

**Corvinus University of Budapest**

**The European Union and Jordan:  
Building Resilience in the Face of the Syrian Refugee Crisis**

**“Doctoral Dissertation”**

**(Supervisor: László Csicsmann PHD, Nagyné Rózsa Erzsébet PhD)**

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**Budapest, 2023**

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**The European Union and Jordan:  
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**Department of International Relations**

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**Corvinus University of Budapest**  
**Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science**

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## **Appendix: List of Abbreviations**

EBRD: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EIB: The European Investment Bank

ENP: The European Neighborhood Policy

EUGS: The European Union Global Strategy

EUTF-MADAD: The EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, known by the Arabic term “Madad”

ILO: The International Labor Organization

ISWG: Inter-Sector Working Group

JIF: Jordan International Non-governmental Organizations Forum

JRP: Jordan Response Plan

MENA: The Middle East and North Africa

MFA: Macro-Financial Assistance

Mo: Ministry of Labor

MoPIC: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

OCHA: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

RoO: Rules of Origin

SDGs: The Sustainable Development Goals

SEZs: Special Economic Zones

UN: The United Nations

UNDP: The United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNRWA: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

U.S.: The United States of America

3RP: The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan

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## 1. General Introduction

“Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a continuing cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a groundswell of support around the world.” This is how Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commission of Refugees (UNHCR) High Commissioner described the Syrian crisis (UNHCR, 2020). Although, the echoes of the strife in Syria is growing louder in Ukraine, with the same images of bombings, destructions and displacements, the Syrian crisis remains one of the worst humanitarian crises ever. Eleven years have already passed on this on-going war in Syria. What makes the picture even worse, till the time of writing this thesis in November 2023, there seems a little hope to end those refugees suffering and returning home safely to their homes.

The war has not only resulted in the destruction of the country, but also the human costs have been very high. Based on estimations by the UNHCR, 600 thousand have been killed since 2011, 6.9 million have become internally displaced inside Syria, and 5.4 million have become refugees, mostly in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). While some of those refugees have dangerously managed their way through the Mediterranean to Europe, the majority remains in the neighboring countries including Jordan, where it has more than 1.3 million refugees<sup>1</sup>.


For this reason, the impact of the on-going war is not only restricted to Syria, but also to the whole region including Jordan. The sudden influx of refugees has magnified the country's own challenges; as Jordan is a middle-low class country with very limited resources, an increasing rate of poverty and unemployment, amid a region of turmoil. The Syrian refugee crisis has placed financial, social, and institutional strains on Jordan as a host community. According to the UNHCR, there is an estimated of 1.3 million Syrian refugees in the country's different governorates (UNICEF, 2022). 653,292 of those are registered as Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan as of September 2023 (UNHCR, 2023). This means that more than 50% of

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<sup>1</sup> As of 2023, the total population of Jordan is almost 11.3 million according to the last data of World Population review. This makes the Syrians counts to almost 13% of the total population (World Population Review, 2023b). Yet, as will be illustrated later, Jordan has received different waves of refugees. The largest are the Palestinians, who count to almost 2 million registered Palestinians under the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) and then the Iraqis.

Syrian refugees in Jordan are unregistered, and are deprived of any assistance provided by the UNHCR. The majority of those refugees in Jordan live in the local communities rather than refugee camps. Out of the total registered Syrian refugees, only 136,181 live in the official camps of the Syrian refugees in Jordan, Zaatari (83,923), Azraq (45,214), and Margeeb Alfhood, (6,748) (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situation, 2023b). The remaining 543,035 are mostly in Jordan’s urban areas, concentrated in Amman (35.6%), Al Mafraq (11.8%) and Irbid (17.6%) as the figure shows

Figure 1. UNHCR Registered Persons of Concern Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Jordan  
 Source: (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situation, 2023b)



The distribution of those refugees and their concentration in the northern and central governorates have drastic impacts ;as those governorates are the main cities and have the highest share of population: Amman has 1.036 330 and Irbid 250. 645 (Population Hub , 2023). Consequently, the socio-economic impact of massive number of refugees are catastrophic. The

influx of refugees has burdened the poor infrastructure of the country. It causes an increased demand on water, energy, shelter, education, and health services. Moreover, it has caused a competition within the labor sector between Syrians and Jordanians (Seeberg, 2020). Such impacts made the deprived Jordanians to mobilize over their grievances, as public frustration grows.

Thus, these socio-economic strains threaten Jordan's stability. Jordan has long been viewed as a beacon of stability in a fragile region, yet, there is a growing risk that the country is becoming destabilized. Since the establishment of the modern Jordanian state, this resource-constrained country has gained increasing strategic importance for its geographical location between conflict zones, including the Arab -Israeli wars, the wars in Iraq, the Syrian and Lebanese civil wars, and the global war against terrorism. Whilst predictions of Jordan's collapse have proven incorrect on every occasion, yet, there is a growing sense of concern over the country's stability. Commentators warn that Jordan stands on the edge of collapse. The reason for such a belief is the intensification of a range of stresses that have emerged as a consequence of the country's complex geopolitical, social, economic, and historical context. ( Elkahlout & Hadid, 2021).

It is true, unfortunately, that these refugees have an impact on the host community's political or security situation. However, in Jordan's case, while the kingdom is a part of a coalition that targets terrorist groups and combats extremist radical ideologies, a threat to its internal and external security is likely to more likely to occur. These factors jeopardize the country's security, as al Rukban attack shows. In that attack, six Jordanian security personnel were killed in a suicide truck bomb attack near a makeshift refugee camp on the border with Syria (BBC NEWS, 2016). The fear of attacks at the Syrian-Jordanian borders urges the kingdom to maximize its border security and abandon the open- border policy<sup>2</sup> (Alougili , 2019). Furthermore, as Jordan's borders have been secured successfully by the Jordanian army, militant Islamist groups including ISIS, have enhanced their efforts to destabilize Jordan through establishing dormant cells scattered throughout Jordan. Those cells exploit the deteriorating economic conditions within the kingdom to cause internal disputes and civil unrests. These were successful to launch

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<sup>2</sup> Open-borders policy is a type of controlling border policy which would still be allowing for monitoring and passport controls, however, it would provide legal routes for migrants and allow temporary migration. In that respect it is less restrictive than closed- border policy which does not provide such routes see James Gledhill (Gledhill, James;, 2008).

some attacks on the Jordanian soil, as in the cases of Baqa, Kerak, Fuhies and Salt attacks ( Al Sabaileh, 2019).

Moreover, during the first years of the conflict, the continuous influx of refugees has made security concerns persist, especially in the Syrian camps. Safety and security have degraded, with theft, fires and riots commonplace. The Zaatari camp, in particular, has been a big security concern. The danger was not only restricted to the residents of camps, but it also threatened aid workers and journalists ( Abuqudairi, 2013). As security concerns prevailed, Jordan was forced to adopt different policies to deal with these challenges.

The massive number of refugees and their distribution within local communities made Jordan securitize Syrian refugees. According to the Securitization theory, an issue is securitized once it is introduced as a threat to the national security (Waeber, 2011; Eroukmanoff, 2018). This implies that those refugees are presented as a threat to Jordan, as they might affect its social cohesion, they can be considered as a threat to the socio-economic, the political stability of the kingdom and its broaden national security. Moreover, there are fears related to terrorism, as there are fears that those refugees are related to terrorist groups. In this regard, the Jordanian army have arrested terrorist group members, disguised as women and with fake identification, among Syrians refugees along the Jordanian border (Nahhas, 2018).

Consequently, refugees can be seen as a challenge to Jordan on the national level. Specially, if we consider the critical timing of the crisis when the country was trying to avoid the influence of the Arab Uprising of 2011. However, due its crucial role in promoting stability, moderation, and inter-faith tolerance and since it's a strategic partner for the EU on the regional and global level, the EU has realized the importance of increasing its support for such a significant actor in the region. Hence, the EU has sought to advance its relations with Jordan and increase its cooperation with it on different levels and across different sectors (Press and inforamtion team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b).

As for Europe, the on- going crisis cannot be separated from its 2015-2016 migration crisis, also known as the refugee crisis. Back then, Europe received more than 1.3 million asylum seekers applicants, from which 378,000 were Syrians, accounting for 29% of all of Europe's asylum



seekers, the highest share of any country (Pew Research Center , 2016). This crisis, along with other crises within and beyond the EU, made the EU adopt a different approach in response to its current problems, in particular, the refugee crisis. Hence, building state and societal resilience became one of its five priorities of foreign and security policy as emphasized in the European Union Global Strategy of 2016 (EUGS) (The European Union External Action Service , 2016).

In this policy document, the term ‘resilience’ or ‘resilient’ appears more than 40 times throughout the EUGS (Missiroli, 2017). Thus, it was mentioned more than democracy, 27 times, or human rights, 12 times. The EUGS enumerates many different policy tools and strategies to promote and maintain resilience including, inter alia: the support to accountable governance; the fight against terrorism and organized crime; the protection of human rights; the reform of judiciary, security and defense sectors; and building rule-of-law capacity. The main goal of all these strategies is to make ‘resilience’ a better longer-term durable solution for the challenges and crises facing the EU in its neighborhood and surrounding, including Jordan.

It is not only through this policy that ‘resilience’ has found ground on the EU policies, but more recently in 2021, with the “Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighborhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean”, ‘resilience’ has become a key policy area that the EU actions aim to achieve in the southern neighborhood.

Five years following the EUGS and ‘resilience’ remains a top priority for the EU as illustrated in this New Agenda for the Mediterranean. Also in this policy, the EU direct efforts with its southern partners aim to strengthen economic, climate and energy ‘resilience’ (European Commission, 2021b) .

As for ‘resilience’ as a concept, the commission defines it as “The ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises" (The European Union External Action Service , 2016, p. 26) . Since then, the EU directed all its efforts and funding toward building ‘resilience’ of the neighboring countries and the hosts of those refugees.

For Jordan as a host, this is translated on the ground in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The EU is one of the most important international donors to Jordan in response to the Syrian crisis.

Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, the EU has pledged more than 3.5 billion EUR for Jordan through different instruments including humanitarian, development and macro-financial assistance (European Commission , 2022).

Moreover, its political support is also significant. The EU has been co-hosting the Brussels Conferences to support the future of Syria and the region since 2017. The Brussels Conferences have become over the years a platform to reemphasize the international community's continued support to the UN and the UN Special Envoy's efforts for a negotiated peaceful political solution, in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254. These conferences also aim to mobilize the necessary financial support to meet the needs of the Syrians and their host communities (Press Release , 2021). In these conferences, the EU emphasizes its commitment to build 'resilience', as a better strategy to respond to the crisis.

Hence, it is crucial to understand the impact of this support and if it contributes to Jordan's national security and secure Europe, by pursuing a policy of migrant containment through which Europe tries to govern migrants from distance.

### **1.1. The Scope and Positioning of the Research Subject**

Building 'resilience' has become the response to the on-going Syrian crisis and been adopted by the international donors and the host countries ' policies. Hence, it is crucial to understand the implication and the role of such a policy to achieve and promote the security of the donors and the hosts of Syrian refugees. As a result, this paper comes within the scope of the security studies, as building 'resilience' has become a pillar of the migration and security policy of both the EU and Jordan.

'Resilience' has been adopted by different institutions in different sectors. This "magical concept" has come across different academic fields, as will be illustrated later. As for International Relations and Migration Policy Studies, 'resilience' is considered a new concept in this field. When it comes to the EU Commission, 'resilience' was adopted as a foreign and security policy in its EUGS of 2016, when it became one of the five priorities of the EU foreign policy (The European Union External Action Service , 2016). In this document policy, the EU has emphasized its commitment to build resilience, not only of the EU member states, but also

of its neighboring countries including the host communities of refugees. However, it has not been the first time that the Commission adopted ‘resilience’. It was adopted in previous policies in the humanitarian aid policies. ‘Resilience’ first appeared in the EU Approach to Resilience as a response to the food crisis in 2012. Then, it was borrowed by the Commission in the EU foreign policy in 2016 through the EUGS. The definition provided in the Strategy defines ‘resilience’ as "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises" (High Representative of the EU 2016: 23). Since then, it became a pillar and a main priority of its foreign and security policy, especially in response to crises.

As for Jordan, since 2015, it started to adopt ‘resilience’ in its local policies. This happened in parallel to the international community’s response to the Syrian crisis, as a shift from humanitarian aid to development nexus. The drastic impact of the influx of the Syrian refugees into Jordan would make this paper of a great interest to Jordan as a host for those refugees and a receiver of the EU's support to build its ‘resilience’ in response to the crisis. Further, it would be of a great interest to the EU and its institutions, which have been supporting Jordan since the beginning of the crisis, with the aim of securing the country and securing its own borders by keeping the refugees where they are.

## **1.2. The Significance, Actuality and Relevance of the Research Subject**

Choosing the EU’s building ‘resilience’ in Jordan as a response to the Syrian crisis as a topic for this dissertation is significant. This significance stems from different reasons; first, after 7 years of adopting this policy, this paper aimed to examine the role of ‘resilience’ to achieve and promote security by the EU. ‘Resilience’ has become widely used in different EU foreign and security policies including ,and not restricted to, the European Neighborhood Policy review of 2015 , its 2016 EUGS and its Strategic Approach to resilience of 2017, as well as the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighborhood of 2021. The EU emphasized its commitment to building ‘resilience’ of the EU and its neighbors, including Jordan, but how the EU’s contribution at building ‘resilience’ really contributes to Jordan's and the EU national security is not clear, and this is what the paper aimed to answer.

Second, as both Jordan and the EU securitized refugees, it would be crucial to see the role of 'resilience' as a security strategy, to secure both the donors and the host countries. The term securitization was associated originally with the Copenhagen School and International Relations scholars such as Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and others. It can be seen as the process by which states determine and specify threats to national security according to subjective rather than objective views of perceived danger (Kilroy, 2018). Thus, by securitizing refugees, they are dealt with as an urgent security issue. This shifts the refugee crisis from a low priority political concern to a high priority concern. In turn, this requires urgent actions for both Jordan and the EU (Eroukmanoff, 2018).

Finally, although 'resilience' is a well-known term in engineering, socio-ecological Systems science, and psychology, it is relatively a new comer in political science, international relations, and security studies. Since these related fields are sensitive to buzzwords (for example of 'human security'), the question arises whether 'resilience' is not just another popular but short-lived term, bound to disappear as quickly as it appeared. That depends, of course, on its potential meaning and subsequent tangible effects. 'Resilience' is abstract and malleable, and although this may have contributed to its acceptability to policymakers, it also provokes the question whether it is not just an empty catch-phrase or a container concept. Indeed, in abstraction, 'resilience' might mean as little as an ontological factor 'a capacity of life itself', until we start asking 'resilience to what?', 'resilience of whom?', and 'resilience by what means?' (Anholt & Wagner, 2016). This is absolutely crucial in order to successfully navigate the 'more connected, contested and complex world'.

For this reason, this paper aims to contribute to this debate by attempting to answer such questions and identify the tangible effects of 'resilience' as a policy. This would be a great value added to policymakers in general, and more specifically, for Jordan and the EU policy makers. Considering the characteristics of the EU building 'resilience', as revealed in the Action Plan for Resilience, it demonstrates the significance of the local context (European Commission, 2013b). This means that the implementation of 'resilience' would be of a varying success based on the local actor. Another reason for the varying success is that the institutionalization of 'resilience' discourse into EU foreign policy has been characterized as 'very limited' and 'shallow'. The reason for this is partly because the EU's existing institutional

architecture staggers the implementation, and partly because the member states cannot seem to agree on what ‘resilience’ means (Joseph and Juncos 2019: 999). Hence, this paper, as an empirical research, aimed to draw attention to the local actor, its implementation of building ‘resilience’ with the support of the EU, the EU understanding of ‘resilience’ in the Jordanian context, their success, the tangible effects that have been achieved and what have been missed to enhance this policy efficiency in the future.

As for the actuality of the research, which covers the period of 2015 since adopting ‘resilience’ till the final report of the monitoring and evaluation in 2023, it stems from the on-going war on Syria. This makes the possibility of new waves of refugees to either Jordan or the EU is possible, probably with less intense than the early years. Moreover, there is little hope for the majority of those refugees to return back to Syria. Since 2016, only 63,770 of the total registered refugees have returned voluntarily to Syria. The highest share was during 2019 after the reopening of borders between Jordan and Syria (UNHCR, 2022). However, there are some fears hindering other refugees to return, as the situation is not getting much better. At the same time, they feel they are trapped in Jordan with economic and social restrictions as they see it (Federman & Akour, 2019). Thus, it seems many of those refugees are going to stay either in Jordan or leave for Europe, but again how building ‘resilience’ contributes to secure those refugees' need in Jordan so it may keep them in Jordan instead of migrating to Europe and threaten its own external borders is not completely obvious.

As for the relevance of this paper to my school, actually, building ‘resilience’ as such is a new topic and has not been discussed by many scholars. The aim of my paper was to interpret how Jordan as a host country and the EU as a donor are working to secure those refugees' rights, thus, to be reflected on their security as a whole. For this reason, this topic could be a new addition to my school and can be an illustration of the EU-Arab world relations, as well. The EU has bilateral relations with all the Arab countries along the Mediterranean and 10 countries, including Jordan, are covered by the European Neighborhood Policy. In this policy, which celebrates its 20 year anniversary this year, the EU emphasizes its commitment to strengthen its relations and support for these partners, to tackle their different crises. Yet, this is not a wide common topic at the school. In addition, in the same policy the EU emphasizes its commitment to building ‘resilience’ to secure Europe and its Arab world neighbors including Jordan. In that

respect, by studying Jordan- EU relations and the EU's building 'resilience' in Jordan, I am taking a case which would be of a value added to the school, and a new addition to the discussed topic which would may open the door to future research by new students.

Moreover, as the researcher's sub-programme is International Security Studies, it would have a contribution to the school security studies directly since it explores building 'resilience' as a security policy which has never been discussed by any student at the school before.

And the last point here is that it comes within the researcher own interest, as a Jordanian, to investigate and learn more about the EU-Jordan relations. Since the EU considers Jordan a strategic partner, it would be crucial for me as a Jordanian researcher to shed light on such a relationship. In addition, the fact that the researcher is a Jordanian facilitated conducting such a research in terms of obtaining the primary data and hence it made the research more feasible.

### **1.3. The Objective of the Research**

The main objectives of this research were two folds, first, as a basic research this research aimed to the theoretical development of Bourbeau's classification of 'resilience'. He emphasizes that society responds to crises by one of these types of 'resilience' : 'resilience' as Maintenance, Marginal or Renewal, This typology mirrors (Chelleri et al. 2015: 7) approaches to 'resilience' in which they illustrates three stages of 'resilience' related to short-, medium- and long-term perspectives and accordingly there are three aspects of 'resilience'.

The short -term shock calls to return to a status quo and hence, it is a recovery perspective of 'resilience'. The medium-term perspective where the shock turns into continuous stress and where the stress persists, thus, the system or entity has to adapt. Consequently, the medium-term aspect is related to adaptation perspective. The long-term perspective, when the stress becomes too much and for a longer time, larger changes, longer-term structural adjustments and transformation become necessary. This transformation leads to a new regime and it is related to the transformation perspective of 'resilience'.

This paper aimed to examine the EU role in building 'resilience'. By the EU here I mean the EU as a whole with its main institutions not any specific member states. Though, the supports

by some donors like Germany can make it the second main international donor to support Jordan in response to the Syrian crisis. This paper aimed to address the EU's foreign and security policy and 'resilience', as integrated within its migration policy. For this reason, the focus was on the EU contribution in renewing, maintaining or marginally changing the policies, the host and refugee communities in response to this crisis and connected it to Jordanian and the EU's national security. As I mentioned in the new perspective section, I argue that the EU's building 'resilience' in Jordan could mix the three or at least two of these types.

Second, the empirical research aimed to contribute to the debate regarding the EU governing migration from the distance and the role of the EU external action in its neighborhood. As Andrew Geddes argues in his article of 2015, the EU policies have a broader point as an external migration governance that seek to keep the vulnerable where they are, by trying to find ways to promote their adaptation and build their 'resilience', where they are. Consequently, securing Europe from the influx of those refugees. The 2016 EUGS policy suggests 'resilience' of the EU and neighbors including the hosting countries of refugees to secure Europe and its neighbors by governing migrants from the distance, but this is a theoretical approach. How this policy contributes to secure Europe or the hosting neighbors, empirically is not clear. This is what the paper sought to answer in the case of Jordan and the EU. This would be significant since there are not many empirical studies in that respect.

#### **1.4. The Research Question**

As illustrated in the back ground section, the great influx of refugees puts a great pressure on the Jordanian institutions and the Jordanians themselves. Since Jordan mainly relies on the international community, the challenge is whether Jordanian institutions are able to be transparent, accountable, representative, informative to gain public trust, be reliable in front of the public through all its efforts and whether its capable of engaging all the society sectors in achieving 'resilience' since this process is a dynamic, continuous and a bottom-up level process.

This leads us to the main question of this research which is:

**How does the EU's building 'resilience' as a donor contribute to the host countries and its own national security in response to the Syrian refugee crisis in the case of Jordan?**

The researcher aimed to examine the role of the EU's building 'resilience' (Maintenance, Marginal or Renewal) and its relation to Jordan's and the EU's national security. There might be three possible answers to this question. First, the EU's building 'resilience' in Jordan contributes to the national security of both Jordan and the EU, with the support of other internal or external factors. Second, the EU's building 'resilience' in Jordan contributes to the national security of Jordan only but not the EU. Third, Jordan's existing institutions hinder and challenge the EU's building 'resilience' in Jordan.

### **1.5. The Research Limitation**

Although the research topic is on the EU role in building 'resilience' and its relation to the EU's and Jordan's security as a donor and a host, Jordan, as a host, would be the main focus. One reason for that is that measuring the impact of building 'resilience' on the EU's security would be beyond the research scope and capability, as obtaining data for measuring this would be difficult. Another reason for making the focus on Jordan is, as would be discussed later, the different understanding of 'resilience' on the member states' level and the EU's institutional level as a whole. For instance the Baltic States understand 'resilience' regarding cyber security and their focus on this aspect while the Nordic States, as main humanitarian donors, focus on humanitarian assistance and development. Yet, both understandings affect the EU's security. These different understandings made the researcher focus on Jordan's security mainly, as each understanding needs different methodology for measurement and different sources for data.

Another limitation is that that the author was unable to conduct a survey in the Syrian camps or the local communities to quantify the impact of building 'resilience'. Although this would help to quantify the impact of building 'resilience', on the other hand the fears that that the chosen sample might not be representative made the author not to choose this method. The reason behind that is the EU engagement varies among the camps and the local communities.

### **1.6. The Research Approach and Methodology**

This research was built on a constructivist approach and is what Sarantakos defines as 'exploratory social research' ( Sarantakos, 2005). The research sets out to explore, explain and evaluate 'resilience' as perceived by the EU and Jordan. Considering this approach, reality is



perceived as ‘constructed’, dynamic and evolving. Constructivism views the world, and what we can learn about the world, as socially constructed. Unlike other traditional approaches, like realism, constructivism does not only focus on states only, as main actors, but it has opened much space to observe the role of other agencies of individuals (Theys, 2018). This is crucial for ‘resilience’ understanding and its characteristics. A main character of ‘resilience’, as will be illustrated later, is it is a bottom-up approach, which demonstrates the need to enhance the capacities of individuals, communities, or institutions to be able to adapt, as adaptation is the essence of building ‘resilience’ (Tocci, 2020) .

Moreover, this approach highlights the importance of the social context in our understanding of the reality (Theys, 2018). This is also significant for understanding ‘resilience’ as a process. As Badarin illustrates, the EU’s building ‘resilience’ has different meanings based on the context in which it occurs. For instance, the EU’s building ‘resilience’ in Jordan means to support the country to respond to the influx of the refugees and counter terrorism while in Palestine it means that the EU’s interventions seek to facilitate the establishment of “an independent, democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel” (Badarin, 2021, p. 70).

The ontological position suggests that ‘resilience’ is a social phenomenon believed not to only be produced through social interactions but it is in a constant state of revision (Goffman, 2002; Bryman, 2004; Sarantakos, 2005). For this reason, the purpose of this study was to explore how this concept is constructed within the EU and the Jordanian context, as well as to ask what sort of impact ‘resilience’ has had on Jordan's security as a host for Syrian refugees, as a main focus, and the EU as donor.

One way of doing this was through document analysis. The document analysis covered the EU-Jordan bilateral agreements that were concluded at the time of adopting ‘resilience’ in response to the crisis, i.e. from 2015. The analysis of these agreements, in particular, aimed to draw attention to how ‘resilience’ is understood within the EU-Jordan context. The focus of this analysis tried to grasp the objectives, characteristics, methods and instruments of building ‘resilience’ in Jordan. This attempted to illustrate the difference between theory and practice, if there is any, as this might hinder building ‘resilience’ and its objective. The EU's and

Jordan's main documents and strategies used in the analysis are all found on the EU's and Jordan's official websites. The study of documents included the revision of reported information from the Commission, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis in Arabic the 'MADAD Fund (EUTF-MADAD), or the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) projects such as: mid-term and final evaluation report.

To support the analysis, semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from both Jordan and the EU. The respondents were chosen based on their expertise in the field of building 'resilience' in Jordan: academics, politicians, project managers, and heads of departments from public institutions in Jordan responsible of the response to the Syrian refugee crisis or civil society activists.

The findings were predominantly based on the analysis of qualitative data. This included the outcomes of several formal face-to-face meetings and informal discussions. The formal face-to-face meetings with politicians or civil society activists were conducted in Jordan. The other part of interviews were Skype or zoom meetings because of the difficulty of conducting face to face interviews as the respondents were in another country far from the author. The interviews engaged with some of the key definitions and arguments in the 'resilience' literature in the EU-Jordan context, which enabled the author to frame the analysis of how 'resilience' has been translated into practice.

The other method upon which this thesis built upon was through looking at the tangible and intangible impacts of the EU support to Jordan. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the EU is at the forefront in supporting Jordan to handle its impact, however, since its support to Jordan is political, economic, and in different sectors, examining its role in preserving Jordan social cohesion, stability and the broader security is crucial. Designing a model to quantify the impact was one method. Obtaining the data for this model was from the results in reports of EUTF-MADAD, which was established in December 2014 to enable a more coherent and integrated EU response to the crisis. It primarily addresses longer-term 'resilience' and early recovery needs (economic, educational, social and psycho-social) of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, and supports overstretched host communities and their administrations. In Jordan, the EUTF Syria is responding to the needs of

refugees and host communities in four different areas: education - basic and higher, livelihood, water and sanitation and health and in complementarity with projects funded under The European Commission's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO) as well as the European Neighborhood Instrument (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b). Moreover, as the EU is a main contributor in the 3RP, obtaining data from this plan's reports and the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) portal was another source of these data.

The evaluation and the annual reports of this plan provided an important source for quantitative, as well as a qualitative data about the contribution of the different donors, including the EU. These reports take stock of the support to Jordanian public institutions by 3RP partners, including the EU, and enable regular tracking of the evolution of the 3RP towards strengthening 'resilience'.

### **1.7. The Research Concept**

'Resilience' is relatively a new concept to the academic discipline of political science. In a short period of time, the concept has been integrated into sub-disciplines, such as urban planning, development policy, national security, public health, and psychology, to name but a few (Walker and Cooper 2011: 143). The multi-faceted conceptual background of 'resilience' has allowed it to be a part of a variety of fields and strategies. At the same time, it has also made it harder for researchers and policy makers to determine what 'resilience' really is (Malkki & Sinkkonen, 2015). However, this is not necessarily a problem, since the conceptual flexibility facilitates its application in a broader context. Moreover, the vagueness, might also indicate that the concept is still immature. This, in turn, sparks a debate leading to further exploration of the concept, as well as conceptual clarity (Furedi, 2008, p. 648). Similarly, Bourbeau illustrates that political scientists often use highly contested terms such as 'democracy', 'power', and 'governance', and that has not been a barrier that hinder the utilizing of these terms, just because they lack clear and contested definitions (Bourbeau, 2018a)

One of the simplest ways to define 'resilience' is to look at it "as the ability of societies and people to withstand and recover from shocks" (Joseph, 2019, p. 11). This definition is similar to the EU understanding of 'resilience', as proposed in the EUGS, which states that 'resilience'

is "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises" (The European Union External Action Service , 2016, p. 23).

However, as mentioned, the proliferation of the use of ‘resilience’ has led to a range of various definitions and understandings of the concept. Yet, the general common ground is that ‘resilience’ is about the ability to rebound, sustain, or strengthen functioning during and after a disturbance, or to cope successfully in the face of extreme adversity or risk (Carpenter, 2014). ‘Resilience’ is about the capacity of the system to sustain its proper functions. ‘Resilience’ can be seen as both a metaphor for the durability, strength, or adaptive capacity of particular things ranging from individuals, institutions, societies, ecosystems, to states. It also can be theoretical framework designed for studying the dynamics of this durability, strength, or adaptive capacity in relation to those dynamics.

In light of this, there are common features that can be found about ‘resilience’ as proposed by McAslan. First, he suggests that ‘resilience’ indicates the ability to absorb and then recover from an unusual event. Second, it indicated readiness and preparedness to deal with threats and events that are unusual regards of their scale, form, or timing. Third, the willingness to adapt to change within a threatening environment. Then, there is the commitment to survive and finally, a preparedness of communities and organizations to come round a common cause and a shared set of values to reorganize itself (McAslan, 2010).

Towards that background, Furedi has offered an alternative definition of ‘resilience’. He argues that ‘resilience’ is mostly defined by its absence. "It is a condition that needs to be pushed for consistently, as it will not exist by itself" (Furedi, 2008, p. 648) . ‘Resilience’ in the population would have to be constructed, and this is done through strategies and policies. This makes ‘resilience’ a social construct, as well as a counter-trend to the natural state of vulnerability. Such a premise, that vulnerability is the natural state of populations and societies, has produced vulnerability-led policy responses that articulate ‘resilience’ as a solution to this vulnerability.

In order to architect this solution, ‘resilience’ must be seen as a process. This is similar to Bourbeau definition of ‘resilience’ in which he defined it “as the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous

shocks” (Bou20p. 53). It is a conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformation take place under these circumstances.

The definition presented by Bourbeau here presents ‘resilience’ as a process of adjustment, it’s a dynamic process that makes ‘resilience’ as a systemic way of thinking to face internal and external adversities. While he focuses on the dynamic process that is crucial for building ‘resilience’, scholars like Amy Carpenter emphasizes the capacity and ability to be resilient as she defines it “the ability of a social system to absorb disturbance while retaining its basic identity, function, and structure” (Carpenter, 2014, p. 67). According to her, any social system needs to possess some capacities, she calls them “enablers” as they enable the system to be resilient. She illustrates that these enablers are a group of assets, measures, relationships, and capabilities that together determine resilient communities (Carpenter, 2014).

Amy classifies different types of enablers; physical enablers that supply basic requirements of human survival and security (for instance, water, electricity and gas infrastructure, and food), procedural and operational enablers for responding to disruptive shocking events (e.g., action plans, strategies, local knowledge, and information) and social enablers (e.g., community cohesion and motivation). States and communities that obtain those capabilities are capable to be resilient hence, to tackle the causes of fragility, and strengthen the social and political cohesion as a whole (Carpenter, 2014).

As for this paper, the researcher proposes that the two approaches are merely two sides of one coin that need to be studied and illustrated through their complementarity rather than their differences. This understanding is parallel to Flockhart’s and Korosteleva understanding and definition of ‘resilience’. The researcher sees ‘resilience’ as presented by the latter. According to Flockhart and Korosteleva ‘resilience’ has two specific meanings, it is “as a quality of an entity such as a system, organization, or even a person, and as an analytic of governance” (Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020, p. 158). This clearly clarifies ‘resilience’ as both a quality and a systemic way of thinking interpreted as an analytic of governance.

As a quality, it is about the possession of crucial elements in place that can smooth reflexivity and self-organization, to increase an entity’s inherent strength, consciousness of the surrounding

outside and its purpose, motive and ambition. The capacity and inner strength are within the bigger wider scope to enhance the capability of living together (Deneulin, 2006).

This idea gets an emphasis and wider attention as appears on the well-developed research presented by the Stockholm Resilience Centre. It aims to focus at the practical operational implications of fostering ‘resilience’ qualities across different sectorial policies (landscapes, marine, urban living, to mention few.) In parallel, these qualities are presented as part of the wider hyperlinked units of the global socio-ecological system that characterizes the Anthropocene (Stockholm Resilience Center, 2015).

### **1.8. The Justification of the Case Selection**

Many reasons justify choosing Jordan as a case study. It is true that Turkey has the highest share of those registered refugees 3.5 million, followed by Lebanon 814 715 and then Jordan with 664 554 (UNHCR, 2023), the specific context for Jordan signifies the need to support such a host country and justifies its selection, as a case study.

The first reason is related to Jordan’s geopolitics. The geopolitics of Jordan makes this relative small country a key partner in preserving the region stability, hence, the international community has a great interest in supporting it preserving its stability. Lying in the heart of the Middle East, surrounded by Israel, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan is a middle-low class country with an increasing rate of poverty and unemployment reaching almost 25% of the whole population (The World Bank, 2022). It has limited natural resources. Regarding water, Jordan currently stands second in the list of the world’s water-poorest countries (Al-Junaidi, 2021) and regarding energy needs, Jordan mainly depends on imported oil and gas.

Despite of all these challenges, this small stable monarchy which celebrated its 100 year anniversary in 2021, is a strategic partner for many regional and international actor. Its moderate policy makes it a great ally for the U.S., the Gulf countries and the EU. The interest in this small country, as will be illustrated in a following chapter, stems from different aspects: First, its role in supporting peace in the region. Jordan is the second after Egypt to sign a peace treaty with Israel, a key player in the Middle East Peace Process, and it supports the two states solution as the only possible path for a lasting peace in the region (El-Khazen , 2021).

The second aspect is its role as a host for refugees'. Despite of being amid a region of turmoil, Jordan has always provided shelter for refugees. Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugees Convention and its 1967 Protocol, however, the country has received different waves of refugees. First, there were the Palestinians whom Jordan has received since the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. The Second wave was the Lebanese refugees, who came during the 1975 civil war. Then, there were the Iraqis who came in two waves; the 1991 Gulf War and after the American invasion in 2003, and finally, there were the Syrian refugees (Alougili , 2019). As a result, this relatively small country continues to be the second host country of refugees per capita in the world (United Nations Jordan, 2021).

The final aspect is its role in fighting terrorism. Jordan plays a heavy role as a member of the international campaign against terrorism, it has been playing an active role in the United States led Global War on terrorism ( Ayasrah, 2009). Further, it has proved heavyweight in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and an active partner in the international led coalition to combat ISIS fighters. These aspects illustrate the urgent need to support such a significant partner.

Regarding Syrian refugees, By September 2022, the (UNHCR) has registered 653,914 Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan. However, the total Syrian refugees is estimated by 1.3 million, considering the unregistered refugees. (UNHCR, 2023).

Although Jordan is dealing with many challenges and the refugees have added new social and economic strains, it has managed, till now, to preserve its stability and security. For this reason, as 'resilience' became the main policy to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis and the EU is a main donor to support Jordan, it is crucial to see the role of 'resilience' in preserving the stability and security in such a significant partner.

## **1.9. The Research Structure**

As for the structure of this paper, after the general introduction that covers the scope of the research, the justification of the topic, its significance, the main research question and its objective, the first chapter covers the literature review of 'resilience'. The second chapter would be directed to the conceptual framework and defining the research terms including

'resilience. It traces the origin and the development of the concept, its uses in different scientific fields, including international relations and security studies. This chapter would trace building 'resilience' theories, its classification in security studies, policy changes in response to crises, and how 'resilience' became connected to national security. This chapter will also cover the main second concept which is security and how it is understood in the context of this paper.

The third chapter would be mainly about the theoretical corpus, the new perspective, the main contribution of this paper, its added value to the security literature ,the theoretical development of Bourbeau's classification of 'resilience' typology and. The next chapter would be directed to data collection process including the primary and secondary data. The following chapter would be mainly about data analysis and finally the conclusion, limitations and implications for future research.



## **2. Literature Review of ‘Resilience’ and National Security**

### **2.1. Introduction**

Despite of the fact that the term ‘resilience’ is new in the field of political science and international relations, nonetheless, in a short period of time, the concept has been integrated into different areas including conflict prevention, state and piece building, fighting terrorism, and national security, to name but a few .The multi-faceted conceptual background of ‘resilience’ has allowed it to be a part of a variety of fields and strategies and to be adopted by different national, international organizations and governments, in order to respond to different natural and man-made crises.

As of the first decade of this century, ‘resilience’ also found its ground in the EU policies where it has been integrated into humanitarian and development policies. First, the Commission launched in 2012 ‘The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises’ in which, drawing on EU experience mainly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, the Commission acknowledged the significance of development and humanitarian communities working effectively together to build ‘resilience’ to respond to natural crises.

Since then, ‘resilience’ has been a corner stone for different policies in the humanitarian-development field. However, with the publication of the EU Staff Handbook, Operating in Situations of Conflict and Fragility (June 2015), the EUGS Policy (June 2016) and the New European Consensus on Development (June 2017) ‘resilience’ became one of the top priorities of the EU’s External Action. These policies seek to broaden the EU response to global challenges by complementing EU development and humanitarian efforts with political and diplomatic engagement, particularly in the area of conflict prevention (European Commission, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2017).

In that respect, ‘resilience’ became the response to different crises including the Syrian crisis in order to secure itself and the neighboring countries. This response came in parallel to the international community adopting ‘resilience’ with the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) in cooperation with the UNHCR launching the 3RP to support Syria and the host countries for the Syrian refugees, including Jordan, in 2015.

Jordan also, as a host, launched its Jordan Response Plan (JRP) to the Syrian crisis in the same year. This plan has been integrated within the 3RP which covers the main host countries, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. This plan provides a comprehensive response that aims to link short-term coping solutions with longer –term initiatives aim at strengthening the ‘resilience’ of the Syrian refugees and the host communities in order to promote the country’s broader security.

Seven years have already passed on adopting this policy, and the situation in Syria is not completely settled, though the intensity is not as within the first years of the conflict. As result, little hope is there for those refugees to return home. This makes building ‘resilience’ of the host countries a priority for the donors and the hosts of the Syrian refugees. Yet, how building ‘resilience’ contributes to promote the security of the donors and the hosts of those refugees is still a main question. Hence, the paper objective was to examine how building ‘resilience’ contributes to secure Jordan, as a host county for the Syrian refugees, and the EU as a donor.

