Conditional and Differential? Locating the Role of Civil Society in Anti-corruption Policy Outcomes

by

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Abstract

Quantitative, and to a much lesser degree qualitative, research is the dominant approach to corruption. However, the call to investigate the contextual dependencies of corruption is brought about by the failure of anti-corruption approaches that do not tackle other actors or institutions and issues simultaneously. One approach that can tackle the complex nature of corruption from this perspective but remains wanting in corruption research is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Much more limited is the application of QCA in understanding civil society's anti-corruption role. The supposed place of civil society in anti-corruption is even more compounded by contemporary events that directly assault their presence in countries, regardless of the type of government or economic development in place. This closing of civic space phenomenon is part of the broader democratic backsliding or autocratization that has pervaded even long standing and consolidated democracies.

Locating the place of civil society given such contexts poses a daunting challenge, as one may ask: if democratic grounds are backsliding, where are anti-corruption efforts anchored on? As such, the dissertation intends to look at configurations of (democratic) political institutions that enhance or mitigate corruption while trying to locate the position occupied by civil society in this respect. Taking a cue from the civil society-corruption nexus and the broader democracy-corruption linkage scholarship, with institutionalism as an overarching theory, the dissertation hopes to contribute to the discourse via three related studies.

The first of these serves as a springboard for the argument that civil society cannot battle corruption all alone. While internal civil society characteristics may have a part in corruption mitigation, through a large-N quantitative analysis, the study highlights the importance of civil society environment, transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement and rigorousness and

impartiality of public administration on corruption. Noting that the formula derived from regression analyses shows the average net effects of the independent variables, the second study looks at the combinatorial effects of conditions necessary and/or sufficient for the outcome high perceived corruption to occur through fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The configurational analysis of 33 episodes of contemporary autocratization from the third wave (1994- 2017) confirm the conditionality of civil society's effects as the condition absence of robust civil society organizations combines with the absence of extensive media freedoms and simultaneously the absence of wide and independent public deliberations to produce the outcome high perceived corruption. The pathway to corruption in these states experiencing autocratization also includes two individually sufficient conditions: the presence of high political exclusion as well as the absence of sociopolitical integration. No necessary precondition was found for the outcome presence of high perceived corruption. Given the pretext of equifinality and multifinality in QCA, the third study extends the second but in the context of 30 democracies that did not experience substantial autocratization episodes in the same given period. The results are interesting although not surprising under the theoretical underpinnings of QCA: the absence of high perceived corruption in non-autocratizing states is not brought about by robust civil society organizations (in their presence or absence; or individually or in combination with other conditions) but instead by the presence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion. The latter is also a necessary condition for the outcome of interest.

While the conditionality of civil society's effect is confirmed in the second study, the third highlights the possibility of the differential impacts of civil society depending on context. Limitations of the dissertation are discussed and venues for future research are presented.

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Chapter 1
Introduction[1]

1. Background

Due to the wide recognition of the complex nature of corruption, democratic governments and civil society are prompted to shift their anti-corruption strategies to holistic ones. The failure of previous anti-corruption approaches is in part brought about by separate, individual interventions to tackle such a systemic problem (Gans-Morse, *et al.*, 2018). Hira (2016), for instance, noted that the focus on formal institutional incentives while ignoring culture has contributed to the failure of reforms in developing countries. Perhaps this is why Svensson (2005) calls for the investigation of the contextual dependencies of corruption. This complexity seems to resonate with what qualitative comparative analysts hold regarding the importance of contexts and with the configurational character of much of social life.

The same can be told about the supposed role of civil society (CS) in democracy and anti-corruption. Encarnación (2012) claimed that the errors in understanding the conditions under which CS can be most effective is largely due in part to the neglect of important contexts: while a strong CS may be a transformative political force capable of fixing the political system, there is a possibility that under certain (deteriorating) political conditions, CS may as much be a burden as a help. Indeed, while participation in CS has been considered as one of the most promising routes to

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tackle corruption, functioning democratic institutions increase the costs of corruption for both public and private partners (Bertelli *et al.,* 2021).

Putnam's (1993, 2000) prominent work on social capital highlights the importance of civic participation on the democratic performance of a society. Such social capital, cooperative social networks, based on trust and reciprocity, is needed to monitor government performance and more broadly, to participate in the public policy process. While drawn mainly from research on industrialized and developed countries, international donors now emphasize the need for CS as a crucial factor for the social, economic, and political development in the Global South (Brass, 2021, p. 2). The expectation that societies will further democratize via CS and thus be able to address corruption is however rather more complex and complicated. As Hira (2016) pointed out, while democracy should open the space up for more competition and alteration of clientelistic networks, having a democracy is not a requirement for anti-corruption. On the other hand, speedy democratization has been an appealing argument to radically change perceptions about corruption (Rothstein, 2011) since only when well-functioning democratic institutions are in place that growth and transformation can begin (Rose-Ackerman, 2007) but building institutional capacity such as the rule of law in weak states has become a promising avenue for international organizations to address corruption (Jetter and Parmeter, 2018). Such is the complicated character of the relations between corruption and democracy and the role of CS is situated in this context. Encarnación (2012) succinctly captured the dilemma facing governments tackling corruption: do we promote CS development or political institutionalization?

The supposed place of CS in anti-corruption is even more compounded by events that directly assault their presence in the world over, regardless of the institutions, type of government, and economic development in place. The closing of civic space phenomenon can indeed be

observed in many countries across typologies. For example, although later on declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in June 2019, the anti-corruption activists in Ukraine were required to file detailed personal financial and asset declarations annually after the 2017 amendments to the Law on Preventing Corruption until April 2018. The case of Guatemala is no different. The government did not renew the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala's (CICIG) mandate in 2018. The year 2019 saw the unilateral termination of such mandate, with the government claiming it put the country's security at risk. The CICIG contributed to efforts to investigate criminal networks and structures and ensured pursuance of notable corruption cases in the post-conflict period (Amnesty International, 2019). Developed economies and consolidated and long-standing democracies are not spared, from the US to Brazil and India (Varieties of Democracy, 2020). In these societies, and the world over, not only are CS as components of democracy attacked by government repression; censorship on the media, threats to freedoms of expression, and attacks on free and fair elections, among many others, are a regular occurrence in what Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) call the phenomenon of autocratization.

Locating the place of CS in anti-corruption given such contexts poses a daunting challenge. An important question that merits attention is thus: what configurations of political institutions enhance or mitigate corruption? Taking a cue from the civil society-corruption and the larger democracy-corruption nexus scholarship, and with institutionalism as an overarching theory, this dissertation intends to contribute to the discussion on the question via three related studies.

2. Theoretical approach

The study is grounded on an overarching institutional approach to corruption. Institutional theories look at the institutional design of political systems and focus on how institutions shape behavior (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). In *Syndromes of Corruption,* Johnston (2009)

claims that problems with participation and institutions not only contribute to corruption but shape it in a variety of ways. Several anti-corruption tools used by governments and international non-governmental organizations to address corruption are founded on these very same institutions.

Following the institutional logic and from a configurational, set-relational perspective, corruption is a product of a combination of different factors, including these institutional ones. From the standpoint of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), corruption implies conjunctural causation, equifinality, asymmetry, and multifinality. First, *corruption results from conjunctural causation*; that is, it is a product of a combination of different conditions. *Corruption is also equifinal*: there possibly are multiple pathways to it. Third, the absence of conditions that lead to the presence of corruption may not necessarily lead to its absence; thus, *corruption is asymmetrical.* Lastly, *corruption implies multifinality*: the conditions leading to the presence of corruption may be causally relevant for both the presence of corruption and its absence.

In the process of locating the supposed anti-corruption role of civil society, the dissertation is guided by the same institutional and configurational foundation. The said role of civil society is conditional on several (democratic) political institutions. This deviates from the two common strands in the study of civil society-corruption linkage which are from the optimists who argue that civil society's anti-corruption role is undeniable and the skeptics who claim that civil society can possibly become corrupt if not conduits for corruption. Given the "conditionality" literature then, and through set-theoretic analysis particularly QCA, the supposed anti-corruption role of civil society is conditioned by such democratic institutions as socio-political integration, media freedom, and public deliberation and engagement, among others.

These same democratic institutions are challenged and constricted by a larger phenomenon known as democratic backsliding or autocratization. Given this process and the importance of

context in QCA, looking at corruption and anti-corruption in regimes of different types is one way to understand corruption and the anti-corruption role of civil society as politically contentious phenomena. While anti-corruption interventions succeed by means of the introduction of reforms to political institutions, building capacity of enforcement institutions, and reinforcement of civil society oversight, it transpires only to the extent that the nature of the polity is considered.

In emerging democracies, or those that are in transition, corruption is a transitional phenomenon given that procedural practices have yet to be founded on firm liberal culture and effective institutions (Harris-White and White, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). In backsliding democracies, or autocratizing states as referred to in this study, anti-corruption is increasingly a concern. As Amundsen and Jackson (2021) note, "because de-democratizing leaders and would-be autocrats benefit from corruption, traditional governance-focused reforms are rolled back, and traditional anti-corruption measures can be hijacked and weaponized" (p.4).

The importance of context, in this case the polity or regime, in understanding both corruption and the anti-corruption role of civil society cannot be understated. Boulding's (2014) pertinent question succinctly captures this: which institutional conditions might influence whether civil society is inclined to work toward developing clientelistic relationships with politicians, or conversely, when they may be more likely to employ other strategies for serving members' needs (p.676)? Moreover, given this, one may ask, does civil society play the same anti-corruption role in autocratizing states as it does in democratizing contexts?

In what follows, the specific research problems and study design are briefly presented.

3. Research questions and study design

The dissertation moves from a correlational (Study 1) to a set relational approach (Studies 2 and 3) to corruption. The first study serves as a springboard for the argument that civil society

cannot battle corruption all alone. While internal civil society characteristics may have an influence on political corruption, external factors such as the presence of open and transparent political institutions (Alt and Lassen, 2003; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010), strong rule of law and well-established political legal structures and democratic institutions (Zhan, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 2007), among many others, are as crucial. Similarly, an often-neglected aspect in the civil society literature particularly on the symbiosis between civic engagement and government effectiveness are aspects of public administration (Serageldin, 1996; Anechiarico, 1998). Thus, with the broader institutionalist framework as an overarching theory, and learning from the public administration/bureaucracy-civil society nexus, the first study raises the question: *What is the effect of civil society environment, transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement and rigorousness and impartiality of public administration on corruption?*

Given that the regression model derived in the first study offers only one formula for political corruption, the second study probes whether there are multiple pathways to corruption using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The supposed impact of civil society on corruption is situated within a context of conditionality; that is, civil society exerts an influence only in combination with other conditions. The conditionality scholarship provides that the anti-corruption effects of civil society may be conditioned by several conditions such as media freedoms (Ahrend, 2002; Themudo, 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2016) and the presence of independent public deliberations (Newman *et al.*, 2004; Booher, 2004), among others. With the current assaults on civil society in mind, it is imperative to look at this conditionality in the context of contemporary autocratization, referred to as democratic recession (Diamond, 2015) or democratic backsliding (Bermeo, 2016; Walder and Lust, 2018) in the literature. As such, the study asks: *What are the configurations of corruption in countries in the third wave of autocratization (1994-2017)?*

The third study extends the immediately preceding question in the context of countries that did not experience substantial autocratization in the given period. Following the theoretical underpinnings of QCA, it is possible that the same conditions may produce a different outcome given the context. Similar to the second study, the last study locates the role of civil society in anti-corruption, albeit in non-autocratizing cases. As such, the question put forward is: *What are the pathways to corruption in states that did not experience substantial autocratization in the third wave?*

4. Outline of main findings

Utilizing a four-step hierarchical multiple regression, the first (Chapter 4) of the three studies tried to unpack the question related to the factors that determine the level of political corruption. Guided by the nascent literature on civil society-corruption nexus and institutionalism as an overarching theory, *civil society structure* [which includes civil society organizations (CSO) participatory environment, which measures the involvement of people in CSO; and CSO consultation, which measures whether or not major CSOs are routinely consulted in policy], *civil society environment* (which includes institutions that directly affect CSO's movement: CSO repression, which assesses the extent to which governments repress CSOs; and CSO entry and exit, a measure of the degree to which the government controls entry and exit of CSOs), *transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement,* and *rigorousness and impartiality of public administration* are expected to have a predictive capacity on political corruption. The regression models confirm the argument put forward in the paper: while civil society and its structure is a significant determinant of the level of political corruption, the introduction of civil society environment (Model 2), transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement (Model 3) and rigorousness and impartiality of public administration (Model 4) in the regression model accounted

for additional variance in political corruption. However, and more importantly, of the three predictors entered after civil society structure (in Model 1), it was transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement that had the highest additional variance (21.7%), followed by rigorousness and impartiality of public administration (11.5%), and civil society environment (1.4%). These results point not only to the importance of institutional arrangements, transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement in this case, but also to the quality of public administration, in curbing corruption.

Given that the regression performed above shows the average net effects of the independent variables, a fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) was used in the second study (Chapter 5) to look at the combinations of conditions, necessary and/or sufficient for corruption to occur. As such, an exploration of the combinatorial effects of the conditions reflects much of the configurational character of much of social life. Five relevant conditions were chosen in the analysis: *robust civil society organizations, extensive media freedoms, wide and independent public deliberations, high sociopolitical integration,* and *high political exclusion.* A configurational analysis of 33 episodes or cases of contemporary autocratization (1994-2017) (1) reveals that there is no necessary precondition for the presence of high perceived corruption, even the "democratic" conditions considered in the study; and (2) confirms the "conditionality" of civil society's anti-corruption effects as it was found out that the absence of a robust civil society combines with the absence of extensive media freedoms and simultaneously the absence of wide and independent public deliberations to produce the outcome, high perceived corruption. The configuration of corruption also includes two individually sufficient conditions: the presence of high political exclusion as well as the absence of sociopolitical integration. These results are robust based on the sensitivity checks.

Finally, the last study (Chapter 6) extends the preceding investigation albeit in the context of 30 democracies that did not experience autocratization episodes in the third wave of autocratization. While it is particularly the absence of a robust civil society organization combined with other conditions that lead to the presence of high perceived corruption in autocratizing states, following the logic of QCA, it may very well be that the pathway for the presence or absence of the outcome, high perceived corruption, in non-autocratizing democracies, is different from those that experienced autocratization. The results of the analysis confirm this. Though the results for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption are striking, they are not surprising as they are in line with the theoretical foundations of QCA: the absence of high perceived corruption in non-autocratizing states is not brought about by robust civil society organizations (both in their presence or absence, and/or in combination with other conditions) but by the presence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion.

5. Contribution

Results of the first study point to why civil society cannot battle it all alone. That civil society organizations are an all-powerful actor by themselves may be an overestimation of civil society's potential. While the results echo the suggestions made previously by scholars that the reduction of corruption is founded on the presence of legal (and political) institutions, the current study points as well to the idea that corruption mitigation is also founded on public administration. Brown (2007) may have claimed that the success of any anti-corruption initiative will also depend on the answer to the question "Is leadership provided from the highest levels of government?", but the current study asks whether such leadership is also rigorous and impartial, or whether it is characterized by arbitrariness and biases. The second study fills in not only a theoretical but also a methodological gap in the scholarship on corruption and on the role of civil society in this regard.

While most studies on corruption are large-N quantitative, only very few QCA studies (Stevens, 2016; Ingrams, 2018; Zimelis, 2019; Dunlop et. al, 2020) on the configurations of corruption have so far been done. Bold as it may be, the study is the first to attempt to look at the pathways to corruption while at the same time locating the role of civil society. The paper also formalizes the claims of necessity and sufficiency made in the civil society-corruption literature. The third study extends the arguments made in the preceding, while locating the role of civil society in anti-corruption, albeit in states that have not had a substantial decline in their democratic attributes. Civil society's role is elusive in the context of non-autocratizing states, and this result highlights the importance of not only the contextual dependencies of civil society's functions but also that of corruption.

6. Limitations

The study has its own limitations. The first concerns the conceptualization of corruption and civil society. Perceptions of corruption were used as a measure of success/failure of anti-corruption policy. While this limits corruption research in general, it is possible to use proxies for corruption or direct, "objective" measures of it, and specify which types of corruption are accounted for by which conditions and their configurations. Aspects of anti-corruption, and not just corruption, also need attention. For instance, it is possible to look at the configurations of corruption prosecution or the emergence and effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) via QCA. The same is true with the use of a rather general conception of civil society. Although such is helpful and relevant as the study is a first attempt to formalize claims of necessity and sufficiency in relation to the anti-corruption role of civil society, the definition conflates non-governmental organizations with other actors beyond the state and market. A more nuanced understanding of which types of civil society can be relevant for anti-corruption will be important in locating the

role of civil society. It is also possible to look at the emergence of anti-corruption movements and their specific role in anti-corruption in the contexts of democratization and autocratization. The second involves limitations in time. Although the first study involves a very long timeframe, the second only deals with contemporary democratic reversals (from 1994 to 2017). While it was important to determine such scope condition, to include earlier autocratization episodes might also shed light into the main issue on hand and provide an understanding of the development or trajectory of civil society's effects, if any, in anti-corruption. Third, while the solution formula derived in the QCA were of high consistency and coverage, to make causal claims based on these should be taken with caution, particularly so that a further and elaborate exploration of the causal chain is needed. This, for example, can be addressed via a study of the typical or deviant cases, through process-tracing.

7. Dissertation structure

The dissertation is organized as follows. The following chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the study. It is followed by the methodological choices and research design in the third chapter. The next three chapters present the results. The fourth chapter, *"Why can't civil society battle it all alone?"* quantitatively investigates the effect of several institutional indicators on political corruption. The fifth chapter, *"Explaining the conditionality of civil society's anti-corruption effects in democracies in the "third wave" of autocratization"* presents the conditions (and their configuration) necessary and or sufficient for the outcome, high perceived corruption, to occur. The sixth chapter, *"Pathways to corruption in non-autocratizing democracies: Locating civil society's place",* extends the test done in the previous chapter. The final chapter concludes.

Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework

1. Conceptualizing corruption

1.1. Corruption as a contested concept

There is not one, single definition of corruption.[2] Corruption is construed in a variety of ways and from different theoretical perspectives and academic traditions. As de Graaf, et al (eds) (2010) aptly put, "the norms defining what corruption is vary across both societies and academic disciplines" (p.13). True enough, as Johnston (2009) recounted, "corruption is a deeply normative concern and can be a matter of considerable dispute" (p. 10). Nonetheless, for Heidenheimer and Johnston (2011), commonly used and contemporary social science definitions of corruption can be classified into three: public-office-centered, market-centered, and public-interest-centered (Introduction, p. 7)[3].

Public-office-centered definitions concern the duties of public office and the deviations from the norms binding upon the office holders. These definitions look at corruption as a misuse of authority due to considerations of personal gain that need not be monetary. J.S. Nye (2011) for instance considers corruption as a "behavior that deviates from the normal duties of a public role due to private-regarding (family, close private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (p. 8). Also, for Johnston

[2] It is not the goal of the study, however, to contribute to the definitional debate on corruption as it is done considerably in the literature, nor does it intend to extend the typology of corruption currently offered in the scholarship. As Johnston (2009) claimed, the inconclusive nature of the definitions debate also spring from the complications arising from the serious difficulty of categorizing so many actions as corrupt. For an extensive discussion of the definitional debate, see Heidenheimer and Johnston (2011) and Kurer (2015).

[3] Public-opinion centered definitions of corruption, while dismissed in the theoretical literature, are adopted without much hesitation by those engaged in measuring corruption (Kurer, 2015). Public opinion definitions focus on how the people in a nation define corruption (Gardiner, 2011).

(2009), corruption involves the *(a)* abuse of trust *(b)* generally one involving power *(c)* for private benefit which often but not by no means always come in pecuniary forms. On the other hand, some market-centered definitions look at corruption as a behavior that sees the public office as a business and that it is a unit that maximizes income (Van Klaveren, 2011). Lastly, public-interest definitions view corruption as a subversion of the public and its interests. Corruption damages the public interests when the power-holder is induced to make actions in favor of whoever provides the rewards not legally provided for (Friedrich, 2011). For Friedrich (2011), such a deviant behavior is associated with a particular motivation: private gain at public expense, or, in Lancaster and Montinola's (1997) words, public's best interest.

There is a considerable overlap that exists among the definitions of corruption. However, the basis of virtually all the definitions is the reference to the "public versus private" (Zimelis, 2020). Johnson and Sharma (2004) succinctly put it: "although corruption comes in many shapes, shades, and sizes, and with different degrees of tolerability, corruption is always defined with one feature—the inappropriate mix of public and private as it is corrupt for officials to profit personally from public office" (p.3). While current corruption research is criticized for its near-exclusive focus on the public sector, as if the private sector were not involved (Heywood, 2015), the dissertation looks at both public officials and the public interest, given the extent of governmental power and resources bestowed upon the former, legally and normatively, by their office and at the same time the detriment borne by the latter who are supposedly the beneficiaries of such resources. Also, as Kurer (2015) noted, "corruption implicating the public sector affects the interest of the public directly and effective countermeasures often involve political processes" (p. 32). As such, the study combines public-office and public-interest definitions of corruption. Philp (2015) best captures this: "*Corruption in politics occurs where a public official (A), violates the rules and/or norms of*

office, to the detriment of the interests of the public (B) (or some sub-section thereof) who is the designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and a third party (C) who rewards or otherwise incentivizes A to gain access to goods or services they would not otherwise obtain" (p.22). The definition mirrors what international organizations such as the World Bank and the academic literature also consider as corrupt (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Amundsen, 1999; Sung, 2002; Gerring and Thacker, 2004; Chang and Chu, 2006; Desta, 2006; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 2008).

Although with the blurring of the public-private divide, apart from more traditional forms such as bribery and embezzlement, corruption may likely take the form of conflicts of interest, abuse of office, lobbying by former public officials or inappropriate use of official information or particularly those types of corruption that emerge from, for instance, the rise of "business politicians" or the financial-political complex (Heywood, 2015)[4], among many others. The number of "corrupt" activities that spring from this blurring of the public-private is so enormous that an exhaustive typology, or even a new one, seems futile, at least for the purposes of the dissertation, it being a comparative one. What the study argues for instead is that, with the definition espoused by Philp (2015), a configurational understanding of corruption be had; that is, an understanding of corruption as a phenomenon that implies conjuctural causation, equifinality, asymmetry, and multifinality (as discussed further in the next chapter).

The definition of Philp (2015) is instructive in this regard. First, the turn to the public-office and public-interest conceptualizations is appropriate with the focus of the study on the character

[4] These "business politicians" are new breed of political entrepreneurs who combine mediation in (licit or illicit) business transactions, first-hand participation in economic activity, and political mediation in the traditional sense (della Porta and Vannucci, 1997, p.75 in Heywood, 2015, p. 4). The financial-political complex is characterized by banks and the finance industry being allowed by governments to operate with minimal regulation and virtually no risk of failure in spite of their involvement in scandals such as irresponsible lending, rigging software to hide the channeling of drug money and terrorists' finance, and fixing Libor interest rates (Harding, 2012, in Heywood, 2015, p. 4).

of regimes, particularly the phenomenon of autocratization. It is formal responsibilities and resources attached to the office that are also used by public-office holders at large to move towards autocratization (as discussed in Chapter 5) and to move towards further strengthening of institutions in more matured democracies (as presented in Chapter 6). The norms considered integral in these polities or regimes are relevant for how corruption is framed in these contexts. Philp (2015) noted that while what exactly may count as corrupt is relevant and that the underlying conception of politics is contested and that its character and scope vary (although not infinitely) across contexts, people's concerns about corruption are predicated upon it (p. 21). Second, considering that the problem with prevailing definitions of corruption is that they are either loose and more broadened, and thus may seem to trade clarity for comprehensiveness, or too narrowly conceived that a useful comparative analysis becomes challenging if not obscured, the definition moves beyond technical, one-line definition, while at the same time makes way for comparative research to be possible given the context of regime as considered in this dissertation.

1.2. Theories of corruption

How are the causes of corruption theoretically framed? Given that such phenomenon is studied within different disciplines and from varied theoretical perspectives, there are as many factors contributing to corruption as there are as many varieties as possible of corrupt behavior (Caiden, Dwivedi & Jabbra, 2001). The complexity of corruption makes it impossible to provide a comprehensive account of its causes (Heywood, 1997). Fijnaut and Huberts (2002) note that existing research shows that corruption is brought about by a multitude of social, economic, political, organizational, and individual causal factors.

In this section, I discuss the commonly used approaches to corruption. This is by no means exhaustive, as such is beyond the scope of the dissertation, and several materials are readily

available. For example, in *The Hidden Order of Corruption,* Della Porta and Vannucci (2012) discuss the main theoretical approaches to the analysis of corruption. Alternatively, in *The Good Cause,* de Graaf, et al (eds) (2010) survey such theoretical perspectives extensively.

Although the dominant, *economic approaches*, are not the only discourse on corruption. Institutional economics sees corrupt officials as rational utility maximizers who simply take the most profitable course of action. In this strand, corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap. The works of Klitgaard (1991) and Rose-Ackerman (2006), among many others, fall within this tradition. For Rose-Ackerman (2010), corruption is an archetypal topic for political economic analysis. From this perspective, any analysis of corruption and the succeeding reform must investigate (a) the prominent role of self-interest, and (b) changes in the norms of officials and individuals together with (c) changes in or focus on incentives for pay-offs through a rearrangement of rewards and costs of corrupt and honest behavior.

Post-positivist approaches, meanwhile, look at how corruption is socially constructed. Scholars such as de Graaf, Wagenaar and Hoendernoom (2010) are interested on how actors define corruption in relation to discourse; that is, corruption cases cannot be understood without the discourses that give them meaning. Scholars within this tradition claim that an act is considered as corrupt at a given time and place. Its meaning therefore is considered as contingent, contextual, and historical. The roles of discourse, history, and power are rendered important in defining notions of abuse, public role, and private benefit. Thus, corruption manifests as a specific type of social relationship, of contestation and clashes over the public/private and state/society.

On the other hand, *institutional approaches*, those that look at the institutional design of political systems, focus on how institutions shape behavior and contend that some political systems are more prone to corruption than others. Prominent scholars in the literature are Gerring and

Thacker (2004), Johnston (2009), Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Peters (2010), Weingast (1995), and Treisman (2000), among many others. Della Porta and Vannucci (2012) offer a comprehensive institutional account of corruption in *The Hidden Order of Corruption.* The impact of political systems, for instance its degree of political competition, openness and transparency, party competition, decision-making rules, constitutional structure, and the structure of political regimes, are among those considered by institutionalists to influence corruption. In *Syndromes of Corruption*, Johnston (2009) claims that corruption reflects and perpetuates weaknesses in participation and institutions and that the prospects of corrupt benefits undermine both. Following Johnston (2009), problems with participation and institutions not only contribute to corruption but shape it in a variety of ways.

