority groups or individuals' names are substituted.

The final step of the analysis explores the social roles assigned to the Roma and LGBTQ minority groups in the online political communication analyzed. Politicians attribute these social roles to minorities by connecting Roma and LGBTQ people to specific processes, events, and social practices, such as organizing demonstrations or participating in elections in one way or another. This is crucial as assigning different social roles can be a tool for cross-categorization, which is the discursive construction of the concept of a minority group along categories or social roles other than their minority status (Messing & Bernáth, 2017). Furthermore, this step systematically integrated the results of the previous analysis steps and the practices and events in which these minority groups were portrayed as participating. This resonates with Tonkiss's (2012) analysis step of identifying key themes and representations that cluster around them. The step also draws on van Leeuwen's (2008) analysis step of *role allocation* in that it examines the social

practices, activities, and processes in relation to which minorities appear.

These four analysis steps contribute to answering the first research question (RQ 1) by providing a complex picture of how the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people were discursively constructed in Hungarian politicians' social media communication and allowing for a comparison of the portrayal of these minority groups. The first and final steps help answer the second research question (RQ 2) by highlighting the minority-related and non-minority-related events and topics that led the politicians analyzed to mention LGBTQ and Roma people. When analyzed and interpreted together, the research steps outlined above contribute to our understanding of what *social goods* are granted to or denied from these minority groups and what representations and social roles are unquestioned in the posts, thus taking them as 'normal' regarding these minority groups (Gee, 2010). Therefore, when interpreted in the socio-political context, they also shed light on the dimensions of social exclusion along which these minorities are discursively constructed (RQ 3).

The units of analysis in this research are the linguistic tools and meaning-making strategies used in social reality construction and meaning-making. These units of analysis span from specific words, such as the labels used for Roma and LGBTQ people, to the entire post. The meaning-making tools are interpreted in both their proximate context, which includes the still images attached to the posts, and their broad context, which is the socio-political context of the chosen year's political and minority-related events. The coding was conducted using *NVivo*, a qualitative data analysis computer software.

Section 3.5 Ethical considerations

The research studies the social media communication of Hungarian politicians, for which data was gathered from the 45 politicians' official and public Facebook pages. As the subjects of the analysis were public figures at the time, and only public data was collected, no ethical dilemmas emerged during the research. Since politicians are public figures, their consent was not sought. Issues of anonymity and confidentiality did not occur due to the nature of the content analyzed, that is, public official content provided by the politicians themselves. The automated and manual data-gathering processes only collected official public content from public figures; thus, personal data storage issues did not emerge.

Section 3.6 Limitations

The research project's limitations are two-fold. On the one hand, the research is limited regarding the number of minority politicians in its corpus. Namely, only one openly gay MP and one of Roma ethnicity were included in the analysis. Moreover, there were only eleven women among the 45 politicians selected. This is due to the lack of minority politicians not only in the analyzed parties' parliamentary election party list (from which the politicians were selected for analysis) but altogether in Hungarian politics (OSCE/ODIHR, 2018). Therefore, it is worth noting that the results of this analysis mainly mirror the opinions and voices of white, heterosexual men, who, in general, dominate Hungarian online political communication.

On the other hand, the completeness of the corpus cannot be verified due to technical reasons. Publishers of Facebook posts can delete their already published posts anytime, or if one's post is deemed to violate the terms of service (e.g., by containing racist or homophobic remarks), it can also be deleted by Facebook. Hence, even though data was gathered in two cycles and was verified manually, and in some cases, manually collected in the first place, there could have been Facebook posts that were deleted before the data gathering. This limitation of the study could not be avoided realistically. However, the more than 18 thousand gathered posts presumably present an appropriate slice of the Facebook communication of Hungarian politicians for analysis.

Chapter 4. RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the data collection and analysis of Hungarian politicians' minority-related Facebook posts. The four aspects of analysis previously presented (see Section 3.4), i.e., the different terrains of discursive construction, guide the structure of this chapter in so far as first, descriptive data of the corpus and the subcorpus are presented (Section 4.1), such as the results of the different sampling methods and the distribution of posts among political parties and groups. Subsequently, identifying techniques will be in focus (Section 4.2), in which politicians indicate that the given post is connected with one or both of the minority groups analyzed. These techniques also reveal the aspects through which the minorities were separated from the majority population. In what follows, sources of represented opinions will be examined to find out whose voices dominate the minority-related posts, with emphasis on minority voices (Section 4.3). After that, the actors represented in the LGBTQ and Roma people-related posts will be analyzed (Section 4.4), specifically focusing on minority individuals and their active or passive portrayal. Finally, the social roles politicians ascribed to LGBTQ and Roma people will be discussed (Section 4.5). The analysis of these meaning-making tools and strategies will shed light on how the concepts of LGBTQ people and Roma people were discursively constructed in the Facebook communication of selected Hungarian politicians.

Section 4.1 Descriptive findings about the corpus and the subcorpus

Section 4.1.1 Descriptive findings about the corpus

The 45 selected politicians published 18683 Facebook posts in 2019. These posts constitute the corpus of the analysis. The distribution of these posts is shown in Table 3.

By the sheer number of posts, independent representatives and members of Párbeszéd and DK were the most active on Facebook in 2019 (Table 3). However, according to the average number of posts per capita, politicians of LMP, independent representatives, and members of Párbeszéd posted most frequently on Facebook in 2019. Both underpin that opposition or independent politicians, on average, turned to Facebook more often than politicians of the governing parties, Fidesz and KDNP. However, there are some exceptions; politicians of MSZP used the platform roughly the same amount, while Momentum politicians posted less frequently on Facebook than members of the

governing parties (Table 3). Hence, these numbers do not conclusively support either the equalization or the normalization thesis (Bene, 2023; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016).

3. Table. Distribution of selected politicians' 2019 Facebook posts

	Among parties	Avg. per capita
Independent representatives	3225 (17%)	645
Párbeszéd	3144 (17%)	629
DK	2531 (14%)	506
Fidesz	1719 (9%)	344
KDNP	1664 (9%)	333
MSZP	1653 (9%)	331
LMP	1296 (7%)	648
Momentum	1261 (7%)	252
Jobbik	1194 (6%)	398
Munkáspárt	597 (3%)	597
Mi Hazánk	275 (1%)	138
Minority representatives	124 (1%)	62

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Concerning the most active politicians on Facebook in 2019, Gergely Karácsony (Párbeszéd, 1471 posts), László Varju (DK, 1085 posts), and Péter Ungár (LMP, 931 posts) posted the most often. Besides the fact that all of them are opposition politicians, Gergely Karácsony ran for the office of mayor of Budapest in 2019; hence, his highly active use of social media was most probably due to his campaign, as such political events tend to boost social media activity of politicians and parties concerned (Larsson, 2016). The least active users were József Tóbiás (MSZP, left politics in October 2019, 0 posts), Imre Ritter (German minority representative, four posts), and Gábor Kubatov (Fidesz, 43 posts). The average number of posts was 415 per politician, while the median was 335; therefore, although the number of posts greatly varied across the 45 selected politicians, most published a post once every 1-2 days in 2019.

Section 4.1.2 Descriptive findings about the subcorpus

As presented in Section 3.2, three selection methods were applied to find minority-related posts in the corpus. The first found 197 posts by a content-based selection with keywords, of which 175 contained at least one keyword, while 22 relevant posts were published before or after these. The second method focused on minority-related events in the corpus and found 153 posts. In the third selection method, the emphasis was on the most frequently mentioned minority-related events and their immediate surroundings. During this process, 20 relevant posts were found. In total, politicians published 370 posts related to one or both of the minority groups analyzed, which accounts for 1.98% of the corpus. These 370 Facebook posts constitute the minority-related subcorpus and the subject of

further analysis.

Section 4.1.2.1 Results of the first selection method

The 175 posts containing at least one of the minority-related keywords account for approximately 0.94% of the 2019 Facebook posts of the selected politicians and 46.4% of all minority-related Facebook posts. Of these 175 posts, 71% mention the words Roma or Gypsy (n=124), while 27% mention at least one LGBTQ-related keyword (n=48). Posts mentioning both minority groups are rare, as they account for only 2% (n=3) of the 175 posts containing at least one keyword.

The words used to refer to minorities are linguistic tools with which politicians define the two minority groups and separate them from the majority population. Regarding the Roma, two keywords were used in the selection process: Roma and Gypsy. In the public discourse, 'Roma' is considered more formal and generally non-racist (see, for example, the name *National Roma Self-Government* or the official name of the position of *Roma nationality advocate*). In contrast, the public and political perceptions toward using the word 'Gypsy' are ambivalent. On the one hand, the expression has racially loaded connotations, as, for example, in the 2000s and 2010s, it was frequently used by radical right-wing politicians and public figures as part of racist, anti-Roma expressions, such as 'Gypsy terror' and 'Gypsy crime' (see Section 2.3.1.), and, in general, as a racist slur. On the other hand, the term is also used in non-racist contexts, usually as a synonym for Roma, among others, in scholarly works (e.g., Munk, 2013).

Out of the 127 posts that mention either Roma people or both minority groups explicitly, politicians used the word 'Gypsy' in 56 posts. In comparison, the term 'Roma' was used in 102 posts to refer to the minority group[17]. This shows that 'Roma' is still preferred over 'Gypsy' in political communication. Due to the ambivalent public perception toward using the term 'Gypsy,' it should also be addressed that politicians from all over the political spectrum used the word. It was mentioned most frequently by Félix Farkas, Roma nationality advocate (23 times); however, members of vocally anti-racist political parties have also used the expressions, such as Ágnes Kunhalmi (MSZP, three times), Tamás Soproni (Momentum, five times), and Péter Niedermüller (DK, four times). Other politicians used the terms as well, such as Dr. Ádám Steinmetz (three times), a member of the right-wing political party Jobbik, which had been outspokenly racist, as presented

[17] Some posts contained both terms.

previously (see Section 2.1.2).

Regarding the 51 Facebook posts in which politicians mentioned LGBTQ individuals or both minorities, in 24 posts, politicians used the term ‘gay,’ which is equally an umbrella term in Hungarian for LGBTQ people in general and is also used to refer to homosexual men specifically. Other than that, 23 posts used the term ‘homosexual,’ and 11 referred to the group or its members as LGBT or its Hungarian equivalent. Other keywords, such as ‘lesbian’ and ‘bisexual,’ were used once each, ‘trans*’ was mentioned twice, while ‘queer’ did not appear in the subcorpus.

Concerning the expressions used, several studies argue that using the term ‘homosexual’ is alienating or even hostile, being a medical word with connotations of sickness (Herek, 1984; Takács, 2004; Takács & Szalma, 2011). Furthermore, according to Tamássy (2019), in hostile media contexts, the term ‘homosexual’ is preferred instead of ‘gay’ or any other non-alienating expression in the Hungarian media, while others could not prove that the expression ‘homosexual’ leads to or enhance a negative or hostile attitude toward LGBTQ people in receivers (Janky et al., 2018). Regarding the variety of the terms used, it is striking that lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer people were not named in almost any of the Facebook posts. As such, these members of the sexual minority were practically erased from the sexual minority-related discourse, as instead of being named, they were only included in the posts under different umbrella terms. Furthermore, the predominant use of the terms ‘gay’ and ‘homosexual,’ both of which are equally used to refer to specifically gay men and as umbrella terms for LGBTQ people in Hungary, suggest a masculinized portrayal of LGBTQ people.

Section 4.1.2.2 Results of the second and the third selection methods

Another 173 minority-related posts were found using the 2nd and the 3rd selection methods, i.e., the event-based selection methods. These account for approximately 0.93% of all downloaded Facebook posts. The distribution of these posts is strikingly different from those explicitly mentioning one or both minority groups. Namely, 53% of posts found with event-based selection methods were in connection with LGBTQ people (n=92), 33% concerned Roma (n=57), and 14% referred to both minority groups (n=24). Thus, minority-related posts not explicitly mentioning their subjects were mainly in connection with sexual minorities. The proportion of posts linked to both minority groups (14%) is also visibly higher than their share in the first selection method (2%).

As presented earlier, the event calendar used for sampling relevant minority-related posts is based on the three most-read Hungarian online news sites' 2019 minority-related news and on minority-related events politicians mentioned in their formerly-found explicitly minority-related posts (see Section 3.2).



3. Figure. Distribution of minority-related events included in the event calendar
Source: Author's own elaboration.

Figure 3 shows that the event calendar contains 79 dates: 45 events connected to LGBTQ people, 31 concerning the Roma minority, and three linked to both minorities. Out of the 79 events, only 41 triggered at least one politician's reaction, that is, were mentioned in at least one Facebook post. It is worth noting that even though there is a higher number of LGBTQ-related events on the event calendar, these sparked fewer posts than the Roma-related events (Figure 3). Namely, out of the 45 LGBTQ-related events, only 18 (40%) triggered politicians' Facebook posts. In contrast, out of the 31 Roma-related events on the event calendar, 20 triggered at least one politician to post, which is 64.5% of the Roma-related events. This suggests that even though more LGBTQ-related events were found in the Hungarian online newspapers, fewer attracted the attention of the prominent Hungarian politicians analyzed. All the while, the most popular news sites reported less frequently on Roma-related events, which politicians perceived more worthy of posting about (Figure 3).

Finally, regarding the events on the calendar that politicians did not mention, it is notable that those not mentioned in connection with LGBTQ people were overwhelmingly tabloid news events or not connected to Hungarian LGBTQ people. On the contrary, Roma-related events ignored by politicians were all Hungarian events that directly concerned Romani Hungarian citizens. Events mentioned in the Facebook posts will be presented at length in Section 4.2.

In addition to the 173 posts, 22 were found during the first selection process solely due to their proximity to explicitly minority-related posts. None of these posts identified the Roma and the LGBTQ with previously presented keywords but referred to them with other linguistic tools. Hence, 195 posts, 52.7% of the subcorpus, did not name the minority groups.

Section 4.1.2.3 Descriptive findings on the minority-related subcorpus

Concerning the whole subcorpus, the 370 minority-related posts account for about 1.98% of all 18683 posts published by the selected politicians in 2019. 52% of these posts portrayed Roma people (n=193), while 39% of the posts portrayed LGBTQ people (n=144). 9% (n=33) of the subcorpus concerned both Roma and LGBTQ people. Table 4 shows the distribution of these 370 minority-related posts between political parties and political groups.

4. Table. Distribution of minority-related Facebook posts among parties and political groups

	Among parties	**Avg. per capita**
Minority representatives	74 (20%)	37
Independent representatives	63 (17%)	13
Párbeszéd	50 (14%)	10
Momentum	43 (12%)	9
LMP	31 (8%)	16
DK	30 (8%)	6
MSZP	24 (6%)	5
Mi Hazánk	19 (5%)	10
KDNP	13 (4%)	3
Fidesz	12 (3%)	2
Jobbik	11 (3%)	4
Munkáspárt	0 (0%)	0

Source: Author's own elaboration.

The most active political group regarding minority issues was the minority representatives (Table 4). This representative group consists of two politicians, Imre Ritter (German minority representative) and Félix Farkas (Roma nationality advocate). Imre Ritter published only four posts during the year, none connected to either minority group. Hence, all 74 relevant posts were published by Félix Farkas, which all concerned Romani-related topics. When looking at the sheer number of minority-related posts, the second most active political group is the independent representatives, responsible for 17% of all minority-related posts (Table 4). However, by the average number of posts per capita, the second most active political group is LMP, responsible for 16 relevant posts per capita. This was partly due to the fact that only two of the five first politicians on LMP's party list remained party members in 2019 (see Section 2.1.2). In addition, Péter Ungár, one of the remaining LMP members, published more posts than anybody else in

connection with the LGBTQ minority during the year and is single-handedly responsible for 18.75% of all LGBTQ-related posts. Independent representatives were still quite active, looking at the average number of posts. They were the third most active political group, posting on average 13 posts about the two minority groups per capita (Table 4).

Regarding the least active political groups, only one prominent politician of Munkáspárt had a public Facebook page at the time of the research, Gyula Thürmer, who published zero posts with original content throughout the year (Table 4). Besides him, the least active politicians were the members of KDNP, Fidesz, and Jobbik. They were responsible, on average, for 3, 2, and 4 of the relevant posts per capita, respectively. The position of Fidesz is interesting in light that in 2019, a member of Fidesz, László Kövér, made a rather infamous speech in which he likened child-rearing by same-sex parents to pedophilia (see in detail in Section 4.3.2.2). However, neither the politicians of Fidesz nor its permanent coalition party, KDNP, communicated much about the minority groups analyzed (Table 4). In the case of Jobbik's 3% share of the minority-related posts per capita, a possible explanation is the party's desired transformation into a more moderate, right-centrist party in contrast to their radical right-wing history (see Róna & Molnár, 2017).

After presenting descriptive findings about the corpus and the subcorpus, the next section will introduce the results of the first analysis step.

Section 4.2 Identifying and separating techniques

By analyzing the naming techniques with which politicians implicitly or explicitly identify (van Leeuwen, 2008) the two minority groups, one can find out what *characteristics* of the minorities were deemed significant and insignificant, what *identities* were attributed to them, and which well-known minorities and events were *connected* to the minority groups, or disconnected from them by the politicians (Gee, 2010). This analysis step draws on van Leeuwen's (2008) schema of social actor representation and Tonkiss's (2012) analysis steps 'looking for patterns of association and dissociation' and 'attending to emphasis and silences.'

Analyzing politicians' tools that indicated that a particular Facebook post is about minorities found three main identifying methods: 1) explicit or implicit naming, 2) evoking minority-related events, and 3) referring to well-known members or groups of Roma or LGBTQ people. Through these methods, politicians identified and highlighted

the distinguishing characteristics of minorities that are crucial in their perception, therefore identifying the Roma and LGBTQ minorities and defining the aspect or social dimension in which the minority group is (supposedly) different from the majority (Glózer, 2013; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), thereby contributing to the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people.

However, the three categories of identifying techniques are not mutually exclusive. That is, in some posts, politicians used more than one identifying technique to indicate that the particular post concerns the LGBTQ or Roma minority. The following quote from Tamás Soproni (Momentum), mayor of the VI District of Budapest, is an example of this:

> For the first time in many years, *I cannot attend Pride*. But I am there in spirit. In spirit, I am there every day with every person who is discriminated against for belonging to any *sexual minority*. I believe that we need people in politics who care about the protection of *sexual minorities*, not just on the day of the *Pride* [March]. People who will work to ensure that there are psychologists in schools to whom every teenager can go, people who will work to get the message across to as many people as possible that the problem is not *being attracted to the same sex*, but hatred without a cause. Nothing is more beautiful than love, *no matter the gender of the person you love.*[18] (Soproni, 2019, emphasis added)[19]

Soproni's post contains explicit and implicit naming and evokes a minority-related event. Firstly, Soproni called LGBTQ people 'sexual minorities,' which is an explicit naming technique that emphasizes the social group's minority position in society. Secondly, he also evoked the Budapest Pride March, a well-known event for the LGBTQ community, thus connecting sexual minorities to an event where the minority group is active, fighting for visibility, equality, and self-affirmation. Thirdly, Soproni employed an implicit naming technique when he identified minority individuals through their personal relationships, writing, "no matter the gender of the person you love."

Another example is the following Facebook post of Ferenc Gyurcsány (DK).

> On the anniversary of *the horrific series of Roma murders*, I re-watched Eszter Hajdú's film about it. Horror. Horror in every aspect. The insane murder of everyday people just because *they were gypsies*. The trembling pain of those who remained. The seemingly *faceless anti-Gypsy slur-using instigators, the impunity of the hate-speech conductors*.

[18] The analysis was carried out on Hungarian data. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Hungarian are the Author's own.

[19] "Sok év óta először fordul elő, hogy nem tudok ott lenni a Pride-on. De lélekben ott vagyok. Lélekben mindennap minden olyan emberrel ott vagyok, akit bármilyen szexuális kisebbséghez való tartozása miatt megkülönböztetnek. Hiszem, hogy olyan emberek kellenek a politikába, akiknek nemcsak a Pride napján jelent valamit a szexuális kisebbségek védelme. Akik tesznek azért, hogy az iskolában legyen pszichológus, akihez minden kamasz fordulhat, akik tesznek azért, hogy minél többekhez eljusson: nem az a baj, ha valaki a saját neméhez vonzódik, hanem az ok nélküli gyűlölet. A szerelemnél nincs szebb, mindegy, milyen nemű, akit szeretsz."

[…] (Gyurcsány, 2019a, excerpt, emphasis added) [20]

In the post, Gyurcsány employed the same identifying techniques as Soproni did regarding LGBTQ people. First, Gyurcsány evoked a Roma-related event, namely the 2008-2009 Roma murders in which neo-Nazi perpetrators, in a series of racially motivated attacks, killed six Roma people. Second, he employed explicit naming techniques when calling the murders 'Roma murders' and later referring to the victims as 'Gypsies.' Third, Gyurcsány also used implicit, indirect naming when referring to the anti-Gypsy, racist attitudes of the instigators toward the minority group.

Regarding the distribution of the three identifying techniques in the subcorpus, explicit and implicit naming accounts for 207 posts (56% of the subcorpus). The most frequent technique, evoking minority-related events, was employed in 260 Facebook posts (70%), while well-known minorities were mentioned in 78 posts (21%). Table 5 shows the distribution of these identifying techniques between minority groups.

5. Table. Distribution of identifying techniques among minority groups

	LGBTQ people	**Roma people**	**Both**
Explicit and implicit naming (n=207)	36%	54%	10%
Minority-related events (n=260)	42%	47%	11%
Well-known members or groups (n=78)	31%	69%	0%

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Concerning the distribution of the identifying techniques, it is worth noting that the most frequently employed technique regarding LGBTQ people was referring to minority-related events (Table 5). In contrast, in the case of the Roma, mentioning well-known members or groups of the minority as an identifying technique was highly overrepresented compared to their share in all minority-related posts (52%). Moreover, none of the posts concerning both minorities used the identifying technique of portraying well-known members or groups of minority groups, meaning that zero Romani LGBTQ person was portrayed in the 370 minority-related posts (Table 5). The upcoming paragraphs introduce these identifying techniques one by one.

Section 4.2.1 Explicit and implicit naming

Two hundred seven posts employed *the linguistic means of explicit and implicit naming*

[20] „A borzalmas romagyilkosság-sorozat évfordulóján újra belenéztem Hajdú Eszter erről szóló filmjébe. Iszonyat. Iszonyat mindenhonnan nézve. Hétköznapi emberek őrült legyilkolása, csak mert cigányok voltak. A megmaradtak remegő fájdalma. Az arctalannak tűnő, cigányozó felbújtók, a gyűlöletbeszéd karmestereinek büntetlensége. […] "

to indicate that the post concerns LGBTQ or Roma people and, thus, to identify these minority groups, of which 65 used this technique solely. The 207 posts can be divided into two main groups: those using explicit naming, that is, employing the keywords introduced previously (see Section 4.1.2.1), and those engaging in implicit naming techniques. Four main techniques were defined for the implicit naming techniques.

Firstly, some politicians used phrases that referred to the minority groups under analysis by mentioning their *intrinsic qualities*, i.e., characteristics that derive from themselves, not their personal relationships or social status. Twenty posts used this identification technique, which is called *classification* in van Leeuwen's (2008) schema of the representation of social actors and *relational identity* in Gee's (2018) approach. The phrases used in this technique include *szexuális orientáció* ("sexual orientation"), *szexuális identitás* ("sexual identity"), *nemi identitás* ("gender identity"), *etnikai hovatartozás* ("ethnicity"), *bőrszín* ("skin color"), and *származás* ("origin"). The following post published by Péter Niedermüller (DK) exemplifies this identifying technique.

> […] We would like to think that this district is, or at least will be, a home for everyone, regardless of religion, *sexuality*, or *ethnicity*. We will work hard to make it so! […] (Niedermüller, 2019b, excerpt, emphasis added)[21]

These intrinsic qualities appeared equally in positive contexts (such as the one shown above) and as part of negative, discriminatory remarks. The following two excerpts from Dóra Dúró's (Mi Hazánk) Facebook posts are examples of the latter. The first post below was considered to use implicit naming as the politician used a censored racial slur, 'Gypsy crime,' which suggests that engaging in criminal activities is intrinsic to Roma people (Juhász, 2010; Pócsik, 2007).

> […] Meanwhile, in another petition, the NEC [National Election Commission] also ruled that RTL Klub was not only in breach of the law in its procedure but that g********e is an inherently criminological term; its use has become part of public discourse, so it is not objectionable in terms of content if it is used in, for example, Mi Hazánk's ad. […] (Dúró, 2019a, excerpt)[22]

Dúró referred to the intrinsic qualities of LGBTQ people in a negative context when, in the following post, she declared that her kids would not be allowed to "decide whether

[21] „[…] Szeretnénk azt gondolni, hogy ez egy olyan kerület, vagy legalábbis olyan kerület lesz, amely mindenki számára, vallási, szexuális, etnikai hovatartozásról függetlenül otthont teremt. Sokat fogunk dolgozni azon, hogy ez Így legyen! […]"

[22] „ […] Közben egy másik beadvány kapcsán az NVB azt is kimondta, hogy nemcsak eljárását tekintve volt jogsértő az RTL Klub, de a c**********s eredendően kriminológiai fogalom, annak használata a közbeszéd részévé vált, így tartalmilag sem kifogásolható, ha például a Mi Hazánk filmjében szerepel.[…]"

they are boys or girls" and thus called into question and made fun of genderqueer and trans people's gender identities, portraying it as a childhood 'decision' easily 'preventable' by strict parenting.

> […] We try to be conscious about how we raise our children, just as it is not up to them to decide whether they are boys or girls, it also matters [to us] whether they play sports or take drugs, and so on. […] (Dúró, 2019b, excerpt)[23]

Secondly, others used phrases that describe minority individuals' *personal relationships with others*. In this category, the description of the minority individual or group is inseparable from their relationship with others, whether their feelings toward others or their formal or informal relationships. Therefore, the identity assigned to the minority group or individual is based on their connections and not on themselves alone. This is called *relational identification* in van Leeuwen's analytic framework (2008) or the building task of language that refers to *connections* in Gee's (2010) approach to discourse analysis. Furthermore, this is the only implicit naming category containing phrases connected to LGBTQ people only. The 19 posts using this identification technique, among other things, often referred to the relationship statuses or love interests of LGBTQ people, using phrases such as *azonos neműek házassága* ("same-sex marriage"), *azonos nemű párok* ("same-sex couples"), etc., and the slogan 'Love is love,' which has been used widely throughout the pro-same-sex marriage movement.

The following post from Gergely Karácsony (Párbeszéd), then Budapest's mayoral candidate, provides an example of this identification technique.

> I put up the rainbow flag in Zugló before the opening of Pride tonight because I am convinced that in the 21st century, no one should be afraid because of *whom they love*, and no one should be ashamed of *whom they love*. […] (Karácsony, 2019b, excerpt, emphasis added)[24]

However, such identifying techniques were not limited to politicians supporting LGBTQ people. In Katalin Novák's post, then MP of Fidesz and later head of state in Hungary, the politician referred to LGBTQ people by mentioning emojis portraying same-sex couples. In the post, Novák implies that families with more than two children ("large families") are underrepresented in emojis, while there are emojis depicting same-sex couples. Through the Facebook post, the politician suggests that it is the large families

[23] „[…] Igyekszünk tudatosak lenni a gyereknevelésben; ahogy azt sem ők döntik el, hogy fiúk vagy lányok lesznek, az sem mindegy például, hogy sportolnak vagy drogoznak, és sorolhatnám. […]"

[24] "A Pride ma esti megnyitója előtt azért helyeztem ki Zuglóban a szivárvány zászlót, mert meggyőződésem: a 21. században senkinek sem szabad félnie amiatt, hogy kit szeret, senkinek sem szabad szégyenkeznie amiatt, hogy kit szeret. […]"

who are ‘actually marginalized’ instead of LGBTQ people, thereby relativizing LGBTQ struggles in Hungary and around the World.

> Where are the emojis depicting large families??? […]
> I was looking for an emoji on my phone that depicts a large family, but I couldn't find one. There are all sorts of formations: one man – one woman, two women, two men, various combinations of these with one or two children, single parents with one or two children, but no more than two children. How is it then…? (Novák, 2019a, excerpt)[25]

In the third identification technique, used in 30 posts, Roma and LGBTQ people were identified through *their minority status* in Hungarian society. This technique describes the minority groups through their relationship to society instead of a person or closely related group. Thus, it places minorities in a social category that reflects their social position in Hungarian society (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Politicians, when engaging in this technique, used the phrases *kisebbség* (“minority”) and *nemzetiség* (“nationality”) to refer to LGBTQ and Roma people. The former was equally used to refer to sexual minorities and ethnic minorities and was overwhelmingly preferred by politicians of the opposition. It is also worth noting that the expression ‘minority’ mirrors the marginalized groups’ position within the hierarchical power structures, i.e., emphasizes the individuals’ and groups’ lack of social power.

‘Nationality,’ however, was used only to refer to national and ethnic minorities in the public discourse as well as in Hungarian law, as ‘nationality’ is the exact expression used in laws concerning some of the national and ethnic minorities of Hungary (e.g., the Act CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities). Interestingly, the expression ‘nationality’ is almost exclusively used by the Roma nationality representative Félix Farkas (also a member of the Romani party Lungo Drom that has close ties to the ruling parties Fidesz-KDNP) and Zsolt Semjén, MP of KDNP, Fidesz’s permanent coalition party. The word ‘nationality’ became the official name for national and ethnic minorities in Hungary after 2011. It has an official, thus arguably alienating tone. At the same time, it does not stress the group’s social position, thereby concealing or even denying the existing power structures in which Roma people experience discrimination and racism (Neményi et al., 2019). Neither expression was used in an explicitly negative context.

The fourth identifying technique is more indirect as it is centered around *the attitudes of*

[25] “Hol vannak a nagycsaládos hangulatjelek??? […]
Kerestem a telefonon egy olyan hangulatjelet, ami nagycsaládot ábrázol, de nem találtam. Van mindenféle formáció: egy férfi-egy nő, két nő, két férfi, ezek különböző kombinációi egy-két gyerekkel, egyedülálló szülők egy-két gyerekkel, de kettőnél több gyerek sehol. Hogy is van ez...?”

some majority members toward minorities (van Leeuwen, 2008). The authors of these 36 posts addressed homophobes, racists, Nazis, and fascists in their posts, and thus, the LGBTQ and the Roma were present implicitly as the subject of these groups' hate or discrimination; however, minorities were often invisible in these posts. In the case of 'homophobe,' the link to LGBTQ people is evident. However, posts mentioning fascists, Nazis, etc., were only coded as related to the LGBTQ or Roma minority when their context suggested that these minorities were subjects of the particular group's, person's, or political party's hate or discrimination. Such posts, by emphasizing the majority population's negative and hostile attitudes toward the two minority groups, contribute to the discursive construction of the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people as ostracized victims and, thus, as implied passive actors. The following quote is an example of the latter from Bernadett Szél's Facebook page (independent).

