

Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem

**FROM INTROVERSION TO REGIONAL SOFT
POWER AMBITIONS**

An analysis of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy

DOKTORI ÉRTEKEZÉS

Témavezető: N. Rózsa Erzsébet, Dr. Habil, egyetemi docens

Készítette: Rada Csaba

Budapest, 2016

Rada Csaba

From introversion to regional soft power ambitions

An analysis of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy

Nemzetközi Tanulmányok Intézet

Témavezető: N. Rózsa Erzsébet, Dr. Habil, egyetemi docens

© Rada Csaba

Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem
Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Multidiszciplináris Doktori Iskola

From introversion to regional soft power ambitions
An analysis of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy

Doktori értekezés

Készítette: Rada Csaba

Budapest, 2016

Table of contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	4
INTRODUCTION	5
OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE ANALYSES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY	10
WHY ANALYSING THE TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?.....	15
TIME FRAME.....	17
I. HYPOTHESES AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.....	21
HYPOTHESES	21
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND I. – NEO-CLASSICAL REALISM	22
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND II. – SOFT POWER.....	31
METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES OF RESEARCH	40
II. FROM QUIETIST TO ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY.....	46
OVERVIEW OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST	46
EXTERNAL FACTORS	55
INTERNAL FACTORS	62
<i>Transformation inside the Turkish society: top-down modernization versus bottom-up development</i>	<i>63</i>
<i>Transformation of the political elite groups</i>	<i>69</i>
Emergence of the Islamist political elite	70
The transformation of the Kemalist elite	75
<i>The role of the business elite.....</i>	<i>81</i>
The emergence of the new business elite	82
Situating the old business elite	87
EFFECTS OF THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS.....	89
IMPLICATIONS OF THE KURDISH ISSUE.....	93
SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS	98
III. TURKEY AS A RISING REGIONAL POWER	105
OVERVIEW OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INFLUENCING EXTERNAL FACTORS.....	106

TRANSFORMATION INSIDE TURKEY – THE INTERNAL FACTORS	118
<i>Power relations and political affiliations inside the Turkish society</i>	119
<i>Transformation of the elites' role and the empowerment of the AKP regime</i>	123
The AKP as a Muslim-Democratic party and the EU accession process from a domestic point of view	126
Challenges to the new power and the AKP's political responses	130
A strong ally of the AKP - the Hizmet.....	133
The leaders of the AKP and the Erdoğan factor.....	134
<i>Implications of the Kurdish issue during the 2000s</i>	137
SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS	140
 IV. THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT AND TURKISH “SOFT POWER”.....	148
NEW CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY – THE CONCEPT OF THE STRATEGIC DEPTH	149
AIMS AND TOOLS OF DAVUTOĞLU'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY	152
<i>Military capabilities and hard power of Turkey</i>	154
<i>Economic performance as a source of power</i>	155
<i>“Softer tools” of Turkish power ambitions</i>	158
Turkish norms, political value system and Neo-Ottomanism	158
Turkey as a mediator	161
International development policy.....	162
Public diplomacy and cultural attraction.....	167
 V. SOFT POWER IN QUESTION?.....	170
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SPRING	171
THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT OF TURKEY AFTER THE 2011 ELECTIONS	180
<i>Tensions inside the ruling elite</i>	180
<i>Further polarization of the Turkish society</i>	182
<i>New steps in the Kurdish questions</i>	184
SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS – TURKISH FOREIGN RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE EXTERNAL CHALLENGES AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS.....	185
 CONCLUSION	189
BIBLIOGRAPHY	197
PUBLICATIONS BY THE AUTHOR ON THE TOPIC	226

Acknowledgements

Completing this dissertation would not have been possible without the support of numerous people, who contributed to it with their help and valuable comments. I would like to express here my gratitude to all who made this dissertation possible.

I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Erzsébet N. Rózsa, Dr. Habil, who has been following my work throughout these years and has kept my work on the right track. She has given me guidance from the first moment of formulating the initial form of the hypotheses until the last touches of the dissertation. I am also grateful for the support of the lecturers and professors of Corvinus University of Budapest, especially Zsolt Rostoványi DSc, László Csicsmann PhD, Péter Marton PhD, who provided valuable comments on my work and supported my efforts.

I am also grateful for the support of my former boss, Ambassador Csaba Czibere, who inspired my work throughout the years that we worked together in Ramallah, and helped to widen my knowledge further regarding the Middle East.

I am also indebted to my colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture, who supported me in finishing this work. They contributed to create a sane personal environment and pushed me forward in difficult situations.

Most importantly, without the support and the sound background provided by my family, it would have not been possible to complete this dissertation. Their encouragement and affection helped me through the whole research, thus I would like to express my gratitude to them.

List of Abbreviations

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party
ANAP: Anavatan Partisi, Motherland Party
AO: Aydınlar Ocağı, Intellectuals' Heart
AP: Adalet Partisi, Justice Party
BDP: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Peace and Democracy Party
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party
DP: Demokrat Partisi, Democratic Party
DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party
FP: Fazilet Partisi, Virtue Party
ISI: Import substituting industrialization
MG: Millî Görüş, National Outlook Movement
MHP: Miliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Action Party
MNP: Mili Nizam Partisi, National Order Party
MSP: Milli Selamet Partisi, National Salvation Party
MÜSIAD: Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
NSC: National Security Council
OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference
PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Worker's Party
RP: Refah Partisi, Welfare Party
R2P: Responsibility to Protect
SP: Saadet Partisi, Felicity Party
TIKA: Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı, Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
TÜSIAD: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association

Introduction

“Peace at home, peace in the world”.¹ This has been the leading principle of the Turkish foreign policy. It guided the first few decades of the newly established Turkish Republic and has never lost its influence since then. The principle itself was created in hardship and in an era of deep transformation of Turkey, thus it represents a snapshot of the period after the establishment of the republic. After centuries of Ottoman history, characterized by power and dominance (even in the last century of the Empire’s demise) a new isolated entity was established in 1923. After the devastating World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, the new Turkish leadership pursued a fresh start including the detachment from the Ottoman past and the creation of a new Turkish identity. Despite the fact that the Turkish Republic was in many ways the successor of the Ottoman Empire, the leadership denied any continuity.

In 1923, not only a new country was established but the leaders faced the challenge of creating a unified nation, a modern political institutional structure and a viable economy on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The internal transformation consumed so much energy that the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic in the first decades could only concentrate on the residual issues of the settlement after WW I. As a result Turkey tried to stay away from the approaching conflicts of Europe that preceded WW II. The inward-looking government and the virtually isolationist foreign policy served specifically the state-building process.

After two and a half decades of a top-down, state-led institution-building, the internal political structure was ready for the democratic transformation. The start of the multiparty period, however, did not bring about a comprehensive foreign policy reform. Although the populist Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) rule in the 1950s brought some foreign policy „adventures”,² Turkey could not leave its foreign policy passivity

¹ The leading principle of the Turkish foreign policy, „Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh" in Turkish was first phrased by Kemal Mustafa Atatürk in 1931. Source: (The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, URL: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>)

² The Kemalist political elite, especially the military did not welcome the populist policies and the foreign policy endeavours of Adnan Menderes, the leader of the DP. They were especially cautious of the emergence of the Middle East among the foreign policy goals, which contradicted the course of the Kemalist leaders in the previous decade. The Kemalist leadership pursued perfect isolation from the Arab Middle East, based on distrust as a result of their role in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and looked down on them. More on the Menderes period see: (Göktepe; Sunar 1990)

behind; the first signs of real activism have not appeared until the mid-1980s. Neither the domestic political chaos at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s, nor the failure of the import substituting industrialization (ISI) development model³, nor the consecutive military coups (1960, 1971, 1980) made it possible for Turkey to pursue active foreign policy.

The 1980s under the leadership of Prime Minister and later President Turgut Özal brought a remarkable change in the Turkish political behavioural pattern. Answering to external political and economic pressures, he started a massive liberalization of the economy and the social sectors, which was followed by openness and outward looking initiatives. His policies were supported by newly emerging social, economic and political actors. At the same time, the old political elite groups started to lose their former power. Activism reached its peak after the end of the Cold War, when Turkey lost its geostrategic importance and self- redefinition became imminent.⁴ After the death of Özal in 1993, the previous foreign policy initiatives faded away and Turkey slowly downgraded its external exposure, however, never returned to isolationism.

The changes that happened after the success of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) in general elections in 2002 were foreseeable but their depth was unexpected. The several-decade-long domestic transformation processes reached to a final point and a new Muslim elite, together with newly emerged social groups demanded drastic changes: a new leadership with a new vision. By 2002 Turkey had been devastated by multiple economic crises, domestic political problems and most of all, the failure of redefining itself after the end of the Cold War. The once very important Western ally lost from its geopolitical importance after the fall of the Soviet Union and by the second half of the decade the EU seemed less eager to embrace it. Nevertheless, the whole international environment changed around Turkey and influenced heavily the internal transformation process. The latter transformation made the domestic environment ripe for the political and further economic changes that led to the electoral victory of the AKP in 2002.

After 2001, the 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq changed the regional environment of Turkey again. After the fall of Iraq a power and security vacuum

³ Import substituting industrialization model characterized the Turkish economy from the late 1950s until Özal's neoliberal reform in the 1980s. More on the Turkish ISI: (Barkey, 1990)

⁴ On the foreign policy of the Özal period see: (Laçiner 2009; Ataman 2002). On the economic reforms of Özal see: (Öniş 2004)

emerged in the Middle East. This created the opportunity and the external constraint for Turkey to step up and fill it in. On the other hand, the domestic changes in Turkey were ripe for a foreign policy change. The one-party AKP government could make independent decisions and was ready to redraw the foreign policy course of Turkey. Both external and internal factors directed Turkey towards a growing activism in foreign policy.

After 2002 a new and energetic Turkey appeared that tried to live up to its ambitions both on the regional and the global levels. This change became visible after the second electoral victory of the AKP in 2007. Ahmet Davutoğlu's ambitious foreign policy brought high level of activism. The "zero problems with the neighbours"⁵ policy's aim was to create a stable environment for Turkish businesses and to boost ties with countries in the regional vicinity. Turkish leaders started to speak openly about Turkey's soft power, the export of the Turkish democratic model and the ambitions to gain regional influence. The booming economy and the absolute political majority gave a basis for self-esteem in progressive foreign policy initiatives, such as a visa free zone in the Middle East, free trade agreements or mediating efforts in conflicts. (Evin, et al 2010, 13) These initiatives signalled that the regional influence of Turkey started to become a reality. Full of self-esteem, the Turkish government declared that by 2023, the 100th anniversary of the Republic, Turkey will have entered the elite group of the 10 biggest economies in the world. (Akdeniz 2013, 2; Bayazit 2013)

Following the beginning of the Arab Spring the Turkish influence in the Middle East seemed to grow even further. Turkey could use its ongoing regional initiatives to gain more popularity, enhanced by the Turkish government's political rhetoric in which they openly supported the democratic changes in the Middle East. In the first period of the Arab Spring the Turkish leaders managed to even „upgrade” this influence in the region promoting the Turkish model as an example for the political development. Everything was settled for a Turkish regional political dominance and growing economic influence through „soft” means. ⁶

However, at a later stage of the Arab Spring the Turkish image lost from its shine. The international military intervention in Libya supported by the AKP government and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war proved to be game changers. In mid-2012 the Turkish

⁵ Davutoğlu had been discussing his foreign policy strategy in several articles and his book, *Stratejik Derinlik* (Davutoğlu 2001) even before 2007, but the concept itself was developed later through his speeches and scholarly work (Davutoğlu 2008; Davutoğlu 2011; Davutoğlu 2013a)

