

**BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**THE ADVANTAGES OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION**

THESES

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A) The aim of the work; its antecedents

1. At the beginning of the 1990s in connection with the democratic transformation of the ex-socialist countries, the countries of the region showing the most prominent development (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland) put in their claim for integrating again into the natural course of development of Europe, thus into the European Community. This claim however, came unexpectedly to the social and political life of the period in the Community and scientific researches could not find an appropriate answer to how and with what consequences could the integration of certain ex-socialist countries to the Western European course of development – by the time already functioning as the European Union (from November 1, 1993) – take place. As a result, instead of a quick enlargement – the German currency union and later the unification was settled immediately by an accelerated procedure – the so called Europe Agreement model was offered to the Central and Eastern European region in April, 1990. The Agreement meant a unilateral contract, that is a contract for the claim from the countries of the region to be members. The future relations, including the accession of these countries was made to depend on the fulfilment of the contract, meaning the success of democratic transformations in these countries.

Soon it became evident that a quick enlargement will not take place and that Europe – struggling with laying down the new foundations of her own internal integration (the introduction of the Treaty of Maastricht, a tripillar union, the Economic and Monetary Union) – will choose a coherent and safe way. Accordingly, the would-be member states were given a privileged place in the system of the EU's contracts made with non-member states. The EU held out the prospect of technical aid and loans as well as non-reimbursable sources (Phare) were given as accelerators for catching up in market economies and European orientation and not as aids. By this system of contracts the EU has opened its own and its partners' markets for one another and made it possible for the countries to prepare for the accession and to put through the necessary transformations and as a result, later the catching up. Thus, the accession on political basis was off the agenda by 1991-92. The accession process took a different direction from that of 10 years before at the time of the accession of Greece, when the consolidation of the insecure social-political situation that emerged after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974 was also a chief condition at the accession. That it was politically motivated is also proved by the fact that Greece was the only candidate for membership in the case of which, in spite of the negative opinion of the European Committee

– it did not recommend the accession of Greece to the Council consisting of the government representatives of the member states – the member states decided to admit Greece to the European Community. The Community has followed the Portuguese-Spanish model in the present enlargement process in trying to democratise the member state candidates after the dictatorships and to encourage the necessary transformations by a longer course of preparations and negotiations preceding the accession. (In the case of Portugal and Spain 12 years had passed between the fall of the dictatorships and their accession; this will expectedly be 14-15 years in the case of the most developed member state candidates).

The only problem concerning the EU's plans would have been if the Central European countries had not been able to survive on their own the internal social-economic difficulties caused by the necessary changes after the political transformations. This, however – as it soon turned out, – was no real danger. The countries of the region mature enough to join in did not collapse and in addition, they have brought the painful transformations into action on their own. Now, the question of enlargement based on rational viewpoints could become the focus of political and scientific analyses. These analyses considered the fact that the enlargement must take place on the basis of the present achievements (*acquis communautaire*) of the Community, that is it would be impossible to take decisions upon political bases and to pursue a course of policy or legal system considering the specific situations of the new members, thus making exceptions in their integration. (This scheme was codified at the summit of Copenhagen in June, 1993, which laid down the principle that new Eastern members must adopt the achievements of the Community, they must apply them and only by bearing their burden can they be possible subjects of the EU enlargement). All this pointed toward the reinforcement of the European Union's unity and at the same time it became clear that becoming a member state will be a long process for the newly transforming countries. In the meantime, the analyses and opinions had been formulated in the EU, which were concerned with the geographical boundaries of the enlargement in the middle run. Thus, a Europe Agreement had been settled with 10 Central and Eastern European countries (which is the precondition of membership as settled in Copenhagen), which set the extent of the possible Eastward enlargement thus the directions for researches for the time being. (Besides this, to invite Malta and Cyprus to the accession negotiations – however, these have no real significance for the researches considering the small size of these states – and to accept Turkey as a candidate country are part of the present discussions about the enlargement. Nevertheless, where these countries have to be dealt

with in the analyses – public opinion polls, institutional questions – researchers and myself in my thesis have done so).

2. Based on the above mentioned, the professional (political and scientific) researches began (and are still in process) with the knowledge that the new member states must prepare during a longer period of time (to this fact referred the famous sentence of the period from H. Szuhoczka, the Polish prime minister: “We have been 5 years away from the accession since 1990”) and their membership must fit in the present system of the Union and the Community.

After signing the Europe Agreements serious debates flared up at the beginning of the 90s in both sides of Europe, since by opening the markets of the associated countries the EU was not interested any longer in executing the actual enlargement; an internal collapse did not occur in the Central European states, the transformations were in process, external aggression did not threaten them, the levy of commercial profits for the EU had already been settled by opening the markets of industrial products. Fierce attacks were launched against the agreements in the associated countries as well (e.g. Judit Kiss, Research Institute for World Economy), since the bilateral opening of the markets ensured in the contracts were not beneficial for the region in the fields of agricultural trade and the significant trade deficit deprived the economies already lacking capital and struggling with recession of important sources. Basically, this situation was recognised at the summit of Copenhagen and Essen and even before by the proposal of the members of the European Union, Andriessen and Hans Van den Broek. The prospect of new openings of Community agricultural markets, possibilities for co-operation – e.g. opening of Community programs – were held out. It was during this period that R. Baldwin wrote his work, also outlined by myself, about the orientation of the Eastern European countries towards the EFTA, in connection with which were the projects made to create the Central European agricultural policies instead of joining the Common Agricultural Policy as proposed by Mr. Nallet, French ex-minister of agriculture. The leading powers of the Central European countries, the countries of Visegrad and Slovenia, however, refused this solution both politically and intellectually, thus the process of membership began at the summit in December, 1995 and the European Commission was given the task to take the first step of the EU and to write an opinion about the application for accession. As a result, debates and analyses took a new turn. For the beginning of the enlargement indicated an objective interest on the side of the EU (not because of the political pressure from the candidates or the destabilisation of the region) to realise the membership with the candidates and to go beyond the association process. The political intention and the start of preparation of the candidate countries in itself would not have been enough to set the process in action, which is proved by the fact that other European states – e.g. Croatia, Ukraine, Macedonia – are not considered as candidate countries since the EU has not yet shown any sign that it would initiate accession

talks with them. Therefore, in my thesis I shall primarily focus on the literature and statistics of this period (the second half of the 1990s) and look for the factors indicating objective interest.