> He said he didn't care about what I said. But I told him the truth: that he was anti-Semitic and racist and had no place in the Hungarian Parliament.
> ➡️ Once again, women did not stay silent, and we were right.
> #womeninpolitics #womenpower #whitehats (Szél, 2019a) [26]

In this post, by 'he,' Szél is referring to János Pócs, MP of Fidesz, of whom an old video was published in which he threatens a Roma man by locking him in a boiler. On the date Szél's post was published, female MPs, including Szél, launched a petition for the resignation of Pócs for the previously mentioned video; therefore, the mentioned 'racism' refers to Pócs's anti-Roma behavior.

The analysis of implicit naming thus showed that LGBTQ and Roma people were frequently portrayed as 'minorities' and thereby put into the social category of minorities, highlighting their social position in Hungarian society (Richardson, 2007), while Roma were also referred to as 'nationalities,' an expression covering up such social inequalities. The analysis also revealed that while both minorities had been identified in some posts by their intrinsic characteristics (van Leeuwen, 2008), only LGBTQ people were identified through their personal relations (van Leeuwen, 2008). The former and the latter identification techniques appeared in both positive and negative contexts. Finally, associations and dissociations (Tonkiss, 2012) also played a part in identifying minorities in politicians' Facebook posts, where instead of directly referring to either group through

[26] "Azt mondta, nem érdekli, mit mondok. De megmondtam neki az igazat: hogy antiszemita és rasszista és nincs helye a Magyar Országgyűlésben.
➡ A nők megint nem maradtak csendben, és igazunk volt.
#womeninpolitics #womenpower #fehérsapkások"

naming characteristics or relationships, politicians pointed to discriminative and exclusionary attitudes without explicitly naming their subjects. As such, politicians dissociated minority individuals from these attitudes, making them invisible as victims regarding attitudes that are hostile explicitly toward them and thus concern them primarily.

Section 4.2.2 Minority-related events

Evoking minority-related events can also serve as an identifying technique (van Leeuwen, 2008). Connecting particular events to minorities, or, furthermore, identifying the group solely by mentioning a related event, *connects* LGBTQ and Roma people to the event's other characteristics and context as well (Gee, 2018), such as the goal of the event, the role of minority individuals in initiating the event, and the reaction of minorities, politicians, and society to the particular event. Nevertheless, it plays a more critical role in the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people when used independently, without any other identifying techniques.

Of the 260 posts that mentioned one or more events related to either or both minority groups, 43% (111 posts) used this as their only identifying method. The posts covered a wide range of minority-related events, even some not included in the event calendar. Minority-related events can be divided into non-party-political and contemporary party-political events, categorized based on their initiator(s) or performers. Non-party-political events were referred to more often than contemporary party-political events, as the former were mentioned in 170 posts, while the latter had only 100 posts. As some posts referred to more than one event, these groups are not mutually exclusive. The following paragraphs will present the most frequently cited minority-related events whose characteristics transferred to the minority groups analyzed.

Section 4.2.2.1 Non-party-political events

Politicians evoked 45 non-party-political events to identify LGBTQ and Roma minorities in 170 posts (see Appendix F). Although this suggests an average of ca. four posts per event, two-thirds (30) of the events were mentioned in only one or two posts, and only five were evoked in at least ten Facebook posts. Thus, the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people through minority-related events was quite fragmented. Many events did not resonate with politicians from different sides of the political spectrum, and most were not followed up on but mentioned only once or twice;

thus, they did not provide a comprehensive picture of the event and its impact on minorities.

Table 6. shows the distribution of the non-party-political events, which shows that even though politicians mentioned fewer LGBTQ people-related events, proportionally, these events were cited more frequently. I.e., the ten LGBTQ-related events were mentioned in 77 posts, while the 31 Roma-related events were referred to in 87 Facebook posts. This underpins the notion presented previously that LGBTQ-related events triggered strikingly more reactions from politicians compared to Roma-related events (see Section 4.1.2).

6. Table. Distribution of non-party-political events

	No. of events	**No. of posts mentioning the events**
LGBTQ people	10	77
Roma people	31	87
Both	4	16

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Moreover, half of the 87 Roma-related posts mentioning a non-party-political event (43 posts) were published by a single politician, Félix Farkas (Table 6). On one hand, this could be more than understandable, as he was the nationality advocate for Roma people in the Hungarian Parliament. On the other hand, this means that other politicians were significantly less concerned with Roma-related non-party-political events. Furthermore, the events' fragmentation is also biased: out of the 30 non-party-political events mentioned by politicians only once or twice, 23 were in connection with Roma people, and only five concerned LGBTQ people, while two were linked to both minority groups. These shed light on two things. Firstly, fewer LGBTQ-related events were able to reach the attention threshold of the politicians analyzed, but those that did so attracted the attention of more (usually opposition) politicians. Secondly, several Roma-related posts remained solely in Félix Farkas's attention spectrum.

Table 7. shows the most frequently mentioned non-party-political events. Concerning these events, it's noteworthy that most of them were not instigated by the Roma or LGBTQ minority individuals or advocacy groups. However, two exceptions stand out – the Budapest Pride March, a long-standing initiative by the Szivárvány Misszió Foundation, an LGBTQ advocacy group, and an interview with Krisztina Balogh, a former employee of the public television channel M1, who is of Roma ethnicity (Table 7). These instances highlight the active participation of these minority groups in shaping public discourse. In terms of portrayal, of the ten most frequently mentioned events, minorities were depicted as active in only two (Table 7). In the other three to three events,

the dominant portrayal mode was passive or not portrayed, while in the case of two events, minorities were portrayed in mixed modes. A detailed analysis of the events mentioned in at least ten posts will be presented in the following.

7. Table. Most frequently mentioned non-party-political events

Event	Involved minority group(s)	No. of posts mentioning	Initiator of the event	Common minority portrayal (active/passive/not portrayed)
Coca-Cola campaign	LGBTQ people	30	Coca-Cola Company	Not portrayed
Budapest Pride	LGBTQ people	27	Szivárvány Misszió Foundation	Passive
Roma Holocaust Memorial Day	Roma people	15	No central memorial event	Mixed
International Romani Day	Roma people	12	No central memorial event	Active
Anniversary of the 2008-2009 Roma murders	Roma people	11	No central memorial event	Passive
International Holocaust Memorial Day	Both minority groups	9	No central memorial event	Not portrayed
Publication of interview with Krisztina Balogh	Roma people	7	Krisztina Balogh, *444.hu*	Active
For the Nationalities Award ceremony	Roma people	7	The Government of Hungary	Mixed
Public television program on conversion therapy	LGBTQ people	7	*M5* public television channel	Passive
Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Day	Both minority groups	5	No central memorial event	Not portrayed

Source: Author's own elaboration.

The 2019 Coca-Cola campaign

30 Facebook posts referenced the most frequently addressed event, the 2019 Coca-Cola campaign, all published by left-leaning opposition politicians (Table 7). The campaign featured same-sex couples on billboards depicting a male couple hugging and a female couple cuddling above a bottle of Coke, accompanied by the 'love is love' slogan associated with the LGBTQ equality movement. The campaign launched on 2nd August 2019 and instantly became the center of attention.

On the 2nd of August, a petition was launched to ban the ad, and two days later, István Boldog (Fidesz) announced his boycott of Coca-Cola products on Facebook until the company removed the ads. On the 6th of August, László Kovács Vésey (2019) published an opinion piece on *Pesti Srácok*, a pro-government news site. In the article, Vésey likened homosexuals to disabled people, arguing that the fact that he ("we," as he put it) did not want to "see people in wheelchairs" on billboards either, but that did not mean

that he hated disabled people (Vésey Kovács, 2019), which caused another outrage. Five days later, on the 7th of August, the original billboards showing same-sex couples were removed, and rainbow posters appeared with the same slogan. Coca-Cola claimed that the original campaign strategy was to change posters, while opponents of the campaign interpreted the change as a partial 'win.' Finally, a protest was held for both sexual minorities and disabled people on the 11th, called a 'Solidarity walk.'

The event, that is, the campaign itself, was not initiated by LGBTQ civilians or activists; therefore, the minority group was passive in this regard. Since it was a multinational company's ad campaign and not a political party's, and it portrayed a general egalitarian statement (it did not argue for same-sex marriage or any tangible claims regarding LGBTQ people), it was relatively easy for politicians to jump on the bandwagon.

Most opposition politicians did so, as this was the most mentioned event concerning the two minority groups analyzed. Only members of the left-leaning opposition parties (DK, LMP, Momentum, MSZP, Párbeszéd) and independent MPs posted about the event, and all but one of their posts supported the campaign and its message. However, most politicians' posts were just as vague as the campaign. Namely, most posts contained only a manifest or latent moral evaluation and support of LGBTQ equality. Albeit LGBTQ organizations published statements about the outrage around the campaign, these were not quoted in politicians' posts. Thus, advocacy groups did not have agency in the posts over the course of the event. Only two LGBTQ people appeared in politicians' posts regarding the event. Firstly, Gergely Karácsony (Párbeszéd) shared a picture of Róbert Alföldi, a well-known theater director and actor who is also publicly out, holding a bottle of Coke in an everyday setting. Posting pictures about holding or drinking a bottle of Coke became a symbol at the time, showing that the person has no problem with consuming a product of a company campaigning with same-sex couples. Therefore, Karácsony's post shows his and Alföldi's supportive opinions without adding any new information or angle to the event.

Secondly, Péter Ungár (LMP), an openly gay MP, published his opinion not on Coca-Cola's or István Boldog's statements about LGBTQ rights but on the perceived intention of the company. Out of the 30 posts mentioning the event, Ungár's was the only one critical of the ad, questioning the company's intentions:

> "But it's disappointing that the opposition can't see that Coca-Cola is not interested in human rights, but in the purchasing power of gay people."

> I admit that I'm skeptical about the Coca-Cola situation. I don't think a multinational [company] should be expected to be a minority advocate. This is a marketing tactic, not a fight for human rights. (Ungár, 2019b)[27]

In his other post on the topic, Ungár shared a Facebook event created for the Solidarity walk, a protest held for disabled and LGBTQ people, in light of the hostile reactions to the campaign. Thus, he implied that he recommends joining the protest. As such, Ungár expressed that he condemned the homophobic and ableist responses to the company's ads.

The ad's relatability is best illustrated by the event becoming a *pseudo title* (Bell, 1985, cited in van Leeuwen, 2008) for István Boldog, as it was used to describe him, his personality, and his homophobia. As such, it appeared in several of Ákos Hadházy's (independent) Facebook posts.

> RTL has also spoken to mayors blackmailed by *cola-free Fidesz MP István Boldog*, who said they could only get EU money if they gave the work to the fake companies he named. Even among Fidesz MPs, Boldog is not the sharpest tool in the shed, which is why he could arrange the scams in such a primitive way. (Hadházy, 2019, emphasis added)[28]

With the pseudo title 'cola-free,' Hadházy refers to Boldog's boycott of Coca-Cola. Based on the context, Hadházy used the term derogatorily to describe Boldog and connected the politicians' homophobia to his allegedly limited intellectual capacities when writing in the following sentence, "Boldog is not the sharpest tool in the shed." Used in this capacity, Hadházy implied that he condemned Boldog's homophobia, although he refrained from explicitly stating his opinion on the topic or even explicitly mentioning LGBTQ people.

Budapest Pride Festival

The second most mentioned event (a series of events) was the Budapest Pride Festival, with 27 posts mentioning it (Table 7). Budapest Pride Festival is a month-long series of cultural, community-building, and awareness-raising events focusing on the LGBTQ minority, achievements of the sexual liberation movements so far, and the inequalities sexual minorities face to this day, in particular discrimination based on homophobia,

[27] "»De az elég elkeserítő, hogy az ellenzék se képes átlátni, hogy a Coca-Colának nem az emberi jogok, hanem a melegek vásárlóereje a fontos.«
Bevallom szkeptikus vagyok Coca-Cola ügyben. Szerintem nem kéne egy multitól várni, hogy kisebbségi érdekképviselet legyen. Ez egy marketing fogás, nem emberjogi küzdelem."

[28] "Az RTL is beszélt olyan polgármesterekkel, akiket a kólátlan fideszes képviselő, Boldog István zsarolt meg azzal, hogy csak akkor kaphatnak EU-s pénzt, ha az általa megnevezett kamucégeknek adják a munkát. Boldog még a fideszes képviselők között sem számít a legélesebb késnek a fiókban, ezért tudta ennyire primitív módon intézni a csalásokat."

transphobia, sexism, and racism (Tóth, 2013). In 2019, the festival started on the 7th of June, and its peak program, the March, was on the 6th of July.

Pride Festivals are traditionally organized by Szivárvány Misszió Foundation, a non-governmental LGBTQ advocacy group, making it an event where the minority group is inherently active. Even though the historical background of Pride was not emphasized in the Facebook posts found – for example, none of the politicians mentioned the Stonewall riot – in its very nature, the event is for and by LGBTQ people (Tóth, 2013), making the minority group an active participant and having agency over the event. Politicians overwhelmingly referred to solely the Pride March (instead of any other part of the series of events), thereby depicting LGBTQ people as if the March was the only occasion they attended and appeared at. This portrayal of the sexual minority as an exotic urban phenomenon underpins the previous research findings of Bartoş et al. (2014), Janky et al. (2018), and Tamássy (2019). Of the 27 posts mentioning the event, 25 were posted by members of left-leaning opposition parties, all of which were supportive, and two were by Mi Hazánk politicians Dóra Dúró and János Volner. In these, Dúró stated that she made an official complaint about the "provocative Pride March," while Volner used the event as a *negative pseudo title* for progressive liberals in his post.

Even though Pride is an event where LGBTQ people are inherently active and bear agency, with one exception, their voices were not represented in the Facebook posts, with one exception. The absence of LGBTQ voices points out that most politicians used LGBTQ people almost as a living set design to seem progressive and tolerant by attending the event. As such, the portrayal of Pride, just like the Coca-Cola campaign, consisted of rather vague explicit or implicit moral evaluations and support for LGBTQ people and rights. For example, Karácsony Gegely's (Párbeszéd) following Facebook post contained a generic statement like Pride is "important" and stated that elected representatives should support the event by attending, using the motto 'love is love,' while neither portraying LGBTQ people nor organizers of Pride. In contrast, Karácsony was portrayed as an active actor, both in words and in the pictures attached to the post, as most of them depicted him and his fellow politicians attending the March, but not other attendees or official event organizers.

> In luckier cities of the world, for example, from New York through London to Barcelona, mayors are in the front row at Pride. In contrast, Tarlós... but never mind. I am here because I feel it is important and will be here next year. Because the mayor of Budapest should be at Pride. Because Budapest belongs to everyone. And because: love is love. 🏳️‍🌈

#EveryoneForBudapest (Karácsony, 2019c)[29]

Since right-wing politicians have called for the event's ban every year so far, the event enters the realms of party-political communication every summer. In 2019, among radical right-wing politicians and activists demanding to ban the March, István Boldog, a member of Fidesz, also publicly called for prohibiting the March due to its perceived 'negative impact on children.' Thus, opposition politicians frequently mentioned Budapest Pride as an example of the government's and other right-wing politicians' intolerance also, condemning this attitude on moral grounds in general.

The only exception among the posts was one of Bernadett Szél's, which contained an infographic by *Háttér Society*, an NGO advocating for sexual minorities, thus providing space for LGBTQ people. Szél's posted image showed information on the different kinds of abuses and discrimination and their prevalence that LGBTQ people face daily.

Porajmos – Roma Holocaust Memorial Day

The 2nd of August commemorates Roma victims of the Holocaust. With 15 posts, this was the third most mentioned minority-related event and the most mentioned Roma-related event in the subcorpus (Table 7). Evoking the event depicts Roma people as victims, i.e., physical and fatal victims of Nazism and, in general, racism. Commemorating the date can be interpreted as a statement, as most politicians on other Holocaust Memorial Days (as it will be presented later) did not address the non-Jewish victims of the Holocaust.

Regarding this memorial event, the minority group's activity and agency were depicted differently in the various Facebook posts. In some memorial posts, Roma people were portrayed solely as victims of the Holocaust, as passive and having no agency. In two posts published by Félix Farkas (Roma nationality advocate) and Ágnes Kunhalmi (MSZP), the Porajmos was connected to the Roma Resistance Day, that is, the Day of Roma Courage and Youth commemorating the uprising of the Roma in Auschwitz Birkenau on 16th May 1944, in which Roma people, victims of the Holocaust, were active and had agency.

However, the most striking characteristic of these posts is that ten of the 15 were posted by the same politician: Félix Farkas, Roma nationality advocate. As the quotation below

[29] "A világ szerencsésebb nagyvárosaiban, New Yorktól Londonon át Barcelonáig például, a főpolgármesterek ott vonulnak az első sorban a Pride-on. Ezzel szemben Tarlós... de ez már mindegy. Itt vagyok, mert fontosnak érzem, és itt leszek jövőre is. Mert Budapesten is ott a helye a főpolgármesternek a Pride-on. Hiszen Budapest mindenkié. És mert: love is love. 🏳️‍🌈 #MindenkiBudapestért"

shows, Farkas's posts mostly portrayed himself as an active actor and contained information on a specific memorial program. Other Roma actors bearing agency in the Porajmos memorial event in Farkas's posts were artists or artist collectives, such as theatre companies or bands. Thus, Farkas completed the passive portrayal of the Roma victims of the Holocaust with an active portrayal of contemporary Roma artists remembering the Porajmos through their art.

> On the initiative of Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality advocate, we will commemorate the victims of the Roma Holocaust on 02.08.2019 at 18:30 in the courtyard of the Parish of Köröm.
> Father Lourdu will give a eulogy, and the Szendrőlád Roma Kurzillós Choir and the Romano Teatro nationality theatre company will perform.
> Join us in remembering and lighting a candle for the victims! (Farkas, 2019e)[30]

Other than Farkas, two DK, two Párbeszéd, and one MSZP politician, thus, only left-leaning opposition politicians commemorated Roma victims of the Holocaust with Facebook posts on the Roma Holocaust Memorial Day. While Farkas published his stance as an official advocate and a Roma individual, only one other politician, Bence Tordai (Párbeszéd), provided space for the voice of a member of the minority group, János Klajbán, a representative of the Roma self-government in Salgótarján. Other memorial posts were either generic remembrance statements condemning the Roma Holocaust or addressed the Roma people's current struggles in Hungary.

International Romani Day

International Romani Day, mentioned in 12 posts and thus the second-most mentioned Roma-related event (Table 7), was appointed by the United Nations and celebrates Roma culture and raises awareness of the struggles of the Roma minority on the 8th of April. As there was no one official celebratory event, the active role and agency of Roma people in the portrayal of the event directly depended on politicians' depiction. Like in the case of Porajmos, International Romani Day was mentioned predominantly by Félix Farkas, i.e., ten out of 12 times the Roma nationality advocate posted about the event. Other than him, one Párbeszéd and one DK politician mentioned the event. This and the portrayal of the Roma Holocaust highlight that the representation of Roma-related events was fragmented among governing politicians of the governing parties, the opposition politicians, and Félix Farkas, as the first barely published anything about such events, and the last two found

[30] "Farkas Félix roma nemzetiségi szószóló kezdeményezésére 2019.08.02-án 18:30 órakor Köröm településen, a Plébánia udvarán emlékezünk a Roma holokauszt áldozataira. Áldást mond Lourdu atya, közreműködik a Szendrőládi Roma Kurzillós Kórusés [*sic*] a Romano Teatro Nemzetiségi Színház. Emlékezzen Ön is velünk és gyújtson gyertyát az áldozatokért!"

different Roma-related events to be worthy of mentioning in their Facebook communication.

Another similarity between these posts and those about the Roma Holocaust is that Félix Farkas portrayed himself and Roma musicians and theatrical companies as active in most of his posts, as the excerpt below shows.

> […] Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality advocate, was delighted to lead the initiative to celebrate this special day with a play for the children of Csongrád County. At his invitation, the nationality theatre company ROMANO TEATRO, which won a national award, came to the Kelemen House in Makó to perform 'Egy darabot a szívemből.' […] (Farkas, 2019a, excerpt)[31]

Anniversary of the 2008-2009 Roma murders

Eleven Facebook posts commemorated the 2008-2009 Roma murders, which have no official memorial day (Table 7). There are two de facto remembrance days for the event: first, 3rd November, the date of the first murder, the killing of Tiborné Nagy and József Nagy, and second, the date of the Tatárszentgyörgy killings, 23rd February. The politicians analyzed, including Félix Farkas, commemorated the latter date.

The 2008-2009 Roma murders were a series of racist and anti-Roma attacks against Roma people in which six people died: Tiborné Nagy, József Nagy, Róbert Csorba Snr., Róbert Csorba Jr. (often referred to as 'Robika'), Jenő Kóka, and Mária Balog, and several others were injured. Four men were convicted of the crimes and have been serving their prison sentences since. The neo-Nazi perpetrators attacked Roma people in nine towns; in several cases, they threw Molotov cocktails and shot firearms at residential buildings where Roma people lived. They committed their first attack in July 2008 and were caught in August 2009. Governmental and non-governmental organizations voiced their criticism of the police and, in general, of the processes that followed the murders. In particular, the handling of the Tatárszentgyörgy murder was heavily criticized. The European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), the National and Ethnic Minority Rights Office (NEKI), and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) published a report (2009) about the shortcomings of the authorities regarding the Tatárszentgyörgy murder.

As in the case of the Roma Holocaust Memorial Day, evoking the event depicted Roma

[31] "[…] Farkas Félix roma nemzetiségi szószóló örömmel állt élére annak a kezdeményezésnek, hogy egy színdarabbal ünnepeljék a Csongrád megyei gyerekek ezt a jeles napot. A szószóló hívására érkezett a makói Kelemen-házba a nívódíjas ROMANO TEATRO nemzetiségi színtársulat, akik az 'Egy darabot a szívemből' című előadással kedveskedtek az érdeklődőknek. […]"

people as passive physical and fatal victims of racism. Therefore, posts that portrayed the Roma as active agents concerning this event were rare. The distribution of these posts is significantly more balanced than those about the Roma Holocaust Memorial Day and International Romani Day. Out of the 11 Facebook posts commemorating the racially motivated murdering of Roma people, only two were published by Félix Farkas and nine by left-leaning opposition politicians (DK, Párbeszéd, Momentum, independent reps.). Right-wing opposition politicians and members of the governing parties did not mention the event. Out of the eleven posts, not one quoted those affected or family members of the victims, Roma activists, NGOs, or any other members of the minority group or organizations, virtually silencing the minority regarding the event. The following quote from Márta V. Naszályi (Párbeszéd) exemplifies this mode of portrayal.

> It has been 10 years since racist terrorists attacked innocent, unarmed people. Since families fleeing the attack were shot at and killed, including the 5-year-old Robika Csorba and his father.
> Let us remember them and stand up against racism and fearmongering; let us stand up for a Hungary in solidarity! (V. Naszályi, 2019)[32]

Some opposition politicians (Momentum, independent reps.) connected the 2008-2009 Roma murders in their posts to a contemporary political event, i.e., Mi Hazánk's 2019 anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós which protested the so-called 'Roma aggression.' Connecting the two events emphasized that in the time of the 2008-2009 racist murders, right-wing political groups were free to hold such demonstrations as Mi Hazánk's 2019 protest. These posts highlighted that unrestricted hate speech and hate demonstrations could have encouraged the racist perpetrators. Therefore, opposition politicians emphasized radical right-wing politicians' responsibility for the physical aggression against the Roma.

Section 4.2.2.2 Contemporary party-political events

The analysis found 25 minority-related contemporary party-political events mentioned in 100 posts (see Appendix G). The average number of mentions was 4 per event, almost the same as non-political events. However, this terrain of the discursive construction of the concepts of minority groups was also fragmented: even the most frequently mentioned event was referred to in less than 20% of these posts, while more than half of the events

[32] "10 éve annak, hogy rasszista terroristák ártatlan, fegyvertelen emberekre támadtak. Hogy a támadás elől menekülő családokat sortűz alá vették és megölték többek között az édesapjával együtt az 5 éves Csorba Robikát is. Emlékezzünk rájuk és álljunk ki a rasszizmus és a félelemkeltés ellen, álljunk ki egy szolidáris Magyarországért!"

(15) were referred to in only one or two posts.

8. Table. Distribution of contemporary party-political events

	No. of events	No. of posts mentioning
LGBTQ people	11	44
Roma people	11	52
Both	3	4

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Table 8 shows the distribution of contemporary party-political events and the number of posts mentioning these events. Data shows these events were more balanced between the two minority groups than non-party political events (cf. Table 6). Félix Farkas's posts did not significantly alter these events' portrayal, as he reflected on contemporary party-political events in only seven of his Facebook posts. This highlights that Farkas Félix (Roma nationality advocate) mainly focused on Roma cultural events, Memorial Days, and sharing administrative information in his communication, in contrast to addressing social issues affecting Roma people, such as education, equality, racism, etc., in a party-political context.

Table 9 shows the most frequently mentioned contemporary party-political events, i.e., those mentioned in at least five Facebook posts. Regarding these events, it is noteworthy that none of them were inclusionary in their initiation, as all listed events started as exclusionary, sometimes even hostile acts against the LGBTQ or Roma minority. In addition, four of the eight events listed were initiated by the radical right-wing party, Mi Hazánk. Therefore, Hungarian politicians' Facebook communication was heavily defined by Mi Hazánk's actions. Another two events were started by 'unknown leakers' who published old videos or sound recordings of politicians (Table 9). Thus, online political communication regarding minorities also revolved around statements made 5-10 years ago, which were probably refurbished to gain political capital. The active or passive portrayal of the minority groups shows a unanimous mode of portrayal in that, regarding most events, minorities were not even present as actors (Table 9). Contemporary party-political events were, therefore, dominated by politicians' communication on each other's opinions and statements instead of communicating about Roma and LGBTQ minorities per se, which, according to van Dijk (1997), is characteristic of political discourse. A detailed analysis of the events mentioned in at least ten posts will be presented in the following.

9. Table. Most frequently mentioned party-political events

Event	Involved minority group(s)	No. of mentions	Initiator of the event	Common minority portrayal (active/passive/not portrayed)	The nature of the event (inclusive/ exclusionary)
László Kövér makes dehumanizing comments about LGBTQ people	LGBTQ people	19	László Kövér (Fidesz)	Mixed	E
Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós	Roma people	14	Mi Hazánk	Passive	E
János Pócs's video published	Roma people	13	János Pócs (Fidesz)/unknown leaker	Not portrayed	E
Mi Hazánk's Christian cross on Nyugati tér	Roma people	7	Mi Hazánk	Mixed	E
Recording of Tamás Sneider re-published	Roma people	5	Tamás Sneider (Jobbik)/unknown leaker	Not portrayed	E
Mi Hazánk campaign video controversy	Roma people	5	Mi Hazánk	Not portrayed	E
Mi Hazánk's proposal to ban LGBTQ sensitizing program	LGBTQ people	5	Mi Hazánk	Mixed	E
Political Network for Values conference	LGBTQ people	5	Katalin Novák (Fidesz) and Political Network for Values	Mixed	E

Source: Author's own elaboration.

László Kövér's speech

On 15th May 2019, László Kövér, Fidesz MP and Speaker of the National Assembly, gave a speech in Zugló, Budapest, as part of Fidesz's 2019 European Parliament election campaign. The speech was later evoked in 19 minority-related posts, making it the most frequently mentioned party-political event (Table 9).

In his speech, Kövér addressed LGBTQ people and rights, which hadn't been the focus of Fidesz-KDNP's campaign before. Kövér made several exclusionary comments about LGBTQ people in his speech. In one of these infamous comments, the Speaker of the National Assembly claimed that same-sex couples' wish to adopt children is 'like pedophilia,' arguing that in both cases, the child is 'merely an object of pleasure' (Dull, 2019) In another comment, Kövér stated that 'normal' homosexuals 'do not consider themselves equal [to non-LGBTQ people]' (Dull, 2019). These remarks of Kövér quickly

made their way to the headlines and the politicians' Facebook pages. Neither László Kövér nor any of his fellow party members apologized or distanced themselves from these statements. Right-wing politicians analyzed (Fidesz, KDNP, Mi Hazánk, and Jobbik) did not comment on the incident on their Facebook pages, nor did Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality advocate. Consequently, all 19 posts that mentioned the event were posted by left-leaning opposition politicians.

Regarding the minority's role, LGBTQ people were passive in the initiation of the event. However, some opposition politicians, in their responses to Kövér's speech, quoted the Hungarian LGBT Alliance, which published a statement in reaction to Kövér's speech. Others quoted Zoltán Lakner's opinion, an openly gay political analyst, while some members of the Momentum party quoted the party's LGBTQ working group's speaker, Dániel Turgonyi. Therefore, the minority group subsequently became active in the event, shaping it with their voices and opinions, thus having agency over it. Consequently, with LGBTQ individuals and organizations being quoted this many times, the sexual minority's voice was heard the most in connection with László Kövér's speech.

Additionally, many of the politicians' posts portrayed the minority group as active, depicting members of the minority as already adopting and raising children and living as families. Even so, several reactions failed to represent LGBTQ people as active or even portray them as actors. These posts instead showed the politicians' fundamentally and morally opposing position to Kövér, such as the following quotation from Ágnes Vadai's (DK) Facebook.

> I send this song to László Kövér. He said Freddie Mercury was also not his equal. I note quietly that the Queen singer cannot be mentioned in the same breath as the current Hungarian Speaker of the National Assembly! #agnesvadai #democraticcoalition #dc #europeanhungarians #WEREMAINEurope 🇭🇺🇪🇺 (Vadai, 2019)[33]

Just as in the case of the Coca-Cola campaign, a protest followed Kövér's discriminatory comments; nevertheless, none of the politicians mentioned the protest in their posts.

Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós

The second most mentioned party-political event of the subcorpus was Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós, which politicians mentioned in 14 posts

[33] "Kövér Lászlónak küldöm ezt a dalt. Freddie Mercury-ra is mondta, hogy nem egyenrangú vele. Halkan jegyzem meg, hogy a Queen énekese semmilyen módon nem említhető egy lapon a jelenlegi magyar házelnökkel! #vadaiagnes #demokratikuskoalicio #dk #europaimagyarok #EuropaMARADUNK 🇭🇺🇪🇺"

(Table 9). In May 2019, a video started circulating on the Internet, showing a young man beating up two men in a shop in Törökszentmiklós, seemingly without any motive. The video caused a stir in Hungarian media, with several news sites publishing it. Soon after, it was revealed that the perpetrator, a local man, had carried out a similar assault a few weeks ago, after which he was not arrested. However, after the recorded incident, he was arrested by the police. The Mi Hazánk, the radical right-wing satellite party of Fidesz (Tóka, 2019), called the incident an act of 'Gypsy terror' and called for a fast and radical response, claiming that in Törökszentmiklós Roma families had been 'terrorizing local families' for a long time. Both in the party's official statements and during the press conference, the party's politicians used the expressions 'Gypsy terror' and 'Gypsy crime,' which are widely considered highly discriminative, essentializing anti-Roma slurs (Juhász, 2010; Pócsik, 2007). László Toroczkai, leader of the party, announced a demonstration in Törökszentmiklós on 21st May 2019. Toroczkai called for the participation of *Betyársereg*, a radical right-wing paramilitary organization, as well as other right-wing political groups.