For this reason, while reviewing the literature, the focus was on the relevant literature covering major themes .These major themes cover: First, ‘resilience’ in international relations and security studies. Second, understanding ‘resilience’. Third, the characteristics of ‘resilience’ and its dark and bright side .Then, ‘resilience’ typologies. Next, recent studies on the role of building ‘resilience’ by the EU on crises-prone countries. At last, recent studies of the impact of building ‘resilience’ by the EU to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.

## **2.2. ‘Resilience’ in International Relations and Security Studies**

To evaluate the impact of ‘resilience’ on national security, it is essential to understand what ‘resilience’ means in security studies and how it has been integrated first. The new ontological understanding about the world is that volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) is the new normal and there are constant reminders of the unpredictability of what might be lurking around the corner ( Atcheson, 2021). Covid-19, employee anxiety, catastrophic climate change, terrorist attacks, financial crises, or social unrest are just few examples of the long list of the crises the world is witnessing. Different policies are put forward to manage these uncertainties. Amidst the prescribed remedies for handling such a state of flux, the one that is rapidly gaining currency is ‘resilience’ (Davoudi, et al., 2012).

Integrated within systems ecology in the 1970s, 'resilience' as a scientific field of complex adaptive systems and an operational strategy of risk management has since flourished. Asserting itself continuously as an ascending discourse in natural resource management. The concept of 'resilience' has in the recent past rapidly dominated vast areas of the social sciences, becoming a regular, if under-theorized, term of art in discussions of international finance and economic policy, risk analysis, the psychology of trauma, development policy, urban planning, public health and the broader national security ( Walker & Cooper, 2011; Bourbeau, 2018a).

As of the first decade of this century, the concept entered the terminology of critical Security Studies and started to be related to global governance, terrorism, migration and other issues related to security studies (Aradau, 2014; Cavelti et al , 2015). Several EU foreign policy subfields such as the state- and peace-building processes (de Coning, 2016; Juncos, 2018) and disaster management (Matayas & Pelling, 2015), and development and humanitarian aid (Duffield, 2012).

The proliferation in the use of the concept in the last decade made many international relation scholars show a great interest in the concept. Those scholars' focus has been two folds: First, the 'resilience' of the world order itself. The structure of world politics and the way states interact with it is the focus of this strand of scholarship (Kahler, 2013; Deudney & Ikenberry, 2018). In these studies, 'resilience' is generally formulated as being equated with stability and preservation on the one hand, with the actions of rising powers (such as China, or Russia) being framed as key sources of risks and challenges on the other ( Gaskarth, 2015). In the course of these studies, there is a strong sense of normativity extended throughout. These studies attempt to discuss how the 'resilience' of the Western-led liberal order can be preserved or enhanced. In that respect, 'resilience' in these studies is presented as a character of the world order and there is a need to safeguard the current liberal shape of this order (i.e. principled behavior and multilateralism) within the context of increasing challenges from what are perceived to be illiberal regimes ( Thies & Nieman, 2017).

Second, 'resilience' has been investigated in respect of the way states act in the world order. This stream of scholarship, as the previous strand, assumes that the current Western-led liberal order is characterized by an increasing lack of stability, with a decreasing role for key pillars, as

the United States or the United Kingdom, in preserving its key features ( Harold, 2014; Higgott & Proud, 2017) . ‘Resilience’ here is generally understood as the ability of international actors to predict and identify challenges, manage them, overcome them and bounce back from any adverse consequences and effects ( Juntunen & Hyvönen, 2014; Juncos, 2016; Thiele, 2016). For this reason, scholars in this spectrum investigate the way liberal international actors in the West (primarily the EU and its member states) understand and adapt to the changing world order ( Christou, 2016; Deudney & Ikenberr, 2018; Joseph, 2019).

The reason behind the emphasis on the West, specially, the EU, is that it has developed a comprehensive framework for ‘resilience’, in comparison with other non- Western states. For the EU, there have been different policies and strategies that aim to enhance ‘resilience’ (Bendiek, 2017). Even within the EU official discourse, it has entered heavily and there has been an institutional development, with new rules and procedures to enhance ‘resilience’ ( Davis Cross, 2016). Unlike the West, mainly the EU, non-Western states share a less clear framework and they generally act in a rather reactive manner to what they assume to be challenges coming from the West and the liberal world order. However, that does not mean that the non-Western perspective of ‘resilience’ has not been analyzed. The adoption of ‘resilience’ by non-Western countries have tempted scholars within the comparative studies to conduct such studies in order to understand how ‘resilience’ is understood by influential superpowers like Russia or China ( Nitoiu & Pasatoiu , 2021)

Studying ‘resilience’ on the ontological level and as a process for these actors illustrate that they have different approach to ‘resilience’ than the Western perspective. Ontological ‘resilience’ for China and Russia is different than from the West. For China, as it perceives itself as a rising power which aims to interact harmoniously and peacefully with other states in the world order ( Beeson & Zeng, 2018), ‘Resilience’ comes from its ontological peaceful predisposition. For Russia, on the other hand, the development of a distinct brand of democracy (sovereign democracy) as well as the leadership mentality of the former Soviet Union is seen to be synonymous with ontological ‘resilience’ by Moscow. Unlike the case of China where the self (with its predisposition towards peaceful coexistence) is a source of ‘resilience’ that can be exported throughout the world, Russia’s ontology shapes ‘resilience’ as an attribute that the

country has developed incrementally due to the hostile external environment ( Tsygankov, 2014).

An essential part of their ontology presents two broad pathways towards ‘resilience’. First, the need to preserve domestic unity and strengthen national identity in the face of multiple external challenges (essentially originating from the liberal world order and the West) ( Guter-Sandu & Kuznetsova, 2020). Second, the need to have strong leaders. The existence and practice of strong leaders are markers for ‘resilience’. Strong leaders are equated with driving forward development, maintaining unity and coherence, or securing the country from external influences ( Nitoiu & Pasatoiu , 2021). In that regard, Vladimir Putin represents the perfect example of a strong leader, who has managed to suppress almost any form of opposition whilst striving to recover the status and glory of the Soviet Union. Further, these aspects have gradually become also notable in the case of Xi Ping, where the push against corruption has weakened most of the opposition and the Belt and Road Initiative has given the potential to give China the level of respect it deserves.

More importantly, not being treated as equals to the West in the world order, puts them both in a constant state of ontological vulnerability. This, in turn, translates into weak ‘resilience’. In this context, ontological ‘resilience’ is understood as synonymous with the international recognition of their claims of influence and control over so-called spheres of influence, formed by small states around their borders. Indeed they have shown willingness to complement these beliefs with practical assertive actions in their neighborhood: i.e. Russia’s actions in Georgia or Ukraine, or Beijing’s involvement in the South China Sea ( Nitoiu & Pasatoiu , 2021) .

Another different issue for China and Russia is related to the process of enhancing ‘resilience’. Both China and Russia have developed less comprehensive approaches than the EU. While the EU’s approach to enhance ‘resilience’ is by putting a greater emphasis on the agent of ‘resilience’, they strive to foster ‘resilience’ through its emphasis on intentional actions integrated in different policy areas. These actions, based on experience from the past, are reflections of their self-image and reactions for what they believe as challenges originating from the West. For example, China has employed significant resources in order to enhance the ‘resilience’ of its financial system, and particularly the way it fits into the global economy (

Ferdinand, 2016), the series of fiscal policies, the development of high-tech industries beside the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are some of the action taken during the last decade by the Chinese government to enhance 'resilience' ( Overholt, 2004).

While China's 'resilience' relies, to a large extent, on economic paths to face Western challenges and reshape the world order, Russia has followed a more assertive path. Russia recognizes different challenges. These challenges stem from the West not recognizing Moscow's interests as equal and pose a constant threat to the status quo of the region. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the enlargement of the EU to the post-Soviet space pose challenges to Russia and weaken its 'resilience'. Hence, some key moves to enhance its 'resilience' includes its actions in Georgia or Ukraine, the move towards the East and a greater strategic alignment with China (Allison, 2017).

As illustrated, many international actors have adopted 'resilience', yet, there have been growing fears that the growing use of this concept without a clear picture of what it means or how it is applied makes it become just a simple buzzword, where its flexibility allows it to be integrated in different contexts with different interpretations of what it exactly means (Chandler, 2020). For this reason, the following section traces how 'resilience' is understood in international relations and security studies.

### **2.3. Understanding 'Resilience'**

In the broad literature, the debate about conceptualization 'resilience' attempts to deal with the confusion about 'resilience'. This debate revolves around two main arguments; the first one argues that 'resilience' is to be looked upon as a quality of an entity. It focuses on different qualities of an entity varying -from their robustness and even resistance to change (Capano & Woo, 2017) to quite the opposite - their adaptability, agility, reflexivity and responsiveness to change (Schmidt, 2014).

One element that these models have in common is their inclination to understand 'resilience' in a binary way. 'Resilience' is seen as an all or nothing: either there is 'resilience' or there is not. The direct outcomes of this is that the notion of a binary understanding of 'resilience' is either

under-theorized or completely marginalized (Bourbeau, 2013a; Robertson, 2019). Another outcome of dealing with ‘resilience’ in a binary way is that it renounces the question of the types of ‘resilience’. This is problematic because, on the one hand, renouncing the question of the types of ‘resilience’ creates a decoupling – in theoretical and empirical terms – between the complexity of contemporary world politics and the analytical framework suggested to make sense of the different patterns of response that world politics brings. On the other hand, the decoupling doesn’t only restrict our understanding of the patterns of response, but it also under-theorize or marginalize another critical aspect of ‘resilience’ regarding its measurement (Bourbeau, 2013a).

Another outcome of this binary understanding is that it renounces the question of the levels of ‘resilience’. This in turn has an implication on how ‘resilience’ is to be applied at the society and where it settles. This binary understanding of ‘resilience’ doesn’t illustrate on which entities ‘resilience’ is to be applied. Is it enough to be resilient at the state level or the individual level? Walklate et al suggest that defining the concept is not enough to be able to use ‘resilience’, rather , the concept "needs to be broken down, both in terms of the capacities it describes and the levels at which it is mobilized" (Walklate el al., 2014, p. 409). Thus, they propose multiple levels for ‘resilience’, namely the individual, familial, communal, institutional, national, regional, and global (Walklate el al., 2014; Flockhart, 2020).

Taking these aspects in consideration, the second approach argues that in a world of complexity and uncertainty, it is insufficient to focus only on the quality of an entity, ( Walker & Cooper, 2011), rather, the focus should be directed toward the process of adaptation, self-governance and organization. As a way of thinking. ‘Resilience’ is a conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformation take place under challenging circumstances (Bourbeau, 2013a; Chandler, 2014).

Considering ‘resilience’ as a framework suggests that it is not only necessary in a particular area or to be implemented by one actor. This calls for a complete integration of policy sectors and the coordination of all actors. ‘Resilience’ is not a programming area, as such, but a programming “lens” ( Bargués & Schmidt, 2021). For this reason, nothing can be left out of ‘resilience’ programming.

In that respect, the critical scholars of ‘resilience’ note that one way to understand ‘resilience’ is to look at it through the ‘governing from the distance’ lens. For this reason, they examine developments in policymaking, with the objective of boosting strategies of learning and adaptation, making communities and individuals more reflexive and enhancing individual and community self-governance. This can be considered as governing through complexity (Chandler, 2014). They have also pointed out that ‘resilience’ promoting strategies of learning and adaptation can be seen as a strategy that shifts responsibility, from states onto populations, so that they are better able to govern themselves ( Evans & Reid, 2014; Mavelli, 2016). For policy makers ‘resilience’ is useful. Its usefulness stems from its ability to play a certain role in managing or governing populations from a distance, through ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2008). This Foucaultian argument has influenced the more critical understandings of ‘resilience’. It considers ‘resilience’ as an attempt to embed a set of neoliberal norms of behavior and self-governance ( Walker & Cooper, 2011).

While the first argument constantly asks to strengthen ‘resilience’ as a quality and a feature of an entity, it presents ‘resilience’ also as a goal. The second argument suggests that ‘resilience’ is a mean and not a goal. Thus, a third approach suggests understanding the two meanings as complementary to each other. The two approaches are merely two sides of the coin. ‘Resilience’ has two specific meanings, it is “as a quality of an entity such as a system, organization, or even a person, and as an analytic of governance” (Flockhart, 2020, p. 158; Hurley, 2022). This clearly clarifies ‘resilience’ as both a quality and a systemic way of thinking interpreted as an analytic of governance.

The third approach aims to bring a deeper and comprehensive understanding of ‘resilience’, yet, the unsolved question remains, how empirical is this understanding and how it is to be realized by policy makers. Despite the fact that the concept has been integrated theoretically in different policies by many international actors, its implementation has been controversial.

#### **2.4. ‘Resilience’ Characteristics**

It is not only about the path through which ‘resilience’ has flourished, but also its characteristics that make it so attractive for different fields. The usage of the concept in different fields has led



to different understandings of the concept. Yet, despite of its various meanings, there are common characteristics about 'resilience'. These characteristics make 'resilience' appears as a better strategy to respond to natural or man-made crises.

By tracing the EU policies documents regarding 'resilience', Tocci illustrates these characteristics. She summarizes them as follows: first, 'resilience' requires all actors (humanitarian, development, political) to work differently and more effectively together to achieve 'resilience' goals. Second, the emphasis on the local ownership of building 'resilience'. It is the responsibility of the local government to achieve 'resilience'. This implies the need for integrating 'resilience' into national policies and planning for development. More importantly, 'resilience' approach has to be sustainable, multi-sectorial, multi-level and jointly planned by the people, communities, or governments at risk (Tocci, 2020).

Third, 'resilience' approach is characterized as people-centered and focus on the most vulnerable groups. The indication is that 'resilience' does not only aim to increase the local abilities to absorb shocks and to cope with stresses, but it also constitutes an opportunity for transformation, with regard to adaptation, changing environments, improving livelihoods and economic opportunities (Chandler, 2014; Tocci, 2020).

These characteristics are also echoed by Pol Bargués and Pol Morillas who attempt to illustrate the shift in the EU foreign policy to adopt 'resilience', as a better strategy to respond to crises. They illustrate that the crises, within and beyond the EU, emphasize the EU need to transfer to 'resilience' as a shift from the normative approach (Bargués & Morillas, 2021). The 'Normative Power Europe' has been a main theme in the broad literature, with a reference to the often quoted Manners study entitled, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" .In his argument, he contrasts the notion of 'Military Power Europe' and attempts to set a new direction for the EU's international role. By examining the case study of its international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty, he argues that the EU practice may be best understood as 'Normative power Europe' (Manners, 2002).

Hence, unlike the normative approach, through which the EU seeks to promote shared values of democracy, rule of law and human rights , 'resilience' emphasizes the local ownership and the

bottom up approach ( Bargués & Morillas, 2021). In that respect, ‘resilience’ represents a pragmatist approach that could be seen as middle ground between the EU over- ambitious of liberal peace building and under -ambitious stability (Anholt & Wagner , 2016).

Considering these characteristics, the shift to the local ownership and the emphasis on preparation, planning and constructing, ‘resilience’ is a cost-effective strategy. In the broad literature, there has been a normative assertion that preparation, in the form of stronger, faster and more inclusively could reduce the cost of future disasters in several countries as well as globally ( Manis, 2018). building ‘resilience’ , in terms of better planning and constructing, can not only reduce future costs but can also ameliorate the effects of damage.

For this reason, in the policy arena, there have been increasing calls for ‘resilience’. Recent seminal policy and analytic documents for states, like the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s flagship report or the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review, have underscored that states’ ‘resilience’ and capacity for adaptation will be keys to their future success in the geopolitical arena. For donors’ peace-building and development policies, high-level emphasis on ‘resilience’ has also swelled over the past few years, including in official communications from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the EU. (Mavelli, 2016; Brown, 2022).

For the policy makers ‘resilience’ is useful. Its usefulness stems from its ability to play a certain role in managing or governing populations from a distance, through ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2008). It represents a way to turn from full intervention in favor of more distant approaches that shift responsibility away from the international community onto local actors ( Pospisil & Besancenot, 2014).

While these features present a normative affirmation of being resilient as something good, this leads to another debate in the field that draws attention to the bright and dark side of ‘resilience’.

#### **2.4.1. The Bright and Dark Sides of ‘Resilience’**

The previous section provides the positive aspects of ‘resilience’. The one who advocates ‘resilience’ emphasizes on these aspects supported by empirical studies that suggest, in many

cases, that a resilient strategy has been a rather successful course of action (Cohn, 2012; Davis D. E., 2012; Williams, 2013). While these empirical studies illustrate the success of ‘resilience’ for individuals, communities and institutions abound, they also suggest that the ‘resilience’ agenda is beyond the means of those individuals, communities or institutions of what it is capable to achieve.

This limitation for ‘resilience’ has been one aspect for critical theorists who attempt to neglect the positive aspects of ‘resilience’ and focus on its negative aspects. Their argument is supported by cases of negative ‘resilience’ in cities like Johannesburg or Nairobi, Kenya. They suggest that ‘resilience’ agents who are supposed to be security providers (both private and state-run) have become drivers of violence (Savage & Muggah, 2012). In addition, scholars have decried the policy of progressively putting the responsibility of prevention and preparation for disruptive shocks onto communities and individuals rather than the state. They point out that this leads to a state’s abdication of all responsibility for managing crises.

Other scholars go further to reject the new turn for ‘resilience’ in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. They attempt to explore the political and philosophical stakes of the ‘resilience’ turn in security and governmental thinking (Dollin & Reid, 2009; Lentzos & Rose, 2009; O’Malley, 2010; Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams, 2011; Bourbeau, 2015). In their arguments, ‘resilience’ is presented as a neo-liberal cover that works by disempowering endangered populations. Its consequences represent a profound change for the human subject whose meaning and sole purpose is reduced to survivability. With its emphasis on the inevitability of lasting crises and the need to adapt, it suspects the possibility of achieving security at all reference (Evans & Reid, 2014). Considering the positive and negative aspects together, ‘resilience’ can be seen as an international phenomena that has together a dark and a bright side. This would avoid the normative bias towards ‘resilience’. At the same time, it would bring a deeper investigation for scholars in order to investigate how ‘resilience’ can be fostered and improved to achieve its goals.

## **2.5. Typologies of ‘Resilience’**

Reviewing the literature reveals that the concept of ‘resilience’ has a multitude of meanings and aspects related to it. Based on these aspects, two typologies of ‘resilience’ are presented.

The first typology considers a critical aspect of ‘resilience’ which is the level of ‘resilience’. As mentioned earlier, the approach that suggests to break down the concept in order to understand how the concept is mobilized, proposes a typology with multiple levels, namely the individual, familial, communal, institutional, national, regional, and global. (Walklate et al., 2014; Price & Unal, 2020) . However, the approach illustrates that these levels do not operate separately, but they complement each other. Building ‘resilience’ should consider all these levels together to bring a better tomorrow. Moreover, this multi-level systems approach to ‘resilience’ is not unique to one field, but its features prominently developed across various fields, including development, disaster recovery, climate change adaptation and humanitarian crisis intervention (Interpeace, 2016).

Understanding these levels provides a deeper understanding of ‘resilience’, yet, they don’t provide a clear picture of how ‘resilience’ is operationalized by these levels. In other words, this uncomprehensive typology leaves out the different patterns of response that ‘resilience’ brings to world politics.

The second typology attempts to deal with the different patterns of response ‘resilience’ brings. As the scope of ‘resilience’ had broadened from ecology to social Sciences, multiple typologies of ‘resilience’ have been presented ( Slocum & Kline, 2017). Different scholars tend to define ‘resilience’ and its application, based on the scientific field in which ‘resilience’ has been applied, and then design their own typology (Handmer & Dovers, 1996; Bourbeau, 2013a; Walklate et al., 2014).

Here again Holling was the first to present a typology of ‘resilience’, distinguishing between ‘resilience’ perspectives in relation to ecosystem management. He distinguishes between ecological ‘resilience’ and engineering ‘resilience’. The first refers to the system ability to withstand and absorb shocks while the latter refers to the system ability to return to an equilibrium following a disturbance ( Walker & Cooper, 2011).

Holling’s perspective is crucial for policy makers in order to illustrate how resources are managed. Moreover, his perspective is echoed on other typologies of ‘resilience’ in other fields. As ‘resilience’ brings different responses to crises, scholars attempt to examine how

these are addressed. They seek to provide a theoretical basic for thinking about the full range of possible responses to challenges (Handmer & Dovers, 1996; Bourbeau, 2013a; Quinlan et al., 2015).

What is common about 'resilience' typology regarding response is that it revolves mainly around three types of responses; first, resistance to change; second, change at the margins and third openness and adaptation (Handmer & Dovers, 1996). These have different terminologies, varied within each field. For instance, Simpson et al, address them as capacities of 'resilience' (Interpeace, 2016). These capacities include absorption, adaptation or transformation.

Christophe Béné labels them as 3D 'Resilience' Framework: Absorptive capacity, Adaptive capacity and Transformative capacity ( Béné, 2014).The ultimate goal of these responses is to investigate what changes 'resilience' brings to policy making, what it addresses, and from which perspective.

In international relations, Bourbeau echoes these three types. He presents a typology, through which 'resilience' scholars distinguish three main perspectives of 'resilience': The first type is called Maintenance. It is related to an engineering perspective focusing on systems' stability. The adjustment of existing policies is what can be seen through this perspective. The second type is Marginal 'resilience' and it is related to ecological 'resilience'. This type refers to the ability of the system and society to adapt after crisis. This type is characterized by responses that bring changes at the margins but that do not challenge the basis of a policy (or a society). 'Resilience' as marginality implies responding within the boundaries of the current policy, and/or social structure (Bourbeau, 2013a).

The last type is Renewal 'resilience'. It is related to the socio-ecological 'resilience'. This type is characterized by responses that transform basic policy assumptions and, thus, potentially remodel social structures. 'Resilience' as renewal implies introducing completely novel vectors of responses. These will (in an implicit or explicit way) basically change existing policies and set new directions for governance. In this type crises are seen positively that aim to bring fundamental changes to current policies (Bourbeau, 2013a).

While the first two types tackle the consequences or the impact of the shock or the crisis, the third type aims to tackle the causes of the crisis, to prevent it in the future. For this reason, the first two are looked upon as negative ‘resilience’ and the latter as a positive one (Interpeace, 2016). While The value added of the analytical and theoretical typology is recognized, nonetheless, the challenge is how comprehensive this typology is and its capacity to capture all the diverse and complex responses ‘resilience’ brings.

## **2.6. The Role of Building ‘Resilience’ by the EU in Crisis-Prone Countries**

The integration of ‘resilience’ into the EU discourse is not something new. Some researchers indicate that the EU institutions have included the term ‘resilience’ in areas such as environmental policy and economy since the 1980s ( Treshchenkov , 2017; Romanova , 2017). The European Environment Agency's interest in the concept is understandable. Like many environment agencies, in the last decade, the main area of the term’s circulation was the assistance to developing countries to prepare for natural disasters and emergency situations. In that respect, the efforts of the EU, individual donor countries and organizations under the UN, tried to make this support possible. In that context, ‘resilience’ was rarely mentioned while its substance and core never became explicit ( Treshchenkov , 2017).

The active penetration of the concept into the discourse and political praxis of the EU began in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The reviewed literature points to the fact that the European Commission stated that the essence of ‘resilience’ is to link humanitarian assistance to development policy (Tocci, 2020). Within this context, the EU was not acting in separation from the international arena, on the contrary, its ‘resilience’ approach was consistent with a trend across a range of international organizations regarding how to organize international intervention in the best way ( Joseph & Juncos, 2019).

In order to act as a legitimate actor, the EU has to fly within the flock of other international actors, thus, while developing its approach to ‘resilience’, the EU has ‘borrowed’ from these already existing approaches, namely, that of the UN. As the Commission states, ‘[t]he EU has an interest in developing a shared understanding and practice around ‘resilience’ with other international partners, including the UN, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD) (European Commission, 2017). The increasing emphasis on 'resilience' by the international donors, including the EU, rests on reorganizing the international interventions around more cost effective strategies.

The application of the new approach starts with the programs adopted by the EU in November 2011 and December 2012. These programs aim to support developing countries building their own 'resilience' in the face of various kinds of disasters (European Commission, 2012b).

SHARE programs, which stands for 'Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience' and AGIR the 'Global Alliance for Resilience' initiatives came as quick responses to the 2011 food crisis in the Horn of Africa. Tracing the adoption of 'resilience' by the EU in these earliest policies indicates that the aim of 'resilience' integration is to enhance the developing countries capacities to respond to natural crises (Joseph, 2014). 'Resilience' has been touted as "the new big thing" in terms of its perceived positive benefits for society at large (Sparf & Petridou, 2019).

While the essence of adopting 'resilience' in the EU humanitarian and development policy is to respond to natural crises, the timing of these initiatives suggest that 'resilience' is best understood as part of a particular approach to global governance. The 'resilience' project is part of a broader strategy that seeks to govern from a distance through supporting developing countries building their own 'resilience' (Joseph, 2014; Tocci, 2020).

The increasing commitment to 'resilience' approach starts to be emphasized in the EU following policies including 'The EU Approach to Resilience - Learning from Food Security Crises' in 2012 and 'The Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020' in 2013. The latter document represents a road map that aims to actualize and operationalize the previous Communication. This is to be done through setting the ways forward to a more effective EU collaborative action on building 'resilience', bringing together humanitarian action, long-term development cooperation and on-going political engagement (European Commission, 2016b). Yet, scholars point out that these earliest policies often have little substantive guidance for practitioners on the ground regarding how to implement the 'resilience' approach (Mitchell et al., 2014).

From humanitarian and development policy, ‘resilience’ has found its way into the EU foreign and security policy. The revised European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) adopted at the end of 2015 is one of the first documents to introduce building ‘resilience’ as a foreign policy goal for the EU ( Juncos, 2016; Schumacher, 2017) .

The document illustrates that, “[t]he measures set out in this Joint Communication seek to offer ways to strengthen the ‘resilience’ of the EU’s partners in the face of external pressures and their ability to make their own sovereign choices” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 4). Through this policy, policy makers have introduced ‘resilience’ into the foreign policy and security discourse. However, it is the presentation of the EUGS on June 2016 that increased the significance of this concept and connected building ‘resilience’ to core geostrategic interests ( Juncos, 2016; ARENA Centre for European Studies, 2021).

In this policy, ‘resilience’ gains an astonishing importance. It is mentioned no less than 41 times in the 60-page document ( Juncos, 2016). More importantly, building “state and societal ‘resilience’ to our East and South” is identified as one of the five key priorities for the EU’s external action alongside building the Union’s own security; pursuing an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; supporting cooperative regional orders and a commitment to a reformed multilateral, rules-based system of global governance (The European Union External Action Service , 2016).

While both policies have introduced ‘resilience’, they have different understandings of it. The revised ENP has introduced ‘resilience’ as a goal to be achieved, however, the EUGS understands it as a process “the ability to reform”, an endless process of enabling.

The increased significance of ‘resilience’ in the EUGS is not derived only from the number of times it is mentioned, but also the process and the context through which this policy has come into existence. In the respect of the process, the EUGS came to light after an extensive process of discussion and wide consultations with EU member states, EU institutions, third-country representatives, civil society, experts and academics. While the content of the EUGS owes a lot to Nathalie Tocci, Special Adviser to EU HRVP Federica Mogherini, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) Strategic Planning Division, the intensive discussions suggest that the



EUGS represents a degree of consensus within the EU foreign policy circle (Missiroli, Towards an EU Global Strategy -Background , Process, References, 2015).

Regarding the context, this policy comes after a strategic assessment for the EU foreign policy. This assessment appears in the European Council Conclusion in December 2013. This was presented to the Council in June 2015 (European Commission, 2015b). The essence of this assessment is the identity crisis which made the rethinking of the EU role in the international arena inevitable. In the broad literature about 'resilience' in the EU foreign policy discourse, scholars have emphasized the idea of the identity crisis and the implication of 'resilience' as a response to it ( Beaugard, 2016; Altomonte & Villafranca, 2019; Joseph & Juncos, 2019).

The identity crisis appears with the new self-perception the EU has about itself, its neighborhood and the world. The new EUGS presents a new view about the EU self-image which is in a big contrast to the previous self-perception presented in the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 (Barbé & Morillas, 2019; Tocci, 2020). The optimism demonstrated in the opening of this strategy "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free" (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 1) could not be in more contrast to that of the new EU Global Strategy. The new EUGS states: "We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned (The European Union External Action Service , 2016, p. 7). These words position the EU in a context of different crises both domestically and internationally (Youngs, 2018).

Scholars note that 'resilience' comes as a pragmatic approach in the age of uncertainty, complexity, and internal and external challenges. Indeed, the emergence of 'resilience' comes at the time when the EU project has been dealing with many challenges. There have been internal crises, including, the Eurozone economic crisis, the rise of populism, Euro-skepticism, and Brexit. Further, there have been external crises including a deteriorating geopolitical environment in the Southern and Eastern neighborhoods, the rise of Islamic terrorism and ISIS, hybrid threats and the refugee crisis ( Juncos, 2016; Barbé & Morillas, 2019) .

The failure of the EU to tackle complexity and uncertainty, is what has led to the emergence of ‘resilience’. This led Jonathan Joseph to label ‘resilience’ as “governance through failure” (Joseph, 2016).

The reviewed literature illustrates two contrasting views regarding the role of ‘resilience’ in the EU foreign policy. The first view presents it as a robust policy framework to guide the Union's external action, and a transformational agenda the EU has set to increase its role regionally and globally (Grevi, 2016; Biscop, 2016). This agenda represents a return to Realpolitik. This Realpolitik, as understood originally by the German liberal Ludwig von Rochau in 1853, meant a rejection of liberal utopianism, but not of liberal ideals themselves ( Hay, 2016). This is what Biscop calls “Realpolitik with European characteristics” ( Biscop, 2016, pp. 1-2).

By the emphasis on ‘resilience’, the EU has attempted to put a positive spin on the realization that the world order is not as receptive to its liberal version of international governance as it believed during the decade of enlargement (Juncos, 2018). Instead of the focus on the over ambition object of promoting liberal values and the Normative power Europe (Manners, 2002), ‘resilience’ puts new life into the EU and its foreign policy and empowers it to engage in an effective manner with different challenges ( Juncos, 2016; Smith & Youngs, 2018).

‘Resilience’ is seen as a better and more effective strategy than democratization. Some scholars argue that the failure of the EU to produce sustainable democratic change and reforms in the Eastern and Southern neighbors illustrates the need to reform. After investing considerable resources in promoting its normative agenda throughout the 1990s and 2000s, lower costs, less normative commitments from the EU and more leeway and agent responsibility for its neighbors became necessary ( Börzel & Risse, 2012; Grabbe, 2014; Moga, 2017).

The second argument is more skeptical about this transformational agenda, rather, they argue that ‘resilience’ can be partly seen as a continuation of the EU previous policies. Here again, this argument is based on different perspectives. The first perspective assumes that the EU’s ‘resilience’ approach can be partly seen as a continuation of neoliberal forms of governance , as mentioned, and template by many other international actors to promote governing from distance, (Chandler, 2014; Joseph & Juncos, 2019; Mavelli , 2019).

Another approach argues that this continuity is embedded within the continuous commitment to liberal norms. Though ‘resilience’ implies more pragmatic approach ( Juncos, 2016)) or a middle ground between liberal peacebuilding and stability (Anholt & Wagner , 2016). The EU’s narrative is still closely linked to liberal norms and values ‘[a] resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state’ (The European Union External Action Service , 2016, p. 24),yet, ‘resilience’ thinking also suggests a humble view about the ability of the EU to shape the world, in comparison with the previous view presented in the European Security Strategy ( Tocci, 2017).

This also appears from acknowledging that the promotion of values alone will not be the only objective; but also the EU needs to promote its interests. For this reason, to bridge the gap between values and interests, the EUGS advocates principled pragmatism as a new guiding paradigm in parallel to the introduction of ‘resilience’ (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2012; Anholt & Wagner , 2016; Juncos, 2016; Barbé & Morillas, 2019) .

The third approach points to the fact of the difficulty in achieving this transformational agenda. While ‘resilience’ has been generally adopted in both of the EU foreign and development policies, the institutionalization of ‘resilience’ discourse remains very limited or shallow (Lehne , 2022). Scholars like Korosteleva and Flockhart argue that full institutionalization would need an overhaul of the EU’s institutional framework and a rethinking of its main rationale for intervention ( Treshchenkov , 2017; Zilber, 2017; Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020) . On the other side, the scholars’ argument considers that ‘resilience’ discourse would require full agreement among member states, the EU institutions and other important actors, but many of those have strong, often opposing, interests in this domain ( Juncos, 2016).

More importantly, the lack of a general clear agreement to what ‘resilience’ really means in practice, among academics and policy makers, makes this process of translation into institutional policies even a harder task ( Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Garschagen, 2013).The limitation for achieving this transformational agenda is not far from other scholars’ argument who aim to examine the impact of ‘resilience’ on the EU’s foreign policy.

Many studies have set evaluating the impact of ‘resilience’ on the EU foreign policy as a core theme. Tocci notes that ‘resilience’ is still to produce important quantifiable outcomes. She argues that the contrasting interpretations of ‘resilience’, among the EU policy makers and scholars, hinder obtaining clear outcomes (Lavrelashvili, 2018; Tocci, 2020). Cristian Nitoiu and Loredana Simionov suggest that there is an ambiguous middle ground understanding of the EU goal of ‘resilience’. ‘Resilience’ aims to foster stability and order whilst also sustaining the humanitarian and norms-based agenda, however, measuring the impact is a challenging task (Nitoiu & Simionov, 2022). What these studies have in common is that they indicate that the EU policies lack clear indicators with clear specific objectives for building ‘resilience’.

Other empirical studies illustrate that the multi-dimensions of the EU building ‘resilience’ may lead to success in one policy area while undermine another policy areas (Tocci, 2020; Colombo et al., 2017). Other scholars also highlight the failure of the EU to strengthen the bottom-up approach or the materialization of local ownership ( Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020; Joseph & Juncos, 2020; Bargués & Morillas, 2021; Petrova & Delcour, 2020). While the former studies focus on the outputs of building ‘resilience’ , the latter pay attention to the approach shift to be achieved.

The reviewed literature also indicates the contrasting results regarding fostering ‘resilience’ in and beyond the EU. While the EUGS made the state and societal resilience a main priority, the following years witnessed a greater inward looking approach to enhance the EU own ‘resilience’. Scholars argue that ‘resilience’ becomes a mean to achieve the EU interests including migration management strategy, risk management, and stability (Korosteleva, 2020; Nitoiu & Simionov, 2022). Other scholars go further to argue that the rise of geopolitics, Covid 19, the intensified competition between the U.S. and China have made the external dimension of ‘resilience’ disappear (ARENA Centre for European Studies, 2021). The previous studies may indicate the failure of the EU external dimension of building ‘resilience’ and its self-interest while the latter provide lessons to be learnt from the EU response to crises and its need to build ‘resilience’ internally prior to build it externally. Moreover, the Russian war against Ukraine proves how insecure the bloc is and its need to balance between the internal and external dimension of ‘resilience’.

Yet, ‘resilience’ efforts in the neighborhood have not always been failure and there are some tangible results. Teona Lavrelashvili argues that the EU efforts to promote ‘resilience’ in its Eastern neighborhood, with a varied degree, have been successful. By examining these efforts in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, she finds that progress has been achieved in terms of the EU’s reform agenda (Lavrelashvili, 2018). Although success has been there, the fear of the cracking down of these reforms make ‘resilience’ vulnerable to a reversed result. Luigi Narbone comes to the same conclusion while studying the Tunisian case. He finds that the EU policies have supported Tunisia in establishing formal democratic institutions and dealing with security challenges, and less success has been produced in addressing its socioeconomic challenges and in fostering social ‘resilience’ ( Narbone, 2020). To go further, Eric Stollenwerk argues that ‘resilience’ is essential to prevent governance breakdown in Tunisia and Libya (Stollenwerk, 2021).

The latter cases highlight the role of ‘resilience’ in limited statehood or even failed state<sup>3</sup>, as in Libya, at the same time, they demonstrate that more empirical research is needed to examine the impact of ‘resilience’. In addition, they indicate the gap in the broad literature in term of the role of the EU building ‘resilience’ in the neighborhood, and this is what the paper aims to contribute to.

## **2.7. The EU in Jordan**

When it comes to the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan, the broad literature attempts to examine empirically the role of ‘resilience’ and how it has been integrated within the EU – Jordanian context. The Jordanian case drove the scholars’ attention as the implementation of ‘resilience’ in Jordan starts at the time of the adoption of ‘resilience’ in the EUGS.

The literature produced has also main themes to cover. Among these themes are; first, understanding building ‘resilience’ in the Jordanian case. Second, the operationalization of building ‘resilience’ in Jordan and its impact on the host communities and refugees. Finally,

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<sup>3</sup> Limited statehood areas are parts of the territory in which the central government lacks the capacity to implement decisions and/or its monopoly over the means of violence is challenged. See Thomas Risse ( Risse, 2015). Failed state, on the other hand, is a condition of “state collapse”. A state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions ( Mahr, 2022).

comparison between the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan and Lebanon as hosts for Syrian refugees.

Regarding the first theme, scholars examine how to understand ‘resilience’ and its implication on Jordan as a host and the EU as a donor. The implementation of ‘resilience’ in Jordan at the time of the European migration crisis of 2015 draws scholars’ attention to investigate ‘resilience’ as a containment strategy ,that aims to keep refugees in the host countries instead of their influx to the EU ( Achilli, 2015) ( Fakhoury, 2016; Panizzon, 2018; Niemann & Zaun, 2018; Badarin & Wildeman, 2021; Anholt & Sinatti, 2020; Tubakovic, 2019) .

There is a common agreement among those scholars that one of the main interests of the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan is a refugee containment strategy, yet, the expected result might be in contradiction with what the EU has expected. Rosanne Anholt & Giulia Sinatti argue that the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan could ultimately threaten rather safeguard the security of the EU. Their argument considers how ‘resilience’ might increase the instability of Jordan, through increasing the pressure in the host communities socially and economically (Anholt & Sinatti, 2020). Their argument highlights the contrasting view adopted by the EU in term of those refugees. While the EU presents the refugees as a development asset for Jordan, at the same time, it presents them as a challenge to the EU’s own cohesion, economic and political stability.

Whilst their argument presents ‘resilience’ as a tool of instability of Jordan, in other vein, scholars explore the role of the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan’s regime stability and its ‘resilience’ ( Borisov, 2015; Barblet et al , 2018; Csicsmann, 2022). It is historically known that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, to a lesser extent, have been key security providers for Jordan (Csicsmann, 2022), however, the EU’s building ‘resilience’ in Jordan has also contributed to the regime ‘resilience’ and the maintenance of the status quo. This argument reveals an opposing results for the EU building ‘resilience’. While it may contribute to the regime ‘resilience’ at one level, it does not lead to societal ‘resilience’. Hassan Al Barari argues that this appears from the growing dissatisfaction among many citizens regarding the economic and social circumstances along the huge trust gap between the citizen and the political institutions in Jordan (Barari, 2015).