Anchored on the institutional approaches of corruption, the dissertation uses a combination of political and institutional factors from the extant literature on civil society and the larger democracy-corruption nexus to explore the conditions for corruption in the three studies. In the following sections, I discuss the general framework of how civil society is thought to impact corruption and how its anti-corruption role is conditioned by several factors. The first study's hypotheses and their conceptual underpinnings are presented separately in Chapter 4 for readability. The same is true with the specific expected theoretical directions of the second and third studies as seen in the configurational analysis of corruption in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively.

2. Civil society and anti-corruption

2.1. What is civil society?

Despite the huge interest on the study of civil society and attempts by different donor agencies and academics to measure such concept, there is still no agreement on what indicators to use when making sense of what is called a civil society in very different contexts (Uhlin, 2010). This is perhaps what Tusalem (2007) referred to as an empirical challenge in defining and operationalizing what constitutes civil society. Nonetheless, I adopt a fairly broad definition of civil society in this study: "an intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values" (White, 2004, p.10).

2.2. Civil society's anti-corruption role

The civil society-corruption nexus literature is currently divided between those who believe that civil society's impact in mitigating corruption is undeniable (the optimists) (see for instance Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011; Grimes, 2013; Tusalem, 2007), and those who claim that they have by themselves become corrupt or conduits for corruption (the skeptics) (see Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon and Keating, 2007). Within the first group, development agencies and scholars contend that civil society plays a key role in fighting corruption. No less than the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) asserted that civil society is important in the global fight against corruption (OECD, 2003; UNDP, 2008). This anti-corruption function is manifested in a number of respects. First, not only does civil society provide information about or raise awareness on

corruption and report governmental malfeasance (Grimes, 2013); it also serves as a vehicle for the mass public to articulate their grievances and associate or organize to call for and promote transparent and accountable state institutions (Tusalem, 2007). Second, civil society diagnostically assesses and monitors the performance of public institutions (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). Civil society, in the words of Grimes (2013), thus occupies an important role in a polity's meta-system of checks and balances. Third, and more directly, civil society partakes in anti-corruption policy advocacy and redesign of anti-corruption institutions in states (Setiyono & McLeod, 2010; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004).

Despite these optimistic views, there are those who cast doubt on the decisive role of civil society in anti-corruption efforts. The first group of scholars in this strand point to challenges to the internal accountability mechanisms of civil society organizations themselves. That civil society organizations are often not very transparent to the public or held accountable is a recurring theme within this strand (Ebrahim, 2003; Townsend & Townsend, 2004). Gibelman and Gelman (2004), for example, advanced that among many other characteristics, the failure to institute internal controls, lack of oversight and absence of checks and balances in procedures and practices as well in nongovernmental organizations breed corruption. Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon and Keating (2007) also added that nonprofit organizations suffer from occupational fraud and thereby experience financial losses due to their limited financial management capacity where "essential tasks are undertaken by individuals with little financial expertise and no training in the design of appropriate controls against errors and fraud" (p. 690) coupled by an atmosphere of trust that discourages monitoring.

The second group of scholars within this strand questions the autonomy of civil society organizations, both from the state and from their donors. For example, with reference to CSOs in

the Middle East, Wiktorowicz (2000) claimed that when CSOs are embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes which allows those in power to monitor and regulate their collective activities, the civil society becomes more an instrument of state social and political control than a mechanism for empowerment. Similarly, with reference to the case of Turkey, Doyle (2018) posited that government co-option of civil society transpires and thus CSOs function to disseminate government ideas in society and to provide a cloak of democratic legitimacy to policy decisions. Indeed, as Lewis (2000) provided, while non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may act as organization spaces for activism, they also present spaces into which governmental power can be projected. The extent to which the state or government does this is also evident in the literature and it runs from the idea of transformation of CSOs into "public utilities" and "semi-public agencies" (van Biezen, 2004 in Saglie and Sivesind, 2018) and "state agencies" (Dreher, Molders, and Nunnenkamp, 2007) to states' colonization of voluntary organizations (Lorentzen, 2004 in Saglie and Sivesind, 2018).

CSOs' sources of funding, be it the state or external donors, also has serious implications on their autonomy. For instance, it is claimed that NGOs in developing countries rely heavily on foreign donor funding and donor dominance is evident (AbouAssi, 2012) to the extent that NGOs re-align their priorities with donor interests (Parks, 2008) and appropriate activities to funders' priorities and demands (AbouAssi, 2014; Mosley, 2012). In this case, CSOs may thus have limited possibilities of making ethically consistent decisions in view of their sources of funding (Egerer, Kankainen, and Hellman, 2018). Similarly, the heavy reliance on external donor's funding by CSOs resulted to its disconnect from local publics (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2015) or as Ishkanian (2014) noted, with particular reference to post-Soviet societies, to its reduction to professionalized NGOs that were engaged in advocacy which supported liberal Western values, thereby losing its

diversity and authenticity—a stab on the very legitimacy of CSOs. Indeed, as in recent years, studies about and calls for NGO accountability are continuously mounting (see for example, Ebrahim, 2003; Jepson, 2005; O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015; O'Leary, 2017).

As an emerging body of literature, and which narrows the supposed divide between the optimists and skeptics, a possible third strand looks at the conditions under which civil society may affect control of corruption, including media, government transparency, political competition, and important legal, political and socioeconomic contexts partly shaped by national governments (see Donaghy, 2011; Uhlin, 2009, 2010; Marinova, 2011; Widojoko, 2017). What is common among the last group of scholars above is the belief that civil society cannot constitute a single, independent force in the anti-corruption movement and reform. The current study is directed towards an exploration of these conditions and their configurations.

2.3. The conditions for corruption and why civil society's anti-corruption role is conditional

In policy, anti-corruption experts caution that if corruption reform does not tackle other actors or issues simultaneously with other concerns, they are most like to fail (You, 2015). From a similar configurational fashion, that civil society plays an ambivalent role in anti-corruption (Harasymiw, 2019) is not surprising. Several scholars have put forward that civil society may or may not be decisive in addressing corruption depending on circumstances and contexts. These factors are as well diverse—from civil society's characteristics (Donaghy, 2011; Uhlin, 2009, 2010; Widojoko, 2017) to those of the external environment (Grimes, 2013; Themudo, 2013) including politico-legal institutional partly shaped by the state (Marinova, 2011) to historical antecedents (Baiocchi et al., 2008).

Although not the only relevant aspect of civil society's strength, CSOs are often able to influence policy through their resources and policy expertise (Schrama and Zhelyazkova, 2018). Social capital theorists posit that it is through civil society that citizens are able to mobilize for collective action (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Wollebæk and Selle, 2007)—a large membership base serves to legitimize civic causes and amplifies citizens' voices. As Schrama and Zhelyazkova (2018) note, governments are likely to be more responsive to inputs from CSOs in countries and issue areas that attract high civic engagement. Similarly, in order to influence policies, CSOs cooperate with the state. As an intermediary structure, civil society mediates state-society relations by aggregating societal interests and communicating societal preferences to policy-makers (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999, Treib, et al., 2007). It is in this regard that political opportunity structures scholars mainly from political sociology come in. They posit that civil society's influence on policy also depends on the opportunity structures provided by the state (Kriesi, et al., 1992, Della Porta, 2009). While civil society enjoys a certain degree of autonomy especially in liberal democracies, the state still regulates it. As structuralists claim, the state establishes the framework within which civil society operates (Bernhard, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996). States can thus empower CSOs by providing them public recognition and access to policy-making through consultation mechanisms or disarm them through denial of such opportunities (Harasymiw, 2019). Among the drivers for civil society's ineffectiveness as an anti-corruption actor stems from this lack of domestic structural support even at the presence of international pressure (Harasymiw, 2019). The worry over the shrinking of the civic space as part of a state's autocratization efforts thus becomes all the more material. *The presence of a robust civil society* is thus the first condition in the analysis.

Together with restrictive legislation regarding CSOs, the tightening of civic space also results from the passage of restrictive legislation governing the media. In states moving towards autocratization, this formula seems to be at work. Although in developed societies with a strong tradition of rule of law civil society can make a definite contribution in anti-corruption (Harasymiv, 2019), elsewhere, civil society's anti-corruption role hinges on several conditions, high press freedom (Grimes, 2013) included. The positive effects of media on corruption are highlighted in the extant literature (Ahrend, 2002; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Djankov et.al., 2003; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). Free media, especially that which constrains discretionary government action, lays the ground for an environment where strong collective action flourishes (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2016) and where civil society eventually feeds on. As Mungiu-Pippidi (2016) herself claims, the positive effects of the transparency tools to control of corruption are stronger in the context of free and independent media. Similalry, Themudo (2013) argues that the impact of civil society largely depends on its ability to generate sufficient public pressure, which is dependent on the extent of freedom of the press. While the association between media freedom and corruption is strong and runs from high levels of media freedom to low levels of corruption, results from Camaj (2013) suggest that media freedom might have a stronger indirect effect on corruption when coupled with powerful institutions of horizontal accountability. Similarly, and in a seemingly configurational manner, Mela (2009) found that where press freedom accompanies and democratic governance sustains rule of law, the effect of rule of law in curbing corruption is evident. Among the critical supporting factors for CSO to be consistently an effective anti-corruption agent is the media (Harasymiw, 2019), and governmental crackdown on such apparatus has serious implications in anti-corruption. Thus, *the existence of extensive media freedoms* is considered another important condition.

Civil society become venues for deliberation by organizing and communicating information to publics, thereby provoking public deliberation and monitoring of public officials and institutions (Warren, 2011). This policy representation of citizens is similarly a democratic function of civil society. However, while civil society serves institutional functions necessary for democracy to work, such functions are not necessary to civil society as such. As Warren (2011) notes, they follow from democratic associational ecologies that are comprised of those kinds of associations whose characteristics incline them towards democratic effects. Thus, civil society's role is also contingent on the general state of public deliberation and policy representation in a country. Transparency research and the literature on democratic governance emphasize the importance of institutionalizing spaces for the expression of the voice of the people. Probes into the impact of public deliberation, including its independence and quality, on public policies similarly abound. The literature on collaborative governance as democratic reconstruction, for instance, points to the importance of democratic engagement with citizens as it improves trust in government by enhancing public participation and deliberation in public affairs (Newman *et al.*, 2004; Innes and Booher, 1999). The positive way the state interacts with both citizens and nongovernmental organizations through collaborative governance can resolve seemingly intractable public policy problems and produce successful policy outcomes (Booher, 2004). Thus, *wide and independent public deliberation* during important policy changes becomes a pertinent condition. Consequently, *the existence of socio-political integration*, the wider stable patterns of representation that mediate between society and the state, is another relevant condition.

The extent to which citizen's opinions are effectively integrated as policy input factors expands the democratic principle of inclusion, and civil society has a role to play in this regard. Less inclusive forms of governance resulting from a decline of democratic regime attributes

(Leininger and Lührmann, 2019) has implications as well on civil society's anti-corruption efforts. Why the costs of democratization are high and the resistance on the adoption of democratic institutions strong for those that benefit from high levels of inequality is expected in autocratization: democracy could empower the poor and the middle-class voters to achieve redistribution. The limits placed on the role of citizens to select leaders, access justice, and influence policy due to their political positions are encouraged by elite capture, co-option, and personalized leadership characteristic of clientelistic structures. Among the reasons for the failure of NGOs Lewis (2017) cites is the presence of an institutional setting dominated by clientelism. It is this unequal distribution of socioeconomic and political resources that remains a critical element for the stability of democratic systems as conditions of inequality between different social groups shape the character of state-citizen relations, and the processes of democratization and dedemocratization (Tilly, 2007). Civil society aids in the reduction of such political exclusion by enabling people to build trust networks, cross-class alliances, and encourage synergistic relations between the civil and political society (King and Hickey, 2015; Brett, 2017). Moreover, civil society functions as the social infrastructure of the public spheres from which collective decisions derive their legitimacy via inclusion and public deliberation (Warren, 2011). The extent to which trust networks are integrated into public affairs and how far anti-corruption policy is insulated from such inequality determines not only its legitimacy but also its success. Based on these, *the presence of political exclusion* is another condition.

The general theoretical expectation then is that the absence of the first four conditions and the presence of the last one contribute to the presence of high perceived corruption. However, it is also posited that, based on the "conditionality" literature, the anti-corruption effect of CSOs, herein indicated by the *presence of a robust civil society* condition, is only possible in combination with

the other conditions noted above. The conditions chosen were limited to those that are also indicative of democracy, and the study does not account for all potentially relevant factors, since it is also the goal to look at corruption in states experiencing autocratization.

2.4. Differential role for civil society? Corruption in democracies and autocratizing states

From the perspective of QCA, corruption is conjunctural, equifinal, asymmetrical, and multifinal (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of QCA as an approach). The paper rests on this configurational character of corruption. Similarly, the conditionality of civil society's anti-corruption role is explained from the standpoint of QCA; that is, such role is dependent on the presence or absence of the other specified conditions. Context is also central in this regard. In what follows, I review the larger democracy-corruption nexus and the supposed anti-corruption role of civil society in different regimes.

Looking at corruption and anti-corruption in regimes of different types is one way to understand corruption as a political phenomenon. Amundsen and Jackson (2021) claim that "the nature of a regime or polity affects both the nature of corruption in the country and the abuses of anti-corruption interventions" (p. 1). They continue that such regimes differ, among many others, as to the type and scale of corrupt practices that are mostly in place, the government's power and capacity to curb such practices, and in the independence and capacity of institutions and social actors outside of the government to pursue much needed anti-corruption reforms (p.2). Consequently, they propose that while anti-corruption interventions succeed by means of the introduction of reforms to political institutions, building capacity of enforcement institutions, and reinforcement of civil society oversight, it transpires only to the extent that the nature of the polity is considered.

In emerging democracies, or those that are in transition, corruption is a transitional phenomenon given that procedural practices have yet to be founded on firm liberal culture and effective institutions (Harris-White and White, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Among intermediate democracies, the eventual consolidation of democratic institutions would reduce corruption (Sung, 2004). In fully consolidated democracies, anti-corruption is usually a government agenda promoted and supported by the electorate, media, and civil society. While corruption is sporadic and limited in these polities, anti-corruption primarily centers on refinement of laws, of investigation, and of enforcement (Amundsen & Jackson, 2021). In backsliding democracies, or autocratizing states as referred to in this dissertation, anti-corruption is increasingly a concern. As Amundsen and Jackson (2021) note, "because de-democratizing leaders and would-be autocrats benefit from corruption, traditional governance-focused reforms are rolled back, and traditional anti-corruption measures can be hijacked and weaponized" (p.4). Here, as the case of extractive political corruption shows, corruption serves a political purpose beyond personal pecuniary enrichment. In illiberal regimes, the purpose of corruption is to curb citizen influence, reduce accountability, subvert institutional checks and balances, and establish a non-competitive political system. They caution therefore that anti-corruption is of strategic importance if it forms part of the broader domestic agenda and international alliance to halt de-democratization (p. 3).

The supposed anti-corruption role of civil society in democracies is as complex as the relationship between democracy and corruption itself. Under certain circumstances, civil society may strengthen and stabilize democracy (Boulding & Nelson-Nuñez, 2014). Rose-Ackerman (2007) posit that it is only when well-functioning democratic institutions are in place that growth and transformation can begin. Under this pretext, the anti-corruption role of civil society primarily rests on the presence and consolidation of other institutions of democracy. Boulding (2014)

acknowledges that while civil society may promote political participation in all minimally democratic contexts, the type of participation that emerges will depend on the quality of democracy specifically the extent to which elections are competitive and perceived to be free and fair (p.37). Thus, where these institutions in place are strong and well developed, civil society is thought to contribute to anti-corruption.

On the other hand, Hira (2016) notes that while democracy should encourage more competition and alteration of clientelistic networks through civil society, having a democracy is not a requirement for anti-corruption. Cornell and Grimes (2015) caution that at times, civil society also contributes to political instability. Thus, under certain deteriorating conditions, civil society may as much be a burden as a help (Encarnación, 2012). Particularly where dissent is risky, corruption issues are one way newly formed assertive social groups take regimes to task without directly challenging their claims to rule (Johnston & Hao, 2005 in Johnston, 2009, p. 5). In the case of competitive authoritarian regimes, dissenting social forces turn to civil society as they have no access to political institutions to democratically challenge the government. Unlike in closed autocracies, competitive authoritarian regimes engage with rather than eliminate civil society as they cannot ignore societal consent and legitimacy and rule by pure coercion (p. 286). The case of autocratizing states is no different. Understanding how and where autocratization or de-democratization begins is crucial in understanding the severe consequences of democratic backsliding for anti-corruption (Amundsen & Jackson, 2021, p. 6). The Varieties of Democracy (2020) report notes that in countries that slid in the last ten years, the scope for media and civil society were first restricted, including political opposition them being watchdogs, followed by elections. Amundsen and Jackson (2021) highlight the double bind of corruption in these regimes: corruption becomes more systemic even as democratic checks and balances are eroded (p. 8).

Autocratization can thus lead to the possibility of a co-opted civil society. This has serious repercussions to the anti-corruption role of civil society. First, the growth and diversification of civil society in such regimes (including in competitive authoritarian ones) cannot guarantee for its ability to become agents of democratic change (Giersdorf & Croissant, 2011; Yabanci, 2019). Second, given the politicization of civil society, the roles of the civil society are contingent to the preferences of the government. Under faux collaboration (façade of cooperation) and non-collaborative co-presence (shared governance role without compromise-based solutions), active civil engagement may produce suboptimal outcomes. Worse, civil society may hinder long-term goals of anti-corruption, including democratization and effective governance (Zaloznaya, et al., 2018).

Thus, the importance of context, in this case the polity or regime, in understanding both corruption and the anti-corruption role of civil society cannot be understated. Tilly (2003) opines that civil society lends organizational structure to social interactions and this relational power may be channeled into different forms of political action in different political regimes. Any study of civil society, if it were to contribute to our further understanding of the corruption-democracy nexus, must consider the characteristics of the institutional environment and the regime. Boulding's (2014) pertinent question succinctly captures this: which institutional conditions might influence whether civil society is inclined to work toward developing clientelistic relationships with politicians, or conversely, when they may be more likely to employ other strategies for serving members' needs (p.676)? Moreover, given this, one may ask, does civil society play the same anti-corruption role in autocratizing states (explored in Chapter 5) as it does in democratic contexts (explored in Chapter 6)? The methodological considerations and research design through which these preceding questions are answered are noted in the following chapter.

Chapter 3
Researching corruption-civil society nexus: Methodological choices and research design

1. Set-theoretic method in corruption research: A missing piece?

Corruption is studied not only from different academic disciplines and theoretical perspectives but also from a myriad of empirical approaches. While this is the case, most of corruption research is rather statistical and cross-sectional and less comparative (Johnston, 2009). There is also a long tradition for in-depth case studies that explore it. However, despite the influx of articles and scholarly publications on corruption, set-theoretic method, particularly Qualitative Comparative Analysis, is yet to be applied extensively. Only few studies on the configurations of corruption have so far been done (Stevens, 2016; Ingrams, 2018; Zimelis, 2019; Dunlop et. al, 2020). This, despite the increase of QCA applications since its introduction in 1987 by Charles Ragin.

Missing from the current scholarship is the treatment of corruption as characterized by causal complexity in set-theoretic terms (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). From the standpoint of QCA, corruption implies conjunctural causation, equifinality, asymmetry, and multifinality. First, *corruption results from conjunctural causation*; that is, it is a product of a combination of different conditions. *Corruption is also equifinal*: there are possibly multiple pathways to corruption. Third, the absence of conditions that lead to corruption may not necessarily lead to its absence; thus, *corruption is asymmetrical.* Lastly, *corruption implies multifinality*: the conditions leading to corruption may be causally relevant for both the presence of corruption and its absence.

Most of the studies thus far treat corruption symmetrically and this is where QCA can contribute further. The symmetrical treatment of corruption assumes that what causes corruption is the same mirror image of what could bring about anti-corruption. Addressing the causes of

corruption is not necessarily the same that would bring about an effective anti-corruption. In set-relational terms, the conditions for the presence of corruption are and possibly different for its absence. Perhaps, this is what Zimelis (2020) pushes for when claiming that anti-corruption should also be studied and not just corruption, to wit: "we need to study specifically the elements of anti-corruption, especially those that lead to more effective anti-corruption, to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the causes and remedies to corruption" (p. 298).

The analysis of the contextual dependencies of corruption remains as an important agenda in corruption research. However, the identification and exploration of which of these conditions and their configuration leads to both the absence and/or presence of corruption remain relatively wanting. In what follows, I explain the study design from a correlational approach to corruption to a set-relational one.

2. From correlation to set relation: The study design

The dissertation progresses from correlation (Chapter 4) to set relation (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 4 provides a long-running analysis of the variables that account for corruption for about 20000 cases from 200 countries and territories spanning the period of 1789 to 2017. This serves as a springboard for the next study which is a configurational analysis of corruption. In Chapter 5, given the importance of context as noted in the literature in the preceding sections, a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of 33 autocratizing states from 1994 to 2017 is conducted. Under the pretext that the conditions for corruption and its configuration in autocratizing states may possibly be different with other contexts, and that the anti-corruption role of civil society in these said contexts may not only be conditional but differential, a separate QCA for 30 non-autocratizing democracies from the same time frame (1994-2017) is performed in

Chapter 6. The table below shows the progression of the approach of the dissertation, followed by a discussion of the methodological considerations in each of the specific studies in the next section.

Table 3.1 The study design

Approach	Test	Scope	Dissertation section
Correlation	Hierarchical multiple regression	200 countries and territories (1789-2017)	Chapter 4- Study 1
Set relation	Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA)	33 Autocratizing states (1994-2017)	Chapter 5- Study 2
		30 Non-autocratizing democracies (1994-2017)	Chapter 6- Study 3

3. The three studies

3.1. Study 1

As a springboard for the next two studies, the first argues that civil society affects corruption mitigation through a number of factors (the specific hypotheses are presented in Chapter 4, 2. Hypotheses). A four-step hierarchical multiple regression was performed to investigate the predictive capacity of civil society environment, transparency and predictability of laws, and rigorousness and impartiality of public administration factors on the level of political corruption (N=23652) while controlling for the effect of civil society structure. Preliminary analyses were conducted to test whether assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity were violated. Results indicate that multicollinearity was unlikely to be a problem. Missing data were handled using listwise deletion for better comparability.

3.1.1. Data and variables

This study relied on the data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)[5], which covers about 200 countries with a time-series from as early as 1789 to 2017. The data used here are measured in an ordinal scale and calculated into interval scale by the measurement model of the V-Dem, except for political corruption, which was already in interval scale[6].

3.1.1.1 Dependent variable

3.1.1.1.1 Political corruption index

This is an aggregate of four different variables in the V-Dem, which reflect how pervasive political corruption is in the countries. The political corruption index *(v2x_corr)* includes six distinct types of corruption that covers both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. The index includes two other indices, namely, public sector corruption index *(v2x_pubcorr)* and executive corruption index *(v2x_execorr)*, and two other variables, namely, legislature corrupt activities *(v2lgcrrpt)* and judicial corruption decision (*v2jucorrdc)* (see MacMann *et al.*, 2015; Coppedge *et al.*, 2018).

3.1.1.2 Independent variables

The key independent variables are civil society structure, civil society environment, transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement, and rigorousness and impartiality of public administration.

[5] It is a new approach to conceptualization and measurement of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame (Coppedge, *et al.*, 2018).

[6] See Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Juraj Medzihorsky, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Natalia Stepanova, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Steven Wilson. 2018. "V-Dem Methodology v8". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project for discussion on the methodology of the V-Dem.

3.1.1.2.1 Civil society structure

This variable measures the strength of CSOs. It is argued that the strength of CSOs are significant in its anti-corruption effects but it is conditioned by three factors: civil society environment, transparency of laws, and rigorousness of public administration. Two (2) variables from the V-Dem are used to indicate civil society structure: *CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt)*, which describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations; and *CSO consultation (v2cscnsult)*, which describes whether major civil society organizations are routinely consulted by policy makers on policies relevant to their members. Similar to the succeeding variables, the preceding indicators flow from less democratic to more democratic, unlike in the dependent variable, *political corruption index,* which flows from less corrupt to more corrupt.

3.1.1.2.2 Civil society environment

This is divided into two (2) main variables from the V-Dem, which are *CSO repression (v2csreprss)*, which looks at whether the government attempts to repress civil society organizations; and *CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs)*, which assesses the extent to which the government achieves control over entry and exit by civil society organizations in to public life (see Bernhard *et al.,* 2015; Coppedge *et al.*, 2018).

3.1.1.2.3 Transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement (v2cltrnslw)

This variable measures the extent to which the laws are transparent and predictable. Specifically, it asks the question: are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner? (see Pemstein *et al.,* 2018; Coppedge *et al.*, 2018).

3.1.1.2.4 Rigorousness and impartiality of public administration (v2clfmove)

It focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases. It asks whether public officials are rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties (see Pemstein *et al.*, 2018; Coppedge *et al.*, 2018).

3.2. Study 2

Based on the first study, given that only one formula for corruption was derived from the quantitative analysis, an fsQCA was performed to identify the multiple pathways to corruption in autocratizing states. In what follows, the case selection is explained, QCA as a method elaborated, and data and calibration strategies presented.

3.2.1. Case selection

Ideally, in order to maximize the generalizability of the findings of the dissertation, all cases of autocratization must be evaluated. Based from the V-Dem 2018 dataset, Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) identified autocratization episodes starting from the first wave (1922-1942) to the second (1960-1975) and third (1994-2017) waves, with a total of 215 episodes in 109 countries since 1900. They consider autocratization episodes as "connected periods of time with a substantial decline in democratic regime traits"[7] (p.6). These episodes were identified through the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)[8], which captures the "extent to which regimes achieve the core institutional requirements in Dahl's conceptualization of electoral democracy as polyarchy: universal suffrage, officials elected in free and fair elections, alternative sources of information

[7] Autocratization is operationalized by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) as a substantial decline on the EDI (within one year or over a connected time period), where a decline is considered substantial if it amounts to a drop of 0.1 or more on the EDI. Countries are considered as democratic if they hold free and fair and de-facto multiparty elections, and achieve at least a minimal level of institutional guarantees as captured by the EDI.
[8] The EDI runs on a continuous scale (0-1) with higher values indicating better democratic condition (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019).

and freedom of speech as well as freedom of association" (p.6). While autocratization also transpired in countries that were already autocracies, the present study only concerns autocratization episodes that started in democracies. Since QCA necessitates a familiar and in-depth understanding of all the cases in the study, I decided to choose only cases of contemporary democratic reversals, or those in the third wave, as shown in Table 3.2.

After all, while this backsliding is problematic in any country regardless of the system, "the loss of democratic traits in regimes that were democratic when an autocratization episode started matters more for the state of democracy in the world than further deterioration in already autocratic regimes" (Lührmann and Linberg, 2019, p.10). Noting the cases of CSO repression, why the alarm of democratic backsliding is considered more draconian to democracies than autocracies is succinctly put by Swiney (2019): "while unreasonable restrictions placed on CSOs are problematic in any country irrespective of their political system, such restrictions are uniquely problematic in democratic states for the simple, but profoundly consequential, reason that civil society is critical to the ongoing existence of a democracy".

Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the distribution of the autocratization episodes by time period and regime. In the pre-third wave, of the 140 total episodes of autocratization, 28 started in democracies and 112 were from autocracies. On the other hand, out of 75 autocratization episodes in the third wave, 47 were from democracies and 28 were from autocracies. As shown in Table 3.3, the chosen 47 autocratization episodes in democracies in the third wave account for 63% of all autocratization episodes in the given period. This same number accounts for 22% of all episodes of autocratization since the first wave as shown in Table 3.4.

Table 3.2 Autocratization episodes in democracies in the third wave

Country	Begin	End	EDI before	EDI end	Rate	Type of Autocratization
Armenia	1993	1998	0.67	0.41	9.62	Democratic Erosion
Bangladesh	2002	2007	0.57	0.23	24.62	Military Coup
Belarus	1995	2005	0.60	0.23	7.91	Democratic Erosion
Bolivia	2006	2015	0.78	0.63	4.90	Democratic Erosion
Brazil	2012	2017	0.89	0.75	7.66	Democratic Erosion
Burkina Faso	2014	2015	0.65	0.37	20.59	Democratic Erosion
Comoros	1999	2000	0.50	0.23	19.71	Military Coup
Comoros	2015	2017	0.61	0.46	12.73	Democratic Erosion
Croatia	2013	2017	0.85	0.67	8.00	Democratic Erosion
Dom. Rep.	2015	2017	0.65	0.54	4.88	Democratic Erosion
Ecuador	2008	2010	0.74	0.60	7.07	Democratic Erosion
Fiji	2000	2001	0.63	0.27	24.26	Military Coup
Fiji	2006	2009	0.59	0.15	36.77	Military Coup
Ghana	2012	2017	0.77	0.64	6.32	Democratic Erosion
Honduras	2009	2010	0.58	0.46	7.31	Military Coup
Hungary	2010	2017	0.82	0.63	5.67	Democratic Erosion
Lesotho	2015	2017	0.71	0.56	10.51	Democratic Erosion
Libya	2014	2017	0.51	0.27	22.65	Military Coup*
Macedonia	2005	2012	0.66	0.47	6.86	Democratic Erosion
Madagascar	1997	2002	0.57	0.45	8.09	Democratic Erosion
Malawi	1999	2005	0.61	0.47	5.25	Democratic Erosion
Maldives	2012	2017	0.60	0.35	9.29	Democratic Erosion
Mali	2012	2013	0.63	0.29	29.86	Military Coup
Moldova	2000	2006	0.66	0.47	5.59	Democratic Erosion
Moldova	2012	2017	0.69	0.56	4.56	Democratic Erosion
Nepal	2012	2013	0.55	0.27	17.58	Military Coup
Nicaragua	1996	1999	0.74	0.62	7.38	Democratic Erosion
Nicaragua	2003	2017	0.66	0.31	11.24	Democratic Erosion
Niger	1995	1996	0.57	0.33	23.34	Military Coup
Niger	2009	2010	0.62	0.27	18.03	Military Coup
Niger	2013	2017	0.65	0.54	5.37	Democratic Erosion
Philippines	2001	2005	0.63	0.50	3.84	Military Coup
Poland	2013	2017	0.91	0.73	10.21	Democratic Erosion
Russia	1993	2017	0.53	0.27	5.36	Democratic Erosion
Serbia	2006	2017	0.69	0.45	7.37	Democratic Erosion
Solomon Islands	1997	2001	0.57	0.26	15.94	Democratic Erosion
South Korea	2008	2014	0.85	0.71	6.38	Democratic Erosion
Spain	2013	2017	0.88	0.77	4.57	Democratic Erosion
Sri Lanka	2004	2008	0.57	0.43	6.95	Democratic Erosion
Thailand	2005	2007	0.55	0.18	26.40	Military Coup
Thailand	2013	2016	0.55	0.14	23.69	Military Coup
Turkey	2008	2017	0.67	0.34	7.17	Democratic Erosion
Ukraine	1997	2002	0.59	0.40	7.88	Democratic Erosion
Ukraine	2010	2015	0.64	0.38	7.04	Military Coup*
Vanuatu	1988	1996	0.71	0.59	4.33	Democratic Erosion
Venezuela	1999	2008	0.79	0.45	10.17	Democratic Erosion
Zambia	2010	2017	0.57	0.35	6.71	Democratic Erosion

Note: The Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) ranges from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic). The autocratization rate captures the maximum EDI depletion during an autocratization episode as a percentage of its highest value (1). High values indicate a sudden autocratization episode and low values a gradual one.

*The autocratization episodes in Libya (2014-17) and Ukraine (2010-15) do not fit to the classical definition of a military coup. The situation in Libya is best described as anarchy and the one in the Ukraine as a revolution. However, for the sake of parsimony we cannot generate new categories for these two cases. Since both involved a process by which the power of the Head of the Executive was limited by non-elite actors – the Maidan movement in the Ukrainian case and the rival government/civil war in the Libyan case – they best fit to the category of military coup.

Source: Lührmann and Linberg (2019)

Table 3.3 Total episodes of autocratization in democracies and autocracies

Period	Democracies		Autocracies		Total episodes
	Number of episodes	Percentage	Number of episodes	Percentage	
Pre-third wave	28	37.33	112	80	140
Third wave	47	62.67	28	20	75
Total	75	100	140	100	215

Source: Author calculation based from Lührmann and Linberg (2019)

Table 3.4 Percentage distribution of all episodes of autocratization

Regimes	Period	No. of episodes	Percentage
Democracies	Pre-third wave	28	13.02
	Third wave	47	21.86
Autocracies	Pre-third wave	112	52.1
	Third wave	28	13.02
Total		215	100

Source: Author calculation based from Lührmann and Linberg (2019)

Of the 47 episodes of autocratization that stemmed from democracies, microstates that have a population of less than 1 million (based from the CIA World Factbook data) were removed: Vanuatu, Comoros, Fiji, Maldives, and Solomon Islands. Similarly, when data for one of the conditions for each episode of autocratization is missing, such case or episode is not included. Thus, the sample included all the countries for which complete data were available. This yields to a total of 33 cases.

The episodes comprise of several continuous years, with beginning and ending points, and some continued until 2017 (as covered by V-Dem 2018 dataset when this study was started; a more recent version is available, and this could possibly lead to changes in cases). I only selected the end point of the autocratization episode to be included in the cases; when such episode was continuing, I chose the latest year for such episode. For instance, in an autocratization episode in The Philippines that started in 2001 and ended in 2005, its 2005 scores were utilized. When it is a continuing episode such as Ghana (2012-2017), its 2017 scores were used. Because I created macroconditions from several conditions, while it was possible to use the maximum autocratization score in a given episode as base year, for consistency reasons, I chose the above-mentioned years. After all, the years in the episodes were still considered as statistically significant autocratization episodes (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Moreover, since I utilized the original ordinal data from the sources instead of the transformed interval data, it was not possible to aggregate the years to come up with one score for an entire episode. Lastly, since an autocratization episode may start again in a country a year after it ended, it is possible to have more than one episode from the same country as a case. The chosen cases are presented in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5 Contemporary cases of autocratization

Type of autocratization	Episodes	Selected case
Democratic erosion	Belarus 1995-2005	Belarus 2005
	Bolivia 2006-2015	Bolivia 2015
	Brazil 2012-2017	Brazil 2017
	Croatia 2013-2017	Croatia 2017
	Dom. Rep. 2015-2017	Dom. Rep. 2017
	Ecuador 2008-2010	Ecuador 2010
	Ghana 2012-2017	Ghana 2017
	Hungary 2010-2017	Hungary 2017
	Lesotho 2015-2017	Lesotho 2017
	Macedonia 2005-2012	Macedonia 2012
	Malawi 2000-2005	Malawi 2005
	Moldova 2000-2006	Moldova 2006
	Moldova 2012-2017	Moldova 2017
	Nepal 2012-2013	Nepal 2013
	Niger 2013-2017	Niger 2017
	Poland 2013-2017	Poland 2017
	Russia 1993-2017	Russia 2017
	Serbia 2006-2017	Serbia 2017
	South Korea 2008-2014	South Korea 2014
	Sri Lanka 2004-2008	Sri Lanka 2008
	Turkey 2008-2017	Turkey 2017
	Venezuela 1999-2008	Venezuela 2008
	Zambia 2010-2017	Zambia 2017
Military coup	Bangladesh 2002-2007	Bangladesh 2007
	Burkina Faso 2014-2015	Burkina Faso 2015
	Honduras 2009-2010	Honduras 2010
	Libya 2014-2017	Libya 2017
	Mali 2012-2013	Mali 2013
	Niger 2009-2010	Niger 2010
	Philippines 2001-2005	Philippines 2005
	Thailand 2005-2007	Thailand 2007
	Thailand 2013-2016	Thailand 2016
	Ukraine 2010-2015	Ukraine 2015

3.2.2. Method

While current research on CSO's effects have stated their results in a seemingly configurational manner albeit drawing mostly from quantitative methods, they have not formalized such as set relations and in causal complexity. Similarly, while there are cross-national studies on the causes of corruption, most of these are highly quantitative and to a much lesser extent, qualitative. I departarted from these studies by utilizing qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), a comparative analytical technique that has the strengths of large-N statistical studies (variable-oriented) and small-N case study research (case-oriented) (Ragin, 1987). As a point of departure and as a means forward, through QCA, the dissertation contends that, as in the case with case-oriented methods, there is a possibility that (1) the effects of single factors may depend on the presence or absence of other conditions *(conjunctural causation)* and (2) unlike those offered by standard regression analyses, there may be multiple paths to the same outcome *(equifinality)* (Gerring, 2007). This is currently neglected in the extant literature. As such, my dissertation also intends to fill in not only a theoretical but also a methodological gap in the study of corruption.

As a configurational approach, QCA examines set relations between cases, rather than correlations between variables (Ragin, 2000). These cases then are described as to their degree of membership in the set of cases that has a specified condition. QCA then identifies whether specified conditions or configurations of conditions (including those that are linked by the Boolean operators, AND and OR) can be considered as being consistently necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome to occur (Stevens, 2016). Since it can provide consistency scores for each condition or configurations of condition, it can also determine which of them are either individually necessary, sufficient, or both (Arugay, 2014).

A necessary cause produces the outcome but usually in conjunction with other causes. There are two interrelated measures of fit associated with QCA: consistency and coverage. Consistency "gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given condition, thought to be necessary, agree in displaying the outcome in question". As the consistency score of a cause approaches one (1), it becomes increasingly a necessary condition for a given outcome. High consistency scores (i.e., more than 0.75) also mean fewer *logical contradictions*, which are cases which have the same cause/s but have opposite outcomes. On the other hand, coverage is "the degree to which instances of the condition is paired with instances of the outcome" (Ragin, 2008, pp.44-45). Coverage scores are relevant only if consistency scores are high since variance in the impact of the cause or set of causes are minimized (Grofman and Schneider, 2009). Given a high consistency score, the coverage score of a given causal condition tells us to what extent it can explain the outcome from the universe of cases (Arugay, 2014).

A sufficient cause is one that is capable of producing the outcome but is not the only cause with this capability. There can also be several or multiple combinations of causes, that is, the outcome is determined by equifinality or conjunctural causation (Arugay, 2014) as argued for in this study. Since there are five hypothesized causes in the study, there can be thirty-two (32) causal configurations[9]. Similar to the causal necessity test, the most important configurations are those where consistency scores are above 0.75.

Specifically, I use a fuzzy set QCA, which uses a coding scheme with a continuous scale from 0 to 1 with assigned thresholds for each value. Whether a case is a full member or non-member of a given condition or outcome is decided through calibration (assignment of fuzzy set scores) based on the researcher's specification of three thresholds: full membership (1), full

[9] The formula in determining the total number of rows or causal configurations is 2^k where k is the number of conditions (Ragin, Strand, and Rubinson, 2008).

exclusion (0), and crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5). A case that has a value that is higher than the chosen threshold for full inclusion would be assigned a score of 1 (full membership) while a case that has a value that is just below this threshold would have a score just below 1. A case with a value that is below the threshold for full exclusion from the set will be assigned a fuzzy set score of 0. A case that has a value near the chosen crossover point of maximum ambiguity will be assigned a fuzzy set score near 0.5 (Stevens, 2016). Since fuzzy set scores range from 0 to 1, the differences as to the extent of membership of a case to the given conditions and outcome are observed unlike in crisp-set QCA where membership to a set is only dichotomous (full membership and exclusion only). Fuzzy set allows the researcher therefore to incorporate finer gradation in the analysis (Ragin, 2008).

The results of the QCA will offer a complex solution (causal configuration) to corruption. Fuzzy set QCA provides an option to minimize this complex solution to a parsimonious one based on the rules of Boolean algebra (Arugay, 2014). It does so by eliminating inconsistent configurations (those whose consistency scores were below 0.75). Inconsistent causal configurations mean that while they share the same combination of causal condition, they did not lead to the outcome (Arugay, 2014).

3.2.3. Data and calibration

3.2.3.1 Outcome

The outcome of interest is high perceived corruption (HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP). Public perception of corruption is used as an appropriate gauge of the effectiveness of anti-corruption (policy). A lag of two years was used for the outcome data, following the end point or latest year in the autocratization episode. The data thus follows the country-year format.

Since the interest here is on national levels of corruption rather than particular forms of corruption, data come from the Control of Corruption from the World Governance Indicators by the World Bank. Such capture perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. The scores range from +2.5 to -2.5 (better to poor). Based on the method originally used, for a given episode or country to be fully in the set of HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, it must have a governance score of -1.2815 (10^{th} percentile) and below. For it to be out of the given set, its rating must be +1.2815 (90^{th} percentile) and above. The maximum point of ambiguity or cross-over point is 0, which is typically the mean in a z-score distribution. The direct method of calibration was thus used, and the resulting outcome is a continuous fuzzy set. All data sources and summary of calibration thresholds are presented in Table 3.6.

3.2.3.2 Conditions

3.2.3.2.1 Robust civil society (ROBUSTCSO)

This is a macrocondition derived from four indicators of robustness of civil society that measure both the strength of civil society as to membership (CSOparticipation) and policy (CSOconsultation) and the external environment within which they operate (CSOrepression and CSOentryexit). The ordinal scores were calibrated with the corresponding four-value fuzzy set: 0, 0.33, 0.67 and 1, where 1 is fully in and 0 is fully out of the given set. In combining these scores, given that all four sub-conditions must be present for a robust civil society to exist, the final score for the condition ROBUSTCSO is derived using the *min* function which takes the minimum score in the four sub-conditions. This reflects the logical AND (*) in Boolean logic:

CSOparticipation*CSOConsultation*CSOrepression*CSOentryexit[10]. Data come from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 2018 project.

3.2.3.2.2 Extensive media freedoms (EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE)

Similar above, this condition is a macrocondition indicative of how independent the media is. Such does not only involve the absence of government repression on the media (Govmediacensor), but also the presence of a critical media (Critmedia) and the extent to which the media represents a wide range of political perspectives (Mediabias). A four-value fuzzy set is also used as thresholds as above. Data is culled from the V-Dem 2018.

3.2.3.2.3 Wide and independent public deliberation (ENGAGE)

This condition is a measure of the extent of public deliberations during important policy changes. The original ordinal data used six qualitative assessments with corresponding numerical scores. The same assessment was used for the six-value fuzzy set for the manual or theoretical calibration: 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1. The data source is V-Dem 2018.

3.2.3.2.4 High socio-political integration (SOCIOPOLINTEG)

This is taken from the "interest groups" data of the social and political integration measure in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). It is a measure of the existence of stable patterns of representation that mediate between society and the state. There are four qualitative assessments with corresponding numerical scores, and these are the same threshold used for the calibration of such ordinal data into four-value fuzzy set: 0, 0.33, 0.67 and 1.

3.2.3.2.5 High political exclusion (HIGHPOLEXCLU)

Unlike the conditions above which run from low to high level of democracy (worst to best), political exclusion, as a measure of denial of access to services or participation in governed spaces,

[10] As opposed to when the *max* function is used, where when only one of the conditions is sufficient, the maximum score in the four conditions is derived; hence, the logical OR (+).

runs the opposite. That is, higher scores mean worse (less democratic). As an index in the V-Dem 2018 Project that ranges from 0 to 1, it is calibrated into a continuous fuzzy set where 0.90 is full inclusion and 0.10 is full exclusion. The maximum ambiguity is set to 0.5.

Table 3.6 Calibration of conditions & outcome and data sources

CONDITIONS/OUTCOME	Measure/Questions	Calibration	Data Source
CONDITIONS			
Macrocondition:			
1. ROBUSTCSO			
a. CSOrepression	Does the government attempt to repress CSO? 0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). 2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.	(0 worst to 4 best) (less democratic to more democratic) 1= (4) 0.67= (3) 0.33= (2) 0= (0 and 1)	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

	3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. 4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.		
b. CSOentryexit	To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations into public life? 0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the	(0 worst to 4 best) 1: (4) 0.67: (3) 0.33: (2) 0: (0) and (1)	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

		government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience. 3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.		
c.	CSOconsultation	Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?	(0 worst to 2 best) 1: (2) CSOs are recognized as	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

	0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.	stakeholders in important policy areas and are routinely consulted by policy makers. 0: (0) and (1) CSO are not consulted or are consulted to some degree but CSOs are only one set of voices that policymakers **sometimes** take into account.	
d. CSOparticipation	Which of these best describes the involvement of people in CSOs? 0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them. 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal. 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.	(0 worst to 3 best) 1: (3) Many diverse CSOs exist, it is normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them 0.67: (2) There are many diverse CSOs; popular involvement is minimal 0.33: (1) There are voluntary CSOs but few people are active in them	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

		0: (0) state-sponsored CSOs, large people maybe active but participation is not purely voluntary	
Macrocondition: **2. EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE**			
a. Critmedia	Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government? 0: None. 1: Only a few marginal outlets. 2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do. 3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.	(0 worst to 3 best) 1: (3) All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally 0.67: (2) Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do 0.33: (1) Only a few marginal outlets 0: (0) None	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018
b. Govmediacensor	Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.	(0 worst to 4 best) 1: (4) absent 0.67: (3) 0.33: (1) and (2) 0: (0) present	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

	2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues. 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues. 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.		
c. Mediabias	Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives? 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective. 1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party. 2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society. 3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.	(0 worst to 3 best) 1: (3) 0.67: (2) 0.33: (1) 0: (0)	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018
3. ENGAGE	When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations? 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.	(0 worst to 5 best) 1: (5) Large numbers of non-elite groups and ordinary people discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

	1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas. 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas. 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.	neighborhoods, or in streets; grassroots deliberation common and unconstrained 0.8: (4) Public deliberation actively encouraged; broad segment of non-elite group often participate and vary with different issue-areas 0.6: (3) Public deliberation actively encouraged; some autonomous non-elite participate but confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tend to be the same across issue-areas 0.4: (2) Public deliberation is not repressed but infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites 0.2: (1) Some limited public deliberation

		allowed but the public below the elite level is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them 0: (0) Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed	
4. SOCIOPOLINTEG	As one of the five criteria of Democracy Status of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Political and Social Integration measures the existence of stable patterns of representation that mediate between society and the state and whether or not there is a consolidated civic culture. However, for each indicator of social and political integration, in this case "interest groups", the following were the scores used for the qualitative assessments, from 1 worst to 10 best: 9-10: There is a broad range of interest groups that reflect competing social interests, tend to balance one another and are cooperative. 6-8: There is an average range of interest groups, which reflect most social interests. However, a few strong interests dominate, producing a latent risk of pooling conflicts. 3-5: There is a narrow range of interest groups, in which important social interests are underrepresented. Only a few players dominate, and there is a risk of polarization.	1: (9-10) 0.67: (6-8) 0.33: (3-5) 0: (1-2)	Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2006-2020

	1-2: Interest groups are present only in isolated social segments, are on the whole poorly balanced and cooperate little. A large number of social interests remain unrepresented.		
5. HIGHPOLEXCLU	Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better. Interval, from low to high (0-1) The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol), and access to state	Continuous fuzzy set (0-1) 0.90 is fully in 0.5= cross-over point 0.10 is fully out	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018

	business opportunities by political group (v2peasbpol).		
OUTCOME			
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP	Runs from -2.5 to 2.5, higher scores mean better corruption condition. (Use public perceptions of political corruption as an appropriate gauge of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy)	1= -1.2815 (10^{th} percentile) 0.5=0 0= +1.2815 (90^{th} percentile)	World Bank's World Governance Indicator Control of Corruption

3.3. Study 3

Given the importance of context in QCA, the third study is an fsQCA of countries that did not experience substantial autocratization. As such, this third study is a follow through of the second.

3.3.1. Cases and conditions

The following cases of democracies not experiencing autocratization were from the same Varieties of Democracy (2018) project. Originally, there were 36 such cases, however, the microstates were removed given their idiosyncrasies. This yields to a total of 30 cases, as shown in Table 3.7. Similarly, given that most of the cases were not covered in the BTI, the socio-political integration (SOCIOPOLINTEG) condition was removed[11]. The four conditions as listed in the original test in Chapter 5 thus remain: ROBUSTCSO, ENGAGE, EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE, and HIGHPOLEXCLU.

[11] Because the BTI focuses in its analysis on transformation toward democracy under the rule of law and a market economy anchored in principles of social justice, it excludes countries that might be considered long-consolidated democratic systems and in which economic development can be regarded as well-advanced. In the absence of a clearly defined "threshold of consolidation," the Transformation Index therefore excludes all countries that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by the year 1989. This is not to suggest that these countries have achieved a static end-state. Rather, it reflects the observation that the reform agenda and the political priorities in a consolidated democracy with a highly developed market economy differ markedly from those that emerge during transformation (BTI, 2020).

Table 3.7 Democracies never experiencing an autocratization episode (2017)

Country	EDI 2017	Country	EDI 2017
Australia	0.88	Namibia	0.74
Botswana	0.71	New Zealand	0.88
Canada	0.86	Paraguay	0.65
Cyprus	0.84	Senegal	0.72
El Salvador	0.66	Slovakia	0.84
Finland	0.88	Slovenia	0.86
Georgia	0.74	South Africa	0.73
Ireland	0.84	Sweden	0.90
Israel	0.69	Switzerland	0.90
Jamaica	0.83	Taiwan	0.80
Japan	0.83	Timor-Leste	0.72
Lebanon	0.51	Trinidad and Tobago	0.76
Mauritius	0.83	Tunisia	0.70
Mexico	0.65	United Kingdom	0.87
Mongolia	0.68	United States of America	0.82

Note: The Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) ranges from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic).

Chapter 4
Why can't civil society battle it all alone?[12]

1. Introduction

That corruption, defined by the World Bank and the extant academic literature (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Amundsen, 1999; Sung, 2002; Gerring and Thacker, 2004; Chang and Chu, 2006; Desta, 2006; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 2008;) as the abuse of public office for private gain, is a pervasive and an endemic problem around the world (United Nations Convention Against Corruption) is non-debatable. For Transparency International, no one country in the world is corruption free, including those in the G20 and even those considered as long-lived democracies. True enough, as Stevens (2016) argued, "the formal institutions that are most likely to be involved in the causes of corruption include the institutions of democracy" (p.185). Given its serious socio-economic and political effects, leading development organizations have emphasized the need to curb corruption (Gans-Morse, et al., 2018). While there is unanimity that corruption is detrimental to the interests of society in general (Brown, 2007, *Foreword*), the search for the ways to combat corruption has led to not only varied but also unclear results of what works, or as Gans-Morse, et al., (2018) aptly put, "...a clear sense of which anti-corruption policies are likely to succeed" (p.172). This is expected given the multidimensional and multilayered nature of corruption.

For the most part, the economistic perspective of corruption (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999) has become influential in the scholarly literature. However, as critics note, the narrowly technical

[12] This is a modified version of my publication entitled "Why civil society cannot battle it all alone: The roles of civil society environment, transparent laws and quality of public administration in political corruption mitigation", *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2020. This was published with the support of the project "From Talent to Young Researcher project aimed at activities supporting the research career model in higher education", identifier EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16-2017-00007, co-supported by the European Union, Hungary and the European Social Fund.

view has downplayed other important perspectives (see Chapter 2 for a brief presentation of the approaches to corruption). As Hindess (2013) posited, "to treat the problem of corruption as if it were really amenable to technical solution is also to ignore the fundamentally contentious character of political life" (p. 10). It seems therefore that a broader political perspective is needed to shed light into some of the important questions both policy-makers and scholars raise about what works to combat corruption, apart from those offered by the economistic view. One equally important body of work that looks at corruption from a contentious, political perspective is that offered by the civil society literature.

What can be learned from the discussion in Chapter 2 is that while civil society exercises its anti-corruption role as information providers (Grimes, 2013), as vehicles for association and channels for public grievance articulation (Tusalem, 2007), as instruments for checks and balances and surveillance of government performace (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011), and as advocates for anti-corruption policy and redesign of such institutions (Setiyono & McLeod, 2010; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004), they are not insulated from a host of issues that endanger these same roles. Here, the skeptics caution that civil society organizations are by themselves mired by corrupt activities and that these have an impact on their supposed anti-corruption efforts. This claim springs from two important questions on internal accountability and autonomy. For one, civil society organizations are challenged by weak internal accountability mechanisms (Ebrahim, 2003; Townsend & Townsend, 2004; Gibelman & Gibelman, 2004; Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon & Keating, 2007). Second, civil society organizations' autonomy is compromised due to them being embedded in the state's bureaucratic network and their reliance on funding from either the state or external donors (Lorentzen, 2004 in Saglie and Sivesind, 2018). However, apart from these views of the "optimists" and "skeptics", there is also another strand which surveys the conditions under

which civil society exercises its anti-corruption role: the "conditionality" literature, which posits that such effect civil society has hinge on a number of conditions. (Donaghy, 2011; Uhlin, 2009, 2010; Marinova, 2011; Widojoko, 2017). As an emerging body in the civil society-corruption nexus literature, this body engages in the pertinent question of what conditions or limits civil society to contribute to anti-corruption; be it those that the "optimists" consider as strengths of civil society or what the "skeptics" claim as its weaknesses and challenges.

The public administration and policy literature are of course not silent on the issue of conditionality. In particular for instance, the literature on policy failure in corruption control stresses on the problem of agency (see Fritzen, 2005; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010); insufficiency of existing laws (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996); weakness of law enforcement agencies (Batalla, 2015); and policy transfer (Minogue, 2002). Similarly, in the policy implementation body, for instance target compliance, among the factors why those whose behavior the anti-corruption policy seeks to change fail to act as expected are: lenient penalties coupled by low detection and conviction rate; autonomy problems; and information deficits (Batory, 2012). Brown (2007) succinctly puts that the success of anti-corruption initiatives will depend partly on answers to three major questions: (1) who owns the anti-corruption efforts being undertaken?; (2) is leadership being provided from the highest levels of government?; and (3) does the state have the capacity to implement anti-corruption strategies and campaigns through effective detection, investigation, and prosecution? (*Foreword*, xi).