⁶ "The dissertation will define the concept of soft power in the section: Theoretical background II"

rhetoric about Syria changed and the Turkish leaders started to assert the resignation of the Assad regime. (Robins 2013, 397) Despite the gradual deterioration of the regional perception of Turkey, the Turkish leadership only modified but did not change the political rhetoric. The Turkish programme of promoting regional stability, the “zero problems policy with the neighbours”, could not continue in its original form in the environment of the Arab Spring. However, the Turkish leadership could not escape from its vow to the democratic changes and the support for Islamist governments. The reaction of the Turkish leadership after the Egyptian domestic changes in July 2013 did not influence the regional image of Turkey necessarily positively. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called it a coup and demanded the restoration of the elected Morsi government. This led to the deterioration of the Turkish-Egyptian bilateral relations and a credibility loss between the strong former partners. (Robins 2013, 397; Akdeniz 2013, 5) Growing criticism emerged from both Western allies and the Gulf countries, the major economic partners of Turkey. (Sağlam, 2013)

Cracks on the domestic platform revealed as well. One of the main elements of the Turkish soft power rhetoric was the promotion of the Turkish model, the „Muslim democracy”⁷. However, throughout the three AKP governments the party followed a path to fortify its power against the military and the old Kemalist elite. The foreign policy successes, the picture of a proud Turkey and the booming economy effaced the democratic deficit. After 2012, however, both the regional influence and the previously booming economy suffered a sudden drop. After almost 10 years of side-lining the Kemalist elite and social polarization, the domestic dissatisfaction could not be handled by external successes and the reinvigorated glory of Turkey. New laws of religious motivation led the people to the streets first in 2012. The Gezi Park demonstrations that started in May 2013 were triggered by symbolic problems⁸ but reflected the polarization of the domestic environment, the contradiction between the Turkish government’s rhetoric and the reality. The domestic crackdown under heavy international attention influenced the Turkish soft power capabilities negatively and especially the credibility of democracy promotion came into question. (Egeresi 2013b, 4-5; Akdeniz 2013, 8)

⁷ On the understanding of Muslim democracy in the concept of the AKP: (Ahmadov 2008, 26-27; Yavuz 2009; Duran 2008; Tepe 2005; Nasr 2005; Hale 2005; Carroll 2004)

⁸ It was triggered by the government’s plan to build a shopping mall resembling a military building from the Ottoman era in the heart of Istanbul and a new law banning the vending of alcohol after 10 pm in convenience stores. (Egeresi 2013b, 2-3) These symbolic issues represented the dissatisfaction of the young secular generations with the AKP government.

Taking stock of the foreign policy trends of the Turkish Republic an interesting pattern can be observed. A once isolationist, introverted country has grown up to be an important regional and a global factor in certain aspects. This was based not only on growing capabilities, but an emerging domestic will to step out and build influence in the external environment.

Turkey's unique geopolitical position predestines that both regional and global systemic pressures and incentives affect its behaviour. After WW I the Turkish leaders were concentrating on state-building and at the same time tried to block all external influences, moreover, managed to avoid getting involved in WW II. During the Cold War the fast Turkish integration to the Western alliance and the constant threat posed by the Soviet Union and its proxies determined Turkish foreign policy opportunities. After the Cold War Turkey lost its previous geostrategic importance and the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey flamed up⁹ with the threat of destabilizing Turkey itself. Other types of external shocks also influenced Turkish politics: the rejection from the EU¹⁰ or the series of economic crises¹¹, which washed away Turkish governments. In 2003, the invasion of Iraq caused a blow to the American influence in the Middle East and created a power vacuum that called for other regional actors to step in. The AKP government tried to live up to this opportunity and turned its attention to the East especially after the halt of the EU accession process in 2006. The foreign policy activity and the growing external influence received a new external shock in 2011 with the Arab Spring.

Not only external, but internal factors influenced Turkish foreign policy. The state-building efforts in the first decades, the political turmoil of the 1960s and the 1970s and the military coups were all incentives of foreign policy "introversion". The democratic opening in the 1950s and the emergence of a new Anatolian elite motivated an – at least partial – foreign policy opening. (Göktepe) The strengthening of the new elite, the growing power of the religious constituency and the demise of the old elite group(s) all led to the emergence of the AKP with new foreign policy ambitions. Powered

⁹ The Gulf War, the Yugoslav crisis, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict all carried serious destabilizing threats. Especially the Gulf war threatened with spill over effects caused by the waves of refugees from Iraq and the strengthening of the Kurdish insurgency.

¹⁰ In 1997 the EU did not include Turkey as a candidate country, which caused disappointment in Turkey, that later proved to be effective in facilitating internal reforms that led to the AKP's victory and the start of the negotiations in 2005. The dissertation will elaborate on this issue in the chapter that verifies the first hypothesis.

¹¹ Turkey was stroke by international economic crises in 1994 and was notable to restructure its economy. The structural weaknesses led to a twin financial crisis in 2000 and 2001. On these crises see: (Alper and Öniş 2004; Öniş 1996; Akyüz and Boratav 2003)

by the interests of a new electoral voter basis and the new religious economic elite, the AKP started to pursue new foreign policy goals and influence in the neighbouring regions. However, the social polarization and the decade long discontent burst out in the Gezi Park further curbing the opportunities of the Turkish foreign policy.

Overview of the literature on the analyses of Turkish foreign policy

After 2002 several scholarly works were published focusing on the transformations of Turkish foreign policy strategy and its different segments. There is an abundance of works dealing with the sudden change of the Turkish foreign policy behaviour shaped by both emerging foreign policy activism and reprioritization of the foreign policy goals. As a result of these processes, from the mid-2000s Turkey gradually turned to the Middle East seemingly downgrading its relations with its Western partners. The questions of these new ways in foreign policy motivated a wide range of analyses from Turkish and international scholars, who grasped different aspects of this change. However, the different explanations suffered from serious flaws, despite the explanatory capacity, forgetting the complex relationship between the domestic and the external factors shaping Turkish foreign policy. (Bank and Kardağ 2013, Dinc and Yetim 2012)

Some explanations have a narrow theoretical basis, focusing only either on the internal or on the systemic explanatory factors in examining certain periods or changes in Turkish foreign policy. Describing the transformation of Turkish foreign policy based on external factors would only mean an exclusive focus on the effects of the Cold War, and later the end of the Cold War, which provided both opportunities and constraints for Turkey to step up actively in its immediate neighbourhood. The foreign policy independence was further enhanced by the 2003 Iraqi invasion and the problems in US-Turkish bilateral ties and later the slowdown in the EU accession after 2006. (Oğuzlu and Kibaroglu 2009, 586)¹² Nevertheless, these explanations entirely disregard the internal political willingness for such actions and the internal capacities for the implementation

¹² After the AKP's second victory in 2007 Turkey not only had the potential and capabilities of an influential actor but started to articulate its regional claims. This coincided with the realization from the European side that Turkey became a clear economic and political factor in its neighbourhood that can serve as an important asset for the EU's foreign policy and economic purposes. Turkey could be a credible intermediary of the European interest to its neighbouring regions. (Kirişci, Tocci and Walker 2010, 24-28) Inside the EU more and more research organizations and political groups raised the question of how Europe had "lost Turkey?" (Evin et al 2010, 7).

that would give an answer to the question, why the foreign policy change did not start in the 1990s. There is also a series of explanations focusing on the security environment of Turkey and having an exclusively Neo-realist explanation on Turkish foreign policy, however, they are falling into the same trap. (Bilgin 2005; Bilgin 2007)

Other explanations attribute the transformation of Turkish policy to factors rooted in domestic politics, such as the de-securitization processes¹³ in the new environment and the establishment of a new regional security approach. According to this logic, the demilitarization in the domestic arena empowered the new civilian elite groups and let civilian interests step to the fore. (Larrabee 2010; Araş and Polat 2008) Similar explanations connect the Turkish foreign policy changes to the influence of the interest groups that recently gained power. (Bozdağioğlu 2003) An alternative version of these explanations focuses on the business and economic interests of Turkey. The new Anatolian elite groups, or the Muslim bourgeoisie emerged in the 1980s and pursued to gain influence in the 1990s with the aim of helping the AKP to get into power.¹⁴ Some studies point out that the interest of the “Anatolian tigers” should not be underestimated in Turkey’s turn towards the Middle East. The most prominent concept from this line is the liberal political-economic explanation of the “trading state”. According to this perception, Turkey’s foreign policy decisions reflect the will of the internal economic elite. This is especially true under the AKP governments, which gained power with the considerable help of the new economic elite. The foreign policy activism in new geographic locations and influence building are reactions to Turkey’s economic needs and the expansion in foreign trade. Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with the neighbours” policy reflects the pursuit for political stability in the region in order to smoothen the economic relations and lessen the security risks for the Turkish businesses. (Kirişçi 2009, Kaptanoğlu and Kirişçi 2011) This concept does not fall far from the neoliberal theories of economic cooperation (Hirschman 1977) or the democratic peace theories (Doyle 1983; Couloumbis and Kentikelenis 2007) where states substitute their conflict for economic cooperation.

Another category of explanations focuses on the questions of identity and how the new Islamist government try to “Middle-Easternize” Turkey. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003;

¹³ On the securitization and de-securitization processes in Turkish literature Bilgin (2011) gives a comprehensive overview. The Copenhagen school of IR had its impact in the Turkish academia as well, see: (Kaliber and Tocci 2010; Kaliber 2005; Araş and Polat 2008)

¹⁴ On the rise of the Anatolian economic elite groups this dissertation will elaborate extensively. Further works on the topic see: (Başkan 2010; Acar, Demir and Toprak 2010; ESI 2005; Gümüşcü 2008)

Bozdağlıoğlu 2008; Yavuz, 2009; Hale and Özbudun 2010; Warning and Kardaş 2011) According to some of these assumptions, the constant rejection of the Turkish approach to the EU and the West caused distortions inside Turkey. As a result, Turkey turned away from Europe trying its wings, proving its independence as an important regional actor in the Middle East. (Oğuzlu and Kibaroglu 2009; Dağı 2005) This explanation was created as a wake-up call for Europe, a warning of possibly losing Turkey. This line of explanation after alterations became the basis for the “bridge argument”. Turkey – using both its Western and Islamic identities – can play a very important role for the EU. Shoving off from the Western interests and establishing influence in the Middle East would make Turkey only more valuable in the long term. With strengthening the linkages to the Islamic Middle East, Turkey actually builds up its own future accession to the EU. (Oğuzlu and Kibaroglu 2009; Çağaptay 2013a; Çağaptay 2014)

Until the beginning of the 2000s scholars of Turkish foreign policy focused mainly on different bilateral issues with particular regard to Turkey’s foreign policy towards the West and the accession process to the European Union. (Çarkoğlu and Rubin 2003) After the AKP’s step into power, with the change in the foreign policy focus of Turkey, scholarly works also changed. After the foreign policy shift of Turkey in the mid-2000s, the topic of the growing Turkish foreign policy influence in its region became a central topic of analysis. (Robins 2007; Meral and Paris 2010; Grigoriadis, 2010) The regional ambitions of Turkish foreign policy had become more and more accentuated and foreign policy ambitions started to be interpreted through the foreign policy vision drawn up in the scholarly works of Ahmet Davutoğlu¹⁵, later foreign minister (and Prime Minister). The concept of Turkish soft power (Oğuzlu 2007; Beng 2008; Bilgin and Eliş 2008; Altunışık 2011; Kalın 2011) and regional influence dominate these analyses.¹⁶ Bank and Karadağ (2013) designate the period between 2007 and 2011 as the “Ankara Moment”, they define this period as the most successful foreign policy era and a time of strengthening Turkish regional and global influence. Turkey became an important regional economic hub and influential actor in its region. (Balogh et al. 2013) Davutoğlu

¹⁵ As mentioned earlier Davutoğlu drew up his foreign policy vision in his book *Stratejik Derinlik* in 2001 (Davutoğlu 2001) and later he contributed to the concept with several articles for example (Davutoğlu 2008; Davutoğlu 2011; Davutoğlu 2013)

¹⁶ In 2013 a special issue of *Turkish Studies* was released that had a comprehensive account on regional influence of Turkey. see: (Oğuzlu 2013; Oğuzlu and Dal 2013; Çağaptay 2013b; Çağaptay 2014; Dal 2013; Kardaş 2013; Yeşiltaş 2013) On the issue see also: (Murinson 2006; Robinson 2007; Turin 2007; Hursoy 2011; Adam 2012 Murinson 2012)

himself, as the Prime Minister's advisor and as foreign minister also contributed significantly to the development of Turkish foreign policy analysis.