Emile Badarin and Jeremy Wildeman examine foreign aid, as a decisive ‘resilience’ instrument, in the EU’s foreign policy. They illustrate how it has been utilized to promote the EU short-term priorities, in particular in term of security and migration issues. Further, it aims to achieve longer term objectives regarding institutional reforms. This perfectly suits the EU’s preferred style of governance in areas including trade, security and migration ( Badarin & Wildeman, 2021). Their argument points at the operationalization of ‘resilience’ to serve its goals more than the host countries. Further, the case selection of countries in the Middle East and North Africa provides a deep understanding of the EU with the “Other”. It reveals a long-perspective of asymmetrical relationship that is translated through liberal phraseology.

Bridging the gap between the humanitarian-development nexus, the shift to a bottom-up approach and enhancing local ownership, which are vital for the EU ‘resilience’ understanding have been also examined. The Jordanian case clarifies the success in some of these aspects and failure in others. Intellectuals like Rosanne Anholt and Giulia Sinatti and Gustavo Gonzalez argue that Jordan architecting the JRP, as an integrated chapter in the 3RP, and explicitly adopt ‘resilience’ as the sole approach represent a shift to development base approach (Gonzalez, 2016; Anholt & Sinatti, 2020).

They argue that the Jordan’s emphasis on international aid to target both refugees and local communities illustrates a commitment to bridge the humanitarian –development gap (Gonzalez, 2016; Anholt & Sinatti, 2020). Other scholars attempt to clarify the challenges in term of coordinating short-term emergency and longer-term development approaches (Anholt & Wagner , 2016; Boustan et al., 2016). These arguments do not indicate the failure of building ‘resilience’, on the contrary, shedding lights on these challenges raises the awareness regarding the need for a more flexible and multi-years funding to gradually bridge this gap. For this reason, the coming years of implementing the JRP witnessed more flexible funding from donors including the EU ( Kittaneh & Stolk, 2018).

As for the responsibility of the local actors to implement ‘resilience’ projects and enhancing their capacities, this also has been challenging. The EU seems to prefer the UN or its own development agencies to implement these projects ( Lavenex & Piper,

2022). Scholars illustrate that the EU's dependency on the UN organizations and development agencies increase the legitimacy of the EU's external migration policies through the respectability and legitimacy of the UN (Lavenex, 2016; Think Tank European Parliament, 2018; Spijkerboer, 2022). While those scholars highlight the issue of raising legitimacy through the UN, a question remained unsolved about the capacity of the local actors themselves in terms of designing, implementing and evaluating these big projects.

Further, scholars also attempt to understand the EU's building 'resilience' in light of its role in promoting development for the refugees and local communities. In this respect, exploring the EU 'resilience' thinking on the ground and its operationalization in response to the Syrian refugee crisis is the task (Turner, 2015; Fakihi & Ibrahim, 2015; Lenner & Turner, 2019; Anholt & Sinatti, 2020; Seeberg, 2020; Şahin Mencütek & Nashwan, 2021). The scholars in this spectrum try to provide a comprehensive analysis for the 2016 EU–Jordan Compact. The Compact is a special instrument designed to promote 'resilience', achieve development for local communities, along achieving self-reliance for Syrian refugees.

Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner clarify the challenges and contradictions of the Jordanian political economy which have been ignored while designing this Compact. (Lenner & Turner, 2019). It is true that their argument analyzes these challenges, on the other hand, the procedures done by Jordan to facilitate Syrian refugees' integration in the market were marginalized.

In the same direction, there has been a criticism for the Compact in terms of the refugees' work conditions. Shaddin Almasri criticizes the nationality based- priority for Jordan at the expense of the refugees work conditions and social protection. He argues that Jordan attempts to comply with the Compact, by issuing more work permits, to serve its interest of obtaining the foreign aid (Almasri, 2021). In addition, Ala Al-Mahaidi criticizes the Compact's potential to secure refugee living and labor rights. He argues that there are challenges that hinder achieving the Compact objectives, however, a greater focus on their rights and social protection help to overcome these challenges (Al-Mahaidi, 2021). His argument shows the



possibility of moving ahead to achieve a greater success for this Compact without only paying attention to obstacles.

Peter Seeberg, from a different angle, builds his argument on the basis of Jordan migration diplomacy. He clarifies its responsiveness to the EU incentives, including the Compact. He traces the development in the Jordanian institutions' flexibility. This flexibility allows Jordan to get benefits from EU incentives and facilitates refugees' integration into the labor market (Seeberg, 2020). His emphasis on the development of Jordan's institution flexibility provides a strong argument in relation to the possibility of making the Compact more workable.

This also takes scholars to examine the impact of building 'resilience' on refugees' self-reliance and local communities' development. As for the first point, scholars challenge the idea of the possibility of achieving self-reliance for refugees. Anholt and Sinatti argue that this is difficult to achieve, as there is a high rate of unemployment, even among Jordanians (Anholt & Sinatti, 2020). Second, they point to the fact that issuing work permits does not indicate that all those refugees are capable to make their own living and find decent jobs. Şahin Mencütek and Ayat J. J. Nashwan's argument highlights further challenges women face, as a result of gender roles and cultural sensitivities ( Şahin Mencütek & Nashwan, 2021) . These arguments signify two contradicting points. On the one hand, they show the idealistic view the architects of this Compact have about its potentials, and on the other, they reveal how the Jordanian context has been marginalized or has not been examined well, before the Compact formulation.

Considering the local communities' development, the debate among scholars revolve around the value added of the Syrian refugees to the Jordanian labor market. Some scholars argue that Syrian refugees are to be considered a value added. Yousef Mansour takes the Creative Construction" of Schumpeter, 1994 as his point of departure. He attempts to bring empirical studies from developing countries to support his argument. Based on this concept, he argues that those refugees are value added, with regards to the skills, knowledge and creativity those refugees bring over, along their impact on the host economies (Mansur, 2020). Further, he takes the same direction as Ali Fakih and May Ibrahim , to highlight that refugees don't challenge Jordanians in terms of job opportunities ( Fakih & Ibrahim, 2015). Yet, the latter

build their argument on vector autoregressive methodology. This serve as a better methodology to examine time series data from the most affected governorates in Jordan. Using this methodology shows that unemployment rates of Jordanians, based on employment rates, labor force participation, the number of refugees, and economic activity at the level of governorates have not been affected by those refugees.

Other studies present a different point of view. Many studies present negative perceptions among Jordanians regarding those refugees (Mercy Corps, 2013; Ali et al., 2014; Stave & Hillesund, 2015; Alshoubaki & Harris, 2018; Baylouny, 2020; Anholt & Sinatti, 2020) . Stevin Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund's argument examines the Jordanian labor market and demonstrates how refugees are competitors for Jordanians in informal sectors like agriculture, construction, and services ( Stave & Hillesund, 2015). Anne Marie Baylouny's study pays more attention to the changing perceptions Jordanians have regarding those refugees. She argues that who used to be brothers have become invaders in the Jordanian society, especially in the most affected governates ( Baylouny, 2020). The value added of her argument is that it analyzes refugees within the frame of xenophobia, militarization, and humanitarianism. This in turn reveals refugees' wider roles in catalyzing changes in state-society relations.

Wa'ed Alshoubaki's and Michael Harris debate is a comprehensive analytical framework for the influx of the Syrian refugees. They provide a deep analysis for the various humanitarian, political, economic, sociocultural and environmental challenges Jordan and its government face as the result of this influx. These challenges hinder the suggested development for the refugees and their hosts ( Alshoubaki & Harris, 2018). The advantage of the proposed framework is that it is not only applicable to Jordan, but also, it has the potentials to be used as a comparative analytical tool for other receiving states.

In term of the Rules of Origin scheme (RoO), it has also been a central theme. The reason behind its receiving a great attention is that it has been presented as a main instrument for the EU building 'resilience'. The reviewed literature analyzes the efficiency of this component of the Compact. Although this scheme aims to facilitate Jordan exports to the EU market through the relaxation of the rules of origin, however, it has not been capable to produce the promised

rewards of growth and development ( Sak et al., 2018; Prieto , 2018; Lenner & Turner, 2018; Mansur, 2022) .

Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner argue that the focus on the special economic zones (SEZs), as an incubator of change for Syrians and Jordanians, is a challenge, rather than an opportunity for Syrians and investors alike. They argue that there are many challenges that make these SEZs remain unattractive for investors. Regarding Syrians, the low wages, long working hours beside long distance make them avoid such opportunities (Lenner & Turner, 2018). Güven Sak et al's argument does not consider this scheme as fully unsuccessful, but it demonstrates the need for more efforts by the both sides, to get it full potentials ( Sak et al., 2018).The same argument is presented by Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner, yet they argue that to get more benefits from the trade scheme, there are not only more efforts to be done by Jordan, but moreover, Jordan perspective has to be changed.

In the Jordanian discourse, instead of discussing the economic benefits and feasibility of the scheme, public discussions occasionally have portrayed future possible investments as a European duty, or a gift that Jordan deserves ( Lenner & Turner, 2019). The significance of these studies is that they shed the light on the uniqueness of this Compact and the possibilities of getting greater potentials by changing some policies and instruments in Jordan. In addition, they open the door for other host countries to consider their settings and political economies before adopting such schemes, especially after the model has gone global (Press Release, 2017). Moreover, they signify the need for more empirical research to bridge the gap regarding the impact of the Compact and the EU building 'resilience' in Jordan for Syrians and Jordanian alike and this is aim of this paper.

### **3. The Theoretical Framework**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

The main focus of this chapter is introducing, defining the research concepts and presenting the theoretical framework. Its main objective is to illustrate briefly the scholar's engagement of 'resilience' in the international relations and how it has been conceptualized and theorized by those scholars. Since the paper's main question is about the role of the EU building 'resilience' and its contribution to Jordan security in response to the on-going Syrian crisis, it is crucial to understand the concept and how it is understood within the context of this paper.

In our contemporary world, it becomes difficult to deny that there are tremendous challenges, a strong sense of uncertainty, and constant reminders of the unpredictability of what might be lurking around the corner. To mention a few, catastrophic climate change, terrorist attacks, civil wars or mass redundancies. Different policies are put forward to manage these uncertainties. Among the prescribed policies for handling such a state of flux, the one that is increasingly gaining currency is "resilience" (Davoudi, et al., 2012).


'Resilience', as a word, stems from the Latin word "resilire." "Salire" means to leap or jump; the suffix "re" indicates repetition, or backward motion. As for its origin, the first use of the concept is found from the year 1430 in early modern French as a juridical term for contract termination and for the restoration of the original legal situation (Göbbling et al., 2018).

However, the concept started to flourish only in the seventeenth century. Amongst the scholars who used the concept at early times were: Thomas Blount's, in his *Glossographia* of 1656. He used 'resilience' as "a leaping or skipping back, a rebounding". Samuel Johnson in 1751 "spoke about the common resiliency of the mind" (Bourbeau, 2018a, p. 26). Thomas Tredgold, on the other hand, in 1818, utilized the term to describe a property in its strength of timber. Nevertheless, it was not till the mid of the twentieth century that 'resilience' became dominant in the field of ecology. This is attributed, as mentioned, to Peter Holling who introduced the concept in 1973 (Walklate et al., 2014; Juncos, 2016; Joseph, 2016). Others have emphasized the important contributions from psychology, where 'resilience' implies a shift in the focus from

vulnerability and deficits to protective factors and adaptive capacities ( Walker & Cooper, 2011; Bourbeau, 2018a).

Throughout ecology and psychology, ‘resilience’, as a scientific field, has flourished. The concept has rapidly dominated vast areas of social sciences, asserting itself continuously as an ascending discourse in natural resource management. It has become a regular, if under-theorized, term of art in discussions of international finance and economic policy, risk analysis, the psychology of trauma, development policy, urban planning, public health and the broader national security ( Walker & Cooper, 2011; Bourbeau, 2018a) as the chart illustrates

Figure 2. ‘Resilience’ in the Scientific Fields  
 Source : Own edition



For this reason, it seems that ‘resilience’ is emerging in everyday discourses, however, understanding the concept within each field will be beyond the scope of this paper. As for the

context of this paper, mapping it briefly in ecology, Hollings' work, and psychology will be presented briefly. The essence for choosing these fields only comes from two folds. First, the fact that the typology of 'resilience' which is the theoretical framework of this paper is based on understanding 'resilience' in these fields intensifies the need to understand them within their scope. Second, this is essential to understand the paths through which 'resilience' has been integrated into different fields in political science and international relations.

### **3.2. Genealogy of 'Resilience'**

After looking at the paths through which 'resilience' has been integrated into different fields in political science, the literature in the genealogy of the concept distinguishes between a linear understanding of the genealogy of 'resilience' and a non-linear understanding.

The linear understanding on the concept argues that the beginning of the concept can be traced back to C.S. Holling's influential article 'Resilience' and Stability of ecological System. (Walklate et al., 2014; Methmann & Oels, 2015; Juncos, 2016; Joseph, 2017). Holling's work shifts 'resilience' into a new understanding in the ecology system. When 'resilience' was first integrated into ecology, the concept "tended to emphasize the ability of systems to return to an equilibrium ex ante" ( Juncos, 2016, p. 4).

Unlike the previous literature, Holling shifts focus away from equilibrium as an ecosystem's core, towards a focus on persistence. The significant contribution of Holling's work relies on the fact that it destabilized the notion of 'resilience'. Where previous research had paid a special attention to the ecosystems ability to return to a 'balance of nature', Holling seeks to shift the focus to the persistence of the ecosystem ( Walker & Cooper, 2011).

Accepting that 'resilience' began to develop in ecology, with Holling's work, leads to a linear understanding of the genealogy of 'resilience'. This is Walker and Cooper's main argument in their inspiring and often quoted article Genealogies of 'Resilience': From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaption ( Walker & Cooper, 2011). Here, they suggest that there is only one genealogy of 'resilience', where the concept moved "from its first formulation in ecosystems science to its recent proliferation across disciplines and policy making arenas

loosely concerned with the logistics of crisis management" ( Walker & Cooper, 2011, p. 144). In this regard, 'resilience' has moved through the ecology literature to the literature of crisis management and international relations. The linear understanding highlights the importance of a critique of the proximity between the emergent discourse of 'resilience' and contemporary neoliberal doctrines. 'Resilience' success in 'colonizing' areas of governance is due to its intuitive ideological fit with neoliberal philosophy of complex adaptive systems ( Walker & Cooper, 2011).


The increased understanding of the lack of predictability in the world makes 'resilience' perfectly fits ecology as well neo-liberal philosophy. Walker and Cooper engaged in interpreting the essence of 'resilience' in the ecosystem and neo-liberal philosophy by the support of the complex systems theory. Their argument explains why 'resilience' is integrated as a better response to the complex world. It considers the adaptation, which is essential for Holing's understanding of 'resilience'. The uncertainty makes species compile to adapt in order to survive. The same logic is seen in the neoliberal thinking in economy. As the economist Friedrich Hayek argues, the market is so much complicated and it's difficult to be predicted or controlled and it is only possible to adapt to its changes ( Hayek , 1988) .Other scholars go further to present 'resilience' as an instrument of "rolling-out neoliberal governmentality" (Joseph, 2013a, p. 51; Zebrowski, 2013; Mavelli, 2016). From this perspective, 'resilience' is increasingly seen as a local process of governance and as a self-organizing response of communities to adversity, complexity and vulnerability.

The other domain of literature has a different perspective. The main argument of the non-linear literature is that by accepting 'resilience' as it has flourished from ecology, in a linear path, this excludes the contribution of other fields through which 'resilience' might have travelled. This is Philippe Bourbeau's main argument. He challenges Walker and Cooper's attempt to create a determinate and fixed genealogy of 'resilience'. He proposes a different genealogy that is more inclusive and considers the contribution of other fields in the proliferation of the concept (Walklate et al., 2014; Bourbeau, 2018a). His main argument suggests that the emergence of 'resilience' can be attributed to at least four different fields, one of them is ecology. The other fields are psychology, social work, and engineering. Focusing on one of them leaves much out of the debate. The same argument is attributed to Chris Zebrowski. In his book, he presents a

genealogy of resilient populations, as a referent of governance. He traces case studies in the context of the United Kingdom back to World War I through to the current notion of civil contingencies ( Zebrowski, 2015).Other scholars attempt to present a non- linear genealogy of ‘resilience’. For instance, Peter Rogers, Kevin Grove and Ana E. Juncos and Philippe Bourbeau (Rogers, 2017; Grove, 2018; Juncos & Bourbeau , 2022),

While Walker and Cooper want to present a fixed partial genealogy of ‘resilience’, the nonlinear argument attempts to create genealogies of ‘resilience’ with a more inclusive and comprehensive image considering contributions for other fields before ecology as the figures illustrate.

Figure 3. Walker and Cooper’s Genealogy of ‘Resilience’  
Source: Own edition based on (Bourbeau, 2018b)








Figure 4. A Genealogy of 'Resilience'  
 Source: Own Edition based on (Bourbeau, 2018b)

In that respect, the second approach provides a comprehensive genealogy of 'resilience' while tracking its path to the international relations. Although none of these fields contribution should be marginalized, the contribution of psychology in the debate of 'resilience' is arguably one of the most important contributions.

Two aspects make the contribution of psychology fundamental in the debate of 'resilience'. First, it defies the linear understanding of the concept with its emphasis on Holling's influential

article as a base for the emergence of ‘resilience’. Scholars illustrate that ‘resilience’ has been widely used in the psychology and psychiatry literature since the end of First World War. The devastating consequences of this war on mental health led to a greater interest in the issue of regaining individual and social psychological stability. With the emphasis on recovery from war experiences and catastrophes, psychology now recognizes ‘resilience’ as an element of the emotional behavior’s repertoire, making the first efforts towards the targeted enhancement of the personal and collective resistance and ‘resilience’ to disasters.

The second aspect is related to its role in the development of ‘resilience’ understanding. In this vein, the literature distinguishes between two approaches for ‘resilience’. The earlier works in psychology highlighted ‘resilience’ as a personal trait, something one either does or does not have. The quality of individual humans is stressed, as ‘resilience’ refers to withstand or tolerate adverse events without dramatic decreases to their well-being. ‘Resilience’ is conceptualized as good outcomes despite adversity, resilient individuals are capable of achieving emotional development, academic achievement, psychological advancement or self-esteem despite of the adversity they have been through (Kinzig, et al., 2006).

Such a subject-based understanding of ‘resilience’ is what David Chandler names 'classical' ‘resilience’ (Chandler, 2014, p. 5). In this view, the subjects overcome oppressive conditions or harsh natural or social environments because of their inner strengths and capacities to cope with adversities. However, this idea of ‘resilience’ has a tendency to 'blame the victim', as a lack of ‘resilience’ will be the fault of the individual.

The second approach that has emerged from the middle of 1950s illustrates the need to view ‘resilience’ as a process, making ‘resilience’ "the process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats or even significant sources of stress" (Southwick et al., 2014, p. 2). Instead of focusing on personal traits, greater emphasis on the idea of overcoming disasters through a process of strengthening of individual capacities and the activation of defense mechanisms came into the center of attention (Göbbling et al., 2018) .

Relating this processual perspective of ‘resilience’ to world politics seems an attractive idea for scholars and politicians alike. One reason behind that is the assumption that the process of

building ‘resilience’ in local communities may work as a strategy against conflict (Walklate et al., 2014; Bourbeau, 2018a). They assume that resilient local communities will be better prepared for dealing with shock when it occurs, this in return will decrease the impact of the crisis. For this, policy makers show bigger interest in ‘resilience’ as process and are keen to know how it can be implemented and enhanced.

However, these different understandings do not hinder the existence of common features found in resilient entities. McAslan suggests that these features include: First, the ability to absorb and then recover from an unusual event. Second, readiness and preparedness to deal with threats and events that are unusual, regardless of their scale, form, or timing. Third, the willingness to adapt to change within a threatening environment. Fourth, there is the commitment to survive. Finally, the preparedness of communities and organizations to find a common cause and a shared set of values to reorganize itself (McAslan, 2010).

When it comes to world politics, the impact of psychologists and political geographers have been influential in importing ‘resilience’, as will be illustrated in the following section.

### **3.3. ‘Resilience’ in International Politics**

The previous section illustrates the paths through which ‘resilience’ arrived to world politics and international relations. However, the fact that ‘resilience’ is a late comer into the field did not hinder producing a broad literature about ‘resilience’. In general, the engagement of international relations scholars with the concept has followed five paths summarized as follows (Bourbeau, 2015).

First, ‘resilience’ has been connected with global governance. Issues of globalization and how financial, digital, and other economic systems are connected have highlighted a growing number of shareholders' and managers desire to improve their companies’ ‘resilience’ to systemic shocks. Thus, scholars examine how ‘resilience’ contributes to tackle challenges related to economic liberalization. This comes in time of the financial crisis and the need to enhance capacities and be well prepared to decrease the impact of the crisis (Schneifer, 2008). Moreover, politicians have shown a big interest in the concept to improve the ‘resilience’ of public sector.

Hence, 'resilience' in global governance is about empowering individuals, businesses, and countries to make their own decisions and better respond to shocks (Goldin, 2020).

In another spectrum, scholars have made it reference in terms of erosion (or lack thereof) of sovereignty (Ansell & Weber, 1999). Other scholars have examined the 'resilience' of authoritarian regimes to democratic pressures. Within this context, 'resilience' is equated with the persistence and resistance of an institution, a social norm, or a political regime (Nathan, 2003). The importance of these studies is that it has opened up a space for reflecting the significance of resilience in world politics, yet, they have not sought to theorize the concept.

Second, 'resilience' has found its way into international relations through international development, humanitarian aid and disaster reduction sub-fields. Scholars in these areas attempt to underscore the positive impact of 'resilience' on individuals and communities amid of wars, conflicts and chronic violence. As 'resilience' has become a principal guidance adopted by several developmental international and non-governmental organizations including the UN (Goldstein, 2011), the ultimate goal of 'resilience' in this domain is to prevent unacceptable levels of human suffering and reducing the costs of international emergency response. Examples of different initiatives where 'resilience' has been a key factor include: the UN Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report (2012); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Platform for drought disaster 'resilience' (2013) (Bourbeau, 2015). What these policies have in common is that they are normatively biased towards 'resilience'. These studies start with the premise that the disturbance (or shock) is negative, and 'resilience' is about positive adaptation. Thus, there is an overarching acceptance that 'resilience' is good and must be promoted ( Thorén & Olsson, 2018).

Terrorism and counter-terrorism is the third path through which 'resilience' has attracted international relations scholars. While 'resilience' here aims to improve preparedness, a great role is expected to be played by local communities. A top priority for several governments has become emergency management infrastructure. In the United Kingdom, for instance, 'resilience' became a key component in the National Security Strategy from 2010 (Kaufmann, 2013).The main argument presented here is that making 'a strong Britain in an age of uncertainty' requires developing a new approach. A central pillar of this approach is the

development of domestic ‘resilience’ in the face of terrorism (Bourbeau, 2015). Canada also followed the same path of promoting ‘domestic resilience’ from 2011. The government announced the creation of the Kanishka Project – a five-year, \$10M initiative that aims to achieve a better understanding of effective policies to counter terrorism and violent extremism (Public Safety Canada, 2018).

A main challenge, in term of the application of ‘resilience’ in terrorism governance, is that it attempts to interpret it as a static concept. The incompleteness of this understanding becomes clearer when considering that it deals with ‘resilience’ as a binary notion. It is seen as an all or nothing concept. This perspective lacks the multi-scalar conceptualization of ‘resilience’ (Brassett & Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Moreover, it also eschews the question of the types of ‘resilience’. Hence, it creates a disconnection between the complexity of the contemporary social world and the tools developed to make sense of that world (Bourbeau, 2015).

The fourth vein through which international relation scholars tries to understand ‘resilience’ is through its relationship with neoliberalism. Many arguments have been proposed in this regard (Joseph, 2013a; Chandler & Reid, 2018; Mavelli , 2019). Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont propose a sweeping comprehensive assessment of the impacts of neoliberalism on the different aspects of social, economic, and political life. They explore how communities, social groups, and nations try to sustain their well-being in the face of the challenges aroused by neoliberalism (Hall & Lamont, 2013). The authors utilize the concept of social ‘resilience’ to refer to the capacity of groups of people linked together in an organization, class, community, or nation to sustain and advance their well-being (Bourbeau, 2015). A core theme for ‘resilience’ in this path is the emphasis on the capacity of individuals or groups to secure favorable outcomes under new circumstances.

Other critical theorists in this approach represent ‘resilience’ as something lamentable. It is considered as the representative of the continuity of a state’s rationality and dominance (Dollin & Reid, 2009). Joseph goes further to suggest that ‘resilience’ should be understood as part of a neoliberal rationality of governance that takes the responsibility from the social institutions and places its burden on the individual (Joseph, 2013a). Here, ‘resilience’ highlights the idea of preparedness, active citizenship and responsibility, hence, it contributes to a neoliberal ideology. On the other hand, ‘resilience’, within such understanding, constitutes a strategy for

states to abandon responsibility in crises ( O'Grady & Shaw, 2023) .Thus, it is best understood in the context of “rolling-out neoliberal governmentality” (Joseph, 2013b, p. 258).

Finally, a broader view of international relations engagement with ‘resilience’ is presented through the fifth path. This perspective proposes that any extensive evaluation of ‘resilience’ and its relationship to contemporary world cannot be restricted only to the questionable instrumentalization of ‘resilience’ by some governments. Rather, it asks to look at the broader picture of the complex and multifaceted application of ‘resilience’ in world politics (Bourbeau, 2015; Humbert & Joseph, 2019). Thus, applying ‘resilience’ is not only for governments, but it is also applicable across different sectors and at different levels. Within such a context, the possibility of building ‘resilience’ intends to foster links between very different sectors including: institutional and physical infrastructure, local capacity building, disaster preparedness, and emergency response (DAI, 2014).

By large and far, a common ground in these paths is that they all focus on the bright side of ‘resilience’, demonstrating how good it is to be resilient. Further, they clarify the different agent levels of ‘resilience’; these levels that range from individuals, institutions, communities or states as a whole. Moreover, they acknowledge that enhancing ‘resilience’ requires understanding the importance of the local ownership and how crucial it is to enhance their capacities in a world of uncertainty and complexity.

The growing use of this concept has made many international relation scholars attempt to theorize the concept in the field. Those scholars were fully engaged to answer different questions. In addition to what it means, they investigate how it is practiced and operationalized, why it is good or bad to be resilient, resilient of what and against what and where resilient settles.

The question of how is concerned with the operationalization of ‘resilience’. The proliferation in the use of ‘resilience’ tempts scholars to analyze the practice of many policies, to understand how it is understood and implemented through them. Some policies introduce ‘resilience’ as an ultimate goal (Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020, p. 153). These policies look for enhancing local communities, to be capable to respond to crises (Tocci, 2020). Other policies introduce ‘resilience’ as an instrument, it is a progressive process that never comes to an end, since it is an endless process of adaptation ( Bargaés & Schmidt, 2021). Other scholars challenge the idea of building societal ‘resilience’ as an instrument to respond to crises. They argue that the

unpredictability of crises makes adapting difficult to be achieved through ‘resilience’ policies (Joseph, 2013a; Chandler et al., 2020; Keelan & Browne, 2020) . This debate illustrates the entrapment among scholars regarding the suitability of ‘resilience’ to respond to crises in a world of complexity and uncertainty.

Regarding the EU, scholars examine how empirically possible it is to bridge the gap between the humanitarian and development nexus. As this aspect is crucial in the EU ‘resilience’ understanding (Anholt & Sinatti, 2020), scholars engage with the EU wider neighborhood, to see the possibility of making communities more resilient, and responsible for their own change and adaptation (Petrova & Delcour, 2020).

The question of why explores and analyzes the driving motives and practices behind adopting ‘resilience’. While some policies prioritize ‘resilience’ and illustrate how sufficient it is, other scholars expose why it may not be suitable for global governance. They attempt to highlight tensions between the current governing approaches and ‘resilience’, as an internal process of communal capacity-building and part of the Anthropocene ( Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020).

For many debates, the Corona epidemic and the policies dealing with it provide a good argument to illustrate the unsuitability of ‘resilience’. They argue when facing a global crisis, like the pandemic, this reactive, flexible and community-led approach is not an option. People are irrational, they cannot be trusted and they even do not know better. Considering their behavior, during the pandemic, they socialize, they make parties, they travel, and they put others and themselves at risk (Chandler, 2020). What is clear, at the state of emergency, the public are not to be trusted with the public interest. They lack the capacities for reasoning (Pospisil J. , 2020; Bargués,, 2020a). Many radical and critical commentators went further calling for the extension of regulatory governance and confirmed the potentially positive outcomes of a greater level of a state intervention (Sotris, 2020). Thus, ‘resilience’ as a policy of governance built on capacity building of the local communities is insufficient.

The last question the scholars attempt to deal with is the ‘resilience’ agent. This question investigates the level of the state or society that is capable of producing ‘resilience’ (Chandler & Coaffee, 2017; Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020). In order to understand ‘resilience’, as a full

comprehensive approach capable of achieving its potentials of development and peace, some scholars argue that the concept “needs to be broken down, both in terms of the capacities it describes and the levels at which it is mobilized” (Walklate et al., 2014, p. 410). Thus, Walklate, McGarry and Mythen propose a typology with multiple levels, namely the individual, familial, communal, institutional, national, regional, and global (Walklate et al., 2014). Furthermore, they illustrate that these levels do not operate separately, but they complement each other. This understanding of the multiple levels of ‘resilience’ points to the fact there is a wide variety of actors, with veto power, and those are capable of achieving resilience.

As illustrated, the literature debate concerns with the development of the conceptual, theoretical and empirical approaches of ‘resilience’ The following section will briefly trace ‘resilience’ in the EU policies, the section will mainly address ‘resilience’ in the EU humanitarian and development policy and its foreign and security policy, as they are related to the Syrian refugee crisis.

### **3.3.1. ‘Resilience’ in EU Policies**

As resilience has found its way to international relations from the first decade of this century, it also finds its way into the EU through different policies. It firstly has found its path into the EU humanitarian and development policies since 2012. The first straightforward reference of ‘resilience’ is through The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises. In this document, the Commission has demonstrated that ‘resilience’ is the ability of states, societies, communities and individuals to manage, tackle, adapt, and recover from shocks and crises. (European Commission, 2012a).

Since then, the European Commission has systemically used the term in its humanitarian and development policy. In the Conclusion of the Council of the EU on The EU Approach to ‘Resilience’ in 2013, it has been stretched to be more comprehensive. It was not only restricted to natural crises, but also to other man-made crises including, for instance, conflicts and weak governance. More importantly, the council has highlighted three important aspects of building ‘resilience’. Firstly, bridging the gap between the humanitarian and development nexus and the significance of their actors working together. Secondly, the emphasis that building ‘resilience’ requires working closely with local communities, civil societies and the private sector. In



addition, it has highlighted the overall national government responsibility of building ‘resilience’ (European Commission, 2013a).

Following that shortly, the European Commission published the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries (European Commission, 2013b). This document was designed to reinforce the momentum of ‘resilience’ agenda. Tocci illustrates the importance of this document, as the three characteristics of the EU’s building ‘resilience’ mentioned in the previous document are clearly notable here. First, the plan affirms that all EU actors (humanitarian, development, political) should work differently and more effectively together to achieve ‘resilience’ goals. Second, the document asserts the responsibility of local governments to achieve ‘resilience’. This implies the need for integrating ‘resilience’ into national policies and planning for development. More importantly, the plan asserts that ‘resilience’ approach has to be sustainable, multi-sectorial, multi-level and jointly planned by the people, communities, or governments at risk (Tocci, 2017).

Third, ‘resilience’ approach is characterized as people-centered and focused on the most vulnerable groups. Focusing on those groups does not aim to increase their abilities to absorb shocks and to cope with stresses, but it also constitutes an opportunity for transformation, adaptation, changing environments, improving livelihoods and economic opportunities (Tocci, 2017).

What is important here, in term of the Syrian refugee crisis, the indication that crises present of possibilities and chances for development. This can be read as a precursor for the EU’s framing refugees as an economic asset for the refugees’host countries. The same implication is found in later policy documents like *Lives in Dignity: From Aid-Dependence to Self-Reliance: Forced Displacement and Development* (European Commission, 2016a). The reason that paved the way for this policy is the growing concerns, due to the EU migration crisis in 2015. The main goal of this document is to foster ‘resilience’ and self-reliance of forcibly displaced people.

The significance of these characteristics for this study, as an empirical research, is that they contribute to bridging the gap between the theoretical and empirical understanding of ‘resilience’. In other words, this paper aims to examine how applicable these characteristics are and their implication on the local policies of Jordan in response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

In addition, these characteristics seem crucial for the paper's definition of 'resilience'. These can be seen as a justification for the adoption of the definition of 'resilience', presented here as a quality and a dynamic process of adaptation. As the EU asserts the local communities' responsibilities to build their 'resilience', it is crucial to see how they adapt and engage in that process. This implies, in essence, the dynamic process of 'resilience' as a restorative, adaptive and transformative. Moreover, with the EU's assertion that 'resilience' is people-centered and focuses on the most vulnerable groups, this draws attention to the significance of the qualities of these communities to be, prepared, restorative, transformative and adaptive.

This leads us to 'resilience' within the context of this paper. Philippe Bourbeau contribution to the study of 'resilience' in international relations is crucial and can never be underestimated. His conceptual and theoretical approach of 'resilience' and its typologies will be a corner stone for this paper.

#### **3.4. Conceptualize 'Resilience' within the Context of this Paper**

After studying 'resilience' in international relations and seeing the limitations of 'resilience' in this field, Bourbeau defines it "as the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks" (Bourbeau, 2013a, p. 53). 'Resilience' is a conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformation take place under these circumstances. The definition presented by Bourbeau presents 'resilience' as a process of adjustment, it's a dynamic process that makes it as a systemic way of thinking to face internal and external adversities.

While he focuses on the dynamic process that is crucial for building 'resilience', scholars like Amy Carpenter emphasizes on the capacity and ability to be resilient. She defines it as "the ability of a social system to absorb disturbance while retaining its basic identity, function, and structure" (Carpenter, 2014, p. 67). According to her, any social system needs to possess some capacities, she calls them "enablers" as they enable the system to be resilient. She clarifies that these enablers are a group of assets, measures, relationships, and capabilities that together determine resilient communities (Carpenter, 2014).

Carpenter classifies different types of enablers; physical enablers that supply basic requirements of human survival and security (for instance, water, electricity and gas infrastructure, and food),

procedural and operational enablers for responding to disruptive shocking events (e.g., action plans, strategies, local knowledge, and information) and social enablers (e.g., community cohesion and motivation). States and communities that obtain these capabilities are capable to be resilient.

As for this paper, the researcher proposes that the two approaches are merely two sides of one coin. They need to be studied and illustrated through their complementarity rather than their differences. This understanding is parallel to Flockhart's and Korosteleva understanding and definition of 'resilience'. The researcher sees 'resilience' as presented by the latter. According to Flockhart and Korosteleva 'resilience' has two specific meanings, it is "as a quality of an entity such as a system, organization, or even a person, and as an analytic of governance" (Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020, p. 158). This clearly clarifies it as both a quality and a systemic way of thinking interpreted as an analytic of governance.

As a quality, 'resilience' is about the possession of crucial elements in place that can smooth reflexivity and self-organization. These elements increase an entity's inherent strength, consciousness of the surrounding outside (Anthropocene) and its purpose, motive and ambition (Deneulin, 2006).

This idea gets an emphasis and wider attention as appears on the well-developed research presented by the Stockholm Resilience Centre. It aims to focus at the practical operational implications of fostering 'resilience' qualities across different sectorial policies, to mention few landscape, marine, and urban living. In parallel, these qualities are presented as part of the wider hyperlinked units of the global socio-ecological system that characterizes the Anthropocene (Stockholm Resilience Center, 2015).

However, 'resilience' as an analytic way of thinking, enables governing to become more reflective, responsive and adaptive. This is significance, in a world that is more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous—or as Gnad and Burrows (2017) have called it—the "VUCA world." (Burrows & Gnad, 2018). 'Resilience' from this perspective is seen as a process and a form of self-governance. This puts the emphasis on the local and the person inside-out procedures of learning and capacity-building. The aim is to help the self-responsible agency to find its own equilibrium and to be capable of bouncing back. Systems are capable of adaptation in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure and identity. Achieving this requires

the employment of institutional and available material resources, in line with the internal ontological security seeking and the necessary external assistance (Flockhart, 2020).

Considering this definition and seeing ‘resilience’ as a quality and a dynamic process of adaptation is not out of space, but it comes in light with the research object and the gap that this research aims to contribute to. This in turn, leads us to Philippe Bourbeau’s contribution to the study of ‘resilience’, which is the typology of ‘resilience’.

### **3.5. Bourbeau's Typology of ‘Resilience’ in International Relations**

After he studies ‘resilience’ in international relations, Bourbeau echoes three strands, through which ‘resilience’ scholars in the field differentiate three main perspectives of ‘resilience’. Then, he presents his typology of ‘resilience’ (Bourbeau, 2013b). Yet, this typology is not uniquely new, but it is built upon Handmer and Dover’s typology in sustainable development. Those have examined how uncertainties and risks are addressed. After that, they have constructed a three-related typology of ‘resilience’. This typology aims to provide a theoretical framework regarding the full range of possible responses to the challenge of sustainability (Handmer & Dovers, 1996).

According to them, the existing institutions and policy processes appear to address risks by one of these types of ‘resilience’; first, resistance to change; second, change at the margins and third openness and adaption (Handmer & Dovers, 1996).

With respect to the first type, they clarify its main characteristics as its tendency to resist change and denial of an existing problem. Avoiding change is preferable by the human systems in this type. They also illustrate that this type is favored by those who tempts to maintain the status quo and preserve their authority (Handmer & Dovers, 1996).

Regarding the second type, it is characterized by the acknowledgment of the existing problem facing the human system. This acknowledgment has its implications on policy-makers and requires changes. However, these changes are minor and within the current existing policy. This type of policy aims to address the symptoms and effects rather than the causes of the risk (Handmer & Dovers, 1996).

While the first two types are mainly concerned with the symptoms, the third type concerns with the main reasons of the developmental problems. This type is more flexible and adaptive. Its main character is its preparedness to adopt new basic operational assumptions and institutional structures. What distinguishes this type is the readiness of the adaptable society to move in a completely new direction (Handmer & Dovers, 1996).