Interestingly, the scholarship on state-civil society and bureaucracy/administration-civil society (policy) partnerships bridges these two preceding bodies of literature, and these raise important points in the study of corruption and anti-corruption policy, as well. Initially, as Anechiarico (1998) noted, the scholarship produced by the civil society literature and those of

public administration were separated due to increasing professional and academic specialization compounded by other factors. He cautioned that the civil society scholarship neglects those aspects of public administration, which are important in the civil society literature's central element: civic engagement. Conversely, he continues, "the movement to "reinvent government" in public administration, based on a model of the citizen-consumer, neglects the importance of civic engagement to its central element: government effectiveness" (p. 13). In the broader development literature, this symbiosis between civic engagement and government effectiveness is heralded as well. Serageldin (1996) for instance contends that strong, effective, and efficient governments are essential to development because they have the capacity to create an environment conducive for the private sector and civil society to flourish (as cited in Birner and Wittmer, 2006). Control of corruption, together with regulatory quality and effective service delivery, is not only an aspect of the agenda of good governance (Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi, 2003) but also of the bigger agenda of development. It is in these contexts that effective and capable public administration is material.

Peters (2001) suggested that the interaction of administration with both formal and informal political actors in the society has a profound impact on the behavior of administrators and on their decisions. The importance of this relationship between bureaucracy and civil society in policy is highlighted in the extant literature. For instance, Rashid (2014) posited that the quality of policy inputs of a bureaucracy are affected by three important factors: (1) political influence in bureaucratic functions; (2) decline of bureaucratic capacity as to policy support and management; and (3) weak engagement of bureaucracy with civil society and nongovernmental organizations. As to administration, the literature on collaborative governance and participatory governance also emphasizes this relationship. For instance, looking at the case of Guatemala's forest

administration, Birner and Wittmer (2006) advanced that the success of Instituto Nacional de Bosque (INAB) was based on its institutional design anchored on the two principles of delegation and partnership. That delegation of authority to an autonomous body characterized by partnership with the private sector and civil society proved successful even more so in a sector where mismanagement and corruption were widespread. Several other landmark cases where the partnership proved challenging but successful were the Philippines' Department of Education's (DepEd) *Textbook Count* that sought to address concerns on the transparency, accountability, and efficiency of the DepEd through the help of the civil society organization Government Watch (G-Watch) (Leung, 2005); and Brazil's Porto Alegre case where participatory budgeting has reduced opportunities for favoritism and challenged the infrastructure of clientelism (Abers, 1998). However, some scholars point to the downsides of participatory policy-making and deliberation. For instance, calling it "participatory-deliberative public administration" (PDPA) whose main goal is the promotion of a rejuvenation of democratic institutions and progressive politics by favoring direct civil society involvement in public policy-making, Baccaro and Papadakis (2009) claim that policy developments in South Africa point to yet one important defining element of the relationship mentioned in the preceding discussion which deviates from the central elements of participatory governance: "the state does not just benevolently devolve, as PDPA theory assumes, but rather has clear preferences about the kind of policies it wants participatory fora to adopt, generally as a result of international macroeconomic pressures" (p. 247). The question of whether the state has predetermined options for civil society in the deliberation process thus surmounts. More importantly though, noting the success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre as compared to those in South Africa, Baccaro and Papadakis (2009) contend that "participatory

institutions may work in particular circumstances, but also that, in the absence of those circumstances, they may fail dramatically" (p.270).

It follows from the preceding discussion that the environment within which civil society operates, not only its structure or other internal characteristics, condition its influence on corruption. The broader institutionalist framework is informative in this regard. The significance of institutions in addressing the corruption problem is widely highlighted in the extant literature. Open and transparent political institutions (Alt and Lassen, 2003; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010), strong rule of law and well-established political-legal structures (Zhan, 2012) including the justice system institutions (Rios-Figueroa, 2012), electoral rules and constitutional framework (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005), the design and structure of government institutions and political processes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) and anti-corruption commitment rules (Collier, 2002) and agencies and enforcement organizations (Yang, 2009) inhibit corruption.

2. Hypotheses

The extant literature on civil society-corruption nexus stresses on the importance of civil society organizations on corruption mitigation. However, little research has been done about the conditions under which civil society organizations impact corruption despite calls from scholars in the field to probe into these. Specifically, much less has been done on the quality of public administration, that is the rigorousness and impartiality of public administration, as a condition for civil society's anti-corruption effects. This first study pursues this direction and hopes to contribute to this field.

From the above discussion then and following the third strand in the civil society-corruption nexus literature, I argue that while civil society and its structure affects corruption mitigation, such effect is conditioned by a number of factors. Firstly, the environment that

regulates specifically the entry and exit of CSOs and the extent to which the government attempts to repress CSOs is important in the CSO's anti-corruption effects *(H1).* Secondly, anchored on institutionalism as an overarching theory, I also argue that the broader politico-legal institutional environment is as well significant. I hypothesize, therefore, that the presence or absence of transparent laws with predictable enforcement is material in accounting for civil society's supposed effect in curbing corruption *(H2).* Lastly, gleaning from public administration and the bureaucracy-civil society relationship body, I hypothesize that rigorous and impartial public administration conditions not only the effect of civil society structure, but also the effects of civil society environment and transparent laws and predictable enforcement in political corruption *(H3).*

The variables and measurement are presented in 3.1.1. Data and variables.

3. Results

The summary results of the regression are presented in Table 4.1. Model 1 presents the variation on political corruption based on the civil society structure. In order to look at the supposed effect of civil society environment on political corruption while controlling for the effect of civil society structure, Model 2 is provided (H1). Model 3 presents the effect of transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement while controlling for the effects of the civil society structure and civil society environment (H2). The fourth and last model presents the effect of rigorousness and impartiality of public administration on political corruption (H3).

In the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression (Model 1), civil society structure, a measure of civil society strength indicated by two variables from the V-Dem, namely CSO participatory environment and CSO consultation were entered. Civil society structure accounts for 36% of the variance in political corruption and the model was statistically significant (F (2,

23649)=1757.102, p<0.001). Both indicators were significant predictors of reduction in political corruption: CSO participatory environment (β= -0.199) and CSO consultation (β= -0.188).

In the second step (Model 2), the predictor civil society environment which has the following indicators were entered: CSO entry and exit and CSO repression. This model was statistically significant (F (4, 23647)=987.236, p<0.001) and explained 37.8% of the variance in political corruption. All civil society environment factors made a significant unique contribution to the model. The best predictor of reduction in political corruption in this model is CSO repression (β= -0.248) followed by CSO participatory environment (β= -0.193) and then CSO consultation (β= -0.157). It is important to note that CSO entry and exit did not lead to reduction in political corruption, and this result was statistically significant (β= 0.197). Overall, the entry of civil society environment resulted to only 1.4% additional variance in the dependent variable.

After entry of the variable transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement in Model 3, the total variance on political corruption was 60% (F (5, 23646)=2659.163, p<0.001). While controlling for the effect of the civil society structure and civil society environment, transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement accounted for the additional 21.7% variance in political corruption. All the factors entered made a unique significant contribution to the model, but it is important to note that the best predictor of reduction in political corruption in this model is transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement (β= -0.700) followed by CSO participatory environment (β= -0.127) and CSO repression (β= -0.080). It is also noteworthy that with the entry of the variable transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement in this model, CSO consultation did not reduce political corruption (β= 0.52) unlike previously noted in Model 2.

In the final model, when the variable rigorousness and impartiality of public administration was entered, 68.9% (F (6, 23645)=3564.363, p<0.001) of the variance in political corruption was

accounted for. The introduction of such variable in the model, while controlling for all the other variables, accounts for an additional 11.5% variance in political corruption. While all the variables entered made a unique significant contribution to the model, the following were the best predictors in the reduction of political corruption: rigorousness and impartiality of public administration (β= -0.567) followed by transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement (β= -0.280), CSO participatory environment (β= -0.125), and CSO repression (β= -0.030).

It is important to point out as well that with the entry of rigorousness and impartiality of public administration in this model, CSO consultation did not lead to reduction in political corruption (β= 0.108) (unlike previously in Model 2) similar to that reported in Model 3 when the variable transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement was entered.

Table 4.1 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Political Corruption (N=23652)

Variables	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	*SE B*	*β*	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	*B*	*SE B*	*β*	*B*	*SE B*	*β*
Civil Society Structure												
CSO participatory environment	-.039	.002	-.199**	-.038	.002	-.193**	-.025	.002	-.127**	-.025	.002	-.125**
CSO consultation	-.038	.002	-.188**	-.032	.002	-.157**	.011	.002	.052**	.022	.002	.108**
Civil Society Environment												
CSO entry and exit				.037	.003	.197**	.062	.002	.330**	.049	.002	.262**
CSO repression				-.048	.002	-.248**	-.017	.002	-.085**	-.006	.002	-.030*
Transparency of Laws and Predictability of Enforcement							-.135	.002	-.700**	-.054	.002	-.280**
Rigorousness and Impartiality of Public Administration										-.111	.002	-.567**
R	0.360			0.378			0.600			0.689		
R^2	0.129			0.143			0.360			0.475		
R^2change	0.129			0.014			0.217			0.115		
F for change in R^2	1757.102**			189.378**			8009.485**			5178.903**		

Note. Statistical significance: *p<.05. **p<.001

4. Discussion and conclusion

The results above confirm the argument put forward in this paper: while civil society and its structure is a significant determinant of the level of political corruption, the introduction of civil society environment (Model 2), transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement (Model 3) and rigorousness and impartiality of public administration (Model 4) in the regression model accounted for additional variance in political corruption. However, and more importantly, of the three predictors entered after civil society structure (in Model 1), it was transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement that had the highest additional variance (21.7%), followed by rigorousness and impartiality of public administration (11.5%), and civil society environment (1.4%).

These results point not only to the importance of institutional arrangements, transparency of laws and predictability of enforcement in this case, but also to the quality of public administration, in curbing corruption. While the results echo the suggestions made previously by scholars that the reduction of corruption is founded on the presence of legal (and political) institutions, the current study points as well to the idea that corruption mitigation is also founded on public administration, and especially to the agents, public officials if we may. Moreover, while the current scholarship on the conditions that affect civil society's impact on anti-corruption point to the relevance of free media (Themudo, 2013; Camaj, 2013), politico-legal institutions (Marinova, 2011), historical antecedents (Baiocchi, et al., 2008) and political parties (Morlino, 2011), the current study highlights the supposed role of the quality of public administration and its administrators in the civil society-corruption nexus, one that has been disregarded in the extant scholarship. While Brown (2007) claimed that the success of any anti-corruption initiative will also depend on the answer to the question "Is leadership provided from the highest levels of

government?", the current study asks whether such leadership is also rigorous and impartial, or whether it is characterized by arbitrariness and biases. As such, even the debate on the relationship between civil society and corruption, and the anti-corruption effects of civil society to be more specific, is also founded on the discussions on the relationship between structure and agents, one that is also at the heart of much of the social sciences. This leads us back to, for instance, the importance of agency (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Fritzen, 2005) together with sufficiency of existing laws (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996) and strength of law enforcement institutions (Batalla, 2015) in corruption mitigation.

Indeed, civil society cannot battle it all alone. That civil society organizations are an all-powerful actor by themselves may be an overestimation of civil society's potential. The contributions of civil society in anti-corruption work are considered futile without the preceding important mechanisms discussed above. The success therefore of any actor in anti-corruption reform and movement also hinges on the environment national governments partly shape, including the environment within which civil society organizations work (specifically participatory and repressive ones as studied here) and the broader politico-legal institutional framework where governance and administration take place in general. But several notes of caution must be made here, and this has serious implications not only on the supposed civil society-corruption nexus but also on the corruption-democracy linkage in general, and on the importance of the quality of public administration as an important condition for civil society's anti-corruption effects. It is important to reflect on the question of whether the state has predetermined options for civil society (Baccaro and Papadakis, 2009; Doyle, 2018), not only in participatory governance or policy making, but also and most especially in the anti-corruption agenda of governments. For instance, it was found out in this study that, taken all together in the final regression model, CSO

consultation did not lead to reduction of political corruption. It is important thus to not only ask the question of whether CSOs are routinely consulted by policy makers; it might be prudent to ask whether states have already had predetermined options for civil society in its anti-corruption agenda, thus making CSO consultation irrelevant in the equation. Similarly, more than the frequency of inclusion of CSOs in the policy-making process by state actors (Schrama and Zhelyazkova, 2018), the quality of engagement with CSOs matter. As Rashid (2014) emphasized, weak engagement of the bureaucracy with civil society and nongovernmental organizations affects the quality of policy inputs of a bureaucracy. Perhaps, it is only when the quality of engagement with civil society is improved that the positive effect, that is reduction of political corruption, of CSO consultation transpires. Moreover, several scholars have warned of the effect of current trends toward democratic recession such as the squeezing of civic space (Buyse, 2018) and on how state elites have increasingly used the NGO legal environment as a ruling strategy to disable dissent (Gilbert and Mohseni, 2018; Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2015) on the vibrance of civil society and by extension, its contribution to the enhancement of democracy and governance. However, it is puzzling but very important to note yet again that as found out in this study, similar to CSO consultation but unlike CSO repression, CSO entry and exit, defined here as the extent to which the government achieves control over the entry and exit of CSOs into public life, did not lead to a reduction in political corruption as the regression models provide. Regulatory, consultative and repressive environments or perhaps institutions have differing effects on political corruption.

While the current study used large-N data that covers about 20000 observations from about 200 countries from 1789 to 2018, it is limited in a number of ways and these provide prospects for further research. First, control variables can be used to assess the robustness of the results presented here. For instance, it might be worth revisiting the economistic view of corruption as put forward

in the introduction. How do economic variables factor in this model? Second, and still founded on the overarching theory of institutionalism, one might be prompted to ask how different are democratic polities and autocracies in this regard, given the importance of context in anti-corruption? Third, and most importantly, the regression model offers only one formula for political corruption. Could there be multiple pathways to corruption, given that as emphasized earlier in the introductory part, corruption is multidimensional and multilayered? Several techniques can be used to look at this. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), as used in the next studies, is informative in this regard.

Chapter 5
Explaining the conditionality of civil society's anti-corruption effects in democracies in the "third wave" of autocratization[13]

1. Introduction

State institutions have become more receptive of civil society and consequently, the legal and political environment within which civil society organizations (CSOs) operate have become hostile. Many observers consider this increased government pressure and heightened harassment against CSOs as the phenomenon of "closing" or "shrinking" of civic space (Carothers and Brechenmacher, 2014; Mendelson, 2015; Poppe and Wolff, 2017; Buyse, 2018). These recent developments threaten the sustainability of civil society (CS) and continue to transpire and affect many countries in the world over.

In the most recent Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project report, in 2018, 59.8 percent of countries in the world had in one way or the other repressed CSOs—from weak repression such as government use of material sanctions to deter oppositional CSOs from expressing themselves, to the moderate and substantial ones that include restrictions on the scope of activities of CSOs or detention of their leaders, and to the severe ones that aim to liquidate members of CSOs through violent government action. Similarly, in its 2019 report, Amnesty International noted that at least 50 countries have introduced legislation, including those in line that interferes with the right to freedom of association and hampers the work of CSOs, in recent years. These laws that range from excessive burdens in registration to those that restrict access to funding are as diverse as the

[13] I thank the participants of the 4th International QCA Paper Development Workshop, Online, 2020, ETH Zurich, especially the discussants of my paper from which this chapter is based on, Julia Bartosch (Free University of Berlin) and Michael Baumgartner (University of Bergen), for their very constructive feedback. Errors and shortcomings are mine alone.

countries in which they are implemented. Irrespective of political systems, regime types, and levels of development, the trend is evident in all regions—in autocracies and in long-standing democracies alike.

This closing civic space phenomenon is part of a broader challenge facing diverse countries and is often referred to in a variety of terms including but not limited to democratic recession (Diamond, 2015), democratic backsliding (Bermeo, 2016; Waldner and Lust, 2018), or autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). What is an evident common denominator among these is the idea that the trend involves the decline of democratic qualities among states and thus signifies possibly a move away from democracy.

In its 2018 Transformation Atlas, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) reported that of the 129 countries evaluated, from 2015 to 2017, there were only two (2) countries that registered significant improvement in democratic development as opposed to the thirteen (13) that registered a significant deterioration in the same. The same report noted that in the said time period, conditions for elections were less free and fair in 2017 than in 2015; 19 countries had progressed in strengthening the state's monopoly on the use of force between 2015 and 2017; party systems were due to decline in 22 countries; and commitment to democratic institutions was waning in several regions, particularly East-Central Europe, South and East Africa, and Central America. The V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018 similarly noted that while global levels of democracy remained high, the number of countries that backslided (24) was the same with those which advanced; and autocratization, the decline of democratic attributes (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019), manifested in large countries such as India, Brazil, and Turkey. Corroborating these findings, Freedom House's 2019 Freedom of the World reported the continuous, consistent, and ominous decline of global freedom, affecting both old democracies such as the United States and

authoritarian ones such as Russia and China. Furthermore, the report highlighted the rolling back of the wave of democratization noted between 1988 and 2005 such that the number of countries considered "not free" surged to 26 percent while the number of countries considered "free" declined to 44 percent between 2005 and 2018.

Among those components or aspects of democracy that had undergone drastic declines, the V-Dem Annual Democracy 2018 noted, were media autonomy, rule of law, alternative sources of information, and freedom of expression. Furthermore, one indicator of freedom of association that had more countries improving than declining was the measure of the extent to which civil society could operate freely from government interference or repression (p.26). Thus, as Sung (2004) opined, it has become the most critical task of the civil society together with the government and the business community to check on the power of the elites and to garner sufficient support for deepening institutional reforms. He further warned that "when efforts at consolidating checks and balances of state powers and establishing a firmer rule of law are aborted by the same corrupt elite groups, the country risks reverting back to authoritarianism or away into a kleptocracy" (p.188).

The government repression of CSOs has stifled the latter's advocacy work in general and the worry over the consequences of such repression on CSOs working on anti-corruption efforts becomes even more material. Supposing the existence of relationship between democracy and corruption as discussed in Chapter 2, one is therefore prompted to ask the worrisome question, *if democratic grounds are backsliding, where are anti-corruption efforts anchored on?* Following this path of analysis, this second study aims to contribute to the discussion on what causes high levels of corruption in democracies experiencing autocratization. Specifically, the study aims to identify, assuming the presence of democracy-corruption nexus, which institutional aspects of democracy lead to the presence or absence of corruption. The current study is pursued under the

belief that a theoretical and methodological gap exists in the study of corruption and democracy in general and the civil society-corruption nexus in particular.

First, this study intends to bridge the gap particularly in the civil society-corruption nexus literature, currently divided between those who believe that CS's impact in anti-corruption is undeniable (the optimists) (see for instance Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011; Grimes, 2013; Tusalem. 2007), and those who claim that CS have by themselves become corrupt or conduits for corruption (the skeptics) (see Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon and Keating, 2007). As an emerging body, the "conditionality" literature which narrows this supposed divide, looks at the conditions under which CS may affect control of corruption (see Donaghy, 2011; Uhlin, 2009, 2010; Widojoko, 2017). The present study is situated within this context of conditionality.

Second, the study uses fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to probe into the causal recipes for corruption and tries to strengthen the argument that there may be multiple causal pathways to corruption and that CS's effects may be possibly in combination with other conditions. As the predominant analytical lense in the study of corruption and its links with democracy, standard regression analyses attempt to "isolate the independent, additive effect of each predictor variable on the response variable". By contrast, a configurational analysis such as QCA posits that causal effects are configurational rather than independent and combinatorial rather than additive (Stevens, 2016, p.187). Only very few studies (Stevens, 2016; Ingrams, 2018; Zimelis, 2019; Dunlop et. al, 2020) on the causes of corruption that employs QCA have so far been done.[14] For instance, Stevens (2016) looked at the levels of democracy, human development,

[14] Rihoux, Alamos-Concha, Bol, Marx and Rezsohazy (2013) noted that from 1984 to 2011, there were only 313 peer-reviewed journal articles with QCA applications, 51% of which were in political science, specifically comparative politics and comparative policy analysis. Thus, since Ragin's (1987) seminal

income inequality, and value orientations (traditional/rational-secular and survival/self-expression) as potential conditions for the outcome perceived corruption. While the present study's use of QCA is expected to positively contribute to the debate surrounding corruption-democracy linkage similar to that of Stevens', I deviate from his by looking at the supposed combinatorial anti-corruption effects of specific components of democracy, with a focus on civil society.

Third, the countries in the third wave of autocratization are a paradigmatic case to reassess the debate on the supposed impacts of democratic reversals. To assess whether the worry posed by observers on the effects of democratic reversals is as draconian as widely claimed, is to test whether the supposed declining conditions I proposed here lead to high perceived corruption. For instance, as the USAID's Civil Society Sustainability Index (2016) reported: "the hard work of developing strongly-rooted democratic cultures—including the development of an independent, vibrant, and pluralistic civil society—is far from over in Central and Eastern Europe" (p.11). While democratization has spread across CEE after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, challenges to democratic consolidation or improvement of the quality of democracy remain. Democratic holdouts and backsliding transpire even after accession to the European Union, which requires that member countries should have stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the development of an independent civil society included (CSO Sustainability Index, 2015). As Arugay (2014) noted, "in states where democracy remains an unfinished business, it becomes an open question and therefore subject to empirical investigation whether civil society is a categorical democratizing agent positively contributing to the quality of democratic rule" (p.17). Extending this to the issue of control of corruption as an agenda of good governance and thus of the improvement of quality of democracy, the role of civil society in these contexts and its

work, *The Comparative Method*, there were only about 160 articles in political science that used QCA, roughly an average of about 6 articles per year in the said 27-year period.

examination thus matters. After all, as Stevens (2016) argued, "the formal institutions that are most likely to be involved in the causes of corruption include the institutions of democracy" (p.185).

Thus, I ask, are there different causal configurations or "recipes" for corruption in these countries? Can civil society (CS) solely explain anti-corruption among states in the third wave of autocratization or is its effects rather conditional on the presence or absence of other conditions?

In Chapter 2, the relevant conditions included in the analysis are extensively discussed in 3.2.3.2 Conditions. The calibration strategies used in the fsQCA are summarized in Table 3.6. In what follows, the results of the analysis and the sensitivity checks conducted to verify its robustness are presented.

2. Results

2.1 Paths to the outcome high perceived corruption[15]

Given that there are no consistency scores higher than the threshold of 0.9 for the test of necessity (Ragin, 2006), there are no necessary conditions (both in their presence or absence) for the presence of the outcome. This is in line with the expectation that there is no necessary precondition for high perceived corruption to occur, as such is only possible with combination of conditions. Table 5.1 presents the parameters of fit for all conditions.

To identify the sufficient conditions, an analysis of sufficiency is carried out. This is based on the logical minimization of the sufficient truth table rows. Table 5.2 presents the 33 cases spread out in 21 out of 32 logically possible combinations. Although the consistency threshold (herein set at 0.95) may be not smaller than 0.75 (Ragin, 2000), a higher consistency cut-off will produce a solution term that is highly consistent and is thus more robust.

[15] For the absence of the outcome (~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP), no consistency score was higher than 0.75.

Table 5.1 Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.720	0.898	0.879
SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.618	0.879	0.890
ROBUSTCSO	0.202	0.843	0.968
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.601	0.949	0.959
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.462	0.977	0.989
~ENGAGE	0.560	0.948	0.963
~SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.679	0.986	0.986
~ROBUSTCSO	0.846	0.734	0.439
~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.640	0.845	0.843
~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.753	0.819	0.739

~denotes absence of the condition

Table 5.2 Truth table, outcome high perceived corruption

Row	EN	S	R	EXT	H	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	1	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	3	1	1	Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10
3	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	Moldova_06, Nepal_2013
4	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Bangladesh_07
20	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Libya_17
28	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Dominican Republic_17
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Mali_13
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	0.999	0.996	Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.999	0.996	Turkey_17
17	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.992	0.977	Moldova_17, Thailand_07
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.99	0.974	Ecuador_10
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.968	0.898	Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	5	0.939	0.861	Brazil_17, South Korea_14, Honduras_10, Philippines_05, Ukraine_15
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	3	0.933	0.838	Bolivia_15, Ghana_17, Burkina Faso_15
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	0.926	0.795	Croatia_17, Macedonia_12, Poland_17, Serbia_17
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
12	0	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.95; EN: ENGAGE; S: SOCIOPOLINTEG; R: ROBUSTCSO; EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE; H: HIGHPOLEXCLU

Table 5.3 Intermediate solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	**PRI**	**Raw cov.**	**Uniq. Cov.**	**Cases**
~SOCIOPOLINTEG+	0.986	0.974	0.679	0.144	Belarus_05, Russia_17, **Thailand_16**, Turkey_17, **Moldova_06**, **Nepal_2013**, Bangladesh_07, **Moldova_17, *Thailand_07*,** Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, **Zambia_17; Ecuador_10,** Libya_17, **Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10**
HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.977	0.957	0.462	0.062	Turkey_17, Bangladesh_07, Lesotho_17, *Venezuela_08,* Zambia_17, Libya_17, **Dominican Republic_17, Mali_13**
~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.941	0.869	0.488	0.040	*Belarus_05*, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17, Hungary_17, **Sri Lanka_08**
Overall solution	0.946	0.912	0.785		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

The Boolean minimization in the analysis of sufficiency produced conservative (Supplementary Material Table A.4), parsimonious (Supplementary Material Table A.5), and intermediate solutions (Table 5.3). The intermediate solution is used given that the current study intends to explore and formalize the sufficient combination of conditions for high perceived corruption consistent with the theoretical directional expectations, one that is currently lacking in the literature. The intermediate solution reveals three paths leading to high perceived corruption: the absence of socio-political integration (~SOCIOPOLINTEG) as well as the presence of high political exclusion (HIGHPOLEXCLU) as well as absence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of a robust civil society and absence of extensive media freedoms (~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE).

The first path (~SOCIOPOLINTEG) has a consistency of 0.986 and a coverage of 0.679. The most typical case is Thailand_07 which is also a uniquely covered case. The other uniquely covered cases are Thailand_16, Moldova_17, Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, Malawi_05, Niger_17 and Niger_10. The second path (HIGHPOLEXCLU) has a consistency of 0.977 and a coverage of 0.462 with Venezuela_08 as its most typical case and Dominican Republic_17 and Mali_13 as uniquely covered cases.

The last path (~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE) has a consistency of 0.941 and a coverage of 0.488 with Belarus_05 as the most typical and Sri Lanka_08 as a uniquely covered case. The solution consistency is high at 0.946 with a moderate coverage score of 0.785. Given such coverage, in some cases the outcome of interest involved additional conditions not covered in the study.As Rubinson, et. al (2019) note, low coverage values mean that many cases may remain uncovered by the theoretical model. Figure 5.1 displays the sufficiency plot for the solution formula. Figure 5.2 shows the solution formula as a radar chart.