3. As my experience shows, on the basis of the debates up till now highly biased analyses have been prepared concerning the question in which fields will the enlargement be beneficial for the European Union. First of all, analysts have focused on the characteristics of the relationships before the political transformations – when the most important and measurable relations could be observed in the field of trade - even after 1990, they have limited the profit and cost-benefit to trade relations. (This characterised the early works of Baldwin and Ludlow based his statements on it as well and several documents of the European Commission or the Parliament reflected it). Others have occasionally extended their analysis to the more favourable possibilities for investment (Baldwin, François, Portes [1997]), or they confronted it with the costs of the Phare (the financial aid the Community has given to the candidate countries for preparation since 1990). These , in my opinion, were indeed acceptable for the period before 1989 (I showed the interest of the two sides through the works of Peter Balazs and Mrs Izik and some original documents), but it did not cover the entire system of relations of the second half of the 1990s. The other extreme approach has been to emphasise the historical-political elements without supporting them with facts that still hold or trying to define them numerically. (This approach is mostly characteristic for politicians).

4. The official documents and scientific analyses published in the second half of the 1990s started to concentrate on the complex nature of the enlargement, that is they considered the verifiable advantages and disadvantages of all the Community policies in the economic field and they also started to be concerned with the so called human factors (such as A. Mayhew's work: Win Win Exercise, written at the end of 1997). On the basis of the above mentioned and based on my personal diplomatic experiences I started to elaborate my conception to show the EU's interest concerning the most directly affected economic and non-economic areas to overstep the ever more developed association and to create a membership relation. This interest is proved by the proceeding of the present negotiations even if they operate not so fluently. I supposed that not in every area and especially not in the case of every member state candidate does the Union's interest exist at the same time, but my basic assumption was that considering all factors the result would have a positive effect on the whole of the region and first of all the most developed candidate countries. The comprehensive approach has not been without antecedents in Hungary as well since Andras Inotai published a short treatise on the matter in 1998 (Bertelsmann Foundation: Costs, Benefits and Chances of Eastern Enlargement of the European Union).

When starting my research I set up the following hypotheses:

- The accession of the new members is important for the Union in order to expand the internal market because this way it can increase its competitiveness as a result of the internal scale of economy and the economic division of labour while the common legal area guarantees uniform conditions of operation.
- The service markets of the new member states will be opened and the countries remaining outside the Union will not enjoy them with the same preferences.
- Concerning human factors the new member states will be able to meet the level of the present member states.
- The new member states will be able to catch up although it will take a long time.
- A refined approach to differentiate among the candidate countries is essential.

B) The method in force and its justification

The working methods I applied in my thesis accurately reflect the way of looking at and investigating matters of a practising diplomat who aims at theoretical grounding. It has the following characteristics:

- Since the matter is quite complex I have divided it into sectorial sections. I examined the general background of the enlargement separately and I briefly touched upon the issue why the candidate countries are interested in accession. (Although it is not the chief topic of the thesis, the synchronous existence of the interests of the two sides – the “win-win” result – is an important element of my Ph.D. theses). I also dealt separately with the analysis of the results of the public opinion polls and the three big content elements of the research: the institutional and security effects of the enlargement, the role of human factors and the aspects of the economic factors. I followed a logic according to which I first analysed the public opinion polls and with this knowledge I examined in details the factors about which the political-social public mind or the political circle of decision making formed an opinion. The three big content elements I have examined (institutional and security, human and economic effects) is divided into another 23 parts according to factors. Within the chapters – depending on the extent of the topics – I did research in subchapters when necessary. I primarily focused on economic and human elements from the factorial examination of the 23 areas. However, I did not intend to become engrossed in the detailed analysis of the institutional effects for the limits in size and the complex nature of my thesis. From this matter I only highlighted those circumstances which on the one hand throw light on the special consequences of the enlargement and on the other, analyse the effects of the internal relations of decision making. I could not aim either at examining separately all factors that could be logically recited at the analysis of economic and human factors, here I focused on the factors that I consider most important.
- In each chapter I tried to emphasise what means more in a certain area than the association relation and by fulfilling the obligations by the candidate countries of membership the Union can benefit in the given area. These obligations mean not only that the candidate countries must apply the entire Community law and policies but also to enforce the application of such issues that the future member states would not do in the long run either (such are for example the opening of the transport market to the EU, the realisation of the totally free capital movement, directives on sewerage or the enforcement of the norms of competition law etc.). For the sake of surveying this interest I started from the statistically visible, factual situation analysis of the member states and candidates. As far as it was possible I tried to show the changes that take place in time (taking the 90s as period), from which certain trends can be traced.

- For basic starting thesis and literature I have taken the impact study of Agenda 2000 (2nd volume) which was accepted by the European Commission in 1997, because the material touches upon the issue I have elaborated. In most cases by the statistical data I tried to correct or to update the statements of the Agenda 2000 document.
- After defining the problems and advantages of the integration in the subchapters I attempted to explore the catch up course of the associated countries by statistical data as much as it was possible. Therefore, instead of making limited references to literature I used numerous tables, in which I proved by temporal trends as well whether the development of the associated countries – which is in the interest of the EU – takes place or not. I began on the basis of this exploration inductively towards the acceptance or refusal of partial conclusions and partial trends that is I tried to prove my conclusions. At the end of each chapter I draw general final conclusions and make references to other chapters if my conclusions apply to them as well. To draw conclusions on statistical basis gave me the opportunity to see the aspects which do not support the enlargement at certain given parameters and also why the candidate country could be interested in the enlargement even if this was not the subject of examination in the chapters.
- Since the hypothesis of my thesis is based on the assumption that there are enormous differences between the candidates in most areas of the preparation and that the disadvantage of the most developed candidates to the least developed countries in the EU is not always significant, the facts and data I gave to prove my conclusions refer to the countries separately either among the candidates or the EU's members.
- Because of the extensive nature of the dissertation I did not aspire to examine the issue of a certain chapter in full details since the areas in connection with the chapters are quite far-reaching. That is why in order to be able to focus on the central theme – the EU's interest in the enlargement – I decided not to disjoin the structure of my work by references to Community provisions of law. They are irrelevant for the thematic discussions and the elaboration, since the political and economic and not the legal relations of the matter are important.
- Due to my special position I had the chance to use primarily the official or unofficial documents of the EU or the countries that have an important role in the enlargement process (Austria, Germany). That is why many publications of the EU Commission, European Parliament or other corporate bodies can be found in the bibliography. Since original information was available for my working method (from governments, statistical offices) I could try to avoid using research works exclusively.