Bourbeau echoes these three types in international relations and migration governance and distinguishes three main perspectives of 'resilience': an engineering perspective focusing on system 'stability. The adjustment of existing policies at best what can be seen through this perspective. The first order policy change is the motive, meaning only the instrument settings for a policy are changed.

The second perspective is an ecological perspective, this approach considers adaptive changes for policymaking. First and second order policy change are the goal. As such, instrument settings and the instruments themselves are changed.

The final perspective is the evolutionary perspective. Focusing on reflexive renewal basis, there is an ontological acceptance of crises as unpredictable, unforeseeable and uncontrollable. This type considers the third order or paradigmatic policy change. All three components of policy: the instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy as a wholesale are to be changed. (Bourbeau, 2013a).

According to Bourbeau, there are three types of 'resilience' and these lead to policy changes in societies :the first type is related to engineering 'resilience' and it is called Maintenance. In this type, the society aims to maintain the existence of one equilibrium and preserve the status quo. Crises are seen as threatening of the stability of this equilibrium; hence, the main goal of this 'resilience' is to ensure that systems can bounce to an original equilibrium state after crisis. In order to emphasize the significance of preserving the status quo and how threatening the crisis is, there will be a possible alignment between security discourses and security practices. Portraying the event as a significant threat, within the context of the security discourse, will be crucial in order to either implement or strengthen security practice (Bourbeau, 2013a).

This alignment between discourses and practices can be seen in the practices of the Jordanian state, in response to the influx of refugees. Oroub Al-abed analyzes three inter-related discourses

that guide the Jordanian policies and practices :“Guest discourse” refers to the way Jordan manages and labels most refugee populations with reference to three cultural dimensions embedded in the practice of hospitality: the Bedouin, the Islamic, and the Arab, but in parallel to its political agenda. “Development discourse” pays attention to the state’s development priorities and suggests that forced migration helps to justify the flow of financial resources and humanitarian aid from the international community in service of Jordan’s development agenda. Lastly, the “security discourse” with its emphasis on the priority of the state to preserve its stability and social cohesion.

These three discourses can be seen all through the crisis. At first, Jordan adopted the guest discourse, by welcoming refugees and opening camps for them. However, the continuous influx of refugees, the escalation of the conflict from 2014 and the rise of (ISIL) led to the adoption of the security discourse and the implementation of harder procedures to secure the country. Then, the prolonged war with no foreseeable solution for the crisis led to a greater emphasis on the development discourse. The Jordanian discourse here shed the light on the importance of the international community financial support for Jordan, to develop the capabilities of refugees and the hosting communities.

The second type of ‘resilience’ is Marginal and it is related to ecological ‘resilience’. This type refers to the ability of the system and society to adapt after crisis. This type is characterized by responses that bring changes at the margins but that do not challenge the basis of a policy (or a society). ‘Resilience’ as marginality implies responding within the boundaries of the current policy, and/or social structure. The nature and importance of the problem will often be presented as being less threatening than with the first type, but an effort to recognize that marginal adjustment is needed will be made. However, since the crisis is presented as less threatening, discourses and security practices are unaligned (Bourbeau, 2013a)

The last type is Renewal ‘resilience’ which is related to socio-ecological ‘resilience’. This type is characterized by responses that transform basic policy assumptions and, thus, potentially remodel social structures (Bourbeau, 2013a). ‘Resilience’ here implies introducing novel vectors of response that will (in an implicit or explicit way) basically change existing policies and set new directions for governance. In this type, crises are seen positively that aims to bring fundamental changes to current policies (Bourbeau, 2015).

However, Bourbeau adds that these types are not mutually exclusive and they can be found in the same society (Bourbeau, 2013a). Yet, *the new perspective of this research is that the researcher argues that these types are never exclusive and, in any society, you cannot find only one type, but more than one. Any society may adopt one type in one domain, and another one in other domain.* Hence, the possibility of building ‘resilience’ is not either Maintenance, Marginal or Renewal, rather, mixing more than one of those types. In the Jordanian case, the researcher argues that the EU's building ‘resilience’ is not only Marginal, Maintenance or Renewal, but rather, the two or three types together. The EU building ‘resilience’ aims to renew the structures of the hosting and refugee societies and-or the policies dealing with them. At the same time, it aims to maintain and preserve the social cohesion, the political, social and economic stability of the country. Moreover, it might be also Marginal, that aims to bring marginal changes to some of these policies dealing with those refugees.

However, in the context of building ‘resilience’ which asserts the responsibility of the national and local government to achieve ‘resilience’, the EU emphasizes the importance of the local context. As Tocci suggests, this implies the need for integrating ‘resilience’ in national policies and the responsibility of local actors to achieve ‘resilience’ (Tocci, 2017). Yet, the question here is whether the Jordanian institutions foster or challenge the EU's role in building ‘resilience’.

With no doubt, effective governing is a main principle of statehood, but this efficiency is challenged at times of crises. Thus, the national institutions capability to manage, adapt and respond to crises positively has always been a debatable question. What makes some countries institutions capable to achieve that has been discussed from different perspectives, specially, during crises.

Crises have drastic impacts on national institutions. For instance, COVID-19 pandemic has strongly impacted national institutions. The pandemic has disrupted, to varying extents, the regular functioning of state institutions, such as parliaments and justice systems. The need to respond quickly and with drastic measures has also created additional risks for institutional processes and organizations. Beyond individual institutions, the pandemic has increasingly

affected the whole institutional systems and the way public institutions interact with people (Chandler, 2020).

Considering Jordan, the impact of the Syrian crisis and the international community's response, including the EU, cannot be fully understood without considering its institutions and how they were affected by the crisis. The great influx of refugees has put a great pressure on the whole institutions and the Jordanian themselves. Since Jordan mainly relies on the international community to help the country to respond to the influx of refugees, the challenge is whether Jordanian institutions are capable to be transparent, accountable, representative, and informative. In addition, given that 'resilience' is a dynamic, continuous and a bottom-up level process, another challenge is whether these institutions are capable of engaging all the society sectors in achieving 'resilience'.

This leads us to the final section of this chapter which addresses the second concept of this paper that is national security, as the paper mainly concerns with how building 'resilience' does or does not- enhance national security.

### **3.6. National Security**

Defining security has been a challenging task within the international relations field, and giving a comprehensive capturing concept for what it actually means has dominated many scholars. Security is generally defined as the freedom of any danger or threat. It is the state's ability to maintain its sovereignty and independence by identifying potential threats and elements crucial to its survival (Alougili , 2019).

Etymological discussions on the English notion "security" is that the term security is derived from Latin *securus* meaning safe, secure. It is made from *se* meaning without + *cura* meaning care - the quality or state of being secure or as a freedom from danger ( Mesjasz, 2004) .In the classical sense, security - from the Latin *securitas*, refers to tranquility, or what Cicero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends ( Liotta, 2002).

One of the most comprehensive definition of security was proposed by Arnold Wolfers "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a



subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Stoessinger, 1963, p. 451). This definition has become a "standard" in the field. The reason behind that stems from the fact this definition indicates that security has two main dimensions which cannot be separated. The First dimension is the condition (the absence of threats and risks) which is related to security in a subjective sense and the second dimension is of the process (the provision of protection against threats and risks) and that is related to the objective sense (Powell, 2009).

Yet, the broader view in the literature is that security is an essentially contested concept (Connolly, 1999). Before proceeding to interpret how security is contested, it is crucial to see what makes it as such.

The main reason for such a view is that it is believed that security is regarded to be 'high politics' (McDonald, 2012, p. 5). Wolfers who defined security as an ambiguous symbol stresses the political force that 'security' entailed despite having very little intrinsic meaning (Wolfers, 1952). This political force lies in the ability of security policy to subordinate all other interests to those of the nation (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Hence, the meaning of security, and – as a consequence – what, or who, is being secured and protected from threats 'is potentially enabling in terms of ascribing a level of priority and importance leading to particular logics of response' (McDonald, 2012, p. 18).

Security is a powerful political tool that has the capacity to call attention to prioritizing items, in the competition for the government attention (Buzan, 1991a). As a result, by securitizing an issue by political leaders, they give it a political leverage that enables them to prioritize it on the political agenda. This is significant, especially for the securitization theory and the process of securitizing issues. From this view, it enables the political elites to take an action that needs the political support in the name of security (Bhal, 2014).

Both the EU and Jordan have securitized refugees. For the EU, the securitization process enabled the EU, as a whole and some EU members, to put this issue on their political discourse and take actions in the name of security. For instance, the call for tighter measures on the EU borders, especially within the context of the migration crisis of 2015. The same discourse is perceived in Jordan policy. More importantly, Jordan has employed those refugees to draw the international community's attention to the fact that support is needed to

preserve Jordan's security. Failure to do so, would lead to instability and insecurity in Jordan, as those refugees have increased the burdens on the already heavy-burdened country.

In that respect, as security is a highly contested concept, different theoretical approaches try to capture the sense of national security. It is beyond the scope of this paper to cover these theories, yet, two schools will be illustrated briefly to demonstrate how the concept is highly contested. The focus on those two schools does by no means underestimate the other theories, yet, as mentioned, for reason of space and since those two became dominant in security studies. The focus will only be on the schools of structural realism and the Copenhagen school.

Carnesale and Michael in their forward to the first edition of *International Security* in 1976 defined security as factors with a 'direct bearing on the structure of the nation state system and the sovereignty of its members, with particular emphasis on the use, threat and control of force' (Carnesale & Michael, 1976, p. 2). For realists, the referent object – what, or who, is being secured – is the state within an anarchic international system in which no higher authority sits above states. This can be illustrated by Morgenthau who describes the world order as a system of competing self-interested state actors under anarchy (Morgenthau, 1978). Realists emphasize that threats to the state come in the form of external military threats and survival is its main objective. They emphasize that obtaining security depends on a state's own military power (Bhal, 2014).

In 1983, Barry Buzan's book, *People, States, and Fear* was a seminal manuscript, which led to the development of Critical Security Studies. It broadens the concept of security to include various elements and emphasizes on the idea that individual humans were the 'irreducible base units' for security (Stave S., 2005, p. 38). The goal of this book is to offer a "broader framework of security" (Buzan, 1991a, p. 20) and integrate concepts that were not considered to be part of the security puzzle like regional security, or the societal and environmental sectors of security (Stone, 2009).

By the beginning of the 1990s, increasing numbers of theorists started to embrace more critical analyses of security. The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks have led to an increased call for reassessment and redefining national security. This call has emphasized growing international interdependence, the danger of arms races, and the changing nature of

threats to people's daily lives. As a result, different perspectives present a definition of security, less focused on military power and more focused on economic, social, political and environmental issues (Booth, 1991; Buzan & Hansen, 2009) .

"Security: A New Framework for Analysis" by Buzan in 1998 was another call to broaden the security concept to include political, economic, societal, ecological threats. More importantly, this manuscript concretely differentiates a new 'Copenhagen School' from other Critical Security Studies (Buzan et al , 1998). The Copenhagen School is distinguished by these two core arguments. The first one asserts that "the social production of security is sufficiently stable to be treated objectively" (Mutimer, 2007, p. 62).

Unlike other Critical Security Studies, including critical theory and post-structuralism which attempt to cope with the social construction of security, the Copenhagen School asserts that even the socially constituted is often strained as structure and then becomes relatively stable as practice. In that respect, when it comes to this school's purposes, they are closer to traditional security studies, which at their best attempt to hold security constellations and thereby steer them into harmless interactions (Buzan et al , 1998). A main character of this approach is its flexibility. It does not reject the role of classical themes, but aims to introduce critical elements from interdisciplinary approaches in relation to security studies, confirming the role of political, social and economic processes that are present in these approaches ( Oliveira, 2020).

Another fundamental element and a main theoretical contribution of the Copenhagen School is the idea of 'securitization' of political issues. It is the process through which an issue is presented as related to the national security of the state. The main goal of 'securitization' is to legitimize the use of force or any other extraordinary actions, then mobilize resources and exercise special powers that would be unacceptable for domestic and international audiences in normal occasions (Buzan et al , 1998).

However, within the securitization process, the presented issue might not be a real problem or a threat to the national security, but what makes it as such, is the way it is presented within the security discourse. The demand for an urgent action is necessary or that would lead to state insecurity. As a result of this, securitization is a 'speech-act', in which a performance of the securitization's rhetorical process creates rights, commitments or obligations. Moreover, the

acceptance of the audience for the process is fundamental to accept and tolerate the process and that would legitimize the process (Buzan et al , 1998).

This highlights why the Copenhagen's School approach is fundamental within the scope of this paper. As mentioned, both Jordan and the EU have securitized the Syrian refugees and the alignment between their security discourse and practice is there in different phases from the crisis, especially in light of the EU 2015 migration crisis. As for Jordan, till recently, the emphasis on the burden of the refugees and the need for greater support to secure the country is highlighted ( Petillo, 2023).

A main direct outcome of the securitization process is that the scope of national security has broadened. It is no more restricted to military threats, but it includes other economic, social, political or environmental threats. Moreover, it also suggests that security experts, while preparing the state security policy, have to make it flexible, updated and always ready to consider other issues that threaten the state.

Yet, considering different issues as threats to the state can be in parallel to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Although the latter didn't call for the securitization process, but it expanded the definition of security for a wide range of security areas ;Economic area including the creation of employment and measures against poverty; Food area: measures against hunger and famine; Health area : measures against disease, unsafe food, malnutrition and lack of access to basic health care; Environmental area: measures against environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters and pollution; Personal area: measures against physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence and child labor ;Community area: measures against inter-ethnic, religious and other identity tensions and Political area: measures against political repression and human rights abuses (Osisanya, 2020).

Barry Buzan classifies sectors of security analysis as follows: military security and political security which is the organizational stability of states, systems of government and ideologies that give them legitimacy. It refers to protecting the sovereignty of the government and the political system as well as the safety of society from unlawful internal and external pressures; economic security means access to resources, finance and markets necessary to maintain adequate levels of welfare and state power ,create jobs and fighting poverty; societal security

is concerned with sustainability, within satisfactory levels conditions of evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, customs, religious and national identity, and finally ,environmental security relates to the possible ecological threats that are results of human impact on the planet such as global warming, pollution, and the ozone layer (Buzan, 1991b).

Understanding national security for this paper can only be viewed within the scope presented by the OCHA, Buzan classification of sectors and the securitization process of the Copenhagen School. National security is not only about protecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the state, but it also includes its ability to deal with different internal and external challenges, in their different forms, its facing.

The massive influx of Syrian refugees led to drastic impacts on the kingdom. In addition, both Jordan and the EU present Syrian refugees within their political discourse as a serious challenge to their security. The need to secure the EU borders, to support Jordan to secure its borders, support its economy, verify and preserve its resources require taking different measures. Building ‘resilience’ in Jordan is one of these measures. Although Syrian refugees may not be a security challenge for the five sectors of the national security of both Jordan and the EU, the great influx of refugees can be seen as a challenge to the EU political security, stability, or its social cohesion. As for Jordan, those refugees may be seen as a challenge to Jordan political and economic security. Thus, the main goal of this paper was to see how the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan, contribute or does not contribute to the national security of them both.

## 4. Structure and Methodology

After the theoretical background which helped me to capture a greater understanding of ‘resilience’, the empirical research aimed to investigate building ‘resilience’ as a key element of the EU response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. Thus, there are chapters in my dissertation dedicated to building ‘resilience’ by the EU in Jordan, how it is interpreted, implemented and, measured, its impact and its contribution to Jordan security.

In order to contribute to Bourbeau’s typology development, I had to examine the types of ‘resilience’ the EU builds in Jordan. Second, in order to understand the relationship between ‘resilience’ and security, I had to examine the ways in which a relationship in terms of possible connections and causal mechanism between ‘resilience’ and security exists. For this reason, the following questions needed to be answered:

- ‘Resilience’ typology. Which type of ‘resilience’ can be found in Jordan, Marginal, Maintenance or Reflexive? To which type is the EU support is directed?
- Humanitarian- development nexus. How does the EU work to bridge the gap between them? How does this affect Jordan’s security?
- The role of institutions. How do Jordan’s institutions foster or hinder building ‘resilience’ in Jordan?
- ‘Resilience’ measurement. How is it possible to measure the impact of building ‘resilience’ in Jordan?
- ‘Resilience’ and Jordan’s security. How does it contribute to Jordan security, politically, economically, socially or environmentally?
- ‘Resilience’ and the EU Security. How does building ‘resilience’ contribute to secure the EU borders from refugees?

The main hypotheses of this research are as follows:

*H1. EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan contributes to the national security of **both Jordan and the EU, with the support of other internal or external factors.***

H2. *EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan contributes to the national security of Jordan only but not the EU.*

H3. *Jordan’s existing institutions hinder and challenge the EU’s building ‘resilience’ in Jordan.*

Related to the dependent variable, national security is subject to different interpretations, as mentioned. Within the scope of the research, Jordan’s national security is within the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, especially after adopting ‘resilience’ since 2015. For this reason, I had to answer several questions connected to the mechanism of building ‘resilience’ in Jordan and its relation to security.

- How do Syrian refugees affect Jordan’s national security?
- Which policies does/did Jordan use to preserve its security?
- Why does ‘resilience’ appear as a better strategy to promote national security?
- How to balance between Jordan’s national security and refugees' rights? Which has the priority?
- What are the roles of international donors, in particular the EU, in preserving Jordan’s security?
- What are the other factors that contribute to Jordan’s security?

#### **4.1. Quantitative Data**

Quantifying ‘resilience’ and measuring the EU building ‘resilience’ tangible and intangible impacts on Jordan is a challenging task. There were 3 main sources for this dissertation to quantify this impact. The first source is the Commission official website which provides data regarding the EU’s total assistance to help Jordan managing the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis since 2011. The total assistance amounts to **almost €3.5 billion**. Looking at these data was crucial, as it helped to clarify in detail how the EU support is directed, through which instruments and what are the objectives of this support.

The Second source was the 3RP official website. The EU is a main contributor to the 3RP, obtaining data from this plan reports and the JRP portal was another source, to highlight its commitment for ‘resilience’.

However, considering only the amount of funding by the EU was not enough, more was needed to analyze the result of this funding. This leads us to the third source for quantitative data for this dissertation. It was a model to be designed based on data from the evaluation reports of the EUTF-MADAD in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the ‘MADAD Fund’. This fund was established in December 2014 to enable a more coherent and integrated EU response to the crisis. It primarily addresses longer-term ‘resilience’ and early recovery needs (economic, educational, social and psycho-social) of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. In Jordan, the EUTF-MADAD for Syria is responding to the needs of refugees and host communities in six different areas: education - basic and higher, livelihood, water and sanitation, health, protection and social cohesion. This to be done compatible to projects funded under ECHO as well as the European Neighborhood Instrument (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b). Moreover, as the EU is a main contributor in the 3RP, obtaining data from this plan reports and the JRP portal would be another source of these data.

The evaluation and the annual reports of the EUTF-MADAD projects along the 3RP provided an important source for quantitative, as well as a qualitative data about the contribution of the different donors, including the EU. These reports take stock of the support to Jordanian public institutions by 3RP partners, including the EU, and enables regular tracking of the 3RP towards strengthening the ‘resilience’ of public institutions in Jordan. These reports implement this by looking at the 3RP support provided across sectors and agencies TO and THROUGH public institutions.

Support THROUGH institutions refers to programming where the beneficiaries are individuals and communities, but which is delivered through public systems (for example children accessing education through public schools, or cash transfers disbursed through national safety nets). Support TO institutions indicates the support the main beneficiaries of which are public institutions themselves retain the support provided, whether in the form of additional resources



(equipment, facilities, infrastructure, staffing, etc.) or in the form of system strengthening (capacity building or policy development). This enables tracking of what has been accomplished through building ‘resilience’ and its limitation.

The analysis of these reports gives insights to the impacts of the EU building ‘resilience’ and its ability to achieve a longer term sustainable solutions. In addition, it enabled me to clarify ‘resilience’ characteristics in terms of the local ownership, and the bottom up approach.

#### **4.2. Document analysis**

In order to understand the impact of ‘resilience’, I did not take the same path of other scholars who have studied the impact of ‘resilience’ on the EU by counting the number of times ‘resilience’ has been mentioned in documents or strategies. ( Juncos, 2016; Tocci, 2020). Though, this can definitely draw a picture of whether or not ‘resilience’ is considered a key concept, counting the number of the concept tells nothing of how ‘resilience’ is understood or how the strategies aim to enhance building ‘resilience’ . For this reason, a more intensive case study was required, in order to get a better picture of the EU's use and understanding of ‘resilience’. Hence, quantitative analysis for these documents was not chosen for this dissertation, as I believe qualitative analysis to be more suitable to lay down the foundations understanding the different uses and perceptions of the concept. After all, qualitative analyses are better suited for describing phenomena and the context in which they operate ( Justesen & Mik-Meyer, 2010, p. 17).

The document analysis covered the EU-Jordan bilateral agreements that were concluded at the time of adopting ‘resilience’ in response to the crisis, i.e. from 2015. The analysis of these agreements, in particular, aimed to draw attention to how ‘resilience’ is understood within the EU-Jordan context. The focus of this analysis tried to grasp the objectives, characteristics, methods and instruments of building ‘resilience’ in Jordan. This attempted to illustrate the difference between theory and practice, if there is any, as this might hinder building ‘resilience’ and its objective.

The EU's and Jordan main documents and strategies used in the analysis are all found on the EU's and Jordan's official website. The main documents cover ten documents including the

EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities, The EU-Jordan Compact of 2016 and its Review of 2018, Multi-year Planning documents of 2017-2020 and 2021-2027, The Single Support framework, the 3RP, and the Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighborhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean. This last document of 2021 represent the latest policy document to govern the EU and its southern partners' relationship, with the aim of enhancing their partnership to foster 'resilience'. Moreover, Jordan National Strategy, Jordan 2025, has been also analyzed to examine how 'resilience' is understood by the local actor and it is alignment with the EU understanding of 'resilience'.

### **4.3. Interviews**

To support the analysis, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The respondents were chosen based on their expertise in the field of building 'resilience' in Jordan. Those include academics, politicians, project managers, and head of departments from public institutions in Jordan or civil society activists taking part in the response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Conducting interviews with some politicians from the EU side, like member of the EU parliaments, unfortunately, could not be achieved. However, reviewing reports from the commission could compensate this. On the other hand, the author was able to conduct semi-structured interviews with EU officials from the European Union External Action Service- the Middle East and North Africa Division (MENA). The European Commission's Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the EU Delegation in Jordan, and EU scholars who are specialist in 'resilience'. As for Jordan, interviews with academics from the University of Jordan, the German Jordanian University, the Phoenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies, Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development organization, were conducted.

As for politicians, the researcher managed to conduct interviews with current and former members of the Jordanian Parliament, former economic minister as well as policy officers from the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Cooperation and International Planning , UNHCR delegation in Jordan , and the Economic and Social Council in Jordan .Moreover, civil society organizations activist were interviewed, These organizations support Syrian refugees and get support from the EU specially in the northern governates .

Twenty five interviews were conducted in the period between June 2022 and August 2023. Some of these interviews were face-to- face meetings with politicians or civil society activists in Jordan. The other part were Skype or zoom meetings because of the difficulty of conducting face –to- face interviews or due to the respondents’ preference. The framework of these interviews were mainly concerned with some of the key definitions and arguments in the ‘resilience’ literature in the EU-Jordan context .This enabled the author to frame the analysis of how ‘resilience’ has been translated into practice.

## **5. Building ‘Resilience’ in Jordan**

Thirteen years have already passed on the Syrian crisis, with little hope to end these Syrian sufferings within and beyond Syria. The war has not only resulted in the destruction of the country, but also the human cost has been very high. Based on estimates by the UNHCR, 600 thousand hundred have been killed since 2011 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023) , 6.9 million have become internally displaced inside Syria, 5.4 million have become refugees, mostly in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (UNHCR, 2023).

These figures make the Syrian crisis one of the largest displacement crises in the world, with an impact on the whole region, including Jordan. The International community, including the EU, has been trying to support these host countries. As each of them is burdened with its political, economic or social challenges, the influx of refugees is an additional challenge for them.

While Turkey has the highest share of those registered refugees 3.5 million, followed by Lebanon 814 715 and then Jordan with 653914 (UNHCR, 2023), the specific context for Jordan signifies the need to support such a host county and justifies its selection, as a case study. For this reason, the chapter will proceed as follows:

First, the context-specific risks in Jordan. Second, the Jordanian- Syrian relations. Third, Jordan policies in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Third, the impact of the crisis on the EU. Fourth, the EU's policies in response to the Syrian crisis. Next, the EU's external governance of migration: the cases of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Then, the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan. The EU's building ‘resilience’ and Bourbeau's Typology of Resilience.

### **5.1. The Context-Specific Risks in Jordan**

As illustrated earlier, the geopolitics of Jordan makes this small country a key partner in preserving the stability in the region. As a result, the international community has a great interest preserving its stability. Jordan moderate policy makes it a great ally for many regional and international actors. In this regard, Jordan has managed to keep a balance between all the superpowers. Despite of its great dependency on the West, Jordan has always walked on a tight rope to keep a stable relation with

Russia. Here it is enough to mention that King Abdullah is the Arab leader who has met Putin the most over the past 20 year. At the same time, it has a good relation with China and the country has joined the Belt and Road Initiative. In that respect, Jordan is trying to maintain a status where it has a stable relation with Russia, get economic benefits from China and be a main ally to the West.

Historically speaking, the United States (U.S.) is considered a security provider for Jordan (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In addition, the Saudi Arabia, to a certain extent, is also considered a security provider for Jordan (Csicsmann, 2022). Considering the U.S., it is Jordan's single largest provider of bilateral assistance. In 2021 only, it gives \$1.65 billion, distributed between fiscal support, over \$1.197 billion, and \$425 million as a military aid. (U.S. Department of State, 2022). To highlight the significance role of Jordan, it is worth mentioning that Jordan is the third country receiving the largest amount of the U.S. foreign aid, preceded only by Afghanistan (\$4.89 billion) and Israel (\$3.3 billion). While Afghanistan receives this share as the country is recovering from war, Jordan and Israel receive it as strategically important partners to the U.S. (World Population Review, 2023a).

As for Saudi Arabia, it has a big interest in preserving a stable Jordan. It is not only history or geography that they both have in common, but also interests. The two countries have long had a similar political position with regard to regional and international issues, including Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, terrorism, and more recently, illicit drug trafficking from Syria. To highlight the country's role in Jordan, it is worth mentioning that it is Jordan's largest economic partner, with investments of more than \$13 billion. Further, trade between the two nations reached \$5 billion in 2021 (Omari, 2022).

Further, not only the Saudis have an interest in stable Jordan, other Arab Gulf countries, the UAE, in particular has been a great partner for Jordan. Not only its foreign aid or trade that are important for Jordan, but also in term of foreign investment that is crucial for employment and growth. Not to mention also its role in facilitating energy for water deal with Israel as demonstrated on September 2023. Under the suggested agreement, Jordan will supply solar energy from a UAE-funded plant to Israel and receive desalinated water from Israel in return (Al Jazeera, 2023). This in return would be crucial to tackle water shortages in Jordan.

In addition, the EU also has an interest in Jordan. The interest in Jordan mainly stems from three main aspects. The first aspect is related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this regard, Jordan is among the first Arab countries to sign a peace treaty with Israel and a key player in the

Middle East Peace Process. Further, it supports the two states solution, as the only possible path for a lasting peace in the region (El-Khazen , 2021).

The second aspect is its role as a host for refugees. Despite of being amid a region of turmoil, Jordan has always been a safe haven for refugees. Although, it is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugees Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the country has received different waves of refugees. First, there were the Palestinians whom Jordan has received since the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. The Second wave was the Lebanese refugees, who came during the 1975 civil war. The Iraqis came in two waves; the 1991 Gulf War and after the American invasion in 2003, and finally, there were the Syrian refugees (Alougili , 2019). As a result, this relatively small country continues to be the second country host of refugees per capita in the world (United Nations Jordan, 2021).

The final aspect is its role in fighting terrorism, as a member of the international campaign against terrorism, Jordan has been playing an active role in the U.S. led Global War on terrorism ( Ayasrah, 2009). Further, it has proved heavyweight in the fight against ISIS and an active partner in the international led coalition to combat ISIS fighters. These aspects illustrate the urgent need to support such a significant partner. To ensure that, the EU Delegation for Jordan works on the implementation, the following up and the advancement of their bilateral relations in different fields (Press and inforamtion team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b).

Regarding the Syrian refugee, By September 2023, the UNHCR has registered 654,914 Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan. However, the total Syrian refugees is estimated by 1.3 million (UNHCR, 2023). The distribution of those refugees is mainly out of the Syrian refugees' official camps; Zaatari, Margeeb Alfhood, and Azraq as the figure shows and illustrated earlier in figure 1 (UNHCR, 2023).

The fact that the majority of those refugees are within local communities and not the Syrian main camps, makes those refugees a greater challenge to the country's social cohesion. The mass flows of refugees exacerbate the economic, political and social vulnerabilities already existing in Jordan. Those refugees have slowed Jordan economic growth and increased Jordan's challenges. Today, the country has been struggling to provide housing, water,

education, healthcare and jobs to its increased population and this huge number of Syrian refugees ( Alsoudi, 2020). Further, refugees have become a greater competitor for the Jordanians within the labor sector (Seeberg, 2020). Above all, there are political and security challenges, Jordan is a main member of the international coalition to fight ISIS at the same time, it combats extremist radical ideologies. As a result, the country has always been a target for radical groups.

These challenges led Jordan to adopt a flexible approach enabling the country to respond to these challenges in line with its broader security. However, before proceeding to clarify these policies, understanding the nature of the Jordanian-Syrian relations is fundamental. The reason behind that is the difficult relationship which historically they have had. This in turn became more complex during the Syrian crisis and the new challenges that arose after.

#### **5.1.1. The Jordanian- Syrian Relations**

The Jordanian –Syrian relations have been described as one of the most tumultuous bilateral Arab relationships (Curtis, 2006). There were many ups and downs in their relationships, especially during the reigns of the late King Hussein and the late President Hafez al-Assad, however, their relations improved quietly after King Abdullah II and President Bashar al-Assad took their offices almost two decades ago ( Kilani, 2021).

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the relations between the two has witnessed changes in Jordan’s approach. This has been driven mainly by its concern over the impact the crisis on the kingdom, including refugees and threats on its border ( Kilani, 2021).

Based on the course of events, Jordan’s approach has changed from being fraught with the rise of the conflict to gradually rethink of rapprochement with the Syrian regime. A main reason of this rethinking was the feeling that the country had nothing to gain by remaining part of the Western-led efforts to isolate Syria ( Tokmajyan , 2022).

With the rise of the conflict, Amman was initially seen as part of the camp against Assad. With pressure came both from within the kingdom and from outside, Jordan found itself compelled to take a harder position toward the regime. In Jordan, part of the political opposition was pushing for a change in policy in response to the Syrian regime’s violent

clampdown on protesters. Externally, the U.S. and the Gulf countries, both of which had become very critical of Assad, were doing the same. This pressure called King Abdullah II to ask Al Assad to step down during a T.V interview in 2011 ( Tokmajyan , 2022).

The rise of ISIS in 2014 was a game changing for Jordan's security policy. Security concerns have put confronting ISIS at the top of Jordan's priorities and pushed regime change far down the list. Thus, the survival of the Syrian regime began to seem like one of the least bad options for Jordan ( Kilani, 2021).

Another game changing for Jordan was Russia's intervention toward the end of 2015. This fact made the survival of the regime appear likely to increase. This military support has changed the course of events dramatically. This support made the regime captured one opposition stronghold after another in 2016–2018, including rebel-held Daraa, which lies along Syria's border with Jordan and hosts the main crossing between the two countries. By 2018, the prospect of Assad remaining in power had become a near-certainty. Moreover, Amman found itself neighboring not only the Syrian regime, but also the latter's allies—Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah—and had to deal with all the challenges brought about by such a development ( Tokmajyan , 2022).

Thus, Jordan found itself trying to make a balance, in order not to upset its main allies the U.S. while at the same time attempting to improve its relations with its northern neighbor. A step translated on the ground by the opening of the Daraa border crossing after the regime recaptured it from rebels in August 2018 ( Kilani, 2021).

The hope for economic gains was the main drive for such a step. Before the war, Syria was a crucial trading partner for Jordan. Petty trade mainly benefited Jordan's border areas and transit trade, which is reliant on trucking, leveraged Jordan's land link to the Gulf's markets. The significance of Syria for Jordan's trade made observers describe it as "Jordan's lungs" (Curtis, 2006, p. 40).

Before the war, Ramtha which is on the border areas, boasted the country's biggest bazaar for cheap and relatively high-quality Syrian goods, which made their way to all other Jordanian cities. No doubt, cross-border petty trade was the city's economic backbone: on the one hand



it created jobs, and on the other it kept the cost of basic foodstuffs and certain consumer goods low because of price differences between Jordan and Syria ( Tokmajyan , 2022).

Although the situation improved after the opening, it did not last. This is for a number of reasons: First, Jordanian authorities became stricter in dealing with petty trade, which included an informal aspect. Second, the U.S., which had positioned Syria under sanctions through the Caesar Act, pressured Amman to refrain from engaging economically with Damascus ( Tokmajyan , 2022).

With Biden's coming to office in 2021 , the Syrian file started to be governed differently. The new administration showed more flexibility when it came to the Syrian file. The U.S. made a deal with Russia on the issue of humanitarian access to Syria, cut back on sanctions due to their "chilling effects" on ordinary Syrians, and approved a deal to transport Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity to Lebanon through Syria. It is true that the U.S. remained committed to sanctions, still, its more tolerate policies on Syria, opened up new opportunities for Jordan ( Kilani, 2021).

Hence, Jordan framed its new policy as an attempt to get more involved directly. In that respect, instead of pursuing the wait-and-see approach that had previously failed to serve Amman's interests, Jordan attempted to tackle its top concerns through direct engagement with Syria. These concerns included preventing drug smuggling, reviving economic ties, maintaining security and economic stability in southern Syria, actualizing a return (even if partial) of Syrian refugees in Jordan, and tackling the presence of Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in the Jordanian-Syrian border area ( Tokmajyan , 2022)

On the ground, the new policy translated into a Jordanian-led initiative to normalize Arab relations with Damascus. The initiative is based on the idea of reciprocity. The regime helps the Arabs by taking positive steps, to deal with the Jordanian-Arab concerns while they ,in return ,will bring it back to the Arab fold, seek to gradually reduce the sanctions on Assad's government and start working on reconstruction and the return of refugees ( Ersan, 2023).

For this reason, Jordan engaged heavily in diplomacy with other Arab countries to get their support. For instance, talks engaged with Bahrain and Lebanon, at the same time, it engaged

with the Syrian regime at the highest levels. There were communications between president Assad and King Abdullah II, between their foreign ministers and other senior officials, in meetings discussed issues such as border security, drug smuggling, cooperation on energy and water supply, and the facilitation of trade through the Daraa border crossing ( Tokmajyan , 2022).

Even though the reengagement with the regime started, and some Arab countries already reopened their embassies, first Bahrain and recently Saudi Arabia approved to strengthen its ties with Syria ( Ersan, 2023) , there were doubts whether these efforts would achieve Jordan's policy objectives. Some believed its useless for Jordan to discuss drug smuggling with Syria's defense minister while the Syrian regime is widely accused of being responsible for the phenomenon from the first place ( Tokmajyan , 2022).

Further, another challenge for Jordan is that the U.S. disapproves Jordan's plan to normalize relations with Syria. In an interview with Al Ra'i, Jordan's leading pro-government daily newspaper, The U.S. former ambassador to Jordan Henry Wooster made it clear that Washington is not in favor of the current Jordanian-led initiative to rehabilitate Syrian President Bashar AL Assad (Kuttab, 2023).

It is too early to judge the results of such efforts, if it will achieve Jordan's objectives and how the U.S will react. However, what seems a fact that the return of all those refugees seems still far. For this reason as the course of events changed dramatically since the beginning of the war, Jordan has adopted different policies to govern the Syrian refugees' influx, in line with its broader security.

## **5.2. Jordan's Policies in Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis**

The scholarship on the refugee's governance has been drawn within different lens. It aims to understand the determinants shaping the refugees' policies within the host countries. For the scope of this paper, the analysis of Jordan policies in response to the Syrian refugees rests on the policy legacies and policy memories framework.

The term “policy legacies” highlights the structural dimension of the designed policy. These can evolve from multiple and overlapping regimes or policy areas ( Paul, 2015) or from the history of single elements, technologies, or paradigms that have obtained a life of their own. The policy actors use these elements during the process of designing a policy (Freeman, 2007). On the other hand, policy memories” illustrates the role of actors in making sense of the past, and in mobilizing different narratives about it, with a view to the present ( Lenner, 2020).

This framework perfectly suits this paper as it clarifies Jordan reflexive approach to the Syrian refugee inflows and investigates how Jordan manages to preserve its stability. This stability, despite of Jordan’s limited economic advantages, a volatile neighborhood and successive refugee inflows, comes from two factors: the international support, including the EU, which will be always important in underpinning the kingdom's stability (Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, 2022) and its reflexive flexible approach to crises.

Jordan's approach in response to the Syrian inflows is shaped by policy legacies and past memories. Those policy legacies and past memories affect the composition and shape of current polices (Freeman, 2007). Past memories bring in the personal histories of policy-relevant actors, or the ways in which they (selectively) remember past events or procedures when framing or implementing policies. Hence, it highlights the subjective dimensions of policy legacies (Freeman, 2007) .

Regarding refugees, memories of past refugees’ reception is crucial in designing the strategies of various actors and agencies involved. They may shape red lines and constraints of policy-shaping directly or indirectly ( Lenner, 2020). Thus, in the context of the Syrian refugees’ governance in Jordan, policy legacies and past memories are significant in policy-shaping processes. After all, Jordan has a long history of hosting different waves of refugees. Considering their size and presence in Jordan, the Palestinian and the Iraqi influxes are most relevant, yet, their presence has different characteristics and different governing policies.

The mass influx from Iraq to Jordan is somehow recent. A number of policy-makers responsible for the Syrian response in the country, at least in the first years of the response, had also taken part in governing the Iraqi file in Jordan. Hence, some policy-makers have personal memories and professional experiences with governing the Iraqi displacement (

Lenner, 2020). This in turn resulted in a rationale that is, somehow, shaped the Syrian as the Iraqis in the same vein where they both will not have a long presences in the country, at least, this is what they had expected.