Figure 5.1 Sufficiency plot, intermediate solution, outcome high perceived corruption



Figure 5.2 Radar Chart



2.2 Robustness checks

In order to look at the robustness of the tests carried out, a sensitivity analysis was performed to check if changes in the case selection, calibration, and raw consistency scores produce substantively different results (Wagemann and Schneider, 2015). The first test (Supplementary Material B.1 Test 1) thus involves dropping of military coup cases from the original 33 episodes of autocratization. Since it was possible to differentiate gradual autocratization (democratic erosion) from abrupt autocratization (military coup) in the data, a separate test involving only the gradual cases of autocratization is done. This is also within the theoretical foundations of QCA, as it is expected that there are also different pathways to corruption among states that have had abrupt autocratization. Test 1 thus only includes 23 cases of gradual autocratization (democratic erosion) as appears in Table B.1.

At 0.95 consistency, the parsimonious solution derived from the minimization features the same combination of conditions in the original test: ~ENGAGE+~SOCIOPOLINTEG+HIGHPOLEXCLU (consistency=0.944 and coverage=0.837) (see Table B.6). Meanwhile, the intermediate solution is slightly different in one solution term (~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU). Here, HIGHPOLEXCLU combines with ~ROBUSTCSO unlike in the original test where HIGHPOLEXCLU is sufficient by itself. The results (both the original and the alternative Test 1) still point to the contention made in the beginning that civil society's anti-corruption effect is rather conditional on the presence of the other conditions. This also holds true to the other components of the solution formula, which are the same with the original test: ~SOCIOPOLINTEG+~ENGAGE*ROBUSTCSO*~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE. The intermediate solution has a consistency of 0.944 and a coverage of 0.828, with the consistency slightly lower but coverage higher compared to that of the original test (see Table B.7). For the

absence of the outcome (~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP), the parsimonious and intermediate solutions are the same: SOCIOPOLINTEG*~ROBUSTCSO*~HIGHPOLEXCLU. The test reveals that in a context where a robust CSO is absent but socio-political integration is present and simultaneously high political exclusion is absent, there is an absence of high perceived corruption (the typical and uniquely covered case being South Korea_14). While the consistency cut-off was 0.75, the solution term has a rather low consistency score (0.681) but with a high coverage (0.875) (see Table B.11). In the original test, no solution term was higher than 0.75 for the minimization of the truth table configurations for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption (~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP).

The second test (Supplementary Material B.2. Test 2) involves minimal changes in the raw consistency score, originally set at 0.95. Where the raw consistency score is set to slightly lower value of 0.94 and a minimally higher value of 0.96, the derived parsimonious and intermediate solutions are the same with the original analysis. However, if the consistency score is set to 0.93 (any lower and all the truth table configurations are used in the minimization process) (see Table B. 13), both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions change particularly on the conditions EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE [which became part of the solution formula in its presence rather than its absence (~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE) as is the case in the original test] and HIGHPOLEXCLU (which is no longer a part of the solution formula, whether in its absence or presence). The parsimonious solution (consistency=0.929; coverage=0.842) is ~ENGAGE+~SOCIOPOLINTEG+EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE (see Table B.15). The intermediate solution, on the other hand, is EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE+~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO+~SOCIOPOLINTEG*~ROBUSTCSO (consistency=0.929; coverage=0.842) (see Table B.16).

The third test (Supplementary Material B.3. Test 3) involved changes in the calibration thresholds. As with the original test, this robustness test used the original ordinal data calibration from the V-Dem for the conditions ROBUSTCSO, EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE, and ENGAGE. For the condition SOCIOPOLINTEG, the same original ordinal categories from the BTI were used. For HIGHPOLEXCLU and the outcome HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, however, for lack of agreement on corruption and political exclusion thresholds, the calibration (see Table B.17) with slightly higher and lower values than the original were used. As Skaaning (2011) noted, "while many other breakpoints are possible, they are placed at levels near the original anchors. Only minor changes are made to ensure that similar theoretical justifications could apply to the original as well as the new anchors defining set-memberships" (p. 395). As such, using a consistency cut-off set to 0.96 (since at 0.95 all truth table configurations are used in the minimization), the derived parsimonious and intermediate solutions in the first calibration strategy (slightly higher thresholds) were the same with the original test. Where the calibration thresholds were lower compared to the original test, and the consistency cut-off was 0.95, the parsimonious and intermediate solutions were ~SOCIOPOLINTEG+HIGHPOLEXCLU.

3. Discussion and conclusion

In general, the analysis reveals that there is no necessary precondition for corruption, even the "democratic" conditions considered in the study. This supports the claim, made for instance by scholars such Stevens (2016), that even democracy at the general level combines with other conditions to have an impact on corruption. The analysis also reveals the conditionality of civil society's effect on corruption, mirroring perhaps what Schrama and Zhelyazkova (2018) call the differential impact of civil society strength or what Harasymiw (2019) considers as the ambivalent role of civil society in anti-corruption. The third sufficient path specifically confirms this, as the

absence of a robust civil society is sufficient only in combination with two other conditions, namely, the absence of wide and independent public deliberation and absence of extensive media freedoms. This, taken together with the two other individually sufficient paths, namely the absence of socio-political integration as well as the presence of high political exclusion, lead to the outcome presence of high perceived corruption.

That the presence of high political exclusion is an individually sufficient path in the solution formula for the presence of high perceived corruption in autocratizing states may be partly explained by the persistence of clientelistic relations and institutions that characterize much of these societies. Similarly, the absence of socio-political integration as an individually sufficient path of the solution formula for the outcome may be explained by the recurring significance of the general exacerbating condition of state-society relations in these countries. Both phenomena pose a challenge to civil society and the paradox that it faces. CSOs that are able to avoid creating relationships of dependency while pushing for its advocacies of empowerment and social justice (Thorp, et al., 2005) and that are able to address categorical inequality and rebalance relations with the state are critical within democracy (Edwards, 2009; Michael, 2004). However, civil society organizations are challenged by the persistence of exclusion and clientelism in these states which eventually define the extent of corruption therein.

There are explanations for why the absence of robust civil society can sufficiently lead to the presence of the outcome only in combination with the absence of wide and independent public deliberation and absence of extensive media freedoms in autocratizing states. The shrinking of civic space is almost always accompanied by attacks on the media as these two are by themselves avenues for societal interest representation, deliberation, popular participation, and mobilization, as social capital theorists claim. Similarly, both civil society and the media contribute to anti-

corruption through their surveillance and monitoring functions (Grimes, 2003; Tusalem, 2007; Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). Themudo's (2013) findings suggest that indeed, civil society has a strong anti-corruption effect only in countries with greater press freedom. Apparently, anti-corruption approaches based on democratic participation is also hampered by the lack of an institutional platform for an independent watchdog function within civil society (Fritzen, 2005). Taking a cue from theories on resource mobilization and political opportunity structures in political sociology, it may very well be that civil society organizations are able to effectively carry out their anti-corruption functions and take advantage of opportunity structures and access political institutions (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2008) given their resources: an active membership base whose influence on policy is based on wide and independent deliberation that goes far way beyond voting and a mutually reinforcing relationship with free media. But this does not go without caveat.

Uncovered cases such as The Philippines, for instance, reveal that even at the onset of high levels of democracy with a robust civil society, independent media, and institutional guarantees for participation and deliberation, high corruption still persists—a trend entirely opposite of South Korea whose corruption is rather low. The same is true with Ukraine whose robust civil society has not contributed to successful anti-corruption efforts (Harasymiw, 2019). This is, however, in line with the expectations in QCA, particularly the existence of multiple pathways for the same outcome. Given that the existence of high perceived corruption in some of the countries is not covered by the intermediate solution, other conditions and combinations thereof not included in the study may be at play. For instance, conditions from explanations from studies on bureaucracy as in state/bureaucratic capacity (Schrama and Zhelyazkova, 2018; Dahlstrom, et. al, 2012), culture (Stevens, 2016; Harasymiv, 2019; Hira, 2016), transparency (Bauhr, 2019), institutionalism (Dahlstrom, et al., 2012; Fritzen, 2015) and the design of political institutions (Gerring and

Thacker, 2004; Johnston, 2009; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005) or economic theory (Klitgaard, 1991; Rose-Ackerman, 2006) might shed light on this puzzle. Apart from these, given the role context plays, it is interesting to note that quite possibly, the anti-corruption role of CS is not only conditional but differential; that is, locating the role of CS might be elusive in the context of non-autocratizing democracies. The third study presented in the next chapter delves into this.

4. Supplementary material

A. Sufficiency tests

Table A.1. Raw data

Country	R				EXT			E	S	H	HPC
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB				
Belarus_05	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	4	0.282	-0.66
Bolivia_15	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	7	0.383	-0.66
Brazil_17	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	8	0.034	-0.33
Croatia_17	3	3	1	3	2	2	3	3	8	0.197	0.13
Dominican Republic_17	4	3	1	2	2	3	3	4	7	0.682	-0.76
Ecuador_10	2	2	1	2	2	3	2	4	4	0.252	-0.58
Ghana_17	4	4	2	3	2	4	3	4	8	0.178	-0.08
Hungary_17	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	6	0.265	0
Lesotho_17	4	4	1	3	2	2	3	3	4	0.515	-0.03
Macedonia_12	3	3	1	2	2	1	2	3	6	0.316	-0.02
Malawi_05	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	0.464	-0.51
Moldova_06	3	2	0	1	2	3	2	2	5	0.247	-0.63
Moldova_17	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	3	5	0.289	-0.62
Nepal_2013	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	2	5	0.297	-0.58
Niger_17	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	4	5	0.278	-0.55
Poland_17	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	3	9	0.075	0.6
Russia_17	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	4	0.312	-0.83
Serbia_17	3	3	1	2	1	0	2	3	7	0.337	-0.45
South Korea_14	3	3	1	3	2	3	3	4	8	0.103	0.46
Sri Lanka_08	1	2	0	2	2	1	2	2	6	0.426	-0.42
Turkey_17	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	5	0.684	-0.29

Venezuela_08	2	2	1	1	2	1	3	3	3	0.827	-1.23
Zambia_17	3	3	1	2	2	1	2	3	5	0.833	-0.64
Bangladesh_07	2	2	1	3	3	3	3	2	5	0.698	-1.07
Burkina Faso_15	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	7	0.18	-0.11
Honduras_10	3	3	0	2	2	3	2	3	6	0.411	-0.95
Libya_17	3	3	0	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.595	-1.6
Mali_13	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	8	0.688	-0.68
Niger_10	4	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	5	0.28	-0.64
Philippines_05	4	4	1	3	3	3	3	4	6	0.13	-0.72
Thailand_07	2	3	1	2	2	0	2	4	5	0.48	-0.31
Thailand_16	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	0	4	0.499	-0.4
Ukraine_15	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	6	0.308	-0.78

R: ROBUSTCSO
- CSOr: CSOrepression
- CSOe: CSOentry
- CSOc: CSOconsult
- CSOp: CSOparticip

EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREEDOM
- CM: Critmedia
- GMC: Govemediacensor
- MB: Mediabias

E: ENGAGE
S: SOCIOPOLINTEG
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU
HPC: HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

Table A.2. Calibrated data

Country	R				EXT			E	S	H	HPC
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB				
Belarus_05	0.33	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.2	0.33	0.16732307	0.82001502
Bolivia_15	0.67	0.67	1	1	0.67	0.67	1	0.6	0.67	0.29707859	0.82001502
Brazil_17	1	0.67	0	1	1	0.67	1	0.6	0.67	0.03136269	0.68096816
Croatia_17	0.67	0.67	0	1	0.67	0.33	1	0.6	0.67	0.09705248	0.42587664
Dominican Republic_17	1	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0.67	1	0.8	0.67	0.79244385	0.85147468
Ecuador_10	0.33	0.33	0	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.8	0.33	0.13876899	0.79127653
Ghana_17	1	1	1	1	0.67	1	1	0.8	0.67	0.08546777	0.54582406
Hungary_17	0.33	0.33	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.4	0.67	0.15060576	0.5
Lesotho_17	1	1	0	1	0.67	0.33	1	0.6	0.33	0.5275761	0.51722556
Macedonia_12	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.6	0.67	0.20514512	0.51148623
Malawi_05	0.67	0.67	1	0.67	0.67	0.67	1	0.6	0.33	0.43413512	0.76347053
Moldova_06	0.67	0.33	0	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.4	0.33	0.13442849	0.80961643
Moldova_17	0.67	0.33	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.6	0.33	0.17462579	0.80604967
Nepal_2013	1	0.67	0	1	1	0.67	1	0.4	0.33	0.18327678	0.79127653
Niger_17	0.67	0.67	1	1	0.67	0.67	1	0.8	0.33	0.16326078	0.77966371
Poland_17	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	1	0.6	1	0.0419482	0.20123551
Russia_17	0.33	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.4	0.33	0.20038557	0.87068735
Serbia_17	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0.33	0	0.67	0.6	0.67	0.23150032	0.73767955
South Korea_14	0.67	0.67	0	1	0.67	0.67	1	0.8	0.67	0.05105944	0.25789864
Sri Lanka_08	0	0.33	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.4	0.67	0.36708999	0.7241244
Turkey_17	0	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.2	0.33	0.79485488	0.66067835
Venezuela_08	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.67	0.33	1	0.6	0.33	0.91736551	0.94407056
Zambia_17	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.6	0.33	0.92065248	0.8131328
Bangladesh_07	0.33	0.33	0	1	1	0.67	1	0.4	0.33	0.81114959	0.9211798

Burkina Faso_15	1	1	1	1	1	0.67	1	0.8	0.67	0.08662555	0.56285117
Honduras_10	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.6	0.67	0.34183271	0.89869135
Libya_17	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	1	0.67	1	0.6	0.33	0.6680335	0.9753072
Mali_13	0.67	0.67	1	1	1	0.67	1	0.8	0.67	0.79961444	0.82669779
Niger_10	1	0.67	1	1	0.67	0.67	1	0.6	0.33	0.16528192	0.8131328
Philippines_05	1	1	0	1	1	0.67	1	0.8	0.67	0.0615947	0.83947248
Thailand_07	0.33	0.67	0	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0.8	0.33	0.46326085	0.67090291
Thailand_16	0	0.33	0	0.67	0.67	0	0.67	0	0.33	0.49815973	0.71485057
Ukraine_15	0.67	0.33	1	1	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.6	0.67	0.19570925	0.85719279

R: ROBUSTCSO
- CSOr: CSOrepression
- CSOe: CSOentry
- CSOc: CSOconsult
- CSOp: CSOparticip

EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREEDOM
- CM: Critmedia
- GMC: Govmediacensor
- MB: Mediabias

E: ENGAGE
S: SOCIOPOLINTEG
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU
HPC: HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

Table A.3. Final Data*

Country	EN	S	R	EXT	H	HPC
Belarus_05	0.2	0.33	0	0	0.16732307	0.82001502
Bolivia_15	0.6	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.29707859	0.82001502
Brazil_17	0.6	0.67	0	0.67	0.03136269	0.68096816
Croatia_17	0.6	0.67	0	0.33	0.09705248	0.42587664
Dominican Republic_17	0.8	0.67	0	0.67	0.79244385	0.85147468
Ecuador_10	0.8	0.33	0	0.67	0.13876899	0.79127653
Ghana_17	0.8	0.67	1	0.67	0.08546777	0.54582406
Hungary_17	0.4	0.67	0	0.33	0.15060576	0.5
Lesotho_17	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.5275761	0.51722556
Macedonia_12	0.6	0.67	0	0.33	0.20514512	0.51148623
Malawi_05	0.6	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.43413512	0.76347053
Moldova_06	0.4	0.33	0	0.67	0.13442849	0.80961643
Moldova_17	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.17462579	0.80604967
Nepal_2013	0.4	0.33	0	0.67	0.18327678	0.79127653
Niger_17	0.8	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.16326078	0.77966371
Poland_17	0.6	1	0	0.33	0.0419482	0.20123551
Russia_17	0.4	0.33	0	0	0.20038557	0.87068735
Serbia_17	0.6	0.67	0	0	0.23150032	0.73767955
South Korea_14	0.8	0.67	0	0.67	0.05105944	0.25789864
Sri Lanka_08	0.4	0.67	0	0.33	0.36708999	0.7241244
Turkey_17	0.2	0.33	0	0	0.79485488	0.66067835
Venezuela_08	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.91736551	0.94407056
Zambia_17	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.92065248	0.8131328
Bangladesh_07	0.4	0.33	0	0.67	0.81114959	0.9211798
Burkina Faso_15	0.8	0.67	1	0.67	0.08662555	0.56285117
Honduras_10	0.6	0.67	0	0.67	0.34183271	0.89869135
Libya_17	0.6	0.33	0	0.67	0.6680335	0.9753072
Mali_13	0.8	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.79961444	0.82669779
Niger_10	0.6	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.16528192	0.8131328
Philippines_05	0.8	0.67	0	0.67	0.0615947	0.83947248
Thailand_07	0.8	0.33	0	0	0.46326085	0.67090291
Thailand_16	0	0.33	0	0	0.49815973	0.71485057
Ukraine_15	0.6	0.67	0.33	0.67	0.19570925	0.85719279

*The macroconditions were created from the conditions using the MIN function (Logical AND)

EN: ENGAGE
S: SOCIOPOLINTEG
R: ROBUSTCSO
EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU
HPC: HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

Table A.4. Conservative solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO+	0.984	0.971	0.609	0.146	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16; Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013; Bangladesh_07, Moldova_17, Thailand_07, Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, Libya_17
~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.971	0.924	0.427	0.040	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
ENGAGE*~SOCIOPOLINTEG* EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.992	0.980	0.377	0.056	Ecuador_10, Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10
ENGAGE*SOCIOPOLINTEG* EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* HIGHPOLEXCLU	1.000	1.000	0.264	0.029	Dominican Republic_17, Mali_13
Overall solution	0.971	0.949	0.743		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table A.5. Parsimonious solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	**PRI**	**Raw cov.**	**Uniq. Cov.**	**Cases**
~ENGAGE+	0.948	0.894	0.560	0.051	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
~SOCIOPOLINTEG+	0.986	0.974	0.679	0.109	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17; Moldova_06, Nepal_2013; Bangladesh_07, Moldova_17, Thailand_07, Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, Libya_17, Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.977	0.957	0.462	0.062	Turkey_17, Bangladesh_07, Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17, Libya_17, Dominican Republic_17, Mali_13
Overall solution	0.947	0.914	0.796		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

B. Robustness tests
B.1. Test 1

Cases of autocratization that stemmed from military coup were dropped. Within the theoretical foundations of QCA, it is expected that there are also different pathways to corruption among states that have had abrupt autocratization (in this case, via a military coup). The first test thus only includes 23 cases of gradual autocratization (democratic erosion) from the original data as appears in the preceding Table A.3. Final Data.

Table B.1. Cases selected for analysis

Type of autocratization	**Episodes**	**Selected case**
Democratic erosion	Belarus 1995-2005	Belarus 2005
	Bolivia 2006-2015	Bolivia 2015
	Brazil 2012-2017	Brazil 2017
	Croatia 2013-2017	Croatia 2017
	Dom. Rep. 2015-2017	Dom. Rep. 2017
	Ecuador 2008-2010	Ecuador 2010
	Ghana 2012-2017	Ghana 2017
	Hungary 2010-2017	Hungary 2017
	Lesotho 2015-2017	Lesotho 2017
	Macedonia 2005-2012	Macedonia 2012
	Malawi 2000-2005	Malawi 2005
	Moldova 2000-2006	Moldova 2006
	Moldova 2012-2017	Moldova 2017
	Nepal 2012-2013	Nepal 2013
	Niger 2013-2017	Niger 2017
	Poland 2013-2017	Poland 2017
	Russia 1993-2017	Russia 2017
	Serbia 2006-2017	Serbia 2017
	South Korea 2008-2014	South Korea 2014
	Sri Lanka 2004-2008	Sri Lanka 2008
	Turkey 2008-2017	Turkey 2017
	Venezuela 1999-2008	Venezuela 2008
	Zambia 2010-2017	Zambia 2017

Table B.2. The calibrated data

Country	EN	S	R	EXT	H	HPC
Belarus_05	0.2	0.33	0	0	0.16732307	0.820015021
Bolivia_15	0.6	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.29707859	0.820015021
Brazil_17	0.6	0.67	0	0.67	0.03136269	0.680968158
Croatia_17	0.6	0.67	0	0.33	0.09705248	0.425876642
Dominican Republic_17	0.8	0.67	0	0.67	0.79244385	0.851474678
Ecuador_10	0.8	0.33	0	0.67	0.13876899	0.791276529
Ghana_17	0.8	0.67	1	0.67	0.08546777	0.54582406
Hungary_17	0.4	0.67	0	0.33	0.15060576	0.5
Lesotho_17	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.5275761	0.517225558
Macedonia_12	0.6	0.67	0	0.33	0.20514512	0.511486231
Malawi_05	0.6	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.43413512	0.763470527
Moldova_06	0.4	0.33	0	0.67	0.13442849	0.809616427
Moldova_17	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.17462579	0.806049666
Nepal_2013	0.4	0.33	0	0.67	0.18327678	0.791276529
Niger_17	0.8	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.16326078	0.77966371
Poland_17	0.6	1	0	0.33	0.0419482	0.201235509
Russia_17	0.4	0.33	0	0	0.20038557	0.870687348
Serbia_17	0.6	0.67	0	0	0.23150032	0.737679552
South Korea_14	0.8	0.67	0	0.67	0.05105944	0.257898643
Sri Lanka_08	0.4	0.67	0	0.33	0.36708999	0.724124401
Turkey_17	0.2	0.33	0	0	0.79485488	0.660678346
Venezuela_08	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.91736551	0.944070558
Zambia_17	0.6	0.33	0	0.33	0.92065248	0.813132802

EN: ENGAGE
S: SOCIOPOLINTEG
R: ROBUSTCSO
EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU
HPC: HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

Table B.3. Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.732	0.879	0.864
SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.624	0.836	0.856
ROBUSTCSO	0.164	0.849	0.978
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.576	0.931	0.952
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.439	0.965	0.984
~ENGAGE	0.612	0.956	0.967
~SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.711	0.979	0.980
~ROBUSTCSO	0.877	0.686	0.324
~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.714	0.837	0.816
~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.794	0.781	0.671

~denotes absence of the condition

Table B.4. Alternative truth table, outcome high perceived corruption

Row	EN	S	R	EXT	H	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	Belarus_05, Russia_17
3	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	Moldova_06, Nepal_2013
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	Malawi_05, Niger_17
28	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Dominican Republic_17
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	0.998	0.993	Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.998	0.993	Turkey_17
17	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.989	0.958	Moldova_17
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.987	0.954	Ecuador_10
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.957	0.838	Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.936	0.852	Bolivia_15, Ghana_17
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.909	0.705	Brazil_17, South Korea_14
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	0.903	0.695	Croatia_17, Macedonia_12, Poland_17, Serbia_17
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
12	0	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.95
EN: ENGAGE
S: SOCIOPOLINTEG
R: ROBUSTCSO
EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU

Table B.5. Conservative solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE+	0.975	0.945	0.581	0.076	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Turkey_17, Moldova_17, Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17
~SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.991	0.980	0.531	0.035	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Moldova_17, Ecuador_10
~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.962	0.887	0.481	0.060	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
ENGAGE* ~SOCIOPOLINTEG* EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.989	0.966	0.403	0.058	Ecuador_10, Malawi_05, Niger_17
ENGAGE* SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO* EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* HIGHPOLEXCLU	1	1	0.255	0.022	Dominican Republic_17
Overall solution	0.959	0.923	0.789		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table B.6. Parsimonious solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~ENGAGE+	0.956	0.900	0.612	0.067	*Belarus_05*, Russia_17, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Hungary_17, **Sri Lanka_08**
~SOCIOPOLINTEG+	0.979	0.961	0.711	0.118	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, **Moldova_17,** Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, **Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, *Malawi_05*, Niger_17**
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.965	0.922	0.439	0.055	Turkey_17, Lesotho_17, *Venezuela_08*, Zambia_17, **Dominican Republic_17**
Overall solution	0.944	0.903	0.837		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

Table B.7. Intermediate solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~SOCIOPOLINTEG+	0.979	0.961	0.711	0.172	Belarus_05, Russia_17; Turkey_17, **Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Moldova_17,** Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, **Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, *Malawi_05*, Niger_17**
~ROBUSTCSO* HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.964	0.919	0.427	0.055	Turkey_17, Lesotho_17, *Venezuela_08*, Zambia_17, **Dominican Republic_17**
~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.952	0.88	0.551	0.058	*Belarus_05*, Russia_17, Turkey_17, Hungary_17, **Sri Lanka_08**
Overall solution	0.944	0.901	0.828		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

Figure B.1 Sufficiency plot, intermediate solution, outcome high perceived corruption



Table B.8. Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.941	0.534	0.623
SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.968	0.613	0.715
ROBUSTCSO	0.148	0.362	0.912
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.705	0.538	0.749
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.527	0.547	0.832
~ENGAGE	0.787	0.581	0.756
~SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.741	0.482	0.665
~ROBUSTCSO	0.938	0.346	0.187
~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.910	0.503	0.594
~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.966	0.448	0.448

~denotes absence of the condition

Table B.9. Alternative truth table, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Row	EN	S	R	EXT	H	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	0.782	0.295	Brazil_17, South Korea_14
25	1	1	0	0	0	1	4	0.765	0.257	Croatia_17, Macedonia_12, Poland_17, Serbia_17
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.763	0.108	Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.747	0.042	Moldova_17
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.743	0	Turkey_17
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.742	0	Moldova_06, Nepal_2013
19	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.725	0.046	Ecuador_10
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.712	0	Belarus_05, Russia_17
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	0.705	0	Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.698	0	Dominican Republic_17
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.565	0	Bolivia_15, Ghana_17
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.51	0	Malawi_05, Niger_17
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
12	0	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.75
EN: ENGAGE
S: SOCIOPOLINTEG
R: ROBUSTCSO
EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU

Table B.10. Conservative solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
ENGAGE* SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.749	0.318	0.834	0.046	Croatia_17, Macedonia_12, Poland_17, Serbia_17, Brazil_17, South Korea_14
SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.703	0.214	0.812	0.024	Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08, Croatia_17, Macedonia_12, Poland_17, Serbia_17
Overall solution	0.693	0.269	0.858		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table B.11. Parsimonious and intermediate solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.681	0.276	0.875		Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08, Croatia_17, Macedonia_12, Poland_17, Serbia_17, Brazil_17, ***South Korea_14***
Solution	0.681	0.276	0.875		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

Figure B.2 Sufficiency plot, intermediate solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption



B. 2. Test 2

The original test was done with a consistency cut-off set to 0.95. A slight change to 0.94 and 0.96 consistency-cut did not alter the solution formula. The following, however, report the changes when a 0.93 cut-off was used. Similar to the original test, there was no sufficiency score higher than 0.75 in the analysis of the outcome absence of high perceived corruption.