- I found it important statistically to use official EU sources (e.g. Eurostat, data sources of EU Commission) even if – as in the case of trade data – the statistical records of the countries in question are different (more advantageous for them). In case I did not find sufficient comparative statistical figures, I tried to attain data in other areas – UNO, IMF, World Bank, OECD – but there was information occasionally from a member state or candidate country.
- I did not intend to place the Union's interest in the Hungarian accession into the centre of my thesis. As far as possible, I even tried to avoid emphasising it since the purpose of the dissertation is an approach concerning all candidate countries.
- When examining the Union's interest in the enlargement process it is important to draw conclusions by analysing facts but the feelings and opinions of the decision-makers and electors of the member states are also defining factors. Therefore, I discussed in a separate chapter the relation of the population of the member states and candidates to the enlargement, to the important aspects of it and to the differentiation of the candidates. In order to do so – by exploiting the possibilities of the method and my special position being posted by the government officially in Brussels – I compiled a questionnaire, which I sent to the civil servants in Brussels who play a highly important role in the enlargement process. By analysing the answers I was given a picture of how these officials see the priorities of the enlargement, its main problems, the Union's benefits and the enlargement's dangers. I sent the questionnaires to the persons I had chosen directly (e.g. members of the European Parliament, the officials of the Cabinet of the Member of the European Commission responsible for the enlargement, the advisor of the European Commission's Director General for enlargement and other colleagues, the Deputy Political Director of the Commission and his colleagues) and having 14 relevant opinions I processed them numerically. Since I guaranteed that the responding persons will remain unidentifiable I could make them answer really sincerely. I asked the responding persons that instead of giving a subjective written opinion they give an evaluation on a scale which ranges from 1 to 5 and by taking the average of the given numbers I tried to draw conclusions.

C) The chief scientific statements and results of the theses

1. The actuality and importance of the theme for the public opinion

The question of the Eastern enlargement had been on the agenda for a long time in the professional and scientific circles of the European Union, however, its realisation has become the subject of serious discussions only since the European Commission issued the Agenda 2000 document in July, 1997 and since the summit of Luxembourg in December, 1997. The EU summit held in December, 2001 reinforced the intention of the member states to finish the negotiations by the end of the year 2002 with the candidates who are prepared to join thus making it possible for them to participate in the elections of the European Parliament to be held in 2004. As I have already mentioned in the general review at the beginning of my thesis this expected enlargement will be one of the most important actions in the development of the EU since it means an extent of growth that have never been before as the result of which the population will increase by almost 28 percent. Although its importance at the international market will not increase to such an extent, still it will be one of the most important actors of international politics alongside the United States and based on her rate of progress in the past decades, later China.

The enlargement is special in that the European Union will integrate countries which, when the European integration came to existence, in the middle and the last third of the 20th Century built a social and political system which was an enemy system – based on the Soviet occupation – and it even played part in the birth of the European integration. Another special aspect of the enlargement is the fact that by this hitherto biggest enlargement the EU will integrate countries, which are in many respects less developed. At the enlargements of the EU and its precedents (EEC, EC) at the accession of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal, there was a similar situation, but the extent of the present enlargement is unusual.

It was surprising as the public opinion polls showed that the citizens of the EU do not consider the question of the enlargement a priority, only 28 % thought it distinctly important. Every emphatic task that the Union must solve was considered more important, mainly the problem of unemployment, social issues and the problem of internal security. From the expectations of the citizens of the members states from the enlargement were of primary importance to respect by the new members democracy and human rights, fight against organised crime and the environmental protection. The economic and budgetary aspects were not in the foreground. The top leadership of the EU countries, however, considers the question of enlargement emphatic, that is for them it is an area that can be approached rationally not only emotionally (they possess more information

about the actual interest in the enlargement than the average citizens). Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that the social elite should not become detached from its electors.

The citizens of the candidate countries have a highly positive image of the EU as only 18 % of the population of 13 candidate countries had a negative opinion on the EU and more than half of it had positive attitudes toward the Brussels-based organisation.

When looking at the public opinion on the enlargement of the different member states and candidates a great diversity of attitudes occurs. While from among the member states the Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries support the enlargement the most and the countries playing the key role like Austria, Germany and France are under the average, the support in the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Poland is lower, while in the countries that are the least prepared as Romania and Bulgaria it is the highest. It is even more interesting that only the accession of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland (the three current NATO members) from the candidate countries is supported by more EU citizens than it is refused (in Austria it only applies to Hungary) while in all the candidate countries there are more people for than against it. It means that concerning the public opinion only in the case of the three NATO members do both sides feel that the enlargement will be beneficial that is only in these cases does the “win-win exercise” apply.

The public opinion research with questionnaires that I did among the most important persons of decision making and preparing the enlargement supported my presumption that the most important factor of the enlargement for the EU is the political and cultural reunification of Europe. Among the results of the political-professional research the reinforcement of external and internal security had an emphatic place (the problem of crime and immigration in the first place) alongside with the economic profit of the EU, which had lesser importance for the public opinion.

Concerning the economic consequences of the enlargement the greatest fears are in connection with the budgetary effects. The decision-makers thought the effects of the internal market's enlargement advantageous and they were optimistic about the capabilities of the candidate countries to catch up economically. The professional decision-makers also predicted that the enlargement would have a positive effect on the foreign relations of the EU (including the transatlantic connection and the relation of the countries in the region). The anxiety surprised me with which they reacted to the effect the enlargement would have on the institutional system of the EU and the danger of agricultural overproduction. They considered less significant or spectacular the problems of minorities (Romas) in the region and the region's recent communist past, the competitive challenge caused by the accession, the transit possibilities and the possibility to extend the Euro-zone.

Political realism is reflected in the answers of the 14 decision-makers and promoters even if in their view the enlargement will take place in groups (not with the accession of single countries). However, I can accept that in the forthcoming 15 years the enlargement can be realised only with a group or all of the countries already included in the Eastern enlargement. In their opinion, beyond this region (Western-Balkan, the ex-Soviet area) the enlargement is not likely even in the middle run (in 15 years).