Several scholars give a chronological view on the history of the Turkish Republic and the course of foreign policy. They put the foreign policy decisions in a historical context, however, they don't give an explanation to the underlying causal nexus behind the foreign policy decisions.¹⁷ In most of the cases these works reveal both domestic and international causalities; yet, they are rarely built on a comprehensive theoretical basis. Other approaches put the analysis of the Turkish foreign policy history into a rather theoretical context. Bozdağlıoğlu (2003) gives an explanation to the creation of Turkish foreign policy and its course until the end of the 1990s from a constructivist perspective. His analysis focuses on Turkey's different identity groups and their influence on Turkish foreign policy decisions. He argues that an adequate account of Turkish foreign policy requires an analysis of Turkey's identity, since it is linked to the formulation of foreign policy. This book has several valid points on how the internal shifts of power took place between different identity groups in Turkey, but fails to grasp the complex interaction of Turkey's external and internal environments on foreign policy making. The author of this dissertation also used the constructivist approach in his earlier explanation to understand the pursuit for regional dominance in the AKP's foreign policy, where he gave an account of how the identities of different political elite groups influence foreign policy. (Rada 2007) The shortcoming of this work was that it downgraded the effect of the external environment and the changes in the power relations in describing growing Turkish influence in the Middle East.

Providing another perspective to the examination of Turkish foreign policy, Mufti steps on the realist road. In his theoretical framework he takes into consideration both the external and the internal influences in Turkish foreign policy history. He argues that Turkish security policy cannot be explained by a neorealist analysis only, e.g. by looking only at the systemic factors. He emphasizes that "even if many of the pressures confronting Turkey's leaders are externally generated, the manner in which they choose to react would still need to be explained." (Mufti 2009, 2-3) He examines the changes in the strategic culture, a domestic variable defined as the historically conditioned paradigmatic beliefs, symbols and values that shape the decision-makers' perceptions of their environment and eventually their decisions. His book which follows a "liberal

¹⁷ There are several monographs providing a detailed account of the course of Turkish foreign policy, for example: (Hale 2004; Hale 2013; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003; Mufti 2009; Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu 2009)

realist” line of argument makes a connection between the external and the internal factors, focusing on the security policy of Turkey as factor dependent on the external pressures and the internally generated factors such as beliefs and traditions. Similar consistency can be traced at other scholars as well. Bank and Karadağ argue in their article on Turkish regional power¹⁸ that it is insufficient to deal with domestic transformations or de-securitization alone, they show only one side of the trajectory. “We need to go beyond this and emphasize the linkage between the domestic dimension, which Turkish elites can influence, and the regional setting, which they cannot influence and where Turkey’s power is acknowledged admired and feared. “ (Bank and Karadağ 2013, 291)

This dissertation follows a similar track in examining the course of Turkish foreign policy; it gives an explanation of how the external pressures and the domestic changes created an environment where a once passive Turkey wished to rise up as a regionally influential political and economic power. The most important questions are why and how it happened and why at this moment of Turkish history? Turkey had the military and to some extent the economic capabilities to assert a more active regional role earlier, but this did not happen until the rise of the AKP. The dissertation also intends to answer the question how Turkey could rise up and turned out to be so successful in becoming a regional power. It is very important to describe which tools Turkey used in its course creating its soft power and what the exact motivating factors were behind it. Although, after 2012 we see a decrease in Turkish influence, it is crucial to look into the domestic and external factors causing this phenomenon. How is it possible that a country with a consequent foreign policy line suddenly starts to lose from its regional influence?

This work overviews the external and internal changes that triggered foreign policy activism in Turkey and later initiated soft power building efforts of the Turkish foreign policy. In contrast to most of the articles, this dissertation will use a wider timeline not limiting its scope of examination to the period after 2002. The AKP’s victory at the general elections was undeniably a unique moment in Turkish history. The AKP brought a new approach in the national identity formation, domestic political issues and in foreign policy as well. 2002 meant a further turning point of Turkish history, but did not mean a detachment from the previous political, social and economic processes. A serious shortcoming that may be detected in the comprehensive analyses of Turkish foreign policy is that they interpret the periods before and after 2002 independently from each

¹⁸ For a conceptual definition of Turkish regional power see: (Kardaş 2013)

other. This dissertation treats the pre-2002 period in the same context together with the subsequent periods in order to understand the exact motivations behind the Turkish political elite's behaviour and the Turkish foreign policy.

The dissertation begins with the introduction of the hypotheses, the description of the theoretical background and analysis of the methodology used in the dissertation. Afterwards, the dissertation outlines the studies that helped to assess and confirm the author's hypotheses examining the periods from before the 2002 parliamentary elections through the successful AKP governments and the beginning of the Arab Spring until the Gezi Park movements. Finally, the concluding chapter draws up the main theoretical and practical implications of the study.

Why analysing the transformation of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's role in the Middle East?

First, an explanation is necessary for the subject of this dissertation and the motivations behind analysing Turkish foreign policy and its transformation. The aim of the dissertation is to understand how a country with a traditionally rather quietist foreign policy becomes an ambitious regional factor, a potential leader that tries to build up its "soft power". Second, it is equally important to explain the choice of regional scope of this work, the Middle East, instead of other neighbouring regions, such as the Balkans or the Caucasus and the Turkic republics. The methodological argumentation for the choice of this subject is based on the following considerations:

1. *Lack of comprehensive works on the transformation of the Turkish foreign policy.* Turkey went through a spectacular transformation in the last decade and a half, which raises the questions of how the fast development inside the country could happen and how it was possible that a strong country with low ambitions could multiply its political power and with its foreign policy activity emerge as an ambitious candidate for leadership in its neighbouring regions. There is an abundance of works on Turkish foreign policy during the AKP era after 2002, and the Turkish foreign policy in different periods of the Turkish Republic. Most of these works lack the capacity to make a comprehensive explanation.
2. *Discontinuity in the works on Turkish foreign policy.* In most scientific analyses, the period after 2002 is separated from the previous periods, which disrupts the organic

connection between the domestic and the international factors that influenced the foreign policy change in Turkey. A similar phenomenon can be observed regarding the explanations of the last few years, which handle the periods before and after the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 separately. The latter events coincided with the third victory of the AKP in the parliamentary elections. This dissertation wants to contribute to the literature on Turkish foreign policy by introducing a comprehensive approach.

3. *The geopolitical and economic significance of Turkey.* Turkey's foreign policy, economic and trade ambitions have always impacted its neighbouring regions. Nevertheless, in the last periods Turkish activity has become a decisive element that not only affected but also – in a way – determined the different political, economic and cultural processes in these regions, especially in the Middle East. This does not mean that Turkey could meet its goals to reach regional leadership, though the Turkish decisions have had important impacts in the whole region. Consequently, analysing and understanding the dynamics of the Turkish foreign policy can bring an added value to understand the processes in the neighbouring regions.

4. *The importance of the Middle East in Turkish foreign policy.* The turn towards the East has become a fundamental element of the Turkish foreign policy, which was introduced from the middle of the 2000s. The new foreign policy envisioned by Ahmet Davutoğlu defined the new focus and interest of Turkey lying in the Eastern areas and started to pay an extraordinary attention to the immediate vicinity in the Middle East. Turkish influence was constantly growing in this area until 2011-2012. After 2011, the civil war in Syria, the American pull-out from Iraq, the worsening relations with Israel and later Egypt changed the relations and the ambitions in the region, but did not abolished the Turkish foreign policy focus.

5. *The role of the Middle East in the Turkish foreign policy ambitions.* Davutoğlu defined Turkey's role in the international community as follows. Turkey is surrounded by different regions to which Turkey has to relate according to distance and location, geostrategic interests and historical, cultural ties. Davutoğlu's framework that became a leading concept of the Turkish foreign policy described the different regions of interests and the Middle East became upgraded. (Davutoğlu 2001)

6. *The significance of Turkey in Hungary's foreign relations.* Despite the historical bonds, the strengthening economic, political and cultural ties between the two countries, the long traditions of Oriental studies at the Hungarian universities, only a limited number of analyses have been published on Turkish foreign policy in Hungary. It is a matter of

fact that most of these works concentrated on Turkey's accession to the European Union, describing its different aspects from an economic (Szigetvári 2004, Szigetvári 2006), security policy (Rada and Rada 2007) or cultural, identity-related point of view (Hóvári 2013, N. Rózsa 2008, Szigetvári 2008, Vásáry 2008a; Vásáry 2008b; Szigetvári 2014) and searched for answers to whether Turkish accession is advisable or possible in the future. These works touched upon the aspects of Turkish foreign policy, but their subject was rather the analysis of the possibility, the advantages and the disadvantages of the Turkish accession to the European Union. Lately there has been only a few endeavours in Hungary to create a comprehensive analysis¹⁹ of Turkish foreign policy from different angles, but the different papers were mostly confined to one segment, vertical or horizontal aim of Turkish foreign policy; explaining its ambitions in the Balkans (Egeresi 2013e, Szigetvári 2012b), in the Middle East (Szigetvári 2013b), or its policies regarding economic expansion. (Szigetvári 2012a) Even though this present work is in English, the comprehensive approach of it can be an important supplement to the Hungarian literature on Turkish foreign policy research.

7. *Personal interest.* The author of this dissertation has been researching different aspects of Turkish foreign policy since the beginning of his university studies and has been trying to understand how the dynamics of Turkish regional ambitions change and where the Turkish ambitions exactly lead to. The main research has been to understand the motives and consequences of certain foreign policy decisions and the domestic and external dynamics behind them. Also, the author had the chance to spend a semester of Erasmus scholarship in Turkey, Istanbul at the prestigious Boğaziçi University and to have an insight in the theoretical and practical understanding of Turkish policies in the Turkish academia. The author's personal discussions with internationally recognized Middle East experts strengthened the conviction about the timeliness and importance of a comprehensive analysis on Turkish foreign policy.

Time frame

The time frame of this dissertation needs a thorough explanation as well. The first explanatory chapter examines the transformation of Turkish foreign policy into a more

¹⁹ A series of studies were published in *Külügyi Szemle* 2013/1. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa, 2013; Egeresi 2013; Hóvári 2013; Pintér 2013; Szigetvári 2013a) and also other studies emerged on Turkish foreign policy ambitions e.g. (Balogh et al 2013; Szigetvári 2013b)

active and dynamic approach. To understand the underlying processes and approaches inside the Turkish domestic political and economic arena the analysis has to start from the establishment of the Republic in 1923 with short references to the previous Ottoman times. Even though the choice of the starting date may overstretch the time frame of this dissertation and may seem to be wide, it is necessary to understand the longer processes that all led to the emergence of the new elite that allowed for the radical change in the decision-making. At the same time, the analysis of the external pressures on Turkey also follows this time frame giving a short overview on the foreign policy history of the Turkish Republic with a special focus on the Middle East. The discrepancy caused by the width of the time frame used in the first chapter will be eased by the main topic of the analysis focusing on the period from PM Turgut Özal assuming power in 1983 and the end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s. The end of the time interval in the first explanatory chapter will be the beginning of the 2000s that brought radical external changes in the Middle East with the global war on terror and the American invasion of Iraq and inside Turkey the electoral victory of the AKP in 2002.

The main focus of research of the second and the third explanatory chapters' will be the first two cycles of the AKP in government between 2002 and 2011. In this period the external pressures and incentives allowed for the Turkish leadership to expand the Turkish influence in the Middle East and create a more active foreign policy. This is the period when the new foreign policy theory of Davutoğlu's became a guiding concept of Turkish foreign policy, and the "zero problems with the neighbours" policy evolved from ambition into reality. After 2007, and especially after Davutoğlu's appointment to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Turkish soft power and regional influence became a foreign policy goal. This is the period of the "Ankara Moment" (Bank and Karadağ 2013), the period of successful foreign policy and growing regional and global influence, when Turkey became an important regional economic hub and an influential actor in its region. (Balogh et al. 2013)

It is important to underline that 2002, the year of the AKP's success and the party's rise to power is an artificial and arbitrary dividing line in analysing Turkish foreign policy transformation. 2002 functioned in most of the researches as a starting point of a "new Turkey" or a new Turkish political reality. However, both from foreign policy and domestic political perspectives there were other – in a way more significant elements – that changed the foreign policy behaviour of the Turkish state. The second explanatory

chapter will clearly underline those events that defined the transformation in the 2000s, however, it would be useful to highlight the major issues here.