Table B.12. Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.720	0.898	0.879
SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.618	0.879	0.890
ROBUSTCSO	0.202	0.843	0.968
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.601	0.949	0.959
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.462	0.977	0.989
~ENGAGE	0.560	0.948	0.963
~SOCIOPOLINTEG	0.679	0.986	0.986
~ROBUSTCSO	0.846	0.734	0.439
~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.640	0.845	0.843
~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.753	0.819	0.739

Table B.13. Alternative truth table, outcome high perceived corruption

Row	EN	S	R	EXT	H	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	1	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	3	1	1	Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10
3	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	Moldova_06, Nepal_2013
4	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Bangladesh_07
20	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Libya_17
28	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Dominican Republic_17
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Mali_13
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	0.999	0.996	Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.999	0.996	Turkey_17
17	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.992	0.977	Moldova_17, Thailand_07
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.99	0.974	Ecuador_10
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.968	0.898	Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	5	0.939	0.861	Brazil_17, South Korea_14, Honduras_10, Philippines_05, Ukraine_15
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	3	0.933	0.838	Bolivia_15, Ghana_17, Burkina Faso_15
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	0.926	0.795	Croatia_17, Macedonia_12, Poland_17, Serbia_17
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
12	0	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.93

EN: ENGAGE; S: SOCIOPOLINTEG; R: ROBUSTCSO; EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU

Table B.14. Conservative solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO+	0.984	0.971	0.609	0.146	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Moldova_17, Thailand_07, Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, Libya_17
ENGAGE* SOCIOPOLINTEG* EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE+	0.936	0.873	0.475	0.029	Brazil_17, South Korea_14, Honduras_10, Philippines_05, Ukraine_15, Dominican Republic_17, Bolivia_15, Ghana_17, Burkina Faso_15, Mali_13
ENGAGE* EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU+	0.934	0.87	0.465	0.036	Ecuador_10, Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10, Brazil_17, South Korea_14, Honduras_10, Philippines_05, Ukraine_15, Bolivia_15, Ghana_17, Burkina Faso_15
~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.971	0.924	0.427	0.033	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table B.15. Parsimonious solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~ ENGAGE+	0.948	0.894	0.56	0.035	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
~ SOCIOPOLINTEG+	0.986	0.974	0.679	0.062	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Moldova_17, Thailand_07 Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, Libya_17, Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.949	0.915	0.601	0.108	Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Ecuador_10, Libya_17, Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10, Brazil_17, South Korea_14, Honduras_10, Philippines_05, Ukraine_15, Dominican Republic_17, Bolivia_15, Ghana_17, Burkina Faso_15, Mali_13
Solution	0.929	0.888	0.842		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

Table B.16. Intermediate solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE+	0.949	0.915	0.601	0.181	Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Ecuador_10, Libya_17, Malawi_05, Niger_17, Niger_10, Brazil_17, South Korea_14, Honduras_10, Philippines_05, Ukraine_15, Dominican Republic_17, Bolivia_15, Ghana_17, Burkina Faso_15, Mali_13
~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO+	0.946	0.891	0.534	0.035	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Hungary_17, Sri Lanka_08
~SOCIOPOLINTEG* ~ROBUSTCSO	0.984	0.971	0.609	0.062	Belarus_05, Russia_17, Thailand_16, Turkey_17, Moldova_06, Nepal_2013, Bangladesh_07, Moldova_17, Thailand_07, Lesotho_17, Venezuela_08, Zambia_17, Ecuador_10, Libya_17
Solution	0.929	0.888	0.842		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND

B. 3. Test 3.

As with the original test, this robustness uses the original ordinal data calibration from the V-Dem for the conditions ROBUSTCSO, EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE, and ENGAGE. For the condition SOCIOPOLINTEG, the same original ordinal categories from the BTI were used. For HIGHPOLEXCLU and the outcome HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, however, for lack of agreement on corruption and political exclusion thresholds, the following calibration with slightly higher and lower values than the original are used. As Skaaning (2011) notes, "while many other breakpoints are possible, they are placed at levels near the original anchors. Only minor changes are made to ensure that similar theoretical justifications could apply to the original as well as the new anchors defining set-memberships" (p. 395).

Table B.17. Robustness test set membership scores calibration

Conditions*/Outcome	Full membership	Cross-over point	Full non-membership
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP (i)	-1.2815 (90th percentile)	0 (50th percentile)	1.2815 (10th percentile)
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP (ii)	-1.6448 (95th percentile)	0.1256 (55th percentile)	1.6448 (5th percentile)
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP (iii)	-1.0364 (85th percentile)	-0.1256 (45th percentile)	1.0364 (15th percentile)
HIGHPOLEXCLU (i)	0.90	0.50	0.10
HIGHPOLEXCLU (ii)	0.95	0.55	0.05
HIGHPOLEXCLU (iii)	0.85	0.45	0.15

Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration

Table B.18. Summary of solution formula derived from the alternative calibrations, outcome high perceived corruption

Calibration	Parsimonious solution	Intermediate solution
i	~ENGAGE+ ~SOCIOPOLINTEG+ HIGHPOLEXCLU	~SOCIOPOLINTEG+ HIGHPOLEXCLU+ ~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
ii	~ENGAGE+ ~SOCIOPOLINTEG+ HIGHPOLEXCLU	~SOCIOPOLINTEG+ HIGHPOLEXCLU+ ~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
iii	~SOCIOPOLINTEG+ HIGHPOLEXCLU	~SOCIOPOLINTEG+ HIGHPOLEXCLU

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND;
Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration; For ii, a 0.96 cut-off was used since at 0.95 consistency, all configurations are used in the minimization; For iii, a 0.95 cut-off was used, but an alternative consistency of 0.90 changes the parsimonious solution formula (~ENGAGE+~SOCIOPOLINTEG+HIGHPOLEXCLU+~ROBUSTCSO*EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE) and the intermediate solution formula (~SOCIOPOLINTEG+HIGHPOLEXCLU+~ENGAGE*ROBUSTCSO+~ROBUSTCSO*EXTENSIVEMEDIFREE).

Chapter 6
Pathways to corruption in non-autocratizing democracies: Locating civil society's place

1. Introduction

Studies that look at the relationship between corruption and democracy abound. A survey of the extant literature on the broader corruption-democracy linkage, though, reveals confounding results. True enough, as Sung (2004) noted, "that democratization influences political corruption in a profound way is an indisputable truism but the directions of the impact of democratic reforms on incidence of corruption remain hotly contested" (p. 179).

For instance, several scholars claimed there is an association, linear (La Porta et al., 1999; Ades and Di Tella, 1999) and non-linear (Sung, 2004; Back and Hadenius, 2008; Rock, 2009) between corruption and democracy while one did not find a linear relationship between them (Treisman, 2000). Casting skepticism on the supposed absence of relationship between democracy and corruption, particularly those founded on the belief that there is an upsurge of incentives for corrupt behavior in emerging democracies or in those that are in transition, scholars claimed that (1) despite eruptions of corruption among intermediate democracies, the consolidation of advanced democratic institutions eventually reduced corruption (Sung, 2004); (2) corruption is a transitional phenomenon common in democratic transitions especially where procedural practices have not been founded on a firm liberal culture and effective institutions (Harris-White and White, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999); and (3) while corruption was typically lower in dictatorships than in partial democracies, once the threshold is attained, democratic practices suppress corruption (Montinola and Jackman, 2002). While these statistical studies are informative, more recent studies

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and several researchers suggested that the influence of the potential causes of corruption is likely to be affected by different contexts (Zhang, et al., 2009; De Graaf, et al., 2010; Akbar and Vujić, 2014). This seems to resonate with what qualitative comparative analysts hold regarding the importance of contexts and with the configurational character of much of social life.

Based on the above, this chapter extends the argument provided in the preceding chapter to the context of democracies that have not experienced an autocratization episode in the third wave of autocratization period. While it is particularly the absence of a robust civil society organization combined with other conditions that lead to the presence of high perceived corruption in autocratizing states, following the logic of QCA, it may very well be that the pathway for the presence or absence of the outcome, high perceived corruption, in non-autocratizing democracies, is different from those that experienced autocratization. As such, and similar to the preceding chapter, this section intends to locate the role of civil society organizations in anti-corruption, albeit in democracies that did not experience autocratization from 1994 to 2017.

2. Results

2.1. Paths to the outcome high perceived corruption

The test of necessity in Table 6.1 shows that there are no conditions with a consistency score above threshold of 0.90. As such, there are no necessary preconditions (both in their presence and absence) for the outcome.

After the test of necessity, the test of sufficiency was performed. The following Table 6.2 presents the 30 cases spread out in 6 out of 16 logically possible combinations. This leaves 10 logical remainders, those configurations for which there are no observed cases. Using a consistency benchmark of 0.90 (row 3, with consistency of 0.758 is not included in the analysis

although a 0.75 consistency score may be had, the PRI is rather low at 0.454), the minimization of the truth table resulted to conservative (see Supplementary Material Table A.4), parsimonious (see Supplementary Material Table A.5), and intermediate (Table 6.3) solutions.

The intermediate solution reveals one path for the outcome high perceived corruption, which includes 3 out of the 4 conditions: ~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU. In states that have not experienced autocratization in the third wave, high perceived corruption is brought about by the absence of a robust civil society combined with the absence of wide and independent public deliberations and presence of high political exclusion. The said solution has a high consistency of 0.945 and a rather very low coverage at 0.384. Only 2 out of the 30 cases are covered by the theoretical model or the solution formula: Lebanon and El Salvador.

Table 6.1 Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.815	0.356	0.369
ROBUSTCSO	0.301	0.214	0.614
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.860	0.371	0.364
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.394	0.929	0.989
~ENGAGE	0.616	0.715	0.903
~ROBUSTCSO	0.751	0.429	0.584
~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.562	0.673	0.895
~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.864	0.317	0.185

~denotes absence of the condition

Table 6.2 Truth table, outcome high perceived corruption

Row	EN	R	EXT	H	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.952	0.856	Lebanon
4	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.941	0.84	El Salvador
3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.758	0.454	Paraguay
9	1	0	0	0	0	2	0.689	0.34	Israel, South Africa
11	1	0	1	0	0	10	0.538	0.279	Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago
15	1	1	1	0	0	15	0.258	0.072	Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
5	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	1	0	0	1	?	0			
12	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	1	1	0	1	?	0			
16	1	1	1	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.90
EN: ENGAGE
R: ROBUSTCSO
EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU

Table 6.3 Intermediate solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	**PRI**	**Raw cov.**	**Uniq. Cov.**	**Cases**
~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO* HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.945	0.864	0.348		Lebanon, El Salvador
Solution	0.945	0.864	0.348		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

2.2. Paths to the outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Results of the test of necessity reveal one necessary condition for the absence of high perceived corruption in countries not experiencing autocratization: absence of high political exclusion (~HIGHPOLEXCLU). The consistency is very high at 0.986 and the coverage is 0.778. Table 6.4 presents the other results.

The following is the generated truth table (Table 6.5) used for the Boolean minimization in the analysis of sufficiency. A 0.80 cut-off was used, retaining 27 out of the 30 cases in the analysis. Row 3 (Paraguay) with a consistency of 0.798 is not included (even when a 0.75 cut-off is acceptable) given that PRI is rather low at 0.546. As Greckhamer, et. al (2018) noted, PRI scores should be high and ideally not too far from the raw consistency scores (e.g. 0.7) (p.489). The minimization process resulted to conservative (see Supplementary Material Table A.6), parsimonious (see Supplementary Material Table A.7), and intermediate (Table 6.6) solutions.

The formula for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption is presence of wide and public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion (ENGAGE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU). It has a high consistency score of 0.839 and a high coverage of 0.883.

Table 6.4 Parameters of fit, necessity, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Condition	Consistency of necessity	Coverage of necessity	Relevance of necessity
ENGAGE	0.886	0.832	0.692
ROBUSTCSO	0.536	0.832	0.875
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.873	0.811	0.656
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.134	0.680	0.953
~ENGAGE	0.315	0.786	0.925
~ROBUSTCSO	0.488	0.600	0.667
~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE	0.323	0.832	0.943
~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.986	0.778	0.412

~denotes absence of the condition

Table 6.5 Truth table, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Row	EN	R	EXT	H	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
15	1	1	1	0	1	15	0.906	0.883	Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
9	1	0	0	0	1	2	0.831	0.641	Israel, South Africa
11	1	0	1	0	1	10	0.808	0.7	Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago
3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.798	0.546	Paraguay
2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.715	0.144	Lebanon
4	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.692	0.16	El Salvador
1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
5	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	1	1	1	?	0			
10	1	0	0	1	?	0			
12	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	1	1	0	1	?	0			
16	1	1	1	1	?	0			

Consistency cut-off: 0.80
EN: ENGAGE
R: ROBUSTCSO
EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU

Table 6.6 Intermediate solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	**PRI**	**Raw cov.**	**Uniq. Cov.**	**Cases**
ENGAGE* ~HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.839	0.785	0.883		Israel, South Africa, Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
Solution	0.839	0.785	0.883		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

2.3. Robustness checks

A sensitivity check that involves alternative calibration strategies for the condition HIGHPOLEXCLU and the outcome was performed to assess the robustness of the results. Both slightly higher and lower calibration strategies were used (see Supplementary Material Table B.1) similar to the preceding chapter. The test reveals that the results for the outcome high perceived corruption in the original test are robust. The intermediate solution formula derived from the first alternative calibration is the same with that of the original test. The slightly lower alternative calibration features a solution formula that is not so much different from the original (with one condition missing but the configuration is the same). For the outcome absence of high perceived corruption, while the results from the slightly lower alternative calibration are the same with the original test, the slightly higher alternative calibration reveals that ~HIGHPOLEXCLU is sufficient by itself (it does not combine with ENGAGE unlike in the original test and in the slightly lower alternative calibration).

It was not advisable to perform a sensitivity test that involves different raw consistency cut-off from the original test because of the low PRI score (which means higher inconsistency) of the rows that could have been included if only on the basis of the consistency score of 0.75 above, in both the presence and absence of the outcome (see Truth Tables). Similarly, while providing as much diversity to the outcome, the cases selected are deemed to be homogenous as they are those that have not had a statistically significant decline in their democratic attributes in the given autocratization period. Although it might be sound to, for example, have the cases of non-autocratizing, consolidated democracies with high-income as alternative cases, these are not diverse when it comes to the outcome. QCA is applicable in cases with such diversity in the

outcome, after all, difference-making can only be had in such an instance. Nonetheless, for future research, an alternative, more nuanced case selection strategy in this line can be done.

3. Discussion and conclusion

Following the logic of QCA in the previous chapter, this section reports the pathways to corruption in non-autocratizing states. Specifically, this chapter intended to locate the role of civil society in anti-corruption and whether such role is conditional on the presence or absence of other conditions, given the context of states that have not had an autocratization episode.

While such role is indeed present as the absence of a robust civil society combines with the absence of wide and public deliberations and simultaneously with the presence of high political exclusion to produce the outcome high perceived corruption, the coverage of such solution formula is rather very low. Only two (2) out of the thirty (30) countries that did not experience autocratization were covered by the said solution. Despite the high consistency of such solution, the weak coverage raises concern about the causal importance of the pathway. Interesting as it is, it is in the sufficiency analysis for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption that the role of civil society could not be located. As the intermediate solution provides, the pathway for the absence of high perceived corruption is the presence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion. Not only was the solution consistent; it also has covered more cases as shown by the high coverage score.

The results for the outcome absence of high perceived corruption are striking although not surprising as it is in line with the foundations of QCA. While in the previous chapter, it is the absence of robust civil society organizations combined with other conditions that lead to presence of high perceived corruption (in autocratizing states), the results herein show that the absence of high perceived corruption (in non-autocratizing states) is not brought about by robust civil society

organizations (both in their presence or absence, and/or in combination with other conditions) but by the presence of wide and independent public deliberations combined with the absence of high political exclusion. One is prompted to ask, could this very well be indicative of the differential impacts of civil society? Could this perhaps point to the different role that civil society organizations play in anti-corruption in different contexts, of autocratization or non-autocratization, in this case? Or does this relate to the general political atmosphere that characterizes much of state-civil society relations in countries?

For instance, Yabanci (2019) held that in competitive authoritarian (CA) regimes, dissenting social forces turn to civil society as they have no practical access to political institutions to democratically challenge the government. Even while CA regimes extensively violate these democratic practices and political institutions, unlike closed autocracies, they seek to engage with civil society rather than eliminate it as they cannot ignore societal consent and legitimacy and rule by pure coercion (p.286). A caveat exists, however: the growth and diversification of civil society in such regimes cannot be a guarantee for its ability to become agents of democratic change (Giersdorf and Croissant, 2011; Yabanci, 2019). The existence of co-opted civil society, or the politicization of the same, shows that the roles of the CSOs are thus contingent to the preferences of the government. Moreover, the complicated relationship between state and civil society may undermine the supposed positive impact of civil engagement in anti-corruption. As Zaloznaya et.al (2018) posited, the government and civil society have fundamentally incompatible goals as the former approaches the issue of anti-corruption and reform from the point of self-preservation while the latter seeks to directly challenge the elites. In their study, they claim that under certain conditions, active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes: under the pretext of faux collaboration (façade of cooperation) and non-collaborative co-presence (shared governance role

without compromise-based solutions), civil society may actually hinder long-term goals of anti-corruption, including democratization and effective governance.

But how about in contexts of non-autocratization? Why is it, for instance, that the presence of a robust civil society organization (by itself or in combination with other conditions) does not necessarily lead to the absence of high perceived corruption, given the solution formula discussed above? Most of the countries in the list are highly consolidated democracies and advanced industrialized countries. What roles, if any, do civil society organizations play in anti-corruption in governance contexts where citizens have access to stable democratic political institutions, where citizens are empowered, and where collective action is fostered, among others? These are among the bases for sustainable development and control of corruption, which Mungiu-Pippidi (2016) claimed are rather long term and which few donor agencies pursue to address corruption in the case of neo-patrimonial systems. Corruption levels are quite low once all democratic components are strong, noted McMann et al. (2019), but could it then be that in the case of non-autocratizing states, the anti-corruption effects of other components of democracy (and in combination with each other) are more crucial than civil society's? Or how probable is it that the CS's effects are complemented by other actors or democratic institutions at a given period and time once a certain level of democratization or consolidation is achieved? One thing remains for sure, and it is consistent with the underpinnings of QCA: apart from institutions that support wider and independent public deliberations and that address systemic political inequality, there must be several other conditions and configurations not covered here that can possibly be a pathway to the absence of corruption in the context of non-autocratization.

4. Supplementary Material

A. Sufficiency Tests

Table A.1. Raw Data

Country	R				EXT			E	H	HPC
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB			
Australia	4	4	1	3	3	4	3	4	0.011	1.81
Botswana	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.258	0.71
Canada	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.026	1.77
Cyprus	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.102	0.6
El Salvador	3	3	1	2	3	3	3	2	0.584	-0.55
Finland	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.027	2.15
Georgia	4	4	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.091	0.67
Ireland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.031	1.46
Israel	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.368	0.81
Jamaica	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.118	-0.06
Japan	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	4	0.048	1.48
Lebanon	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	2	0.521	-1.16
Mauritius	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.113	0.32
Mexico	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	0.277	-0.82
Mongolia	3	4	1	2	2	3	3	4	0.291	-0.44
Namibia	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	3	0.204	0.37
New Zealand	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.055	2.17
Paraguay	3	3	1	2	2	3	2	2	0.425	-0.83
Senegal	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	0.23	0.05
Slovakia	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	0.09	0.33
Slovenia	4	4	2	3	2	4	3	3	0.037	0.91
South Africa	4	4	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.356	0.08
Sweden	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.022	2.12

Switzerland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.023	1.98
Taiwan	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	4	0.058	1.05
Timor-Leste	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.454	-0.38
Trinidad and Tobago	4	3	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.199	-0.19
Tunisia	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.178	-0.08
United Kingdom	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.08	1.77
United States of America	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.03	1.22

Legend:
R: ROBUSTCSO
CSOr: CSOrepression
CSOe: CSOentry
CSOc: CSOconsult
CSOp: CSOparticip
EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREEDOM
CM: Critmedia
GMC: Govmediacensor
MB: Mediabias
E: ENGAGE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU
HPC: HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

Table A.2. Calibrated Data

Country	R				EXT			E	H	HPC
	CSOr	CSOe	CSOc	CSOp	CM	GMC	MB			
Australia	4	4	1	3	3	4	3	4	0.011	1.81
Botswana	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.258	0.71
Canada	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.026	1.77
Cyprus	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.102	0.6
El Salvador	3	3	1	2	3	3	3	2	0.584	-0.55
Finland	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.027	2.15
Georgia	4	4	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.091	0.67
Ireland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.031	1.46
Israel	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.368	0.81
Jamaica	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.118	-0.06
Japan	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	4	0.048	1.48
Lebanon	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	2	0.521	-1.16
Mauritius	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.113	0.32
Mexico	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	0.277	-0.82
Mongolia	3	4	1	2	2	3	3	4	0.291	-0.44
Namibia	4	4	1	2	3	3	3	3	0.204	0.37
New Zealand	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.055	2.17
Paraguay	3	3	1	2	2	3	2	2	0.425	-0.83
Senegal	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	0.23	0.05
Slovakia	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	0.09	0.33
Slovenia	4	4	2	3	2	4	3	3	0.037	0.91
South Africa	4	4	1	3	3	2	3	3	0.356	0.08
Sweden	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.022	2.12
Switzerland	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	5	0.023	1.98
Taiwan	4	3	1	3	3	3	3	4	0.058	1.05
Timor-Leste	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	0.454	-0.38
Trinidad and Tobago	4	3	1	3	2	3	3	4	0.199	-0.19

Tunisia	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	5	0.178	-0.08
United Kingdom	4	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	0.08	1.77
United States of America	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	0.03	1.22

Legend:
R: ROBUSTCSO
- CSOr: CSOrepression
- CSOe: CSOentry
- CSOc: CSOconsult
- CSOp: CSOparticip

EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREEDOM
- CM: Critmedia
- GMC: Govmediacensor
- MB: Mediabias

E: ENGAGE
H: HIGHPOLEXCLU
HPC: HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

Table A.3. Final Data*

Country	EN	R	EXT	H	HPC
Australia	0.8	0	1	0.02660796	0.015386674
Botswana	0.6	0	0.67	0.14413213	0.163648002
Canada	0.8	0.67	1	0.02962224	0.016842876
Cyprus	0.8	1	0.67	0.05070396	0.201235509
El Salvador	0.4	0	0.67	0.64983914	0.77966371
Finland	1	0.67	0.67	0.02983456	0.007104138
Georgia	0.8	0	0.67	0.04694532	0.176618767
Ireland	0.8	1	1	0.03069872	0.033745846
Israel	0.6	0	0.33	0.27454878	0.13457526
Jamaica	0.8	1	1	0.0566824	0.534410276
Japan	0.8	0	0.67	0.03464923	0.032279137
Lebanon	0.4	0	0.33	0.53856899	0.934946205
Mauritius	0.8	1	0.67	0.05474624	0.324044121
Mexico	0.6	0.67	0.67	0.1622577	0.868078296
Mongolia	0.8	0	0.67	0.17675789	0.733209188
Namibia	0.6	0	0.67	0.10166273	0.299405452
New Zealand	0.8	1	1	0.0364147	0.006787234
Paraguay	0.4	0	0.67	0.36538143	0.870687348
Senegal	0.6	0	0.67	0.12052199	0.471310916
Slovakia	0.6	0.67	1	0.04661707	0.319031842
Slovenia	0.6	1	0.67	0.03204054	0.109988178
South Africa	0.6	0	0.33	0.25730983	0.45417594
Sweden	1	1	1	0.02878749	0.007607238
Switzerland	1	1	1	0.02899401	0.010463457
Taiwan	0.8	0	0.67	0.03719756	0.082221978
Timor-Leste	0.6	0	0.67	0.41614705	0.70539182
Trinidad and Tobago	0.8	0	0.67	0.09835031	0.607437511
Tunisia	1	1	0.67	0.08546777	0.54582406
United Kingdom	0.8	0.67	1	0.04345255	0.016842876
United States of America	0.8	1	0.67	0.03048043	0.057155083

*The macroconditions were created from the conditions using the MIN function (Logical AND)
Legend:
EN: ENGAGE; R: ROBUSTCSO; EXT: EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE; H: HIGHPOLEXCLU; HPC: HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

Table A.4. Conservative solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
~ENGAGE* ~ROBUSTCSO* HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.945	0.864	0.348		Lebanon, El Salvador
Overall solution	0.945	0.864	0.348		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

Table A.5. Parsimonious solution, outcome high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.929	0.819	0.394		Lebanon, El Salvador
Solution	0.929	0.819	0.394		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

Table A.6. Conservative solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
ENGAGE* ~ ROBUSTCSO* ~ HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.795	0.695	0.434	0.043	Israel, South Africa, Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago
ENGAGE* EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE* ~ HIGHPOLEXCLU	0.859	0.807	0.813	0.421	Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
Solution	0.849	0.796	0.855		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

Table A.7. Parsimonious solution, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Uniq. Cov.	Cases
ENGAGE	0.832	0.778	0.886		Israel, South Africa, Australia, Botswana, Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, Namibia, Senegal, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America
Solution	0.832	0.778	0.886		

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND
Most typical case is italicized; uniquely covered case is in bold

B. Robustness Tests

B.1. Test 1 Calibration

Table B.1. Robustness test set membership scores calibration

Conditions/Outcome	Full membership	Cross-over point	Full non-membership
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP (i)	-1.2815 (90^{th} percentile)	0 (50^{th} percentile)	1.2815 (10^{th} percentile)
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP (ii)	-1.6448 (95^{th} percentile)	0.1256 (55^{th} percentile)	1.6448 (5^{th} percentile)
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP (iii)	-1.0364 (85^{th} percentile)	-0.1256 (45^{th} percentile)	1.0364 (15^{th} percentile)
HIGHPOLEXCLU (i)	0.90	0.50	0.10
HIGHPOLEXCLU (ii)	0.95	0.55	0.05
HIGHPOLEXCLU (iii)	0.85	0.45	0.15

Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration

Table B.2. Summary of solution formula derived from the alternative calibrations, outcome high perceived corruption

Calibration	Parsimonious solution	Intermediate solution
i	HIGHPOLEXCLU	~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU
ii	HIGHPOLEXCLU	~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU
iii	HIGHPOLEXCLU	~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND;
Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration

Table B.3. Summary of solution formula derived from the alternative calibrations, outcome absence of high perceived corruption

Calibration	Parsimonious solution	Intermediate solution
i	ENGAGE	ENGAGE*~HIGHPOLEXCLU
ii	~HIGHPOLEXCLU	~HIGHPOLEXCLU
iii	ENGAGE*~HIGHPOLEXCLU	ENGAGE*~HIGHPOLEXCLU

~ denotes absence of the condition; + denotes logical OR; * denotes logical AND;
Note: (i): original analysis; (ii) first alternative calibration; (iii) second alternative calibration

Chapter 7
Conclusion

There remains an important place for the debate about the supposed anti-corruption role of civil society in the democracy scholarship. This is especially true at the backdrop of autocratization, or democratic backsliding or democratic reversals, to some scholars. With the onset of shrinking of civic space, a part of the general trend of democratic backsliding, the question on civil society's effects amidst assaults against it makes the debate more relevant. In the most recent Varieties of Democracy Project report (2020), it was noted that autocratization, continues to surge in the world: autocracies are now in the majority, with 92 countries being home to 54% of the global population. Indeed, countries across all typologies are currently affected by what Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) call the "third wave of autocratization". Governments not only attack civil society, media freedom, and freedoms of expression and participation, but also violate the institutions of free and fair elections. One may thus ask: if democratic grounds are backsliding, where are anti-corruption efforts anchored on? Broadly, this dissertation builds on and is guided by this very question. In the following sections, I review the most important findings, their contributions, and limitations, and provide venues for further research.