On the other side, the Palestinian influx is governed differently. Jordan demographic composition, where the Palestinians are main component, and their status, as 'refugee-citizens', have shaped political discourses and policies about refugees in the country ( Gandolfo, 2012). At the end, Jordan is not only home for millions of Palestinian refugees, but also, around half of Jordan's population, is of Palestinian descent. Further, The Palestinians in Jordan are recognized as a main contributor at the Jordanian economy. Among the wealthiest families in Jordan who have a control over the banking sector and dominance in the private sector are families from a Palestinian descent (Reiter, 2004).

Keeping this in mind, Jordan policies aim to preserve the status quo in Jordan, where only Palestinians enjoy a permanent presence ( Lenner, 2020). This, in turn, leads Jordan to adopt a flexible approach in response to the Syrian inflows, based on each phase of the conflict parallel to Jordan's interest.

Accordingly, with the rise of the conflict, Jordan has welcomed refugees and adopted an open-door policy. It has built official camps for Syrian refugees; first, it opened Al Za'atari, in July 2012. Then, Mrajeeb Al Fhood in April 2013, and Al Azraq was opened in April 2014 (Beaujouan & Rasheed, 2020).

However, with the escalation of the conflict and the continuous inflows of refugees, Jordan has securitized Syrian refugees as of 2013. The implication is that those refugees are viewed as a main challenge to Jordan, and that what has been demonstrated by the government discourse, emphasizing that Jordan should not be left alone to face such a challenge ( Petillo, 2023).

Presenting them as a challenge may be understood considering how those socio-economic strains challenge Jordan's economic-social security in light of the dimensions of security presented by the OCHA. It clarifies these dimensions arguing that security goes beyond military protection to a wider dimension engaging threats to human dignity. As a result, security is expanded for a wide range of areas: Economic security including the creation of employment

and measures against poverty; Food security: measures against hunger and famine; Health security: measures against disease, unsafe food, and lack of access to basic health care; Environmental security: measures against, resource depletion, natural disasters and pollution; Personal security: measures against physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence and child labor ;Community security: measures against interethnic, religious and other identity tensions and Political security: measures against political repression and human rights abuses (Osisanya, 2020).

The expansion of security meaning to integrate these dimensions indicates that security threats are not restricted only to military threats, rather, there are various types of social, political, economic or environmental threats states face. For this reason, securing external income from international donors is a fundamental instrument for the Jordanian's security agenda. In that respect, those refugees are a valuable economic instrument to get such income ( Lenner, 2020). Even the encampment policy with building those Syrian camps is interpreted as a mean to shed lights on those refugees' sufferings. Camps are built in order to make the world understand the crisis Jordan is going through, in a hope for greater international assistance (Ali, 2021).

Another reason for securitizing those refugees is the refugee mobilization to demand better services. The level of mobilization within the Syrian camps was varied. However, in Al-Za'atari, this level had been relatively high. Refugee contention had been frequent and tenacious creating a chaotic and tense environment (Clarke, 2017).The persistent protesting made those camps highly securitized environments. For this reason, the government established the Syrian Refugee Camp Directorate in 2014, a branch of the Jordanian police responsible for security in camps. The main goal of this directorate is to control the refugees' movements inside and outside camps (Beaujouan & Rasheed, 2020).

Establishing this directorate was in line with Jordan's legal framework for dealing with refugees. This framework is built on Jordan's-UNHCR 1998 Memorandum of Understanding which was renewed in 2014. The essence of this memorandum is that Jordan acknowledges the definition of “refugee” and their rights as stated in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol (Law Library of Congress, 2016). Based on that, registered Syrian refugees in Jordan have some rights including food assistance, subsidized healthcare, and limited access to state

educational institutions for an initial six months (Bank, 2016). However, Syrian refugees are not allowed to make a legal claim to these services after the six-month period. What's more, the Jordanian authorities can expel the refugees after their six-month protection status expires. Despite the government has done so only in very few cases so far, it leaves Syrian refugees in an endless condition of uncertainty (Doris, 2016).

For this reason, in order to avoid such uncertainty and in an effort to protect Jordanian infrastructure while responding to these drastic inflows, the National Resilience Plan (NRP) was launched in June 2014. In this plan, which is a three years program of high priority investments, Jordan committed to invest US\$2.41 billion in local institutions and host communities' various sectors, including health, education, employment, energy, and housing (Jordan kam Portal, 2016).

There was another plan, the JRP. It was launched in December 2014, as a one-year co-work program between the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and the UNDP (Beaujouan & Rasheed, 2020). This plan constitutes a shift in the nature of response to the crisis. Previously, the main goal of the Jordanian government was providing humanitarian relief, yet, from 2014, building 'resilience' of refugees and local communities became the main theme. The plan originally aims to bridge the gap between 'resilience' and humanitarian systems, and harmonize the programming objectives, funding mechanisms and operating systems that often run parallel to each other in addressing short-term people-centered needs. This is to be done with paying attentions to institutional considerations (MoPIC, 2015).

The continuous inflows of refugees emphasizes the urgent need for a more long-term resilient planning. Therefore, the JRP was extended until 2020 in two phases: from 2016–2018 and 2018–2020. Then, it was renewed for additional two years (Beaujouan & Rasheed, 2020). The shift of the JRP to cover two years implies a convergence from emergency intervention into a more sustainable long-term 'resilience' planning.

In addition, to avoid tension between refugees and local communities, this plan was expanded to cover two pillars instead of one, refugees and 'resilience' pillars. The first pillar addresses the need of the refugees while the second pillar addresses the need of the most vulnerable of the Jordanian communities (Jordan kam Portal, 2016).

Finally, with the aim of surging in regional policy initiatives to support ‘resilience’ through regional cooperation, the JRP plan has been integrated into 3RP. The 3RP is one of the most prominent policy instruments for regional cooperation in the context of migration governance in the region. This plan, which was established in 2015 by the UNHCR and the UNDP, has two main objectives: first, to facilitate collaboration and coordination among international organizations, states, and non-state actors in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq. Second, to establish a comprehensive approach to forced displacement which includes promoting access to national systems and supporting national ownership ( Ozcurumez, 2021).

When it comes to the impact of the 3RP, many challenges remain and hinder it from achieving its goals. The risk context in each host country, the surge of Covid 19, and the current gap of funding between what is needed and what has been pledged by the international donors (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situation, 2020) are some of those challenges.

This represents a challenge for the EU, a major external actor, a significant donor and an architect for the EU Jordan Compact. However, a deeper understanding of the EU’s response to this crisis highlights the crucial role the EU is playing to overcome such obstacles.

**5.3. The Impact of the Crisis on the EU**

The Syrian refugee crisis cannot be separated from the 2015- 2016 migration crisis. During these two years, the EU received the highest number of asylum seekers within two decades. In 2015, almost 1.255 million asylum seekers applied for the EU, 28% were Syrians. These were the highest share of all applicants as these figures illustrates :

Figure 5. Asylum application (non-EU) in the EU member states 2008-2021.  
 Source : Own Edition Based on (Eurostat, 2023).





Figure 6. First time asylum seekers in the EU Member States by citizenship, 2015  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (Eurostat, 2016) .



The prolonged war with no foreseeable solution makes a new wave of refugees to Europe is possible. As figure 5 demonstrates, there has been a surge in these numbers in the recent years. As in 2016, Syrians are still have the highest share of those asylum applicants. In addition, the EU, as Jordan, has securitized those refugees. This implies that those refugees are presented as a threat to Europe (Crone, 2017), as they might affect its social cohesion, there are fears of disguised terrorists among those refugees or terrorist attacks. All these fears have intensified the need to secure its borders before a new wave of refugees occurs.

Moreover, the influx of refugees has sparked a political crisis within the EU. There was a clear political dispute among the member states on how to better respond to the refugees' flooding. While some countries, like Germany, have welcomed them, others, like Poland, closed their borders (Evans G. , 2020). What's more, it has created a humanitarian challenge for the EU. Thousands have died trying to reach the EU's shores. As a result, its strict policy in dealing with refugees has put the EU under a big criticism. The former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon openly criticized it in front of the Australian Parliament in April, 2016. He clarified that the EU's policies negatively affect the obligation of member states under the international humanitarian law (The Guardian, 2016).The inadequacy of the EU's migration policy has intensified the EU need to revise its migration policy.



#### **5.4. The EU's Policies in Response to the Syrian Crisis**

Tracing the history of the EU's engagement with the MENA region reveals that the EU broader approach in the MENA has always put migration a core theme, as migration flows from there is not a new phenomenon.

The engagement of the EU with the MENA cannot be separated from the development of its broader migration policy. Since the end of WW2, the reconstruction of Europe and the economic growth of North-Western Europe have led to engagement with the MENA countries, to obtain labor force. As the local native population was no longer willing to get employed in an unhealthy and poorly paid jobs in agriculture, cleaning, and construction and mining, North-Western European governments started to recruit labor from peripheral countries. As a result, bilateral agreements with countries like Algeria, Morocco or Turkey have been concluded since the 1960s ( Mol & de Valk, 2016).

On the multilateral level, their history can be traced back to the 1970s. Back then, the founders of the EU started to design various processes as a main guide to their relationships with the Mediterranean countries, including Jordan. These processes were implemented through several policy frameworks including the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972, the Euro-Arab Dialogue of 1973, the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) ,the ENP of 2004 and its reviews of 2011 and 2015 (Youngs , 2016).

In the context of these policies, the EU has relied on different initiatives. These, have enabled it to co-opt migration government. The migration policy initiatives associate their cooperation with border-making and mobility partnerships. The latter links visa liberalization regimes with fighting irregular migration ( Cassarino & Del Sarto, 2018).

Examining the literature of the EU relations with the MENA reveals that scholars pay a great attention to the assessment of the EU policies in the region, beside an evaluation of the nature of the EU power. A broad literature has been produced attempting to investigate this nature, in particular, within the context of the 2011 regional uprisings, their spillovers and the EU's response to them. While most literature offers an interest-driven narrative of the EU policies towards the region, in which security and economic concerns prevail (Seeberg, 2009), other

literature considers the idea of “Normative Power Europe” (Manners, 2002), with its interest in promoting democracy, rule of law, and human rights.

No doubt, the idea of “Normative Power Europe” raises many questions in the literature, as it has dominated the EU foreign policy discourse. This idea is framed within the narrative of duty- responsibility which has shaped different EU policies. In the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 and the 2004 ENP, even during the initial response to the Arab uprisings, as emphasized by the first review of the 2011 ENP. The EU’s policy frameworks championed and portrayed the EU as a normative power whose impact resorted on being an exemplary source of peace, wealth, and democracy .The EU, reflecting on itself, saw the usefulness of its norms and values, consequently, wanted to export them to its southern neighbors as a common interest for both (Manners, 2002).

Both the ESS and ENP aimed to present a fit-sized policy to stabilize the EU southern neighbors, by exporting the EU's norms. Thus, parallel to these themes, the first review of the 2011 ENP and it’s so called “Strategic Option” emphasizes its support to the Arab uprisings. (European Commission, 2011).

However, internal and external challenges within and beyond the EU, to mention a few, the Brexit, the Russian annexation of Crimea, an authoritarian regime in Belarus, the Arab uprisings, and the EU 2015 migration crisis have led the EU to embrace insecurity narrative and the inevitability of crises.

As a result, a shift in the EU's view about itself, the neighboring and the whole world (European Union External Action Service, 2016) has transformed the EU duty-responsibility to threat- responsibility narrative. For this reason, the review of the 2015 ENP became a turning point for the EU-MENA relations. It showed the de facto abolition of the EU’s long-standing ambition of pursuing a value-based agenda in favor of democracy promotion in the EU southern neighborhood (Evans G. , 2020).

In the area of foreign policy, the review of 2015 ENP is one of the first documents to introduce building ‘resilience’ as a foreign policy goal for the EU. The document illustrates that, “[t]he measures set out in this Joint Communication seek to offer ways to strengthen the ‘resilience’ of the EU’s partners in the face of external pressures and their ability to make

their own sovereign choices” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 4). Moreover, stabilization has become a main priority guiding the EU’s new strategy for security and prosperity. It adds that “the new ENP will take stabilization as its main political priority” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2).

Consequently, the new ENP seeks to work on conflict prevention through early warnings, and increasing partners' capacity. Further, instead of presenting one size fits policy, the reviewed ENP acknowledges the significance of considering each partner's capacities and needs through introducing the differentiation principle (Schumacher, 2017).

Along that, the latest ENP review was concluded in November 2015, eight months before the adoption of the 2016 EUGS. In that respect, it was closely designed with the deliberations leading to the EUGS. The Global Strategy was presented in June 2016, after a comprehensive review of the EU priorities for the EU, the region and the world. The EUGS mentions the commitment to state and societal ‘resilience’, to the East and South neighbors, as one of the new five priorities for the EU ( Tocci, 2017). In this regard, the 2015 ENP paved the way for ‘resilience’ to become a main priority for the EU foreign and security policy.

The tremendous challenges the southern partners face highlight the need to launch more ambitious plan .This call was translated in 2021 with a new Agenda for the Mediterranean. In this new policy, the EU acknowledges the effect of protracted conflicts that continue to inflict terrible human suffering. In that respect supporting forced displacement and countries hosting large refugee populations is crucial though enhancing economic ‘resilience’ of both those displaced people and their host countries (European Commisssion, 2021b).

Based on this, the EU reframed its governance agenda in its neighborhood, positioning building ‘resilience’ as a core narrative of region-making (Anholt & Sinatti, 2020) or a guiding rationale in EU-Southern neighborhood relations ( Badarin & Schumacher, 2020).This in turn has led to new partnership frameworks on migration with countries in the MENA. In line with the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, and the EUGS, these partnerships aim to build greater coherence between the EU’s migration policy, its external actions, and immediate challenges.

As a result, the EU has drawn its external migration policies as an instrument ‘embarked upon region-building’, (Bicchi, 2006, p. 289). Through, this refinement the EU uses different means, policies and strategies, including ‘resilience’, to redesign or reshape its neighboring countries with the aim of keeping refugees closer to their home and in the neighboring host countries .

In parallel to the ENP review, the EU response to the Syrian refugee crisis is set on different directions. First, the EU has revised the Common European Asylum System.

This System designs common standards and co-operations to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally in any European country. The mechanism of this system is regulated by five legislative instruments and one agency including:

- The Asylum Procedures Directive that sets out the conditions for fair, quick and quality asylum decisions.
- The Reception Conditions Directive aims to ensure common standards for reception conditions (such as housing, food and clothing, as well as access to health care and education) are provided for asylum seekers across the EU.
- The Qualification Directive illustrates the grounds for granting international protection and therefore making asylum decisions more robust.
- The Dublin Regulation establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum application in one of the member states.
- The EURODAC Regulation supports the determination of the member state responsible under the Dublin Regulation.
- The European Union Agency for Asylum objective is to improve the functioning and implementation of the Common European Asylum System (Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2023c).

Since its establishment, based on Tampere Agreement in 1999, there have been many reforms for this policy regulations. The Objectives of such reforms were to harmonize the EU members’ procedures and ensure the International protection for those qualified to it (The European Asylum Support Office, 2021).

However, the inadequacy of this policy to respond to the Migration Crisis has revealed the need for such a reform. The refusal of Eastern European countries to participate in an EU-wide resettlement scheme and the re-establishment of border fences within Europe, promoted a widespread perception that the EU lacks solidarity. It is incapable of finding a solution that is up to the challenge it faces ( Trauner, 2016; Scipioni, 2017).

Dublin Regulation, in particular, was under criticism. While, it aims to establish the state responsible for processing each application quickly, it does not seek to fairly distribute responsibility for refugees between member states. Dublin aims to set the criterion to determine the state responsible to examine asylum application, yet, the most commonly-used criterion is that of the first country of arrival. This means that the responsibility falls (in theory at least) on the border countries ( Garcés-Mascreñas, 2015). For this reason, after the crisis, reforms were proposed and some found approval, namely the setting-up of the European Union Asylum Agency, the reform of Eurodac, the review of the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualification Regulation, and the EU Resettlement framework, yet, Dublin Regulation remains a great challenge. This comes from the reluctance of certain countries to accept mandatory quota. These countries which have politicized migration, prefer other schemes of returning or externalization of the EU migration politics, with taking the EU-Turkey as a success model ( Achilli, 2018).

In 2020, the Commission proposed Pact on Migration and Asylum, as a more comprehensive framework that aims to overcome Dublin flaws. Most importantly, it introduced a new solidarity mechanism that is simple, predictable and workable. The new rules link mandatory solidarity with flexibility for member states. Regarding the choice of the individual contributions to this solidarity, more contributions are offered to choose from. These contributions include relocation, financial contributions, and deployment of personnel or measures focusing on capacity building. This gives member states full choice as to the type of solidarity they contribute to (Council of the European Union , 2023).

However, till the time of writing this dissertation, in 2023, no full agreement in this pact has been reached. Some member states, like Poland, is refusing payment for not accepting asylum seekers for countries that accept them. However, regardless of the result, it indicates that the EU

response aims at reforming the EU internal dimension, in parallel to the external one. Though, bringing agreement among all member states remains a challenge to be solved.

Second, besides working to reform its common migration policy, the Commission presented the EU Strategy for Syria in 2017. This special policy describes how the EU can help to rebuild a peaceful and stable Syrian nation and build a pluralistic, tolerant civil society in Syria. The key objectives of this strategy are summed up by: ending the war through a peaceful political transition, providing humanitarian needs, promoting democracy, accountability for war crimes, and fostering 'resilience' of the Syrian population. Further, in order to exert influence on the Syrian regime, the EU has adopted different restrictive measures including sanctions on 270 Syrian individuals and 70 entities and withdrawing from the EU-Syrian partnership (European Council, 2020).

Originally, the framework for the EU's response to the Syrian crisis was established in the EU's regional strategy for Syria, Iraq and ISIS threat, adopted by the Council on 16 March 2015. After reviewing in 2016, the EU agreed to keep implementing it as set out in the Council conclusions of 23 May 2016. With the current strategy, the EU has developed a specific strategy for its approach to Syria as a country-specific part of the regional strategy (European Parliament, 2023).

This strategy highlights the diplomatic efforts for the EU in light of the Geneva communiqué and UN Security Council Resolution 2254. However, the existence of other influential external actors on the ground, namely, Russia, Iran, Turkey and the U.S. has left a little room for the EU in regard of diplomacy ( Bouris & Nacrour, 2023).

Third, the EU plays a significant role in enhancing the international community's support to Syria and the host countries. To that end, the EU has been co-hosting Brussels Conferences for Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region since 2017. The Conference brings together different delegations from neighboring countries hosting Syrian refugees, partner countries, EU member states and international and local organizations, including the UN. The objective of this conference is to address the humanitarian situation in Syria and the region. In addition, it represents an avenue to renew the support to a comprehensive political solution to the conflict and a unique platform for dialogue with civil society (relief web , 2022).

In the Seventh Brussels conference of 2023, the international community pledged €5.6 billion for 2023 and beyond, including €4.6 billion for 2023 and €1 billion for 2024 and beyond. €3.8 billion of grants were pledged by the EU, with €2.1 billion from the European Commission and €1.7 billion pledged by the EU Member States. This support makes The EU and its Member States still remained the largest donors supporting people within Syria and the region since the beginning of the crisis , mobilizing over €30 billion overall (European Commission , 2023).

The EU support is distributed in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilization assistance through the EU different instruments. Some scholars argue that the failure of the EU diplomacy to achieve democratic transition or bring an end to the conflict is compensated by providing this funding and continuing support for the Syrian people within and beyond Syria (Sollich , 2020).

As Demonstrated, the EU support is not restricted to Jordan but to the whole region, in line with the 3RP, however, drawing a picture about the EU's engagement with Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey as the largest host countries of Syrian refugees had to be investigated. Although this dissertation does not aim to present a comparative case study, this analysis between these three cases will be done mainly in the scope of this paper to better understand the impact of EU's building 'resilience' on the security of these three cases and the EU itself. This requires the analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences and patterns across the EU engagement with each of them.

### **5.5. The EU's External Governance of Migration: Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan**

As mentioned, the EU's response is set toward the internal and external dimensions of its migration management. This is represented by reforming its common asylum policy and to manage migration outside the territory of the EU member states. To do so, different policies of extraterritorial migration management are implemented. Among these the externalization of European borders to the Sahel region, or other transit countries. Through externalization, the EU is transferring the responsibility for averting irregular migration to third countries – so-called transit states, specifically in the Sahel – in exchange for large sums of money. Such mechanism has been used with Niger, a main transit country, since 2014 ( Horváth & Schwab

, 2023). Further, restrictive border practices have been employed, as well as return and readmission agreements, mobility partnerships with third countries and last building 'resilience'.

The latter aims to provide aid programmes that are provided in exchange for migration control. These are designed as remedies for the 'root causes of migration, or supporting the host countries of refugees (Niemann & Zaun, 2023). The EU – Turkey Deal or the EU - Lebanon and Jordan Compacts come within the last framework of externalization.

In the broad literature, there have been many comparative studies between these three cases. Some literature examines the socio-economic impacts of refugees and its relation with national policies ( Stheiwi, 2016; Bett et al., 2017; Moayerian & Stephenson, Jr., 2023) (Bett et al., 2017). Other literature investigates the foreign policy responses of these three major host states ( Tsourapas, 2019) .From different perspective, scholars have also examined the economic integration of those refugees in the labor markets of the host states ( Fakhri & Ibrahim, 2017; Zhanaltay, 2017; WRMC, 2021; ILO, 2015).

Within 12 years, there have been many domestic and international changes that have worsened the situation in each of these countries, thus, affected their national policies especially in light of the climate change, Covid -19 and the Ukrainian War. The impact of the latter, in particular for Lebanon and Turkey has been tremendous. The main reason for that is that they both among the main recipients of the Ukrainian wheat before the Russia's invasion. As a result, they were among the top three countries in regards of the highest rate of food price inflation between February and March 2022 ( Petillo, 2023).

Despite of the specificity of each host country, there are many common grounds that could be found in the three. First, the three are among the largest top countries for hosting refugees. While Turkey continues to be the world's largest refugee-hosting country, home to 3.6 million refugees or 10 percent of all displaced people across borders (UNHCR, 2023), Lebanon and Jordan have the highest shares of refugees per capita in the world. According to the UNHCR Jordan hosts 654,914 registered Syrian refugees, Lebanon 814,715. This accounts of 20 per cent of Lebanon's total population and more than 10 per cent of Jordan's ( Petillo, 2023).



Second, beside the highest share of refugees, since the arrival of refugees, domestic social – economic pressures in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan have increased considerably. Although Syrians’ presence represents a cost to governments and, crucially, is a factor for such a pressure, but those refugees cannot be the only main factor. For instance, the political and financial crisis in Lebanon is the result of the political elite and their bad governance ( Blair, 2022).

Third, the three countries have used refugees as a leverage to obtain support from the international community, though to different levels. Turkey, in particular taking advantage of its geographic proximity and working as a buffer zone for Europe, used the weapon of refugees as a threat to secure financial help in a return for securing the EU border. In 2016, it made a deal with the EU for €6 billion over four years. The EU agreed an additional €3 billion for 2021-2024( Petillo, 2023). However, the deal didn’t stop Ankara from threatening to reopen- or even opening- the border. This was the case in 2020 when Turkey’s President Erdogan said his country’s borders with Europe were open, making good on a longstanding threat to let refugees into Europe. This came after a military escalation in Idlib in Syria that arose the fears of a new wave of refugees to Turkey.

In his televised announcement, he said “We will not close the gates to refugees,” he said. “The European Union has to keep its promises. We are not obliged to look after and feed so many refugees” (Wilks & Kantouris, 2020).

The same calls for a greater support by the international community were made by Lebanon and Jordan. This became more common in the recent years, with the widening support gap of the 3RP. For instance, in 2022, the JRP was 77 per cent, or \$1.51 billion, short of its total budgetary requirements of the \$2.28 billion total funding (Jordan Times, 2023a). While Jordan is a country where the international aid is essential for its stability, the Lebanese political and financial crisis enhance the need for such a support.

Considering the fact that the relatively small countries are contributing to the international refugee regime make them take advantage of this position. Lebanese politicians, for instance, have got benefit from the crisis in repositioning Lebanon’s government in the international scene. They make use of the threat of Syrian resettlement to Europe as leverage for receiving international fund ( Geha & Talhouk, 2018). Moreover, Lebanon's "policy of no policy"

towards Syrian refugees with the absent of coherent policy towards them enables Lebanon to use this leverage.

In addition, the highly politicized issue of refugees has become dominance in the national politics of the three countries. This goes in parallel with the rise of anti-refugee rhetoric among host populations, who accuse Syrians of being a drain on resources. This is especially true in Lebanon and Turkey where the refugee card has been manipulated at the time of local elections. Anti- Syrian hashtags, such as “our land is not for the displaced Syrian” and “no to the Syrian in Lebanon” trended prior to the Parliamentary election of May 2022 ( Petillo, 2023) While in Turkey, the refugee card played in Turkey presidential candidates’ election campaigns in May 2023 and is still playing at the local election of 2024, with a greater call for refugees deportation (Menekse, 2023).

This call translated into reality in the both countries where they started to expel refugees in particular after Syria was readmitted to the Arab League in May 2023. This move came with a different motive for both. Ankara aimed to restore its diplomatic relations with Damascus while Beirut discouraged their staying from the beginning although accepting that (Michaelson et al., 2023).

Despite these similarities, there are many differences that makes the EU engages with each partner differently. Neither the scope nor the objective of this dissertation can cover them .But we must bear in the mind the context of each country. The EU-Ankara's context is completely different from Lebanon and Jordan. As one of the interviewee asserted

Sometimes, “I don’t understand these comparative studies that aim to compare these three countries when it comes to the Syrian refugee crisis”.

What he indicates is that the differences between these three are more than the similarities, when it comes to their response. I go with him in this point and I think a better comparison can be conducted between Lebanon and Jordan. The context for Turkey is completely different and the role of Turkey in the management of the Syrian refugee crisis is long- running and multifaceted. It also has important political implications, both in terms of Turkey’s domestic political scene and regarding its external relations with Syria as well the wider region and beyond ( Tsarouhas, 2023). Moreover, Turkey is a G20 country, a NATO member, have a

Customs Union agreement and seeks the EU membership. Further, the geographic proximity of Turkey makes it use refugees as a leverage.

These factors made the EU response come in light of the EU-Turkey Statement, 'EU-Turkey deal' in March 2016. The agreement agreed on three key points: first, Turkey would take any measures necessary to stop people travelling irregularly from Turkey to the Greek islands. Second, anyone who arrived on the islands irregularly from Turkey should be returned there. Finally, for every Syrian returned from the islands, EU member states would accept one Syrian refugee who had waited inside Turkey. This to be done in return of receiving €6 billion to improve the humanitarian situation in the country, and Turkish nationals would be granted visa-free travel to Europe ( International Rescue Committee, 2023). Ankara, being an EU's candidate, gave Brussels the ability to entice Ankara to comply with its demands.

While the EU aims to support the whole region, Turkey in particular is of great importance to the EU. This deal was one element of the EU's response to the sharp rise in the number of people arriving on Europe's shores in search of safety and protection in 2015. In that respect, Turkey has a role in securing the EU borders directly. Hence, no doubt more support for it from the EU is crucial ( International Rescue Committee, 2023).

#### **5.5.1. Lebanon and Jordan: Different Contexts to the Same Compact**

As for Lebanon, considering the Lebanese case helps to give a better view about the EU's building 'resilience' impact on Jordan and its role in supporting refugees and their self-reliance. This stems from the fact that both Jordan and Lebanon have signed the Compact with the EU in 2016, yet, the result of these of these two is completely different.

The EU-Lebanon Compact, followed the EU-Jordan Compact, aims to create a new architecture on the nexus between refugee aid and development. In reality, the EU- Lebanon Compact has remained a "letter of intent" ( Fakhoury, 2020, p. 6). In order to understand why, we have to understand it through the Lebanese domestic politics and its refugee policies lens.

The EU-Lebanon Compact objectives are to support strengthen mutual cooperation between Lebanon and the EU over the period 2016-2020; to enhance the stabilization of the country; to

provide a suitable and safe environment for refugees and displaced persons from Syria, including their residency status, and a beneficial environment for vulnerable host communities; to increase the 'resilience' of the Lebanese national economy, infrastructures and to invest into job-creating projects for Syrians. This is in return of a minimum of EUR 400 million for 2016-2017 and additional funds that the EU will make available in the remaining years of the Compact's timeframe. In addition to this funding, there is the already foreseen bilateral funds the EU pledge for Lebanon at the London Conference in 2016 (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2017).

However, from the onset of this Compact, there has been a mismatch between its objectives and Lebanon politics. The geopolitics of this small state is built around a sectarian model of power-sharing. Its complex political system has made Lebanon unable to develop a unified policy stance towards Syria's war, and towards the refugees' issue. The inability to develop this policy is rooted in the Syrian regime's intervention in the Lebanese affairs in the past four decades. Since the Lebanese civil war of 1976, it has developed into one of the most polarizing cleavages in the domestic arena ( Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021).

After playing the role of balancer between contesting Lebanese factions during the civil war, Syria has also played an essential background role in negotiating the Ta'if agreement, the official agreement that ended that war and established Lebanon's Second Republic. In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon to expel the Palestinian Liberation Organization and establish a pro-Israeli regime, Syria turned down the May 17, 1983 Israeli-Lebanese agreement and supported the Islamic and Lebanese national resistance against Israeli occupation ( Perthes, 1997). Even after Syria withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, the pro- Syrian factions are still playing role in Lebanon Politics. In that background, it is difficult to establish a consensus and a harmonized policy in Lebanon politics.

In the context of Syria's war, a great division appears among the Lebanese factions. Some factions, like Hezbollah, supports the Syrian regime in the face of its rivals. Those allies of Al-Assad hope that, by calling for Syrian refugees return, they would contribute to rehabilitating the legitimacy of the Syrian regime. In their view, achieving a refugee repatriation agenda would support Al Assad's legitimacy and demonstrate to the international community that calm has indeed returned to the regime-held areas ( Fakhoury & Ozkul, 2019).

Others have viewed the conflict as an opportunity to weaken Syria's grip on Lebanon ( Fakhoury, 2021b) .Some factions, like the Free Patriotic Movement, have started portraying the extended stay of Syrian refugees, who are mostly Sunni, as a threat to Lebanon's system of power-sharing which is established around a fragile demographic equilibrium between Muslims and Christians ( Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021) .

This segmentation within the Lebanese political system is mostly reflected on its approach to the Syrian refugees in the country. This approach is characterized by inconsistency, ambiguousness, fragmentation, and securitization that appear all through the crisis (Mourad, 2017). Even prior the refugees' arrival, the policy literature written on Lebanon's politics of refugee reception has highlighted these characteristics (Stel, 2021).

Historically, Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention nor to its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Moreover, the country does not consider itself a country of asylum but a country of transit (Janmyr, 2016). These facts has detached its officials from developing laws that particularly address the status of refugees ( Fakhoury, 2017).

Officially, there are not national laws governed the refugee issues and recognize their status. The essential national legislation governing refugee stay in Lebanon is "the Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country" of 1962. Along this, there is only a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between UNHCR and Lebanon in 2003 ( Kheshen, 2022).

In this memorandum, Lebanon has highlighted that that refugee stay in Lebanon is only temporary: "Refugees and asylum-seekers will be tolerated, but only for a limited period, pending resettlement or voluntary repatriation" (UNHCR, 2010).Thus, even prior the arrival of the Syrian refugees, Lebanon formally refuses the solution of integration and calls for return or resettlement.

The lack of clear legal framework appears in the Lebanese shifting policy since 2011. Since then, different policies have been adopting according to different circumstances. With the outset of the crisis, the Lebanese authority adopted an open border policy, like Jordan. Soon, with the escalation of the conflict, it started to follow securitized politics of refugee

containment. In 2015, it closed its borders and asked the UN Refugee Agency to stop registering refugees (McGinn, 2018).

The EU Lebanon Compact was supposed to be a corner stone for enhancing refugee protection and their rights in Lebanon. Among the commitments the government made were providing an appropriate and safe environment for Syrian refugees; facilitating their residency status, as well as enhancing access to education for Syrian refugees, providing work permits in closed sectors, and facilitating their documentation (American University of Beirut, 2020). Yet, these facilities were soon restricted and by 2018, the Lebanese government had started promoting policies that have significantly restricted Syrians' access to employment, housing, and residency (McGinn, 2018). In the same track, key political executives have raised up calls for refugee repatriation. Others went further to call on international actors including the EU to divert funds from Lebanon to Syria in the hope of encouraging refugees to go home ( Fakhoury, 2021b).

The nonalignment between the Lebanese politics and the Compact objectives contributes to make it “a letter of intention”. Further, the unrealized policy commitments and goals can be attributed to multiple factors. First of all, the intention to integrate Syrians into the Lebanese community was not there since the rise of the crisis. From the outset, the Lebanese government emphasized that incoming Syrians are “nazihin” or displaced individuals ( Fakhoury, 2017). Hence, the non- encampment policy was adopted to incline they are residing temporarily.

Second, while Lebanon ensured at the London Conference and the Compact to create “350,000 jobs in five years, 60 percent of them for Syrians ( Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021).The years following have proved how vain this is. The government attributed that to the limited labor market capacities, slow growth and its own economic ( Majed, 2018) , yet, a deeper look at the Lebanese setting and the structure of its economy reveal how integrating them in the formal market is challenging. Even prior to the war, the transitional Labor ties with Syria exists since the end of Lebanon war in the 1990s. Reports indicate that there are almost 500,000 Syrians have already integrated in Lebanon different informal sectors ( El Daif, 2022).

The lack of clear institutionalization for migrant workers in Lebanon and the refugee's preferences of informal sectors make integrating them difficult. Adding to that, even if the government aims to integrate them, its non-encampment policy, makes Syrian refugees less trackable or spatially visible population group ( Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021). What's more, preserving social cohesion and avoiding tensions between the locals and refugees was a reason for this. As Syrians mainly dominates sectors and works in jobs unfavorable by the Lebanese like the service or agriculture sectors, the government aims to keep the situation like this (Baroud & Zeidan, 2021).

Further, the vagueness and the design of the Compact itself hinder its advancement. Unlike the Jordan Compact where there has been a linkage between labor integration and trade, this linkage is absent from this Compact. The immaterialized linkages could be attributed to Lebanon's "contesting approach to the EU, as Tamarice Fakhoury illustrates. She illustrates the external dimension of the EU refugee governance was incapable of establishing this link as the Lebanese elites has contested the EU approach and avoided such linkages. The reason is that such a linkage would bind the government to integrate refugees in the Labor market, and that what they did not want to (Fakhoury, 2021a).

Other scholars have considered Lebanon adoption of "compassion approach " as a better strategy than this linkage. According to them, the Lebanese felt that the EU is obliged to support Lebanon as part of refugee sharing as they emphasize that instability in Lebanon could be reflected on the EU's security, hence they must help them ( Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021). In addition, the positive incentives from the EU, to facilitate trade with Lebanon, seems inefficient. The idea of facilitating export to the EU market is hindered by technical impediments that hinder this issue. Although, in the wake of the Compact's adoption, a joint EU-Lebanese trade working group was established in 2017 to explore opportunities to enhance bilateral trade and preferential trade, progress has been very slow (Fedelino, 2021). Thus, the development –humanitarian nexus remains unrealistic objective through the Lebanese –EU Compact.

A following section from this dissertation will be dedicated to the Jordan- EU Compact, , yet , this comparative analysis was crucial to highlight the challenges underlying the Compact's

implementation and how these differences contributed to remain the Compact in the Lebanese case as a dead letter. Moreover, we have to keep in mind that Jordan is a country with historical propensity to leverage foreign aid to extract revenue. As a country that has been a safe haven for different waves for refugees, it has a crucial role on the international refugee governance (Alougili , 2019). This enables Jordan to better leverage its position to get benefit from trade-refugee linkages through the RoO scheme and get more foreign aid from the EU. The following table highlights the various factors that facilitate or hinder the Compact implementation in the two cases.

Table 1. Impeding and Facilitating Factors to the Compacts' Implementation  
Source: Own edition Based on ( Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021)

	<b>Impeding Factors in the Lebanese Context</b>	<b>Facilitating Factors in the Jordanian Context</b>
<b>Will/attitude towards trade-migration nexus</b>	Lebanon's refusal to tie trade schemes with official quotas on refugee employment.	Historical propensity to leverage foreign aid to extract revenue.
<b>Degree of coherence in asylum policy</b>	Inconsistent refugee policies and fragmented authority structures.	Coherence over asylum policy making.
<b>Refugee-camp policies</b>	The policy of non-encampment formally adopted by the state.	The refugee-camp policy
<b>Political impact of Syria's war</b>	Syria's war and the issue of refugee inclusion as dividing fault lines.	Less visible polarization over the Syrian issue
<b>Access to labor market for Syrians</b>	Informal labor relations between Syria and Lebanon	Readiness to provide formal employment opportunities for Syrian refugees

As the table illustrates there are factors that contribute to enhance the impact of the EU-Jordan Compact as ‘resilience’ mechanism and a tool for governing migration from distance. Jordan coherent refugee policy, less polarized political system and its ability to make use of its position to use refugee as a leverage contributes to the advancement of its Compact.

## **5.6. The EU Building ‘Resilience’ in Jordan**

Jordan and the EU enjoy a strategic partnership within the framework of the Euro-Med




Partnership of the Barcelona Process and the European Neighborhood Policy. Jordan's geopolitics and the crucial role Jordan plays in promoting stability, moderation and inter-faith tolerance in the region have made the EU support Jordan.

Since the establishment of their Association Agreement in 2002, the EU has been working to support Jordan in different sectors. To ensure that, the EU Delegation for Jordan works on the implementation, the following up and the advancement of their bilateral relations in different fields including politics, economy, trade, and security (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b).

The significance role of Jordan makes it the first Mediterranean partner to conclude technical negotiations leading to an "Advanced Status" with the EU in 2010. In addition, within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy of 2015, the EU and Jordan have adopted the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities. The Partnership Priorities is structured around three mutually reinforcing objectives: i) macro-economic stability and sustainable and knowledge-based growth; ii) strengthening democratic governance, the rule of law and human rights; and iii) regional stability and security, including counter-terrorism (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b).

Not only the advanced but also the amount of the EU aid that Jordan has received since the adoption of the first ENP. As of 2007, Jordan is fourth recipient country in term of EU aid as the chart illustrates

Figure 7. The largest Middle East Recipient of the EU Aid from 2007-2023 by € Billion  
Resource: Based on (EU aid explorer, 2023)




A deeper look at the largest recipient countries reveals that all of these countries are suffering from protracted crises. Only Jordan can be looked upon as a stable partner. Hence, while the EU aims to support those affected countries, supporting Jordan comes within the context of supporting such a stable significant partner.