I examined the already mentioned 23 important factors that truly influence the objective effects of the enlargement and I concluded that the process of the enlargement as a result of positive and negative impacts is beneficial for the European Union. Nevertheless, it is also my final conclusion that the direct profit lessens as we move eastward in the integration since the economic-political difficulties or distinctiveness will increase and the human and economic costs of the integration will also be higher. Thus, in my view the enlargement would rationally take place in two or three waves, which is proved by my researches that I have done in the case of the candidate countries in chapters (factors) concerning the impacts country by country. In the case of most factors almost the same candidates stood out concerning human, economic or historical factors.

In my investigations I also traced how the EU members perform in each area I have taken under examination. As a result I was able to conclude that in the case of most factors the real gap does not always occur between the member states and the candidate countries but between the different candidates. It can be observed in several cases that the more developed candidates (Slovenia in the first place but in many areas Hungary, the Czech Republic and occasionally Estonia, Slovakia and Poland, too) are nearly as good as or in some of the qualitative parameters do exceed the less developed Mediterranean, the so-called cohesion member states, namely Portugal, Spain and Greece.

The real gap can be observed between the candidate countries, where the difference is significant not only in terms of parameters but also because of the divergent nature of chances in catching up. That is why I state that the enlargement can be attained in several steps in time as well, leaving the less prepared candidates a longer period for catching up before the accession. It is possible to deviate from it only by a political decision, by the collective "big bang" conception. When considering the significance of the enlargement it must not be disregarded that out of the 10 countries of the region Poland and Romania have a demographic significance. These two countries contribute by 60 % to the growth in population and 50 % to the territorial expansion by the enlargement. The magnitude of the population and territory of the other candidate countries falls behind that of the Iberian enlargement in 1986, but exceeds that of the enlargement in population of 1995. This fact denies that there is not genuine enlargement without having Poland and/or Romania in the first round.

2. The advantages of the enlargement in historical and human areas and its effect on the institutional system of the EU

Similarly to the opinion of the politicians and experts interviewed by myself as well as several researchers, I set a high value on the analysis of the historical factor of the enlargement. These analyses demonstrated that by the decision of Jalta a natural process was broken off in Europe. The decision included the possibility of a quick historical catch up as the countries of the region stood even between the two wars on the proper level of economic development compared to the average of that time of the fifteen countries that are currently members of the European Union. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland approximated to Finnish or the Italian level in the estimated GDP per person and they definitely exceeded the Iberian states or Greece. In this period the candidate countries played a much bigger role in European trade than they do now. The already started and expected natural restoration of this rate will help the economic catch up. As I see it, the historic restoration in the countries at the Eastern border of the EU – I put Slovenia and Slovakia here as well – will soon take place, which will enable them to reach in some years the level of the economic development of the cohesion member states compared to the EC average at the time of their accession. If looking only at the level of economic development, Slovenia and the Czech Republic have already reached that level of accession of the cohesion member states. But if considering other parameters – as labour productivity, the division of GDP among the main sectors of national economy, the efficiency of the secondary education – these candidates as well as Hungary have already outdone it. All this means that the enlargement to be realised with the more developed candidate countries does not represent major difficulty than at the time of the enlargement with Spain, Portugal or Greece. This difference among the candidates repeatedly underlines the rationality of the realisation in more than one wave of the Eastward enlargement.

Through the analysis of certain human and economic factors it became evident that realising the enlargement in stages on the basis of the above mentioned will not create a new situation in the Community law or the development philosophy of the Union. Consequently, it could be assumed that the theories concerning the new development course and part-membership of the Union after the enlargement are not well based. The Union will operate within the scope of the present legal and institutional system. Doubtless, the increase of the number of the members above 20 will help the development of the reinforced co-operation in certain areas, however, it will not effect the Community's and the Union's legal and institutional system. The enlargement will certainly effect some aspects of the operation of the EU (e.g. strengthening of working languages, working methods of Community organs) but not the basic principles of its operation. This is the clear message of the Treaty of Nice. Concerning the institutional effects, besides the complication of

decision taking, as a consequence the amount of matters taken by qualified majority will increase, the simplification of the system of contracts (primary and secondary legal sources) will be positive, which are themes on the agenda even without the enlargement. At the same time, the total enlargement also excludes the possibility to take decisions against the general interests of the candidate countries by qualified majority.

Through the analysis of different historical factors I concluded that it is not an accident that on the basis of the economic relations (trade in the first place) of the recent and the long past the restoration of the trade and economic relations had started in the 70s and 80s (before the actual political transformations) and accelerated in the early 90s. It was followed by the increase of the EU's political and economic role on the foreign relations of the candidates during the 90s. Although, the candidates have not reached their level between the two world wars in European export yet, but their results are promising and their development (with the exception of Slovenia it grew by 1,75 to 4,21 between 1993 and 1998), which is superior to most of the other European countries with the exception of Ireland, is heartening. No wonder why the different gravitation models (which analyse factors other than the development of GDP, such as geographic factors) predict further chances for development in the trade relations of the two sides. At the analysis of the economic and political relations before 1990 it turned out that the relations were close in the historic past and they remained so in the years of Soviet dominance either. Although, during this period the role of the Eastern countries became inferior again – primary producer, forced to unilateral allowances –, which is not unique in history. Natural integration is shown by the fact that by the end of the 90s the role of the EU in the foreign relations of the candidates had reached a level (trade, investments, scientific-cultural relations), which characterise the relation between only a part of the member states. The orientation deviating from the EU did not ensue either by emphasising the regional integration or by a new Eastern orientation (towards Russia) and towards other power poles of world economy (USA, Japan).

When looking at the human factors I thought it positive that the member state candidates developed similarly to the European model in their historic, religious and cultural aspects. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary stand out from the others in that these countries look back to a thousand-year-old Christian statehood and even by sacrificing themselves they protected the Western culture from the dangers of the East. This way they guarded the common values of the continent in their own society even stronger than the European averages (such are the relations between state and citizen or the positive effect of business ethics). Since the fate of Slovenia was dependent on Venice and Austria for decades and that of Slovakia's to Hungary, the European type of social development can be well observed in their case, too, however, the lack of independent historic statehood is felt in the way they treat the issue of national minorities. It did not motivate the internal political stability either as there are no structures of party or institutional systems that are historically embedded in these two little countries.