Importantly, similar racist, anti-Roma paramilitary demonstrations had been held before in Hungary in the late 2000s. Hungarian Guard, Jobbik's paramilitary organization, held several protests in cities where, they claimed, 'Gypsy crime' had been 'uncontrollable.' Not only were these demonstrations racist and highly threatening to Roma people, but they were also held at, among others, in Tatárszentgyörgy in 2007, where two years later, two people, Róbert Csorba Snr. and Róbert Csorba Jr. were murdered by neo-Nazis. Thus, Mi Hazánk's demonstration threatened the Roma people by both the act and its social context as it reiterated former demonstrations that resulted in the racially motivated killing of six Roma individuals.

Mi Hazánk's demonstration and its counterdemonstrations were held on 21st May 2019. Regarding the initiation of the explicitly hostile anti-Roma event, the minority was passive. However, Roma people took part in counterdemonstrations. Yet, the latter was not represented linguistically in the politicians' posts. Thus, the minority was depicted as passive victims. Meanwhile, opposition politicians portrayed themselves as protesting and protecting the passive minority, which had no agency over the event. None of the politicians quoted Roma individuals or advocacy groups, effectively silencing the minority group.

The minority group was also silent in Bernadett Szél's (independent) post. However, the

politician presented the broader social context of the event. In this example, Szél connected the 2008-2009 Roma murders to this demonstration so her audience could better understand the seriousness of the event. The silence of Roma people was also reflected in the photos attached to the post, as they focused on opposition politicians rather than Roma counterdemonstrators, of whom only one person was visually depicted.

> "We know because we have experienced where incitement of hate leads. We've seen words turn to action; we've seen hate speech turn into hate crime. Let us never forget that six people, including a child, died as a result of the Roma murders committed some ten years ago. We are here to express our rejection of all forms of discrimination, hate speech, and collective stigmatization. I am glad that so many of us are here to express our solidarity with our fellow beings living here. We want to send them a message that they are not alone." […] (Szél, 2019b, excerpt)[34]

The event, and through that, the minority group, was depicted both in opposition politicians' communication and in the Roma nationality advocate's posts. The governing parties, Fidesz and KDNP, did not address the event, nor did Jobbik or Mi Hazánk. However, it is unlikely that politicians of the latter party did not post about their political event; therefore, it can be assumed that they did, but Facebook later deleted these posts for violating community guidelines (e.g., using racial slurs such as 'Gypsy crime').

In addition, there were significant differences between the portrayal of the event in opposition politicians' posts and Félix Farkas Roma nationality advocate's posts. Namely, while the former primarily posted about the counterdemonstrations they attended in Törökszentmiklós against Mi Hazánk and *Betyársereg*, the latter instead posted about the event before it happened, asking Roma people not to participate in the demonstration nor go to the town in question, therefore asking for not to participate in the counterdemonstrations either. There was no information on the Facebook page of the Roma nationality advocate whether he participated in the counterdemonstrations to represent the Roma minority. All politicians who posted about the event condemned the Mi Hazánk's racist demonstration.

Video of Pócs János

On 23rd May 2019, several news sites received a video of Pócs János (Fidesz MP), initially recorded in 2008 by the politician himself. In the video, Pócs threatens a municipal

[34] "»Tudjuk, mert megtapasztaltuk, hova vezet az uszítás. Láttuk, ahogy a szavak tetteket szültek, ahogy a gyűlöletkeltő szavak gyűlölet-bűncselekményekbe fordultak át. Soha ne felejtsük el, hogy a mintegy tíz éve elkövetett romagyilkosságok következtében hat ember, köztük egy gyermek meghalt. Azért jöttünk, hogy kifejezzük, elutasítjuk a megkülönböztetés, a gyűlöletkeltés, a kollektív megbélyegzés minden formáját. Örülök, hogy ennyien vagyunk itt, hogy szolidaritásunkat fejezzük ki az itt élő embertársaink iránt. Azt üzenjük nekik, nincsenek egyedül!« […]"

employee of Roma ethnicity to lock and burn him in a boiler. The politician later claimed that the video was intended as a joke. Various opposition politicians, independents, and members of the parties DK, Momentum, Jobbik, and MSZP mentioned the video in 13 posts throughout the year (Table 9). MPs of the governing parties or Mi Hazánk did not refer to the video in any way, nor did Félix Farkas, Roma nationality advocate.

By all indications, the video was published without János Pócs's knowledge or consent. The politician did not appear visually in the footage; only his voice could be heard, saying, among other things, that 'he only burns the Gypsies he is angry with.' The politician admitted to the media that it was him in the video; he claimed that it was a joke between him and the Roma employee in question, who was his good friend and who wanted to make the video in the first place. He also claimed that asking him about the video was 'insulting,' as the municipal employee threatened in the video had since died. Pócs did not apologize nor acknowledge that there would be any problem with the footage. Pócs's party, Fidesz, did not officially comment on the issue. The official representative body of Romani Hungarians delegating the nationality advocate, at the time Félix Farkas, to Parliament, i.e., the National Roma Self-Government, and several opposition politicians, including a group of female politicians, demanded Pócs's resignation, which he did not do.

In opposition politicians' portrayal, the minority group was passive regarding the incident. Even though the National Roma Self-Government urged a public apology and the resignation of Pócs, none of the politicians analyzed mentioned this in their Facebook posts. No minority individual or activist was quoted; indeed, Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality advocate, did not even refer to the incident at all. This is notable as Farkas is a member of the party Lungo Drom, Fidesz's long-standing ally. Thus, Farkas most possibly had a political interest in not commenting on the incident, as Pócs was a representative of Fidesz. Additionally, Roma people were not even depicted as participants and thus were virtually invisible in most posts, as the following quote from Andrea Varga-Damm's (Jobbik) Facebook page shows. Therefore, the minority was portrayed as passive in every possible aspect of the event.

> I would also like to thank my fellow female MPs for taking the initiative and bringing attention to this harsh situation. (Varga-Damm, 2019b)[35]

[35] "Én is köszönöm képviselő nőtársaimnak, hogy kezdeményezésemre kiálltak, s felhívták a figyelmet erre a durva helyzetre."

In most opposition politicians' condemnatory posts, the Roma employee was depicted as the victim of a tasteless joke of a politician who 'should have known better.' At the same time, some implicitly or explicitly associated the incident with the Roma Holocaust. Even though none of the politicians emphasized it, the event had a classist aspect as well, as the recorded person was a municipal employee in the town where Pócs was a municipal representative at the time; thus, the recorded employee was already in a vulnerable position.

Importantly, János Pócs wasn't the first politician in 2019 of whom older racist, anti-Semitic, or homophobic content was published. Tamás Sneider (Jobbik) and Péter Jakab (Jobbik) both made exclusionary, demeaning comments about minorities in the past, republished in 2019 (see Appendix G). However, when pro-government media brought up those cases, opposition politicians argued that the government only sought to divide them politically. While this motivation of the pro-government media may be true, it does not explain why politicians did not address Sneider's and Jakab's homophobic and racist remarks, let alone demand their apology or resignation. Farkas's silence on the Pócs video and the opposition politicians' reactions, or lack thereof, to the re-publishing of footage of Jobbik politicians, point to a 'silence' in the minority-related discourse (Tonkiss, 2012). Namely, politicians criticized each other's Roma or homophobic remarks only if it was in their political interest and, at different times, when their political interests required it, stayed silent on the topic.

All in all, evoking minority-related events and thus *connecting* their course, public reception, participants, and minorities' active or passive role in them to the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ minorities (Gee, 2010) was quite frequent in the subcorpus, as it was used in 70% of all minority-related posts. Minority-related events were fragmented in that out of the 45 non-party-political and 25 contemporary party-political events mentioned (n_{sum}=70), 45 (64%) were mentioned in only one or two posts. Hence, although these events were also connected to the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people, they did not significantly define the minority portrayal. In contrast, only eight events were mentioned in more than ten Facebook posts. Of these, three were concerned with LGBTQ people, and five related to the Roma minority.

While the number and mention of party-political events were more balanced between the two minority groups, non-party-political events showed a less balanced picture. In the latter case, ten LGBTQ-related events triggered almost as many Facebook posts as 31

Roma-related events (see Table 6). Additionally, on average, an LGBTQ-related event, whether party-political or not, was mentioned in 5.7 posts, while a Roma-related event was mentioned in 3.4 posts on average. Consequently, LGBTQ-related events proportionately triggered more Facebook posts on the minority group than Roma-related events. An explanation for this imbalance could be that Roma-related events were overrepresented among the least frequently mentioned events (see Appendices F and G).

In addition, politicians made two remarkable *associations* concerning the minority-related events mentioned (Tonkiss, 2012). On the one hand, some connected Mi Hazánk's 2019 anti-Roma demonstration to the 2008-2009 Roma murders, and on the other hand, some linked Pócs's video to the Roma Holocaust. Both associations drew attention to violence against Roma and the dangers of relativizing it, especially in the Hungarian social context.

Regarding the initiators of these events, with a few exceptions, they were not started by members of the minority groups or their advocacy groups (see Appendices F and G). In the case of the party-political events, they were mostly, but not exclusively, exclusionary or even hostile events initiated by politicians of the governing parties or Mi Hazánk. These events became characteristic of the minority-related discourse as many opposition politicians condemned them in their Facebook posts, providing more and more publicity to the original exclusionary acts. Hence, party-political event-based communication on the minority groups was heavily connected to and therefore constructed around Mi Hazánk's and Fidesz's exclusionary narratives about minorities and their role in Hungarian society (Gee, 2010).

Section 4.2.3 Well-known minority individuals and organizations

Mentioning well-known minority individuals and organizations can be considered an identifying technique as their *personalized*, *individualized*, and *functionalized* representation and characteristics gleam over their minority group (van Leeuwen, 2008). In addition, by portraying well-known minority individuals in the same role over and over, politicians legitimize the assigned role and repeatedly *connect* (Gee, 2010) specific roles to Roma and LGBTQ minorities while disconnecting the two minorities from other possible roles. As found in previous studies, examples of this identifying technique are portraying a minority group through the predominant mentioning of musicians (Munk, 2013) or minority politicians (Glózer, 2013).

Of the 78 Facebook posts in which politicians mentioned well-known minority individuals or organizations, in more than a quarter (21 posts), this was the only indication that the post was about either minority group. The Roma minority was overrepresented in this identifying technique, with 69% of the 78 posts mentioning famous Roma politicians, artists, etc. (see Table 5 in Section 4.2).

Table 10. presents well-known minority individuals and organizations mentioned in politicians' Facebook posts, by their profession. Interestingly, none of the minority-related posts mentioned Roma LGBTQ people, pointing out a 'silence' in the minority-related discourse (Tonkiss, 2012) at the intersection of these minority categories, as if such individuals did not appear in the public discourse at the time[36]. In the following, each group whose members were mentioned in at least three posts will be presented in detail.

10. Table. Distribution of well-known minority individuals and organizations mentioned

	No. of posts mentioning LGBTQ	**No. of posts mentioning Roma**
Political actors	8	28
Theatre & film artists	8	16
Musicians	1	11
Advocacy groups	3	5
Researchers	3	1
Entrepreneur	1	0
Fashion designer	0	1
Historical figure (protester)	0	1
Religious figure	0	1
Writer	0	1[37]

Source: Author's own elaboration.

The most frequently mentioned well-known minority individuals and organizations were *political actors* (Table 10). Regarding this category, the two minority politicians analyzed, Péter Ungár and Félix Farkas, had to be accounted for. That is, when coding well-known minority political actors, not all of Péter Ungár's and Félix Farkas's posts were categorized as such, as in their case, their minority status was not a choice of communication but a given characteristic. As such, both politicians' posts were coded as depicting minorities as politicians when they referred to another LGBTQ or Roma politician. In the case of Péter Ungár, his posts were coded as depicting a well-known LGBTQ individual also when he referred to his sexual orientation as a politician. Since Farkas is the Roma nationality advocate, his ethnicity is inseparable from his political persona. However, coding every single one of his posts as depicting a Roma politician

[36] Well-known Roma LGBTQ people who could have been mentioned are, for example, Ibolya Oláh, a lesbian Roma singer who previously participated in an MSZP campaign, or József ("Joci") Márton, a Roma LGBTQ activist.

[37] Magda Szécsi Roma writer was mistakenly called Margit Szécsi in one of Félix Farkas's post.

would have been counterproductive in light of the aim of this analysis step, that is, to analyze the well-known individuals and collective politicians intentionally mentioned.

Portraying minority political actors could be interpreted as Roma and LGBTQ minorities' portrayal as serious, responsible individuals, holding critical public functions and being in a decision-making position on a societal level; however, in the case of some of the posts, a closer look proved somewhat differently. In the case of LGBTQ people, all eight posts were published by opposition politicians and were supportive (Table 10). Six mentioned Péter Ungár and two Richárd Barabás. Regarding Barabás, an openly gay politician of the Párbeszéd party, the posts merely named him without disclosing his sexual orientation. The posts addressing Ungár as a gay politician either congratulated him on his public coming out in 2019 or were published by him as an answer to those who attack or denigrate him based on his sexual orientation.

Regarding Roma politicians, half of the 28 posts were published by Félix Farkas, while the other half were published by opposition politicians (Table 10). Many of the 28 posts focused on Flórián Farkas, president of the Lungo Drom party and former president of the National Roma Self-Government. Some posts mentioned Lívia Járóka (Fidesz), a Member of the European Parliament, and other politicians of local Roma self-governments, usually mentioned in one or two posts (Table 10). Flórián Farkas was portrayed in a negative context in eight of Ákos Hadházy's (LMP) posts, who suspected that Farkas had been involved in corruption and the alleged theft of EU grants and subsidies aimed at programs enhancing Roma's social inclusion. Opposition politicians mentioned Lívia Járóka, an elected Vice-President of the European Parliament, several times in a negative context for her role in the Fidesz-KDNP government. However, she was also depicted by Félix Farkas in a positive context. Other Roma politicians of local Roma self-governments were mentioned solely by Félix Farkas. All in all, Roma politicians were predominantly depicted in a negative context in opposition politicians' posts and explicitly as criminals in the case of Flórián Farkas.

The second most frequently represented category of well-known minorities was *theater and film artists* (Table 10), appearing in 24 posts and only in supportive and inclusive contexts. Identifying the two minority groups with theater and film artists connects creativity and artistic flair to these minority groups. These posts revolved around a few but relatively frequently mentioned artists. Regarding the sexual minority, the only artist mentioned was Róbert Alföldi, portrayed in 8 posts published by various opposition

politicians. Róbert Alföldi, besides contributing to the portrayal of LGBTQ people with his creative role, vastly appeared as a politically active public figure supporting opposition politicians and parties in general, and especially Gergely Karácsony (Párbeszéd) during the municipal elections of 2019. Roma theater and film artists appeared in 16 posts, all published by Félix Farkas, Roma nationality advocate, meaning that this kind of portrayal was not connected to Roma people in any of the elected politicians' posts. Farkas specifically posted about Roma theater companies and almost exclusively mentioned them as artists performing at Roma-related events or holidays; thus, he specifically portrayed them as theater artists and not in any other capacity.

In the 12 posts depicting LGBTQ and Roma individuals as *musicians* (Table 10), only one well-known LGBTQ individual was mentioned. Freddie Mercury, the late singer of the band Queen, was cited by Ágnes Vadai (DK) in her response to László Kövér's dehumanizing homophobic comments. In contrast, Roma musicians appeared in 11 posts, of which seven were posted by Félix Farkas and four by various opposition and government politicians. Politicians portrayed Roma musicians first and foremost as performers and not in any other capacity. Finding only 11 posts mentioning Roma musicians or bands was somewhat surprising, as portraying Roma people through the stereotype of being inherently talented in music was one of the most widespread tropes in the representation of the minority group, as previous research findings suggest (Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Munk, 2013). Although all 12 posts depicted minority musicians in a supportive manner, it is also noteworthy that with these posts, politicians further strengthened existing prevalent stereotypes in Hungarian media regarding the Roma minority. However, this stereotype may have somewhat weakened, at least in political communication, as the low number of such posts indicates.

Various politicians mentioned *well-known minority advocacy groups* in eight posts (Table 10). This identifying technique would have endowed LGBTQ and Roma minorities with representation in policymaking and society as well. The mention of such groups portrays Roma and LGBTQ people, on the one hand, in the need for advocacy, and on the other hand, empowered by having organizations representing and advocating for their rights and needs. In the case of the LGBTQ minority, only three posts mentioned two Hungarian LGBTQ advocacy groups: Háttér Society and the Hungarian LGBT Alliance. Of these, one post mentioned Háttér Society in a negative light when Zsolt Semjén (KDNP) addressed the advocacy group's sensitizing campaign. In his post, Semjén argued against Háttér's campaign when stating that marriage can only be between a man and a woman

and that same-sex parents should not raise children as, in his opinion, it would be against children's best interest. Regarding Roma advocacy groups, politicians mentioned them in only five posts (Table 10). Lungo Drom, a Roma advocacy group and party closely connected to Fidesz, was mentioned twice by Ádám Steinmetz (Jobbik) concerning corruption, embezzlement, and election fraud. Advocacy groups Igazgyöngy Foundation, Roma Press Center, and Polgár Foundation were mentioned once each, albeit in a positive context.

Researchers belonging to any of the minority groups analyzed appeared in four Facebook posts (Table 10). The four posts in which such minority individuals appeared were published by Momentum and MSZP politicians and Farkas Félix (Table 10). As an identifying technique, it represents minorities as professionals working in academia, thus highly qualified experts in particular fields. The mentioned researchers include Zoltán Lakner, an openly gay political scientist, mentioned and quoted in connection with László Kövér's discriminatory statement on people who would like to adopt children and live in same-sex relationships; Ádám Nádasdy, an openly gay Hungarian linguist and poet, mentioned for his statement about him moving abroad, and Gábor Bernáth, Roma researcher regarding the International Romani Day.

In sum, although well-known LGBTQ individuals and organizations were less frequently cited, their mentioning was more often positive than negative, and they were portrayed as politically active actors, whether it had to do something with their profession or not. In contrast, Roma individuals and organizations were mentioned in more Facebook posts; however, when mentioned as political actors, well-known Roma individuals were most usually portrayed as corrupt and fraudulent criminals, except in Félix Farkas's posts. Other famous Roma individuals were portrayed predominantly for their artistic talents (in theater, film, music, and applied arts) and not as politically active actors. Therefore, the *functionalized* identification of LGBTQ people was more inclusive and complex, portraying LGBTQ people as relevant, politically active actors even if it wasn't their profession. In contrast, the same identifying technique in the case of Roma people was fragmented, as Félix Farkas portrayed Roma people in vastly different professions and contexts than other politicians. The 'silence' in the discourse (Tonkiss, 2012), that is, the lack of mentioning Roma LGBTQ people, suggests the lack of an intersectional approach to the portrayal of LGBTQ and Roma people among the politicians analyzed. This erases Romani LGBTQ people and identity from the discourse and also implies that these minority groups are mutually exclusive to each other.

After identifying the techniques indicating the posts' minority-relatedness, the following section focuses on the voices and opinions represented in the found posts.

Section 4.3 Represented voices

To understand the discursive construction of minority group concepts, examining what voices and opinions were present in minority-related Facebook posts and how (van Dijk, 1997, 2001) is essential. That is, to analyze whose voices were emphasized or silenced (Tonkiss, 2012) and whether minority opinions were represented at all, i.e., to reflect on the intertextuality of the analyzed posts (Fairclough, 2003; Gee, 2010; Richardson, 2007). To present the frequently represented voices, particularly minority voices, the analysis focused on whether anybody (a person, an organization, or a group of people) was named as the source of the posted text, whether punctuation marks or other linguistic tools (like pronouns) indicated a source other than the publishing politician, and if yes, whether these are minorities or minority-related sources. As such, both direct quotations and paraphrasing were considered in the analysis.

As Table 11 shows, more than 80% (324 posts) of minority-related Facebook posts represented the politicians' own words and opinions, that is, their own voices. However, it should be noted that a Facebook post can cite several sources and voices.

11. Table. Distribution of the voices represented

	No. of posts	**Share of posts**
Publishing politician	324	87.6%
Publishing politician's party	18	4.9%
Other politicians or party	18	4.9%
Roma people/organization	10	2.7%
Media outlet/journalist	8	2.2%
LGBTQ people/organization	7	1.9%

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Politicians were categorized as expressing *their own opinions* in two cases. First, when posts contained linguistic tools implying that the publisher was the source of the opinion. Below is an example from the Facebook page of Ferenc Gyurcsány (DK), former Hungarian prime minister.

> […] *In my opinion*, love is a private matter. And *I find* it hard to see what the state power has to do with it. Everyone loves who and how as their heart and soul dictate. *I repeat, in my opinion*. […] (Gyurcsány, 2019b, excerpt, emphasis added)[38]

[38] „[…] A szerelem szerintem magánügy. És nehezen látom be, hogy mi köze ehhez az államhatalomnak. Mindenki azt és úgy szeret, ahogy szíve, lelke diktálja. Mondom újra, szerintem. […]"

In this excerpt, two things suggest that the politician himself is the source of the posted opinion: the phrase "in my opinion" and the conjugation of the verbs (which show that the politician expressed his position in the first person).

Second, when politicians did not explicitly state or imply that the source of the opinion was somebody else, the post was also coded as representing the publishing politicians' voice and position, as in the following example from László Varju's (DK) Facebook page.

> The Orbánian hate propaganda is ready and rumbling.
> #laszlovarju #election #propaganfa [*sic*] #dc #🇭🇺🇪🇺 (Varju, 2019)[39]

In this post, Varju evoked an incident where a Romani man was assaulted in Pécs because he was mistaken for being a refugee. By 'Orbánian hate propaganda,' Varju referred to the government's anti-refugee discourse in a condemnatory tone and implied that the Roma person in Pécs was assaulted as a result of the government's hostile anti-refugee campaign. It is reasonable to assume that this was Varju's opinion on the government's anti-refugee discourse, as he did not state otherwise.

The second most frequently represented voice, appearing in 18 posts, was that of the *politicians' own political parties* (Table 11). In these posts, the parties were unmistakably appointed as sources of opinion, mainly through the use of the plural first-person and sometimes by naming the party, such as in the following post of Péter Ungár (LMP).

> László Kövér had his moment in the past few days with his stupid statements.
> *We*, in *LMP*, believe in a world where no family is better, regardless of whether the children are raised by opposite-sex, same-sex, or single parents. And we know that none of them believes the lie that climate change doesn't exist, or at least is a good business opportunity. (Ungár, 2019a, emphasis added)[40]

In his post, Ungár defined his party as the source of the published opinion on different types of families using the plural first-person pronoun (we) and naming the party (LMP). However, his first sentence arguably reflected his opinion as it was not included in the plural first person, indicating the party's position.

Politicians quoted *other politicians, parties* (or political groups) in 18 Facebook posts (Table 11). These focused mainly on Hungarian politics as only one foreign politician

[39] "Beérett és dübörög az orbáni gyűlöletpropaganda.
#varjulaszlo #valasztas #propaganfa [*sic*] #dk #🇭🇺🇪🇺"
[40] "Kövér László nagyot ment az elmúlt napokban az ostoba kijelentéseivel.
Mi az LMP-ben egy olyan világban hiszünk, ahol nem különb semelyik család sem, függetlenül attól, hogy ellenkező nemű, azonos nemű vagy egyedülálló szülők nevelik gyermekeiket. És tudjuk, hogy egyikük sem ül fel olyan hazug kijelentésnek, hogy a klímaváltozás nem is létezik, de legalábbis egy jó üzleti lehetőség."

was quoted, i.e., Jair Bolsonaro. In these posts, the politicians quoted various politicians, among others, Viktor Orbán (Prime Minister, Fidesz), János Pócs (Fidesz), Tímea Szabó (Párbeszéd), and Benedek Jávor (Párbeszéd). In general, opposition politicians and parties were quoted more often (in 14 posts) than politicians of Fidesz and KDNP (in 3 posts). Regarding those politicians who quoted their peers, opposition politicians (12 posts) and independent politicians (4 posts) were the most active. In contrast, only one member of KDNP quoted another politician and only once (Zsolt Semjén quoted Viktor Orbán), and zero Fidesz politicians quoted other politicians or parties. Furthermore, in 12 of these posts, the publishing politicians quoted others to express their agreement – usually, opposition politicians expressing their agreement with other opposition politicians on topics of equality and anti-discrimination.

Concerning the representation of minority opinions, and hence the inclusion of minority voices in the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people, the share of quotations is notably low. Only 2.7% of the subcorpus included quotes from Roma people or organizations (Table 11). Of the ten posts that included the voices of *Roma individuals or organizations*, six Roma individuals (predominantly civilians), two organizations, and the head of an organization for Roma were quoted directly. The quotes were published by various opposition politicians, such as two independent politicians and representatives of LMP, Momentum, MSZP, Párbeszéd and Jobbik, and Félix Farkas, Roma nationality advocate. The distribution of quotations was fairly even among these politicians. The quotes typically centered on the hardships of life Roma people face, the racism they encounter, and the importance of combating discrimination on a personal and systemic level. The quotations depicted Roma people as victims of anti-Roma discrimination and sometimes as fighters who have overcome these obstacles. Thus, the quotations and the posts in which they appeared conveyed an inclusive tone. Ágnes Kunhalmi's (MSZP) Facebook post exemplifies this quote.

> As a teenage mother, Edina soon realized that as a Roma without education, she could only do day labor and melon picking. But she needed money because her parents couldn't help. At the age of twenty-one, she walked into the hospice ward of Gyula Hospital with the calmness of an underdog.
> - The head nurse came and asked why I wanted to do this? [*sic*] I said, I want to help people who are vulnerable like me, who do not judge me, who need me. […] (Kunhalmi, 2019a, excerpt)[41]

[41] „A kamasz édesanya Edina hamar rájött, romaként, iskola nélkül csak a napszám, a dinnyeszedés marad. De kellett a pénz, mert a szülők nem tudtak segíteni. Huszonegy évesen az esélytelenek nyugalmával sétált be a gyulai kórház hospice osztályára.

In this post, Kunhalmi quoted an interview from Index (Német, 2019) with Edina Sztojka, who won the Aranypánt award, also known as the award for 'everyday Roma heroes.' First, Sztojka's background was introduced in Kunhalmi's post, emphasizing the limited opportunities available to Romani people without education. By saying she wanted to work with people who "do not judge," Sztojka implies that she faced judgment and discrimination before due to her ethnicity. The post portrays Sztojka as both a victim of anti-Roma discrimination and a determined person who took charge of her life by pursuing a career in a hospital despite the obstacles she faced.

Only once did a quote from a Roma individual appear in a negative context. It was posted by Ákos Hadházy (independent) in connection with an alleged election fraud case without naming the source.

Furthermore, there was only one directly quoted Roma individual whose voice appeared in more than one Facebook post, Krisztina Balogh, who was quoted twice. Notably, she was also the only one whose Roma identity was not the focus of the quotations but her strong stance on a political issue. In the following example, Bernadett Szél quoted her.

> "In reports involving left-wing politicians, the expectation was to make them look ridiculous in as many situations as possible."
> This stance is not right or left [wing]; it is simply the right thing to do. Thank you for speaking the truth about the public media, which has used public money to commit character assassinations and to smear many of our good and constructive initiatives and even our characters. I, on the other side of the microphone and the camera, have felt and feel exactly that - but here is the proof. The current public conditions in this country can be changed by people who will not resign, who will not compromise. This is an important step on that path. ‼ There is no freedom without courage ‼ (Szél, 2019d)[42]

Krisztina Balogh, an ex-reporter of the public television channel M1, was interviewed by the news site *444.hu* after her resignation. In the interview, Balogh made several statements about how the public media acts as a quasi-mouthpiece for the governing parties (Rényi, 2019). In this Facebook post, Szél quoted and portrayed Balogh as a positive figure when praising her decision to resign from the public media, calling it "simply the right thing to do." Szél also implied that Balogh was brave and honest when

- Jött a főnővér és megkérdezte, miért akarom ezt csinálni? Azt mondtam, olyan embereknek akarok segíteni, akik kiszolgáltatottak, mint én, akik nem ítélnek meg, akiknek szükségük van rám. […]"

[42] "»A baloldali politikusokat érintő blokkokban az elvárás az volt, hogy minél több szituációban állítsuk be nevetségesnek őket.« Ez a kiállás nem jobb- vagy baloldali, egyszerűen csak ez a helyes. Köszönöm, hogy kimondta az igazat a karaktergyilkos, számos jó és építő kezdeményezésünket, sőt személyünket közpénzen besározó közmédiáról. Én, aki a mikrofon és a kamera másik oldalán állok pontosan éreztem és érzem ezt — de itt a bizonyíték. Az ország jelenlegi közállapotait a nem beletörődő, nem megalkuvó emberek tudják megváltoztatni. Ez egy fontos lépés ezen az úton. ‼ Bátorság nélkül nincs szabadság ‼ „

referring to her as “people who will not resign, who will not compromise” and writing, “there is no freedom without courage.” In another post quoting Balogh, she was depicted as a hard-working person who worked her way up to national public media but left when her conscience no longer allowed her to continue working there. In both cases, politicians shared quotes from Balogh in their posts, in which she criticized the public media and her prior role in it. Balogh’s Roma ethnicity was emphasized in the interview, so much so that even the article’s title, a quote from her, mentioned it ("Working in the public media has become such stigma like when you’re called a gypsy").

As for *sexual minorities*, five LGBTQ individuals or organizations were quoted in seven posts, which accounts for 1.9% of the subcorpus. In contrast to the Roma individuals and organizations quoted, there is a total overlap between the LGBTQ people and organizations quoted and the well-known members of the minority group previously introduced (Section 4.2.3). Moreover, LGBTQ people were quoted almost exclusively in response to László Kövér’s discriminatory remarks on same-sex couples’ rights and motivations for adoption. Five out of the seven posts directly quoting LGBTQ individuals or groups were in connection with Kövér’s homophobic exclusionary statements: two quoted Zoltán Lakner (openly gay political scientist), two quoted Dániel Turgonyi (speaker of the Momentum party’s LGBTQ working group), and one politician quoted the statement of the Hungarian LGBT Alliance. Bence Tordai’s (Párbeszéd) following Facebook post exemplifies this.