From the external perspective, 2002 brought only indirect influences after the international intervention in Afghanistan, the most meaningful change was the invasion of Iraq and the emerging power vacuum that was left behind it. The security related threats meant at the same time a clear opportunity to enhance its regional political and economic influence and try to create some sort of stability. In this new regional setting other changes occurred as well, by the middle of the 2000s both Syria and Iran started to show a cooperative face towards the AKP government that gave even further opportunities. Parallel, the AKP started its first period with awaited successes in relation to the EU and the accession process. Even though the AKP continued a much longer process of reforms, its commitment to the EU requirements resulted in the official start of the accession negotiations in 2005. However, the euphoria ended already in 2006, when leading EU member states made statements against the Turkish accession and several chapters became suspended. This external shock pushed Turkey into a new direction as well, which cumulated after 2007-2008, when a strong and active Turkey emerged.

It is visible that from an external point of view there are several turning points, but they do not coincide with the elections in 2002. Similar assessment can be made from the domestic perspective. The processes of reorganization inside the society, the emergence of a new elite and the decrease of the power of the old elite started decades earlier and did not stop in the beginning of the 2000s. The 2002 general elections can be rather regarded as one of the first big political successes of the new social groups. The AKP's victory at the elections meant a new platform of vindicating the new elite's interest, but the processes continued later. Thus selecting 2002 as a starting point of the second explanatory chapter seems contradictory to the findings of this dissertation, however, the logic of the dissertation's framework necessitates to create clear dividing lines between the chapters to make the flow of argumentation more understandable.

The starting point of the last explanatory chapter is the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, which caused a serious external shock for the Turkish regional goals. Although in the beginning the Arab Spring seemed to add to the Turkish influence in the Middle East even further, from 2012 distortions and cracks suddenly were appearing in the Turkish influence in the Middle East that would become clear by 2013. The starting date of this period is also justified by the third electoral victory of the AKP in 2011, this time with no major changes in the foreign policy course. For practical reasons, August

2013 has been chosen as the end of the time interval of this dissertation. Even though the choice is arbitrary, it is buttressed by the external pressures and the internal changes inside Turkey. By 2013 the limits and weaknesses of Turkish regional foreign policy had been revealed and despite the Turkish ambitions the “Ankara Moment” was disrupted by massive external pressures. By supporting the NATO’s intervention in Libya and the inability of influencing the events in the Syrian civil war started to weaken the Turkish image in the Middle East. The worsening bilateral ties between Egypt and Turkey not only meant a blow to Turkey’s prestige in the Middle East but triggered economic costs as well. Turkey’s resolute stance on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood after the military regime stepped into power in July 2013 in Egypt brought negative responses and lost opportunities. From the domestic political side, the summer of 2013 brought important changes. May 2013 incited a major appearance of the discontent in the form of the Gezi Park demonstrations that represented the dissatisfaction of the young secular generations with the AKP government. The protests escalated, the violent clashes between demonstrators and the police left several dead and wounded. The Gezi Park events brought about serious internal and external criticism against the AKP government and questioned the very basis of the Turkish soft power ambitions.

The dissertation embraces the period between the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the end of the Gezi Park events in 2013, however, its main focus is the period between 1983 and 2013. This period covers exactly the transformation which led from a quietist Turkey to an (over)ambitious regional soft power and shows the limits of Turkey’s capacity.

I. Hypotheses and theoretical background

Hypotheses

This dissertation aims at examining the course of Turkish foreign policy in three different periods. The main focus of the dissertation is essentially the transformation process of Turkish foreign policy; it tries to give a comprehensive explanation of how a country with an introverted foreign policy would suddenly ambition regional leadership (in the Middle East); and where the limits of such a political, military and economic endeavour are. At the same time – as it will be seen from the theoretical framework – it must be understood which concept was applied for Turkey to generate such endeavour. The dissertation aims at addressing these comprehensive research questions and approaching the answers by means of employing three hypotheses below.

As mentioned in the introduction, not even the best known scholars connected the external and internal decisive factors behind Turkish foreign policy decisions. The intention of this work is to give an overarching assessment on the extent to which the internal and external environment of Turkey affected Turkish foreign policy and on how these two components created an ambitious „soft power” from an isolationist country. The chosen theoretical framework is suitable to explain what went wrong in 2012, and what are the consequences from the perspective of Turkish foreign policy and regional influence?

1st hypothesis: *By the beginning of the 2000s a radical change was inevitable in the Turkish foreign policy approach. Both external and domestic incentives predestined foreign policy activism.*

2nd hypothesis: *Due to the transformation of Turkey’s external environment and the change in the balance of power in the Turkish society, both asserted Turkey to ambition regional soft power in the Middle East.*

3rd hypothesis: *Turkish foreign policy ambitions became limited by both regional upheavals and the domestic discontent inside the Turkish society after the escalation of the Arab Spring.*

Theoretical background I. – Neo-classical realism

This dissertation uses a political theory, which may explain the foreign policy decisions of the Turkish state and might draw up the decision-making process. As mentioned earlier, the main shortcoming of the latest analyses of Turkish foreign policy is that they mainly focus on one side of the picture, owing them to either domestic or external factors. In order to draw an overarching picture on the factors and processes behind the foreign policy transformation and the emergence of Turkish activism, the necessary political theory needs to handle both the external constraints and the internal variables at the same time.

The main schools of international political theories, the realist and the liberal traditions and later the constructivist school left a gap open in explaining states' foreign policy decisions. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 11-12; Schweller 2003, 311-322; Rose 1998, 145-147) They concentrated on the different segments of how the international system works (neorealism)²⁰, on states' interactions (classical realism²¹ and liberal theories) or state's behavioural patterns (constructivism²²). They did not provide sufficient explanations to the specific role of the states in foreign policy decisions and the nature of the interactions between the systemic and the unit level variables. After the publication of Waltz's Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1979), the international system and the role of external constraints and the outcomes of state interactions came into spotlight. The constructivist (Wendt 1993) and liberal (e.g. democratic peace theories²³) theories shifted the focus rather to the unit level, formulating a static conception of the international system. However, both trends failed to integrate the unit and the systemic level variables in a deductively consistent manner. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 11)

Neo-classical realism²⁴ gives an answer to this discrepancy and provides the scholars with an overarching new theoretic tool in the examination of foreign policy decisions. Rose argues that neo-classical realists occupy a middle ground between structural theorists and constructivists. The former assume the existence of a direct linkage between the systemic constraints and the unit-level behaviour, the latter disregard

²⁰ The original neorealist text is Kenneth N. Waltz: Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1979)

²¹ See: (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948)

²² The starting point of constructivism are the works of Alexander Wendt (1992)

²³ See for example: (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993)

²⁴ The name neo-classical realism was invented by Gideon Rose (1998, 146)

the existence of the systemic level incentives, defining the international level as a socially constructed concept. (Rose 1998, 152-154) Neo-classical realists assume the reality of the relative power and the international level, which by definition affects the outcomes of state interactions. (Rose 1998, 150)²⁵

Neo-classical realism was developed on the basis of both the classical realist tradition and the Waltzian structural realist thoughts on international relations. It builds upon the complex relationship between the state and the society, an important feature of the classical realist literature, not giving up on the external constraints of the international system, explained in Waltz's structural realist theory. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 13) It is not the purpose of the current work to make a comprehensive comparison between the different main elements of the realist tradition; however, it is unavoidable to underline some common and differing features. This helps to explain why the choice of neo-classical realism is the most appropriate for the purposes of explaining the transformation of Turkish foreign policy and the reasons behind the rise of a regional soft power.

Scholars of the realist tradition focus on different principles of realism, but at least three of them appear in every realist study.²⁶ The essence of social reality is the group. The building blocks and ultimate units of social and political life are not the individuals of liberal thought, nor the classes of Marxism (but rather) conflict groups" (Gilpin 1996, 7) In real life the most basic political actors of the international system are states. The second common principle of the realist tradition is the international system's conflictual nature, a perpetual struggle among groups following their self-interests. This struggle is happening under the circumstances of scarcity and uneven distribution of commodities: material or social capabilities or resources. The conflict is characterized by a constant uncertainty about the other groups' capabilities and intentions. The third main principle is the central role of power. Power is the necessary means for any of these groups to secure their goals of domination or survival. "The conflicting aims of rival nations are always conflicts of power". (Blainey 1998, 150)

Classical realism focuses on the sources and the use of national power in international politics and the problems that leaders have to face in foreign policy decisions. The main element is the power distribution among states and the character of

²⁵ See also: (Schweller 2003, 337; Schweller 2004; Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 19)

²⁶ This categorization is based on (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009,14), slightly different categorization in (Schweller 2003, 325-332)

these states including the state-society relationship. Classical realists' explanations remain primarily on the unit level, focusing on foreign policy history and on the explanation of occurrences in intergroup relations. However, they tell very little about the external constraints of the international system. On the other hand, neorealism is a systemic level theory in which the single independent variable remains the systemic distribution of power. It seeks explanations to international outcomes, the results of systemic interactions. According to Taliaferro (2000, 133) neorealism is useful in the explanations of outcomes that cannot be attributed to the behaviour of any states: possibilities of the hegemonic wars (Gilpin 1981), war proneness of the international system, arms race, aggregate alignment patterns, etc. However, neorealism is incapable of explaining the foreign policy behaviour of individual states. (Taliaferro 2000, 133, Schweller 2003; 317) Waltz's systemic theory "can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by the systems of different structures, but it can't tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and possibilities." (Waltz 1979, 71) Based on this, the causal conclusion is that in the international system a balance of power will emerge and after certain periods of imbalances the system will always return to the balance of power state. In neorealism, the state is a "black box", the theory does not analyse the differences between states and does not use the unit level to explain occurrences in the international system. Neorealist approaches disregard the fact that states may differ as a result of their domestic environment, structure or the state-society interaction.

Neo-classical realism's starting assumption is that the international system structures and constrains the policy choices of states. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 19) On the other hand, it reintroduces the unit level variable in the explanations. Neo-classical realism is not a simple refinement of the neorealist theory with unit level variables (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 21) and is more than the mixture of the ideas of Waltz and Wendt. Neo-classical realism searches answers for questions which were not answered in the neorealist literature without abandoning its core assumption. According to Schweller, Waltz exhausted the theoretical possibilities hidden inside the neorealist theory, he "...said everything that can be usefully said about neorealism; there is no way to improve or amend Waltz's theory without violating its structural-systemic nature and, in so doing, confounding the theory's highly deductive and internally consistent logic." (Schweller 2003, 313)

Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro point out that neither a systemic theory of international outcomes (such as the structural realist theory of balance of power), nor Innenpolitik theories of foreign policy (such as the democratic peace theory) can explain certain foreign policy choices or historical events. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 2) Schweller argues that the theory of foreign policy is a theory at the national level. (Schweller 2003, 321) This is what neo-classical realism has to offer; it does not concentrate on the outcomes on the systemic level, but seeks explanations to why different states under different circumstances follow particular strategies or decide on certain foreign policy options. The theory's main focus is to give explanations to foreign policy choices of different states in the international arena and give predictions about the states' response to the systemic forces and constraints. Taliaferro (2000, 134) emphasizes that though the neo-classical realists cannot predict systemic consequences of state strategies, but they give explanations to military doctrines, foreign policy strategies, and foreign economic policy decisions of individual states. Schweller points out that while not abandoning the Waltzian international structure, neo-classical realism explains foreign policy decision making and intrinsically important historical puzzles (Schweller 2003, 317)

As stated earlier neo-classical realism inherited the complex relationship between state and society, however, the systemic constraints remain major defining factors in the theory. Neo-classical realism defines states as the primary actors of international politics and works with a top-down conception of the state. The state is not a "black box" or a vague entity which makes foreign policy decisions, but it is embodied by a foreign policy executive (Zakaria Location 132) (can have different forms according to the political form of the given state²⁷). The theory works with an explicit distinction between state and society but at the same time - similarly to classical realists – does not see the state (the political, foreign policy executives) autonomous from the society. Neo-classical realists believe that the state's foreign policy responses to international constraints come as a product of state-society interactions, coordination, even struggle. The executive is autonomous from the society to a certain degree, however, depending on the political structure of the state he is compelled to bargain with other domestic actors on the policy implementation or resource extraction. The level of autonomy given to the executive differs over time, types of states and internal institutional settings. (Ripsman 2002) Neo-

²⁷ This dissertation will not elaborate on the different forms of the foreign policy executives under different state structures. Turkey has a democratic state structure, thus this analysis will only focus on democracies.

classical realists contrary to Marxist, liberal or Innenpolitik explanations do not regard the states as the aggregation of the demands of different domestic groups and interests, however, they do accept the influence of those actors.