It is different from Western Europe and not a necessarily positive aspect that in the area imperial conquests occurred and as a consequence arbitrary borders were decided that do not reflect the adequate ethnic composition. It feeds the nationalism of the region that differs from the average European development. Although it is not possible to fully apply Huntington's statements about the wars of civilisations to the region because the boundaries symbolising Western and Eastern Christianity now in many cases lie within countries (Romania, Ukraine, Yugoslavia) but it can be seen that a couple of definite elements of European development (religious tolerance, protestant ethics, parliamentarism) has not reached Romania and Bulgaria. At the same time, the historical heritage in the other candidates of tolerance and the role of self-government and self-organisation is praiseworthy, which could have a respectable role after the accession as the European, multinational development requires a society that constructs itself from the bottom, democratically since the adoption and execution in each member state of EU policies and directives is the basic element of the Union's operation. The religious roots and their effect on the social sphere in the case of the more developed candidates are similar to the EU members', however the tolerance toward deviance is lower in these societies.

The religious and national composition of the Central and Eastern European region is to a great extent similar to the one observed in the countries of the EU. A part of the candidates is not homogeneous nationally and ethnically (probably Poland, Hungary and Slovenia could be considered homogeneous). The national and ethnic groups outside the motherland and with links to the West (Germans, Hungarian, and Jews) and as driving force and bridge will be capable to reinforce the stability of the regional relations. A serious social challenge is the integration of the significant Romany population in some of the states in the region and the integration of the Russian minority in the Baltic States (mainly Latvia and Estonia). The rate of the Roma population is significantly higher in the candidate countries than the European average; their number will more than double in the EU by the enlargement. (The number of Gypsies is high in Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary). In the candidate countries these social layers are the losers of the political transformations since because of their low level of education and consequently their working culture they were the firsts to become unemployed. The accessing countries try to handle the social integration of the Romas with the already visible assistance of the EU still it will be a problem to be solved for decades. Nevertheless, it is irrational to fear that the Romas will be flooded by the candidate countries to the present EU members after the enlargement as the vast majority of the Central European Roma population does not follow a migratory lifestyle.

In case of the future member states the relation to the course of the European intellectual development is reflected in the analysis of business ethics or inclination for corruption: it can be observed how (the Protestant) Estonia or Slovenia and Hungary differ from the other states of the region (not only from the two Balkan type states but also from Slovakia and Lithuania). The historical background and the European values and the question of the different character of the

role of statehood appear in migration and refugee statistics; here, Romanians and Bulgarians come as a challenge for Western Europe. It does not harmonise, however, with the stable historical background that the Polish show a stronger tendency of mobility.

About the demographic situation I have assessed that the negative European demographic trends characterise the candidates as well, although in their case because of the lower age (earlier mortality) the rate of elderly dependants will remain better for a while than in the present states of the EU. Unfortunately, the fertility rates have fallen under the European average, in the candidate countries after the political transformations, basically near the worst EU data (Italy, Spain) or under, which was partly due to the crises of value and the appearance of uncertainty of existence and the generally decreasing standard of living. As after the accession the economic growth will strengthen the secure livelihood, the mortality statistics will improve in these countries, so life expectancy will be higher, the rate of elderly dependants will also increase at the candidate countries and in a couple of decades it will reach the level of the EU. If this tendency occurs and the birth rates do not improve significantly, the rate of the people of working age will be lower and lower in the new member states that will not have labour surplus for the present member states. Moreover, these countries will have to receive a significant number of immigrants in 10-15 years – in case of Poland approximately 1 million – for maintaining the internal dependant rate.

Similarly to the demographic figures the health statistics of the candidate countries also show a very dark picture. With the exception of Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic the sickness and mortality statistics are very bad and modest health expenditures, that are very low even by the measure of less developed countries, characterise all the candidates including the otherwise well performing Hungary and Poland as well.

However, I find the very strong basic and secondary training the educational level of the region promising and its impact upon the operation of the internal market. Catching up has started also on the field of higher education but the EU proportion of the students that get higher education has not yet reached the EU average at the end of the 90s. However the EU proportion was almost reached by Bulgaria and Estonia. The candidates' devote – except for Romania and Bulgaria – high proportion from the speedily improving GDP to the general education, which helps the process of catching up. (The devotion is especially high in Poland and the Baltic States.) Furthermore in comparison with certain member-states – e.g.: Portugal, Greece, Spain – these countries have already made better results in the financial devotion to the education compared to the GDP as well as in the rate of people with graduation in secondary school. Similar can be said on the field of the research and development as well as in the area of international scientific reputation especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia. As for the informatics training, which is currently indispensable, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic have reached a level in integrating it into the public education which can be compared to that of the member states. In fact, its educational spreading can be compared with the member-states. The other countries –

especially Bulgaria and Romania – however so far have not been able to involve the achievements of the modern informatics society into their education.

The capability to apply the informatics technology is similarly beneficial in some countries (Estonia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) which fact deserves really attention since it undoubtedly proves the ability of an intellectual opening in spite of the fact that these countries are in a worse situation in terms of financial disparity in comparison with the member-states (e.g.: purchase and operation of computer and mobile phone). In those fields where it is not necessary to eliminate the infrastructure backlog of several decades, the majority of the candidate countries are equal partners of the member states. As a result of the enlargement one of the largest and strongest knowledge-based area will come about that is able to apply and improve the modern informatics technology.

The social situation, inherited from the communist era, means significant disparities among the candidates that influence the candidates' migratory potential and their capacity of social development. The surveys prove that the social disparity has grown after the change of the regime differently in every country. The employment level of the population at working age is low, the proportion of the inactive stratum is high but in the case of women the employment has remained high compared to the European level, superseding that of the Mediterranean member states. Despite the creation of new working places, at men the unemployment has remained high. However, the employment can be raised especially by Estonia, Slovakia and Hungary, whereas the high income-proportion devoted to the social position of the population is characteristic of the more developed member-states. The absolute and the relative poverty indexes indicate that while in Romania 27,5 % of the population lived from less than 2 USD/day in the middle of the 90s – and also this proportion was high in Poland and Latvia –, in the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia only less than 2 % of the population could be considered absolutely poor. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia could show good – also on the European level – divisional proportions between the lower and the upper parts of the society. By the exclusion of the social polarisation a smaller part of the society will be inclined to the different type of deviancies, crime and migration, while a relatively large number of people can be employed in those economic branches of the internal market that require qualified labour force.