> “it [*sic*] is very dangerous if someone cannot or does not want to distinguish between the desire to become a parent and pedophilia. The desire to become a parent is about providing our children with a safe, good, and loving environment. Pedophilia, on the contrary, exploits the vulnerability of the child to fulfill the sick desires of the adult. László Kövér relativizes the crimes of pedophiles by portraying the two as equals.” (Tordai, 2019)[43]

In his post, Tordai quoted the press release of the Hungarian LGBT Alliance without commentary. By doing so, he gave a platform for an LGBTQ organization’s voice; however, he did not cite its source. Other LGBTQ quotes on this topic also emphasized the dangers of László Kövér’s speech. They were inclusive toward LGBTQ people in that every one of them highlighted the crucial difference between pedophilia and same-sex parenting. Additionally, each quote made it clear that Kövér’s notions were deeply

[43] „»nagyon [*sic*] veszélyes, ha valaki nem tud vagy nem akar különbséget tenni a szülővé válás iránti vágy és a pedofília között. A szülővé válás iránti vágy azt célozza, hogy biztonságos, jó, és szeretetteljes környezetet adjunk gyermekeinknek. A pedofília éppen ellenkezőleg, a gyermek kiszolgáltatottságát használja ki a felnőtt beteges vágyainak kiélése érdekében. Kövér László a pedofilok bűneit relativizálja azzal, hogy a kettő közé egyenlőségjelet tesz.«”

homophobic and exclusionary.

In one of the two remaining posts, Gergely Karácsony (Párbeszéd) quoted Róbert Alföldi (openly gay theater director and actor), who encouraged people to vote for the politician in the municipal primaries. In the other post, the Háttér Society was quoted in Bernadett Szél's (independent) post, which contained an infographic about the amount and kind of abuse LGBTQ people suffer in Hungary.

Quoting *media outlets or journalists* was also among the most common, albeit only two journalists (Ottó Gajdics and Árpád Tóta W.) and seven media outlets (*444.hu, Azonnali, CNN, Index, Mandiner, Ugytudjuk.hu,* and *Válasz Online*) were quoted in these eight posts (Table 11).

When analyzing *paraphrasing or indirect speech*, the focus was on whether the publisher of the Facebook post indicated that the post represents someone else's utterance or opinion. To identify this, verbs indicating indirect speech (such as *mondta* ["said"] and *írta* ["wrote"]), the use of pronouns, and other linguistic and visual elements were examined. Politicians paraphrased LGBTQ or Roma people in five posts each. Posts paraphrasing LGBTQ voices all reported on the opinion and political stance of Róbert Alföldi, an openly gay theater artist. The following post, in which Ágnes Kunhalmi (MSZP) encouraged people to vote for Gergely Karácsony by reporting that Róbert Alföldi did the same, exemplifies this.

> Listen to Róbert Alföldi and be part of the success! Only one and a half days are left to cast your vote for Gergely Karácsony! (Kunhalmi, 2019b)[44]

The group of paraphrased Roma individuals was somewhat broader, including six people in five posts. In two of them, Krisztina Balogh, a former M1 employee introduced previously, was paraphrased by opposition politicians, while in the other three, Roma people in general (as in 'Roma people said...') and Roma self-government politicians were paraphrased. The following excerpt is from Félix Farkas's (Roma nationality advocate) post in which he paraphrased three members of the Roma self-governments.

> […] Anikó Horváth, vice-president of Lungo Drom in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, highlighted the importance of learning. *She said* that learning helps the most the social

[44] „Hallgassatok Alföldi Róbertre és legyetek részesei a sikernek! Már csak másfél nap van arra, hogy Karácsony Gergely mellé behúzzátok az X-et!"

inclusion of the Roma. […] (Farkas, 2019c, excerpt, emphasis added)[45]

Politicians paraphrased each other and other parties more often (12 posts). They used this technique mainly to summarize the political stances of their opponents or other parties and to add context to their responses. The majority of these posts referred to contemporary Hungarian politicians and parties, such as László Kövér (Fidesz), Péter Jakab (Jobbik), or Dóra Dúró (Mi Hazánk). The only exception was a post that paraphrased Ursula von der Leyen. In addition, in four posts, politicians paraphrased media outlets and journalists to present the content of an article or a TV show they disagreed with and to provide context for their response.

In conclusion, neither minority group got many chances to articulate their opinions, give statements in their own words, or even get through their (political) stances to the public with the help of politicians. This resembles the previous findings of Messing and Bernáth (2017) on the issue of Roma voices in Hungarian media. Furthermore, although Roma people and organizations were quoted a little more frequently than LGBTQ individuals and organizations, they did not have an opportunity to express their views on Roma-related political issues, such as the Mi Hazánk party's constant use of the racist phrase 'Gypsy terror,' or about the anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós. In contrast, LGBTQ individuals had fewer opportunities to make their voices heard in the politicians' posts, but they could respond to contemporary public issues, such as László Kövér's homophobic notions. It is reasonable to assume that minority advocacy groups and individuals did react to minority-related statements and events throughout the year, even if their reactions did not appear on politicians' Facebook sites. Still, politicians, even those who claim to fight against discrimination, decided to voice their own opinions instead of providing their platforms for distributing minority voices.

Indeed, politicians' and parties' voices dominated the minority-related discourse, with even media outlets being more frequently quoted than LGBTQ individuals or organizations (see Table 11). This reinforces van Dijk's (1997) notions of political discourse mainly revolving around itself. The analysis also revealed that the minority-related discourse on these politicians' Facebook pages was largely segregated (van Dijk, 2001), with members of the Roma and LGBTQ minority barely having their voices heard – they were quoted in only 2.7% and 1.9% of the subcorpus, respectively. The results of

[45] „[…] Horváth Anikó, a Lungo Drom Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén megyei alelnöke kiemelte a tanulás fontosságát. Mint mondta, a cigányságot a tanulás segítheti leginkább a felzárkózásban. […]"

analyzing paraphrasing further reinforced the meaning-making strategies outlined by the analysis of verbatim quotes. Namely, while minority voices were virtually absent from government politicians' posts, opposition politicians mostly quoted or paraphrased minorities when it suited their political interests. For example, they quoted and paraphrased Krisztina Balogh and Róbert Alföldi's opinions as those supported their interests but did not quote or paraphrase minority individuals critical of their work or position. In addition, minority voices rarely appeared in politicians' Facebook communication, even when considering the paraphrases. Consequently, the emphasis was on politicians and political parties in the subcorpus, while the voices of Roma and LGBTQ were silenced (Tonkiss, 2012).

This section discussed the voices represented in Hungarian politicians' minority-related Facebook posts. The following section focuses on portrayed actors.

Section 4.4 Actors

In analyzing the representation of any given social actor, it is crucial to see which actors are represented in the given social actor-related texts and how (Tonkiss, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008). The importance of explicitly and implicitly portrayed actors concerning the discursive construction of the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people is manifolded. On the one hand, it highlights which actors were deemed worthy of mention by politicians when communicating about minorities, that is, who was placed in the center of attention concerning minorities and can play a part in the discursive construction of the concept of the minority group. On the other hand, the active or passive portrayal of minority actors assigns agency, or lack thereof, to minorities in the minority-related discourse (Tonkiss, 2012; van Dijk, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2008).

The range of represented actors in the subcorpus was extensive and included alive or deceased persons, such as politicians and civilians, who were explicitly referred to or implied through context; groups of people, such as minority groups, political parties, NGOs, or Magyar Gárda, who were explicitly referred to or were implied by plural general subject 'us' and 'them'; perceived groups of people, e.g., 'the gay lobby,' 'the left,' 'the fascists' referred to generically or as groups or by plural general subject 'us' and 'them'; media outlets and media workers referred to as specific individuals or specific groups or by their (perceived) affiliation with political sides or groups; institutions such as the State, ministries, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the European Union, etc.,

and other phenomena, usually through nominalization, for example, ‘Trianon borders,’ ‘the hate propaganda’ or ‘Budapest.’ Considering the focus of the research and due to space constraints, only the most frequently mentioned actors and actor groups are presented in the following, while LGBTQ and Romani actors are described in detail later in this section.

Figure 4. shows the distribution of actors and actor groups mentioned explicitly or implicitly in at least 45 Facebook posts. The publishing politician of a post was coded separately from other mentioned politicians to show how often politicians talked about themselves as actors and how frequently they mentioned other politicians as actors. Since three of the eight most common actor groups comprise political actors (publisher of the post, Hungarian politicians, and political parties), it can be concluded that minority-related Hungarian political communication revolved around them in the first place (Figure 4). Furthermore, the also very commonly used plural 1st person subject ‘us’ (and those posts suggesting the plural 1st person by verb conjugation) usually referred to either a specific political party or a political-ideological community that the publisher assumed their readers were also members of, therefore also addressed a somewhat political body. In this aspect, the analysis of the mentioned actors shows similar results to that of the represented voices, further reinforcing the notions of van Dijk (1997) about the self-centeredness of political discourse.



4. Figure. Number of posts mentioning the most frequent actors and actor groups
Source: Author’s own elaboration.

Roma and LGBTQ actor groups include the following types of minority actors: the minority group, minority individuals, minority organizations or groups, and actors

supportive of the minority group. Supportive actors were identified by their supportive relationship to the group or a minority individual suggested by the context of the post, such as 'parents of LGBTQ people,' 'Pride march attendees,' or 'ethnic nationality teachers.' As such, their identity was represented through their allyship to either minority group.

Section 4.4.1 Portrayal of minority actors

When examining the portrayal of minority actors, the analysis found three main portrayal modes: active, passive, and the lack of actor portrayal. Minorities were portrayed as 'active' when depicted as having agency in a process, situation, or event. That is, in these portrayals, minorities had agency in the course of the process presented in the Facebook post; they were depicted as actively and intentionally influencing the process and thus appeared as active actors (Tonkiss, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008). The following excerpt from Katalin Cseh's (Momentum) Facebook post exemplifies active portrayal.

> […] In Baja, a man critical of the government running a lángos buffet was threatened with being humiliated in front of the community because of his homosexuality. Huge respect to Richard Szabó, who ignored the attacks, *bravely came out* in public, and blew the lid off the blackmailers! […] (Cseh, 2019b, excerpt, emphasis added)[46]

In her post, Cseh evoked an incident where a man who publicly criticized the Fidesz-KDNP government was blackmailed for being gay. The man, a lángos buffet owner from Baja, instead published a coming-out video, thereby taking back control over his personal life and public perception. Cseh reported about this event, mentioning that the blackmailed man, Richárd Szabó, took action as he "came out" and "blew the lid off" his blackmailers, thus portraying him as an active actor.

In contrast, passive portrayal is a characteristic of posts in which minority actors are presented as participants but have little to no agency over the process or event portrayed in the post, as shown in the following excerpt of Péter Niedermüller's (DK) post.

> […] By all indications, László Kövér thinks and speaks like Nazis. […] Whoever says to any fellow being, based on their faith, opinion, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic that belongs only to them, that they are a second-class citizen, commits an unforgivable crime. […] (Niedermüller, 2019a, excerpt)[47]

[46] "[…] Baján egy kormánykritikus, lángossütőt üzemeltető férfit fenyegettek meg azzal, hogy homoszexualitása miatt fogják lejáratni a közösség előtt. Óriási tisztelet Szabó Richárdnak, aki a támadásokkal nem törődve, bátran a nyilvánosság elé állt, és lerántotta a leplet a zsarolókról! […]"

[47] "[…] Aki bármely embertársának, annak hite, véleménye, politikai meggyőződése, szexuális orientációja vagy bármely más, csak rá tartozó mivoltja alapján azt mondja, hogy az másodrendű állampolgár, az megbocsájthatatlan bűnt követ el. […]"

In the post, Niedermüller responded to László Kövér's statements about LGBTQ people, which were previously presented (see Section 4.2.2). In Niedermüller's portrayal, sexual minorities and all minority groups were depicted as passive victims of Kövér's discriminatory remarks, referred to as 'crimes.' It is also worth noting that Niedermüller published his post on 17th May, the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia, and Transphobia, which provides another interpretation where LGBTQ people are also victims of homophobia, biphobia, and transphobia, in general.

The active or passive portrayal of minorities in minority-related posts is crucial as the former contributes to constructing the concept of the minority group as actively taking part in their personal and public life, influencing and controlling their perception, and capable of independent advocacy. In contrast, the passive portrayal of minority individuals and groups suggests that the group is a passive victim of Romaphobia, homo, bi-, and transphobia, showing neither ability nor inclination to assert their rights. This not only conveys a false picture of minorities but also denies the social good of self-advocacy from the groups (Gee, 2010). The latter portrayal mode also puts politicians in the position of the savior, who stands up for the otherwise passive victims.

Additionally, when analyzing the portrayal of minority actors, those posts must also be accounted for, which do not portray minority individuals or groups as actors (Tonkiss, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008). These portrayals alienated the actual individuals or groups of people affected by minority-related events from the events and their consequences, making the minority groups invisible regarding their own victimization and further emphasizing politicians' role in the event or process. An example from the Facebook page of Csaba Molnár (DK) can be found below.

> Well, my dear Fidesz-member "friend," I think we can live with that. Because Simicska was indeed right that it is everyone's constitutional right to be stupid... (Molnár, 2019)[48]

In his post, Molnár reacted to István Boldog's (Fidesz) statement that he boycotted Coca-Cola until the company removed its ads depicting same-sex couples. However, Molnár did not mention LGBTQ people in his post or even imply that they were participants or affected by this event, even though he evoked an event that concerns the minority group in essence.

The following post from Andrea Varga-Damm's (Jobbik) official Facebook page also

[48] "Hát kedves fideszes »barátom«, azt hiszem ezzel együtt tudunk élni. Mert Simicskának tényleg igaza volt abban, hogy mindenkinek alkotmányos joga hülyének lenni..."

exemplifies the erasure of minority actors from minority-related discourse. In this post, the politician evoked the racist video of János Pócs introduced previously (see Section 4.2.2) without mentioning even once the person whom Pócs threatened with locking him in a boiler or Roma people in general. Instead, Varga-Damm complained that if a Jobbik MP had done what Pócs did, they would have been 'crucified' by the pro-government media.

> If János Pócs were a Jobbik politician, he would have been prosecuted, his legislative immunity would have been waived, the public and pro-government media would be calling for his resignation several times a day, and we would all be crucified for daring to speak to him. However, according to Fidesz and its dirty media, János Pócs, a member of Fidesz, can do anything without consequences. (Varga-Damm, 2019a)[49]

Table 12. shows the distribution of active and passive minority actor portrayal and those posts in which Roma and LGBTQ minorities were not depicted as actors ('not portrayed') (Tonkiss, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008). When categorizing Facebook posts, those posts in which politicians at least once referred to a minority actor as having agency were coded as active, and those in which politicians hadn't portrayed minorities as active agents at least once were coded as passive portrayal.

12. Table. Distribution of active, passive, and not portrayed minority actors

	LGBTQ actors	**Roma actors**
Active	27%	38%
Passive	33%	31%
Not portrayed	40%	31%
Sum	*100%*	*100%*

Source: Author's own elaboration.

As data shows, Roma individuals and groups were more often portrayed as active than LGBTQ people; however, even their depiction was active in less than half of the Roma-related posts (Table 12). Both minority groups were portrayed as passive actors in roughly one-third of the posts. More importantly, in 40% of the LGBTQ people-related posts and 31% of the Roma-related Facebook posts, politicians did not portray minorities as actors.

Section 4.4.2 LGBTQ actors

Of the 144 LGBTQ people-related and 33 both-minority group-related posts, 106 (60%) mentioned LGBTQ individuals, groups, or actors supporting sexual minorities. Consequently, in the remaining 40% of sexual minority-related posts, LGBTQ

[49] "Ha Pócs János jobbikos lenne, már büntetőeljárás lenne, már kikérték volna a mentelmi jogát, a közmédia és a kormánypárti média már naponta többször követelné a lemondását, már mindannyiunkat keresztre feszítettek volna, hogy merünk vele szóba állni. De a fidesz és szennymédiája szerint egy fideszes Pócs János bármit megtehet következmények nélkül."

individuals or groups were not portrayed as actors (Table 12). In this section, the LGBTQ actors portrayed will be introduced at length.

Table 13 shows the distribution of various LGBTQ actor groups in the 177 Facebook posts that mention LGBTQ people or both LGBTQ and Roma. As politicians could mention several actors in a single post, the different actor categories somewhat overlap.

13. Table. Distribution of LGBTQ actor categories

	No. of mentioning posts	**Share of mentioning posts**
LGBTQ people, in general	72	41%
Specific individuals (named or implied)	26	15%
Actors supportive of the LGBTQ minority	12	7%
Advocacy groups, in general	3	2%
Advocacy groups by name	3	2%

Source: Author's own elaboration.

The most regularly mentioned actors were *LGBTQ people in general*, such as 'gays,' or individuals merely referred to by their sexuality ('homosexual couple'), appearing in 41% of the sexual-minority-related posts (Table 13). The following excerpt from Katalin Cseh's (Momentum) Facebook page exemplifies this.

> Another low point: public TV would like doctors to cure *homosexuality*. Conversion therapies were horribly harmful, unscientific, and inhumane experiments that are being banned all over the world. No wonder since *hundreds of thousands of people* have been psychologically damaged or driven to suicide by such methods over the past decades. […] (Cseh, 2019a, excerpt, emphasis added)[50]

In this post, Cseh first mentions homosexuality in general and not as an actor; however, later in the post, she refers to those who suffered from conversion therapies as 'hundreds of thousands of people,' therefore personalizing her first sentence in which homosexuality was merely a condition, not an actor.

The second most frequently mentioned actor category, *specific individuals*, contains LGBTQ actors already introduced in previous sections (Table 13). Namely, the well-known and quoted LGBTQ individuals, Róbert Alföldi, Richárd Barabás, Péter Ungár, Ádám Nádasdy, Zoltán Lakner, Freddie Mercury, and Péter Árvai. The only civilian LGBTQ individual portrayed as an actor was the lángos buffet owner, Richárd Szabó. No other civilians or activists appeared in the posts, other than gay men, meaning that no

[50] „Újabb mélypont: orvosokkal gyógyítaná a homoszexualitást a köztévé. Az átnevelő terápiák iszonyatosan káros, tudománytalan és embertelen kísérletek voltak, amelyeket sorra tiltanak be a világban. Nem csoda, hiszen az elmúlt évtizedek során emberek százezreit nyomorították meg lelkileg, vagy hajszolták egyenesen az öngyilkosságba ehhez hasonló módszerekkel. […]"

women or non-binary LGBTQ individuals were mentioned, nor Roma LGBTQ people.

The category of *supportive actors*, portrayed in 12 Facebook posts (Table 13), refers to actors who are not necessarily minority individuals but are depicted through their support for the minority group in politicians' posts, such as Pride attendees, parents of LGBTQ youth, or 'homosexual lobby' as an actor. Most of these posts depicted supporters of LGBTQ people in a positive and sensitizing context, while in some, opposition politicians used phrases like 'homosexual lobby' or 'homosexual propaganda' to ridicule the language use of some government and Mi Hazánk politicians thereby taking a moral stance against homophobic rhetoric. Péter Ungár's (LMP) Facebook post below exemplifies the latter.

> […] In addition, one of the prominent figures of the massive, taxpayer-funded, masquerading as informing government propaganda has once again shown that they are the most oppressed minority in the country: it is not them, but the others, the liberal-Stalinist-faggot lobby who want to reshape the Hungarian people's thoughts. […] (Ungár, 2019c, excerpt)[51]

In his post, Ungár referred to one of Árpád Szakács's (then-editor-in-chief of the pro-government media company Mediaworks) speech and ridiculed the homophobic pro-government discourse when referring to the so-called gay lobby with the extremely homophobic Hungarian slur *buzi* ("faggot") and pointing out that it is the government's homophobic propaganda that has the power, capital and tools to influence Hungarian citizen's opinions significantly instead of minority advocates.

LGBTQ advocacy groups, in general (such as 'LGBT groups' or 'the Polish LGBTQ movement') and by name (such as the 'Háttér Society' or 'ILGA,' the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association), appeared in three posts each (Table 13). This is strikingly low, considering that, among other things, Hungarian LGBTQ advocacy groups responded to politicians' discriminatory statements during the year by putting out statements and organizing demonstrations. Furthermore, Pride month, the second most mentioned LGBTQ-related event, was organized by LGBTQ organizations and advocacy groups.

The distribution of LGBTQ actors' portrayal among politicians is also worth examining. Of the 45 politicians, 16 did not post anything related to LGBTQ people in 2019. The

[51] „[…] Ráadásul az adópénzekből tolt tájékoztatásnak hazudott masszív kormánypropaganda egyik fő alakja ismét megmutatta, hogy ők a legelnyomottabb kisebbség az országban: itt nem ám ők, hanem a mások, a liberális-sztálinista-buzilobbi akarja átformálni a magyar emberek gondolkodását. […g"

remaining 29 politicians engaged in mixed portrayals of the minority group. In Table 14, the distribution of active or passive minority actor portrayal or lack thereof is presented among politicians who posted the most frequently about LGBTQ people on their official Facebook page.

14. Table. Distribution of portrayal modes of LGBTQ actors among politicians (no. of posts)

	Active portrayal	**Passive portrayal**	**Not portrayed**	***Sum***
Péter Ungár (LMP)	12	5	13	*30*
Gergely Karácsony (PM)	8	6	5	*19*
Katalin Cseh (Momentum)	3	6	3	*12*
Bernadett Szél (Independent)	4	6	2	*12*
Katalin Novák (Fidesz)	0	1	7	*8*
Tamás Soproni (Momentum)	4	3	1	*8*
Márta V. Naszályi (Párbeszéd)	1	4	3	*8*

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Notably, politicians posting the most frequently about the LGBTQ minority are left-leaning opposition politicians, with one exception, Katalin Novák (Fidesz). Although Péter Ungár posted most frequently about LGBTQ people, in almost half of his posts, the minority group did not appear as actors (Table 14). This was due to Ungár's 2019 Parliamentary proposal for including sex education in the National Core Curriculum. This proposal quickly turned into a debate about teaching about and sensitizing children towards LGBTQ people in public schools. In this debate, Ungár tried to shift the conversation back from sensitizing to essential sex education, in which topic LGBTQ people were not inherently and always actors. Furthermore, Ungár also posted cynical and humorous comebacks for other politicians' discriminatory statements targeting his sexuality or LGBTQ people in general, which posts also lacked LGBTQ people as actors.

While Márta V. Naszályi's (Párbeszéd) posts were similar to Ungár's regarding their imbalance between the portrayal modes, other listed politicians' representations of LGBTQ actors were more balanced between the three categories (Table 14). The prevalence and distribution of each portrayal mode imply that even those politicians most invested in the representation of LGBTQ people, by not portraying minority individuals or organizations as actors, often wrote about the minority in ways that separated the movement or the phenomena from actual, real people and several times even erased minority individuals from the discourse.

A noteworthy exception is Katalin Novák, Fidesz's then Minister for Family Affairs, who primarily opted not to portray LGBTQ people at all (Table 14). In Novák's posts, the LGBTQ minority is not named but merely implied through the political-ideological

context as posing a 'threat' to 'traditional families.' These posts positioned international anti-LGBTQ advocacy groups, such as the Political Network for Values or the Alliance Defending Freedom, in a positive context, praising their aims and efforts and some even suggesting that the so-called 'traditional family values' or 'traditional families' are under attack from which they should be protected from. The following post exemplifies this lack of portrayal of LGBTQ people.

> I was honored to be elected President of the Political Network for Values. […] I accept the position because I am pleased to see that Hungary and the Hungarian government are seen as role models when it comes to human dignity, the protection of the family, the importance of family values, and human life. (Novák, 2019b)[52]

Political Network for Values is a conservative Christian lobbying group that defines families exclusively as consisting of a married heterosexual couple and their children. The group explicitly advocates against abortion, same-sex marriage, and same-sex couples' right to raise children. The support of this lobbying group and László Kövér's speech earlier that year both suggest that, on the one hand, these are the so-called 'traditional family values' that should be supported and upheld, and on the other hand, the threat from which families have to be protected, according to the governing parties, are LGBTQ families and women's fundamental health rights. Several KDNP politicians shared similar sentiments throughout the year.

However, Novák's posts were noteworthy for another reason as well: as the Minister for Family Affairs, she predominantly posted about issues that affect family life, such as regulations, grants, opportunities, welfare, and financial benefits exclusively for families. Although she did not mention it in her posts, LGBTQ families were always, without a doubt, excluded from the definition of family and thus from these opportunities as well. Albeit Novák did not emphasize it, her party passed a new constitution and, subsequently, several amendments that specifically denied acknowledging same-sex relationships as families and prohibited same-sex marriage on a constitutional level (see Section 2.1.2). As Novák never implied that her opinions about family would differ from the mainstream governmental ideology about families, her posts addressing families de facto exclude non-heterosexual families. Therefore, even though there were only eight posts in which Novák at least implied the existence of non-heterosexual people, almost all of her posts

[52] "Az a megtiszteltetés ért, hogy megválasztottak a Political Network for Values elnökének. […] Azért vállalom el a tisztséget, mert örömmel tapasztalom, hogy Magyarországra és a magyar kormányra mintaadóként tekintenek, ha az emberi méltóságról, a család védelméről, a családi értékek fontosságáról vagy az emberi életről van szó."

were based on a heteronormative understanding of the family and, as such, contained a political stance on the private and family life of LGBTQ people.

Section 4.4.3 Roma actors

Of the 193 Roma people-related and 33 both-minority group-related posts, 152 mentioned Roma individuals, organizations, or actors supporting the Roma minority. Table 15 shows the distribution of Roma actor groups among the 226 posts mentioning Roma or both minorities. Similarly to the portrayal of LGBTQ actors, the most usually mentioned actor category was that of *the minority group in general*, like 'the Roma' or 'Roma people,' or individuals only referred to by their ethnicity.

15. Table. Distribution of Roma actor categories

	No. of mentioning posts	**Share of mentioning posts**
Roma people, in general	100	44%
Specific individuals (named or implied)	51	23%
Roma artists, artist collectives (named)	21	9%
Advocacy groups in general	12	5%
Advocacy groups by name	11	5%
Actors supportive of the Roma minority	10	4%

Source: Author's own elaboration.

The following excerpt from Ferenc Gyurcsány's (DK) post commemorating the 2008-2009 Roma murders is an example of the generalized portrayal of the minority group.

> On the anniversary of the horrific Roma serial murders, I re-watched Eszter Hajdú's film about it. Horror. Horror in every aspect. The insane murder of everyday people just because they were gypsies. The trembling pain of those who remained. […] (Gyurcsány, 2019a, excerpt) [53]

Specific Roma individuals mentioned in 51 posts (Table 15) include Roma civilians, Roma self-government representatives, and the formerly introduced well-known Roma politicians Flórián Farkas and Lívia Járóka (see Section 4.2.3). The portrayal of these actors was divided along the lines of the politicians publishing the posts. Flórián Farkas appeared as an actor exclusively in Ákos Hadházy's (independent) posts, while many rural local Roma self-government representatives appeared as actors only in Félix Farkas's (Roma nationality advocate) posts. Opposition politicians depicted most of the other Roma individuals portrayed, such as Krisztina Balogh, Edina Sztojka, and other civilians. The following example of naming individual actors is from Gergely

[53] "A borzalmas romagyilkosság-sorozat évfordulóján újra belenéztem Hajdú Eszter erről szóló filmjébe. Iszonyat. Iszonyat mindenhonnan nézve. Hétköznapi emberek őrült legyilkolása, csak mert cigányok voltak. A megmaradtak remegő fájdalma. […]"

Karácsony's (Párbeszéd) official Facebook page.

> […] This is why, on the 10th anniversary of the events, I would like to initiate as a representative of the capital to create a monument to be erected in a worthy place. Let it be a place where Roma and non-Roma, parents and children can sit down, remember, and ask for peace for Mária Balogh, Tiborné Nagy, Róbert Csorba, Jenő Kóka, József Nagy and Robika Csorba. […] (Karácsony, 2019a, excerpt)[54]

In this post, Gergely Karácsony commemorated the victims of the 2008-2009 Roma murders and initiated a memorial to be created for them. In his post, Karácsony named every victim of the racist serial murders. This is paramount as it assigns names to the victims, giving them a face and a story, depicting them as real people, not just numbers or generic victims of racism. Only five posts mentioned any of the victims out of the eleven posts commemorating the event, but only one, Gergely Karácsony's post quoted above, named all six of them.

Roma artists and artist collectives as actors account for 9% of all posts that portrayed Roma actors (Table 15). These actors – theater artists and companies, musicians, and choirs – were, without exception, portrayed in an active role and inclusive-toned posts in connection with their artistic performances. Of the 21 Facebook posts portraying Roma artists as actors, 17 were published by Félix Farkas (Roma nationality advocate), two by Katalin Novák (Fidesz), and one each by György Gémesi (independent) and László Varju (DK).

Roma advocacy groups appeared as actors both in general (12 posts) and by name (11 posts) (Table 15). Roma self-governments were mentioned both in general, as institutions advocating for Roma people, and specifically by naming counties and towns' self-governments. Lungo Drom was also frequently mentioned. However, both the Roma-self-governments and Lungo Drom appeared several times in a negative context in opposition politicians' posts, accusing these organizations of stealing European Union funds and engaging in corruption and election fraud. In contrast, opposition politicians portrayed other Roma NGOs both in general and by name rarely as actors, although in a positive context. All the while, Félix Farkas, a member of Lungo Drom and Roma nationality advocate, depicted Roma self-governments and Lungo Drom as positive actors providing cultural and training events to rural Roma communities.

[54] "[…] Az események 10. évfordulóján éppen ezért szeretném fővárosi képviselőként kezdeményezni egy méltó helyen felállítandó emlékmű létrehozását. Legyen az egy olyan hely, ahol romák és nem romák, szülők és gyerekek le tudnak ülni, emlékezni és Balogh Máriának, Nagy Tibornénak, Csorba Róbertnek, Kóka Jenőnek, Nagy Józsefnek, és Csorba Robikának megbékélést kérni. […]"

Of the 45 politicians, 12 did not publish anything related to Roma people on their official Facebook page in 2019. The remaining politicians applied different portrayal modes regarding the minority. Table 16 shows the distribution of Roma actors' active or passive portrayal, or lack thereof, among politicians who published the highest number of posts in connection with Roma people in 2019.

16. Table. Distribution of portrayal modes of Roma actors among politicians (no. of posts)

	Active portrayal	**Passive portrayal**	**Not portrayed**	***Sum***
Félix Farkas (Roma nationality advocate)	38	20	18	*74**
Ákos Hadházy (independent)	12	5	2	*18**
Bernadett Szél (independent)	1	7	5	*13*
Dóra Dúró (Mi Hazánk)	2	2	8	*12*
Gergely Karácsony (Párbeszéd)	3	3	5	*11*

Source: Author's own elaboration.

In the case of Félix Farkas and Ákos Hadházy, the two remarkably active politicians in posting Roma-related Facebook posts, the aggregated number of posts is somewhat lower than the sum of their posts' portrayal modes (Table 16). This is due to some of their posts portraying Roma people both as active and passive actors. Namely, they depicted particular Roma actors as engaging in activities that affect the lives of Roma people. Additionally, both Farkas's and Hadházy's Roma-related posts were dominated by an active Roma portrayal, albeit for radically different reasons. While Farkas presented Roma artists and rural local Roma self-government representatives in a positive context as active actors, Hadházy focused almost exclusively on the embezzlement allegations against Flórián Farkas (former president of the Hungarian National Roma Self-Government) and the alleged election fraud Roma people took part in the 2019 municipal elections.