Neo-classical realism follows the neorealist thinking about the systemic level and defines the relative distribution of power as the single independent variable. Uncertainty and potential threats are central concepts of both neorealism and neo-classical realism. The international system is essentially anarchical in which the unit level actors (states) have to operate. Rose emphasizes that states do not simply seek security as a default, but respond to uncertainties of the international anarchy by seeking to control the external environment. (Rose 1998, 151-152) Systemic pressures are translated through unit level intervening variables, primarily the decision-makers perceptions and the domestic state structure. Rose underlines that in the neo-classical realist world leaders are constrained by both international and domestic politics. Neo-classical realism focuses on the relative material power, which establishes the basic parameter for the states' foreign policy. However, the "transmission belt between the relative power and the actual foreign policy is imperfect, it is translated through the decisions of the foreign policy executive. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009, 4) The decisions are made by actual existing leaders or elite groups, who base these decisions on their perceptions of the relative power and their assessment of the international incentives, not on the objective relative power itself. Consequently, the foreign policy decisions do not necessarily follow the paths of the relative power distribution or the balance of power pursuit explanations. (Rose 1998, 157-161; Schweller 2003, 332-336)

Therefore, to understand or predict certain foreign policy responses of states we have to open up the "black box". Rose emphasizes that "understanding the links between power and policy requires close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented." (Rose 1998, 147) Leaders deciding on foreign policy face a two-sided pressure. On the one side, the external environment poses constraints and to answer these constraints they have to operate inside the domestic environment and extract resources from it. To do so, they have to work through domestic political institutions, maintain support of the main stakeholders, mobilize the necessary part of the society, and in doing so not antagonize them, in order to keep the power. (Taliaferro 2009; Schweller 2009)

In neo-classical realism the state is not unitary; it is comprised of a number of different actors, who have certain levels of impact on the foreign policy making process.

The neo-classical realist scholars agree that the main actor is the state leadership or the foreign policy executive who have direct influence on foreign affairs. (Ripsman 2009, 171) Some scholars focus only on the role of the foreign policy executive and play down the influence of other possible actors, like societal elites, interest groups etc. Christensen (1996, 17) emphasizes that the society does not dispose of the necessary information and expertise to understand and seriously affect the foreign policy decisions of the state. In contrast, Lobell states that it would be wrong to totally disregard the impact of societal leaders or other interest groups of the society. (Lobell 2009, 57) He defines two broad societal coalitions: the internationalist and the nationalist. The first one comprises of a competitive economic and other outward-oriented groups, such as export-oriented firms, financial institutions, intelligentsia, and skilled labour. They support foreign policy expansion and activism. The second group follows an inward-looking approach, focusing mainly on the domestic environment of the country. They do not necessarily try to influence the foreign policy decisions; however, their interest is to lessen the domestic costs of the foreign policy decisions, rather an isolationist conception. In responding to the international constraints the foreign policy executive has to balance between the interests of these groups that can be in serious conflict. (Lobell 2009, 58-59) Dueck confirms the influence of the society in the foreign policy decisions. His model explains how a state decides to answer an external, possibly military threat, or decline to respond to it. He argues that military intervention can be very costly in societal terms, thus before making the decision the foreign policy executive has to consider the interests and the reaction of the societal actors. The domestic political incentives can encourage decisions that are suboptimal from the international perspective (Dueck 2009, 167) According to Ripsman other domestic actors, including members of the legislation, political allies and members of the cabinet who are not leading foreign policy related areas may try to influence the decisions of the executive. (Ripsman 2009, 171) This comes as a consequence of the top-down conception of the state.

Ripsman argues that a large number of domestic actors want to influence foreign and security policy decisions. The public is interested in any decision, which has direct or indirect effect on them (raising taxes, likelihood of war, etc.). Generally, national security and purely foreign policy related decisions are harder to have an influence on: the executive has greater autonomy in it. Societal groups wishing to influence external policy making have to create certain sufficient payoffs for the executive if he follows their interests, and penalties if he does not. (Ripsman 2009, 179-186) In democracies, leaders'

main interest is to keep the power and secure the re-election, and secondly they want to pass the policy agendas following their own perception of the national interest. Consequently, interest groups with reasonable electoral impact can successfully influence the policy decisions including foreign policy. (Ripsman 2009, 182) Ripsman emphasizes that these interest groups can be especially successful in affecting the agenda of the state if they are representing one certain issue, having significance in a strategic geographical region or their voter basis is mainly coming from the influential strata of the society. He also admits, that the public opinion under certain conditions can restrain the executive. (Ripsman 2009, 181-182) Aside from the calculations of the electoral payoffs, the executive responds to the claims of the economic or political elite, which can provide the necessary resources. From the political leadership, the ones in the legislation and main parties can have indirect effects through the political institutions. Ripsman underlines that in – as he calls it – quasi democratic regimes – the foreign policy executive has to pay special attention to the military that has the capability to lead a coup against the regime. (Ripsman 2009, 183)²⁸ In these states powerful bureaucratic actors, religious leaders can also manipulate their power to obstruct to extract policy concessions. Therefore, we cannot deny the impact of these interest groups which have the power to shift public opinion, by creating a new mindset on certain issues (this can be the media groups and certain pro-agenda activist groups).

Schweller examines states' balancing behaviour from a neo-classical realist perspective. He points out that balancing described in neorealism will not happen automatically, a set of domestic factors filter the external incentive before it induces a foreign policy response. (Schweller 2004, 168-169) He posits four unit-level variables to explain states' initial foreign and security policy choices to a change in the external environment. This offers a comprehensive framework in which a wide variety of systemic and unit-level explanation of foreign policy choices and shifts of strategies can be explained. In unfolding my first hypothesis this dissertation will rely mainly on this framework. The first domestic factor or intervening variable that will affect the states' foreign policy response to the changes in the external environment is elite consensus/disagreement. This factor emphasizes the fact that states don't make decisions, but their leaders do. The elite consensus concerns the degree of shared perception about some facts

²⁸ Ripsman uses the Turkish example, where the military used its power to intervene in civil politics. He argues that especially the Islamist government had to pay attention in its foreign policy decisions to the will of the military establishment. (Ripsman 2009, 183)

in the world of a particular nature requiring certain remedies. The main question is whether the policy elites are in agreement about the shift and its nature in the external environment, if they agree about which policy remedy will be the most effective and lastly, if they are ready to take risks and costs of a decision in the domestic environment? Schweller emphasizes that in a democratic environment costly and dramatic foreign policy choices or shifts can be expected only in a state of elite consensus. In the absence of the consensus the elites will opt for suboptimal policies. (Schweller 2004, 170-173)

Schweller's second domestic factor is the regime's vulnerability. This factor answers the question, whether the governing elites face a serious non-democratic challenge from the military, the opposing parties or other powerful groups in the society. This factor reflects the state-society immediate relationship, how much power the rulers have over the ruled. In essence, the strength of the elite-mass linkages has a critical role in determining the legitimacy of the ruling regime and the viability of any policy choices made by the ruling government. Vulnerable leaders with less public support or fear of coup will be more cautious in their foreign policy responses to any major changes in the foreign policy agenda of the country. (Schweller 2004, 173-175)

Thirdly, Schweller posits the level of social cohesion in his framework as an influencing factor to the foreign policy decisions. Social cohesion does not mean the lack of disagreements or political debates inside the society. Every society has natural conflicts of interests along different political, economic, ethnic, religious lines, where the social actors pursue their own interests, which necessarily oppose other actors' interests. Social cohesion rather reflects whether members of the society support the existing institutions as legitimate and appropriate mechanisms for governing them and settling their differences. Until the moment the opposing forces question the decisions of the ruling government in the framework of the established institutional system, there is a room for manoeuvre in policy choices. However, when the opposing forces question the structure or the institutions, or their legitimate basis and the threat becomes imminent, the government will lose much of its policy making capabilities. Schweller points out that problems of social cohesion can emerge in ethnically stratified societies, where in certain minority groups are discriminated against or suppressed by the state/ruling elite. This can cause social fragmentation, which depending on its degree can influence the government's policy-making capabilities. (Schweller 2004, 175-180)

The fourth factor is the cohesion of the elite groups, the degree to which the central leadership is fragmented by internal divisions. The question reflects on the social elite's

unity behind the executive in charge (in our case the foreign policy executive). The main question here is whether there is a struggle among them for domestic political power (deeper than the democratic electoral processes)? If there is, how deep is the division between them, especially if they follow different worldviews and foreign policy strategies? (Schweller 2004, 180-181)

Neo-classical realism, as a realist theory recognises that states are the main actors of the international system. However, the state is not a “black box” that makes foreign policy decisions: it is embodied by the executive, in the Turkish case especially by the incumbent governments. The governments are not autonomous from the society, the foreign policy responses of the state come from a leadership-society interaction. The international pressures are translated through the state structure and the perceptions of the Turkish decision-makers. To answer the external constraints the Turkish leaders have to work through the domestic political institutions, mobilize certain parts of the society and maintain the interest of the important stakeholders.

As mentioned before, in neo-classical realism the state and even the decision-makers are far from being unitary; these groups are comprised of different actors. There is no agreement inside the neo-classical realist literature on which actors influence the foreign policy decisions, thus, making a comprehensive list of them would divert this research. Instead, this dissertation turns to Schweller’s argument on the domestic variables that influence the decision-making process of the foreign policy elite. He points it out that, a set of domestic factors filter the external constraints before the foreign policy outcome. The four variables are the elite consensus, the regime’s vulnerability, the social cohesion and the cohesion of the elite groups. The first and the last factors will give an answer to the question of how much the elite creates one group and how certain clashes are expected between the decision makers and other elite groups. Major changes or difficult decisions are only possible in a state of consensus of the elite groups and a certain degree of cohesion. The other two factors give a picture of how firmly the society can step up against and influence or threaten the decision-makers. The more autonomy the leadership disposes of, the more difficult foreign policy decisions it can make.

Theoretical background II. – Soft power

The first theoretical element of this study was based on neo-classical realism, or in a bigger picture, realism. In the realist literature power relations constitute the core of the explanation, scholars focus on the distribution of power either in bilateral relations or in the international system. The second and the third hypotheses bring in the so-called soft power concept, which was first developed by Joseph S. Nye.²⁹ However, the soft power theory is not an integral part of the realist literature; it deals with power relations, thus does not fall far from neo-classical realist thoughts.