1. Review of findings

The paper adopted a fairly broad definition of civil society (see White, 2004) and corruption (see Gerring and Thacker, 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 2008; Johnston, 2009; Philp, 2015) in its exposition of civil society-corruption nexus. The general debate surrounding the role of civil society in anti-corruption is divided into three: (1) those who claim that civil society's effects is undeniable and that they are a powerful actor; (2) those who argue that civil society has become conduits for corruption if not by themselves corrupt; and (3) those who believe that civil society's

impact is “conditional” on other aspects. The dissertation is founded on the third, conditionality literature, with institutionalism as an overarching theory.

In Chapter 4, I asked the question: why can’t civil society battle it all alone? Taking into account the idea that much of our understanding of corruption is brought about by the influence of the economistic perspective, this section looked at corruption from a contentious political perspective based on the extant civil society literature, public administration, and transparency research with institutionalism as an overarching theory. While the internal structure of civil society is found to be a significant determinant of corruption, the results point to the importance of institutional arrangements and the quality thereof. First, the civil society environment, which includes the extent to which the government controls the entry and exit of civil society organizations into public life and the extent to which the government represses the latter, is material. This is not surprising, as it had already been echoed by previous researchers that the government determines the playing field to a large extent. However, this raises an important concern: how much of the goals of civil society are predetermined by the state, given that it is a gatekeeper? Should civil society be allowed entry, to what extent is their participation in policy recognized? CSO consultation (a part of the CSO structure) as well as CSO entry and exit (a part of civil society environment), did not lead to a reduction in corruption, as the final regression model showed. This moves the discourse from the number of routine consultations to the independence and quality of engagement by the state with CSOs. After all, together with many other optimists, Rasmussen and Reher (2019) found evidence that CSOs have a role in policy representation, one that takes their place a notch higher than their usual interest advocacy function. Second, the transparency of laws and the predictability of their enforcement is found to have a bearing on corruption. Scholars such as Marinova (2011) claimed that politico-legal institutions

are important, as is the rule of law (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010), but the findings here also suggested that the coherence, stability, and predictability of enforcement of (transparent) laws are as crucial. Third, and more importantly, the rigorousness and impartiality of public administration, the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat cases alike and whether they are arbitrary or not in the performance of their duties, was found to be significant in political corruption mitigation, leading to greater reduction in corruption more than the other variables above. The question raised by Brown (2007) as to whether leadership is provided from the highest levels of government becomes all the more pertinent; but the quality of such leadership should also be zeroed in. Indeed, the problem on agency, as the literature on policy failure in the control of corruption stresses, remains valid. While the results show the formula for political corruption through the individual net effects of each of the variables considered, such is but one. As is with the configurational character of much of social life, there is a possibility that there may be multiple paths to corruption. The fifth chapter addressed this.

Via fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), I explored the configurations of conditions that give rise to corruption in the second study, results of which were presented in Chapter 5. I did such while locating the role of civil society in anti-corruption in countries that have experienced significant or substantial autocratization. Still guided by the "conditionality" literature, and consistent with the underpinnings of QCA, I found evidence for the conditionality of civil society's effects. Particularly, the absence of a robust civil society organization combined with the absence of extensive media freedoms and simultaneously the absence of wide and independent public deliberations for the outcome, high perceived corruption, to occur. Apart from these, the solution term for the same outcome also included two other sufficient conditions: the presence of high political exclusion as well as the absence of sociopolitical integration. It must be

noted that the closing of civic space phenomenon is accompanied almost always by attacks on the media and its independence in autocratizing states, two rather important venues for societal interest representation and surveillance. The results thus resonate what anti-corruption experts caution: when policies to mitigate corruption do not tackle other institutions or issues simultaneously, they are more likely to fail (You, 2015). It is also worth noting that several states which have otherwise robust civil society organizations and extensive media freedoms are worse performers in anti-corruption. The solution formula only covered conditions deemed relevant to the study and the finding echoes one of the foundations of QCA, that is, there may be multiple paths to the same outcome.

Context is also one of the cores of QCA. While the preceding tackles the role of civil society in autocratizing contexts, in the third study the results of which were presented in Chapter 6, I located such role in the context of states that have not had a substantial decline in their democratic attributes. It is after all possible that the very same conditions may lead to the presence or absence of the outcome given the context (multifinality). Interestingly, one may ask, if in the previous the absence of robust civil society organizations combined with other conditions to lead to the presence of high perceived corruption, does the presence of robust civil society organizations (by itself or in combination with other conditions) lead to the absence of corruption in non-autocratizing states? This question is also driven by the conditionality literature particularly that which says that under certain institutional and political contexts, civil society may have merely an auxiliary role (Encarnacion, 2012). As such, as an extension of the claims made in Chapter 5, I extended the QCA test in 30 countries that have not experienced autocratization from 1994. While it is found out that the outcome presence of high perceived corruption in non-autocratizing states is brought about by the absence of robust civil society organizations combined with absence of

wide and independent public deliberations and simultaneously presence of high political exclusion albeit with very low coverage score (as only two of the countries were covered), it is in the outcome absence of high perceived corruption that the role of civil society seemed elusive. The absence of high perceived corruption is rather brought about by the presence of wide and independent public deliberations and simultaneously the absence of high political exclusion (a condition that is also necessary for the outcome). Although it is constantly highlighted in the extant scholarship that having a democracy is not a requirement for anti-corruption to work (Hira, 2016), or for corruption to be mitigated or addressed, the results point to the importance of specific aspects of democracy that are part of the solution formula. However, civil society's role in this case could not be located and as such one may ask, what roles do civil society organizations take in anti-corruption in governance contexts where citizens have access to stable democratic political institutions, where collective action is fostered, and where accountable and credible state agencies are in place? In the following table, the pathways to corruption in both contexts of autocratization and non-autocratization are summarized.

Table 7.1 Pathways to corruption and its absence in the third wave of autocratization (1994-2017)

Regime	Outcome	Pathway
Autocratizing states	High perceived corruption	~SOCIOPOLINTEG + HIGHPOLEXCLU + ~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO* ~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
	Absence of high perceived corruption	-
Non-autocratizing states	High perceived corruption	~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU
	Absence of high perceived corruption	ENGAGE*~HIGHPOLEXCLU

Note: Only the intermediate solution based on the theoretical directional expectation is reported in this summary; * denotes logical AND; + denotes logical OR; ~ denotes absence of the condition; - not possible to perform the analyses of necessity and sufficiency given that no consistency score was higher than 0.75.

2. Contributions

The dissertation's more important share in the scholarship lies in specifying and formalizing the configuration of corruption while at the same time locating the role of civil society within this configuration. As such, that civil society organizations can contribute to anti-corruption is acknowledged in the study, but the view that they are an all-powerful actor in this regard is limited. The dissertation contributes to the scholarship by not only showing the conditional effect of civil society's anti-corruption role but also the possibility that such effect is differential.

First, civil society's effects are conditioned by several factors and that it is only in combination with these factors that CSOs can exert its supposed impact. While most studies on corruption are large-N quantitative, only very few QCA studies (see Stevens, 2016; Ingrams, 2018; Zimelis, 2019; Dunlop et. al, 2020) on corruption have so far been done. In the second and third studies, through Qualitative Comparative Analysis which has been rarely applied in corruption research, the dissertation makes a novel contribution on the understanding of corruption as a conjunctural, asymmetrical, equifinal, and multifinal phenomenon.

Second, and in relation to the one of the cores of QCA, such anti-corruption effect of civil society is context dependent. Although it raises more questions than confirms specific studies or much less answers them, the third study can be a starting point to look further into this supposed differential impact of civil society. Looking at Table 7.1, the condition presence of robust civil society organizations (ROBUSTCSO) does not figure in the absence of high perceived corruption in non-autocratizing states. This signals the possibility that there are instances in which locating civil society's role may be elusive. What the third study also highlights is the view that what brings about corruption may not necessarily the same, or a mirror image, of that which brings anti-corruption. This is consistent with what corruption scholars who caution that if a true and

meaningful understanding of the complex phenomenon that is corruption is wanted, anti-corruption must also be studied not just corruption, in contexts of development and not just underdevelopment, in democracies not just in autocracies, and possibly in local and not just in national levels.

3. Limitations and directions for future research

However, as with any academic work, this study has its own limitations. The first concerns the conceptualization of corruption and civil society. Perceptions of corruption were used as a measure of success/failure of anti-corruption policy. While this limits corruption research in general, it is possible to use proxies for corruption, and specify which types of corruption are accounted for by which conditions. The same is true with the use of a rather general conception of civil society. Although such is helpful and relevant as the study is a first attempt to formalize claims of necessity and sufficiency in relation to the anti-corruption role of civil society, the definition conflates non-governmental organizations with other actors beyond the state and market. A more nuanced understanding of which types of civil society can be relevant for what specific anti-corruption will be important in locating the role of civil society. The second involves limitations in time. Although the first study involved a very long timeframe, the second only dealt with contemporary democratic reversals (from 1994 to 2017). While it was important to determine such scope condition, to include earlier autocratization episodes might also shed light into the main issue on hand and provide an understanding of the development or trajectory of civil society's effects, if any, in anti-corruption. Third, while the solution formula derived in the QCA were of high consistency and coverage, to make causal claims based on these should be taken with caution, particularly so that a further and elaborate exploration of the causal chain is needed. This, for example, can be addressed via a study of the typical or deviant cases through process tracing.

These limitations can be addressed by succeeding research as mentioned. However, there are findings in the study that signal some theoretical and practical interest. First, a nuanced understanding of what impacts CSO consultation (as part of CSO structure in Chapter 4 and part of ROBUSTCSO in Chapter 5) have in anti-corruption can be investigated, while keeping in mind the role of context. There is a stark variation for example in countries that have not experienced autocratization as to the degree in which they consult civil society organizations in matters of public policy. Similarly, in some autocratizing states where robust civil society organizations together with extensive media freedoms and freedoms of expression thrive, corruption still pervades. A look into the conditions under these contexts may be material. Second, one may ask, given the differential impact of robust civil society organizations (in both their absence and presence), can autocratization as a process be included in the analysis? The inclusion of autocratization as a condition and a process in a QCA analysis might be fruitful. This can be a direct test of the supposed impact of democratic backsliding in (anti-corruption) policy, a scholarship that currently not only attracts but also merits attention.

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Appendices

A. Replication Code Chapter 5

1. ORIGINAL ANALYSIS

A. CALIBRATION

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("AUTO.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

#THEORETICAL CALIBRATION
#CSOREPRESS TO CSOREPRESS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOREPRESS_TC <- NA
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=4]<-1
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<4 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=3]<-0.67
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<3 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=2]<-0.33
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<2 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=0]<-0
CSOREPRESS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame

DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC<-CSOREPRESS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOENTRY TO CSOENTRY_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOENTRY_TC <- NA
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=4]<-1
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<4 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=3]<-0.67
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<3 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=2]<-0.33
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<2 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=0]<-0
CSOENTRY_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC<-CSOENTRY_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOCONSULT TO CSOCONSULT_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide
```

```
1
2   CSOCONSULT_TC <- NA
3   CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=2]<-1
4   CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT<2 & DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=0]<-0
5   CSOCONSULT_TC
6
7   #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
8   DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC<-CSOCONSULT_TC
9   head(DEMCOR)
10
11  #CSOPARTICIP TO CSOPARTICIP_TC
12  #Thresholds are in the code guide
13
14  CSOPARTICIP_TC <- NA
15  CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=3]<-1
16  CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<3 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=2]<-0.67
17  CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<2 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=1]<-0.33
18  CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<1 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=0]<-0
19  CSOPARTICIP_TC
20
21  #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
22  DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC<-CSOPARTICIP_TC
23  head(DEMCOR)
24
25  #CRITMEDIA TO CRITMEDIA_TC
26  #Thresholds are in the code guide
27
28  CRITMEDIA_TC <- NA
29  CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=3]<-1
30  CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<3 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=2]<-0.67
31  CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<2 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=1]<-0.33
32  CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<1 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=0]<-0
33  CRITMEDIA_TC
34
35  #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
36  DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC<-CRITMEDIA_TC
37  head(DEMCOR)
38
39  #GOVMEDIACENSOR TO GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
40  #Thresholds are in the code guide
41
42  GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC <- NA
43  GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=4]<-1
44  GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<4 &
45  DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=3]<-0.67
46  GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<3 &
47  DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=1]<-0.33
```

```
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<1 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=0]<-0
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC<-GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#MEDIABIAS TO MEDIABIAS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

MEDIABIAS_TC <- NA
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=3]<-1
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<3 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=2]<-0.67
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<2 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=1]<-0.33
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<1 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=0]<-0
MEDIABIAS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC<-MEDIABIAS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#ENGAGE TO ENGAGE_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

ENGAGE_TC <- NA
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=5]<-1
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<5 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=4]<-0.8
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<4 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=3]<-0.6
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<3 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=2]<-0.4
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<2 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=1]<-0.2
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<1 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=0]<-0
ENGAGE_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$ENGAGE_TC<-ENGAGE_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#SOCIOPOLINTEG TO SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC <- NA
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=9 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=10]<-1
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=6 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=8]<-0.67
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=3 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=5]<-0.33
```

```
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=1 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=2]<-0
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC<-SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CREATE MACROCONDITION- ROBUSTCSO
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CSOREPRESS
#CSOENTRY
#CSOCONSULT
#CSOPARTICIP

ROBUSTCSO<-pmin(DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC,DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC,
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC, DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC)
ROBUSTCSO

DEMCOR$ROBUSTCSO<-ROBUSTCSO
head(DEMCOR)

#CREATE MACROCONDITION EXTENSIVE MEDIA FREEDOM
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CRITMEDIA
#GOVMEDIACENSOR
#MEDIABIAS

EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-
pmin(DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC,DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC,
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC)
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE

DEMCOR$EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
head(DEMCOR)

#DIRECT CALIBRATION
#Use direct calibration for POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND HIGH PERCEIVED
CORRUPTION

#POLITICAL EXCLUSION

HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$POLEXCLUD, type = "fuzzy", thresholds = c(0.10,
0.50, 0.90))
HIGHPOLEXCLUFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- HIGHPOLEXCLUFS
head(DEMCOR)
```

```
#HIGH PERCEIVED CORRUPTION

HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, type =
"fuzzy", thresholds = c(1.2815, 0, -1.2815))
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
head(DEMCOR)

#REMOVE COLUMNS WITH THE RAW DATA:

DEMCOR<-DEMCOR[,-c(1:18)]
DEMCOR

write.csv(DEMCOR, "DEMEROSION7.csv")
```

B. SUFFICIENCY TESTS

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("DEMEROSION7.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

#ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)

#No necessary condition

##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

#Create a Truth Table
TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:5]),
                        incl.cut = 0.95,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
TT_DEMCOR

#Export truth table as text
stargazerTT(TT_DEMCOR,
            show.cases = TRUE,
            type = "text",
```

```
        out = "myTT.text")


#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR <-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR

stargazerSol(results=CONSOL_DEMCOR,
          outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
          show.cases = TRUE,
          type = "text",
          out="ConSol.txt")

#Typical cases
smmr(results= CONSOL_DEMCOR,
    outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
    match = FALSE,
    cases = 1,
    term = 1)

#Most Typical case
#1st term: Belarus_05
#2nd term: Turkey_17
#3rd term: Niger_17
#4th term: Mali_13

#Plot the Conservative Solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
      results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
      outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
      all_labels = TRUE,
      jitter = FALSE)

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR

#Typical case for each sufficient condition
smmr(results= PARSOL_DEMCOR,
    outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
    match = FALSE,
    cases = 1,
    term = 1)

#Most Typical case
#1st term: Belarus_05
```

```
#2nd term: Turkey_17
#3rd term: Venezuela_08

#Plot the parsimonious solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
                            all.sol = TRUE,
                            include = '?',
                            dir.exp = '0,0,0,0,1',
                            details = T)
INTERSOL_DEMCOR

smmr(results=INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
     outcome="HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
     match = FALSE,
     cases = 1,
     term = 1)

#Most Typical cases
#~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE: Belarus_05
#~SOCIOPOLINTEG: Turkey_17
#HIGHPOLEXCLU: Venezuela_08

#Uniquely covered cases
#~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE: Sri Lanka_08
#~SOCIOPOLINTEG: Turkey_17, Thailand_07, Thailand_16, Malawi_05
            #Niger_17, Ecuador_10, Nepa_2013, Moldova_17
            #Moldova_06, Zambia_17, Niger_10
#HIGHPOLEXCLU:  Mali_13, Dominican Republic_17

#Plot the intermediate solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#Create a radar chart for the intermediate solution
QCAradar(results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
         outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
         fit=TRUE,
         sol = 1)
```

```
#ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: absence of high perceived corruption ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE,
      names(DEMCOR[, 1:5]), neg.out = TRUE)

#ENGAGE, SOCIOPOLINTEG are necessary but with low coverage, at
# 0.394 and 0.474, respectively.
#~HIGHPOLEXCLU is necessary but with low coverage at 0.376.

#ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP
TT_DEMCOR_NEG <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
neg.out=TRUE,
                    conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[,1:5]),
                    incl.cut = 0.90,
                    show.cases = TRUE,
                    complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                    sort.by = c("incl", "n"))
TT_DEMCOR_NEG

#No consistency score is above 0.75.
```

2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

A. TEST 1

a. SUFFICIENCY TEST

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("DEMEROSION8.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

# ROBUSTNESS CHECK 1
# Drop cases of military coup and leave gradual
# autocratization as cases: 23 cases
# Same calibration strategy as the original analysis
# Data: 23 cases

##ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)

#No necessary condition
```

```
#Check Skewness of Data
skew.check(DEMCOR)

#No necessary condition

##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

#Create a Truth Table
TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:5]),
                        incl.cut = 0.95,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
TT_DEMCOR


#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR


#Plot the Conservative Solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR


#Typical case for each sufficient condition
smmr(results= PARSOL_DEMCOR,
     outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
     match = FALSE,
     cases = 1,
     term = 1)

#Most Typical case
# ~ENGAGE: Belarus_05
# ~SOCIOPOLINTEG: Malawi_05
# ~HIGHPOLEXCLU: Venezuela_08
```

```
1
2   #Uniquely Covered Cases
3   # ~ENGAGE: Sri Lanka_08
4   # ~SOCIOPOLINTEG: Malawi_05, Niger_17, Ecuador_10, Moldova_17, Zambia_17
5   # ~HIGHPOLEXCLU: Dominican Republic_17
6
7   #Plot the parsimonious solution
8   pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
9         results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
10        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
11        all_labels = TRUE,
12        jitter = FALSE)
13
14  #INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
15  INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
16                        all.sol = TRUE,
17                        include = '?',
18                        dir.exp = '0,0,0,0,1',
19                        details = T)
20  INTERSOL_DEMCOR
21
22  stargazerSol(results=INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
23            outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
24            show.cases = TRUE,
25            type = "text",
26            out="Robustness1_InterSol.txt")
27
28  smmr(results=INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
29     outcome="HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
30     match = FALSE,
31     cases = 1,
32     term = 1)
33
34  #Most Typical cases
35  # ~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE: Belarus_05
36  # ~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU: Venezuela_08
37  # ~SOCIOPOLINTEG: Malawi_05
38
39  #Uniquely covered cases
40  # ~ENGAGE*~ROBUSTCSO*~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE: Sri Lanka_08
41  # ~ROBUSTCSO*HIGHPOLEXCLU: Dominican Republic_17
42  # ~SOCIOPOLINTEG: Malawi_05, Niger_17, Ecuador_10, Nepal_2013, Moldova_17,
43  Moldova_06, Zambia_17
44
45  #Plot the intermediate solution
46  pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
47        results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
48        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
```

```
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#Create a radar chart for the intermediate solution
QCAradar(results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
         outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
         fit=TRUE,
         sol = 1)


#ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: absence of high perceived corruption ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE,
      names(DEMCOR[, 1:5]), neg.out = TRUE)

#ENGAGE, SOCIOPOLINTEG are necessary (0.941 and 0.968, respectively) but with low
coverage, at
# 0.534 and 0.613, respectively.
#~ROBUSTCSO is necessary at 0.938 but with low coverage at 0.346.
#~EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE is necessary at 0.910 but with low coverage at 0.503
# HIGHPOLEXCLU is necessary at 0.966 with low coverage at 0.448.

#Trivial necessary condition?

#ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP
TT_DEMCOR_NEG <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
neg.out=TRUE,
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[,1:5]),
                        incl.cut = 0.75,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("incl", "n"))
TT_DEMCOR_NEG

#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG, details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE, use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG, include = "?", details = TRUE,
show.cases = TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

#SOCIOPOLINTEG*~ROBUSTCSO*~HIGHPOLEXCLU

#Typical case for each sufficient condition
```

```
smmr(results= PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
    outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
    match = FALSE,
    cases = 1,
    term = 1)

#Most typical and uniquely covered:
#SOCIOPOLINTEG*~ROBUSTCSO*~HIGHPOLEXCLU: South Korea_14

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG,
                    all.sol = TRUE,
                    include = '?',
                    dir.exp = '1,1,1,1,0',
                    details = T)

INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

#same as parsimonious solution

#Most typical and uniquely covered:
#SOCIOPOLINTEG*~ROBUSTCSO*~HIGHPOLEXCLU: South Korea_14

pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
      results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
      outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
      all_labels = TRUE,
      jitter = FALSE)
```

B. TEST 2

a. SUFFICIENCY TEST

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("DEMEROSION7.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

##ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)

#Check Skewness of Data
skew.check(DEMCOR)

#No necessary condition
```

```
1
2   ##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
3   #Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
4
5   #Create a Truth Table
6   TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
7                           conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:5]),
8                           incl.cut = 0.93,
9                           show.cases = TRUE,
10                          complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
11                          sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
12  TT_DEMCOR
13
14  #CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
15  CONSOL_DEMCOR<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
16  use.tilde=FALSE)
17  CONSOL_DEMCOR
18
19  #Plot the Conservative Solution
20  pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
21        results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
22        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
23        all_labels = TRUE,
24        jitter = FALSE)
25
26  #PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
27  PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
28  TRUE)
29  PARSOL_DEMCOR
30
31  #Plot the parsimonious solution
32  pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
33        results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
34        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
35        all_labels = TRUE,
36        jitter = FALSE)
37
38  #INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
39  INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
40                              all.sol = TRUE,
41                              include = '?',
42                              dir.exp = '0,0,0,0,1',
43                              details = T)
44  INTERSOL_DEMCOR
45
46  #Plot the intermediate solution
47  pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
48        results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
```

```
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#Create a radar chart for the intermediate solution
QCAradar(results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        fit=TRUE,
        sol = 1)
```

C. TEST 3

a. ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION 1

i. CALIBRATION

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("AUTO.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

#THEORETICAL CALIBRATION
#CSOREPRESS TO CSOREPRESS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOREPRESS_TC <- NA
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=4]<-1
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<4 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=3]<-0.67
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<3 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=2]<-0.33
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<2 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=0]<-0
CSOREPRESS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame

DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC<-CSOREPRESS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOENTRY TO CSOENTRY_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOENTRY_TC <- NA
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=4]<-1
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<4 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=3]<-0.67
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<3 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=2]<-0.33
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<2 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=0]<-0
CSOENTRY_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
```

```
DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC<-CSOENTRY_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOCONSULT TO CSOCONSULT_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOCONSULT_TC <- NA
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=2]<-1
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT<2 & DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=0]<-0
CSOCONSULT_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC<-CSOCONSULT_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOPARTICIP TO CSOPARTICIP_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOPARTICIP_TC <- NA
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=3]<-1
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<3 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=2]<-0.67
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<2 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=1]<-0.33
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<1 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=0]<-0
CSOPARTICIP_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC<-CSOPARTICIP_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CRITMEDIA TO CRITMEDIA_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CRITMEDIA_TC <- NA
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=3]<-1
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<3 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=2]<-0.67
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<2 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=1]<-0.33
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<1 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=0]<-0
CRITMEDIA_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC<-CRITMEDIA_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#GOVMEDIACENSOR TO GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC <- NA
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=4]<-1
```

```
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<4 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=3]<-0.67
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<3 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=1]<-0.33
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<1 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=0]<-0
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC<-GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#MEDIABIAS TO MEDIABIAS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

MEDIABIAS_TC <- NA
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=3]<-1
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<3 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=2]<-0.67
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<2 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=1]<-0.33
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<1 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=0]<-0
MEDIABIAS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC<-MEDIABIAS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#ENGAGE TO ENGAGE_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

ENGAGE_TC <- NA
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=5]<-1
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<5 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=4]<-0.8
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<4 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=3]<-0.6
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<3 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=2]<-0.4
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<2 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=1]<-0.2
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<1 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=0]<-0
ENGAGE_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$ENGAGE_TC<-ENGAGE_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#SOCIOPOLINTEG TO SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC <- NA
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=9 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=10]<-1
```

```
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=6 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=8]<-0.67
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=3 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=5]<-0.33
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=1 &
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=2]<-0
SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC<-SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CREATE MACROCONDITION- ROBUSTCSO
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CSOREPRESS
#CSOENTRY
#CSOCONSULT
#CSOPARTICIP

ROBUSTCSO<-pmin(DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC,DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC,
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC, DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC)
ROBUSTCSO

DEMCOR$ROBUSTCSO<-ROBUSTCSO
head(DEMCOR)

#CREATE MACROCONDITION EXTENSIVE MEDIA FREEDOM
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CRITMEDIA
#GOVMEDIACENSOR
#MEDIABIAS

EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-
pmin(DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC,DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC,
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC)
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE

DEMCOR$EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
head(DEMCOR)

#DIRECT CALIBRATION
#Use direct calibration for POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND HIGH PERCEIVED
CORRUPTION

#POLITICAL EXCLUSION

HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$POLEXCLUD, type = "fuzzy", thresholds = c(0.05,
0.55, 0.95))
```

```
HIGHPOLEXCLUFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- HIGHPOLEXCLUFS
head(DEMCOR)

#HIGH PERCEIVED CORRUPTION

HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, type =
"fuzzy", thresholds = c(1.6448, 0.1256, -1.6448))
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
head(DEMCOR)

#REMOVE COLUMNS WITH THE RAW DATA:

DEMCOR<-DEMCOR[,-c(1:18)]
DEMCOR

write.csv(DEMCOR, "DEMEROSION9.csv")
```

ii. SUFFICIENCY TEST

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)
library(cna)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("DEMEROSION9.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

##ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)

#Check Skewness of Data
skew.check(DEMCOR)

#No necessary condition

##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

#Create a Truth Table
TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:5]),
                        incl.cut = 0.96,
```

```
                    show.cases = TRUE,
                    complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                    sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
TT_DEMCOR

#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR

#Plot the Conservative Solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
      results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
      outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
      all_labels = TRUE,
      jitter = FALSE)

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR

#Plot the parsimonious solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
      results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
      outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
      all_labels = TRUE,
      jitter = FALSE)

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
                    all.sol = TRUE,
                    include = '?',
                    dir.exp = '0,0,0,0,1',
                    details = T)
INTERSOL_DEMCOR

#Plot the intermediate solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
      results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
      outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
      all_labels = TRUE,
      jitter = FALSE)


#ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: absence of high perceived corruption ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

```

```
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE,
    names(DEMCOR[, 1:5]), neg.out = TRUE)

#ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP
TT_DEMCOR_NEG <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
neg.out=TRUE,
                    conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[,1:5]),
                    incl.cut = 0.75,
                    show.cases = TRUE,
                    complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                    sort.by = c("incl", "n"))
TT_DEMCOR_NEG

#No sufficiency score higher than 0.75
```

b. ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION 2

i. CALIBRATION

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("AUTO.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

#THEORETICAL CALIBRATION
#CSOREPRESS TO CSOREPRESS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOREPRESS_TC <- NA
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=4]<-1
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<4 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=3]<-0.67
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<3 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=2]<-0.33
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<2 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=0]<-0
CSOREPRESS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame

DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC<-CSOREPRESS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOENTRY TO CSOENTRY_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOENTRY_TC <- NA
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=4]<-1
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<4 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=3]<-0.67
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<3 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=2]<-0.33
```

```
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<2 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=0]<-0
CSOENTRY_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC<-CSOENTRY_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOCONSULT TO CSOCONSULT_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOCONSULT_TC <- NA
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=2]<-1
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT<2 & DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=0]<-0
CSOCONSULT_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC<-CSOCONSULT_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOPARTICIP TO CSOPARTICIP_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOPARTICIP_TC <- NA
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=3]<-1
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<3 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=2]<-0.67
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<2 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=1]<-0.33
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<1 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=0]<-0
CSOPARTICIP_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC<-CSOPARTICIP_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CRITMEDIA TO CRITMEDIA_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CRITMEDIA_TC <- NA
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=3]<-1
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<3 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=2]<-0.67
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<2 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=1]<-0.33
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<1 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=0]<-0
CRITMEDIA_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC<-CRITMEDIA_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#GOVMEDIACENSOR TO GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
```

```
#Thresholds are in the code guide

GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC <- NA
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=4]<-1
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<4 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=3]<-0.67
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<3 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=1]<-0.33
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<1 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=0]<-0
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC<-GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#MEDIABIAS TO MEDIABIAS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

MEDIABIAS_TC <- NA
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=3]<-1
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<3 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=2]<-0.67
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<2 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=1]<-0.33
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<1 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=0]<-0
MEDIABIAS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC<-MEDIABIAS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#ENGAGE TO ENGAGE_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

ENGAGE_TC <- NA
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=5]<-1
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<5 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=4]<-0.8
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<4 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=3]<-0.6
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<3 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=2]<-0.4
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<2 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=1]<-0.2
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<1 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=0]<-0
ENGAGE_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$ENGAGE_TC<-ENGAGE_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#SOCIOPOLINTEG TO SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide
```

```
1
2   SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC <- NA
3   SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=9 &
4   DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=10]<-1
5   SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=6 &
6   DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=8]<-0.67
7   SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=3 &
8   DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=5]<-0.33
9   SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC[DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG>=1 &
10  DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG<=2]<-0
11  SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
12
13  #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
14  DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC<-SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
15  head(DEMCOR)
16
17  #CREATE MACROCONDITION- ROBUSTCSO
18  #Get the minimum of the intersection of
19  #CSOREPRESS
20  #CSOENTRY
21  #CSOCONSULT
22  #CSOPARTICIP
23
24  ROBUSTCSO<-pmin(DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC,DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC,
25  DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC, DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC)
26  ROBUSTCSO
27
28  DEMCOR$ROBUSTCSO<-ROBUSTCSO
29  head(DEMCOR)
30
31  #CREATE MACROCONDITION EXTENSIVE MEDIA FREEDOM
32  #Get the minimum of the intersection of
33  #CRITMEDIA
34  #GOVMEDIACENSOR
35  #MEDIABIAS
36
37  EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-
38  pmin(DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC,DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC,
39  DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC)
40  EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
41
42  DEMCOR$EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
43  head(DEMCOR)
44
45  #DIRECT CALIBRATION
46  #Use direct calibration for POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND HIGH PERCEIVED
47  CORRUPTION
48
```

```
#POLITICAL EXCLUSION

HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$POLEXCLUD, type = "fuzzy", thresholds = c(0.15,
0.45, 0.85))
HIGHPOLEXCLUFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- HIGHPOLEXCLUFS
head(DEMCOR)

#HIGH PERCEIVED CORRUPTION

HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, type =
"fuzzy", thresholds = c(1.0364, -0.1256, -1.0364))
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
head(DEMCOR)

#REMOVE COLUMNS WITH THE RAW DATA:

DEMCOR<-DEMCOR[,-c(1:18)]
DEMCOR

write.csv(DEMCOR, "DEMEROSION10.csv")
```

ii. SUFFICIENCY TEST

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)
library(cna)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("DEMEROSION10.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

##ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)

#Check Skewness of Data
skew.check(DEMCOR)

#No necessary condition

##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

#Create a Truth Table
```

```
TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:5]),
                        incl.cut = 0.95,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
TT_DEMCOR

#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR

#Plot the Conservative Solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR


#Plot the parsimonious solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
                            all.sol = TRUE,
                            include = '?',
                            dir.exp = '0,0,0,0,1',
                            details = T)
INTERSOL_DEMCOR


#Plot the intermediate solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)
```

```
1
2   #Create a radar chart for the intermediate solution
3   QCAradar(results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
4           outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
5           fit=TRUE,
6           sol = 1)
7
8
9   #ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
10  #Outcome: absence of high perceived corruption ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP
11
12  QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:5], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE,
13      names(DEMCOR[, 1:5]), neg.out = TRUE)
14
15  #ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP
16  TT_DEMCOR_NEG <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
17  neg.out=TRUE,
18                          conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[,1:5]),
19                          incl.cut = 0.75,
20                          show.cases = TRUE,
21                          complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
22                          sort.by = c("incl", "n"))
23  TT_DEMCOR_NEG
24
25  #No sufficiency score higher than 0.75
```

B. Replication Code Chapter 6

1. ORIGINAL ANALYSIS

a. CALIBRATION

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("NOAUTOC2.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

#THEORETICAL CALIBRATION
#CSOREPRESS TO CSOREPRESS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOREPRESS_TC <- NA
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=4]<-1
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<4 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=3]<-0.67
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<3 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=2]<-0.33
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<2 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=0]<-0
CSOREPRESS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame

DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC<-CSOREPRESS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOENTRY TO CSOENTRY_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOENTRY_TC <- NA
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=4]<-1
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<4 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=3]<-0.67
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<3 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=2]<-0.33
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<2 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=0]<-0
CSOENTRY_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC<-CSOENTRY_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOCONSULT TO CSOCONSULT_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOCONSULT_TC <- NA
```

```
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=2]<-1
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT<2 & DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=0]<-0
CSOCONSULT_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC<-CSOCONSULT_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOPARTICIP TO CSOPARTICIP_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOPARTICIP_TC <- NA
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=3]<-1
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<3 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=2]<-0.67
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<2 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=1]<-0.33
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<1 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=0]<-0
CSOPARTICIP_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC<-CSOPARTICIP_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CRITMEDIA TO CRITMEDIA_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CRITMEDIA_TC <- NA
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=3]<-1
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<3 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=2]<-0.67
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<2 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=1]<-0.33
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<1 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=0]<-0
CRITMEDIA_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC<-CRITMEDIA_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#GOVMEDIACENSOR TO GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC <- NA
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=4]<-1
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<4 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=3]<-0.67
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<3 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=1]<-0.33
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<1 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=0]<-0
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
```

```
1
2   #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
3   DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC<-GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
4   head(DEMCOR)
5
6   #MEDIABIAS TO MEDIABIAS_TC
7   #Thresholds are in the code guide
8
9   MEDIABIAS_TC <- NA
10  MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=3]<-1
11  MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<3 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=2]<-0.67
12  MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<2 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=1]<-0.33
13  MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<1 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=0]<-0
14  MEDIABIAS_TC
15
16  #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
17  DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC<-MEDIABIAS_TC
18  head(DEMCOR)
19
20  #ENGAGE TO ENGAGE_TC
21  #Thresholds are in the code guide
22
23  ENGAGE_TC <- NA
24  ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=5]<-1
25  ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<5 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=4]<-0.8
26  ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<4 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=3]<-0.6
27  ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<3 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=2]<-0.4
28  ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<2 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=1]<-0.2
29  ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<1 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=0]<-0
30  ENGAGE_TC
31
32  #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
33  DEMCOR$ENGAGE_TC<-ENGAGE_TC
34  head(DEMCOR)
35
36  #Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
37  DEMCOR$SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC<-SOCIOPOLINTEG_TC
38  head(DEMCOR)
39
40  #CREATE MACROCONDITION- ROBUSTCSO
41  #Get the minimum of the intersection of
42  #CSOREPRESS
43  #CSOENTRY
44  #CSOCONSULT
45  #CSOPARTICIP
46
47  ROBUSTCSO<-pmin(DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC,DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC,
48  DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC, DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC)
```

```
ROBUSTCSO

DEMCOR$ROBUSTCSO<-ROBUSTCSO
head(DEMCOR)

#CREATE MACROCONDITION EXTENSIVE MEDIA FREEDOM
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CRITMEDIA
#GOVMEDIACENSOR
#MEDIABIAS

EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-
pmin(DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC,DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC,
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC)
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE

DEMCOR$EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
head(DEMCOR)

#DIRECT CALIBRATION
#Use direct calibration for POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND HIGH PERCEIVED
CORRUPTION

#POLITICAL EXCLUSION

HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$POLEXCLUD, type = "fuzzy", thresholds = c(0.10,
0.50, 0.90))
HIGHPOLEXCLUFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- HIGHPOLEXCLUFS
head(DEMCOR)

#HIGH PERCEIVED CORRUPTION

HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, type =
"fuzzy", thresholds = c(1.2815, 0, -1.2815))
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
head(DEMCOR)

#REMOVE COLUMNS WITH THE RAW DATA:

DEMCOR<-DEMCOR[,-c(1:17)]
DEMCOR

write.csv(DEMCOR, "NOEROSION3.csv")

```

b. SUFFICIENCY TEST

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("NOEROSION3.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

##ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:4], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)

#No necessary condition

##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

#0.90 raw consistency (no lower and higher)
#Create a Truth Table
TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:4]),
                        incl.cut = 0.90,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
TT_DEMCOR

#Export truth table as text
stargazerTT(TT_DEMCOR,
          show.cases = TRUE,
          type = "text",
          out = "NoAutoc_TT.text")


#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR <-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR

stargazerSol(results=CONSOL_DEMCOR,
           outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
           show.cases = TRUE,
           type = "text",
           out="NoAutoc_ConSol.txt")

#Typical cases
smmr(results= CONSOL_DEMCOR,
```

```
    outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
    match = FALSE,
    cases = 1,
    term = 1)

#Most Typical case

#Plot the Conservative Solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
      results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
      outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
      all_labels = TRUE,
      jitter = FALSE)

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR

stargazerSol(results=PARSOL_DEMCOR,
          outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
          show.cases = TRUE,
          type = "text",
          out="NoAutoc_ParSol.txt")

#Typical case for each sufficient condition
smmr(results= PARSOL_DEMCOR,
    outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
    match = FALSE,
    cases = 1,
    term = 1)

#Most Typical case

#Plot the parsimonious solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
      results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
      outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
      all_labels = TRUE,
      jitter = FALSE)

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
                    all.sol = TRUE,
                    include = '?',
                    dir.exp = '0,0,0,1',
                    details = T)
INTERSOL_DEMCOR
```

```
1
2   stargazerSol(results=INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
3               outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
4               show.cases = TRUE,
5               type = "text",
6               out="NoAutoc_InterSol.txt")
7
8   smmr(results=INTERSOL_DEMCOR,
9       outcome="HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
10      match = FALSE,
11      cases = 1,
12      term = 1)
13
14
15  #ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
16  #Outcome: absence of high perceived corruption ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP
17
18  QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:4], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE,
19        names(DEMCOR[, 1:4]), neg.out = TRUE)
20
21  # ~HIGHPOLEXCLU at 0.986, coverage of 0.778, and RoN of 0.412. Necessary condition.
22
23  #ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP
24
25  #Raw consistency at 0.90 but possibly lower until 0.75
26  TT_DEMCOR_NEG <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
27  neg.out=TRUE,
28                          conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[,1:4]),
29                          incl.cut = 0.80,
30                          show.cases = TRUE,
31                          complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
32                          sort.by = c("incl", "n"))
33  TT_DEMCOR_NEG
34
35  stargazerTT(TT_DEMCOR_NEG,
36              show.cases = TRUE,
37              type = "text",
38              out = "NoAutoc_TT_Neg.text")
39
40
41  #CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
42  CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG, details = TRUE, show.cases =
43  TRUE, use.tilde=FALSE)
44  CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG
45
46  stargazerSol(results=CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
47              outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
48              show.cases = TRUE,
```

```
            type = "text",
            out="NoAutoc_ConSol_Neg.txt")


#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG, include = "?", details = TRUE,
show.cases = TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

stargazerSol(results=PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
            outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
            show.cases = TRUE,
            type = "text",
            out="NoAutoc_ParSol_Neg.txt")

#Typical case for each sufficient condition
smmr(results= PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
    outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
    match = FALSE,
    cases = 1,
    term = 1)

#Most typical and uniquely covered:


#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG,
                        all.sol = TRUE,
                        include = '?',
                        dir.exp = '1,1,1,0',
                        details = T)

INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

#same as parsimonious solution

smmr(results= INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
    outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
    match = FALSE,
    cases = 1,
    term = 1)

#Most typical and uniquely covered:

stargazerSol(results=INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
            outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
            show.cases = TRUE,
            type = "text",
```

```
        out="NoAutoc_InterSol_Neg.txt")

pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)
```

2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

A. TEST 1

a. ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION 1

i. CALIBRATION

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("NOAUTOC3.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

#THEORETICAL CALIBRATION
#CSOREPRESS TO CSOREPRESS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOREPRESS_TC <- NA
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=4]<-1
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<4 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=3]<-0.67
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<3 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=2]<-0.33
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<2 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=0]<-0
CSOREPRESS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame

DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC<-CSOREPRESS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOENTRY TO CSOENTRY_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOENTRY_TC <- NA
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=4]<-1
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<4 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=3]<-0.67
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<3 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=2]<-0.33
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<2 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=0]<-0
CSOENTRY_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
```

```
DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC<-CSOENTRY_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOCONSULT TO CSOCONSULT_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOCONSULT_TC <- NA
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=2]<-1
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT<2 & DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=0]<-0
CSOCONSULT_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC<-CSOCONSULT_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOPARTICIP TO CSOPARTICIP_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOPARTICIP_TC <- NA
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=3]<-1
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<3 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=2]<-0.67
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<2 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=1]<-0.33
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<1 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=0]<-0
CSOPARTICIP_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC<-CSOPARTICIP_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CRITMEDIA TO CRITMEDIA_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CRITMEDIA_TC <- NA
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=3]<-1
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<3 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=2]<-0.67
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<2 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=1]<-0.33
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<1 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=0]<-0
CRITMEDIA_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC<-CRITMEDIA_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#GOVMEDIACENSOR TO GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC <- NA
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=4]<-1
```

```
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<4 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=3]<-0.67
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<3 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=1]<-0.33
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<1 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=0]<-0
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC<-GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#MEDIABIAS TO MEDIABIAS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

MEDIABIAS_TC <- NA
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=3]<-1
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<3 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=2]<-0.67
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<2 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=1]<-0.33
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<1 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=0]<-0
MEDIABIAS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC<-MEDIABIAS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#ENGAGE TO ENGAGE_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

ENGAGE_TC <- NA
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=5]<-1
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<5 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=4]<-0.8
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<4 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=3]<-0.6
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<3 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=2]<-0.4
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<2 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=1]<-0.2
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<1 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=0]<-0
ENGAGE_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$ENGAGE_TC<-ENGAGE_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CREATE MACROCONDITION- ROBUSTCSO
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CSOREPRESS
#CSOENTRY
#CSOCONSULT
#CSOPARTICIP
```

```
1
2   ROBUSTCSO<-pmin(DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC,DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC,
3   DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC, DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC)
4   ROBUSTCSO
5
6   DEMCOR$ROBUSTCSO<-ROBUSTCSO
7   head(DEMCOR)
8
9   #CREATE MACROCONDITION EXTENSIVE MEDIA FREEDOM
10  #Get the minimum of the intersection of
11  #CRITMEDIA
12  #GOVMEDIACENSOR
13  #MEDIABIAS
14
15  EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-
16  pmin(DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC,DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC,
17  DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC)
18  EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
19
20  DEMCOR$EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
21  head(DEMCOR)
22
23  #DIRECT CALIBRATION
24  #Use direct calibration for POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND HIGH PERCEIVED
25  CORRUPTION
26
27  #POLITICAL EXCLUSION
28
29  HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$POLEXCLUD, type = "fuzzy", thresholds = c(0.05,
30  0.55, 0.95))
31  HIGHPOLEXCLUFS
32
33  DEMCOR$HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- HIGHPOLEXCLUFS
34  head(DEMCOR)
35
36  #HIGH PERCEIVED CORRUPTION
37
38  HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, type =
39  "fuzzy", thresholds = c(1.6448, 0.1256, -1.6448))
40  HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
41
42  DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
43  head(DEMCOR)
44
45  #REMOVE COLUMNS WITH THE RAW DATA:
46
47  DEMCOR<-DEMCOR[,-c(1:17)]
48  DEMCOR
```

```
1
2   write.csv(DEMCOR, "NOEROSION4.csv")
3
4
5
6                                   ii. SUFFICIENCY TEST
7   rm(list = ls())
8   library(QCA)
9   library(SetMethods)
10
11  DEMCOR <- read.csv("NOEROSION4.csv", row.names = 1)
12  head(DEMCOR)
13
14  ##ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
15  #Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
16  QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:4], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)
17
18  #No necessary condition
19
20  ##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
21  #Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
22
23  #0.90 raw consistency (no lower and higher)
24  #Create a Truth Table
25  TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
26                          conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:4]),
27                          incl.cut = 0.90,
28                          show.cases = TRUE,
29                          complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
30                          sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
31  TT_DEMCOR
32
33  #Export truth table as text
34  stargazerTT(TT_DEMCOR,
35              show.cases = TRUE,
36              type = "text",
37              out = "NoAutoc_TT.text")
38
39
40  #CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
41  CONSOL_DEMCOR <-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
42  use.tilde=FALSE)
43  CONSOL_DEMCOR
44  #Plot the Conservative Solution
45  pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
46          results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
47          outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
48          all_labels = TRUE,
```

```
        jitter = FALSE)

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR

#Plot the parsimonious solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
                        all.sol = TRUE,
                        include = '?',
                        dir.exp = '0,0,0,1',
                        details = T)
INTERSOL_DEMCOR

#ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: absence of high perceived corruption ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:4], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE,
      names(DEMCOR[, 1:4]), neg.out = TRUE)

#ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

#Raw consistency at 0.90 but possibly lower until 0.75
TT_DEMCOR_NEG <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
neg.out=TRUE,
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[,1:4]),
                        incl.cut = 0.80,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("incl", "n"))
TT_DEMCOR_NEG


#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG, details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE, use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG,
```

```
                    include = "?", details = TRUE,
                    show.cases = TRUE,
                    )
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG,
                    all.sol = TRUE,
                    include = '?',
                    dir.exp = '1,1,1,0',
                    details = T,
                    )

INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG

#same as parsimonious solution
```

b. ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION 2

i. CALIBRATION

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("NOAUTOC3.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

#THEORETICAL CALIBRATION
#CSOREPRESS TO CSOREPRESS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOREPRESS_TC <- NA
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=4]<-1
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<4 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=3]<-0.67
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<3 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=2]<-0.33
CSOREPRESS_TC[DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS<2 & DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS>=0]<-0
CSOREPRESS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame

DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC<-CSOREPRESS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOENTRY TO CSOENTRY_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOENTRY_TC <- NA
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=4]<-1
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<4 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=3]<-0.67
```

```
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<3 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=2]<-0.33
CSOENTRY_TC[DEMCOR$CSOENTRY<2 & DEMCOR$CSOENTRY>=0]<-0
CSOENTRY_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC<-CSOENTRY_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOCONSULT TO CSOCONSULT_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOCONSULT_TC <- NA
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=2]<-1
CSOCONSULT_TC[DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT<2 & DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT>=0]<-0
CSOCONSULT_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC<-CSOCONSULT_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CSOPARTICIP TO CSOPARTICIP_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CSOPARTICIP_TC <- NA
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=3]<-1
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<3 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=2]<-0.67
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<2 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=1]<-0.33
CSOPARTICIP_TC[DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP<1 & DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP>=0]<-0
CSOPARTICIP_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC<-CSOPARTICIP_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#CRITMEDIA TO CRITMEDIA_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

CRITMEDIA_TC <- NA
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=3]<-1
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<3 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=2]<-0.67
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<2 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=1]<-0.33
CRITMEDIA_TC[DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA<1 & DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA>=0]<-0
CRITMEDIA_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC<-CRITMEDIA_TC
head(DEMCOR)

```

```
#GOVMEDIACENSOR TO GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC <- NA
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=4]<-1
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<4 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=3]<-0.67
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<3 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=1]<-0.33
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC[DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR<1 &
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR>=0]<-0
GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC<-GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#MEDIABIAS TO MEDIABIAS_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

MEDIABIAS_TC <- NA
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=3]<-1
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<3 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=2]<-0.67
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<2 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=1]<-0.33
MEDIABIAS_TC[DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS<1 & DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS>=0]<-0
MEDIABIAS_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC<-MEDIABIAS_TC
head(DEMCOR)

#ENGAGE TO ENGAGE_TC
#Thresholds are in the code guide

ENGAGE_TC <- NA
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=5]<-1
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<5 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=4]<-0.8
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<4 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=3]<-0.6
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<3 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=2]<-0.4
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<2 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=1]<-0.2
ENGAGE_TC[DEMCOR$ENGAGE<1 & DEMCOR$ENGAGE>=0]<-0
ENGAGE_TC

#Add the new calibrated set to the data frame
DEMCOR$ENGAGE_TC<-ENGAGE_TC
head(DEMCOR)


```

```
#CREATE MACROCONDITION- ROBUSTCSO
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CSOREPRESS
#CSOENTRY
#CSOCONSULT
#CSOPARTICIP

ROBUSTCSO<-pmin(DEMCOR$CSOREPRESS_TC,DEMCOR$CSOENTRY_TC,
DEMCOR$CSOCONSULT_TC, DEMCOR$CSOPARTICIP_TC)
ROBUSTCSO

DEMCOR$ROBUSTCSO<-ROBUSTCSO
head(DEMCOR)

#CREATE MACROCONDITION EXTENSIVE MEDIA FREEDOM
#Get the minimum of the intersection of
#CRITMEDIA
#GOVMEDIACENSOR
#MEDIABIAS

EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-
pmin(DEMCOR$CRITMEDIA_TC,DEMCOR$GOVMEDIACENSOR_TC,
DEMCOR$MEDIABIAS_TC)
EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE

DEMCOR$EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE<-EXTENSIVEMEDIAFREE
head(DEMCOR)

#DIRECT CALIBRATION
#Use direct calibration for POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND HIGH PERCEIVED
CORRUPTION

#POLITICAL EXCLUSION

HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$POLEXCLUD, type = "fuzzy", thresholds = c(0.15,
0.45, 0.85))
HIGHPOLEXCLUFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPOLEXCLUFS<- HIGHPOLEXCLUFS
head(DEMCOR)

#HIGH PERCEIVED CORRUPTION

HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- calibrate(DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP, type =
"fuzzy", thresholds = c(1.0364, -0.1256, -1.0364))
HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS<- HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
```

```
head(DEMCOR)

#REMOVE COLUMNS WITH THE RAW DATA:

DEMCOR<-DEMCOR[,-c(1:17)]
DEMCOR

write.csv(DEMCOR, "NOEROSION5.csv")
```

ii. SUFFICIENCY TEST

```
rm(list = ls())
library(QCA)
library(SetMethods)

DEMCOR <- read.csv("NOEROSION5.csv", row.names = 1)
head(DEMCOR)

##ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS
QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:4], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE)

#No necessary condition

##ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY
#Outcome: presence of high perceived corruption HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS

#0.90 raw consistency (no lower and higher)
#Create a Truth Table
TT_DEMCOR <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[1:4]),
                        incl.cut = 0.90,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS", "incl","n"))
TT_DEMCOR


#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR <-minimize(TT_DEMCOR, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE,
use.tilde=FALSE)
CONSOL_DEMCOR

#Plot the Conservative Solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = CONSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
```

```
        jitter = FALSE)

#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR, include = "?", details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE)
PARSOL_DEMCOR

#Plot the parsimonious solution
pimplot(data = DEMCOR,
        results = PARSOL_DEMCOR,
        outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
        all_labels = TRUE,
        jitter = FALSE)

#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR,
                        all.sol = TRUE,
                        include = '?',
                        dir.exp = '0,0,0,1',
                        details = T)
INTERSOL_DEMCOR


#ANALYSIS OF NECESSITY
#Outcome: absence of high perceived corruption ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

QCAfit(DEMCOR[, 1:4], DEMCOR$HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS, necessity = TRUE,
      names(DEMCOR[, 1:4]), neg.out = TRUE)

# ~HIGHPOLEXCLU at 0.986, coverage of 0.778, and RoN of 0.412. Necessary condition.

#ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR ~HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUP

#Raw consistency at 0.90 but possibly lower until 0.75
TT_DEMCOR_NEG <- truthTable(DEMCOR, outcome = "HIGHPERCEIVEDCORRUPFS",
neg.out=TRUE,
                        conditions = colnames(DEMCOR[,1:4]),
                        incl.cut = 0.80,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        complete = TRUE, PRI=TRUE,
                        sort.by = c("incl", "n"))
TT_DEMCOR_NEG



#CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG<-minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG, details = TRUE, show.cases =
TRUE, use.tilde=FALSE)
```

```
CONSOL_DEMCOR_NEG


#PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG  <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG,
                        include = "?", details = TRUE,
                        show.cases = TRUE,
                        )
PARSOL_DEMCOR_NEG


#INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG <- minimize(TT_DEMCOR_NEG,
                         all.sol = TRUE,
                         include = '?',
                         dir.exp = '1,1,1,0',
                         details = T,
                         )

INTERSOL_DEMCOR_NEG
```