In the other three politicians' depictions of Roma actors, the ratio of passive portrayal is proportionately higher than in Farkas's and Hadházy's posts. At the same time, the lack of active portrayal is also notable (Table 16). However, there were crucial differences between these three politicians' portrayals of Roma actors. Many posts of Bernadett Szél and Gergely Karácsony that did not portray Roma actors commemorated the Holocaust Remembrance Days in a way that only addressed the Jewish victims of the Holocaust without mentioning any other victims. The higher proportion of passive portrayal in Szél's and some of Karácsony's posts also stemmed from the depiction of the minority group as helpless victims waiting to be saved by politicians instead of depicting the existing and working Roma advocacy groups and their initiatives. This portrayal was

employed regarding several events, such as Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós or János Pócs's video (see Section 4.2.2). In contrast, Dúró's posts addressed her party's issues with advertising in the media and public spaces, which were blocked due to the party's racist and anti-Roma ideology. Dúró responded to the ban on her party's advertisements in her posts without explicitly addressing the accusations of racism and anti-Roma sentiment and, hence, without portraying Roma actors at all. This way, Dúró avoided legitimizing the allegations and still argued for her party's right to advertise itself.

All in all, the portrayal of Roma and LGBTQ actors shows both significant similarities and differences. Concerning the agency or lack thereof assigned to minorities (Tonkiss, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008), it is paramount to emphasize that less than half of the minority-related posts portrayed both minorities as active actors with an agency. However, politicians more often assigned agency to the Roma actors (38%), while LGBTQ people appeared as active actors in only 27% of the related Facebook posts (see Table 12). Hence, Roma actors were more frequently portrayed as having agency over the processes in which they are portrayed. Politicians made statements and voiced their opinions about the minority groups without portraying Roma and LGBTQ people as actors in more than one-third of their posts, 31% and 40%, respectively (Table 12), thus contributing to a discursive construction of the concepts of the minorities as lacking any agency or role whatsoever in issues concerning them.

Regarding the portrayal of minority actors, politicians preferred *generalized* actor portrayal. Politicians preferred addressing minorities in general as a group or as individuals *characterized* only by their minority status, as 41% of all LGBTQ-related posts (Table 13) and 44% of all Roma-related posts (Table 15) employed this actor portrayal (Tonkiss, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008). The prevalence of *generalized* portrayal contributed to an alienated discursive construction of minority group concepts as it did not connect real minority individuals, faces, and lives to the concepts. *Individualized* portrayal (named minority individuals, organizations, and collectives) could somewhat mitigate this effect (Tables 13 and 15).

Examining the *individualized* portrayal of each minority group reveals differences. For instance, such portrayal of Roma people appeared in 37% of the Roma-related posts, while LGBTQ actors – individuals or organizations – were named in only 17% of the LGBTQ-related posts (Tables 13 and 15). However, many Roma individuals and

organizations named were either politicians in a negative context, accused of committing crimes, or Roma artists, further reinforcing long-standing Roma stereotypes (Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Munk, 2013). Notable exceptions were Roma civilians named in some posts either as active actors having agency over their own lives or as victims of the majority's discrimination. Concerning the LGBTQ minority, its actors' portrayal appears to be narrowed down to a generalized portrayal of a mass identified with their sexuality or gender identity.

After discussing the portrayal of minority actors, the following section presents the social roles assigned to Roma and LGBTQ minorities in politicians' Facebook posts.

Section 4.5 Minority roles

By connecting minority groups to specific practices, activities, and social processes, politicians assign certain social roles to each minority group. Therefore, this step studies politicians' *role allocation*, i.e., examines the social practices, activities, and processes connected to Roma and LGBTQ people in the minority-related Facebook posts (van Leeuwen, 2008) and their intersections with the previously presented meaning-making tools and strategies (such as various naming and identifying techniques, representation of minority voices, and portrayal of minority actors). The social roles depicted in politicians' Facebook posts are perceived and represented roles that minorities or minority individuals fulfill in their social relationships, whether personal, familial, professional, or perceived roles fulfilled by the entire minority in society. These roles can also be tools of cross-categorization when minority individuals are not portrayed solely for their minority status but for other reasons (Messing & Bernáth, 2017). The analysis examines social roles as key themes and the Roma and LGBTQ representations that cluster around them (Tonkiss, 2012). The assigned social roles are paramount as they highlight the relationships, hierarchies, and social dimensions in which politicians discursively construct the concepts of each minority group and thus reveal the relationships, hierarchical positions, and dimensions from which minorities were excluded in the minority-related discourse (Gee, 2010).

Table 17 shows the distribution of the social roles assigned in at least ten Facebook posts (for a list of each assigned social role, see Appendix H). While some roles were employed in relation to both minority groups, e.g., the role of victim and that of the politically active, others were assigned by politicians solely to one or the other minority group, like

preservers of culture and heritage or criminals (Table 17). The following sections introduce the ten most commonly assigned social roles in detail.

17. Table. Distribution of most frequently assigned social roles (no. of posts)

	LGBTQ people	**Roma people**	**Both minorities**	***Sum***
Victim	48	67	21	*136*
Politician	11	36	1	*48*
Artist	9	24	0	*33*
Worker, professional	2	19	2	*23*
Devoted to family	20	2	0	*22*
Preserver of culture and heritage	0	20	0	*20*
Criminal	0	19	0	*19*
Embracing their identity	10	7	0	*17*
Participant of education	5	9	2	*16*
Politically active	7	5	0	*12*
Threat to (parts of) society	9	1	1	*11*
Self-organizing	1	8	1	*10*

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Section 4.5.1 Victims

The concepts of Roma and LGBTQ minorities were constructed most frequently along the social role of victims, as one or both minority groups were portrayed as such in more than a third of all minority-related posts (Table 17). Comparing the Roma and the LGBTQ minorities' share in the social role, 49% and 35%, respectively, to their share in all of the minority-related posts – which was 52% for the Roma and 39% for the LGBTQ – a relatively small difference of 3-4% can be observed. However, posts about both minorities were somewhat overrepresented in this social role, accounting for 15% of the posts that assigned this social role. This is due to the high number of Holocaust commemorating posts, which assigned the victim role to both minority groups – even if not explicitly.

Politicians particularly often assigned the role of victims to minorities in posts that conveyed no other information or political stance but only a generic moral evaluation of events in connection with LGBTQ or Roma people. In such posts, politicians merely stated or implied that a homophobic/racist event, act, or situation was horrific and unacceptable, but they did not mention specific details of the issue, nor their proposed solution for it, or voiced arguments of any kind in support of their evaluation. These posts signed politicians' generic minority-supporting opinions and image of progressiveness instead of focusing on the situations, structures, and actions that victimize these

minorities. For example, in the following post of Anna Orosz (Momentum), which she published along with a picture of her holding a can of Coca-Cola (implying the posts' connection to the then-recently launched Coca-Cola campaign), the politician did not state any kind of opinion other than generally condemning the homophobia-fueled outrage around the campaign. LGBTQ people were assigned the social role of the victim implicitly, as the two sentences call for the end of "this nonsense," which was the public debate around whether portraying same-sex couples in advertisements posed a threat to Hungarian society. LGBTQ people, in this case, were implicit victims because they were not allowed to live in peace.

> Enough of this nonsense. Let people live. (Orosz, 2019)[55]

These kinds of posts are somewhat inevitable on a social media platform that, by its user interface appearance, is not meant for publishing several pages of opinions on specific social issues. However, when politicians rely on short and morally evaluating posts lacking arguments in such volume, minorities' portrayal seems to function as an empty signifier of progressiveness instead of representing the diverse social issues Roma and LGBTQ people face.

In addition, examining the high proportion of such posts in light of previous research findings on Hungarian politicians' use of social media may underpin Bene's (2017) earlier findings. According to Bene (2017), politicians' short, emotionally saturated posts conveying moral evaluation and outrage are more likely to go viral on Hungarian social media, a phenomenon many politicians aspire to achieve as it serves as quasi-free advertising due to the platform's algorithm. It is reasonable to assume that politicians were also aware of this phenomenon, as most engage in data and reach analysis regarding their social media platforms (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018; Bene & Somodi, 2018). Therefore, crafting their posts to be short, morally judging, and emotionally saturated that assign the role of victims to LGBTQ and Roma minorities can be perceived as an attempt to maximize their chances of going viral.

Minorities were portrayed as various kinds of victims, such as victims of hatred and discrimination, fatal or physical victims, victims of hate speech, embezzlement, blackmail, and so on. LGBTQ and Roma people were both frequently assigned the role of victims *of discrimination, hatred, and general hostility*. While for the former minority

[55] "Elég az ostobaságból. Hagyjátok élni az embereket."

group, this was the most common type of victimization, for Roma people, it was only the second most usually occurring victim role. Politicians assigned this specific victim role by explicitly or implicitly suggesting that the minority group, in general, was hated, discriminated against, or not accepted by society or a broader group of people. Two kinds of posts assigned this role to minorities in the subcorpus. The first group merely stated the existence of general hatred, discrimination, or hostility against minority groups. At the same time, posts in the second category did not stop at addressing the phenomenon but also highlighted specific, more defined struggles. The main difference between them is that while both kinds emphasized that minority issues were a broad social problem, the latter also showed that standing up for minorities is not just a political move, an empty signifier of progressivity, but the politician also paid attention to some specific issues.

The following post from Erzsébet Schmuck's Facebook page (LMP) exemplifies those posts that did not further specify the source, way, or manifestation of minority struggles but solely made a statement against discrimination and the incitement of hatred.

> At the invitation of the Roma Sajtóközpont - Roma Press Center and the Polgár Foundation, NGO representatives and political parties made a commitment at 1Magyarország Piknik to fight against incitement of hatred with the means at our disposal, may it be directed toward any minority. János Kendernay and I were honored to attend the event. "There is one Hungary whose citizens are all equal, and there is no place for the incitement of hatred in our country." (Schmuck, 2019)[56]

Katalin Cseh's (Momentum) following post exemplifies the discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ people as victims of general hostility.

> Even though it is 2019, the LGBTQ community in Hungary is once again under increasing attack. As long as this situation persists, Pride is needed, and we will attend Budapest Pride. Join us this Saturday; look for the Momentum team! Come with Momentum to Pride!! #pridebudapest (Cseh, 2019d)[57]

In this post, Cseh established that the LGBTQ community in Hungary was under attack without mentioning who was attacking them and in what way or how the community was suffering due to said attacks. In addition, Cseh insinuated that there is a need for the Pride March just as long as LGBTQ people were attacked or discriminated against when

[56] "A Roma Sajtóközpont - Roma Press Center és a Polgár Alapítvány meghívására civil szervezetek, és politikai pártok képviselői együtt kötelezték el magukat az 1Magyarország Piknik keretében a mellett, hogy a rendelkezésünkre álló eszközökkel fellépünk a gyűlöletkeltés ellen, irányuljon az bármelyik kisebbség felé. Megtisztelő, hogy Kendernay Jánossal együtt ott lehettünk a rendezvényen. »Egy Magyarország van, melynek állampolgárai mind egyenlőek és nincs helye országunkban gyűlöletkeltésnek.«"

[57] "Annak ellenére, hogy 2019-et írunk, újra egyre több támadás éri az LMBTQ közösséget Magyarországon. Egészen addig, amíg fennáll ez a helyzet, szükség van a Pride-ra és mi ott leszünk a Budapest Pride-on. Tartsatok Ti is velünk most szombaton, keressétek a Momentumos csapatot! Gyere a Momentummal a Pride-ra!! #pridebudapest"

writing, “As long as this situation persists…”. This suggests that the Momentum party understood Pride solely as LGBTQ people’s demonstration for social acceptance, which would be a misunderstanding, as both the Pride and the Pride March are also about LGBTQ people’s inalienable right to exist in public spaces without having to hide and conform traditional gender roles and sexual identities.

LGBTQ people were also portrayed as *victims of hate speech* and *inequality*. Here, hate speech as a category of victimization refers to an act of communication that humiliates or intimidates a social group or provokes physical violence against its members and not to the crime specified in the Hungarian Criminal Code. Posts ascribing the role of victims of hate speech were somewhat more precise than the ones previously introduced, as they indicated the manifestation of the hostile attitude against the minority group. The following excerpt from Bernadett Szél (independent) exemplifies the assignment of this role.

> […] This is what illiberalism looks like in action; it's the result of intellectual well-poisoning, verbal abuse pouring on tap, people being picked on and publicly humiliated in the media, and then beating up people having fun peacefully in a village fair. […] (Szél, 2019c, excerpt) [58]

In this post, Szél referred to the physical assault of a woman in a Hungarian village fair who was beaten up for wearing a rainbow-colored tote bag, a symbol of the LGBTQ minority. Szél’s post suggested that the physical assault was the outcome of a long-standing hate speech against the LGBTQ minority, as the listed acts (“verbal abuse,” “public humiliation in the media”) exhaust the above-presented definition of hate speech—moreover, the post connected homophobic hate speech to the homophobic hate crime. As the post was published in August 2019, the “intellectual well-poisoning” and public humiliation of people in the media probably referred to Fidesz and KDNP politicians and pro-government media’s anti-LGBTQ rhetoric, like that of László Kövér’s speech and M5’s television program promoting conversion therapy.

Being victims of inequality is a role that was assigned solely to sexual minorities in the subcorpus. According to the findings of Takács (2004) and Tamássy (2019), this portrayal is also prevalent in Hungarian media. The role was ascribed usually through the explicit or implicit assertion of inequality in the rights of LGBTQ individuals and the

[58] “Így néz ki az illiberalizmus működés közben, ez a szellemi kútmérgezés eredménye, verbális erőszak folyik a csapból is, kipécéznek és nyilvánosan megaláznak embereket a médiában, majd összevernek békésen szórakozó embereket egy falunapon.”

identification of the situation as a problem in need of change. However, most posts emphasized only that everyone, including LGBTQ people, should have the right to love or live with anyone. Thus, instead of explicitly standing up for actual legal demands, such as equality in marriage or adoption, politicians did not name any actual demands but published blank performative statements. The following post from András Fekete-Győr (Momentum), published on the day of the 2019 Budapest Pride March, exemplifies this.

> Equal rights for EVERYBODY! (Fekete-Győr, 2019a)[59]

Concerning victim roles most regularly assigned to Roma people, these were the *victims of physical and fatal abuse* and *victims of fate*. The role *of victims of physical or fatal abuse* was ascribed to the Roma minority most frequently in posts about specific events, e.g., the Roma Holocaust, the Roma murders of 2008-2009, and the Holocaust in general. It is worth noting that none of these events were contemporary events of the time period analyzed. Only three posts connected these events to the then-contemporary public discourse and socio-political context, drawing an analogy between the 2008-2009 Roma murders and the anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós in 2019. That is, while some politicians assigned this role to Roma people based on the past merely, others drew conclusions for the present and future and specified which political elements, parties, or groups need to be stopped or, on the contrary, strengthened so that such things would not happen again to the Roma. Katalin Cseh's (Momentum) post exemplifies the latter.

> ❌ We cannot stay silent ❌ It has been many years since aggressive far-right extremists held demonstration after demonstration to intimidate *our compatriots*. […] At the time, this led to terrible things: the actions and rhetoric may have contributed to the gypsy murders and, in the eyes of many, stigmatized anyone who, *as well as being Hungarian, was proud to be Roma*. Now it looks like those times may be coming back again: on Tuesday evening, aggressive far-right extremists will once again hold a hateful demonstration in Törökszentmiklós […] This time, however, we cannot make the same mistake as a decade ago. We cannot remain silent. […] We cannot remain silent because such actions instill a fear of death in *our compatriots*. […] (Cseh, 2019c, emphasis added)[60]

In her post, Cseh evoked the Roma murders of 2008-2009 when arguing for the importance of the counter-demonstration against Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration

[59] „Egyenlő jogokat MINDENKINEK!"

[60] „❌Nem maradhatunk csendben ❌ Sok éve már annak, hogy agresszív szélsőjobboldaliak egymás után tartották a honfitársainkat megfélemlítő vonulásaikat. […] Akkor ez szörnyű dolgokhoz vezetett: az akkori akciók és retorika hozzájárulhattak a cigánygyilkosságokhoz, és sokak szemében bélyegeztek meg mindenkit, aki magyarsága mellett roma voltára is büszke. Most úgy tűnik, újra eljöhet ez az idő: kedden este Törökszentmiklóson újra agresszív szélsőjobboldaliak tartanak gyűlöletkeltő vonulást […] Ezúttal azonban nem követhetjük el ugyanazt a hibát, mint egy évtizede. Nem maradhatunk csendben. […] Nem maradhatunk csendben, mert az ilyen akciók honfitársainkban keltenek halálfélelmet. […]"

in Törökszentmiklós. Therefore, contrary to many other posts in this category, the politician here not only assigned the role of victims of physical or fatal abuse to Roma to express sympathy and commemorate the victims but also to initiate actions.

Posts ascribing the role of victims of fatal or physical abuse and the role of victims of generic hostility to Romani people both applied a meaning-making tool that constructed the concept of Roma people as integral to Hungarian society and the Hungarian nation. This tool was the definition of Roma as Hungarian people, done by referring to the minority as, among other things, "our fellow citizens," "fellow beings," "Romani Hungarians," "Hungarians," or "our compatriots," as done Cseh in the above-introduced post. This meaning-making tool was relatively rarely used, appearing in only 25 posts (10% of all Romani-related posts). Roma people were mentioned as such in other social roles also, for example, when portrayed as workers & professionals and participants in education. It was an important means of discursive construction, nevertheless, as it openly denied those discourses that construct the concepts of Hungarians and Roma people as mutually exclusive groups, such as that of the 'gypsy terror' (Juhász, 2010).

In the portrayal of Roma as *victims of fate*, political figures often omitted the area, spectrum, or manifestation of discrimination. Notably, no identifiable responsible actors were mentioned either. Instead, the Roma were depicted as passive recipients of predetermined destiny. In this social role, adversities, such as poverty, lack of opportunities, and social marginalization, appeared as inherent to the Roma existence. Politicians ascribed the role to the Roma by addressing 'Roma issues' and 'Roma inclusion' as a set of distinct and complex social challenges, that is, by acknowledging the minority group's long-standing marginalized position in Hungarian society, without naming actors, policies, or other systemic issues responsible for this marginalized social position, or even acknowledging the group's minority position. This portrayal of the Roma minority reflects a victim role that is distinctly characteristic of the Roma-related discourse, as it was virtually absent from posts pertaining to the LGBTQ minority. The following excerpt from Félix Farkas (Roma nationality advocate) exemplifies this victim.

> […] The Roma nationality advocate said that it is not true that everyone is born with equal opportunities because it is not easy to come from a disadvantaged Roma family and to rise from there requires extraordinary effort and perseverance. […] (Farkas, 2019b, excerpt)[61]

[61] "[…] A roma nemzetiségi szószóló kifejtette: nem igaz az az állítás, hogy mindenki egyenlő eséllyel születik, mert hátrányos helyzetű roma családba érkezni nem könnyű és onnan kiemelkedni rendkívüli erőfeszítést és kitartást igényel. […]"

Section 4.5.2 Politicians and artists

The discourse analysis revealed a significant convergence among the posts ascribing the social roles of politicians and artists to Roma and LGBTQ people and those identifying LGBTQ and Roma minorities through well-known politicians and artist members of the groups (see Section 4.2.3). Additionally, there is a profound association between these posts and those portraying Roma and LGBTQ people as active actors as politicians and artists (see Section 4.4). This convergence underscores the predominant individualized and active portrayal of minority politicians and artists in these roles instead of a generalized construction of the concepts of the minority groups in these roles.

However, there are some noteworthy characteristics of these social roles in regard to each minority group. Firstly, Roma people were overrepresented in comparison to their share in all minority-related posts in both roles: they were depicted in the social role of politicians and artists in 36 posts and 24 posts, respectively (Table 17), accounting for 75% and 73% of posts assigning each social roles to any minority group. In comparison, the share of the solely Roma-related posts in the subcorpus was 52%. This overrepresentation was due to Félix Farkas's (Roma nationality advocate) activity on his official Facebook page. Almost half of the 36 posts in which politicians ascribed the social role of politicians to Roma people and more than two-thirds of those assigning the role of artists to Roma people were published by the Roma nationality advocate. These shed light on two critical characteristics of these social roles. On the one hand, they were a predominant part of a prominent minority politician's self-portrayal of the Roma minority. On the other hand, due to the lack of dialogue between the nationality advocate and every other politician analyzed, the roles the nationality advocate assigned to Roma people in his posts were scarcely reflected in other politicians' Facebook communication. Thus, Roma people's overrepresentation in these roles was not a dominant meaning-making strategy of the majority politicians but rather an isolated case in which a member of the minority group constructed the concept of Roma people through these roles. As such, these portrayals were also probably aimed at the politically active Roma individuals by their advocate.

Secondly, the convergence also highlights that LGBTQ people were assigned these roles in particular instances. The political role predominantly emerged in posts in which politicians made reference to Péter Ungár's sexual orientation in relation to his political activity, including his own referrals. It is noteworthy that none of the politicians depicted

Ungár's sexual orientation in a derogatory manner. The social role of actors emerged almost exclusively in Gergely Karácsony's posts about Róbert Alföldi, who was portrayed for his political stance and endorsement of Karácsony in the municipal elections of 2019.

Section 4.5.3 Workers, professionals, employees

19 of the 23 posts scribing the social role of workers and employees assigned the role to Roma people solely (Table 17). That is 82% of the posts, compared to the 52% share of Roma posts in the whole subcorpus. Therefore, the Roma minority was overrepresented in this social role as well. In contrast, politicians portrayed LGBTQ people in this social role in only two Facebook posts (9%). Consequently, the portrayal of minorities in this social role is a meaningful difference in the discursive construction of the concept of each minority group.

In this social role, minorities were depicted through their status in the labor market and related characteristics and opportunities, namely Roma individual's opportunities (or lack thereof) and willingness to work. Notably, nobody, not even the far-right politicians, ascribed the role in a negative context even though it is a long-standing, widespread negative stereotype that Roma people are unemployed and not willing to work (Juhász, 2010; Messing, 2003; Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Munk, 2013). Presumably, right-wing politicians' utterances depicting Roma people in this role in a negative context may have been removed before the data gathering for this analysis (see Section 3.6). However, it can also be reasonably assumed that right-wing politicians did not assign the role to Roma people because such sentiments no longer fit into Jobbik's aspirations to cooperate with other opposition political actors and to become a moderate right-wing party instead of a radical one (Róna & Molnár, 2017). At the same time, politicians of Mi Hazánk assigned other inherently racist social roles, such as a 'threat to society,' 'incapable of integration,' and 'criminal' (see Appendix H), that is, roles more typical of the post-mid-2000s anti-Roma discourse (Juhász, 2010; Pócsik, 2007; Vidra & Fox, 2014). In contrast, the Roma nationality advocate and several opposition politicians emphasized the Roma people's aspirations to work, probably to combat the said negative stereotypes about the minority group. The following post from András Fekete-Győr's (Momentum) Facebook page exemplifies when politicians portrayed the Roma as aspiring to work.

> […] All 1300 members of Alsószentmárton in Baranya County are Boyash Gypsies. Mihály Jovánovics, a prominent member of the community, used to work as a

> stonemason; he is now a knifemaker and is running in the municipal elections as a member of the Momentum party. […] I really liked being here because we spoke the same language: we want to have Roma police officers, doctors, lawyers, programmers, and managers in 21st-century Hungary. […] (Fekete-Győr, 2019b, excerpt)[62]

In this post, Fekete-Győr implicitly emphasized the lack of Roma people in certain, mostly high-paying, or highly respected professional jobs. By using the plural first person when describing the need for Roma people in such professions, Fekete-Győr suggested that these are his wishes and Roma's professional aspirations as well.

Many politicians from various parties assigned the role to Roma people. While some emphasized that the Roma work and aspire to work, like Fekete-Győr in his previously presented post, others somewhat indirectly ascribed the role. For example, they congratulated Krisztina Balogh on her resignation from public media, portraying a Roma individual first and foremost through their professional career. In contrast, depicting Roma people in the role of employers was extremely rare, as it appeared in only two posts published by the Roma nationality advocate.

Another aspect of this social role is exemplified in the following excerpt from Félix Farkas's (Roma nationality advocate) Facebook page.

> […] There are no problems with the Roma community in Törökszentmiklós; they live honest, honorable lives and work. The [Roma] self-government representatives and the local Roma population are asking the Hungarian Roma community not to go to the demonstration in Törökszentmiklós on Tuesday. (Farkas, 2019d, excerpt)[63]

In this post, Farkas Farkas indirectly refuted the key points of Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma protest in Törökszentmiklós by asserting that local Roma individuals *work*. Albeit such statements challenge or counter the above-introduced long-standing, pervasive negative stereotype about the Roma minority, they do not question the underlying assumption of the stereotype. This underlying assumption is that there are 'deserving poor,' i.e., hard-working, productive, and typically perceived as white, and 'undeserving poor,' i.e., perceived to be unproductive. While the former 'deserve' support and respect from society, the latter do not 'deserve' help. In the long-standing racist discourse about Roma's employment, the Roma are depicted as undeserving poor, as they, according to

[62] „A Baranya megyei Alsószentmárton mind az 1300 tagja beás cigány. A közösség oszlopos tagja Mihály Jovánovics, aki régen kőművesként, ma késkészítőként dolgozik, és a Momentum Mozgalom színeiben indul az önkormányzati választáson. […] Nagyon szerettem itt lenni, mert egy nyelvet beszéltünk: azt akarjuk, hogy a XI. századi Magyarországon legyenek cigány rendőrök, orvosok, ügyvédek, programozók, és menedzserek."

[63] „[…] A törökszentmiklósi roma közösséggel nincsenek problémák, tisztességesen, becsületesen és munkából élnek. Az önkormányzat képviselői és a helyi roma lakosság is arra kéri a hazai cigányságot, hogy ne menjenek el a keddi törökszentmiklósi demonstráció helyszínére."

the stereotype, do not work nor aspire to work and, as such, are not productive members of society (Messing & Bernáth, 2017). Challenging this anti-Roma stereotype could address three facets: first, it could be emphasized that Roma people are already productive members of society, thereby disproving the stereotype, as Farkas did in his abovementioned post. Second, it could be advocating for Roma people's right to high-level education and to work in professional and well-paying careers, thus helping them become productive members of society, as Fekete-Győr did in his previously presented Facebook post. Third, it could be argued that every Hungarian citizen has the right to be supported, respected, and helped, regardless of their perceived economic productivity. The latter of which was not addressed in any of the examined posts.

Section 4.5.4 Devoted to family

Politicians assigned the social role of being devoted to family to minorities by depicting them as having or wanting to have a family, get married, or have children. The portrayal of minorities in this social role is another substantial difference between the discursive construction of the concept of each minority group; as of the 22 posts in which politicians assigned this role to any minority, 20 (91%) were about LGBTQ people (Table 17) compared to their 39% share in the subcorpus. At the same time, only two posts (9%) ascribed the role to Roma people.

This social role was assigned to minorities both to exclude them from the definition of family and to include them in it, which differed along political parties: the role appeared to exclude minorities in the posts of Fidesz, KDNP, and Mi Hazánk politicians, while opposition politicians ascribed the role to include minorities to this area of social relationships, except for Jobbik, whose politicians did not portray minorities in this role at all.

In politicians' posts, the devotion of LGBTQ people to having a family was most often embodied in pondering or explicitly advocating for the legalization of same-sex marriage and the adoption of children by same-sex couples. The frequency of the occurrence of the role was significantly affected by László Kövér's speech that aimed to exclude LGBTQ people from child-rearing. Kövér's speech virtually defined the role in which the concept of the minority was discursively constructed in the public and political discourse throughout the year. However, there were notable exceptions when politicians independently stated their stance on the topic or reacted to other politicians' related claims in their posts. The following post from András Béres (Párbeszéd) exemplifies the latter.

> The deputy leader of Fidesz's parliamentary group is furious about Pride. He said that only pictures of happy families should be shared. So why doesn't he take a stand against domestic violence and vote for the ratification of the Istanbul Convention? Why is he obstructing the marriage of gay couples to live as happy families? (Béres, 2019)[64]

In this post, Béres evoked István Boldog's (Fidesz) call for banning the Pride March to draw attention to Boldog's discriminative understanding of family life, which ignores women's health, safety, and happiness as well as the needs of the same-sex couples. Thereby, he highlighted his LGBTQ-inclusive definition of families.

The following post of Zsolt Semjén (KDNP) exemplifies those utterances ascribing the role in an exclusionary context.

> About Háttér Society's "sensitizing" campaign
> The Hungarian government maintains two things: the word marriage is a sacred word, which means the holy union of a man and a woman, and on the other hand, the right of a child to a healthy upbringing is a more important right than the right of homosexual couples to have a child. Therefore, the child's upbringing belongs to the family, where it can learn the role of the father and the mother. (Semjén, 2019) [65]

In this post about Háttér Society's television and billboard campaign, the politician defined LGBTQ people through their aspirations for marriage and child adoption by excluding same-sex couples from the institution of marriage and the definition of family and arguing that same-sex couples could not provide a healthy environment for a child's upbringing.

However, the prevalence of the social role in the discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ people sheds light on the that the interpretation of sexual minorities in Hungarian public and political discourse is still heavily defined by presenting the minority group as merely wishing to live in a 'traditional' family. On the one hand, a large portion of LGBTQ people aspires to get married and have kids (Takács & Szalma, 2020), which, if legalized, could enhance the acceptance of LGBTQ people and families, as previous research has suggested (Takács & Szalma, 2011). On the other hand, politicians relied on this social role so heavily, both in inclusive and exclusionary contexts, that they pushed to the side the representation of LGBTQ people in non-monogamous or non-romantic

[64] "A Fidesz frakcióvezetőhelyettese kiakadt a Pride-on. Szerinte a csak boldog családokat ábrázoló képeket szabadna megosztani. Akkor vajon miért nem lép fel a családon belüli erőszak ellen, miért nem szavazza meg az isztambuli egyezmény ratifikációját? Miért akadályozza, hogy a meleg párok összeházasodva boldog családként éljenek?"

[65] "A Háttér Társaság »érzékenyítő« kampányáról
Két dologhoz Magyarország kormánya ragaszkodik: a házasság szó egy megszentelt szó, ami egy férfi és egy nő megszentelt életszövetségét jelenti, másfelől pedig a gyereknek az egészséges fejlődéshez való joga erősebb jog, mint a homoszexuális pároknak a gyerekre való igénye. Ezért a gyereknek a nevelése a családra tartozik, ahol megtanulhatja az apai és anyai szerepet."

relationship-based roles. Thus, politicians excluded, or even erased, and made invisible those LGBTQ people from the concept of the minority group who cannot or do not want to fit into the majority or the majority's understanding of 'traditional family' – white, middle class, married, having kids.

Section 4.5.5 Preservers of culture and heritage

Politicians assigned the social role of preservers of culture and heritage exclusively to Roma people in the subcorpus (Table 17). The role emerged only in the posts of Farkas Félix, apart from the very few posts of Zsolt Semjén, then-Minister responsible for nationality policy. Thus, it formed an isolated discourse not reflected in other politicians' communication. Due to the lack of prevalence across the political spectrum, ascribing the role fulfilled the function of self-representation and discursive self-construction by Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality representative, instead of prevailing in the online Hungarian political communication. Thereby, it cannot be considered a meaningful difference in the discursive construction of the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma minorities in Hungarian online political communication.