In the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU's support is translated in line with the Partnership Priorities and the revised ENP that aim to promote Jordan 'resilience', enhance its capacities and realize its needs. For this reason, the EU's support is set on different directions and through different instruments.

Within the discourse of Brussels Conferences, the EU plays a significant role in enhancing the international community's support to Jordan. In these conferences, the EU has always emphasized that Jordan should not be left alone and the international community has a duty toward such a main host and an influential partner in the region (Press Release, 2017).

In addition, the EU has been employing different instruments to support Jordan. The EU's total assistance to help Jordan manage the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis amounts to almost €3.5 billion since 2011 through its various instruments as the figure illustrate

Figure 8. Responding to the Syrian Crisis EU support in Jordan  
 Source: Own Edition based on (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2023b).



This table illustrates in details the contribution of each instrument. Regarding humanitarian aids, which is directed through the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, it addresses basic needs as healthcare and food for refugees and the most vulnerable of the Jordanian families within and outside the camps. Beside the 404 million, in

2022 only, the EU pledged €12.5 million in humanitarian assistance as an additional support to health care, multi-purpose cash transfers, water and sanitation, education, and protection assistance (European Commission , 2023).

In line with the shift in the focus from the humanitarian into the development nexus, the non-humanitarian ‘resilience’ assistance is channeled through the EUTF-MADAD in response to the Syrian Crisis (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2023b). This instrument, mainly tackles longer term ‘resilience’. The long-run aim of this fund, through focusing on education, livelihood, water and health, is achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for refugees and the vulnerable Jordanians so that they can have a dignified life.

Despite of the crucial role this fund has been playing, as the main instrument for the non-humanitarian ‘resilience’ assistance, yet, The EUTF-MADAD officially ended in December 2021, with its existed projects still covered by it till 2025. The main reason for this ending, is not the lack of efficiency, on the contrary , it comes within the EU efforts to harmonize its different funding instrument directed toward enhancing its global governance through its new instrument “Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument” (NDICI, also known as “Global Europe”) (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2023a).

Through this new mechanism, the EU aims to create a better mechanism with an overall allocation of €79.5 billion, to cover the EU cooperation with all third countries, with an exception for the pre-accession beneficiaries (Directorate-General for International Partnerships, 2023b). More importantly, it has designed a “cushion” of unallocated funds of €9.53 billion to address unpredictable circumstances, new needs or emerging challenges. Thus, it aims to achieve a better response mechanism by the EU to global needs.

Considering the bilateral assistance these are grants channeled through the European Neighborhood Instrument. The goal of this assistance is in line with the partnership priorities and their main objectives. In addition, it aims to help Jordan recovering from the impact of COVID-19 (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2022a).

While the bilateral assistance are grants directed to help Jordan achieving reforms in different sectors including political, economic and the judiciary, the Macro Financial Assistance (MFA) are loans that are directed to the economic sector. This direct budget support aims to support Jordan to achieve its economic stabilization, enhance public debt sustainability, accelerate implementation of economic reforms and limit the economic fallout due to the Coronavirus pandemic (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2023b).

The EU has mobilized this program for Jordan three times; the first MFA was signed in March 2014, in a programme of €180 million. The MFA II was renewed in September 2017 to pledge an additional €200 million. Finally, the MFA III, totaling EUR 500 million, was adopted on 15 January 2020 (European Commission, 2021a).

As Covid 19 has added new strains, the EU has approved another MFA programme, EUR 200 million to reinforce the resources available under MFA III. It aims to help Jordan curbs the economic fallout of the pandemic. As of November 2020, the EU pledged EUR 250 million, EUR 150 million came from this programme (European Commission, 2021a).

As for the support through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, its main goal is supporting security initiatives and peace-building activities in Jordan. This instrument is the EU's main instrument with which it assists in the fields of crisis response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Through it, the EU looks for implementing a joined-up approach to its external action and strengthen its capacities at the interface of security and development policies. Hence, it creates a bridge between the EU's security and development policy, through incorporating both the short-term and long-term dimension of the EU's approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding ( Bergmann, 2018).

It is worth mentioning that in the Factsheet - Responding to the Syrian Crisis: EU support in Jordan by the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, the MFA, the Non- Humanitarian Resilience Assistance and the support through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace all of them are integrated in one type of assistance called 'resilience' assistance, with a total support counts to 1800 million for 'resilience' only (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2022a). This big support to build 'resilience' illustrates the shift to longer term assistance and the emphasis on

bridging the gap between humanitarian –development nexus on the one hand and security-development nexus on the other.

The EU support through the 3RP is another essential instrument. The importance of this mechanism is that it remains the most prominent instrument to respond to the crisis, despite the existence of other funding instruments. This plan harmonize the efforts of 270 governments, international, as well as civil society organizations. Hence, direct funding by the EU enables it to avoid doubling and enhance its role as a global actor. The charts below illustrate its support to the 3RP since it was adopted in 2015.

Figure 9. The EU Support to the 3RP Plan-Appeal Funding by US Million Dollar  
Source: Own Edition based on (Financial Tracking Services, 2023).




Figure 10. The EU share of the Overall Funding to the 3RP  
Source: Own Edition based on (Financial Tracking Services, 2023).





Figure 11. The EU funding to Jordan through the 3RP by Million Dollar  
Source: Own edition based on (Financial Tracking Services, 2023).



A deeper look at these figures may support the claim that adopting ‘resilience’ is a strategy to secure the EU itself before the host countries. On the one hand, it is true that since the adoption of the 3RP, the EU is one of the top donors for this plan, yet, its support is directed to Turkey in the first place, followed by Lebanon, then Jordan. Turkey, as the biggest host country, its geographic proximity and the support through the EU-Turkey deal of 2016 highlight its important role as a buffer zone ( Bouris & Nacrour, 2023).

Taking in consideration the gradual decrease following 2020 indicates the inadequacy of the containment policies (inside or outside the EU) adopted by the EU and its inward look shift since 2020. 2020 was a year change for the EU perspective and its containment policy. Everything has changed. On the one hand, Turkey has stopped acting as a gatekeeper state for Europe’s borders and the long made threat by its president, has come true when he announced an open border policy as a way to exert pressure on the EU. On the other, there has been an increase in the number of irregular reaching Greek coastlines. The country’s slow asylum system was in collapse and the refugee camps were overcrowded ( Mascareñas, 2020).

Lebanon on the other side makes a different story for the EU. Although it seems cooperative with the EU, Fakhoury illustrates that Lebanon disputes the EU’s attempt to regulate regions through ‘resilience’. Lebanon has sought to contest and adapt the EU’s script of building ‘resilience’, which consists of strengthening governments’ capacity to host refugees (Fakhoury, 2021a). This challenging approach requires the EU to enhance its support for Lebanon,

considering the Lebanese voices who were calling for open its borders to let the Syrians to the EU were never silent ( Fakhoury, 2019).

As for Jordan, the decrease of support through the 3RP does not indicate less support to Jordan, as emphasized by an interviewee from the EU Delegation for Jordan.

Our commitment to Jordan has not changed, despite the increase on the funding gap of the 3RP, the EU is still committed to support Jordan and we still a main donor.

Moreover, after 2020 the world has been witnessing new crises presented by Covid, the on-going Russian war on Ukraine and its impact on the EU and its need to tackle greater challenges because of the war.

The final instrument the EU has been using to support the host countries is the EU Compacts. These Compacts acknowledge that different partners face different challenges and seek for stabilization, supporting the host countries, and building refugees and local communities' capacities in line with the SDGs. As for Jordan, the EU signed this Compact in 2016 following London Conference for Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region. For the first time, it instrumentalizes refugees as a development opportunity that could contribute to their self-reliance and their development, along the host communities. Through it, the EU approves to pledge multi-year grants and concessional loans; \$700 million, as an annual grant for three years, and concessional loans of \$1.9 billion (Barblet et al , 2018).

Further, to support Jordan's trade and facilitate its access to the EU's market, the parties agreed on a special trade regime that simplifies the rules of origin for 52 Jordanian product categories. This scheme has motivated Jordanian companies to diversify their products and to create decent jobs for Jordanians and Syrians. The RoO scheme has increased Jordan exports to the EU, with a total value of €56 million in 2019, in comparison with 19.2 million in 2018 (Press and inforamtion team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b).

In return, and to get benefit of this scheme, Jordan has to meet certain targets considering those refugees. The first target is related to their labor market access. In that respect, Jordan has to facilitate this process. To do so, it has to issue 200,000 work permits for refugees in specified sectors, it must employ certain quotas of refugees in different businesses, work on

the investment climate, and legitimize Syrian businesses in the country. The second target is related to their education, Jordan is committed to increase the enrollment of the Syrian children at the public schools and to increase their work training opportunities (Barblet et al , 2018).

From different perspective, unpacking this Compact shows different challenges that hinders it from achieving its goals in terms of refugees' integration or improving Jordan access to the EU market ( Lenner & Turner, 2019; Anholt & Sinatti, 2020; Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021) .

One aspect is related to the ill-matching between refugee preferences and crafts on the one hand, and existing opportunities on the other. Unlike Asian workers who have been working for decades under difficult conditions in Jordan's garment sector in its economic zones, many Syrian refugees have been unwilling to do so for different reasons. Unsatisfactory employment conditions in these remote (SEZs), including low wages, expensive transportation, and the absence of day care, have made of such work schemes largely unacceptable for many Syrian refugees (Barblet et al , 2018; Lenner & Turner, 2018).

Another obstacle is related to the incompetence of those refugees to work in this sector for they lack the skills required for that. Considering the geographical background of those refugees who came from rural Syria and used to work as farmers there, the shortages of skills making this sector unattractive ( Gordon, 2017).

Another constrain stems from the inability of the Compact to capture the formal and informal dynamics as a major block within Jordan's labor regime. At the formal level closed sectors to Syrians, with an allocation of rigid employment quotas benefitting Jordanian and other migrant workers, have challenged Syrians' access to the labor market. This means that this division has led to the redistribution of jobs instead of compiling with employment rules and improve working conditions. What is more, the increase of work permits to almost 373 000 in 2023 does not incline creating new jobs or all of those work permits holders are working. As an interviewee from the Phoenix Center for Economic & Informatics Studies states that

The statics from the Ministry of Labor (MoL) does not specify exactly the number of the new work permits, this means that the renewal annual work permits seems as new work permits while they are not.



Another important barrier is related to the “informal and semi-formal structures” historically characterizing Jordan’s labor market. Deeply racialized stereotypes, as to what kinds of populations are suitable for certain types of jobs, have dominated Jordan market. Even prior to the Compact, special sectors like construction or farming were dominated with Egyptians while the garment sector is dominated by Asian migrant workers. As a result, such deeply embedded patterns beside employers’ large interests in preserving existing status of labor have certainly hindered the numerical targets that the Compact initially aspired for ( Lavenex & Fakhoury, 2021).

The hard realities about the Compact and the lack of materialization for Syrian refugees’ integration required review for the Compact. In order to add another positive incentive for the Jordanian companies to integrate refugees, the 2018 review stipulates that 60,000 “active” work permits are needed before the Compact can be applied to the whole country and not only to the (SEZs).

Moreover , since 2019 London initiative for Supporting Jordan Growth and the 2019 Conference for Supporting Syria and the Region have highlighted the importance of supporting Jordan and its economic growth without any policy commitments regarding refugees' employment. The following chart illustrates the commitment made by Jordan and the policy changed since 2018.

Table 2. Work Permits and Employment Opportunities  
 Source: Based on ( Vos, 2020).

<b>Jordan’s policy commitments in line with the Compact</b>	<b>Policy changes implemented since 2018</b>
Allow Syrian refugees to apply for work permits. Provide up to 200,000 job opportunities for Syrian refugees by the end of 2018.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 220,000 work permits issued to Syrian refugees since the start of the Jordan Compact (including renewals) as of 2020.</li> <li>• About 42,000 refugees had active work permits during the third quarter of 2018</li> </ul>

Ensure that the cost of obtaining the right to work for Syrian refugees is permanently waived	It has been waived and grace period for Syrian refugee work permits fees extended until the end of 2020.
Continue easing access for Syrian refugees into the formal labor market: consider expanding the sectors and occupations open to Syrian refugees, mainly at technical level with a particular focus on women's participation, in a way that does not create competition with Jordanians.	Increase in sectors where non-Jordanians are prohibited from working. New list of 15 closed categories issued, including office work, sales, hairdressing, drivers and guards, and 13 restricted categories as of October 2019.

While the political commitment to increase the number of work permits has resulted a great increase of the number work permits to become almost 373,000 work permits since 2016 (Jordan Times, 2023b). This does not indicate an increase in the active work permits, nor it clarifies whether having a permit actually improved the working conditions, compared to their employment in those sectors without permits prior to the Compact .Moreover, reports have emphasized the high rate of unemployment among Syrians in comparison with Jordanians, as an indicator that it has not been materialized ( Vos, 2020) .


In addition, the commitment made by the Jordanian government contradicts with its centric agenda regarding their employment. This is not a priority for Jordan, especially when considering the call for the refugees' voluntary return and Jordan initiative. This initiative was presented in May, 2023 and its calls for a step for step approach. The objective of this plan is supporting the Syrian regime to reintegrate again in the international system, the removal of the sanctions to support the reconstruction of the country, facilitate refugees' voluntary return and fight drugs smuggling. The last goal became a main concern for Jordan and the whole region and they emphasize that the regime must play a greater role to fight it ( al-Sheikh, 2023) .

In another respect, the ability to get benefit from the RoO scheme has been a key question. The ultimate goal of the Compact is to amend The Jordanian Association Agreement with the EU, which is in force since 2002. The agreement states that for Jordanian exports to the European

market, an average of 60 per cent of the export value of a product has to be from Jordanian origin. The EU–Jordan Compact relaxes the rules of origin. Hence, products destined for the European market need to contain only 30 per cent on average from Jordanian origin ( Grawert, 2019).

Since the first years of adopting the Compact, the result has not been as hoped for. A report in 2017 states that less than 10 companies of the 936 companies in the 18 SEZs, have been able to employ 15 percent of Syrian refugees (Amjad et al., 2017). Moreover, the great imbalance of trade in favor of the EU and the low growth of Jordan exports to the EU may support such a claim as the following chart shows

Figure 12. EU Trade Flows and Balance by million Euro, Annual Data 2012-2022  
 Source: (Directorate-General for Trade, 2023).



Despite the gradual growth in Jordan imports to the EU as appears, examining the composition of Jordan exports in 2022 reveals that is consisted mainly of chemicals (€0.344 billion), fuel and mining products (€0.165 billion) as well as Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (€0.085 billion) machinery and transport equipment (€0.035 billion) (Directorate-General for Trade, 2023). Other sectors like garment and manufacturing, although included, were incapable to get benefit from the scheme.

Grawert states that there are three economic reasons behind the low performance of benefit for the Jordanian companies: First, the preferential trade regime consist sectors where other Mediterranean countries have greater comparative advantages. Second, many factories in

Asian countries have lower production costs for textiles than Jordanian factories, these also get benefit from preferential market access to Europe, and have established a better marketing networks which Jordanian companies do not have. Third, Jordanian manufacturers find it easier to direct their attention towards the regional markets and do not necessarily see a benefit in increasing their standards to be eligible for the European market ( Grawert, 2019).

A deeper look at the companies which were capable to export reveals that there were many technical and legal challenges that hinder the ability of different companies to get benefit of the scheme, in particular for the small and medium one. Other factors include the lack of experience and the knowledge of the EU market by the Jordanian companies ( Huang & Gough, 2019).

As a result, while Jordan accepted this scheme to get economic benefit, especially as it walked in parallel with its historical attempts to draw out revenues from foreign aid ( Tsourapas, 2019), technical and legal barriers hinder it from doing this.

Technical barriers are related to the design of the Compact (Empociello, 2021). The Compact stipulates that only selected industrial items are included in the new trade regime, 52 (out of 97) chapters of the Harmonized System Code by which the World Customs Organization classifies traded goods. For this reason, the Compact limits the export commodities that are included in the preferential trade regime to specific light industries, mainly garment factories. Companies processing agrarian products, one of the predominant sectors in the Jordanian economy, are not included in the regime (Temprano-Arroyo, 2018).

Taking all these aspects together , the underlying logic behind the EU-Jordan Compact is a truly a game changer ( Lenner & Turner, 2019), yet it seems that presenting the trade-employment as a positive incentive seem incapable to benefit Jordan economy nor the refugees integration despite of the progress that has been made .

### **5.7. The EU's Building 'Resilience' and Bourbeau's Typology of 'Resilience'**

A deeper look at the initiatives within the context of the Jordan Compact or other instrument reveals that the EU's building 'resilience' can be categorized within the framework of Bourbeau's typology.

In the context of Maintenance ‘Resilience’ and preserving the status quo, the initiative aims to create collaboration and expand international support for inclusive growth in Jordan.

Considering the fact that Jordan is a key pillar of regional stability, the Compact recognizes the need to enable Jordan to meet its commitments as a host country and geostrategic partner (Huang & Gough, 2019). Moreover, to avoid tensions within the Jordanian labor market and preserve social cohesion, the Compact encourages employment within SEZs, with the emphasis on the need to employ certain quotas of refugees in different businesses.

Preserving Jordan stability requires fostering and preserving Jordan social cohesion. One main reason for that is the urbanization of the displaced Syrians in Jordan. This means that the majority resides in urban areas alongside local residents in cities and towns of Jordan. This in turn increases the interaction opportunities between refugees and host communities (HollowayID & Sturridge, 2022).

Like ‘resilience’, there is a lack of consensus on defining social cohesion. In the context of the 3RP, it proposes a practical definition of social cohesion as “the management of social tensions within a community so as to prevent conflict and foster opportunities for collaboration between groups”, including at both the horizontal (between groups) and vertical (between groups and the state) levels (UNDP, 2022, p. 5).

Since adopting ‘resilience’ by the international community and the EU, social cohesion has been a priority for the EU. This appears from the EU's support through the Trust Fund, where the support for this sector is a main pillar (External Monitoring and Evaluation For the European Regional Trust Fund in Respond to the Syrian Crisis, 2022).

By looking at the projects implemented by the EU through the EUTF-MADAD in Jordan till accomplishing the 10<sup>th</sup> reports for monitoring and evaluation of 2022, it reveals that progress in social cohesion continues to display a satisfactory progress. The EU projects which are directed to access for services for individuals, local capacities and local institutions made a progress as follows: 329,841 (49%) out of 671,310 the target value get access to social cohesion services for individuals, 1,552 (70%) out of 2,216 target value for local capacities and training officers and 67 (>100%) out of 64 local institutions (External Monitoring and Evaluation For the European Regional Trust Fund in Respond to the Syrian Crisis, 2021).

The social cohesion services for individuals include activities such as peacebuilding activities, peer-to-peer information, outreach, information campaigns, and awareness sessions on various topics such as hygiene, environment, and protection. The local capacities programs aim to train officers on social cohesion services while the local institutions target municipalities, organizations and facilities that provide social cohesion services (External Monitoring and Evaluation For the European Regional Trust Fund in Respond to the Syrian Crisis, 2021).

However, in the context of the 3RP, the approach to social cohesion is less structured with less. According to a report published by 3RP Response to the Syria Crisis, the 3RP does not seem to have a harmonized and coordinated approach to social cohesion in Jordan (UNDP, 2022).

One reason for such a contradicted result might be the type of activities the EU implementing through the EUTF. The fact that social cohesion remains a sensitive topic in Jordan, the EU focuses on activities that enhance social cohesion with taking in consideration for the sensitivity of this topic. This appears from the different activities implemented with the 3RP. For instance, the 3RP activities involve dialogue sessions between refugees and host communities on one side and relevant local stakeholders, including authorities on the other, but these efforts appear to have limited reach and support, as the sensitivity of the topic makes stakeholders usually not receptive to these efforts (UNDP, 2022).

For the EU preserving Jordan stability is crucial, as its instability will have bitter consequences on the EU itself. According to the Political Instability Index by the UNDP, Jordan political instability is 3. This makes its political instability similar to other Arab countries, less affected by the influx of refugees. For instance, Oman or Saudi both stand at 3 (UNDP, 2023). For this reason, preserving social cohesion is very urgent. This stems from the fact that the Syrian influx presents Jordan with a political problem. Syrians are highly focused in Jordan's most vulnerable communities, and frustration brought to the fore have begun to mobilize marginalized Jordanians since 2014 (Francis, 2015). Consequently, since the establishment of the EUTF-MADAD, preserving social cohesion is a priority as it is much related to stability.

As a result, the EU initiatives are directed to decrease the competition between refugees and host communities and enhance the capacities of local communities with an emphasis on the most vulnerable of the Jordanians.

In addition, maintaining the status quo and preserving Jordan stability require supporting macroeconomic stability. The EU's Macro- financial assistance has a key role in reducing Jordan's Central Government debt which stood at 114% to GDP in 2022 (The World Bank, 2022) . Moreover, the EU's contributes at fostering Jordan's economic 'resilience'.

Instruments, like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have a great role in supporting Jordan. The EIB, for instance, helps improving the socio-economic infrastructure. After the EU-Jordan Compact, its support has increased to become €2.63 billion. Currently, its support covers 73 projects in different sectors including water and energy (European Investement Bank, 2023b). This presents an acknowledgement of the challenges posed by refugees, the importance of helping Jordan to compile with its commitments and preserving its stability.

Further, Jordan is covered by the Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI), which was launched by the EU in 2016. The objective of this instrument is to enhance the EU's Southern Neighborhood and Western Balkans countries' ability to withstand shocks and improve their economic 'resilience'. This goes in parallel with the EUGS objectives of enhancing 'resilience' of the EU partners in the EU neighborhood ( European Investement Bank , 2023a).

This initiative builds on the experience of the EIB in implementing projects while giving loans and financial products. However it differs from the EIB in the respect that it blends its funds from donors' community with EIB financing. Hence, there are other main shareholders like the UK or the Commission ( European Investement Bank , 2023a)

In Jordan, it has funded 7 projects in different fields since 2016. In water and sanitation, for instance, in 2019, it approved EUR 65 million financing agreement. This project would improve the water supply systems in "Deir Allah and Al-Karamah" in the Jordan valley, serving almost 85,000 people in that region (European Investement Bank, 2021).

Considering Jordan's energy sector challenges, the ERI supports Jordan to have a green and sufficient energy. Its efforts are directed particularly to support Jordanian governates which host the highest share of refugees. Thus, the EIB last loan in this sector provided €45 million to Cities and Villages Development Bank in order to support municipalities' investments in energy efficiency infrastructure (Elnimr, 2019).

The role of the private sector, along small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to obtain inclusive and sustainable growth cannot be ignored. Accordingly, the ERI has funded many projects that support SMEs. One of these is the Jordanian Action for Development of Enterprises (JADE). A 3 years project that was launched in 2017. Its purposes are supporting over 160 SMEs, startups and entrepreneurs and creating new employment opportunities for Jordanians (Leaders International , 2017).

Further, backing the private sector in light of Covid 19 has even become much more fundamental. For this reason, the EIB bank last support provides € 24 million to enhance economic 'resilience' to companies most impacted by the pandemic ( European Investment Bank, 2022). All these efforts and activities can be categorized within 'Resilience' as Maintenance, yet the EU's work does not stop here and 'Resilience' as Renewal is also there.

Within the framework of Renewal 'resilience', the Compact is a game-changing to how the host countries and the international community respond to the refugee crisis. This Compact makes Jordan the first country in the Arab world to facilitate Syrian refugees' access to the labor market (ILO, 2019a)

The Compact is crowded in concessional financing, trade concessions and other incentives. All these aim to boost economic development and enable Jordan to provide basic services to refugees and local communities. Among other policies, it asserts that the EU is to relax trade regulations to stimulate exports from 18 designated (SEZs) in Jordan. The RoO scheme aims to facilitate exporting to Europe and supporting inclusive growth for Jordanians and Syrian refugees alike ( Huang & Gough, 2019).

Getting the full potentials of the incentives within the Compact required Jordan to adjust existing policies and policy changes to benefit Jordanian host communities (Seeberg, 2020). For example, reforms included these that improve access to work and to register businesses



among Jordanians, improve the business environment, ease procedures, waive the fees to obtain work permits in selected sectors and allow Syrians residing in the camps access to jobs in host communities. Further, access to skills and vocational training opportunities and job-matching services for both Jordanians and Syrians have also been enhanced (ILO, 2019a).

An interviewee of the MoL in Jordan asserted that the Compact is a milestone in running the Syrian refugees file in Jordan:

The Ministry is making a huge effort in order to comply with the Compact and the international law. To formalize labor market and encouraging the refugees correcting their positions, the ministry harmonized its efforts with other ministries, like the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and international partners, like the International Labor Organization (ILO).

To make sure that both Jordan and the EU are meeting their commitments under the scheme, with considering refugees right and decent working conditions, the MoL, the EU and the ILO signed a collaboration agreement to support the scheme's implementation and to provide technical assistance.

As the unemployment rate in Jordan is high, creating decent jobs for Jordanians and Syrians is a challenging task. For this reason, under the EU-ILO agreements there are two phases. In the first phase, their collaboration provided an overall framework for the ILO for supporting, monitoring and provision of technical assistance. The ILO focus was directed to strengthen capacity and facilitate decent job creation for Jordanians and Syrians. Hence, it made partnerships with national stakeholders and the private sector. Such interventions helped build communication networks between job-seekers and private sector companies through employment services (ILO, 2019b)

In the second phase, the agreement continued to create decent jobs. This could be done through continue operating five EU-funded employment centers in Jordan cities of Sahab, Zarqa, Mafraq, Irbid and Zaatari refugee camp. Moreover, the ILO introduced the e-counselling platform. This facilitated job-matching and help Jordanian and Syrian job-seekers and workers, as well as employers in accessing employment information, job and training opportunities, and career guidance. In addition, the second phase sought to scale up

opportunities under the RoO by providing training and technical to facilitate exporting to the EU (ILO, 2019b).

This is not to say that the Compact is flawless, yet the model it presents makes it international. Other host countries sought to employ it. Ethiopia, for instance which is home for Eritrean refugees imported the scheme and based on lessons learnt for Jordan Compact designed and implemented its own (Barbelet et al., 2019).

The 'jobs for refugees' experiments through the Compact is the most promising approach for decades (Huang & Ash, 2018). Despite of the slow progress, there is always a room for improvements. The government has removed many obstacles that hinders the Compact (Barblet et al , 2018).

One of these obstacles is related to work permits' fees. Prior to the agreement, those refugees were dealt with as any labor migrant, who pays almost € 900 annually for a work permit. This high fee, beside long administrative procedures and missing official documentation for refugees, resulted that only around 3,000 permits were issued before 2016. However, Syrians now pay only JD10 (12 €) administration fees. This has led to a tremendous increase in the number of work permits issued. While In 2017, only 46,000 work permits were issued, this figure has increased dramatically to become 313,024 as of June 2023 (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situations, 2023a).

What's more, though Syrians refugees must obtain work permits, the MoL makes human consideration and tolerate those who works without one. The same interviewee from the MoL asserted that

Within the regular inspection tour organized by teams from the ministry, it has never happened that any refugee has been forcibly detained, but encouraged, along his employer to correct his position, except for security alerts.

This is similar to other reports conclusions which attempt to explain the increasing deportation rates. Some of the reports highlight that the spikes in deportations, are related to authorities' response to armed attacks, either directly in reaction to the armed attacks themselves, or as an increase in security measures throughout the country following the attacks. This was the case following an attack on the Jordanian forces near the northeastern Rukban district in June 2016. This attack killed seven, other attack around the southern city of Karak in December 2016

killed 19. Although the deportation was set on security basis, Jordanian authorities have neither showed evidence that any deportees were involved in any of these attacks nor publicly alleged that they were involved ( Frelick, 2017).

The EU Jordan efforts are not only classified as Maintenance or Renewal ‘resilience’, Marginal ‘resilience’ is also there, to a certain extent. . Jordan has not only shifted to a new policy but also has adjusted existed policies without completely changing those existing policies. This appears also when considering the sectors where Syrians refugees are allowed to work. Previously, Syrian refugees were mostly permitted to work only in closed sectors including agriculture, construction and manufacturing. However, since July 2021, Syrian refugees have been authorized to obtain work permits in all sectors open to non-Jordanians. This means that they can now work in new sectors, among these, services, sales and crafts (UNHCR, 2022).

Moreover, within the framework of the Compact, Jordan has adjusted existed policies. Regarding work permits, there has been adjustment to make work permits in some sectors seasonal and/or not tied to one employer (International Rescue Committee , 2018) . As for Syrians operating Home-Based Businesses, there were amendments for existing policy. Accordingly, it allows those Syrians operate and register their Businesses inside Syrian camps as of 2017 and then outside Refugee camps as of 2018 (OCHA Services, 2018). As a result, the three types of ‘resilience’ as Maintenance, Marginal and Renewal exist in Jordan

## 6. 'Resilience' and Security

The main question of this dissertation is how the EU's building 'resilience' contributes to Jordan's security. Determining such a causality is a challenging task. Causality is rooted in ascertaining whether changes in outcomes (dependent variable) are based on variance of certain factors (independent variables). In social science, the task is even harder where measurements is never an easy task. In this research, both 'resilience' (the independent variable) and security (the dependent variable) are abstract concepts and difficult to measure. However, based on the theoretical level and the context of the paper, the measurement can be less challenging.

As illustrated, 'resilience' in the context of this paper, is understood as quality and a process that aims to enhance the entity capacity to deal with crises while national security for this paper can only be viewed within the scope presented by the OCHA, Buzan classification of security sectors and the securitization process of the Copenhagen School. National security is not only about protecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the state, but it also includes its ability to deal with different internal and external challenges, in their different forms.

The massive influx of Syrian refugees led to drastic impacts on Jordan. In addition, both Jordan and the EU present Syrian refugees as a serious challenge to their security. The need to secure the EU borders, to support Jordan to secure its borders, support its economy, verify and preserve its resources require taking different measures. Building 'resilience' in Jordan is one of these measures. Although Syrian refugees may not be a security challenge for the five sectors of the national security of both Jordan and the EU, the great influx of refugees can be seen as a challenge to the EU's political security, stability, or its social cohesion. As for Jordan, those refugees may be seen as a challenge to Jordan's political, economic, social, or environmental security.

Thus, this chapter focused on how the process of enhancing Jordan's capacity to deal with the influx of Syrian refugees enhances or doesn't enhance Jordan political, economic, social, environmental security. This cannot be done without analyzing the role of the Jordanian institutions to promote or hinder 'resilience'. For this reason, this section took historical

institutionalism as a point of departure in the context of the EU-Jordan relations, to understand those institutions role in building ‘resilience’. This is fundamental to understand how those institutions may hinder or promote ‘resilience’. They would hinder it if they are rigid or promote it if they are flexible enough to adapt. The following section is about understanding the impact of the EU’s building ‘resilience’ in different sectors and quantifying that. Finally, the impact of other factors must also be examined. The conducted analysis showed that there are other internal or external factors affect Jordan’s security, this required establishing complex causation which is an outcome results from several different combinations or conditions that to lead a certain outcome (Braumoeller, 2003).

### **6.1. The Role of Institutions in Promoting or Hindering ‘Resilience’**

Jordan has always been a safe haven for refugees and the country has received different waves of them. For decades, Jordan has experienced how refugees have played a key role in the internal political development in the country. First and foremost in relation with the Palestinian refugees fleeing to Jordan, after the establishment of Israel in 1948 and after the 1967 war. Moreover, after the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, there was a significant influx of Iraqi refugees to Jordan, some of which still exist in the country ( Fagen, 2009). Adding to that, Jordan shares large numbers of Egyptian labor migrants and also Asian female migrant workers, particularly from Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Philippines (Eyadat, 2013) .

This makes the Syrian refugees are not the first-time refugees experience for the country. As illustrated earlier, legacies and memories of the past have a significant role in shaping Jordan policy. However, in the context of the Compact and the need to develop and adjust Jordan policies, it is crucial to understand how the Jordanian government has developed its institutional flexibility. The analysis will be drawn on Historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is a social science approach that highlights how timing, sequences and path dependence affect institutions, and form social, political, economic social, behavior and change (Voeten, , 2019).

Dannreuther indicates that historical institutionalism ‘focuses on how institutions develop and adapt, rather than on how they function (Dannreuther, 2010, p. 189). Unlike the functionalism

or rational choice theory, this approach takes in considerations of critical junctures that lead to a policy change. Within the context of Jordan-EU relations, there are some critical junctures, especially following the Compact. These can be seen as turning points that help to explain the occurrence of change in the Jordanian policies.

For the EU- Jordan relations, migration has been a core theme. Many interviewees assert that Jordan efforts with refugees do not only effectively help reducing the influx of refugees towards Europe, but also has an impact on solving problems related to security aspects of the Syrian crisis and its spill-over effects in the region. This point of view is not something new in the literature, see for instance, (Anholt & Wagner , 2016; Seeberg, 2020) . These highlight that the Jordanian efforts in migration and refugees policies are related for stability-security nexus for the EU.

These efforts are seen as part of Jordan migration diplomacy. Jordan migration diplomacy consists of a mutual trade-off between Jordan and the EU. Accordingly, Jordan gets financial support from the EU, to finance programs making it possible for refugees and migrants to become active in the Jordanian labor market. At the same, it makes it possible for the EU via its financial aid to achieve its foreign policy goals. Regarding migration, it aims at reducing migratory movements towards Europe (Seeberg, 2020). This diplomacy is a system of international negotiations which informs and affects the national legal and regulatory systems within certain areas ( Adamson, & Tsourapas, 2019).

Tracing the history of Jordan-EU relations clarifies that their institutional cooperation has been experiencing changes due to the Syrian refugee crisis. Their institutional cooperation has begun since their Association Agreement in 2002. Since then, the cooperation between Jordan and the EU has been based on gradually closer and more complex agreements (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b)..

From migration and refugees lens , their institutional cooperation made a big leap forward with the signing of the Mobility Partnership Agreement in October 2014 .The agreement focuses basically on legal migration, on border management, and on combating irregular migration. This agreement is believed to be a corner stone in establishing the logic of

migration diplomacy trade-off. This appears when considering that the Jordanian efforts will be in return for the start of negotiations on an agreement to facilitate the procedures for the issuing of Schengen visas to citizens of Jordan. Meanwhile, the EU continues its support to Jordan's remarkable efforts in providing stability and refugee in the region (European Commission , 2014).

This Mobility Partnership is a critical juncture in their relations. It comes within the context of the European Agenda on Migration of 2015. A strategic document that presents a new approach to migration. According to it, the EU started to design a new framework in dealing with migration with Mediterranean partners including Jordan. As policy-makers realize that it is impossible to prevent migration completely, they started to focus instead on 'migration management'. The underlying logic beneath these migration policies is to combine migration and development so that the effects of migration are positive for both the EU and its partners. At the end, this partnership aims to establish a win –win approach (Reslow, 2010). The fact that Jordan is one of the first Mediterranean partners to have such a partnership highlights the importance of supporting Jordan, especially in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. Thus, this partnership is presented as a carrot for Jordan. However, this legal framework does not provide an answer for the question of those refugees as a development asset or how they will be integrated in Jordan.

Another critical Juncture in their institutional cooperation took place following the Compact and Brussels Conferences for Supporting the Future of Syria and the region. To be able to live up to the EU's incentives, as part of the trade-off inherent in migration diplomacy maneuvers, the Jordanian institutions needed to adapt to this situation (Seeberg, 2020). To get the incentives of the Compact, the Jordanian ministries have worked on developing their institutional capacities with the purpose of living up to the agreements with the EU (MoPIC, 2023).

The MoPIC plays a crucial role in that respect. As a main authority responsible for designing and implementing the Compact, it needs to make sure that the Jordanian institutions are capable to achieve that. Hence, an interviewee from MoPIC asserts that in light of the institutional adaptation, two units were established and they are of great significance, a unit

working on following the extent to which Jordan lives up to the JRP and a unit working on implementing the ambitions laid down in the Jordan Compact agreement.

From the historical institutions perspective, understanding the timing that led to changes in a policy is crucial (Voeten, , 2019). Reviewing Jordan policies illustrates that the Jordanian institutions adapt according to these critical junctures, beginning from the initial build-up of a system of tools necessary for dealing with migration challenges to the gradual increase in the cooperation between Jordan and the EU. This is to be done in line with Brussels conferences taking place following the Compact.

Thus, the process of adaptation is the result of these institutions flexibility in the first place. Being in a region full of turmoil and facing different exogenous shocks enhance the need for this flexibility. This is understood considering the fact that exogenous shocks such as wars or economic crises may lead to substantial changes in governing institutions (Widmaier et al., 2007). In addition, this institutional development is a result of the process of path dependency. Path dependency which emphasizes the role of history, as it shapes policy making, explains the need for such flexibility (Greener, 2005). Being a recipient of different waves of refugees highlights the importance of being flexible. Jordanian government officials learnt from past experiences that this flexibility is crucial in order to improve the performance of their institutions (Roberts, 2015).

This flexibility enables Jordan institutions to adapt and this is a main objective of ‘resilience’ as well as good governance. Accordingly, the high level of institutional flexibility on the Jordanian side does not hinder building ‘resilience’ in Jordan, on the contrary, it contributes to the ‘resilience’ of the Jordanian state through, to quote Heydemann and Leenders ‘ The capacity to adapt governance strategies to changing domestic and international conditions’ ( Heydemann & Leenders, 2013, p. 5).

## **6.2. Building ‘resilience’ and the Sustainable Development Goals**

One of the main objectives of adopting ‘resilience’ in response of the Syrian crisis is bridging the gap between humanitarian - development nexus, specially, in light of the absent of foreseeable solution for the crisis and the low number of the Syrians voluntary return to Syria. The last data from the UNHCR, reveals that a total of 2,582 Syrian refugees left Jordan to



return to Syria during the first seven months of 2023. This number makes 67,312 Syrians have returned from Jordan since 2016 ( Tayseer, 2023).

Considering these facts makes promoting SDGs fundamental. In this regard, the UN efforts in Jordan and the work of other agencies like Care, the Red Cross, GIZ and other agencies have been crucial. However, the scope of this paper limits the analysis to the work of the UN only. The main reason for this is not marginalizing the work of other agencies, yet, since the UN is considered the guardian of international human rights and international norms, and its goal is making a real difference for all people, in particular, to the most vulnerable (United Nations in Jordan , 2023), these make the UN System in Jordan a corner stone for ‘resilience’. Further, we have to bear in mind that the JRP, the main instrument to respond to the Syrian refugee Crisis, is co-led by the MoPIC and UNDP.