The real-wages also show such a huge dispersion among the candidates (1:8 proportion in Euro) that cannot handle them on common denominator. Although significant proportion of the salaries remain at the employees, the charge of the social dumping can be refuted according to which the would-be member states through the repress of the social caring and with extraordinary low rates and taxes would make the manpower competitive. The employment rate and income position of women compared to that of men are good in the candidate countries also in European respect; however, their political representation of interest is weak.

The examination of the human factors has significant role in the analyses of the integration-capacity of these countries into the internal market. At the candidates, the different corruption-indexes, business, ethical and social relations support the differentiated approach. The more developed candidate countries (first of all Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary) are closer to the European norms than to the other candidate countries and reach or supersede in some fields (corruption, position of women at the labour market, relative number of scientific quotations and patents, application of the informatics technology) the indexes of the Mediterranean member states. The Baltic-States devotes enormous energy to the development of the educational situation, which mirrors individual priorities, however, they neglect catching-up in the social affairs and public health, and moreover they have serious problems in the field of crime. The weakness of the Hungarian and Polish health situation can raise difficulties for the necessary economic boom if there is no healthy labour force available. The total polarisation within the region is perfectly mirrored in the refugee situation where Romania appears as great “sender” whereas the Czech Republic and Hungary as significant receivers, which facilitates for these two countries the integration into the future common refugee policy.

3. The beneficial impacts of the enlargement in the field of the common foreign and security policy and on the co-operation of justice and home affairs

On the results of my researches and of the questionnaire, I find significant the illumination of the following: the involvement of the new member-states into the common foreign and security policy (and into defence policy) and into the justice and home affairs co-operation will bring benefit for the EU-members that is similar to the direct economic fields. The accession of the eastern neighbours further improves the security situations of the EU-countries; it helps that the present member states to further reduce their military expenses that were built previously on the European eastern-western confrontation and their significant armed forces, too. In this way, the sources should be reorganised for the solving of the new-type problems (peacekeeping, handling of ethnic conflicts, fight against terrorism) and for the completion of the military reform (the building up of professional army, realisation of proper technical developments and purchases). Since the reduction of the military budget were moving between 0,1-1,2 % of the GDP – depending on the member states – in the 90s, already this decrease supersedes that amount (0,25 % of the community GDP) that will cost in 2006 – the last year of the present community financial perspective, when the new members get the highest financial support – the total enlargement for the community budget. Besides this, the candidates – e.g. the three new NATO members – will carry out developments of airforce, anti-aircraft and communication means of the order of 10 billion Euro in the following 10-15 years, giving opportunity among others for the European armament industry. (The Czech and the Hungarian governments decided on the import of modern European-originated airplanes in 2001.) Since the other candidates are also eager to join NATO or

adequately contribute to the improvement of the European defence capabilities (it is proved by their contribution to the European forces), further significant purchases can be expected parallel with the economic strengthening of the candidates. (In this matter, not only the obsolescence of the soviet technique but also the expected growing of the defence expenditure takes significant role.) Further important result for the EU of the membership can be that the candidates will take over the EU-viewpoints and the sanctions in contractual system and contribute in great number to the Petersberg-like actions (e.g.: peacekeeping, peace-making, humanitarian operations) of the EU after 2006.

Through the entrance into the Schengen system, the strict border control can be reduced on the boundary sections, which amount to more than 1200 km both in Germany and in Austria. The new member states will be obliged to protect their borders by the strictest control system with Russia (Kalinygrad) Belarus, Ukraine and the Western-Balkan what from the current member states' point of view can be considered, in the light of the present situation, preliminary filter that is pushed eastward. In the protection of the borders especially heavy responsibility will fall on the Baltic States, Hungary and Poland.

The extension of the fight against organised crimes and the smuggling of people to the eastern boundaries of the new member states, including the responsibility of the new member states for the expulsion of the illegal refugees is really advantageous, although it is hard to quantify it. As EU-members, the first acceding states take over from the current member states the problem of the handling and the possible settling of more several thousands of refugees. As we have seen through the example of Hungary and Bohemia, this has already started at the end of the 90s.

At this point, I must emphasise the importance of the historical analyses since the candidate countries – with adequate European solidarity – are prepared to undertake the role of the bastion of the modern Europe. They carry out this role more willingly as member states than as buffer-zone, which was the case beforehand.

4. The economic advantages of the enlargement

Besides the above mentioned security and political benefits that can be measured in annual several billions Euro, the economic advantages coming from the enlargement of the internal market must be emphasised. The economy of the new member states – and it was predicted by the received answers of the questionnaire – will probably grow dynamically in the following decades, which is guaranteed by the high rate of investment as a consequence of the internal savings in concert with the foreign investments. The extension of the internal market and the economic growth will mean supplementary commercial advantages for the EU firms that are being taken completely inside on

the market of the new member states. Analyses (e.g.: WIFO, Schumacher or Mimosa) coming only from the gravitational models and referring only to the enlargement in trade rank the additional GDP-growth resulting from the supplementary market opportunities between 0,1-0,4 % of the community GDP. Obviously, the GDP-growth is not spread evenly among the present member-states; however, the neighbouring Austria and Germany will enjoy the significant advantage of it. This supplementary advantage coming from the enlargement cannot be compared with the advantages resulted from the opening that happened at the beginning of the decade, however, this advantage can be significant by all means. (As far as Austria is concerned, its commercial opening has resulted in economic growth of 1,5 % in the first part of the 90s.) The commercial structure of the acceding countries is really advantageous since the sectors that are sensitive for EU (textile, steel and agriculture) have been pushed into the background. It is also favourable that besides the commerce of the end products, the continental division of labour that can be found within the branches of industry (intra-industrial co-operation) is becoming more and more important.

The opening financial market means similarly important opportunities where the EU is already the biggest investor and the investment security guaranteed by the membership (the political and economic risk will be practically excluded) result in further extra-profit for the old member states by the reduction of the risk premiums. According to Baldwin, this brings benefit especially for Austria and Germany but also for France and Great Britain. (In the 90S, Austria bought more than one third of its capital, which was put into Europe, into the region. In the case of Italy and Germany, this proportion was more than one seventh or one eighth.)