Regarding the role, there was a significant convergence between posts assigning this role and those ascribing the role of artists to Roma people. The role of preservers of culture and heritage was ascribed to the Roma minority by emphasizing the value of Roma culture, the importance of keeping Roma culture and especially language alive, and the crucial role Roma culture has in Hungarian culture. In several of these posts, the nationality advocate voiced his support for these ideas simply by attending Roma cultural events, usually village fairs in rural Hungary. In addition, in many of these posts, the nationality advocate and Zsolt Semjén only stated the importance of preserving Roma culture but provided little to no information on how to do so or the culture itself.

Section 4.5.6 Criminals

Politicians also attributed the role of criminals only to Roma people (Table 17). Regarding the distribution of the role, there are two noteworthy aspects.

Firstly, two-thirds of these posts employed an *individualized* Roma portrayal and depicted a specific Roma individual, Flórián Farkas, as a criminal who allegedly committed embezzlement, corruption, and election fraud. These posts never mentioned the ethnicity of Flórián Farkas; however, as he was accused of stealing EU funds meant for enhancing

Roma integration as the president of the National Roma Self-Government, his political and criminal persona were practically inseparable from his ethnicity. In the remaining one-third of the posts, politicians used a *generalized* portrayal to depict 'Roma leaders' who allegedly took part in election fraud and embezzlement and, at the same time, assigned Roma people the role of victims of embezzlement. As such, the number of posts portraying Roma people in general as criminals is relatively low.

Secondly, regarding the distribution of roles among politicians, it is evident that Ákos Hadházy (independent) authored approximately two-thirds of these posts. Notably, Hadházy predominantly focused on Flórián Farkas's transgressions and did not depict Roma individuals in other social roles. It is worth noting that the assignment of the role of criminals to Roma individuals was not as singular as observed in the portrayal of previous roles, as this role was assigned to Roma people by politicians of Jobbik, Mi Hazánk, and MSZP.

Section 4.5.7 Minorities embracing their identity

The social role of minorities embracing their identity was somewhat more balanced in its distribution between minority groups than the social roles presented previously (Table 17). Nonetheless, LGBTQ people were still more often depicted in this role as of the 17 posts in which politicians ascribed the role, 10 (59%) assigned it to LGBBTQ people, and 7 (41%) to the Roma.

There was a significant convergence between the posts that assigned this role to Roma people and those attributing the role of preservers of culture and heritage. As the role of preservers of culture and heritage was primarily employed by Félix Farkas and somewhat by Zsolt Semjén, the convergence of these roles suggests that in the government and the Roma nationality advocate's Roma-related discourse, Roma identity was embraced through the preservation and consumption of Roma culture. In addition, almost none of the opposition politicians emphasized the importance of embracing the Roma identity, albeit many of their posts reported on events in which the Roma people were victims because of their ethnicity, which could make it harder and predictably more dangerous for them to embrace their identity publicly.

Posts depicting LGBTQ people in the role of embracing their identity were particular to specific events. These were either 'coming-out' events in which a person publicly acknowledged their non-heterosexual orientation, such as Péter Ungár's coming out or

the coming out of the lángos buffet owner, Richárd Szabó. In both cases, opposition politicians congratulated these LGBTQ individuals for publicly embracing their sexual orientation or identity (the two were used as synonyms in the posts) and assured them of their support. In the remaining cases, LGBTQ people were celebrated for their bravery in coming out in general. Opposition politicians posted all LGBTQ-related posts that assigned the role of identity-embracing. Through these gestures, opposition politicians acknowledged the unique social position of LGBTQ people for the need to define themselves publicly as a member of the minority in order to be able to stand up and advocate for themselves as well as the social challenges and threats that coming out pose to LGBTQ people (see Barát, 2011).

Section 4.5.8 Participants in education

Of the 16 posts in which politicians assigned the role of participants in education to minorities, five posts assigned this role to LGBTQ people and nine to Roma people (Table 17), while the two posts in connection with both minority groups mentioned specifically Roma in this role. The role was assigned both in inclusive and exclusionary contexts regarding both minority groups.

Roma and LGBTQ minorities appeared in slightly different positions in this role. Politicians assigned this role to Roma people by portraying them as possible students or beneficiaries of education. In such posts, the opposition politicians focused on the importance of integrated education and the lack of access to quality education for the Roma people. Only one post connected the role of Roma people as students to an anti-Roma discourse that of Dóra Dúró (Mi Hazánk), who argued for the so-called 'positive effects of segregation.' That said, the assignment of the role stretched beyond Félix Farkas's official Facebook page and appeared in several other opposition politicians' posts. In addition, almost all posts calling for integrated and good-quality education for Roma people assigned the role of employee or worker to Roma, connecting the two roles as two stages of the same process: the social and economic inclusion of Roma.

Politicians assigned this role to the LGBTQ minority by referring to the minority as part of the sex education curriculum and as people partaking in education. In many of these posts, the LGBTQ minority was depicted as an abstract concept when politicians argued about its inclusion in public school sex education curricula and sensitization programs. Dóra Dúró (Mi Hazánk) stands out as the sole politician who assigned a negative connotation to this role, asserting that sex education and sensitization classes could

potentially influence children's sexual orientation. Politicians who argued with her and, thus, created a discourse stretching beyond only one politician's or party's online political communication include Péter Ungár (LMP) and Katalin Cseh (Momentum). While Dúró consistently mixed up LGBTQ-inclusive sex education and sensitizing programs, Ungár highlighted the distinction between the two in several posts.

The main difference between ascribing the role to LGBTQ or Roma people was that while portraying Roma people as students addressed an issue's effect on minority individuals, the posts that assigned the role to LGBTQ people did not portray the minority group or its members but a social phenomenon and its effect on society.

Section 4.5.9 Politically active

The social role of the politically active was intended to grasp the representation of non-politician members of minorities who were depicted through their political opinions, stances, and acts. Of the 12 posts ascribing this role, seven assigned it to LGBTQ individuals and five to Roma (Table 17); thus, sexual minorities were overrepresented in this social role compared to their 39% share in the subcorpus.

In this role, minorities were portrayed as actively taking steps to influence politics or party politics. That is, minority individuals not only stated their opinions on public issues or issues concerning the minority group but advocated for political parties or were interested in influencing politics. However, taking a closer look at the characteristics of the posts assigning this role, the portrayal of minority individuals as politically active was a relatively isolated part of the political communication analyzed.

The portrayal of LGBTQ people as politically active was limited to depictions of Róbert Alföldi for his involvement in the 2019 municipal election campaign, supporting the opposition parties and especially Gergely Karácsony in Budapest. Consequently, this role was isolated due to its limited scope and actors. At the same time, there was a noticeable absence of portrayal of Roma people engaging in or influencing the municipal election through legal means, whether individually or collectively. This disparity is more evident when juxtaposing it with the call made by prominent Roma rights activist Jenő Setét for mayoral candidates in Budapest to present political programs targeting the city's Roma citizens, which received minimal response: a single post from Gergely Karácsony (Párbeszéd) that did not mention Setét. In contrast, Roma people were assigned the role of politically active almost exclusively in Félix Farkas's (Roma nationality advocate)

posts. Roma people were portrayed as generalized in this role in Farkas's posts, who also conveyed, through visual representation, that his party, Lungo Drom, played a significant role in the political empowerment of the Roma.

Through the analysis of the social roles attributed to minorities, it is evident that certain roles were characteristic of specific minority groups, while others were observed in a more balanced distribution. For instance, social roles such as being devoted to family, the role of employees, and the role of preservers of culture and heritage were assigned predominantly to one or the other minority group. In contrast, roles such as victims, participants in education, and embracing their identity were more evenly distributed among both minority groups. In addition, the role of victims was prominently depicted in relation to both LGBTQ and Roma minorities. However, politicians often ascribed this role in posts conveying general political statements and moral appraisals, such as denouncing the labeling of LGBTQ individuals as pedophiles or condemning physical threats against Roma people.

Politicians seldom provided detailed information on the spectrum, social-structural reasons, and manifestations of minorities' struggles. The prevalence of isolated roles in the subcorpus is also worth noting, such as those assigned by Félix Farkas to Roma people that were either not or rarely reinforced in other politicians' online communication. Concerning LGBTQ people, such an isolated role was that of the politically active, which appeared in the posts of Gergely Karácsony.

After presenting the results of the discourse analysis of Hungarian politicians' 2019 Facebook communication, the following chapter focuses on answering the research questions introduced previously.

Chapter 5. DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the results of the discourse analysis interpreted and summarized in light of the theoretical framework of the research project and previous research findings. In doing so, the chapter is structured around the guiding research questions. Thus, first, the different aspects of the discursive construction of the categories of Roma and LGBTQ and the similarities and differences between the meaning-making tools and strategies applied will be the focus. As such, the following research question will be answered:

> RQ 1. How does minority-related political communication discursively construct the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma people, and what are the main similarities and differences in the online portrayal of these minorities?

Secondly, I will discuss how the presented modes of the discursive construction of minority concepts were embedded in the socio-political context of the 2019 Hungarian public and media discourse. Beyond reflecting on the specificities of the year, broader structures will be highlighted as well, such as the use of minorities in political events and the patterns of party-political involvement in minority-related issues and events. This will answer the second research question of the research project, i.e.:

> RQ 2. What topics and events trigger Hungarian politicians to include these minorities in their Facebook communication?

Finally, macro-structural differences in the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people, i.e., the various dimensions of the social exclusion of ethnic and sexual minorities, will be discussed by drawing on the previously explored meaning-making tools and the contexts in which they were employed.

> RQ 3. To what extent do the online political portrayals of ethnic and sexual minorities differ in terms of the dimensions of social exclusion?

Section 5.1 The discursive construction of the concepts of LGBTQ and Roma

In answering the first research question, how minority-related political communication defines, and thus discursively constructs the concepts of LGBTQ and the Roma, the focus will be on the similarities of the applied meaning-making strategies first, then the

differences in the minority groups' portrayal, i.e., the particularities of the discursive construction of each minority category.

Table 18 summarizes the main similarities and differences in the discursive construction of the LGBTQ and Roma concepts in Hungarian online political communication.

18. Table. Similarities and differences in LGBTQ and Roma portrayal

<table>
<tr><th>LGBTQ</th><th>Roma</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Similarities</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">- overall neglection in social media political communication
- the determining role of the government's political communication
- isolated discourses
- widespread occurrence of commemorative posts
- victimization
- the infrequent portrayal of Roma and LGBTQ people as active actors
- using the minorities as empty tokens:
• the portrayal of politicians as active actors
• prevalent generalized actor portrayal
• lack of representation of minority voices and opinions</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Differences</td></tr>
<tr><td>- in the role of devoted to romantic relationships, family, and child-rearing</td><td>- in the role of politicians, artists, and workers and employees</td></tr>
<tr><td>- portrayal divided between opposition and government politicians</td><td>- portrayal divided between the Roma nationality advocate and opposition politicians</td></tr>
<tr><td>- few but frequently mentioned identifying events</td><td>- more but fragmented identifying events</td></tr>
<tr><td>- well-known members of the minority group in a positive context</td><td>- well-known members of the minority group in a negative context</td></tr>
<tr><td>- victims of the government and other politicians</td><td>- victims of fate</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Section 5.1.1 Overarching discursive strategies in the portrayal of Roma and LGBTQ people

The 45 Hungarian politicians included in this analysis published 18683 posts on their official Facebook pages in 2019. Of these, 177 posts were found to be related to LGBTQ individuals. More specifically, 144 posts addressed sexual minorities, while 33 posts mentioned both the Roma and LGBTQ minorities. Consequently, LGBTQ-related content, whether explicit or implied, appeared in just 0.95% of the total posts. Politicians had relatively little to say about the Roma as well. Out of the over eighteen thousand posts published in 2019, only 226 were linked to the Roma, with 193 being solely Roma-related. These 226 posts accounted for 1.21% of all posts published. Therefore, any portrayal of these minority groups was quite rare, given the size of the corpus. Furthermore, both Romani and LGBTQ were virtually absent from the official social media communication of members of the governing parties, Fidesz and KDNP. For example, Viktor Orbán, Hungary's prime minister, never posted any written or still visual

content about any of the selected minority groups. Politicians of Jobbik also handled these minorities as non-existent. In addition, the only Munkáspárt politician in the corpus, Gyula Thürmer, had posted zero unique textual content to Facebook, meaning that none of his social media activity was included in the discourse analysis.

Regarding the representation of sexual minorities, it is noteworthy that members of certain political parties did not address or acknowledge the existence of LGBTQ individuals in their online political communications in 2019. Specifically, minority representatives, the Munkáspárt, and Jobbik parties failed to include any mention of sexual minorities. Additionally, politicians of the Mi Hazánk, KDNP, and Fidesz parties each published fewer than ten posts related to LGBTQ issues, which tended to be negative or even hostile. As a result, LGBTQ individuals were almost absent from the online political communication of half of the 12 selected parties and political groups. Thus, the definition of the category of sexual minorities was dominated in social media by the remaining six parties or political groups, especially Péter Ungár (LMP) and the independent politicians, of whom the latter were outstandingly active in the portrayal of both minority groups.

The portrayal of Roma was less fragmented, with nearly every political party or group publishing content about Roma people, except for Munkáspárt. However, politicians from the governing parties and LMP rarely posted about the Roma people, accounting for fewer than ten posts in total. Consequently, the perception of the largest Hungarian ethnic minority group (KSH, 2011) was predominantly shaped by the social media communication of the other eight parties' members, albeit not always in an inclusive light. The most active individuals in shaping the discourse around the Roma were Félix Farkas, Roma nationality advocate, and independent politicians.

As for the similarities in the meaning-making and identifying techniques used, the discourse analysis indicates that *the actions of a specific group of politicians heavily determined* the construction of the concepts of both LGBTQ and Roma people. Most events prompting many reactions from politicians were initiated by members of the governing parties Fidesz and KDNP or their satellite party, the radical right-wing Mi Hazánk (see Tóka, 2019). Since opposition politicians did not initiate major identifying events related to these minorities, their minority-related communication could not be independent of the government's communication or events. Consequently, political communication about both Roma and LGBTQ people was primarily shaped by the

government's actions and the reactions to them, while opposition politicians failed to step outside of the topics and roles in which the government's actions portrayed these minorities. In this context, the representation of minorities was primarily determined by the dominant political discourse, as previously noted in connection with the portrayal of the Roma by Messing and Bernáth (2017).

However, in some cases, *isolated discourses* emerged in the communication of politicians regarding LGBTQ and Romani people. These isolated discourses were not widely shared among politicians and were often championed by independent and opposition figures. Examples include Félix Farkas's portrayal of Romani individuals as active artists, Ákos Hadházy's depiction of well-known Roma figures as responsible for the failed integration of the Roma, and Péter Ungár and Dóra Dúró's representation of LGBTQ individuals as an abstract concept limited to the topic of sex education in school curricula. These distinct discourses emerged mainly on the Facebook pages of one or two politicians, reflecting isolated instances of addressing minority groups.

Based on these findings, both the equalizing and normalizing effects of social media (see Section 2.2.2) can be observed in Hungarian politicians' social media use. Concerning the equalizing thesis that social media allows minor political actors to gain control over deciding whether some content is worthy of communication independent of mass media gatekeepers (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016), it was observed that opposition politicians' portrayal of Roma and LGBTQ minorities was primarily determined by offline events deemed newsworthy by online newspapers. This suggests a prevailing normalizing effect, wherein the events triggering the highest number of posts were offline events covered by the most-read online newspapers and predominantly initiated by members of the governing parties and their radical right-wing satellite or minority activists. In contrast, the events and topics of isolated discourses employed by opposition politicians, many of which were not covered in the reviewed online newspapers, failed to influence the portrayal of the two minority groups as they appeared on the Facebook pages of one or two politicians maximum. This underpins the notions of Klinger and Svensson (2015) and the findings of Klinger (2013) and Larsson (2016) about politicians' social media communication, which, instead of providing an independent alternative content flow, typically reflects, disseminates and reacts to mass media content. As such, it is not independent of the influence of mass media gatekeepers and thus seems to, in a normalizing nature, merely reproduce offline existing power imbalances between well-resourced and minor political actors. However, it is also crucial to note that politicians

did not mention many minority-related events covered in online newspapers. This indicates a departure from journalistic content published in the mass media and conscious choices by politicians on which events to react to. Moreover, isolated discourses demonstrate opposition politicians' attempts to create alternative and independent minority-related discourses, albeit with limited success. Nevertheless, the mere existence of such discourses suggests a potential equalizing effect of Facebook.

Another aspect to consider when evaluating the impact of normalization or equalization is the party affiliation of events determining the portrayal of the analyzed minority groups. The majority of contemporary party-political events that sparked numerous Facebook posts by opposition politicians and thus significantly influenced the portrayal of Roma and LGBTQ people were linked to the governing parties or their radical right-wing political satellite, the Mi Hazánk. This indicates that social media political communication was primarily determined by the actions of well-resourced political actors, thereby perpetuating existing power imbalances between political parties and calling into question the leveling effect of social media platforms proposed by the equalization thesis. On the other hand, despite the fact the events and actions shaping the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ minorities were initiated by major parties and their political satellites, the interpretation and moral evaluation of these actions and events in social media communication was determined by the reactions of opposition politicians. Since the large, well-established parties did not engage in the representation of minorities on social media, opposition politicians had the opportunity to assess the offline actions of the major parties in relation to minorities. Through their assessments, they were able to influence the online portrayal of minorities. So much so that opposition parties' Roma and LGBTQ-inclusive posts dominated minority-related political communication on social media in 2019. Therefore, the governing parties' and Mi Hazánk's political actions in 2019 thematized the minority-related discourse, thereby underpinning the normalization thesis, but opposition politicians were able to determine the minority-related discourse in terms of reactions and moral assessments of said political actions and events and thus exploit Facebook's possible equalizing effects. These findings underpin Jacobs and Spiering's (2016) notion that when larger political actors feel less inclined to use social media to express their positions, Facebook can serve as an equalizing force in the political playing field. In this case, it provides a platform for opposition politicians to express their support for minorities and thus significantly influence the portrayal of minorities in social media political communication.

The discursive construction of the concepts of both minority groups often included *references to commemorative days, international days, and annual events*. These events encompassed a wide range, from Holocaust Memorial Days and International Romani Day to the anniversary of the 2008-2009 Roma murders, the Pride March, and the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia. Although these commemorative posts were prevalent, several failed to portray either minority groups or individuals as actors, erasing the affected group from the minority-related discourse. Notably, LGBTQ and Roma individuals were not represented in posts commemorating the Holocaust. Albeit the Roma Holocaust has a separate memorial day, many politicians altogether omitted any mention of LGBTQ or Roma people in relation to Holocaust remembrance events. Holocaust remembrance events are understandably rather connected to the Jewish victims and community in the Hungarian public discourse; however, the fact that some of the politicians mentioned other victims as well shows that omitting LGBTQ and Roma victims is ignorance at best and a conscious choice at worst. Furthermore, the widely mentioned Budapest Pride was often referred to only as the Pride March by politicians, disregarding that Budapest Pride encompasses an entire month of LGBTQ-related events. Posts commemorating events such as Holocaust Memorial Day or the Budapest Pride March often consisted of just a few words acknowledging the event, offering condolences or congratulations, or expressing the sentiment that racist, anti-Roma, or homophobic events should never occur again.

These events have contributed to the construction of the concepts of minorities as *victims*, a portrayal prevalent in the subcorpus, either as fatal or physical victims or as victims of discrimination or unequal rights. This portrayal frequently coincided with the presentation of LGBTQ or Roma individuals and groups as passive entities. Consequently, politicians depicted Roma and LGBTQ people as powerless victims, passively relying on politicians and activists for support and advocacy. This portrayal deprived Roma and LGBTQ individuals of being perceived as actively asserting their civil rights. Additionally, the lack of portrayal of LGBTQ or Roma people as actors and the proportion of active/passive representations were also common patterns to some extent. Both minorities were made invisible as actors in at least one-third of the minority-related posts; that is, in these posts, Roma and LGBTQ people were not depicted as actors but rather as a phenomenon (such as 'homosexuality') or through hostile attitudes and actions directed toward them (such as racism and homophobia). Such portrayal of LGBTQ people is in line with Rédai's (2012) previous findings on the media discourses

employed in the portrayal of the 2008 Budapest Pride March, where extremist right-wing counter-demonstrators brutally assaulted Pride attendees. The researcher found that "gay people were largely made invisible" (2012, p. 60) as victims and sometimes even as participants by accounts claiming that the target of radical-right-wing violence was not gay people but other phenomena, such as 'provocative behavior,' and larger groups, i.e., the entire Hungarian society.

Even though LGBTQ advocacy groups organized several of the events mentioned by politicians, LGBTQ individuals and groups appeared as active actors in less than a third of the LGBTQ-related posts. This was due to several politicians constructing the concept of LGBTQ people by merely acknowledging the existence of homophobia. In their Facebook posts, opposition politicians focused on condemning the homophobic acts with which the governing parties and Mi Hazánk victimize sexual minorities, centering the representation of the minority group around social exclusion without mentioning the very individuals or groups affected by it. As a result, the opposition politicians' Facebook posts offered vague moral assessments condemning homophobia and advocating for everyone's right to love whomever they choose. This suggests that the stance regarding the minority group was used to differentiate the political parties and sides from each other (i.e., the 'morally good' tolerant and inclusive politicians and the 'morally bad' homo-, bi- and transphobic politicians), rather than politically representing the minority or amplifying the experiences and viewpoints of LGBTQ individuals on these issues. In the context of previous research findings on the topic, the lack of representation of LGBTQ advocacy groups or activists shows stagnation in comparison to Takács's (2004) data on the media portrayal of LGBTQ people in the late 1990s, when in seven years four prominent LGBTQ activists and several LGBTQ advocacy groups were covered.

The depiction of Roma individuals as victims is a recurring theme in the social media communication of opposition politicians. In these posts, the perpetrators are often either the ruling parties and their allies, the far-right Mi Hazánk party, or 'life' or 'fate' itself. This meaning-making strategy was also reflected in the naming techniques, as opposition politicians frequently addressed Roma people as 'minorities' to emphasize the social position of the minority group, while politicians from the governing parties referred to the group as a 'nationality.' The portrayal of Roma people as victims was further strengthened by the representation of Roma actors as passive in almost one-third of Roma-related Facebook posts. Moreover, the absence of Roma actors in more than 30% of the Romani-related posts stems from the same trend observed in the lack of

representation of LGBTQ individuals. Namely, condemning anti-Roma discrimination and racist remarks served as a platform for the opposition to distinguish themselves from other parties as being 'morally good.' These posts condemned Fidesz, KDNP, and Mi Hazánk on moral grounds, suggesting that being racist is unacceptable, but did not provide substantial information about the lives, existence, and experiences of Roma people. This lack of portrayal of Roma civic leaders and advocacy groups as active participants was also highlighted in Messing and Bernáth's (2017) analysis of twenty years of Roma representation in Hungarian mainstream media. Such portrayals contribute to the construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people in political communication as empty tokens signifying the positive moral self-evaluation of the politicians as well as tools to differentiate politicians morally from those not publishing such posts.

The utilization of minority groups by politicians *to underscore their own moral and political positions* was a prevalent trend, as evident from three meaning-making strategies. Firstly, there was a high proportion of posts in which politicians depicted themselves as active actors compared to the lower proportion of posts in which Roma and LGBTQ people were represented as such. Notably, the focus of the opposition's online political communication was not on the initiatives or efforts of the minority groups to advocate for themselves but rather on the moral convictions and actions of the politicians in safeguarding the rights of minorities. This practice further emphasizes the instrumentalization of minority groups, portraying them as mere tokens. Secondly, there was a generalized portrayal of these minority groups, with at least 40% of the minority-related posts for each minority group representing the group in a generalized way, i.e., as one entity instead of portraying minority individuals or defined groups. Thirdly, the Hungarian politicians' use of Roma and LGBTQ issues in political communication as empty tokens is also reflected in the fact that providing space for LGBTQ and Roma people or their advocacy groups was extremely rare. Of the 370 minority-related posts, Roma and LGBTQ people or organizations were quoted or paraphrased in approximately 15 posts each. The generalized representation and silencing of Roma individuals in the minority-related discourse fit in with previous research findings on the portrayal of the Roma as the studies of Messing (2003), Munk (2013), and Messing and Bernáth (2017) also emphasized the lack of space provided for the voice, opinion, and experience of Roma individuals or organizations in Hungarian media.

Summarizing the meaning-making strategies that characterize the discursive construction

of the concepts of both minority groups, it can be concluded that right-wing parties, i.e., the governing parties, the radical party Mi Hazánk and the opposition right-wing party Jobbik neglected both minority groups in their social media communication. These parties constructed the categories of Roma and LGBTQ as excluded from their online political community and did not consider these minority groups as potential voters. However, the governing parties and Mi Hazánk still strongly influenced the minority-related discourse on social media through their offline political actions, prompting many reactions from opposition politicians. These offline actions included various forms and levels of social exclusion, such as likening child-rearing by same-sex parents to pedophilia and holding intimidating anti-Roma demonstrations. In response, opposition politicians reacted by morally condemning vague posts. Both the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ people were constructed by opposition politicians primarily as passive and silent victims on whom they relied to show their moral superiority without engaging in meaningful minority representation, i.e., providing space for minority voices or portraying minority individuals or groups as active actors aiming to assert their civil rights.

Section 5.1.2 Particular characteristics in the discursive construction of the concepts of the Roma and LGBTQ

Distinct characteristics in the portrayal of the two minority groups encompass the specific social roles attributed solely to each group, variations in the meaning-making tools employed, structural differences in the emergence of social roles, and the distribution of these social roles in the social media communication of political party members and political groups.

Considering the meaning-making tools analyzed, i.e., the identifying and naming techniques, the topics regarding which LGBTQ people's voices and opinions were quoted, the LGBTQ actors portrayed, and the roles assigned, *LGBTQ people were predominantly defined as being involved in romantic relationships and committed to family life*. This not only emphasizes the minority's portrayal in politicians' online communication but also underscores the dimension of distinction between sexual minorities and the majority. The representation was realized in various tools of discursive construction, such as explicit and implicit naming techniques that highlighted LGBTQ individuals' relationship status and whom they love. The events referenced in the analyzed posts also frequently revolved around LGBTQ people's romantic and family life, such as the Coca-Cola campaign and László Kövér's controversial speech.

In addition, several mentioned and all quoted members of the minority group, as well as the only mentioned advocacy group, were quoted in connection with László Kövér's (Fidesz) speech, which constructed the concept of LGBTQ people in the context of family life and child-rearing. In this respect, LGBTQ people were represented as white, highly educated, homosexual cisgender men, presumably from the upper-middle class, as only the voices of such LGBTQ individuals were quoted or paraphrased in the posts. The frequent use of the term 'gay' (see Section 4.1.2) further reinforces this portrayal, as, in the Hungarian language, it serves both as an umbrella term for LGBTQ people and as a direct reference to 'homosexual man.' Women, lesbians, bisexuals, or trans folks, let alone Roma LGBTQ individuals, were not depicted as part of the LGBTQ community in the vast majority of the found posts. This is in line with the previous findings of Rédai (2012), who found that in the media discourse around the 2008 Budapest Pride March, attendees were described in the media either by gender-neutral phrases or terms that refer predominantly to gay men; thus, "public discourse tends to masculinize the gay pride by making women invisible" (Rédai, 2012, pp. 52–53). Through the herein-found meaning-making tools, politicians also arguably masculinized LGBTQ people in their Facebook posts.

The discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ people through their romantic relationships, devotion, and wish for a 'traditional' family overarched political parties as almost every party related somehow to this definition of the minority group. However, the interpretation and context of the role's representation showed great differences between political parties. That is, the role appeared in both positive-supporting and negative-hostile or disapproval contexts. In the latter case, politicians of the governing parties and their radical right-wing satellite, the Mi Hazánk party, directly and indirectly depicted LGBTQ individuals longing for family life and equal partnership as a threat to children, families, Hungarian society, and 'traditional values' in general (see Sections 4.2.2, 4.4.2 and 4.5.4). Conversely, most opposition politicians portraying LGBTQ people in this role did so in an inclusive tone, voiced their support for LGBTQ marriage and families, emphasized that it is LGBTQ people's fundamental human right to love and start a family with whomever they want, and often ridiculed and criticized discriminatory remarks made by Fidesz politicians (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.5.4).

These results of the discourse analysis indicate that the private-life-centered social role assigned to LGBTQ people was structurally determined by the specific offline political activities of one politician: László Kövér's speech set the tone and topic of LGBTQ-

related communication throughout the year, both in inclusive and exclusionary contexts. Furthermore, regarding the proportion of referenced events as identifying techniques, it is crucial to highlight that overall, fewer LGBTQ-related events triggered more posts from politicians than events related to the Roma. Furthermore, Roma-related events were isolated cases, as most were mentioned in only one or two Facebook posts (see Section 4.2.2).

Other definitions of LGBTQ people were also found in the subcorpus. Some depicted LGBTQ people as a minority embracing its identity, while others perceived them as an abstract topic, arguing for or against their inclusion in public school curriculums. The former was almost exclusively presented as a political stance rather than aiming to represent the LGBTQ experience, while the latter failed to gain significant attention as a social issue among opposition parties. Consequently, the discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ minority predominantly depicted them as dedicated to family, romantic relationships, and child-rearing.

The predominant portrayal of LGBTQ people through their inclusion into or exclusion from the social construction of family in Hungarian politicians' social media communication highlights important differences from previous research findings. As presented earlier, studies found that heterosexuality is core in the construction of national identity. That is, the studies of Darakchi (2019), Bartoş, Bals, and Berger (2014), and Browne, Nash, and Gorman-Murray (2018) have all concluded that the concept of LGBTQ identity and people were constructed as mutually exclusive to national identity. Although Browne, Nash, and Gorman-Murray (2018) emphasized in their findings that antagonistic representations of LGBTQ and national identities were formed hand-in-hand with the portrayal of LGBTQ rights as a threat to the 'traditional family' and 'family values,' this linking of the so-called 'traditional family' to the national identity did not appear in the Hungarian social media political communication. This does not mean that the Hungarian right-wing populist political discourse does not link these social constructions to each other, but rather that such intertwining did not appear in the 2019 social media communication of the politicians analyzed. Nevertheless, the question of child-rearing by same-sex couples and the battle over the definition of the family was found important in the discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ people, among others, in the findings of Browne, Nash, and Gorman-Murray (2018) and those of Chen (2019), about the argumentation schemes in Facebook comments about the legalization of same-sex marriage in Australia. Hence, it can be concluded regarding the social media

communication of Hungarian politicians that they did not, in fact, employ a new approach to the discursive construction of the concept of LGBTQ people when portraying the minority overwhelmingly in connection with the concept of family and child-rearing; however, neither opposition nor government politicians linked the concept of family openly to national identity in their LGBTQ-related meaning-making strategies, contrary to some previous research findings in the field.