In this regard, the United Nations Country Team works closely with the MoPIC and other partners to develop and update the JRP, based on a comprehensive vulnerability assessment. Hence, how ‘resilience’ is understood by the UN, and how similar or different it is from the EU's perspective in the Jordanian context must also be understood.

Tracing the history of the UN existence in Jordan indicates it is as old as Jordan joined the UN in 1955 (United Nations in Jordan , 2023) . As Jordan started to receive the first wave of the Palestinians after the first Arab Israel war in 1948, the UN started to support Jordan especially with the UNRWA working in Jordan to support the Palestinians refugees in Jordan. Unlike the UNHCR, the UNRWA was established with a special mandate to support the Palestinians refugees only in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza Strip and the West Bank (UNRWA Jordan, 2023). Since then, the UN System in Jordan has worked with 18 UN agencies –the United Nations Country Team, to offer high-end, value-added humanitarian and development interventions, based on international norms and in line with and complement national knowledge (United Nations in Jordan , 2023).

Understanding the mechanism, through which JRP is designed and implemented, gives a better view about the UN's role in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The JRP represents the comprehensive plan led by the Jordanian government to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis since 2015. This plan was introduced since then to replace the National Resilience Plan of 2014-2016. While the first plan aims to provide high priority investments by the government

in response to the impact of the Syrian crisis on the Jordanian host communities and the Jordanian economy (USAID/Jordan, 2016), the latter's objective is to provide a comprehensive response to support both the refugees and the host communities. Thus, the JRP consists mainly of two pillars, the refugees and 'resilience' pillar. It represents the main framework for collective action to support both Syrian refugees and the most vulnerable of the Jordanian communities and institutions alike. It makes sure that critical humanitarian measures and medium-term interventions are well integrated, sequenced and complemented (Inter Sector Working Group, 2017).

In order to do so, there are three main coordinating mechanisms working together in designing this plan, with a crucial role for the UN different agencies. On the top of that, the JRP represents Jordan's country chapter from the 3RP. This requires a permanent consultation between the Jordanian government and its partners with the delegated authority to the UNHCR Representative. The representative in his turn reports to the Regional Refugee Coordinator and then to the High Commissioner. The ultimate goal of this process is to harmonize the efforts for the implantation of the 3RP (Inter Sector Working Group, 2017) .

In sum the coordination mechanisms can be summarized in the following:

- A. The Humanitarian Partners Forum (HPF): this mechanism is composed of the Humanitarian Country Team which is the senior inter-agency humanitarian leadership body in Jordan and the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF). The IATF is composed of the heads of the humanitarian UN agencies and NGOs who are playing the role of a "Steering Committee". It supervises the system of the Sector Working Groups and the connected strategic advocacy and funding processes. This forum is in a consonant consultation with the UN team to support the JRP (Inter Sector Working Group, 2017).
- B. The Inter-Sector Working Group (ISWG): As of 2014, the ISWG was established as a forum of the sectors' chairs. Its main objectives are encouraging harmonies between the sectors of the JRP, avoiding duplication, and working on common processes. Mainly, it works as the main bridge between the Sector Working Groups, as well as between The ISWG and the HPF (Inter Sector Working Group, 2017) .

C. The Jordan INGO Forum (JIF): is a network of 58 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) implementing development and humanitarian programs to respond to the needs of vulnerable Jordanians, along Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. JIF exists mainly to serve the needs of its members and to make them capable of helping vulnerable populations in Jordan. Its members meet monthly to exchange information and discuss Forum priorities at the Country Director meeting. The role of Jordan civil society and the local capacities are represented by JIF organizations which employ over 4,400 Jordanian staff in addition to 750 expatriate staff (Reliefweb, 23).

Keeping in mind that the designation and implementation of the JRP is done by almost 150 national and international organizations highlight the importance of coordination and consultation between them, and here comes the role of the UN agencies as the following chart illustrates:




Figure 13. JRP Inter-Agency Coordination Briefing Kit. Reviewed by ISWG  
 Source: Based on (Inter Sector Working Group, 2017) .

As the chart illustrates each sector is chaired by a specialized UN agency, with the UNHCR representative coordinating the whole process in line with Jordan local ownership. This coordinating model has some pitiful that highlights the need for reviewing it. This structure is believed to be expensive and time-consuming coordination structure. As an interviewee from the UNHCR in Jordan comments

There is “aid worker’s disease,” meaning that there is “too much coordination with too little output,” with too many meetings, too many structures, too much overhead, and inefficient use of time and funds.

Other interviewee from the Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development, ARRD, a member of JIF forum comments

We spend half of our working hours in coordination meetings. There were repeated observations that these structures were consuming significant amounts of funding through salaries and overhead.

Further, as it involves a great number of stake holders, it has increasingly been characterized by tensions. This tension is driven by different factors. On the one hand it involves the UN agencies themselves. As they have different analyses in terms of describing their approaches. For instance, they have different interpretations regarding coordination, thus what elements to be involved. For instance, UNICEF understanding involves a framework of structures, functions, implementing coordination mechanisms, and skills while UNOCHA considers coordination, policy, advocacy, information management, and financing (Culbertson et al., 2016)

On the other hand, tension rises among the UN agencies, the governments and the international assistance community, between international and local NGOs regarding goals and priorities. Stakeholders’ goals, incentives, and priorities affect how they coordinate and manage the response. Different interviewees assert that there are differences between stakeholders regarding what should be done, by whom, and for whom. Some civil society organizations which are playing a great role in this mechanism feel marginalized by other main UN or international agencies, as they get more funding from main donors (Culbertson et al., 2016). Not to mention also there are fundamental divergent views on the approach areas:

over short- or long-term planning. This is a very controversial point of view, as one of the UNHCR interviewee emphasizes,

Especially with the increasing funding gap, of course we know the support should be for humanitarian assistance, but we fear that we will not be able to sustain our livelihood projects which helped self-reliance for many refugees.

Yet, despite of these challenges, this structure has a point of success. It Integrates ‘resilience’ or “stabilization” goals into a refugee coordination structure. The reason behind adopting ‘resilience’ at that time by the UN came while the context in Jordan has changed dramatically as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis. In order to fit for the purpose, the situation has developed from a focus on life-saving humanitarian assistance to a time when assistance to refugees and host communities must be equally prioritized. The timing of adopting ‘resilience’ came at the time of adopting the SDGs in 2015. In that respect, ‘resilience’ principle came as “glue to bridge humanitarian action and development assistance within one coherent framework (UN Sustainable Development Group , 2015; Culbertson et al., 2016).

The objective of adopting these goals is to leave no one behind. They are a universal call to work together to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that by 2030 all people enjoy peace and prosperity (UNDP, 2023). This requires turning challenges into opportunities. In that regard, this brings us back to the EU's ‘resilience’ characteristics as illustrated by Tocci and mentioned before. ‘Resilience’ constitutes an opportunity for transformation, with regard to adaptation, changing environments, improving livelihoods and economic opportunities (Tocci, 2020).

Hence, this indicates that there is a similarity between the UN and the EU's understanding of ‘resilience’. A greater resemblance between the two appears when considering how ‘resilience’ is defined by the UN. The UN understanding of ‘resilience’ is best illustrated by the UNDP which started in Jordan in 1976. The UNDP is considered the convener of the SDGs. This reason makes it plays a crucial role in designing the JRP.

The ‘resilience’ based approach is defined by UNDP as the ability of individuals, households, communities and societies to cope with the adverse impacts of shocks and stresses, to recover from them, and bring about transformational change that supports sustainable human development (UN Sustainable Development Group , 2015). A clearer conceptual framework

of ‘resilience’ is presented by the UN Resilience Guidance. In this document, ‘resilience’ is defined “as the ability of individuals, households, communities, cities, institutions, systems and societies to prevent, resist, absorb, adapt, respond and recover positively, efficiently and effectively when faced with a wide range of risks, while maintaining an acceptable level of functioning without compromising long-term prospects for sustainable development, peace and security, human rights and well-being for all ” (United Nations, 2020, p. 11).

This guidance, which is directed mainly to the UN teams and its agencies, aims to provide a common ground for these agencies to have the same understanding and to work together to support governments and local communities in building their ‘resilience. Moreover, it doesn’t only provide a conceptual framework but an operational guidance for practical application at country level with a rich annex of practical tools and methodologies that can be applied in different contexts (United Nations, 2020).

The analysis of this document reveals there are many similarities between the UN and the EU understanding of ‘resilience’. First, both the UN and the EU have the same understanding of ‘resilience’ as it appears in the EU Approach to Resilience of 2012, however, the UN emphasizes that ‘resilience’ brings changes that support SDGs. Second, both of them highlight the importance of the context where ‘resilience’ is build and what ‘resilience’ means in different contexts ( Badarin, 2021). Third, the emphasis is on the local ownership and the bottom up approach that delegate’s decision-making powers from other levels of governance to the local level. From this perspective, the EU or the UN have the only mission of helping the local partners and not exporting designed plans (Chandler, 2014).

The aligned understanding of ‘resilience’ makes their cooperation even greater. This appears from the EU funding to the 3RP, where the EU is the third largest international donor in 2023 (OCHA Services, 2023). However, their cooperation is not only not restricted to the 3RP. As the EU believes building ‘resilience’ contributes to its global governance, it has been working closely with the numerous UN bodies to achieve this. Some figures are mentioned here to illustrate how the EU is at the core center of the UN system. The EU countries fund 38 % of the UN's regular budget, and more than two fifths of UN peacekeeping operations. The European Commission contributes more than USD 1.35 billion in support of the UN external assistance programmes and projects. The EU, EU institutions and EU countries combined,

provide 56 % of Global Aid to Development and are one of the world's largest donors of humanitarian assistance (Press and information team of the Delegation to the UN in Geneva, 2021). The EU's commitment to support the UN system demonstrates its commitment to international peace. Moreover, it adds legitimacy to its role as a global actor, as the UN is considered as protector of the international order, the EU funding by the UN makes it more accepted by local communities ( Bargaúés & Morillas, 2021) .

In the heart of Jordan's support, the EU's and the UN work has become the emphasis on the SDGs. Since its establishment in 2014, the EU non-humanitarian assistance is directed through the EUTF-MADAD. As mentioned, this fund focuses on education, livelihoods, health, socio-economic support, water and waste water infrastructure –and targets both refugees and their host communities. These are in the heart of SDGs. Additional projects are funded by the EIB. In total, there are 73 projects (European Investment Bank, 2023b), supported by the EIB ( European Investstement Bank , 2023a) and 37 projects supported by the EUTF-MADAD.

#### **6.2.1. The Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals**

Quantifying the impact of such projects is not uneasy task, however for the EUTF-MADAD a Results Framework is a main reference document for the results-oriented planning and management of projects and programs. Combined with indicators, it forms the basis for monitoring and evaluation the EU ‘resilience’ intervention. A results framework illustrates and visualizes the funding logic of a project or programme in different sectors (Particip Consortium, 2017).

This framework clarifies the relationships between the contributions of the various stakeholders, the activities, the intended short and medium-term results, and the medium and long-term objectives and impacts. Moreover, it has various indicators related to the activities, results, and objectives described in the results framework. These Key Performance Indicators (KPI) facilitate measurement and they are significant for a systematic assessment of the extent to which objectives have been implemented and achieved, through a comparison between target and actual performance (Particip Consortium, 2017).

Each report has KPI in different sectors including: Access to Basic Education, Higher Education - Resilience and Local Development, Health, Wash, and Protection. The figure below illustrates the KPI for Wash services sector as a model.

Table 3. KPI for Wash Services  
Source: Based on (Particip Consortium, 2017).

Sector	Results	Key performance Indicators
<b>5. Access To Wash Services</b>	5.1 Wash related <b>municipal infrastructure</b> improved	5.1.1 Number of facilities rehabilitated
		5.1.2 Number of facilities constructed including for water , water waste and solid water
	5.2 Improved access to potable <b>water supply</b> for vulnerable populations affected by the Syrian crisis	5.2.1 Number of individuals having access to safe water
		5.2.2 Water quality respects for standards potable water
		5.2.3 Number of beneficiaries who have experienced hygiene promotion session
	5.3 Volume of <b>local storage capacity</b> increased	5.3.1 Number of households connected
		5.3.1.1 Mt of transmission and distribution lines installed
5.3.2 Number of pumping station constructed		

As the model illustrates, these KPI covers different areas within specific field and the number of beneficiaries or facilities get benefits.

There are almost 10 annual reports till 2023 which have 41 KPI for the different sectors. Moreover, to make the measurement more aligned with the SDGs, there has been an adjustment as of the fourth results reports .The revision of the Trust Fund Results Framework has considered the wider EU Results Framework as well as the SDGs to ensure coherence of results and indicators (Particip Consortium, 2019).



According to these KPI, the targets are divided into two categories: I) Individual Beneficiaries: Persons/Households who benefit from EUTF-MADAD funded projects II) Services: Organizations/Facilities/Institutions who benefit from EUTF-MADAD funded projects as well as direct services provided. Again, in the report revision, even the target themes have been amended to target three categories including local capacities which include the numbers of personnel who have been trained in a certain sector. This new dimension helps to clarify the influence of ‘resilience’ regarding enhancing local capacities (Particip Consortium, 2019).

In term of the data for these KPIs, it depends on each implementing partners. For that purpose, the EUTF MADAD has developed a reporting template which is called Quarterly Information Notes (QINs), for the collection of these data. However, not all the implementing partners provide all the required data. This of course affects the accuracy of measuring the effect, but year by year there have been a decrease in the number of implementing partners who don’t provide these data. (Particip Consortium, 2017).

In addition, this Monitoring and Evaluation framework, which is in place since November 2017, employs three mechanisms; Independent and easy-to-deploy Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) mechanism, which is an external evaluation, available for each Trust Fund project; A database that is used as collection and information platform that is being developed as online tool; and Impact-focused evaluation on a number of sector/thematic priorities part of the Trust Fund portfolio (Particip Consortium, 2019).

Examining the Monitoring and Evaluation reports reveals the alignment between the EUTF-MADAD sectors and most of the SDGS. The EUTF-MADAD focuses on 6 sectors, each sector includes different activities as illustrated below:

- Access to Basic Education: it involves activities of formal education and schooling, non-formal education schemes, catch-up classes, as well as remedial and homework support activities.
- Higher education: it involves access to university, technical and vocational education in the region.

- Livelihoods<sup>4</sup>: it supports employability, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training programs, cash assistance and food related assistance for refugees, people in their local host communities
- Access to Health Services: It enhances primary health care, including consultations, vaccinations, medical examinations, emergency services, the provision of essential medicines, as well as health education activities.
- Water and Sanitation Services: supports access to safe water through improved infrastructures, and hygiene promotion sessions.
- Protection: It provides special treatment in the area of mental health and psychosocial support, mine clearance actions, and asylum improvements.
- Social Cohesion<sup>5</sup>: supports activities that promote social cohesion, such as peace building activities, peer information, outreach, information campaigns, and awareness sessions on various topics (External Monitoring and Evaluation For the European Regional Trust Fund in Respond to the Syrian Crisis, 2022).

The reason for illustrating these activities to clarify the cause for setting different key performance indicators and since the author could not include all these indicators the designed models included only the general target for each sector as will be illustrated.

When considering these activities, they reveal the alignment between the EUTF-MADAD, JRP and the SDGs. education and higher education sectors are aligned with the SDG 4; the health sector is aligned with the SDG 3 ; water and sanitation is aligned with SDG 6 ;livelihood is aligned with SDGs 1,2,8 and ; protection is aligned with SDG 10 and 16 and social cohesion is aligned with SDG 16.The following charts clarify the progress made by the EUTF-MADAD based on the Monitoring and Evaluation reports since 2017. These reports were published each six months. For this reason they present a short term evaluation .What is more, these monitoring reports do not compensate each project evaluation, but they works as a

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<sup>4</sup> In the first four reports this sector was called ‘resilience’ and local development, it was replaced by livelihood as livelihood is a broader umbrella that includes all activities that aim at development and ‘resilience’. Examining the Key performance indicators indicates they were not changed and thus does not affect the measurement in this dissertation.

<sup>5</sup> Social cohesion is closely linked to the protection sector, and they were integrated as one sector in the earlier reports. However, for better reporting and evaluating, special key performance indicators were set for projects mainly focusing on social cohesion.


broad framework for evaluation. Examining the EUTF-MADAD reports and the 3RP demonstrate the different level of progress on each sector. Before proceeding some Key definitions to understand the charts. The targets in the first two reports are categorized into two categories.<sup>6</sup>

- I) Individual Beneficiaries: Persons/Households who benefit from EUTF-MADAD funded projects
- II) Services: Organizations/Facilities/Institutions who benefit from EUTF-MADAD funded projects as well as direct services provided
- III) Local capacities. The strengthening of human capacities<sup>7</sup>

**6.2.1.1. Education**

The following charts clarify the progress since 2017 in the education sector:

Figure 14. Basic Education Progress in Jordan for Individual Beneficiaries  
 Source: Own edition based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)



<sup>6</sup> These Key definitions will be repeated all along the section, hence, they will not be repeated each time.

<sup>7</sup> The third target has been added as of the third report. The reason of that is to avoid duplication and to enhance the accuracy of measurement. This measurement would be crucial to understand the impact of resilience, especially as resilience objective to enhance local capacities

Figure 15. Basic Education Progress in Jordan for Services  
 Source: Own edition based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)




Figure 16. Basic Education Progress in Jordan for Local Capacities  
 Source: Own edition based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)




Figure 17. Higher Education Progress in Jordan for Individual Beneficiaries  
 Source: Own edition based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)





Figure 18. Higher Education Progress in Jordan for Services  
 Source: Own edition based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)



These two sectors are aligned with SDG 4, education. The primary education sector might be considered a successful story. There were tremendous efforts made by the Jordanian government, with the support of donors and humanitarian organizations, including the EUTF, regarding helping Syrian students in obtaining a good education. As a result, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of children enrolled in education ( Khater, 2023). This steady increase made Syrian children enrollment in Jordan beyond the world wide refugee enrollment as of 2020 (Human Right Watch , 2020).

What to be noticed is, despite the great increase in the primary education, unfortunately, the same can't be said about the secondary or higher education. This appears from the gap in the target set for each sector. A report by Human Right Watch in 2020 illustrates the big gap between the primary and secondary sectors with enrollment rates collapsing from nearly 90 percent in primary classes to just 25 to 30 percent in secondary school (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Despite the progress made by the Jordanian government, and the role of the Compact to achieve this, there are different barriers for Syrian refugees regarding the secondary and higher education. These include child labor poverty-driven, child marriage, unavailability of affordable school transportation, and government policies that limit access to education (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

These challenges illustrate the need to address them and the Compact review aimed to do that, in particular with regards of vocational training and the in-formal education. Yet, the increase

in enrollment for Syrians might be at the expense of the quality of education for Jordanians. As an interviewee from the Phoenix Center for Economic & Informatics Studies assert

What development for schools are we talking about? Our schools are over -crowded, lack the proper conditions for summer or winter, but you can't blame the government for that.

The pressure on the infrastructure contributes to these bad conditions. Despite of the government effort and support through the 3RP. The direct support for the refugees and host communities was almost 69,614,291 for the year 2022 (MoPIC, 2022), yet, with the decrease in the funding gap. There are fears over the sustaining of this service.

### 6.2.1.2. Health

Figure 19. Health Sector Progress in Jordan for Individual Beneficiaries  
Source: Own Edition based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)




Figure 20. Health Sector Progress in Jordan for Services  
Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)





Figure 21. Health Sector Progress in Jordan for Local Capacities  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)



As for health sector, aligned with SDG 3 good health and well being, there is also seem a slow progress in term of local capacities and infrastructure, yet there is a progress in term of beneficiaries. However, to be able to understand the reason, different aspects to be considered.

First of all, this slow progress is because of the increased new actions in this sector. Second, Covid 19 intensified the need for these new actions and that made Jordan capable to respond and decrease the impact of the pandemic between the Syrian refugees. In that respect, Jordan was one of the first country to guarantee the vaccination to refugees ( UNHCR, 2021b). The EUTF-MADAD support was crucial. In 2021, The EU has committed €43 million, to support the World Health Organization’s (WHO) efforts to strengthen Jordan’s primary health care services, including expanding access to quality immunization services for Jordanians and refugees (Delegation of the European Union to Jordan, 2022).

Directing the efforts toward the vaccination of those refugees indicates that Jordan is not denying those refugees' rights in having health care and trying to ensure that they have the same right as Jordanians. In addition, the decrease in funding for the JRP has not led the government to decrease its support for this crucial sector. From all the fund allocated through JRP in 2022, this sector was the fourth one well-funded (MoPIC, 2022).

More importantly, the government policy on Syrian refugees’ access to health care services illustrates the need to target high rate of beneficiaries at the expense of local capacities and infrastructure. This policy has changed over the last 10 years. At the beginning of the crisis,

the Syrian refugees’ access to public health services was free of charge, and in 2014 it granted access at the same rate as for Jordanians, as of 2018, the policy was reversed, with Syrian refugees obliged to pay 80% of the rates paid by foreign persons at public health facilities. Finally, since 2020, the Ministry of Health has announced the reduction in the rates for Syrian refugees’ healthcare from the foreigner to the non-Jordanian, subsidized rate (World Health Organization, 2023). Although this rate is less than for foreigners, but it remains high for refugees and they could not cover it (UNHCR, 2023). For this reason, targeting more beneficiaries is fundamental for the EURF.

**6.2.1.3. Wash and Sanitation**

Figure 22. Wash Sector Progress in Jordan for Individual Beneficiaries  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)




Figure 23. Wash Sector Progress in Jordan for Services  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)







Figure 24. Wash Sector Progress in Jordan for Local Capacities  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)



Water is the root of life and is aligned with SDG 6, but it is one of the most challenging sector. Jordan is the World's second poorest country in water per capita (Al-Junaidi, 2021), this even makes it harder to provide enough clean water for locals before refugees. What is more, taking in consideration the big target that has been set, can also explain the slow progress that has been achieved.

Further, Jordan's challenges do not only arise from shortages in water resources, but additional challenges include water theft and leakages. In Jordan, 40% to 60% of the water supply is approximately lost in the network. For this reason, directing support towards infrastructure is influential. Inefficient administrative processes, outdated infrastructure and inadequate maintenance are the main causes of this huge waste (Fanack Water, 2022). For this reason, the focus of the EUTF, JRP and the EIB is on in enhancing local capacities and institutions in this field.

The work of the EIB in this sector cannot be separated from the efforts of the EUTF. The EIB has provided more than EUR 708 million for water investment across Jordan. These contribute to water sector reforms and improve infrastructure in Jordan. This aims to enhance water efficiency, reduce water losses and save fresh water (European Investement Bank, 2019).

These are not the only obstacles to be addressed, an additional challenge is related to the refugees' lifestyle when it comes to water use. Some considers that refugees are wasting the Jordanian water resources because of their different life style. While Jordanians have rationed water since the 1980s, refugees from relatively water-rich Syria lack the basic habits of water

saving. Jordanian families wash clothes and do dishes, and store enough to get through the week. Yet, refugees are not accustomed to such a life style. This made several agencies including the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to raise awareness campaigns to enhance water conservation strategies, with the support of the EUTF (Hussein et al., 2020)

**6.2.1.4. Livelihood**

Figure 25. Livelihood Sector Progress in Jordan for Individual Beneficiaries  
Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)





Figure 26. Livelihood Sector Progress in Jordan for Services  
Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)



Promoting livelihood is one of the main objectives of ‘resilience’. Supporting those refugees to achieve their self-reliance, despite of all the challenges, is a difficult task. Livelihood sector, in the EUTF understanding, is aligned with SDG 1 to fight poverty and 8 decent work and economic growth. Yet, in the JRP, it has a broader framework. As it aims to address also food

security, SDG 3. Considering the big budget allocated to this sector from the JRP, the current values achieved in this sector, especially with the surge in the SMEs, beside the progress through the Compact, are all indicators for progress.

From other perspective, the Jordanian policy itself hinders their self-reliance, with limited access to certain sectors. Not to mention the low wages, the increase of their food insecurity. The latter became a real threat considering the World Food Programme reduction of its cash assistance for all refugees. Those living outside camps started to get \$15(JOD 10) from \$21(JOD 15), and for Syrian refugees in the camps a reduced cash assistance of \$21 (JOD 15) per person per month, down from the previous amount of \$32 (JOD 23). In addition to a gradually exclusion of approximately 50,000 individuals from the assistance to prioritize the poorest families (WFP, 2023). Thus, the result in this sector is a controversial one.

Another challenge that might hinder progress for achieving the SDGs, as an interviewee from the UNHCR asserted, is actually the difficulty in bridging the gap between the humanitarian – development nexus. The urgent need for protection and basic needs make the priority for providing these services. The same interviewee from the UNHCR, from the Unit of the livelihood and economic inclusion which was established in Jordan after the Compact, asserted that

We are doing a good job in this sector, but we are afraid that we have to stop some of our projects, due to lack of funding, in particular, in the Cash for work Program.

Cash for work has been playing a significant role in enhancing self-reliance for refugees and local communities. These employment programs offer refugees and the local population an opportunity to gain some money. At the same time, these programs render vital public services that boost the general welfare of everyone in the host region (GIZ, 2019).

Although these programs are not capable to cover all Syrian refugees, but they managed to help thousands of Syrians. One of these programs is run by the UN Women in Jordan. Since 2012, The UN Women runs three ‘Oases’ safe spaces for women and girls in Za’atari. These ‘Oases’ receive almost 5,000 visitors per month, of which close to 1,000 are regular users. The spaces provide economic opportunities, protection referral services, and day -care services. Cash-for-Work opportunities include tailoring school uniforms, recycling UNHCR tents into

reusable bags, crafts-making, teaching, and working as beauticians, and childcare professionals (UN Women Jordan, 2015). For this reason, it is crucial to sustain funding for such programs as they enhance self-reliance and enable refugees to live in a dignified life.

### 6.2.1.5. Protection

Figure 27. Protection Sector Progress in Jordan for Individual Beneficiaries  
Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)




Figure 28. Protection Sector Progress in Jordan for Services  
Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)





Figure 29. Protection Sector Progress in Jordan for Local Capacities  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)



Protection sector is distinguished from all other sectors. First, it is the only sector where the progress has been beyond achieving the target in term of individuals and services. One main reason for this is the focused actions that this sector aims to achieve through the EUTF. Unlike other sectors the specific actions in this sector contributes to such a progress. Second, this is one of the sectors where nonalignment understanding between the EUTF and JRP appears. Although both understandings are aligned with SDG 10, reduced inequalities and 16, peace and justice, in the 3RP this understanding is much broader. The JRP protection sector focuses on ensuring access to basic rights, including the right to seek asylum and access to registration and civil documentation; mitigating and decreasing the risks and consequences of Sex Gender Based Violence, ensuring that emergency child protection interventions are strengthened; and exploring third country resettlement options.

These broad activities incline that this sector required most of the funding allocated through the 2022 JRP. It was the second sector biggest funded with a total budget of almost \$ 222 million out of the \$ 760 million allocated (MoPIC, 2022). On the other side, for the EUTF, this sector mainly focuses on providing psychosocial and Gender Based Violence related services, aligned with SDG 3 and 16 (External Monitoring and Evaluation For the European Regional Trust Fund in Respond to the Syrian Crisis, 2022). This apparent understanding might appear challenging, but it does not seem the case. The EUTF focuses on services beyond JRP and this is very important.

One reason for that is because the refugees have been suffering from different kinds of challenges accompanied the war and Covid-19. Reports have indicated high rates of mental health symptoms for refugees, the psychological effects of quarantine and social distancing,

isolation, loss of income and fear due to the COVID-19 pandemic have worsened existing mental health (World Health Organization, 2023) . Moreover, there is a lack of awareness among refugees of available health services.

For this reason, the EUTF has directed its support toward these specific actions and building local capacities. This can explain the decrease of beneficiaries as a target, with the focus in the local capacities but not the local organizations. As reports have demonstrated there is a number of international and local organizations implementing programmes in Jordan, such as Nour Hussein Foundation and the Jordan River Foundation. However, the locals are not fully trained and do not understand the full range of services available in terms of mental health and psychosocial support for refugees. In that regards, the EUTF works to provide training that serve to include the mental health component in their work (IOM, 2017).

**6.2.1.6. Social Cohesion**

Figure 30. Social Cohesion Sector Progress in Jordan for Individual Beneficiaries  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)




Figure 31. Social Cohesion Sector Progress in Jordan for Services  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)





Figure 32. Social Cohesion Sector Progress in Jordan for Local Capacities  
 Source: Own Edition Based on (EUTF in Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2023)



As illustrated earlier, for the EU, social cohesion, which is aligned with SDG 16 peace and justice, is crucial to preserve Jordan stability. Prioritizing social cohesion makes it necessary to direct special projects to that sector and to separate it after it has been integrated within the protection sector in the first monitoring reports. This gives a better understanding of what has been implemented in that field. The progress in that respect whether for individuals, institutions or local capacities is obvious and this illustrates how both Jordan and the EU give priority to social cohesion.

To that end, many initiatives aim to address this issue. In education, for instance, there are many. One of these initiatives is Generations for Peace. Originally, the program has been

running in Jordan since 2007 and across all 12 governorates are involved in this programme. It engages children, youth, and adults with various peace-building tools, from Sport for Peace to Arts-, Advocacy-, and Dialogue for Peace. However, in the context of Syrian refugee crisis, it has set many informal after-school activities that bring Syrian and Jordanian students together, with the aim of reducing violence at schools. (Salem & Morrice, 2019).

In addition, to decrease the competition between refugees and local communities, Jordan requires aid organizations to target both refugees and host communities. Adding to that, the official approval for any project needs targeting at least 30% vulnerable host (Jordanian) under the 'resilience' pillar, and at least 30% refugees under the refugee pillar (Beaujouan & Rasheed, 2020).

From other perspective, the increased target achieved should not be taken as a guarantee for a secured social cohesion in Jordan. Reports have indicated a modest decrease in overall social cohesion in Jordan (Salem & Morrice, 2019; David et al., 2020). This might also increase with the absence of political solution for the crisis with a hope for their return. Thus, this progress toward promoting social cohesion might be reversed, if the future risks were not taken in consideration.

#### **6.2.1.7. Energy**

While the EUTF's work is restricted to the previous sectors, the EU works in building 'resilience' has another instruments. The EIB and EBRD are crucial instruments to support the SDG 7, the energy sector. Supporting the energy sector, especially with the influx of refugees, can't not be less important than supporting water. As Jordan is among the highest in the world in dependency on foreign energy sources, with 96% of the country's energy needs coming from imported oil and natural gas from neighboring Middle Eastern countries (energy pedia, 2018) . Hence, more green and sufficient energy is a priority for Jordan.

The EIB and EBRD banks efforts are directed toward supporting Jordan transition to a greener economy. For this reason, the EBRD, which started investing in Jordan in 2012, has provided more than €1.9 billion in financing through 67 projects across the country. The Green Economy Financing Facility programme (GEFF) in Jordan is its latest effort to support the country's transition to a greener economy ( Zgheib, 2022).



The GEF programme is established to address climate mitigation and adaptation challenges by supporting micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and support households to invest in green and innovative technologies that promote energy, water solutions alongside renewable energy ( Zgheib, 2022).

These efforts, along other efforts by other donors, made Jordan capable to respond to the refugee need regarding energy. Beyond that, in term of the humanitarian relief, Jordan presents a model for providing energy for refugees. Since 2017, Jordan has found an important energy solution for thousands of refugees. This solution has enabled Jordan to fully powered electricity derived from solar panels for two large Syrian refugee camps in the country, Zaatari and Azraq ( Pujol-Mazzini, 2017) .

These efforts have somehow alleviated the pressure on Jordan's energy resources. Further, access to electricity has given a sense of dignity, hygiene, security, comfort, and stability in Jordan's refugee camps. In addition, the planting of these solar systems has also empowered people to start small businesses, provide electronic business transactions, and gain new skills. For instance, the Zaatari solar plant has given hands-on skills to 75 refugees who worked on installing the plant. While many of them will be able to keep their jobs to manage the solar plant, others were able to get solar-related jobs outside of the refugee camps ( Pujol-Mazzini, 2017).

Such transmission, besides bringing crucial energy to the residents of the camp, decreases annual carbon dioxide emissions from the camp by 13,000 metric tons per year, equivalent to 30,000 barrels of oil. Such a green transition is much needed in such a very small crowded area. Not to mention also the s annual savings of around US\$5.5m, which Jordan can now reinvest in vital humanitarian assistance for the camp ( King, 2023).

What is more, these efforts are in parallel with Jordan ambition to increase its dependency on renewable energy. The country has managed to do so in the last years. In 2022, renewable energy accounted for 27% of Jordan's energy production, compared to 68% from gas power plants. By comparison, renewable energy accounted for 24% of Jordan's energy production in 2020. This is beyond Jordan target which is set on 15% for 2020 ( Energy & Utilities, 2023).

This section demonstrates that the impact of building ‘resilience’ in achieving SDGs is a controversial issue in Jordan and varied from one sector to another. This analysis supports the claim of different interviewees from different sectors in Jordan. In this regard, there has not been consensus among these interviewees regarding the role of building ‘resilience’ by the EU in Jordan. While officials from the EU Delegation on Jordan, the UNHCR and the MoL have asserted the significance role of the EU in Jordan in promoting these SDGs, in particular in the field of education and energy sector, other interviewees from the civil society in Jordan, academics or from the Economic and Social Council in Jordan don’t agree with these claims, they even went further to say according to one interviewee,

What kind of development are we talking about? Look at the public schools, public transportation, and public health centers in Jordan in different cities, especially in the northern or southern of Jordan, can we say there is development?

Considering the governmental, the EU, or UNHCR perspective, it is totally understandable and it is not different from other donors or government claims. These try to present a picture showing their work is making progress for the refugees and local communities. Thus, sustain funding through JRP and EUTF is crucial to promote SDGs, especially in the sectors where progress has been made, otherwise, the results would be reversed with a greater devastating circumstances for those refugees and the host communities alike.

### **6.3. ‘Resilience’ and the EU's security**

Understanding the impact of building ‘resilience’ on the EU's security is a challenging task in term of quantifying it. The different complex dynamics, within and beyond the EU, makes the EUs security is the total sum of all these dynamics and the result of their interactive together. The scope of this dissertation is not broad enough to consider all these dynamics that is why, the analysis is based mainly on qualitative data.

In a rapidly evolving security environment, following the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, another question has risen whether these developments have led to different priorities for the EU. The changing in the priorities appears when considering the launch of the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defense of 2022. It was launched following the Russian invasion to define what the EU wants to do to strengthen itself from different threats

(Cyber Risk GmbH, 2022). In this policy, ‘resilience’ is still presented as a main objective for the EU. However, some scholars argue that even with the emphasis on ‘resilience’ by this policy, it highlights that the EU and its members being secured depends on being protected from external threats that affect their internal security. More precisely, ‘resilience’ only refers to “the EU” ‘resilience’, the ‘resilience’ of member states, which needs to be bolstered to respond to diverse crises and threats (Bargués, 2022).

During an interview conducted with a researcher from a research at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) when asked if building ‘resilience’ of the EU neighborhood is still a priority, he states

I think the crises the EU are witnessing have highlighted the need for strengthening the EU internal ‘resilience’, so that we can contribute to strengthen other partner’s ‘resilience’. If you yourself is vulnerable, how are you expected to strengthen others’ ‘resilience’?

The need to strengthen the EU ‘resilience’ itself is not emphasized only by the EU Strategic Compass of 2022 that aims to counter different challenges, protect its citizens, and enhance its strategic autonomy to become a stronger global partner (Cyber Risk GmbH, 2022). Moreover, there has been the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This is a temporary instrument which makes a huge amount of grants and loans, €723 billion, available for member states to emerge stronger and more resilient from the current crises (European Commission, 2023).

However, this shift does not imply that the EU building ‘resilience’ is insufficient, on the contrary, it just implies changing the priority, as this is required to be a better actor in global governance. Understanding the impact of the EU building ‘resilience’ in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, in particular, has contributed to secure the EU border, to different levels.

In regard of the EU's objectives of securing its borders, keeping refugees closer to their home, and tackling irregular migration, quantifying the impact of external migration governance for each agreement separately is quite difficult. However, data from the European Union Agency for Asylum and from Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency helps to give a clearer view, as the figures below illustrate

Figure 33. Illegal Border Crossings from Third Countries by Thousands

Source: (Frontex, 2023).





Figure 34. Asylum applicants to the EU till 2022 by Thousands

Source: Based on (Council of the EU, 2023)<sup>8</sup>



These figures illustrate there was a dramatic decrease in the first years following the deal, both in the number of the asylum seekers and the irregular migrants. However, determining the

<sup>8</sup> As of 2020, these application numbers do not include applications made in the UK (following its withdrawal from the EU).


causality link between the EU building ‘resilience’ in Jordan in response to the Syrian refugee crisis with these figures is quite difficult. These figures do not represent Syrian asylum seekers only, rather, all non- EU asylum seekers applicants or irregular migrants. Further, this dramatic decrease is not the result of one factor, but, there are different factors contribute to such a drop. These factors include the EU external migration governance through deals like the EU-Turkey Deal ( Terry, 2021) or its deal with Mali in 2016 to facilitate the return of migrants to the African country (Höije, 2016).

In addition, countries in the Western Balkans also closed access to migrants, fencing a well-trod land route into Europe ( Terry, 2021). Yet, these charts also illustrate there has been a gradual increase, both in the number of illegal migrants and asylum seeker applicants. Following the closure due to Corona, these numbers started to increase.

This gradual increase with a lack of agreement to reform the EU policies have made the forefront countries start looking to secure their own borders. Other external agreements, like the Tunisian- EU memorandum of understanding of July 2023 were concluded with the same objectives of the EU-Turkey deal. As Tunisia became the top country of departure, such agreement aims to reduce irregular migration ( Doyel et al., 2023). This might also indicate the success of the EU-Turkey Deal.

In numerical terms, this success might be proved for the EU-Turkey Deal. The data is clear. At the peak of the crisis, Italy and Greece were asylum seekers’ main arrival points in Europe, with more than 861,000 arrivals in Greece in 2015. The number fell to 36,000 the year after the deal. Not to mention also, the number of dead and missing migrants in the Aegean Sea. This number decreased from 441 cases in 2016 to 102 in 2020.

Figure 35. Migrant Arrivals in Greece by Thousands, 2014-19  
Source: Based on ( Terry, 2021)



In other direction, the success of the EU building ‘resilience’ as a response to the Syrian refugee case varies between the different host countries. As an interviewee from the German University of Jordan comments

If I want to make a scale, with no doubt, the EU-Turkey Deal is more successful to play the role of a buffer zone than Jordan. While Jordan building ‘resilience’ works better than Lebanon.