Nye points out that „power is surprisingly elusive and difficult to measure”. (Nye 2011, 3) Analysts attempted to define power from different theoretical approaches, most of them did not reach a higher level of clarity with creating measurable indexes of power. The problem with these definitions is the fact that they are restrictive, they only give answer to one aspect of power. Some analyses focus on the resources of power: military capacities, economic background, population, territory or natural resources. They can give a primary answer to how chances would be in case of confrontation between two states or groups, but do not cover all the relevant types of power.³⁰ Neo-classical realists also highlighted that states give imperfect answers to international threats even though they dispose of the necessary resources. (Schweller 2004; Schweller 2009; Taliaferro 2009) Until the 20th century, the definition of power based on the equivalence of power with military capabilities and the prevalence in military conflicts was quite precise. Nevertheless, defining power as possession of capabilities or resources that influence outcomes can be misleading. (Nye 2004, 3)

Nye draws up the definition of power on several layers, covering different aspects of it. (Nye 2011, 6-10) The first aspect, defined by Dahl, is the coercive side of power. (Dahl 1957) It is about the capacity of making others act against their initial preferences and strategies, and both sides feel that power. (Nye 2011, 12) The second aspect is framing or agenda-setting; when the powerful actors frame the agenda for action, this way make other actors' preferences irrelevant or out of the frame. The third aspect of power

²⁹ Nye developed the concept of soft power and later smart power in the course of successive books and articles. The main cornerstones were: (Nye 1990; Nye 2004; Nye 2011)

³⁰ Nye enumerates a few analyses that deal with the exact definitions of power and try to create a measurable concept of it based on indexes and other tangible measurements. (Nye 2011, 4-5)

is shaping other actors' basic preferences, beliefs and perceptions according to what they will base their future decisions on. (Lukes 2005, 16-59) In this regard, the inferior actor is not necessarily aware of the power relations.³¹

Oğuzlu argues that "power is the capacity to influence other actors and shape their preferences through the possibilities in hand". (Oğuzlu 2007, 82) He defines three conditions when power comes to existence. The first requirement is that countries need to have certain assets to influence other countries. These assets can be measurable military or economic values, or less measurable ones, e.g. a respected value system or culture. The second condition is that the actors with these assets are conscious of their capabilities and are ready to capitalize on them. The third condition is equally important, that the other actors of the system realize and recognize that power. (Oğuzlu 2007, 82-83) Power is relational. (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9-11)

Nye distinguishes between hard power, soft power and their combination, smart power. He perceives power as a mixture of resources and actors' behaviour. He defines hard power as „...the use of force, payment and some agenda setting based on them". (Nye 2011, 20) In his definition „soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting the positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”³² (Nye 2011, 21)³³ Vuving creates a similar conceptual framework. In his concept, "soft power is similar to cultural influence. In the broader sense, soft power is synonymous with non-military power and includes both cultural power and economic strength." (Vuving 2009, 3) Nye differentiates between power resources and power behaviour (Nye 2011, 7) and points out that classical hard power tools can be used for soft power behaviour and soft power strategies for hard power gains. Hard and soft powers are different sides of the ability of achieving one's strategy through affecting the behaviour of others or creating changes. (Nye 2004, 7) Hard power is based on commandment, coercive or inductive behaviours, it is using force, sanctions, bribes or payments; soft power is co-optive, it is using attraction and agenda-setting, through institutions, values, culture or policies. (Nye 2004, 8) After defining the soft and hard power Nye developed the concept of smart power. He defines it „as the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies." (Nye 2011, 23) The mixture of

³¹ The second and third aspects of power are partially or fully invisible faces of power.

³² Bilgin and Eliş (2008) formulated a critical concept on Nye's theory and offered – in their terms – a more realistic analysis on the relations of soft power and hard power.

³³ Similar definition: "Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion and payment." (Nye 2008, 94)

the soft and hard power elements can create the optimal behaviours actors adopt in different power relations. In the international system it means an optimal balance of coercive behaviour based on military or economic skills and the persuasive invisible faces of power. Hard power and soft power can reinforce and hinder each other and most states would opt for the visible hard power capabilities in their power relations. Nye argues that „smart power suggests it is best to have both”. (Nye 2011, 24)

“Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but in an information age it may be the state (or nonstates) with the best story that wins.” (Nye 2011, xiii) By the 21st century several features of exercising power have changed, the once so obvious conviction that power equals with military capacities has changed. In the time of information technology, nuclear capacities and democratic political institutions it has become very costly for powers to pursue their goals through military means. Other than military (hard power) measures, states started to build on economic and soft power capacities. Looking at the use of militaries, we can see the development of their rather co-optive behaviours also on this front. Nye categorizes four modalities of how the military can be used. The first two, fighting and coercive diplomacy are hard power modalities, but alliance building, peacekeeping and military aids are in the co-optive range of the power definition. (Nye 2011, 39-48)

The soft power theory has been criticized from several angles that made Nye rethink some elements of the concept in his latest work. (Nye 2011) Especially from the Bush administration the proponents of military power were critical of his work. (Frum and Perle 2003) Ferguson dismissed Nye’s ideas with describing soft power with: “that it’s, well, soft.” (Ferguson 2003, 21) From another angle, authors criticized the conceptual unclarity of the soft power definition. Other critical point is the lack of conceptual clarity about the boundaries or the strategies of attraction (see at the end of this chapter). Nye presents the existence of attraction through different examples and the means of wielding soft power, however, does not give exact answer to how attraction is gained. Vuving tries to fill this gap with introducing the concept of the currencies of power (Vuving 2009), Oğuzlu defined legitimacy/credibility criteria. (Oğuzlu 2007) Mattern points out that Nye defines how soft power works in a relational structure, however, he does not give an answer to the starting point of attraction. Nye’s concept can describe the influence of American political values and culture, but does not explain how those became popular in the first place. (Mattern 2005, 591) She argues that attraction is created through socio-linguistical “coercion”, consequently, soft power is not so innocent anymore. Despite the

critiques of the concept and the usefulness of the soft power theory, it inspired several foreign policy changes in different countries in the world. Most importantly, from the perspective of this dissertation, Turkey embraced the concept in its foreign policy strategies.

In Nye's framework of hard power and soft power distinction economic power holds an intermediary position. "Economic resources can produce soft power behaviour as well as hard. A successful economic model not only produces the latent military resources for exercise of hard power but it can also attract others to emulate its example." (Nye 2011, 52) One of the best examples of economic soft power is the EU's political efforts in the neighbouring region, enticing their partners with their economic power. On the other hand, sanctions and threats of economic sanctions obviously belong to hard power tools. Economic power is the basis of both soft and hard power. A sound economy with export, import and investment capabilities better the perceptions of the state itself. Large economic powers set the agenda for the structure of the global (e.g. IMF, WTO or G20) or the regional setting (e.g. local economic cooperation, free trade zones, etc.). On the other hand, developed economies project reasonable soft power through their aid projects or financial credits. Companies with internationally known brands can have positive impacts on the credibility of the respective country as well. Economic power, however, is essential for hard power also creating a basis for solid military capacities or economic sanctions. (Nye 2011, 51-80)

The sources of the soft power of a country are its culture, its political values, and the conduct of foreign policy. "Culture is a set of values and practices that create meaning for a society". (Nye 2004, 11) Culture can be the first and most important element to wield attraction of other parties. It is similar to demonstrative effects; it forms the other parties' perceptions creating favourable outcomes for the first country.³⁴ The cultural appeal can be based on high or popular culture through the effects of cultural, scientific, academic, youth exchanges that generate a positive picture of the host country in the participants. Artistic performances, effects on global fashion, exhibitions, etc. can play a role of shaping the external image of the country. Popular cultural attraction can be more effective, especially in the information age. The internet, the television and the spread of mobile technical devices infiltrated the furthest point of the globe, making it possible to convey messages or have an effect on other countries, or groups in a much faster manner.

³⁴ Kirişci argues that Turkey influenced the Middle East through demonstrative effects (Kirişci 2011)

Arguably, popular cultural impacts can have important public opinion forming effects inside other groups or countries. However, as Nye warns that this is the least controllable tool in the soft power inventory, and in some instances it can produce impacts contrary to the state's political goals. (Nye 2005, 52-54) Nye argues that some of his critiques misinterpreted soft power for soft power means and resources, namely culture. (Nye 2011, 22) He emphasizes, that soft power resources (culture, mass media, popular political values, etc.) are not automatically creating soft power, it depends on the context and the agent converting the resources into behavioural outcomes.

Nye places the domestic values (belief of a certain political system, the social or economic structure and even religion) and policies as second pillar of soft power. The promotion of values or a certain political model can serve as a tool of attraction; however, it can also backfire. Forcing political values (e.g. democracy or political Islam) on other countries might have repellent effect and turn out to be counterproductive. Also double standards can seriously reduce soft power when a country is promoting its values, but in actions does not follow them. (Nye 2004, 55-60)

The third pillar of soft power is the substance and style of conducting foreign policy. Nye argues that soft power is after all, mobilizing cooperation and reaching co-optation at the end of the process without using coercive means. (Nye 2004, 60) It depends on attraction, thus policies based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of the national interests better serve this purpose. Also, policies conveying important values (e.g. promoting the political system) can serve this cause, especially if those values are shared by the receiving party. In this meaning the policies based on democracy, human rights or open market policies served as a basis for cooperation between first world countries. These broadly shared values can serve also as a soft power basis in third world countries, where the public is searching for an internal change based on these values. Providing public goods in foreign policy can be a very important soft power means. Classical tools of this type of foreign policy conduct can be the international development policies or humanitarian assistance.

An important factor in the modern environment is the abundance of information, most of the world's population is overwhelmed by the sources of information, therefore, cannot process all of it. The "paradox of plenty" created the scarcity of attention (Nye 2005, 106), creating a new barrier before building up soft power. Attraction can be created only by credible sources of information; a new competition emerged, the competition for

credibility. Governments, states are in competition for being the most credible sources, politics partially became: “whose story wins”? (Mueller 1989)

Soft power works better in a similar cultural setting, if there are shared values that attraction can be built on. Executing power is understood in relational framework, and especially soft power depends on “willing interpreters and receivers”. (Nye 2005, 16)³⁵ However, the outcome of the investment is less tangible and does not involve immediate effects, which can cause partial disinterests from the investors’ side”. Another problem of soft power is that it is less effective in countries where power is concentrated and the government disregards the public opinion (e.g. autocracies, dictatorships). Soft power, contrary to military or economic power can only have an influence on the other countries’ general goals, but not on specific policies or particular goals. Another important shortcoming is its very nature that it is not in full control of the government. Civil society actors, NGOs, churches, private companies and even individuals can enhance a country’s soft power or undercut it. (Nye 2004, 15-18)

After the main pillars of soft power it is time to take stock of the tools that states use to wield soft power³⁶. Contrary to coercive means of action, gaining military or economic power, wielding soft power is less tangible and vaguer. The first two can achieve their desired (or in some cases unintended) outcomes as results of certain actions in a reasonable period of time, however, soft power is different in this respect. Since soft power does not exist in an absolute measurable manner, it materializes in relational situations, thus its effects are subject to many distortions. Most soft power means are only partially under control of the state, and they depend on the reception of the audience. They work indirectly through shaping the public opinion or the perceptions, thus they have to be long term investments for the governments. However, it can be undermined very fast. (Nye 2005, 99-100) With a metaphor, wielding soft power is like building a house from domino tiles: it takes a long time, but can be destroyed easily by a wrong move.

³⁵ The relational feature of power is highlighted by Barnett and Duvall (2005, 9-11)

³⁶ The following part is based on Nye’s theory, however other explanations exist as well. Vuving’s categorization of soft power tools is similar, in his conceptual framework he builds up three levels of attraction: benignity brilliance and beauty. (Vuving 2009, 8-9) Government policies promoting multilateralism, development aid and humanitarian assistance are the straightforward tools that can be categorized in the acts of benignity that is created through gratitude and sympathy. Brilliance is the category, where soft power is generated through the admiration of the production and power. In this category Vuving enumerates economic and military successes, domestic stability and other features that can create attraction. The last category, beauty is based on the power of inspiration, when a country’s values system, normative foreign and domestic political acts create the soft power. (Vuving 2009, 14-15)

With a top-down approach the first elements of hard power will be analysed. A country's military can create credibility and convey power, thereby creating attention and attraction from other parties. If hard (military) power is overwhelming or it is used contrary to the claimed political values and goals, it can undercut the soft power. A country with a relatively strong military position can play a regional (or even global) peacemaker role, sending in its military to crisis zones or to peacekeeping missions. Another possibility is using its hard power resources (military personnel, advanced technology and experience) in training missions or helping in other countries as advisors. Joint military exercises or military missions in third-country destinations can also contribute to the rise of soft power. Advanced military capabilities and expertise can be an important source of credibility, but as it is in the case of the US the extent of the military edge undercuts its soft power.