Concerning the discursive construction of the concept of the Roma, it is crucial to address that Hungarian online *political communication on Roma people existed in two parallel universes* that did not acknowledge each other. Roughly one-third of all Roma-related posts were published by Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality advocate and member of Lungo Drom. Members of Lungo Drom's political allies, the governing parties Fidesz and KDNP, were relatively inactive in discursively constructing the concept of Roma people in their Facebook communication. However, in their few posts, they assigned the same social roles and mentioned similar events, employing similar meaning-making strategies to those of Félix Farkas. The lack of overlap in the portrayal of Roma people between this group of politicians and other opposition political groups highlights that despite the Roma having a mandatory political representative in the Hungarian National Assembly, the appointed representative was unable to introduce topics, events, and issues that would overarch political groups in the online political communication about Roma.

The social media posts published by the Roma nationality advocate and politicians from the ruling parties predominantly centered on *Roma culture and heritage* and the artists and politicians dedicated to cultivating these. These posts portrayed Roma people as a nationality with an inherently different and valuable culture, embodied in their artistic talents and groups, as well as constant communal celebration of their cultural heritage. These politicians defined Roma people by referring to them as a 'nationality' rather than a 'minority,' of which the latter would have emphasized the existing power inequalities within Hungarian society. Furthermore, these politicians frequently highlighted cultural events as identifying events. Albeit these posts mainly depicted well-known Roma individuals positively, they were limited to artists or politicians from rural Roma self-governments who attended rural cultural events. This perpetuated the portrayal of Roma primarily in social roles related to their professional lives as artists or politicians. Although Roma individuals were active actors in these posts, their activity was mainly concerned with preserving their culture, with limited representation in other areas or processes. Additionally, Félix Farkas's posts either explicitly but mostly subtly hinted at

a connection to Fidesz and KDNP, suggesting that the Roma cultural and political events across the country would not be feasible without the involvement of the ruling parties.

The portrayal of Roma people in Hungarian mainstream news media has long been centered around cultural and artist-based representations, as highlighted by Munk (2013) and Messing and Bernáth (2017). This trend has been substantiated by earlier studies, including those by Terestyéni (2004) and Bernáth (2003). Although some scholars, like Munk (2013), view the depiction of Roma people as artists in a positive light compared to associations with crime, Messing and Bernáth (2017) argue that such discursive construction of the concept of the minority is essentializing and is reinforcing long-standing stereotypes of the Roma, as it usually assigns intrinsic and instinctive qualities to Roma people, even if in a positive context. It also overlooks the everyday issues of Roma people, such as housing, education, health, and social inequality. Consequently, it fails to address the lack of social inclusion of the Roma in Hungarian society, which is fundamentally a political issue; thus, one could reasonably expect politicians, especially the Roma nationality advocate, to address them.

In parallel, politicians of the mainstream opposition parties constructed the concept of Roma along two main social roles. Firstly, they depicted the minority as *victims* of fatal or physical aggression or *life* and *fate*, a social role discussed at length previously. Interestingly, while in the case of the former two, opposition politicians explicitly named the perpetrators, that is, politicians of the government and the radical right-wing party Mi Hazánk, in the case of the latter, the opposition politicians did not identify those responsible for the difficult life of the Roma. As such, they absolved any responsible party for the everyday struggles of the Roma people. This absence of named victimizers constitutes a contrast in the portrayal of the two minority groups. Unlike in the case of LGBTQ people, where radical right-wing and government politicians were explicitly held accountable for their homophobic actions, the Roma portrayal often lacked this direct attribution of responsibility.

In Facebook posts portraying the Roma as victims of racist attacks, opposition politicians employed a specific meaning-making strategy. Through these Facebook posts, the politicians sought to depict Roma people as an integral part of Hungarian society, emphasizing that they are not inherently different but rather fellow Hungarian citizens who shall be protected from both politicians and their fellow citizens. This discourse positioned the racist, anti-Roma politicians and their supporters as the ‘other,’ while it

constructed the ‘in-group’ as the anti-racist opposition politicians, Hungarian citizens (referred to as ‘us’ in the posts), and Roma people, who were addressed as ‘our fellow compatriots,’ ‘our fellow citizens,’ or ‘Roma Hungarians.’ This is in line with the findings of Vidra and Fox (2014) on the discursive strategy employed by the left-wing online newspaper Népszabadság in the late 2000s in the public discourse around the Olaszliszka lynching and the subsequent so-called ‘Roma integration debate.’ In that, the scholars found that the left-wing newspaper Népszabadság interpreted the ‘otherness’ of Roma people as a social construction and perceived “racists, far-right, anti-PC proponents” (Vidra & Fox, 2014, p. 451) as the out-group, i.e., as the ‘other’ while emphasizing the human rights aspect in the debate. However, in the opposition politicians’ Roma concept, the Roma were still a vulnerable, helpless group unable to voice and assert their civic rights, with opposition politicians assuming the role of their saviors. The prevalence of this representation led to the frequent passive portrayal of Roma people in the social media posts of both government and opposition politicians.

Secondly, in a relatively isolated discourse, opposition politicians portrayed prominent Roma politicians as closely connected to the government and involved in *corruption, embezzlement, and election fraud* during the 2019 municipal election. This meaning-making strategy depicting well-known Roma politicians as criminals was employed by a few independent and Jobbik politicians who seldom portrayed everyday Romani people and, when they did, only as passive victims of Roma politicians. This depiction highlighted a distinctive contrast in the representation of Roma and LGBTQ individuals in the opposition’s discourse, with well-known Roma figures being predominantly portrayed in a negative light, while well-known LGBTQ individuals were overwhelmingly depicted positively.

The portrayal of Roma, especially politicians, as involved in corruption and embezzlement is not a new phenomenon in Roma representation. The construction of the concept of Roma as criminals has been consistently present in the Hungarian media for the past 30 years, according to Munk (2013). Previous analyses of Hungarian media have also highlighted the portrayal of Roma people as engaging in election fraud (Terestyéni, 2004) and corruption and embezzlement (Glózer, 2013). However, there are some differences between these portrayals and the recent research findings. In opposition politicians’ 2019 Facebook posts, Romani people were portrayed as individuals, identified by name, who committed specific crimes rather than being depicted as a faceless mass of criminals, as found in previous research (such as Bernáth & Messing,

1998; Vicsek, 1997). Additionally, rather than focusing primarily on the criminal conflicts between the Roma minority and the majority as found by earlier studies of Hungarian media (such as Bernáth & Messing, 1998; Glózer, 2013; Terestyéni, 2004), these posts emphasized that both the perpetrators and the victims are of Roma ethnicity. Nonetheless, depicting Roma as responsible for their dire circumstances is not an entirely new phenomenon in their representation, as, according to the findings of Messing and Bernáth (2017), articles addressing Roma's poverty have long been suggesting that Roma are at fault for their financial situation.

Although less common in the subcorpus, Roma people were frequently depicted as devoted to study and work. These assigned roles also point to the losses and victimization of the Roma people, as both roles were portrayed as stolen opportunities. However, these depictions convey more specific, active, and agentic pictures of the minority group rather than portraying them as generic victims of *fate*. The role assigned to Romani people as workers and employees did not stem from a single event but appeared seemingly independently in various politicians' social media communications. Thus, the social role overarched political groups, appearing both in the posts of Farkas Félix and those of the opposition politicians. The portrayal of Roma in this role only appeared in inclusive contexts, emphasizing that Roma people work and aspire to work. The government's portrayal varied in posts assigning this role; it appeared either as caring about Roma people's employment and providing them with opportunities (in the posts of Félix Farkas) or as lacking concern for the minority and their right to quality education and high-paying jobs (opposition politicians' posts).

The comparison of the particular discursive construction of the concept of each minority group demonstrates that the politicians employed various meaning-making tools and strategies, assigning distinct social roles to LGBTQ and Roma people. The LGBTQ were often portrayed as relationship- and family-oriented, while Roma people were depicted through professional-life-centered social roles, such as artists, corrupt politicians, and devoted to study and work. However, it is crucial to note that politicians failed to challenge the underlying assumptions about these minority groups regarding those social roles overarching political parties and groups. In the portrayal of LGBTQ individuals as committed to family life, politicians failed to consider and, thus, made invisible that part of the LGBTQ minority that may not desire the heteronormative, traditional family model. Instead, they assumed that all LGBTQ individuals aspired to meet these expectations without questioning the conventional family structure. In the case of

portraying Roma people as working or as aspiring to work, politicians did not challenge the presupposition that one has to be perceived as a productive member of society in order to be 'deserving' of support and protection. Therefore, politicians left both presuppositions, that of the traditional family structure and society revolving around work and employment, unaddressed and unquestioned. More importantly, politicians' concepts of the LGBTQ and Roma were constructed around these presuppositions and thus excluded those who do not fit them. This calls into question the politicians' ability to represent the non-conforming minority individuals and their interests, either politically or in terms of vocal support and advocacy.

Section 5.2 Events sparking minority-related political communication

In answering the second research question and analyzing how the above-presented modes of the discursive construction of minority concepts were embedded in the socio-political context of the 2019 Hungarian public and media discourse, three key aspects will be touched upon. Firstly, the scope and characteristics of the intertwinement of the 2019 social media political communication with the minority-related media discourse of the time. Secondly, the characteristics of the event-based identifications of minority groups. Thirdly, the non-minority-related events in the portrayal of Roma and LGBTQ people, that is, what non-minority-related events and topics triggered the inclusion of minorities in political communication.

Regarding *the interplay of political communication* on Facebook *with* contemporary *minority-related media discourse*, the appearance and distribution of the event calendar events in the 45 politician's Facebook posts will be examined. The event calendar, based on the minority-related articles of the most-read online newspapers and the politicians' explicitly minority-related posts, contained 79 events (see Appendix E). Of these, politicians mentioned only 41 in their minority-related posts. Although the event calendar contained more LGBTQ-related events, politicians mentioned more Roma-related events in their Facebook posts (Section 4.1.2, Figure 3). However, comparing the number of events mentioned and the number of Facebook posts that mentioned them, it is evident that the fewer mentioned sexual minority-related events triggered almost just as many Facebook posts as the Roma-related events (Section 4.2.2). Consequently, a lower number of LGBTQ-related events entered the threshold of Hungarian online political communication, but those that did sparked many Facebook posts; meanwhile, politicians

addressed numerous events related to the Roma yet failed to elicit a widespread response from fellow politicians.

The nature of the events included in the event calendar, and thus reported in the most-read online news sites, needs to be examined to interpret this phenomenon further. Three-quarters of those LGBTQ-related events included in the event calendar but not mentioned by politicians were foreign or tabloid news. As such, they did not convey substantial consequences for Hungarian LGBTQ people, nor were they connected to Hungarian political parties or political discourse. In contrast, those Roma-related events on the event calendar that Hungarian politicians did not mention in their Facebook communication were all hard news reports on Hungarian or Hungarian-related events. As such, in connection with LGBTQ people, the politicians analyzed left out sensationalist news, while regarding the Roma, they avoided mentioning meaningful news reporting on discrimination and Roma struggles.

These findings also underscore that political communication on social media could only operate partially independently of mass media coverage. Politicians' communication more or less reflected the movements and themes of online news media, as instead of providing an independent content flow, they disseminated, commented on, and reacted to news published in online newspapers, even if only to express their contrary opinions, as did so many opposition politicians. Therefore, the discourse analysis cannot underpin the assumption of the equalization thesis that social media platforms enable politicians to form and operate a content flow independent of traditional and online news media and to entirely bypass their gatekeepers (see Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Indeed, the results further reinforce findings and thesis contrary to this aspect of the equalization thesis, such as those of Klinger (2013), Larsson (2016), and Klinger and Svensson (2015).

Concerning *the characteristics of the event-based identification*, the identifying technique was so widespread that 70% of all minority-related posts contained an explicit or implicit reference to one or more events in connection with the minority groups, and 30% of them used only this identifying technique. Hence, the events mentioned greatly affected the discursive construction of the concepts of the minority groups. However, the 45 non-party-political and 25 contemporary party-political minority-related events (see Appendices F and G) only partly reflected the findings of the previous literature on the portrayal of minority groups.

Regarding the portrayal of the Roma, events that depicted Roma people as artists,

especially musicians, reinforced a long-standing Roma stereotype defined by many previous studies (such as Bernáth, 2003; Hammer, 2007; Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Munk, 2013; Terestyéni, 2004). However, these were mentioned almost exclusively by Farkas Félix (Roma nationality advocate), who portrayed Romani people through cultural events and assigned the role of artists, musicians, and theater actors to Roma people through those events. Hence, the portrayal of Roma people as performing artists was not dominant in the overall minority-related discourse, while in the relatively isolated case of Farkas, it can be interpreted as an act of self-identification. Additionally, the most pervasive Roma portrayal defined in previous research findings (such as Glózer, 2013; Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Munk, 2013; Vidra & Fox, 2014), that of depicting the minority as criminals, was rarely constructed through the mention of particular events, instead through referring to well-known Roma politicians. Such posts also represented an isolated discourse, as only a well-defined, small group of politicians contributed to constructing this Roma portrayal.

In the portrayal of LGBTQ people, both the frequently mentioned non-party-political and contemporary party-political events reinforced the depiction of sexual minorities through their romantic relationships and devotion to family. As presented previously, this portrayal has been defined as crucial in the discursive construction of the concept of sexual minorities, among others, in the findings of Browne, Nash, and Gorman-Murray (2018) and Chen (2019).

The portrayal of minority groups was heavily influenced by certain key events throughout the year. These events were prevalent meaning-making tools that successfully defined the social roles minorities were perceived in throughout the year. Notably, these key events were exclusionary in their nature and were initiated by members of the governing parties or their radical right-wing satellite, the Mi Hazánk party. Namely, László Kövér's speech established a particular social role for LGBTQ individuals in the context of family life, and the leaked video of János Pócs and Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration depicted the Roma as victims of potential physical harm. Despite efforts by some politicians to move away from these social roles put forth by the government and the far right, their attempts ultimately became enmeshed within the existing discourses about minorities. Overall, the definition of minorities through these events was influenced by political bipartisanship. These events and other inclusive-but-turned-controversial events provided an excellent breeding ground for opposition politicians' short, emotionally saturated, morally condemning, vague posts conveying anger or frustration. The tone and content

of these morally assessing posts fit the description provided by Bene (2017) to describe viral Hungarian political content on social media. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that key events, such as László Kövér's speech and the Mi Hazánk anti-Roma demonstration, defined the portrayal of minorities throughout the year also because they provided a topic for opposition politicians to comment on in an attempt to produce viral content.

Some *non-minority-related events* also played a part in the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ. The representation of the non-minority-related events that triggered politicians to mention either minority group was rather fragmented, as most were mentioned in only one or two posts, thus not entering the political communication in a volume that could considerably affect the depiction of the minority groups. The common characteristic of this wide range of events is that they prompted the mention of minorities so that opposition politicians could emphasize their moral high-ground contrast to the governing parties. Therefore, minorities were seldom embedded into mainstream public discourse and majority events and issues; thus, the concepts of minorities were sharply separated from the majority population in the politicians' discursive construction, hardly, if ever, connecting the minorities to the majority population and hence forming segregated discourses (van Dijk, 2001).

Minorities were rarely mentioned in connection with the year's two important political events, the European Parliament and municipal elections, although more than once. In the portrayal of these events, minorities were assigned the roles of being politicians, being politically active in general, or committing election fraud as criminals. The two analyzed minority groups' portrayals were significantly different but equally isolated. LGBTQ people in connection with the European Parliament elections rarely appeared, either in a positive or negative context. Regarding the municipal elections, Róbert Alföldi was mentioned several times in opposition politicians' campaign posts. Alföldi was portrayed positively, campaigning for the opposition and explicitly posting about his political preferences. Additionally, Péter Ungár addressed his sexual orientation, or more specifically, the attacks he and his fellow politicians received based on his sexual orientation during the municipal elections campaign.

In contrast, Roma people, both generalized and individualized, appeared mainly in a negative context in connection with both European Parliamentary and Hungarian municipal elections. Roma people were rarely depicted in connection with the 2019 European Parliament election. Opposition politicians mentioned Lívia Járóka, Roma

ethnicity MEP of Fidesz, a few times in a negative context. At the same time, the most active politician in publishing posts about Roma people in the EP campaign was Dóra Dúró, who complained about a television channel not airing her party, the Mi Hazánk's campaign video because it contained the racially loaded expression 'Gypsy crime.' Politicians also rarely mentioned Roma people in connection to the municipal election. In these few posts, the Roma were portrayed in the opposition's posts as committing election fraud in favor of Fidesz, a portrayal mode previously identified by Terestyéni (2004) as well. The minority group appeared as possible voters or running for office in very few posts.

Politicians of the governing parties did not address the two minority groups in their European Parliament or municipal election campaign promises, but only a few opposition politicians did. However, posts published by the latter did not contain campaign promises to the LGBTQ or Roma minorities. Therefore, neither minority group was the target of political campaigns in 2019. Furthermore, six and four political parties or groups analyzed seldom published posts about LGBTQ and Roma people, respectively; thus, only the remaining six and eight parties considered the minority groups important and active members of the political community who need to be addressed and whose political support matters.

Some conclusions can be drawn from interpreting politicians' meaning-making strategies regarding the Roma and LGBTQ minority in the social and political context of their minority-related attitudes (see Section 2.1.2). For instance, the governing parties' lack of Roma portrayal and exclusionary, if any, portrayal of LGBTQ people in their minority-related posts can be traced back to these parties' politics. Fidesz's right-wing paternalist populism is incompatible with substantially representing minority rights (Enyedi, 2015). Therefore, the governing parties outsourced the representation of the Roma minority in online communication to Félix Farkas, the Roma nationality advocate, who was also the representative of Fidesz's long-standing ally, the Lungo Drom Roma party. This is also strengthened by those posts of the nationality advocate in which he explicitly campaigns with Fidesz politicians in rural Roma communities. LGBTQ people also scarcely existed in Fidesz and KDNP's political communication, and when they did, they were portrayed as a threat to the so-called 'traditional family.' As such, the governing parties did not consider LGBTQ people as possible voters whom their discourse should persuade to remain in power.

Jobbik's silence on both minority groups could be interpreted as part of their 'moderate turn' and alliance with left-leaning opposition parties. On the one hand, the right-wing opposition party was traditionally hostile against both minorities in the past but has been trying to position itself as a right-wing moderate instead of radical since 2013 (Róna & Molnár, 2017). On the other hand, the party took part in opposition parties' cooperation in the 2019 municipal election with parties that traditionally position themselves as accepting and inclusive toward both minority groups. Therefore, to keep the voters who they gained with the earlier hostile political discourse against the minorities but not alienate the other opposition voters who are supporting the other, more inclusive opposition parties, the most the party could do was stay silent on these topics.

The hostility of Mi Hazánk's politicians towards Roma and LGBTQ minorities stems from the party's far-right ideology. The Fidesz satellite and Jobbik splinter party was founded by radical members of Jobbik who left the party upon the lost election in 2018 and subsequent accelerated 'moderate turn.' As such, their anti-minority attitude stems from Jobbik's founding radical-right-wing politics, in which the belief that the interests of the nation supersede minority rights plays a central role (Enyedi, 2015; Róna & Molnár, 2017).

Politicians of the left-leaning opposition parties, i.e., DK, LMP, Momentum, MSZP, and Párbeszéd, employed rather positive depictions of minorities, as their formerly presented views implied (see Lakner, 2017; Tóka, 2018, 2019). Nevertheless, these portrayals, as mentioned above, often manifested in vague moral evaluations, which could hardly be interpreted as substantial online representations of the Roma and LGBTQ minority.

Section 5.3 Dimensions of social exclusion in the online political portrayal of minorities

The analysis of minority-related political communication pointed out a major difference in the discursive construction of the concepts of ethnic and sexual minorities. Namely, the minority groups analyzed were constructed in politicians' language-use along two different dimensions: the nation and the family.

The concept of Roma people as an ethnic minority was constructed in politicians' minority-related discourse based on its relationship to Hungarian society and nation. Accordingly, both the racist, anti-Roma and the anti-racist, minority-inclusive minority-related political communication defined the ethnic minority through their exclusion from

or inclusion into the dimension of the nation. The anti-Roma discourse observed in the Facebook posts portrayed the ethnic minority as fundamentally and unchangeably distinct from Hungarian people and Hungarian society, effectively positioning them outside the Hungarian nation. This was often articulated through the use of racist language such as 'Gypsy crime' and 'Gypsy terror' and discussions about the feasibility of a 'Hungarian-Gypsy coexistence.' Such language use de facto excluded Roma people from Hungarian society, presupposing their non-belonging within the nation, as they construct Hungarian and Roma identities as mutually exclusive.

Moreover, the political actions initiated by actors employing these phrases further reinforced the idea of the ethnic minority as being separate from the Hungarian society and nation, such as Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós. Considering the socio-political context, including events such as the intimidating anti-Roma demonstrations by the Hungarian Guard in the late 2000s and the subsequent neo-Nazi murders of six Roma Hungarians in 2008-2009, the reluctance of certain political parties to condemn such racist and anti-Roma discourses can only be interpreted as a tacit legitimation of these exclusionary discourses.

In light of this, when left-leaning opposition politicians addressed Roma people as, for example, 'Hungarians,' 'fellow citizens,' 'fellow compatriots,' or other such phrases, they emphasized Roma's integral role in Hungarian society and, thus, argued against the anti-Roma discourse presented formerly. In doing so, these opposition politicians constructed the concept of the ethnic minority within the dimension of the nation, which also served as a counter-political act to the anti-Roma discourses.

At the same time, the concept of LGBTQ people as sexual minorities was constructed in politicians' minority-related discourse based on their relation to the family. In accordance, both the manifest or latent homophobic and the sexual minority-inclusive minority-related political communication defined sexual minorities through their exclusion from or inclusion into the dimension of the social construction of family.

The exclusion of sexual minorities from the concept of family manifested both in politicians' language use suggesting that LGBTQ people pose a 'threat' to families and 'traditional family values' and events initiated by the very political parties employing this language use. In light of the heteronormative family definition of the governing parties, also reflected in the Hungarian Fundamental Law, many more utterances perpetuated the exclusion of sexual minorities from the social construction of family merely by referring

to ‘family values,’ supporting organizations founded in the name of these so-called values or ‘protecting’ children’s rights to grow up in heterosexual families.

However, this homophobic exclusionary discourse differed from the previous concerning the Roma in several aspects. On the one hand, the ruling parties with significant political power and media influence not only tacitly but explicitly supported it. That is, politicians of the governing parties not only failed to denounce homophobic statements such as those made by László Kövér or István Boldog but also bolstered the discriminatory discourse by actively perpetuating it through their language use. In addition, the discursive construction of the concept of sexual minorities in the dimension of family extended to the crucial question of whether the topic of LGBTQ people should be incorporated into public schools’ sex education curricula. This raised the broader issue of whether the awareness and understanding of sexual minorities should enter the realm of family life through the education of children rather than solely being a matter of inclusion or exclusion within the family structure itself.

Left-leaning opposition politicians who engaged in sexual minority inclusive political discourse defined the minority group along the very same dimension of family and romantic relationships. Their inclusive minority-related discourse greatly defined the portrayal of sexual minorities throughout the year. Opposition politicians in their LGBTQ-inclusive and sometimes even anti-homophobic posts both mentioned their inclusive family definitions and condemned the homophobic rhetoric of the governing parties and Mi Hazánk. Furthermore, as another difference from the dimension of Roma’s social exclusion and inclusion, this LGBTQ-inclusive discourse that contradicted the governing parties’ and Mi Hazánk’s homophobic rhetoric was not only crafted by opposition politicians’ meaning-making strategies but also by events independent of the political parties, such as the Budapest Pride or the Coca-Cola campaign.

As this study’s discourse theoretical framework emphasized, the dimensions of social exclusion and inclusion regarding ethnic and sexual minorities are not given in minority-related political discourse but were constructed through the political actors’ communication and its socio-political context (Gill, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, 2001c). For instance, previous research projects that analyzed the portrayal of LGBTQ have found the concept of sexual minorities to be discursively constructed in relation to the nation, such as in the studies of Bartoş et al. (2014), Browne et al. (2018), Darakchi (2019), and Rédai (2012). All the while, as several previous research projects

analyzing the Hungarian media discourse have shown, such as those of Bernáth and Messing (1998), Pócsik (2007), Terestyéni (2004), Vicsek (1997), the concept of the Roma minority had also been constructed in the dimension of the family. Although this dimension was not always explicit, it was emphasized by depicting Roma as living in big families, having many children, and greatly valuing family relationships. Notably, this dimension was virtually absent in the discursive construction of the concept of Roma in the 2019 Facebook posts of politicians. It is also worth noting that the discursive construction of the concept of ethnic minorities in the dimension of the nation was more latent in the subcorpus than the discursive construction of the concept of sexual minorities in the dimension of the social construction of the family.

Consequently, previous research findings support that the dimension of social inclusion or exclusion is not a given for any minority group and is not unchangeable. The dimensions of the social inclusion or exclusion of certain minorities may depend on various things, including the interest and goals of the political actors (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), their political power, the political, financial, and communication means at their disposal, and the unique characteristics of the minority group in question. Regarding the latter, a crucial difference in the social position of the minority groups analyzed is the differing role of language use in ascribing one or the other minority identity to individuals and, thus, the different degrees of active participation in claiming one's minority identity. That is, as Barát (2011) notes, in the case of sexual minorities, identifying as a member of the minority group involves a particular language use, i.e., 'coming out.'

However, interpreting the discourse analysis results in the broader political discourse points out another important aspect in the governing parties' construction of the concept of these two minority groups. Although LGBTQ-related posts did not connect, either explicitly or by implication, the social exclusion of sexual minorities from the concept of family to the social exclusion from the nation, the so-called 'family-centered governance' of Hungary suggests differently. Namely, the Fundamental Law of Hungary, written and adopted almost exclusively by the governing parties, Fidesz and KDNP, states that the most important frameworks of existence are the family and the nation and that the family is the foundation of the nation (Magyarország Alaptörvénye, 2011a). As such, when it later defines family in a way that explicitly excludes same-sex couples (Magyarország Alaptörvénye, 2011b; Szalma & Takács, 2022), it excludes LGBTQ people from the concept of the nation as well. Hence, it judges an individual's or an entire minority group's exclusion from or inclusion into the nation based on protected characteristics and

aims to regulate citizens' sexual and family relationships, invoking the interest of the nation. This fascist biopolitics (Melegh, 2010) was then reinforced in the Fidesz, KDNP, and Mi Hazánk politicians' language use in their Facebook posts that explicitly excluded LGBTQ people from the definition of family.

Additionally, even though politicians in their Roma-related Facebook posts did not connect the definition of Roma to the concept of family, the Orbán government's family policies since the 2010s have been widely criticized for discriminating against the Roma and people experiencing poverty by providing significant so-called 'family tax benefits', 'Family Housing Support Program' (the so-called "CSOK"), and rural 'Family Housing Support Program' and letting family allowance to depreciate. These measures positively affected high-income, typically non-Roma families while negatively affecting Roma people and those experiencing poverty (see, for example, Lugosi, 2018; Szikra, 2014). Therefore, even though Roma people were not directly excluded from the definition of family in political communication, the family policy and political discourse of the Orbán governments constructed them as second-class citizens in that they are 'undeserving' of the financial support provided by programs designed to aid families and encourage citizens to start families (Melegh, 2010; Szikra, 2014).

Hence, regarding the discursive construction of the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ minorities by politicians of the governing parties, it can be concluded that they excluded each minority group from the majority population along specific social dimensions in their social media language use. Namely, they tacitly legitimized the exclusion of Roma people from the concept of the nation and both tacitly and explicitly excluded LGBTQ people from the social concept of the family. However, they indirectly excluded both minority groups from the other dimension as well – Roma people from the definition of family and LGBTQ people from the concept of the nation – through policies. Thereby constructing the definition for both institutions through fascist biopolitics (Melegh, 2010). Moreover, it can be reasonably assumed that the governing parties, both in political communication and social policies, left room for communication maneuvers to interpret their exclusionary politics otherwise by, among other things, relying on tacit exclusions. Namely, to argue that LGBTQ people are excluded 'only' from the definition of family but otherwise 'can live behind closed doors' or that Roma people are not, in fact, excluded from family support programs but are 'free' to earn as much as needed to use the family support programs. Nevertheless, these only served as leeway while governing parties excluded, even if somewhat indirectly, minorities from these institutions.

Chapter 6. CONCLUSIONS

The research project aimed to unveil the meaning-making tools and strategies with which the concepts of the LGBTQ and Roma minorities were discursively constructed in Hungarian online political communication. To do so, 45 politicians' 2019 Facebook posts were analyzed with a discourse analytic approach. The research shed light both on the discursive construction of the concepts of minority groups and on crucial and unexplored dimensions of the social inclusion and exclusion of sexual and ethnic minorities.

In relying on the theoretical approach of discourse analysis, the study understood Hungarian politicians' minority-related communication as *constructive* of minority concepts. Namely, politicians' language use was not perceived merely as a transparent medium or neutral tool for communication but as a social practice that constructs the concepts of specific minority groups and, as such, social reality (Gee, 2010; Géring, 2008a; Wetherell, 2001c). According to this theoretical approach, discourses are formed through social practices, interactions between social groups and actors, and their complex social, economic, political, and cultural contexts (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Mitten & Wodak, 1993). Consequently, discourse is perceived as a social practice that shapes social reality and is simultaneously shaped by it (Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Wetherell, 2001c). Accordingly, this research project aimed to study how politicians engage in this social practice, discursively construct the concepts of minorities, and separate minority groups from the majority population.

The research project perceived politicians' social media communication as part of their minority-related discourse and, as such, a critical terrain of meaning-making on the concepts of minorities. Accordingly, it examined the characteristics of political communication on social media (see Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). In doing so, it touched upon the possibilities and characteristics of the equalization thesis and that of the normalization thesis and interpreted the results of the discourse analysis in the framework of these. The former suggests that social media platforms have the possibility of leveling the political playing field between major, established, well-resourced parties and their minor and less established counterparts (Bene, 2023; Gibson & McAllister, 2015). In contrast, supporters of the latter thesis argue that social media merely reproduces and reinforces existing political power structures (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016).

Stemming from these theoretical notions and previous research findings about the portrayal of LGBTQ people and Roma in various media platforms, the project's research questions focused on three different aspects of portraying the two minority groups. Firstly, the characteristics of the discursive construction of the LGBTQ and Roma minorities, especially the similarities and differences between the two minority groups' construction. Secondly, the events and topics that triggered politicians to include these minorities in their social media communication. Thirdly, the dimensions of social exclusion and inclusion regarding each minority group.

Forty-five prominent Hungarian politicians' 2019 Facebook posts were analyzed to answer these questions. These politicians represent 10 Hungarian political parties, as well as minority and independent representatives. The time period was selected to examine minority-related political communication not only regarding specific minority-related events – as is usually done – but an entire calendar year so as to see what events and topics triggered politicians to include minorities in their social media communication.