The membership can be considered to be positive in the field of environmental protection which field is rather sensitive for the public opinion of the EU-countries. Due to the accession, on this field enormous industrial investments will be realised – annually of the order of 5,5-6 milliard Euro – which open great opportunities for the companies of the member states. Through membership, those states join the EU that have reduced or maintained (e.g.: carbon dioxide) the emission of pollution since 1990 thus show improving tendency on the field of the completion of the international obligations (e.g.: Kyoto Agreement). The new member states bring favourable bio-diversity for the EU, the chemical loading of agricultural lands can be well below the EU-average, emission of pollution and the waste material economy will be under legal control just as the safe operating of the nuclear power stations.

The enlargement of the Union is fundamentally advantageous for the transport and energy sectors. These sectors provide the Union with modern and favourable structures: the favourable ratio of public road and railway, the emphasis of gas-consumption, the control of nuclear energy and of waste material economy. Moreover, the enlargement ensures proper transit opportunities both on the export-side of the eastern-expanding markets and through the satisfaction of the needs of the EU primarily for crude oil and natural gas transit. The transport services (primarily the extension

of haulage to the internal market of the new member states as well as the opening for the community partners of the air and international railway transport) involve significant benefit, although this priority was not demonstrated by the results of my questionnaire. On the transport side, the transit and servicing opportunities are influenced in a negative way by the weak physical infrastructure and the condition of the frontier crossing points whose improvement has to be financed partly by the EU.

In the field of energy-policy, it is not favourable that the new member states themselves – except from Romania, the Czech Republic and Poland – are in need of energy or energy carrier import. This is carried out mostly from the successor states of the former Soviet Union, which promotes the diversification of the community's energy import (the modification of the exaggerated Mediterranean and Middle Eastern dependency). Since the role of the candidate countries keeps growing in the internal commercial relations of the community, the extension of the community competition policy is highly advantageous for the EU through the membership. By this means, the equal competition for the present member states will be ensured through the direct extension and control of the community law.

5. Delicate questions in the process of the accession

Among the delicate issues, in the analysis of the agriculture market it can be determined that in the candidate countries by means of the less increased capacity of production and the higher growth in consumption – which contradicts to the expectations –, the tension coming from the overproduction of the internal market does not mean a serious problem, as opposed to the predictions which were formed at the beginning or in the middle of the decade (e.g.: in 1997, in the document of Agenda 2000 by the European Commission). However, the enlarged European Community has to place the surplus of its grain, beef and milk (issue the present EU and all the new member states have overproduction) by growing export-subsvention or other supporting forms. It can be underlined that through the community regulations – especially in the field of animal health protection and food safety – the EC can urge the new member states to establish equal competition conditions. The cheap agricultural land market will be available only after the membership – though after transitional period – for the present member states on the territory of the candidate countries, which will constitute one of the advantages of the enlargement for the community farmers and for other investors of the EU. The new member states' low efficiency in the agriculture sphere will be considered to be a disadvantage and a "tension-source" since in this sphere, there are enormous disparities among the group of the more developed candidates (Czechs, Hungarians Slovenes and Slovaks) and other countries. In agricultural issues the following countries cause significant difficulties: Poland and Romania (efficiency and overproduction) and Hungary (overproduction). No tension is to be expected from the disparity of agricultural prices

within the enlarged EU. The tendency, namely the catching up of the candidate countries' prices can be observed, which is also helped by the expected revaluation of the currencies. At the beginning, the real problem is the distribution of the estates (the only significant estate-size can be found among the Czechs). However, through the launch of proper programs for the concentration of estates, this problem can be solved through which the efficiency can also be improved. The consumption of population in the new states will grow more quickly than the production in many cases as a result of the growing real wages. Moreover, for the EU, totally free market can only be reached just through the accession; the fact of the membership opens additional markets for the present member states in this field, too. Issues that remain for the membership negotiation are the following: the determination of the production quotas' extent – since the EU does not accept the high production figures of the 80s – and the decision of the extent of direct payment for candidates' producers.

The other sensitive field can be the issue of the free movement of labour force. Since the candidates are in a difficult demographic situation, it is obvious that also in their cases labour shortage might occur in the following decades, which will make the labour force more expensive. On the other hand, in the case of proper economic catching up and production-growing capacity, the disparity between the old and the new members' wages will not cause disturbances in the internal market. The problem is the Polish and Romanian migratory tendency and that of the gypsy population that is present in the whole region. The migratory potential of other populations is negligible. However, the intra-EU East-West migration will be characteristic only for the starting years since after it both sides of Europe have to import manpower. In the present EU, tension can occur only in the following cases: in two member-states – Germany and Austria – and in these two countries in jobs that need uneducated manpower. On the other hand, the inclusion of the candidates' educated manpower into the present member states is desirable for the EU due to its cheap and disciplined features. Commuting will not mean any problems after 2010 for the following reasons: on the one hand the expected equalisation of the wages, on the other hand the growing shortage of labour force in the present member states' frontier territories. In my views, the free movement of labour force – in the case of well-considered enlargement, and even in the starting years – does not mean that serious problem which is feared by the EU. However, the general backwardness of the liberalisation makes the equalisation of the factors' price (wages) more difficult, the contrary of which can be demonstrated by the East-German example taking place after the German unification. In my opinion, after 2010, the real difficulty for the EU will be the source of the new member states' – whose internal dependency ratios will be then suddenly deteriorating – labour force import and also of its quality, that is why the quantitative outflow of workers from the new member states into the old ones will not be real problem. Only Hungary and Romania possess outside-frontier national reserves. The other candidates usually solve the import of labour force from more remote continents or countries. Particularly significant will be the Polish manpower demand (approximately one million people) due to the huge size of the country.

The question of regional (structural) and cohesion supports is a similarly crucial and delicate field that asks for differentiated approach of enlargement. It is promising that before the extension of the structural funds to the new member states, the catching up of the candidates' main team has already started. However, due to the unequal capital investment, the regional disparities within each country are growing. (This was characteristic of the three Mediterranean cohesion countries after their accession.) Nevertheless there is not dropping behind in the absolute sense, in the less developed region compared to the EU average, which makes possible (after the membership and by means of community sources): the regional and parallel with this the social cohesion, the regional equalisation within the new member countries. (This is supported by the fact that the previous enlargements were able to heal the problem of the "dropped-behind" territories within the new member states. Moreover, my questionnaire answers prove also to be optimistic in this respect.) However, the macroeconomic catching up to the EU average seems to be hopeless despite the expected community assistance in the case of Romania. As far as Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia are concerned, it is only realistic in the long run.