As mentioned earlier, economic power plays an intermediary role in the soft power and hard power continuum. The role of economic power is very important in "country branding" and agenda-setting. Economic power is needed as a tool to penetrate other countries' markets and build up business-to-business connections. The governments' role is to enable its own companies to develop and help their foreign operations, and, on the other hand, create favourable environment for foreign businesses. The companies can bring a positive picture and thus create attraction towards the home country. The positive picture built on economic tools is an important source of the "self-esteem"³⁷ of the country and enhances its development. Economic power is key to external influence, according to some scholars more important than military power. This enables a country to become an influential actor and increasingly affect the "rules of the game". Through cooperative or co-optive (bilateral and multilateral frameworks) and coercive (sanctions) means a wide range of tools exist to influence the behaviour of other countries and to create favourable outcomes.

From the clearly co-optive tools of wielding soft power the foremost plausible one is public diplomacy³⁸. Public diplomacy has a comprehensive literature analysing different aspects of it. Public diplomacy is "understanding, informing and influencing foreign publics". (Krause and Van Evera 2009, 109) Most important part of this process is the production, distribution, control and filtration of the information. At the end of the

³⁷ On the relation of economic development and growing self-esteem see: (Kalin 2011)

³⁸ On public diplomacy several books and study collections were published. On the theory of public diplomacy see: (Melissen 2005; Lennon 2002, Simon-Nagy 2012, Hansen 1984)

process public diplomacy is an active action building up a strategic language of communication based on facts. Public diplomacy, unlike classical diplomacy goes beyond official communication of officials, diplomats and their foreign partners. Public diplomacy being a soft power tool can be distinguished in two types: the state-to-public and the public-to-public frameworks. (Krause and Van Evera 2009, 109) In the first version the state aims to influence other states' public (in Nye's definition this the indirect manifestation of soft power). The second framework means a complex and indirect way of influencing the public of the other state, through generating interaction with the state's own public. This can happen through enhancing civil society connections, NGO relations, cultural and academic exchanges, etc. According to Kalin, "public diplomacy is a dynamic and multidimensional communication process". (Kalin 2011, 11)

Nye divides the communication process into three dimensions. (Nye 2004, 105-118) The first dimension is the daily communication that is the immediate explanation of policy, especially reflecting on foreign policy decisions to the public. This involves crisis prevention and media responses to delicate situations. This dimension involves also the explanation of decisions on domestic politics both to internal and external audiences.³⁹ Nye's second dimension is strategic communication, which involves midterm campaign, thematic communication panels and purposive image building. The thematic communication campaigns' focus most of the times built on policy initiatives, such as the pre-emptive explanation of difficult foreign policy decisions. The third dimension is the long term image building, the development of lasting relationships with individuals and groups. This dimension can be reached through exchanges, trainings, seminars, focusing on certain groups. Public diplomacy works in a relational framework, thus the state after conveying messages also has to listen to the answers and change its strategic accordingly. The best way to make an impact is to understand the target audience, sort out the possible shared values and build on them. In a sense, public diplomacy incorporates the communication of the three pillars of soft power. According to Ross, Public diplomacy is "winning hearts and minds, making friends and influencing enemies, building the policy context..." (Ross 2002, 253) Promotions of political values and value-based foreign policy are less effective without the necessary communication strategies⁴⁰. Also, the fine-

³⁹ Leonard underlines the importance of the latter. In his opinion governments don't pay enough attention to it, this way sometimes undercutting their soft power. (Leonard 2002)

⁴⁰ On the possibilities of acquiring attraction see: (Kaufman 2002; Blinken 2002)

tuning, or cultural diplomacy contribute highly to the effective soft power building through the cultural assets of the country.

However, as a soft power means, public diplomacy has several shortcomings. It cannot be effective if the “product” it is selling is widely unpopular, or there is serious dissonance between the communication and the facts on the ground.⁴¹ (Nye 2004, 110) The cost and payoffs relation is also problematic, effective public diplomacy is a long term investment with results that can only pay off in years. (Nye 2004, 113; Simon-Nagy 2012, 63) The other problem is that the messages go through interpretations, and the channels can be hardly controlled by the governments (television, internet). The government is only one player of public diplomacy and cannot directly affect its civil society actors’ or companies’ communications. However, non-governmental actors can play a crucial part in a country’s public diplomacy raising (or downgrading) its credibility. (Nye 2004, 113-114) A trustworthy brand name, a famous NGO with an international presence can have very important effects in line with the governmental goals.

Development aid and humanitarian assistance are separate tools from public diplomacy⁴² for three reasons: First, development aid is in-between economic power and soft power, thus cannot be regarded as a clear soft power category (like public diplomacy). Secondly, development aid can be used in a more straightforward manner: the audience can be better targeted, thus the outcome is more expectable. Development aid gives greater visibility inside the target audience, therefore it is better at creating positive influences on the outcomes. The third reason is that, development aid can be further enhanced with public diplomacy means and strategic communication. Development aid became one of the most important tools of influencing other countries in the last few decades.

Neither Nye nor other authors have specified the concrete definition of soft power, consequently, have not provided a comprehensive list of soft power means. Different authors prioritize these tools differently with an open end to the list. This dissertation also leaves the list open for any policy (especially foreign policy) actions with the potential of generating soft power. The chapter verifying the second hypothesis will devote special attention to the peace-making feature of the Turkish foreign policy⁴³, which involves both

⁴¹ This involves the double standards, where for example the US government claimed democracy promotion, but on the other hand left autocratic leaders on top of the countries.

⁴² Similar categorization of soft power tools: (Balogh et al 2013)

⁴³ Several studies dealt with the peace-making as a tool of soft power for Turkey: e.g. (Balogh et al 2013; Balogh 2009; Fidan 2013; Kirişci, Tocci and Walker 2010)

military and civilian elements. For a certain period Turkey used its political-economic influence to affect the regional agenda and duly create a stable regional environment. One important tool was its mediation efforts in different regional conflicts.

Methodology and resources of research

Having established the three hypotheses of this dissertation it is inevitable to give a thorough outline of the methodological background and foundations of this research. The most important task here is to apply the theoretical background in the context of the Turkish foreign policy and to give an explanation to the main research question: on what basis has the Turkish foreign policy transformed? According to the theoretical framework, created by Randall Schweller, the external independent factors are processed inside a country and influence the decision-makers of foreign policy. Applying this theory in the Turkish context the following factors must be taken into account:

Chart 1.: Factors of analysis in the dissertation

Factors of analysis in the dissertation				
Independent variable	Changes in the external environment of Turkey			
Type of the external incentive		security-related	economy-related	political
Nature of the changes	threat or opportunity			
Dependent variables	elite consensus	elite cohesion	social cohesion	regime's vulnerability
Factors examined by the dissertation	homogeneity of the governing political elite group	competition of the Kemalist and the newly emerged devout Muslim political elite groups	relationship of the Kemalist and the devout Muslim social groups	political legitimacy of the leadership, the political support from the society
	relationship between the governing political elite with the business and the military elite	relationship between the old and the new business elite groups	relationship of the majority of the Turkish society and the Kurdish minority	military's role in questioning the government's legitimacy
		military as an independent factor		

As it was described, the dissertation analyses the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in three different periods. The three hypotheses underline that the changes are influenced both by external and internal factors. The external environment constitutes the independent variable throughout all three periods. However, it must be described here, what the main factors are that the dissertation pays attention to, in relation to the external

incentives of Turkish foreign policy. Every state is influenced by certain factors from the external environment, but in their foreign policy they are most sensitive to security-related, economic and political incentives. These external influences may be categorized into two main groups: the threats or challenges that the state must give an answer to in order to provide its own existential or economic security; and the opportunities, in case a country has the possibility to gain security, economic turnover or political influence.

In the first period of the analysis (from the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the beginning of the 2000s), the main external factor was the environment created by the Cold War that brought a certain level of both threat and predictability in the system. With the end of the Cold War the external environment lost its stability and several security threats emerged both in the economic and the political-military spectrum. Turkey lost from its geopolitical significance that it had possessed earlier; the external environment claimed a growing activity from the Turkish leadership in order to guarantee the interests of the country and its security.

The second period of the analysis focuses on the new challenges and the opportunities in the Middle East, that emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. Iraq meant both a serious security threat and a power vacuum that generated regional competition, as well as an opportunity. At the same time the strengthening civilizational discourse in the West vis-à-vis the Muslim world made it possible for Turkey to see a more cooperative face of majority of the countries in the Middle East. On the other hand, the positive responses from the EU until 2006 triggered important internal changes in Turkey and later the slow-down in the negotiations spurred the Eastern turn for Turkish foreign policy. The challenges and the opportunities created an environment, where Turkey could become a strong regional factor.

The third and shortest period of examination is the one which covers the period of the Arab Spring. After 2011, the external environment in the immediate vicinity of Turkey flamed up. The series of demonstrations and the regime changes in the region brought serious economic, political and security threats. The instabilities questioned the good cooperation with certain countries and the evolving civil wars in Syria and Libya meant very real security threats. On the other hand, the Arab Spring held out the hopes of expanding Turkey's regional power position and influence.

Following the chosen theory, the external environment creates the independent variables that influence several internal factors. The foreign policy decision-makers are affected by the dependent variables in the domestic arena. Looking at the domestic

environment of Turkey following Schweller's four factors – not necessarily in the order of Schweller's logic – are applied. From the point of view of the social cohesion, the transformation inside the society during the period of examination has a significant influencing power on the policy makers understanding and perceiving the newly arising foreign policy considerations. The Turkish society is not homogenous, it has strong cleavages; the strongest fault-line is along cultural and religious differences. The first element that the dissertation examines in all three periods of the analysis is how the relationship between the secular, mainly Kemalist groups is formed in antagonism to the conservative, devout Muslim groups. Their power balance and different interests has a strong effect on the understanding of the external environment and the foreign policy responses. Their power balance is not only influenced from the inside but from the external environment as well: through the EU's and the West's decision to support or reject and the proneness of cooperation by the Eastern partner countries. In this context the other fault-line that influences the Turkish decision-makers is the relationship between the regime and the Kurds, as well as between the majority of the Turkish population and the Kurdish minority.

The cleavage on the religious and cultural line has existed in Turkey on the elite level as well. The Turkish society is built up on an elitist and exclusive social structure. The elites are originally distanced from the rest of society. For decades, the Kemalist elite groups held on to all political positions and they controlled the most important segments of the economy. With the transformation of the society a new devout Muslim elite started to emerge. The competitive relationship between the old and the new elite groups defines the elite cohesion in Turkey and their relative power changes affect Turkey's foreign policy orientation. The military gives an unavoidable element in the analysis of the fraction between the elite groups. The military regards itself as the protector of Kemalism and as such, the values and existence of the republic and with reference to these notions initiated four interventions or coups. The military created its own political role and institutions thereby became unavoidable in the strategic questions, including foreign policy orientation.

The expansion of the institutional autonomy of the military became a tool of reducing civil control. As a result, the regime's vulnerability relied partially on the military's will and the power to remove the incumbent government. The dissertation examines the military's role also from this perspective, how much they could intervene in different periods against the regime's political decisions. The regime's vulnerability is

also examined through the political support of the political groups in power. Their political legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of society creates an indication of their room for manoeuvre in foreign policy.

Last, it is also important to understand and examine, to what extent the governing elite group is hindered by its own internal fractures and how much the decision-makers can agree on the main policy lines. In the Turkish context, two questions became interesting; first, the consensus inside the political governing elite groups and their own relations with the military; second, the relations of the business and the political elite.

This dissertation uses qualitative analysis to describe the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The choice of topic makes this approach essential, yet inevitable, since a quantitative analysis of both external and internal factors would make the basis of the main arguments far-fetched and artificial. Another reason for this is that the variables used by this work are hardly quantifiable. The qualitative analysis covers different areas to fulfil the purpose of this research:

Analysis of primary resources:

Political discourses of decision makers: Before the AKP government stepped into power in 2002, the basis of the new foreign policy vision had been settled in different scholarly works of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, who started his political career as a political advisor to PM Erdoğan. During his political career he elaborated on a new foreign policy course, which became accentuated in his book, different articles and his public speeches. Davutoğlu, being one of the most important masterminds behind the new Turkish foreign policy: “the zero problems with the neighbours” policy, the regional ambitions and the soft power concept of Turkey, made a clear vision for the foreign policy decision-makers and as a decision-maker since 2009, he followed the path he had developed himself. Consequently, one important element of this research is to analyse the most important works of Davutoğlu. It is equally important to take into account the enouncements of the main foreign-policy decision-makers in Turkish foreign policy, especially PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Following their officially released discourses and their translations in the media, a clear picture can be drawn on the development of Turkish foreign policy.