The research corpus comprised more than 18 thousand Facebook posts published by prominent Hungarian politicians. After a thorough three-step selection method, 370 posts were found to be related to either the LGBTQ or Roma minority or both minority groups. This subcorpus was then analyzed with a discourse analytic approach based primarily on the methodological notions of Gee (2010, 2018), Tonkiss (2012), and van Leeuwen (2008). In doing so, the analysis focused on various meaning-making tools and strategies: the identifying techniques politicians employed to indicate a post's connection to minority groups, the opinions and voices represented, the actors portrayed, and the social roles frequently assigned to each minority group.

Regarding the main findings, it is notable that both minorities were scarcely mentioned in politicians' social media communication. That is, only approximately 2% of the more than 18 thousand Facebook posts were in connection with either or both LGBTQ and Roma people. Concerning the similarities in the portrayal of the two minority groups, both minorities were frequently depicted as passive, silent actors. As such, the voices and opinions of minority individuals or advocacy groups rarely appeared in the subcorpus. Additionally, politicians portrayed the LGBTQ and the Roma minority as active actors only in 27% and 38% of the Facebook posts, respectively. Both minorities were often depicted in a generalized way instead of an individualized portrayal. The most frequently ascribed social role was the victim for both minority groups.

It is also worth noting that in several of the inclusive-toned posts, above all, politicians emphasized their moral evaluations of different social and political events and phenomena but, at the same time, did not provide information on the experiences and struggles of LGBTQ and Romani people and neither proposed solutions to the different difficulties. In these typically short, emotionally saturated, morally condemning, vague posts conveying anger or frustration, the minorities appeared merely as empty signifiers, tokens of the politicians' ideological-political stances. These posts fit well into Bene's (2017) description of those posts that typically go viral in Hungarian social media political communication. As such, it is reasonable to assume that they were crafted due to politicians' vested interest in creating such viral posts, allowing their messages to reach a broad audience without extra financial outlay.

Regarding the particularities of each minority group's portrayal, the discursive construction of the concept of the LGBTQ minority was dominated by depicting them as being devoted to family and as victims. The minority group's portrayal significantly differed between the left-leaning opposition politicians and politicians of the governing parties and Mi Hazánk. Although both constructed the concept of sexual minorities predominantly in these two roles, the former did so in an inclusive tone, while the latter in an exclusionary, sometimes even hostile mode. Through the portrayal of LGBTQ actors and voices, the concept of the sexual minority was constructed as consisting solely of white, cisgender, upper-middle-class men. Other relatively isolated LGBTQ-related discourses included the portrayal of minority individuals as politically active actors, as minorities embracing their identity, and the sexual minority as a possible topic of sex education.

The portrayal of Roma people was also divided between political actors but along different lines, namely, between the social media communication of the Roma nationality advocate, Félix Farkas, and the left-leaning opposition politicians. Politicians of the governing parties rarely posted about the Roma minority, and when they did, their portrayal was in line with that of Farkas. In the portrayal of Farkas, Roma individuals and organizations were individualized and portrayed primarily as artists, especially musicians and theater artists, strengthening a long-standing stereotypical portrayal of the minority (Messing & Bernáth, 2017; Munk, 2013). Farkas also depicted the minority group as politically active by the recurring mention of rural Roma self-government representatives. In contrast, opposition politicians constructed the concept of Roma predominantly as victims, especially victims of physical abuse or fate, and as workers and professionals. In

these inclusive-toned Facebook posts, generalized minority portrayal was more prevalent. An isolated discourse in the opposition's online political communication was the depiction of the Roma as criminals through the individualized portrayal of a well-known Roma politician, Flórián Farkas. This depiction, however, differs from previous depictions of the minority as criminals as it employs an individualized portrayal instead of a generalized one, focusing on specific cases of corruption and embezzlement instead of portraying Roma people in general as aggressive or threatening to the majority of the population.

Regarding the events that triggered politicians to include minorities in their social media communication, it is noteworthy that although politicians mentioned fewer LGBTQ-related events, these sparked just as many Facebook posts as Roma-related events. Furthermore, the research study's findings also underscored that political communication on social media could operate only partially independently from the influence of mass media coverage. Namely, opposition politicians, instead of providing an independent content flow, disseminated, commented on, and reacted to news published in the online news media, even if only to express their contrary opinions. As such, the content flow could not bypass mass media gatekeepers, therefore questioning one of the main assumptions of the equalization thesis (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016; Klinger & Svensson, 2015).

In addition, the portrayal of minority groups was heavily influenced by certain key events, i.e., prevalent meaning-making tools, throughout the year. These events were exclusionary in nature and were initiated by members of the governing parties or their radical right-wing satellite, the Mi Hazánk party. Namely, László Kövér's speech established a particular social role for LGBTQ individuals in the context of family life, while the leaked video of János Pócs and Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration depicted the Roma as victims of potential physical harm.

Politicians rarely connected non-minority-related events to the minority groups analyzed, therefore sharply separating the concepts of minorities from other public issues and events. A glaring example was the lack of posts connecting minority groups to the 2019 European Parliament election and the Hungarian municipal election. In this regard, other than very few cases, neither politician considered LGBTQ or Roma people essential target audiences, crucial members of the political community to address in their political campaigns on social media directly.

A key finding of the research was that the politicians' language use constructed the concepts of Roma and LGBTQ minorities in different social dimensions. That is, while the concept of sexual minorities was constructed through their inclusion into or exclusion from the social construction of the family, ethnic minorities' social exclusion or inclusion was constructed along the dimension of the nation. Moreover, in the case of Roma, the governing parties legitimized the exclusion of the minority group from the definition of nation tacitly by, among others, not denouncing Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration. In contrast, in the case of the exclusion of LGBTQ people from the definition of the family, the governing parties not only failed to denounce homophobic statements made by members of the party but also bolstered the discriminatory discourse by actively perpetuating it through their language use which suggested that LGBTQ people pose a 'threat' to families and so-called 'traditional family values.' In addition, the research sought to interpret these results in the broader context of the Hungarian political discourse, such as in light of the Fundamental Law that describes the family as the foundation of the nation and the social and family policies of Fidesz, which have been widely criticized for discriminating against the Roma. Subsequently, it concluded that the governing parties of Hungary, hand in hand with their radical-right wing satellite, the Mi Hazánk, excluded Roma people from the definition of family as well as the LGBTQ people from the definition of nation with policies.

Regarding the social relevance of the research, it shed light on the exclusionary and inclusive meaning-making strategies related to the minority groups under discussion. Notably, it revealed that the exclusionary discourse of the governing parties and the dimensions of their social exclusion were already apparent in their members' 2019 political communication. Consequently, the 2019 online communication of the governing parties laid the groundwork for their subsequent deeply homophobic and anti-Roma political actions from 2020 onwards[66]. Concerning those politicians who defined themselves as supporters of minority groups and posted inclusive-toned Facebook posts, it is essential to see that they portrayed both the LGBTQ and the Roma minority as passive victims with no voice, opinion, or agency over their lives, sometimes even erasing them from the minority-related discourse.

[66] See, among other things, the adoption of Article 33 in 2020 prohibiting the legal recognition of gender reassignment, the quasi-banning of adoption by same-sex parents in 2020, the adoption of the so-called 'child protection law' in 2021, and Viktor Orbán's anti-Roma remarks about the Gyöngyöspata segregation case in 2020.

In this respect, the results of this research project outline the aspects in which Roma and LGBTQ people's online political portrayal, and thus, the discursive construction of these minorities' concepts could be improved. The results highlighted the necessity for a more nuanced representation of minorities, portraying them in a broader array of roles and amplifying the presence of minority voices and opinions. The inclusion of minorities into non-minority-related public issues, especially elections, could also significantly improve the overall minority-related discourse. These modes of portrayal were already somewhat present in the social media political communication of 2019. Therefore, politicians would only need to increase the proportion of posts portraying minorities as politically active agents in their Facebook posts further. Several minority advocacy groups and initiatives, such as the 1Magyarország Piknik organized by Roma advocacy groups, have already underscored the importance of inclusive language use in political communication. This research project seeks to bolster these endeavors, as its findings could be leveraged in initiatives aimed at fostering more inclusive political communication, in educational programs conducted by NGOs and advocacy groups focusing on promoting inclusive language usage among politicians, and even within journalism education.

Further research directions include the in-depth comparison of other areas of political discourse, such as Parliament speeches, policies, political campaigns, European Parliament speeches, etc., or the media discourse with online political communication. A comparative analysis of the media discourse and the findings of this study could highlight the similarities and differences in the discursive construction of the concepts of minorities in media and political communication. Additionally, comparing different areas of political discourse could reflect on the topics and discursive strategies that appear in one or another area of the political discourse and not in another. Furthermore, it would also allow the comparison of politicians' minority-related meaning-making strategies to their actual political actions, such as the proposal of bills impacting minorities.

Examining online political communication over the years that have since passed would be another relevant area for further research. This would be particularly pertinent given recent significant legal amendments affecting minority groups, including regulations that quasi-banned adoption by same-sex parents and the adoption of the so-called 'child-protection law' targeting LGBTQ media content and LGBTQ-inclusive sex education, among other things. Furthermore, such a study could also explore the potential impact of international minority advocacy movements, such as the Black Lives Matter movement, on minority-related Hungarian online political communication in the past few years.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A.



Figure A1. Different approaches to discourse analysis. Source: Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 20.

Appendix B.

Table B1. List of political parties selected for analysis in alphabetical order. Source: Author's own elaboration based on Enyedi, 2015; Lakner, 2017; Róna and Molnár, 2017; Tóka, 2019.

Name	Ideological orientation	Additional information
Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség ("Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance", Fidesz)	Right-wing conservative populism	In an alliance with KDNP since 2005
Demokratikus Koalíció ("Democratic Coalition", DK)	Social liberalism	
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom ("Movement for a Better Hungary", Jobbik)	Far-right nationalism	
Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt ("Christian Democratic People's Party", KDNP)	Christian democracy Social conservatism	In an alliance with Fidesz since 2005
Lehet Más a Politika ("Politics Can Be Different", LMP)	Green New Left	In an electoral alliance with several micro-parties in the 2018 general elections
Magyar Munkáspárt ("Hungarian Workers Party", Munkáspárt)	Communism	
Magyar Szocialista Párt ("Hungarian Socialist Party", MSZP)	Social democracy	In an electoral alliance with Párbeszéd in the 2018 general elections
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom ("Our Homeland Movement", Mi Hazánk)	Radical right-wing nationalism	Founded after the 2018 general elections
Momentum Mozgalom – Momentum (Momentum Movement)	Liberalism	
Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt ("Dialogue for Hungary Party", Párbeszéd)	Green New Left	In an electoral alliance with MSZP in the 2018 general elections

Appendix C.

Table C1. List of politicians selected for analysis. Source: Author's own elaboration.

Name	**Party affiliation in the 2018 National Elections**	**Party affiliations in 2019 (only if different)**	**Official Facebook page in 2019**
Ritter Imre	National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary		www.facebook.com/ritterimre (since deleted)
Dr. Mellár Tamás	Independent	Joined Párbeszéd's parliamentary group in 2018; Independent	www.facebook.com/dr.mellar.tamas
Dr. Szabó Szabolcs	Együtt	His party since dissolved, independent	www.facebook.com/szaboszabolcs.egyutt
Farkas Félix	Roma nationality advocate		www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100063695151676
Molnár Gyula	MSZP		www.facebook.com/molnargyulaujbuda
Kunhalmi Ágnes	MSZP		www.facebook.com/kunhalmiagnes
Dr. Tóth Bertalan	MSZP		www.facebook.com/dr.toth.bertalan.mszp
Tóbiás József	MSZP	Retired from politics in 2019	www.facebook.com/TobiasJozsefMSZP (since deleted)
Mesterházy Attila Csaba	MSZP		www.facebook.com/mesterhazy.attila
Karácsony Gergely	Párbeszéd		www.facebook.com/karacsonygergely
Tordai Bence	Párbeszéd		www.facebook.com/TordaiBenceParbeszed
Váradiné Naszályi Márta	Párbeszéd		www.facebook.com/VNaszalyiMarta
Szabó Zsolt	Párbeszéd		www.facebook.com/szabo.zsolt.pm
Béres András	Párbeszéd		www.facebook.com/beresandraspm
Volner János	Jobbik	Mi Hazánk	www.facebook.com/volnerjanos
Dúró Dóra	Jobbik	Mi Hazánk	www.facebook.com/durodora
Dr. Steinmetz Ádám	Jobbik		www.facebook.com/drsteinmetzadam
Dr. Varga-Damm Andrea	Jobbik		www.facebook.com/drdamm
Zsiga-Kárpát Dániel	Jobbik		www.facebook.com/zkarpatdaniel
Orbán Viktor	Fidesz		www.facebook.com/orbanviktor
Veresné Novák Katalin	Fidesz		www.facebook.com/novak.katalin.official
Varga Mihály	Fidesz		www.facebook.com/VargaMihalyKepviselo
Gulyás Gergely	Fidesz		www.facebook.com/gergely.gulyas.585
Kubatov Gábor	Fidesz		www.facebook.com/kubatovgabor
Semjén Zsolt	KDNP		www.facebook.com/semjenzsolt
Harrach Péter Pál	KDNP		www.facebook.com/harrachpeter
Dr. Simicskó István	KDNP		www.facebook.com/istvan.simicsko
Dr. Szeszták Miklós	KDNP		www.facebook.com/sesztakmiklos
Kárpátiné Dr. Juhász Hajnalka	KDNP		www.facebook.com/juhaszhajnalkakdnp

Fekete-Győr András	Momentum		www.facebook.com/feketegyorandras.momentum
Orosz Anna	Momentum	Retired from politics in 2018, then returned in 2019	www.facebook.com/oroszannaujbuda
Soproni Tamás István	Momentum		www.facebook.com/sopronitamas.momentum
Dukán András Ferenc	Momentum		www.facebook.com/dukanandrasferenc.momentum
Dr. Cseh Katalin	Momentum		www.facebook.com/csehkatalin.momentum
Gyurcsány Ferenc	DK		www.facebook.com/gyurcsanyf
Dr. Molnár Csaba	DK		www.facebook.com/drmolnarcsaba
Dr. Vadai Ágnes	DK		www.facebook.com/vadaiagnes
Niedermüller Péter	DK		www.facebook.com/PNiedermueller
Varju László	DK		www.facebook.com/dk.varju
Dr. Thürmer Gyula	Munkáspárt		www.facebook.com/thurmergyula
Dr. Szél Bernadett	LMP	Independent	www.facebook.com/szelbernadett
Dr. Hadházy Ákos	LMP	Independent	www.facebook.com/hadhazyakos
Dr. Gémesi György	LMP	Gave back his mandate, independent	www.facebook.com/gemesidr
Dr. Schmuck Erzsébet	LMP		www.facebook.com/schmuckerzsebet
Ungár Péter	LMP		www.facebook.com/UngarPeterLMP

Appendix D.

Table D1. Dictionary for minority-related words. Source: Author's own translation.

English	Hungarian
bisexual	biszexuális
ethnicity	etnikai hovatartozás
gay	meleg
gender identity	nemi identitás
Gypsy	cigány
Gypsy crime	cigánybűnözés
Gypsy terror	cigányterror
homosexual	homoszexuális
lesbian	leszbikus
minority	kisebbség
nationality	nemzetiség
origin	származás
Roma, Romani	roma
same sex (e.g., couples)	azonos nemű (pl. párok)
sexual identity	szexuális identitás
sexual orientation	szexuális orientáció
skin color	bőrszín
trans*	transz*

Appendix E.

Table E1. List of events in the event calendar. The three most mentioned events per minority group are highlighted in grey. Source: Author's own elaboration.

Date	Event	Source
LGBTQ-related events		
2019.01.14	LGBTQ people tortured to death by police in Chechnya	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.01.16	A public television program airs on channel M5 promoting conversion therapy	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.01.29	Actor Jessie Smollet is assaulted in the street for being Black and gay – later revealed to be staged	*24.hu*
2019.02.04	Richárd Szabó, a lángos maker from Baja, is threatened with outing	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.02.08	The conviction of a Canadian serial killer who mainly targeted gay men	*Index*
2019.02.19	A 2010 video of Péter Jakab (Jobbik) is published in which he calls LGBTQ people 'aberrant'	Péter Ungár's Facebook page
2019.02.21	Jessie Smollett's assault turns out to be staged	*24.hu*
2019.02.26	The municipality of Budapest blocks access to LGBTQ-themed websites	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.03.02	Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer jokes about a gay-tolerant CDU member group at a carnival.	*Index*; *Origo*
2019.03.07	A Texan transgender man gives birth (the exact date is not disclosed; the publishing date was used)	*Index*
2019.03.25	Mi Hazánk proposes to ban 'homosexual propaganda' in public schools.	Dóra Dúró's Facebook page
2019.03.27	LGBTQ people could be punished by being stoned to death in Brunei	*Index*
2019.03.29	A transgender woman suffers discrimination from her employer by not letting her use the women's changing room	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.04.01	Ottó Gajdics likens Hungarian LGBTQ people to dog feces in a television program.	Péter Ungár's Facebook page
2019.04.25	Péter Ungár's public coming out	*24.hu*
2019.04.27	Roundtable talk on LGBTQ political representation in the European Parliament election campaign	*Index*
2019.04.30	A popular superhero movie is censored in Russia due to LGBTQ content	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.05.15	László Kövér makes dehumanizing comments about LGBTQ people and likens them to pedophiles	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.05.17	International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia	*24.hu*
2019.05.17	Same-sex marriage is legalized in Taiwan	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.05.31	Péter Ungár asks Miklós Kásler in Parliament about László Kövér's homophobic remarks, to which Bence Rétvári answers	*Index*
2019.05.31	A movie about Elton John's life is censored in Russia	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.06.07-07.07.	Budapest Pride (including the Budapest Pride March on the 6th of July)	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.06.07	A lesbian couple is assaulted in London (the exact date is 30th May; instead the date of the publication of the first Hungarian article is used)	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.06.13	István Boldog demands banning the Pride March	*24.hu*
2019.06.17	A gay couple is discriminated against by not renting a flat to them	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.06.18	Istanbul Pride is held despite the official ban	*Index*
2019.06.29	Vladimir Putin makes a public joke about transgender people	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.07.01	The official coming out of Lil Nas X, an American	*24.hu*

	country musician	
2019.07.04	Ádám Nádasdy moves to the United Kingdom	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.07.06	Amazon no longer sells books about conversion therapy	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.07.10	Toy Story 4 features two women kissing; an American anti-LGBTQ organization starts a petition	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.07.11	A transgender woman was denied the rental of a traditional folk dress (the exact date is not disclosed; the publishing date was used)	*Index*
2019.08.02	Coca-Cola's 'Love is love' campaign debuts	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.08.10	Prague Pride March	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.08.29	A research article is published in the journal Science, claiming the 'gay gene' does not exist	*24.hu*; *Index*; *Origo*
2019.09.26	György Budaházy and his accomplices disrupt an LGBTQ movie screening in Budapest	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.10.01	Gergely Karácsony's clerk was accused of harassing a university student (the exact date is not disclosed; the publishing date was used)	*Origo*
2019.10.01	The municipal candidate for Budafok supports gender affirmation surgeries for kids.	*Origo*
2019.11.04	Germany bans the promotion of conversion therapy for kids	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.11.21	Árpád Szakács wins the István Lovas press award and mentions the 'LGBTQ lobby' in his acceptance speech.	Péter Ungár's Facebook page
2019.12.01	Homosexual altarpiece unveiled in Sweden – later removed	*Origo*
2019.12.03	Prince & Knight, an LGBTQ-themed children's book, is available in a public library in the US (the exact date is not disclosed; the publishing date was used)	*Origo*
2019.12.05	The municipality of Budapest lifts the ban on access to LGBTQ-themed websites	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.12.17	A television and billboard campaign of Háttér Society debuts aiming to sensitize toward the adoption of children by same-sex parents	Zsolt Semjén's Facebook page
Roma-related events		
2019.01.15.	A Roma-themed play in theaters called *Cigány magyar* ("Gypsy Hungarian")	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.01.26.	Equal Treatment Authority ruling: Gozsdu Court security guards must attend a sensitization course after discriminating against Roma individuals	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.01.28.	A 2015 audio recording is re-published of Tamás Sneider 'joking' about assaulting Roma people.	*Origo*
2019.02.20.	A 2014 video is published of Péter Jakab making racist, anti-Roma remarks.	*Origo*
2019.02.23.	Anniversary of the Tatárszentgyörgy murder, the non-official remembrance day of the 2008-2009 Roma murders	Several politicians' Facebook pages
2019.03.22.	A 2008 video published of János Pócs threatening a Roma employee of his by locking him into a boiler	*Index*
2019.03.25-30.	V. Jelen/Lét festival, the festival of nationality theater	Félix Farkas's Facebook page
2019.04.02.	Female MPs demand János Pócs's resignation	Several politicians' Facebook pages
2019.04.04.	Lívia Járóka's presentation on the EU Roma inclusion program	*Index*
2019.04.08.	International Romani Day and Roma Everyday Heroes award ceremony	*24.hu*; *Index*; *Origo*
2019.04.15.	Liberal Party: rural *CSOK* ("Family Housing Support Program") is discriminative	*24.hu*
2019.04.17.	Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma campaign event for European Parliament elections	*Index*
2019.04.23.	The almost-nationalization of Dr. Ámbédkar school	*Index*

2019.05.13.	In-depth report on adopted Roma children	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.05.15.	The television channel RTL Klub refuses to air Mi Hazánk's EP election campaign video because it uses the expression 'Gypsy crime'; the party turns to the National Election Office.	Dóra Dúró's Facebook page
2019.05.16.	Day of Roma Courage and Youth	Several politicians' Facebook pages
2019.05.21.	Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.06.02.	Pope Francis talks to Roma people on his visit to Transylvania	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.06.28.	Roundtable discussion of Roma's present and future at VOLT Festival	Félix Farkas's Facebook page
2019.07.03.	Election of Lívia Járóka as EP Vice-President	Several politicians' Facebook pages
2019.07.07.	1Hungary Picnic for non-Racist political campaigns and programs	Several politicians' Facebook pages
2019.08.02.	Porajmos – Roma Holocaust Memorial Day	Several politicians' Facebook pages
2019.08.15.	The President of the National Roma Self-Government is indicted on suspicion of bribery.	Ákos Hadházy's Facebook page
2019.09.06.	Ferenc Haszilló, who has previously made anti-Gypsy statements, is running for office again in the 2019 municipal election	Péter Niedermüller's Facebook page
2019.09.25.	Tarlós István's mayoral program concerning Roma people is presented	*Index*
2019.10.13.	Roma people are threatened during the municipal elections	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.10.15.	Roma emigration to Canada – in-depth article	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.11.11.	Interview with Péter Jakab, specifically mentioning his opinion on Roma Hungarian	*24.hu*
2019.11.28.	Mi Hazánk proposes segregation in education	*24.hu*
2019.12.16.	Mi Hazánk's initiation to erect a Christian cross in Nyugati tér, Tamás Soproni opposes it due to the party's anti-Roma and anti-Semitic views.	Several politicians' Facebook pages
2019.12.17.	For the Nationalities Award ceremony	Several politicians' Facebook pages
Events in connection with both minorities		
2019.01.27.	International Holocaust Remembrance Day	Péter Niedermüller's Facebook page
2019.03.30	The youth chapter of Mi Hazánk disrupts a movie screening about a Roma LBGTQ person in Szeged	*24.hu*; *Index*
2019.04.16	Memorial Day of Hungarian Victims of the Holocaust	Several politicians' Facebook pages

Appendix F.

Table F1. List of minority-related non-party-political events mentioned in the subcorpus and the number of posts mentioning the event.

Event	**Involved minority group(s)**	**No. of posts**
Coca-Cola campaign	LGBTQ people	30
Budapest Pride	LGBTQ people	27
Porajmos, Roma Holocaust Memorial Day	Roma people	15
International Romani Day and Roma Everyday Heroes award ceremony	Roma people	12
Anniversary of the 2008-2009 Roma murders	Roma people	11
International Holocaust Memorial Day	Both minority groups	9
Publication of interview with Krisztina Balogh	Roma people	7
For the Nationalities Award ceremony	Roma people	7
Public television (M5) program promoting conversion therapy	LGBTQ people	7
Memorial Day of Hungarian Victims of the Holocaust	Both minority groups	5
Day of Roma Courage and Youth	Roma people	4
International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia	LGBTQ people	4
1Hungary Picnic for non-Racist political campaigns and programs	Roma people	3
Péter Ungár's public coming out	LGBTQ people	3
Vandalizing the Roma Holocaust memorial statue	Roma people	3
25th birthday of minority policy journal, called Barátság	Roma people	2
Interview with Bishop Székely against LGBTQ inclusive sex education	LGBTQ people	2
Celebrating the beatification of Ceferino Giménez Malla	Roma people	2
25th Anniversary of minority self-governing	Roma people	1
50th Anniversary of József Farkas's music career	Roma people	1
5th Anniversary of the erection of the 2nd World War German occupation memorial	Both minority groups	1
Ádám Nádasdy moves to the United Kingdom	LGBTQ people	1
Aranypánt Award Ceremony: celebrating everyday Romani heroes	Roma people	1
The arrest of Iván Sztojka, murderer of Marian Cozma, during his parole	Roma people	1
Conference for Roma self-governments on minority funds	Roma people	1
Conference for Romani entrepreneurs	Roma people	1
Conference of Roma self-governments in Mezőkövesd	Roma people	1
Conference on Romani women, children, families	Roma people	1
V. Jelen/Lét Festival of minority theater companies	Roma people	1
For the Nationalities Award Ceremony, Pécs	Roma people	1
Holocaust Memorial March in Újpest	Both minority groups	1
LGBTQ sport conference	LGBTQ people	1
National Conference of Minority Teacher-students	Roma people	1
National drawing competition for minorities	Roma people	1
Ottó Gajdics and his colleagues liken Hungarian LGBTQ people to dog poo in a television program	LGBTQ people	1
Premiere of Romani theater play	Roma people	1
Roma man gets beaten up for looking like a 'migrant'	Roma people	1
Roma Cultural Day in Kisvárda	Roma people	1
Roma Cultural Day in Kunszentmiklós	Roma people	1
Roma Cultural Day in Megyaszó	Roma people	1
Roma Cultural Day in Olaszliszka	Roma people	1
Roma Cultural Day in Sajólád	Roma people	1
Roma Cultural Day in Sály	Roma people	1
The television and billboard campaign of Háttér Society debuts that aims to sensitize toward adoption of children by same-sex parents	LGBTQ people	1
The almost-nationalization of Dr. Ámbédkar school	Roma people	1

Appendix G.

Table G1. List of minority-related contemporary party-political events mentioned in the subcorpus and the number of posts mentioning the event.

Event	**Involved minority group(s)**	**No. of posts**
László Kövér makes dehumanizing comments about LGBTQ people	LGBTQ people	19
Mi Hazánk's anti-Roma demonstration in Törökszentmiklós	Roma people	14
János Pócs video	Roma people	13
Mi Hazánk's initiation to erect a Christian cross in Nyugati tér, Tamás Soproni opposes it due to the party's anti-Roma and anti-Semitic views	Roma people	7
A 2015 audio recording is re-published of Tamás Sneider joking about assaulting Roma people	Roma people	5
The television channel RTL Klub refuses to air Mi Hazánk's EU election campaign video for using the expression 'Gypsy crime,' so the party turns to the National Election Office	Roma people	5
Mi Hazánk proposes to ban "homosexual propaganda" in schools	LGBTQ people	5
Political Network for Values conference	LGBTQ people	5
Richárd Szabó, a lángos buffet owner from Baja, is threatened with outing	LGBTQ people	4
Péter Ungár's proposal on sex education	LGBTQ people	3
The municipality of Budapest blocks access to LGBTQ-themed websites	LGBTQ people	2
The youth chapter of Mi Hazánk disrupted a film screening about a Roma LBGTQ person in Szeged	Both minority groups	2
Roundtable talk on LGBTQ people's political representation in the European Parliament election campaign	LGBTQ people	2
Roundtable discussion of Roma's present and future at VOLT Festival	Roma people	2
Roma people were threatened during municipal elections	Roma people	2
Katalin Novák publicly supports the Alliance Defending Freedom, an implicitly homophobic organization	LGBTQ people	1
Dóra Dúró's proposal for segregation in public education	Roma people	1
Ferenc Haszilló known racist running for office	Roma people	1
Homophobic religious organization supported by Katalin Novák	LGBTQ people	1
International neo-Nazi organization's event in Budapest	Both minority groups	1
Induction of new members into the racist Mi Hazánk paramilitary organization, Nemzeti Légió	Roma people	1
Márton Gyöngyösi's racist speech in the Parliament in 2012	Roma people	1
Katalin Novák publicly supports the One of Us implicitly homophobic organization	LGBTQ people	1
A 2010 video published of Péter Jakab in which he calls LGBTQ people 'aberrant.'	LGBTQ people	1
Viktor Orbán's speech at the Conference of the Association of Christian Intellectuals	Both minority groups	1

Appendix H.

Table H1. The complete list of roles assigned to Roma or LGBTQ people or both (no. of posts).

Social role	LGBTQ people	Roma people	Both minorities	Sum
Victim	48	67	21	136
Politician	11	36	1	48
Artist	9	24	0	33
Worker, professional, employee	2	19	2	23
Devoted to family	20	2	0	22
Preserver of culture and heritage	0	20	0	20
Criminal	0	19	0	19
Embracing their identity	10	7	0	17
Participant of education	5	9	2	16
Politically active	7	5	0	12
Threat to society	9	1	1	11
Self-organizing	1	8	1	10
Local resident	0	6	3	9
In need of protection	2	3	3	8
Applicant for state funds	0	5	0	5
Hero, revolutionary	0	4	0	4
Fights against incitement of hatred	1	2	1	4
In need of solidarity	3	1	0	4
Propaganda subject	0	4	0	4
Researcher	3	0	0	3
Influenced, persuaded	0	2	0	2
Not equal, not valuable citizen	1	0	1	2
Passive to incitement of hatred	0	2	0	2
Sportsmen	0	1	1	2
Used by the government to attack the opposition	2	0	0	2
Used for advertisement	2	0	0	2
Defending themselves	0	1	0	1
Drug user	0	1	0	1
Forcing their lifestyle on others	1	0	0	1
Growing in number	0	1	0	1
Having purchasing power	1	0	0	1
Badly raised	1	0	0	1
In need of political representation	1	0	0	1
Judged on the basis of their origin	0	1	0	1
Separate from their identity	1	0	0	1
Partner in state-building	0	1	0	1
Taking part in planning the future	0	1	0	1
Unable to be integrated	0	1	0	1

THE AUTHOR'S PUBLICATIONS ON THE TOPIC

Peer-reviewed journal articles

Tamássy, R., & Géring, Z. (2022). Rich variety of DA approaches applied in social media research: A systematic scoping review. *Discourse & Communication*, *16*(1), 93-109. https://doi.org/10.1177/17504813211043722