Concerning the direct budgetary impacts of the enlargement, it can be stressed that the various estimations of the 90s became groundless (about amounts of 35-40 billion euro) for the following reasons: On the one hand, in the case of Structural Funds, which is one of the most significant items, the ceiling of the amounts that can be raised was drawn in the 4 % of GDP. On the other hand, in the case of the candidates – also in the field of agricultural integration – steps towards the reduction of the costs of the enlargement were made. Although the ceiling of 4 % can only be partially compared with the principle of catching up of the poorest (the more "richer poor" a new member state is, the bigger support can it receive), the absorption-capacity – in which principally the own contribution will be in principal minimum 25 % of the project (exceptionally in the case of the Cohesion Fond it can be reduced to 15 %) – really hurdles the real spending of the amounts that can be utilised.

The other important factor of the direct budgetary impacts is the size of the agricultural sector's direct payment (direct support for producers) that can be estimated for 5 billion euro per year without Romania and Bulgaria. (Without the two candidate countries in the Balkan the total agricultural support for the other 10 candidate countries would amount to approximately 9 billion euro on the bases of the production quotas calculated by the European Commission.)

If we compare the previously mentioned community budgetary expenses (which will not exceed the 0,25 % – 25 billion euro – of the community GNP in 2006) with the benefits (estimates range from 0,1 to 0,4 % of the GDP) that is enjoyed by the business sphere in the EU member states through the enlargement, we can observe that after the membership the budgetary incomes coming from the business sphere (additional taxes, social security contributions) makes the enlargement financially more favourable. However, this income appears in the national budget of the current EU member states and not in the community budget. In addition to that we can also calculate with

the saving for the EU member states by the new security policy situation (this can also be guessed at least at the 0,1 % of the GDP) as well as by the eastern expansion of the community borders (the physical cutback of the borders of those present member states that are next to the candidates). Furthermore, we can also add to the benefit the profit resulting from the extension of the Euro-zone besides the enlargement of the internal market.

From the point of the candidates, besides the financial transfer (about 20-25 billion euro) that is coming from the community budget, the additional economic growth that is excited by the membership can bring at least the same benefit at 2010. On the other hand the new member states have to calculate with the expenses of the accelerated preparation, although these expenses are needed for the stabilisation of the rule of law, the improvement of the market economy and the dependence on the access to the EU markets.

Consequently, as far as the direct economic impacts are concerned, both sides can come out as winners (“ win-win exercise”). However, measuring the direct benefit, the candidates can be better off with since from the point of view of the current member states, the main benefit was the western opening of the regions’ societies and economies at the beginning of the 90s.

Thus, my initial assumption seems to be justified according to which for the EU – by means of the comparison of the direct and the indirect costs – the enlargement is all in all a profitable enterprise. In my opinion, however, the accession of the new members should be carried out gradually by the Union – in two or three waves – since the real gap has to be jumped over not between the EU and the most developed candidate countries but between the EU and the more unprepared candidates. A big collective accession – due to the highly heterogeneous development level of the candidates – would aggravate for the realisation of the institutional steps that are necessary for the first group and for their insertion into the community policies. (The best example for this is the NATO-enlargement in 1999, where there were only three new member states.)

The success of the enlargement depends – and these influences the further course of the Union’s operation – on whether the accession of the new members will be carried out according to equal principles and treatment. (This also supports the differentiated enlargement since some candidates are unable to complete the membership challenges even with longer transitional agreements.) If the equal treatment is realised then the appearance of the Yalta-lines within the new EU after the enlargement can be really excluded. In the case of the neutralisation of these dangers, there will not be any regional groupings or alliance system that are not based on real values or interests but on cold war fracture-lines. The handling of the enormous disparity that is presented through my thesis paper raises the geopolitical responsibility of the Union since the following phenomena would lead to politically untreatable situation: On the one hand, the handling of Romania and Bulgaria as members, on the other hand, the exclusion Croatia and later Yugoslavia or other

Balkan countries from the enlargement. This discrimination will not be possible to be justified by the difference in development and preparation.

In this way, as a further-development of my thesis, besides the enlargement's impacts upon the internal market and the system of relations of the EU, the question that analyses or models the possible accession of the new candidates (e.g.: on the West-Balkan) can also be discussed. Thus, the further discussion of the following question can be the subject of another investigation: where is the geopolitical border that makes the enlargement profitable in every respect for the EU? This can be later the geographical border of Europe.

D) Observations referring to the utilisation of the thesis paper

The paper can be primarily used as an auxiliary paper for university courses that deal with various EU issues. Since according to its character, it is characterised by economic approach and not by legal one, it can be used in the following cases: at Universities and departments of economics, College for Foreign Trade and other training-types that are specialised in EU or world-economic issues. Some of its chapters can be used – due to its historical character – for students of diplomatic history.

It can also properly used at postgraduate studies since it can be used – due to its general character – by those students that do not deal with specific EU-studies but study them only in shorter courses. It can also complete the knowledge about the institutional and legal system of the EU and about some community or union policies. Some of its chapters – or the whole paper – are suitable for further research and for the first place for updating since during the course of time, the trends and consequences that are represented in the paper can be proved (or denied). These can be for example: the differentiated capacity of catching up among the candidates and the fact that there is not qualitative difference between the present and the would-be member states.

The Consequences – which is the VI. point of the dissertation and is approximately 19 pages and forms point C of the this collection – due to its summarising character can be used separately not just at postgraduate training but also at further vocational training of teachers or local government officials. The author himself has held lectures at courses for several times in this subject.

The introduction of the dissertation, some historical chapters and the consequences can also be used for students of secondary school (at various study circles) that have significant interest in EU. This paper shows for the students that the soon acceding countries, thus also Hungary, will become members of the European Union – within this the members of the euro-zone and the Schengen-zone – on the basis of concrete EU-interests and not just for historical and moral reasons.

E) Author's publication in this topic

1. The advantages of the European Union's eastward enlargement for the European Union; in Európa Kislexikon, [1999] Hans Seidel Foundation, Budapest
2. The advantages of the European Union's eastward enlargement for the European Union; in Európa Kislexikon, [1999] Aula, Budapest