Yet, such agreements were under fire. The transactional nature of these deals was met with sharp criticisms. Some called them “dirty deals”, comparing them to “horse trading” at the price of “the rights and dignity of some of the world’s most vulnerable people. As for the EU-Turkey Deal, the detainee centers in the Greek islands where criticized (kerisci, 2021). This heavy criticism made Greece faces possible court over 'prison-like' EU-funded migration centers ( Nielsen, 2023). When it comes to the Tunisian case, the inhuman Tunisian policy attempted scholars to call it another harmful deal after the EU-Turkey Deal ( Doyel et al., 2023).

In addition, there have been shortcomings, in terms of implementation, from both sides. Turkish officials complained about the slow disbursement of funding, and the inadequacy of the relocation scheme. The EU relocated almost 25,000 Syrians who were in Turkey, but this falls to meet the 72,000 upper limit in the original deal (Rankin, 2020). As well as its failure to liberalize visas for Turkish nationals and re-energize Turkey's accession process. On the other side, the EU leaders were disappointed by the Turkish President Erdoğan's repeated threats to "open the borders" and let refugees stream towards Europe, as he did in 2020 (kerisci, 2021). This indicates that as the root causes of forced migration is not treated, the success in any measure including the externalization of migration governance can only be seen as a short term remedy, what more is needed is dealing with the causes rather than the effects.

Nevertheless, the implication for such deals is not only restricted to the numerical data, but what has been accomplished for these refugees. The 6 billion euros, that have been allocated, supported a variety of programs and projects. These range from cash assistance for the most vulnerable refugees, to improve refugee access to public health services and education. These have been in parallel to programs aiming to improve social cohesion between refugees and their host communities, as well as expand access to livelihood opportunities. The success of these projects for those refugees seems greater during the first years of the deal. A 2019 survey showed that almost 89% of Syrians feel that they are "completely/almost completely" and "partially" integrated with their host community (kerisci, 2021).

Thus, the success of such a deal is a controversial, but considering the fact that a possible draft out for a revised statement was presented in September 2023 may also support such a claim (European Stability Initiative, 2023). This revised statement aims to address the shortcomings and builds on the successes of the first Statement.

As for Jordan building 'resilience' impact on the EU, getting a numerical data for that was difficult, but as a policy officer from the European External Action Service, MENA Division, Co-desk for Lebanon and Jordan comments

Jordan cooperative approach has enabled us to harmonize our efforts in line with Jordan policies so that we can best support the refugees and the local communities. This in turn has been reflected on those refugees integration and the country social cohesion.

This indirectly contributes to keep those refugees closer to their home. However, this does not incline that building ‘resilience’ as an external migration governance leads to secure the EU borders or safe its borders from a new wave of Syrian refugees. The rise of anti-migration sentiment in the host countries , among the locals and policy makers alike, the low tendency of returning back to Syria and the absence of political solution in the future may lead to this, as figure 34 illustrates, by 2022 there has been a 52% increase.in the number of asylum seekers to the EU. Almost 40% of all applications in the EU member states in 2022 were Syrians, Afghans, Turks and Venezuelans. In addition, the latest asylum trends reveals that Syrians lodged the most applications in July 2023, nearly 15,000 in total which is up by 63% in comparison to the same time last year (Council of the EU, 2023).

#### **6.4. Building ‘Resilience’ and Jordan’s Security**

Going back to the main question of this dissertation that aims to examine the role of the EU’s building ‘resilience’ (Maintenance, Marginal or Renewal) and its relation to Jordan’s and the EU’s national security. Determining such a causality is a challenging task. Causality is rooted in ascertaining whether changes in outcomes (dependent variable) are based on variance of certain factors (independent variables). In social science, the task is even harder where measurements is never an easy task. In this research, both ‘resilience’ (the independent variable) and security (the dependent variable) are abstract concepts and difficult to measure.


The literature review signifies that measuring ‘resilience’ is very challenging. While ‘resilience’ has been adopted by different organizations or states, there is lack of common analytical framework for measurement. This has led to the establishment of Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (RM-TWG) in 2013, under the supervision of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP). The RM-TWG underscored that it is challenging to come up with a universal approaches of measuring ‘resilience’ (European Comission, 2017a)



For this reasons, various institutions use different approaches to measure it, including Resilience Index Measurement Analysis (RIMA) by FAO; TANGO’s consultant ‘resilience’ framework; Livelihoods Change over time (LCOT) model by TU" University; capacity-focused approaches by Oxfam, Community Based Resilience Analysis (CoBRA) and a Structurally Integrated Metrics for Resilience (SIMI-R) approach, among others (European Comission, 2017a).

In order to be able to relate the EU building ‘resilience’ to security, the author used principal components analysis to design a chart of ‘resilience’ capacity variables, based on the USAID Simplified Resilience Measurement Framework. Under this framework, ‘resilience’ is defined as “the ability of people, households, communities, countries and systems to absorb, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.” This definition describes the relationship between three distinct elements that are in combination form the basis of a ‘resilience’ measurement framework – ‘resilience’ capacities, shocks and stresses, and well-being outcomes

Figure 36. Simplified Resilience Measurement Framework  
 Source: Based on (REAL, 2002)




In this framework, ‘resilience’ capacities represent the potential for proactive measures to be taken in order to deal with shocks or stresses. These capacities according to Amy Carpenter are what any social system needs to possess and she calls them “enablers”, as they enable the system to be resilient (Carpenter, 2014). The ultimate goal of enhancing these capacities, is to make household, communities or states capable to do better and withstand shocks and stressors.

These capacities represent supporting resources (REAL, 2002) .The supporting resources include physical capital (land, labor, livestock, water, and other assets), human capital, social capital, and financial capital, among others. Services include basic services such as education, health; social safety net, among others. Moreover, well-functioning institutions, governmental structures and policies will help individuals, households and communities to be resilient in one-way or another (FAO, 2015).

This framework, as the EU, assumes that shocks can easily affect various pillars of wellbeing of less-resilient households or communities than their more-resilient ones. Moreover, it assumes that less-resilient households or communities may not be easily access to basic services than more-resilient counterparts (REAL, 2002).

Thus, as the EUTF and JRP work to enhance these capacities, the quantitative and qualitative data will be used to relate these capacities to security. However, it must be noticed that since the dissertation main focus is Jordan national security, the chart is the result of the analysis of ‘resilience’ capacities on the national level and not on the individual or communities level. This means the analysis of the monitoring and evaluation reports of the EUTF, JRP or other EU instruments. The reason not to choose a specific sample of refugees, within or outside camps, is the fear that the chosen sample might be widely representative. The researcher was not able to conduct a field work to cover Jordan as whole, as it needs a team of researcher and more resources, unfortunately, beyond the researcher capacity. Thus, I relied heavily on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data available to design a model linking these capacities and security sectors as the chart illustrates

Figure 37. The Relation between ‘Resilience’ Capacities and National Security Sectors  
 Source: Own Edition



By examining Buzan classification and the EU building ‘resilience’ capacities, we will be able to see the connection between them. Buzan classifies sectors of security analysis as follows: military security and political security which is the organizational stability of states, systems of government and ideologies that give them legitimacy. It refers to protecting the sovereignty of the government and political system and the safety of society from unlawful internal and external pressures; economic security meaning access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to maintain adequate levels of welfare and state power ,create jobs and fighting poverty; societal security is concerned with sustainability, within satisfactory levels conditions of evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, customs, religious and national identity, and finally ,environmental security relates to the possible ecological threats that are results of human impact on the planet such as global warming, pollution, and the ozone layer (Buzan, 1991b).

Jordan is a heavy dependent country on foreign aid. In that respect, its stability, political and economic security can never be taken in separation from the donors support, including the EU.

The EU's Macro- financial assistance has a key role in reducing Jordan's Central Government debt which stood at 114% to GDP in 2022 (The World Bank, 2022). In addition, it enhances the government ability to provide essential services which is crucial for its legitimacy and efficient governance.

One of the most important results of the Compact and building 'resilience' is supporting Jordan to provide these services, in particular, in term of livelihood and education. As for the first one, as mentioned the institutional flexibility allowed for adaptation that enhanced the number work permits. While In 2017, only 46,000 work permits were issued, this figure has increased dramatically to become 344,471 as of January 2023. (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situations, 2023a).

Issuing such a huge number of work permits leads to a great sense of relief for refugees. Having work permits would save them from deportation, if caught working illegally. More significantly, this increase is not only related to the number of issued work permits, but also in term of the type of the work permit. There has been an increase in the flexible work permits. This type allows them to change from one employer to another or from one sector to another. Although issuing working permits does not mean that all those Syrians are working and they have decent jobs, but this indicates that Jordan is trying to compile with its commitments despite all the challenges it has.

Adding to that, stimulating economic growth is a key issue to enhance economic security. In this matter, the RoO scheme has increased Jordan exports to the EU, with a total value of €56 million in 2019, in comparison with 19.2 million in 2018 ( Al Nawas , 2020). From other angle, the EU has been working to deal with another real challenge that hinders economic growth in Jordan. This challenge is represented by the high rate of employment in the public sector. The public sector has been traditionally one of the largest employers in the Jordanian Labor Force. Moreover, it has increased from 39 percent in 2010 to 42 percent in 2016. Factors including Jordanian policies and Jordanian peoples' perception about public employment contribute to such an increase. People prefer public employment as it is more secure and there are less working hours (Assaad & Salemi, 2018).

For this reason, the EU has paid a greater attention to enhance the role of the private sector. For the development of the private sector, the EU prioritizes SMEs, investing over €200 million in 1,300 companies over a decade. Further, a new project “Innovation for enterprise Growth and Jobs” was initiated in 2020 to encourage private sector innovation through partnerships (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2023b).

As for education, the EU support is essential. The outcome of the Compact, the JRP and EUTF is that, as of June 2022, 145,644 Syrian children school age were enrolled in public schools out of the 257,038. This constitutes 60% of the whole registered Syrian children (UNHCR, 2022).

The ability of the government to provide services including health, education, water or energy is in the heart of effective governance, otherwise, the country will face unrests. In fact, Jordan was not saved from those unrests, specially, at Zaatari camp. In that camp, refugees have been mobilized in protests against the degrading conditions and lack of services ( Clarke, 2017) .

The fact that Jordan managed to protect itself from the consequences of the 2011 Arab uprisings and those unrests reveal the EU important role. In 2011, political opposition movement called Movement “Hirak in Arabic ” mobilized hundreds of contentious protests demanding for political and economic reforms ( Yom, 2014). Jordan managed to conduct, if partially, these reforms and they were the lifeline that saved the domino effect of the Arab uprisings. In this respect, the EU direct budget support helps to conduct those reforms. The EU last grant is just one example of this support. This grant consisted of two smaller grants. The first grant provides 10 million euros for the "Support for democratic reforms in Jordan" programme. It aims to develop political life in Jordan, in line with the political modernization plan and the goals of the Royal Jordanian Commission to Modernize the Political System, constitutional and legislative reforms (Jordan Times, 2023c).

The second grant of 15 million euros is in line with the Economic Modernization Vision and its 2023-2025 executive programme, as well as the public sector modernization roadmap. It aims to support the government's efforts to enhance institutional performance and efficiency in to improve the quality of public services provided to citizens (Jordan Times, 2023c).

What is more, the EU role in supporting Jordan borders control has been essential since the beginning of the crisis. Jordan's border with Syria is 378 kilometers long, mostly made of desert and rough area. The crisis in Syria has accelerated the pressure on the infrastructure and human resources at the border. Since 2013, through the EU-funded projects, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) provided technical support to the Jordanian border authorities with establishing border posts. This allowed Jordan forces to respond to humanitarian and security challenges at the north-eastern border with Syria. Moreover, long-term concerns has increased the need for capacity building and training. Thus, the EU officers engaged in roundtable discussions and training programs to do that (IOM, 2017).

Over and above that, in recent years, following Jordan reopening its border with Syria, a new challenge has plagued Jordan's border. An organized, accelerating, and increasingly violent drug smuggling has become Jordan's “new war ” ( Al Sharif, 2022).

Tackling this new threat has become a war with all what this word means. Daily stories in the media regarding attempts for drug trafficking. In August 2023 only, the Anti-Narcotics Department (AND) stated that it handled 636 cases and arrested 1,094 individuals, including dealers and high-risk individuals. The seized substances included half a million Captagon tablets, 4,000 other narcotic tablets, 7.4 kg of crystal meth, 13 kg of marijuana, 2 kg of synthetic cannabis, and 600 grams of synthetic cannabis powder, along firearms (Jordan News, 2023c).

For this reason, Jordan needs as much support to tackle such a threat. The EU's work and experience in dealing with organized crimes can be a great help. In that respect, projects like the "Strengthening International Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, with a focus on Organized Crime and Terrorism in Jordan" helped Jordan on several levels. At the legislative level, it supported the authorities in the drafting of the National Law on International Judicial Cooperation. At the technical level, the project has supported different units from the Ministry of Justice, the General Prosecution Office, the Cybercrime Unit under the Criminal Investigation Department, and the State Security Court through a series of specialized capacity building. At the operational level, the project has advanced institutional capacities through the development of software and IT solutions for relevant

institutions as part of the digital transformation vision of the Government and the Justice Sector Strategy (UN, 2023).

These efforts do not eliminate the risks Jordan facing but, such new threats need new technologies, and with such projects from the EU, the Jordanian forces can enhance their capacities and secure Jordan borders.

While the drug war is a man-made crisis, another emerging challenge faces Jordan, as the rest of the world, is climate change and global warming. The UN Secretary General António Guterres stated that the 'Era of global boiling has arrived,' (Niranjan, 2023), Jordan is not isolated from the globe and in August 2023, Marka, a city in Amman the capital, saw the highest temperature ever recorded since climate records began 100 years ago (Jordan News, 2023b).

Further, Jordan is the 2nd water poorest country per capita in the world (Al-Junaidi, 2021) and this increase will accelerate drought and water shortages. For this reason, directed cooperative efforts are much needed. The EIB and EBRD are crucial instruments to support Jordan transition to clean energy.

The EIB and EBRD efforts are directed toward supporting Jordan transition to a greener economy, as illustrated in the energy section. These efforts, along other efforts by other donors, made Jordan capable to respond to the refugee need regarding energy. Since 2017, Jordan has found an important energy solution for thousands of refugees. This solution has enabled Jordan to fully powered electricity derived from solar panels for two large Syrian refugee camps in the country, Zaatari and Azraq (Pujol-Mazzini, 2017). Such transmission, decreases annual carbon dioxide emissions from the camp by 13,000 metric tons per year, equivalent to 30,000 barrels of oil. Such a green transition is much needed in such a very small crowded area (King, 2023).

What is more, these efforts are in parallel with Jordan ambition to increase its dependency on renewable energy. The country has managed to do so lately. In 2022, renewable energy accounted for 27% of Jordan's energy production. This is beyond Jordan target which is set on 15% for 2020 (Energy & Utilities, 2023).

The EU directed effort in solid waste management and clean water have been a corner stone for providing water, especially in the northern governorates of Jordan ,where the refugees are concentrated. An example for such an effort is the EU co-funds the Wadi Al-Arab Water System II, a water supply infrastructure investment that improves drinking water availability for the Northern Governorates of Jordan. Currently, 1.1 million people are getting benefit directly, and 800,000 indirectly, from improved water supply, including enhanced ‘resilience’ to extreme droughts and climate change (Press and information team of the Delegation to JORDAN, 2023a).

What is to be noticed here enhancing one ‘resilience’ capacity may lead to enhancing more than one sector of security. Water, for instance, enhances economic security and environmental security at the same time. This explains the priority shift while conducting some projects, with taking in consideration for the urgent circumstances that might emerge.

Keeping that in mind, the EU new Global Europe: Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument which covers the EU cooperation with all third countries from 2021, has allocated €3.18 billion for rapid response actions. In addition, it directed a “cushion” of unallocated funds of €9.53 billion that could top-up for rapid response mechanism and to address unpredictable circumstances, new needs or emerging challenges (European Commission , 2022).

A fundamental principle for Jordan and the EU is social cohesion and protection. Being a destination for migrant workers and refugees, preserving social cohesion is crucial for its security. Jordan has been directing its effort to preserve its status quo.

The Compact, the JRP and the EUTF all attributed to do this. These efforts that include decreasing competition between refugees and local communities, enhancing activities targeting social cohesion and raising awareness among refugees and local communities, among others are leading to this result.

Yet, this social cohesion should not be taken for granted, as what happened in 2014 with protests and tension between refugees and police officers ( Clarke, 2017). Moreover, the increase of the funding gap and its implication on their social protection, the absence of



political solution for the crisis may lead to same scenario of 2014. This is why Jordan and the EU officials emphasize on the importance of supporting Jordan, by deeds more than words.

Accordingly, the EU efforts as a main donor in enhancing these ‘resilience’ capacities contribute to Jordan national security, however, determining this causality, which is rooted in ascertaining whether changes in outcomes (dependent variable) are based on variance of certain factors (independent variables) would be incomplete without considering other factors that contribute to Jordan's security.

Jordan moderate policy makes it a great ally for many regional and international actors. The U.S. is a key security provider for Jordan (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The U.S. is Jordan’s single largest provider of bilateral assistance. Its annual direct support amounts to \$1.65 billion. (U.S. Department of State, 2022). To highlight the significance role of Jordan, it is worth mentioning that Jordan is the third country receiving the largest amount of the U.S. foreign aid, preceded only by Afghanistan (\$4.89 billion) and Israel (\$3.3 billion). While Afghanistan receives this share as the country is recovering from war, Jordan and Israel receive it as a strategically important partners to the U.S. (World Population Review, 2023a).

Another key indicator that signifies the crucial role Jordan plays comes from their historical Free Trade Agreement. This agreement entered into force as of 2000. Under the agreement all Jordanian goods enter the U.S. are duty free. Such an agreement is one of the first ever negotiated with an Arab state and is only the fourth free trade agreement the U.S. has negotiated (Organization of American States, 2000). The result of such an agreement was a great benefit for the economy where Jordan exports surplus was 1.4 billion in 2022 (Office of the United States Trade Representative , 2022).

In addition, there is the direct security assistance from Defense Department Appropriations accounts. The act specified that Jordan receives “not less than” annual \$150 million from the Defense Department’s Operation and Maintenance. As a result, half a billion is provided as military assistance annually. This makes its military aid amounts to 20% of Jordan's total military defense budget ( Sharp, 2023) .

The U.S. interest in Jordan springs from different reasons. Jordan is one of the first Arab states to sign a peace treaty and remains at peace with Israel. Second, the ongoing instability in neighboring Syria and Iraq intensifies Jordan's strategic importance to the U.S. Further, Jordan is also a Key U.S. partner in global counterterrorism operations and it hosts nearly 3,000 U.S. troops. As a result, there is a great U.S. Jordanian military, intelligence, and diplomatic cooperation. This seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and eliminate terrorist threats in the region ( Sharp, 2023).

In addition, Saudi Arabia, to a certain extent, is also considered a security provider for Jordan (Csicsmann, 2022). The reason for saying to a certain extent is due to the different type of relation they have. It is true that Saudi Arabia has been the second biggest donors to Jordan in the last few decades , Saudi Arabia is Jordan's largest economic partner, with investments of more than \$13 billion and trade between the two reached \$5 billion in 2022 (Omari, 2022), however, it is difficult to put their relation in one specified mold. Over the years, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have often taken the same positions on major regional and international affairs, including relations with the U.S., the Arab Israeli conflict, and opposition to radical Arab regimes, terrorism, Iran and more recently, drug trafficking. However, that does not mean that the two countries' positions have always been identical. At times, Jordan has implemented internal reform policies, including permitting peaceful Islamist political parties to operate, which were assumed not to gain Saudi approval. And there have been differences on regional issues as well that have led to suspensions in Saudi's aid. This was the case during the 1990s when the Saudis and Gulf aid stopped because of Jordan's refusal to support a military intervention after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Muasher, 2020).

This suspension has not lasted long, their aid to Jordan has increased over two decades. Following the Arab uprisings in 2011, the Saudis were there to lead the Gulf efforts to provide \$5 billion in aid to Jordan. This comes in an effort to help Jordan tackle the aftermath of countrywide protests. 2014, was another turning point in their relation when they have not provided any direct bilateral aid to Jordan (Muasher, 2020).

The proclaimed reason for such a block is the drop in the oil prices, yet , it is largely assumed that such a move is not more than an instrument of pressure by the Saudis to make Jordan

adhere to have similar positions in issues including the war in Syria and Yemen ,the blockade against Qatar and outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood ( Schenker, 2016). Yet, when Jordan was under a big wave of protests in 2018, it was there to support Jordan with a direct full package of loans and direct support (Muasher, 2020). Hence, if Jordan instability is on the edge, the Saudis will pledge. This non-stable type of their relation explains why the Saudis to a certain extent are also a security provider to Jordan.

Those external factors play a role in Jordan's security, in parallel, Jordan's people and the Jordanian culture of hospitality are not less significant. Some interviewees assert that the main reason behind Jordan's security, especially in the response to the influx of refugees is the Jordanian people themselves. Both an officer from the MoL and the Jordanian parliament had the same identical remark

Internal factors, in particular, the Jordanians and the Jordanian culture of hospitality are the main reason for such stability. Those who opened their homes to refugees, accept their existence and share with them, even their daily bread. Especially in the northern part of Jordan, Syrians are everywhere and you can barely distinguish if he-she is a refugee or not.

In fact, even before the Syrian refugees, this hospitality contributes to Jordan security for decades. Jordan's approach to the waves of refugee crises indicates that the Arab tradition of hospitality still exists and the notion of being the gracious neighbor (hosn eljewar in Arabic)<sup>9</sup> ( Urhov, 2023) remains part of Jordan s policies.

Historically, Arab nations have been following the principles of the so-called 'intervention' (dikhalah in Arabic) or 'succour' (najda), indicating the social and religious duty to accept and protect refugees. In today's language, these practices can be compared to the notion of granting asylum. According to these traditions today, Muslims who are in a need of asylum are given 'shelter', with the right to protection becoming an obligation for the authorities, while making expulsion of the asylum-seeker from the territory prevented ( Urhov, 2023). Although the

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<sup>9</sup> This Islamic principle about neighbors is much used in the context of the Arab refugees as neighbors. In Islam, neighbors have rights over their neighbors as outlined in the Qur'an, where God says, "to parents do good, and to relatives, orphans, the needy, the near neighbor, the neighbor farther away, and the companion at your side, the traveler, and those whom your right hands possess." ( Diaz, 2021)

influx of refugees puts great pressure on Jordan's already limited resources, King Abdullah has repeatedly emphasized, particularly within the first year of the crisis, that welcoming refugees is the right thing to do, as they have nowhere else to go and are being persecuted in their own countries (Urhová, 2023). As a result, different factors contribute to Jordan security and the EU building 'resilience' is one factor. Jordan security is the total sum of different internal and external factors and the exclusion of any of these would have a drastic impact on the country's security.

## 7. Conclusion

The objective of this dissertation was to determine and see the relation between the EU's building 'resilience' in Jordan and Jordan and the EU's security. Through mixed quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, spanning over 4 years, the author came across some interesting results. First, on the theoretical level, this dissertation proved, based on a profound case study for the EU's building 'resilience' in Jordan, that building 'resilience' is not only Maintenance, Marginal or Reflexive, rather more than one type of 'resilience' can be found together in Jordan. The EU-Jordan Compact is Reflexive 'resilience' and a game changing that transfers the policy utterly and leads to a new policy.

This policy presents refugees as a development asset for the first time. By issuing linkages between trade and refugee employment policies through RoO scheme, the EU and Jordan present a game changing for governing future humanitarian crises and a model to achieve self-reliance and development for both refugees and host countries.

Although the Compact has not achieved its full potentials, but with no doubt, considering the progress that Jordan has achieved, regarding labor and education for refugees, can never be underestimated. Regarding education, as of June 2022, 145,644 Syrian children school age were enrolled in public schools out of the 257,038. This constitutes 60% of the whole registered Syrian children (UNHCR, 2022). When it comes to issuing work permits, 373,000 work permits were issued to Syrian refugees since the start of the Jordan Compact (including renewals) as of 2023, in comparison of only about 3,000 work permits prior to 2016 (Jordan Times, 2023b).

When considering Jordan's export to the EU, since the RoO scheme came into effect in July 2016, 14 companies have gained authorization to export under the scheme, 8 companies have already started export to the EU market with a value of EUR 83.28 million (Jordan Chamber of Industry , 2019).

A deeper look at both the EU -Jordan and the EU -Lebanon Compact helped to give a better view about the EU's building 'resilience' impact on Jordan and its role in supporting refugees and their self-reliance. This stems from the fact that both Jordan and Lebanon signed these Compacts with

the EU in 2016, yet, Jordan harmonized, collaborative refugees' governance approach enables it to achieve progress in term of those refugees' integration and trade. In the Lebanese case, the Lebanese domestic politics and its refugee fragile contested policies has made the EU-Lebanon Compact remains a letter of intent with no progress regarding those refugees integration or development.

Maintenance 'resilience' can also be found in Jordan. Different initiatives aim to maintain the status quo in Jordan. Consequently, these initiatives contribute to Jordan's social cohesion and its stability. They are doing this through creating collaboration and avoiding the tension between refugees and local communities. As the EU recognizes that Jordan is a key pillar of regional stability, the Compact objective is to enable Jordan to meet its commitments as a host county and geostrategic partner ( Huang & Gough, 2019). At the same time, to enhance those refugees economic integration, the Compact emphasizes on the need to employ certain quotas of those refugees in different businesses.

In addition, to a certain extent, Marginal 'resilience' is also there. Jordan has not only shifted to a new policy but also has adjusted existed policies without completely changing those existing policies. This appears when considering the sectors where Syrians refugees are allowed to work. Previously, Syrian refugees were mostly permitted to work only in closed sectors including agriculture, construction and manufacturing. However, since July 2021, Syrian refugees have been authorized to obtain work permits in all sectors open to non-Jordanians.

Further, there has been adjustment for the existed policy to make work permits in some sectors seasonal and/or not tied to one employer, flexible one (International Rescue Committee , 2018). Hence, this enabled Jordan to create different categories of work permits. The creation of these categories has removed another barrier for Syrians, as for employers. Previously, in many sectors, like agriculture or construction, employers were unable to offer one-year contracts with full-time employment. As a result, there was a need for short-term or seasonal work (ILO, 2021). This adjustment has guaranteed this flexibility.

In addition, there has been adjustment for Syrians operating home-based businesses, there were amendments for existing policy to allow those Syrians operate and register those

businesses inside Syrian camps as of 2017 and then outside refugee camps as of 2018 (OCHA Services, 2018).

Second, on the empirical level, considering the impact of the EU's building 'resilience', the dissertation concluded that the Jordanian's institutions promote building 'resilience' in Jordan. Taking the historical institutions approach demonstrates that the Jordanian ministries have worked on developing their institutional capacities with the purpose of living up to the agreements with the EU (MoPIC, 2023).

One reason for this ability is Jordan's institutional flexibility. Being in a region full of turmoil and facing different exogenous shocks enabled the Jordanian policy makers to enhance this flexibility, as it is much needed. Jordan's geopolitics and its need to improve the performance of its institutions, in parallel to these shocks, emphasize the need to such flexibility. This is understood considering the fact that exogenous shocks such as wars or economic crises may lead to substantial changes in governing institutions (Widmaier et al., 2007). In addition, being a recipient of different waves of refugees highlights the need for this flexibility. Jordanian officials learnt from the past experiences that this flexibility is crucial in order to improve the performance of their institutions (Roberts, 2015).

The third conclusion is related to the impact of the EU's building 'resilience' in promoting Sustainable Developments Goals. The paper concludes that this impact differs from one sector to another. The EU's different instruments including the EURF, EIB, and EBRD with almost 100 projects in different sectors contribute to achieve this. In the water and energy sectors the EU is helping Jordan. In the energy sector, for instance, this support helped Jordan to increase its dependency on the renewable energy. In 2021, renewable energy accounted for 26% of Jordan's energy production. By comparison, renewable energy accounted for 20% of Jordan's energy production in 2020. This is beyond Jordan target which is set on 15% for 2020 (Energy & Utilities, 2023).

In addition, in the education sector, the EUTF helps Jordan to compile with its commitment regarding the right of Syrians' children in education. Although, the target is not fully achieved but, there is always a progress. In 2022, there were almost 145 thousands out of the 257 thousands Syrian children enrolled in the Jordanian schools, and Jordan will not be able to achieve this target without the EU's support. In other sectors like health, the progress was

slower. This is due to the surge of Covid and the need to contain it. The result was the need for new actions and shift into other priorities.

Another conclusion is that there are many challenges that hinder bridging the gap between the humanitarian-development nexus, which is a main goal for building 'resilience'. An interviewee from the UNHCR asserted that the urgent need for protection and basic needs make the priority for providing these services, especially with the decrease in funding and the surge of Covid.

The analysis supports the claim of different interviewees from different sectors in Jordan. In this regard, there has not been consensus among these interviewees regarding the role of building 'resilience' by the EU in Jordan. While officials from the EU Delegation on Jordan, the UNHCR and the MoL have asserted the significance role of the EU in Jordan in promoting these SDGs, in particular in the field of education and energy sector, other interviewees from the civil society in Jordan, academics or from the Economic and Social Council in Jordan don't agree with these claims, they even went further to say according to one interviewee,

What kind of development are we talking about? Look at the public schools, public transportation, and public health centers in Jordan in different cities, especially in the northern or southern of Jordan, can we say there is development?

Regarding the dissertation main question and the EU building 'resilience' role in to promoting the EU own security. The dissertation proved that the success of the EU external migration governance through building 'resilience' as a response to the Syrian refugees' case varies between the different host countries. The EU-Turkey Deal plays a more successful role as a buffer zone than Jordan. While Jordan building 'resilience' works better than Lebanon.

While this success can be proved in numerical terms for turkey, this can't be proved in numerical terms for Jordan. At the peak of the crisis, Italy and Greece were asylum seekers' main arrival points in Europe, with more than 861,000 arrivals in Greece in 2015. The number fell to 36,000 the year after the deal. Not to mention also, the number of dead and missing migrants in the Aegean Sea. This number decreased from 441 cases in 2016 to 102 in 2020.



What is more, this success can't be attributed only to the EU building 'resilience', but other factors contributed to this. For instance, countries in the Western Balkans closed access to migrants, fencing a well-trod land route into Europe.

As for Jordan building 'resilience' impact on the EU, Jordan cooperative approach has enabled it to harmonize the EU efforts in line with Jordan policies so that they best support the refugees and the local communities. This in turn has been reflected on those refugees integration and the country social cohesion. Consequently, this indirectly contributes to keep those refugees closer to their home.

Yet, the dissertation also concluded that building 'resilience' as an external migration governance can't be taken for granted to secure the EU borders or safe its borders from a new wave of Syrian refugees. The rise of anti-migration sentiment in the host countries, the low tendency of returning back to Syria and the absence of political solution in the future may lead to this. By 2022, there has been a 52% increase in the number of asylum seekers to the EU. Almost 40% of all applications in the EU member states in 2022 were Syrians, Afghans, Turks and Venezuelans. In addition, the latest asylum trends reveals that Syrians lodged the most applications in July 2023, nearly 15,000 in total which is up by 63% in comparison to the same time last year (Council of the EU, 2023).

In term of the EU building 'resilience' and Jordan' security. The dissertation proved that it is one factor. The dissertation proved that the EU instruments contributes to enhance 'resilience' capacities. These capacities represent the potential for proactive measures to be taken in order to deal with shocks or stresses.

The author was capable to prove the connection between Buzan classification of the security sectors and the EU building 'resilience' capacities. These capacities, which include providing services, protection, social cohesion, the EU's Macro- financial assistance, and border management support, have a key role in promoting Jordan economic, political, military, societal and environmental security.

Since the beginning of the crisis, the EU has pledged € 3.5 billion through different instruments. These contribute to enhance these capacities. In term of the economic security,

the EU's Macro- financial assistance and the direct budget support contributes to reducing Jordan's central government debt which stood at 114% to GDP in 2022 (The World Bank, 2022). Further, this direct assistance helped Jordan to provide services including education, health, energy and water.

The Compact has helped to enhance those refugees economic integration and their self-reliance. To meet the Compact requirements, Jordan has enhanced the number of work permits. While In 2017, only 46,000 work permits were issued, this figure has increased dramatically to become 344,471 as of January 2023 (Operational Data Portal Refugee Situations, 2023a).

Adding to that, stimulating economic growth is a key issue to enhance economic security. In this matter, the RoO scheme has increased Jordan exports to the EU, with a total value of €56 million in 2019, in comparison with 19.2 million in 2018 ( Al Nawas , 2020). Moreover, the EU has paid a greater attention to enhance the role of the private sector. For the development of the private sector, the EU prioritizes SMEs, investing over €200 million in 1,300 companies over a decade.

The ability of the government to provide services including health, education, water or energy has enabled Jordan to protect itself from the consequences of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The EU support was crucial to conduct political and economic reforms which were at the heart of these uprisings. As a result, these efforts contributes to Jordan political and economic security.

The EU technical and financial assistance are crucial to secure Jordan borders. The crisis in Syria has accelerated the pressure on the infrastructure and human resources at the border. The EU funded projects provided technical support to tackle this. This allowed Jordan forces to respond to humanitarian and security challenges at the north-eastern border with Syria. What is more, the EU experience in dealing with organized crimes and drugs trafficking help Jordan in its current drug war.

The EIB, EURD and ERTF efforts are directed toward supporting Jordan transition to the green economy. This in turn supports Jordan societal and environmental security. The EBRD, for instance, has provided more than €1.9 billion in financing through 67 projects across the country. These efforts, along other efforts by other donors, made Jordan capable to respond to

the refugees need regarding energy. Since 2017, Jordan has found an important energy solution for thousands of refugees. This solution has enabled Jordan to fully powered electricity derived from solar panels for two large Syrian refugee camps in, Zaatari and Azraq ( Pujol-Mazzini, 2017) . Such transmission, decreases annual carbon dioxide emissions from the camp by 13,000 metric tons per year, equivalent to 30,000 barrels of oil. Further, these efforts are in parallel with Jordan ambition to increase its dependency on renewable energy. The country has managed to do so recently. In 2022, renewable energy accounted for 27% of Jordan’s energy production. This is beyond Jordan target which is set on 15% for 2020 ( Energy & Utilities, 2023) .

The EU directed effort in solid waste management and clean water have been a corner stone for providing water, especially in the northern governates of Jordan where the refugees are concentrated. An example for such an effort, the EU co-funds the Wadi Al-Arab Water System II, a water supply infrastructure investment that improves drinking water availability for the Northern Governorates of Jordan. Currently, 1.1 million people are getting benefit directly, and 800,000 indirectly, from improved water supply, including enhanced ‘resilience’ to extreme droughts and climate change (Press and information team of the Delegation to JORDAN, 2023a).

The Compact, the JRP, and the EUTF all attribute to preserve social cohesion and enhance protection for refugees and the most vulnerable Jordanians. These efforts that include decreasing competition between refugees and local communities, enhancing activities targeting social cohesion and raising awareness among refugees and local communities, among others are leading to this result till the time being. Accordingly, the EU efforts as a main donor in enhancing these ‘resilience’ capacities contribute to Jordan national security.

Along with this, the dissertation proved that Jordan national security is not fully dependent on the EU only, but there are other internal and external factors contribute to this. In this respect, The U.S. is a key security provider for Jordan (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The U.S is Jordan’s single largest provider of bilateral assistance. The US annual direct support amounts to \$1.65 billion making Jordan the third country receiving the largest amount of the U.S. foreign aid.

The U.S direct security assistance is half a billion annually that makes its military aid amounts to 20% of Jordan's total military defense budget ( Sharp, 2023) .

In addition the dissertation concluded that Saudi Arabia, to a certain extent, is also considered a security provider for Jordan. It is true that Saudi Arabia has been the second biggest donors to Jordan in the last few decades, Saudi Arabia is Jordan's largest economic partner, with investments of more than \$13 billion and trade between the two reached \$5 billion in 2022 (Omari, 2022), however, there were some ups and downs in their relations that makes it difficult to put their relation in one specified mold. Although they have the same positions regarding different issues including the war in Syria and Libya, there are disagreements including the war in Yemen. Yet, this did not stop the Saudis from supporting Jordan when its stability was at risk. This happened when Jordan was under a big wave of protests in 2018, they were there to support Jordan with a direct full package of loans and grants (Muasher, 2020).

Other internal factor contributes to Jordan security is Jordan's people and the Jordanian culture of hospitality, even before Syrian refugees, this hospitality contributes to Jordan security for decades. Jordan's approach to the waves of refugee crises, starting from the first wave of Palestinians in 1948, indicates that the Arab tradition of hospitality still exists and the notion of being the gracious neighbor ( Urhová, 2023) remains part of Jordan s policies.

Although the influx of refugees puts great pressure on Jordan's already limited resources, King Abdullah has repeatedly emphasized that welcoming refugees is the right thing to do, as they have nowhere else to go and are being persecuted in their own countries ( Urhová, 2023). This was crucial, specially, during the first years of the crisis to avoid the tension between the refugees and local communities.

Taking all these aspects together, the given analysis proved that the first hypothesis which is the EU building 'resilience' in Jordan contributes to the national security of both Jordan and the EU, with the support of other internal or external factors is valid while the other two hypotheses are not.

## **7.1. Recommendation**

This dissertation concludes that the EU's building 'resilience' contributes to the SDGs, and it recommends to sustain the EU's funding, especially in the sectors where progress has been made, otherwise, the results would be reversed with a greater devastating circumstances for those refugees and the host communities alike.

In order to get the full potentials of the RoO scheme, it recommends that more efforts to be done from both Jordan and the EU. As for Jordan, It needs to do more efforts to raise the awareness of the business community about the scheme, and identify and address the challenges businesses face in taking advantage of this scheme. The EU, on the other side, can add more categories beyond these 52 categories including foodstuffs. This is because these make a main component of Jordan manufacturing but are not included in the scheme.

In order to turn the refugees into a development asset, the paper recommends concluding more agreements between the EU and the host countries that facilitate those refugees travel to the EU for working. According to Eurostat, By 2035, there will be about 50 million fewer people of working age in Europe than in 2010 ( Jiménez, 2023). Such agreements may compensate such a shortage while decreasing the pressure on the host countries and may also reduce the illegal migration.

Finally, this dissertation concludes that building 'resilience' is workable but to make it more fruitful, more efforts are needed to achieve a political solution to the long protracted crisis. The ultimate goal of 'resilience' is to end those refugees suffering, but without this political solution, all what have been done and would be done would be in vain. Those refugees will not be capable to return and have a dignified life in their homeland. Thus, both of the refugees and the local communities would be in an endless suffering.

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