Official Documents: Turkish foreign policy strategy and vision is well documented on the official websites of the President's and the Prime minister's Office and most importantly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Media sources: Turkish media covers and comments the most important changes in Turkish politics and gives a clear picture on the public's perception of these events.

Analysis of secondary sources:

Journals, books, sociological and political research: As pointed out earlier, there is an abundance of works and research analyses on Turkish foreign policy. However, these documents, books and articles generally cover different aspects of Turkish policy decisions or transformation. Nevertheless, these works are carefully selected from the most well-known authors and credible sources in order to represent a high standard of research.

Interviews and discussions with experts on Turkish foreign policy: The author had the chance to discuss his research ideas and development of his dissertation during the time he spent in Israel with internationally recognized scholars from the Gloria Center ⁴⁴ in Tel Aviv University and the INSS⁴⁵ institute. Besides, the discussions with Hungarian experts gave an important basis for the structural foundations of this work.

Conferences on Turkish foreign policy: Recognizing the growing regional and global importance of Turkey, numerous conferences have been organized in this subject.

The dissertation aims at addressing three causally interconnected questions on the transformation and later the regional ambitions of Turkish foreign policy. Three from the four subsequent chapters of the dissertation follow the same logic, the backbone of the argumentation is Neo-Classical Realism:

- What are the main external influences, pressures, and opportunities created by the international system? How do these affect Turkey and the Turkish decision-makers?
- What are the most important factors in the domestic arena in Turkey, what are the elite's and the society's reactions to the challenges outside? What are the main

⁴⁴ Global Research in International Affairs that publishes two of the most important academic journals on Turkey and the Middle East: Turkish Studies and Middle East Review on International Affairs.

⁴⁵ The Institute for National Security Studies.

underlying factors of the reactions of Turkish foreign policy in the examined period?

- How are the external and the internal factors interconnected?

For the growing regional influence and the strengthening foreign policy ambitions of Turkey a new theoretical tool was introduced: soft power. To understand the growing ambitions of the Turkish government after the second half of the 2000s this theory will be used. A separate chapter will be devoted to analyse the new foreign policy concept of Ahmet Davutoğlu and its use in practice. The following questions will be answered in this chapter:

- What are the main pillars of the new and active Turkish foreign policy? How did Davutoğlu's ideas revitalize Turkish foreign policy?
- What are the soft power tools used by the Turkish decision makers?
- For being a soft power, is it inevitable that other partners accept these ambitions?
- Factors contributing to the soft power ambitions of Turkey: are the ambitions feasible? Which are the strong and weak points of Turkish influence in the Middle East?

II. From quietist to active foreign policy

Overview of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East

After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the first sixty years of the republic brought a significant change in the foreign policy orientation of Turkey. The Ottoman Empire, once a glorious global and regional power in the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and parts of Eurasia turned into a nation state with an introverted foreign policy. The first periods of state-(and nation-) building required relative external stability, best achievable through self-isolation. Mufti argues that Atatürk's call for „peace at home” meant the promotion of a cohesive national identity to forestall civil upheavals and deny foreign powers the opportunity to build up a strong influence in vulnerable times. (Mufti 2009, 21) The isolationist foreign policy of the republican new elite – legitimized by the domestic efforts and the sharp rupture with the Ottoman past – made it possible to detach the country from any external obligations and to reorganize its foreign relations both with the European powers and its immediate vicinity.

The foreign policy transformation meant effective isolation; the Kemalist leadership concentrated its external connections to the lowest minimum of necessary diplomatic or foreign actions in the first two decades, in order to deal with the residual issues after WW I and provide security for Turkey. These policies spared Turkey from being dragged into WW II; Prime Minister Ismet İnönü manoeuvred out of the pressures to join any sides and actively get engaged in war. (Mufti 2009, 25-26) After the transformation to the multiparty system and the first democratic elections, the main characteristic remained foreign policy passivity, with certain periods of partial activity. The first period was characterized by the governments of the DP rule under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. (Göktepe) The systemic (security) constraints in the Cold War environment necessitated Turkey's accession to the NATO and this way to the Western bloc. Under the NATO umbrella the Menderes governments initiated a foreign policy opening, focusing mainly on the Middle East. But the Kemalist security regime regarded this adventurous and risky and removed Menderes from his position in a military coup in 1960. Two decades of relative seclusion followed due to domestic political, economic and social crises. Deliberate and strategically planned foreign policy returned only after 1983 with Prime Minister (and later President) Turgut Özal. During his period the Turkish

foreign policy opened towards the neighbouring areas and at the same time European integration became a priority. (Laçiner 2009) However, these signs of activism are not comparable to the level of the current foreign policy activism. The Cold War environment, the geopolitical location of Turkey, the gradually growing internal capabilities and the strong military control of the strategic decisions all restrained the governments' foreign policy opportunities. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey started an internal soul searching, a redefinition of the regional importance of the country in a new geopolitical environment. At the same time, Turkish leaders had to deal with the external security threats of the different wars and tensions in the neighbouring regions (Gulf war, the Armenian-Azeri conflict, the Yugoslav war). In this new security environment Özal's ambition was to build a regional political influence, however, Turkey did not have the capabilities yet to claim regional leadership in either of the neighbouring regions. (Hale 1994, 276-287; Laçiner 2009) The first Islamist government of the republic's history, led by Necmettin Erbakan brought a new idea of foreign policy, which was used for foreign policy initiatives contrary to the military's will and the traditional Turkish foreign policy orientation.⁴⁶ The Erbakan government managed to start a few initiatives of mainly Islamist orientation, however, the 1997 coup meant a clear cut and a return to a lower level of foreign policy activity until 2002.

This dissertation does not offer a full overview of the history of the Turkish Republic's foreign policy history,⁴⁷ its main focus is Turkey's regional role in the Middle East. Consequently, this section focuses on the patterns of Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world and other non-Arab countries in the region. Murinson coined Turkey as „a Middle Eastern regional power that chose to reject its region and its past in favour of the West and Europe.” (Murinson 2012, 3) After the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic the Kemalist elite, the political leadership viewed the Arab countries with distrust. They could not recover from the shock, which was caused by the Arab revolts and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The permanent suspicion against the Arab elites that „stabbed the knife in the back of the Turks” was enhanced by the Sévres treaty after WW I ⁴⁸, which created a haunting perception in the Turkish elite about the

⁴⁶ On the foreign policy of the Erbakan period see: (Bilgin 2008; Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 130-136)

⁴⁷ For History of modern Turkish foreign policy see: (Hale 2013; Hale 1994; Bozdağlioğlu 2004)

⁴⁸ The Treaty of Sévres was intended to be the peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies at the end of WW I. It was never ratified and thus aborted. However, this treaty became the root of a popular belief in Turkey, namely that some outside forces are conspiring to carve up Turkey. On the Sévres Syndrome see: (Göçek 2001, 98-184)

immediate environment of their country. The Kemalist elite viewed the Ottoman rule and engagement in the Balkans and the Middle East as disastrous that nearly ended in the demise of the modern Turkish state. (Murinson 2012, 3) At the same time, the Kemalist elite's decision to break with the Ottoman past meant that they distanced Turkey from the most important element of its identity, Islam. In the strictly secular Turkish Republic, Islam did not have a role anymore, as the early Kemalist elite viewed Muslim countries with suspicion and despise. Interestingly, instead of building on Turkey's embeddedness in the Muslim Middle East, using its cultural, historical, economic ties Turkey turned its eyes only towards the West and fenced itself off from its neighbours. Choosing the path of Westernization meant strict isolation in Turkish foreign policy history. „The design of republican Turkey was to become identified as European.” (Bozdağlıoğlu 2004, 58) In order to receive recognition as a European state Turkey gave up its neutrality, its guiding principle for decades. After the announcement of the Truman-doctrine, Turkey rapidly became an integral part of the Western alliance joining the OECD, the Council of Europe and the NATO.

The Middle East was seen by the elite as a zone that must be stayed away from. Except for a short period in the 1950s Turkey kept low profile in its relations with the Middle East until the mid-1980s. The four guiding principles of the Middle East policy that can be designated as the “İnönü doctrine” were built on the maximum distance possible from the Arab states. The first principle was reservation from all states and interference in their internal affairs. The second, neutrality was set up to avoid getting into any conflicts in the Middle East or getting identified with any particular interests in the region. As a result of the regional territorial resettlements in the 20th century and the “Sèvres Syndrome” the third principle became being a status quo power, opposing any attempts of revision in the territorial disposition. The fourth principle was compartmentalization, the clear isolation of the Middle East from the West in the Turkish foreign policy making. (Mufti 2009, 31-32) Turkey did not fear aggression from the Middle East, the distance was rather built up in order to avoid being dragged into any conflicts of the region, especially between Israel and the Palestinians. (Kıbaroğlu and Kıbaroğlu, 2009, 34.)

In the Cold War period Turkey aligned with the West, while two of its neighbours Syria and Iraq became proxies of the Soviet Union. This strategic decision further deepened the mutual distrust between the sides. Turkey's non-interference in the region

– putting aside the territorial agreements in the first two decades ⁴⁹ - was first distorted in 1947, when Turkey had to be involved in the vote on the UN resolution on the partition of Palestine. Turkey voted together with the Arab countries against the partition, because of the fear of a possible new socialist country in the making in Turkey's backyard. (Araş 2000; Bozdağlıoğlu 2004, 116-117) However, Turkey was among the first ones to recognize Israel, which was a further blow to Turkish-Arab relations, as the Arab countries regarded this act as treason. On the other hand, the Turkish leadership wanted to emphasize the country's Western credentials, thus the recognition was a pragmatic decision on the way entering the West and leaving the East behind. (Bozdağlıoğlu 2004, 116-117)

After the first multiparty elections Adnan Menderes led the DP to power in 1950 against all military intentions. Menderes believed that he had to aim at a certain degree of activism in foreign policy, so that Turkey could prove its value to its Western allies. (Bozdağlıoğlu 2004, 117) The pan-Arab movements and the fight against the colonial powers would have made it possible for Turkey to build a strategic relationship with its neighbours, based on historic-cultural ties and most of all Islam. However, the insistence to coordinate with Western (post-) colonial powers and the diplomatic relations with Israel enhanced the distrust from the Arab regimes. In the Cold War environment the Turkish leaders perceived the Soviet Union as the biggest threat and made diplomatic steps towards the Arab countries trying to line them up against the Soviet penetration. The Egyptian rejection of the British initiated Middle East Defence Organization and later the Baghdad Pact in 1955 clearly signalled the limits of any foreign policy endeavour in the region. Even though the Baghdad Pact was aimed at a security alliance, it rather destabilized the Turkish neighbourhood by strengthening the animosity between Iraq on the one side and Egypt and Syria on the other. In the following years every Turkish decision⁵⁰ regarding the Middle East tried to demonstrate its alliance with the West. The Baghdad Pact caused further loss of credibility for Turkey, which was seen as a representative of the Western interests in the heart of their region. The Baghdad Pact,

⁴⁹ After the establishment of the republic a few territorial issues remained to be resolved: the dispute between Syria and Turkey on the province of Hatay (Alexandretta) and the dispute between Iraq and Turkey on Mosul were resolved only after years of negotiation. (Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu 2009, 25-30)

⁵⁰ in 1955 Turkey stood against the Non-Aligned group, sided with the West in the Lebanese crisis, pushed for intervention in Syria in 1958, stationed groups on the border at the time of the military coup in Iraq in 1958 (Bozdağlıoğlu 2004, 119)

however, lost its importance in 1958, with Iraq's decision to pull out from the treaty.⁵¹ (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 116-119; Hale 2013, 78-103)

The military coup against the Menderes government, which led to the execution of the Prime Minister himself, triggered a reassessment in Turkey and the elite declared the regional foreign policy activism to be a failure. They admitted the impossibility of any defence cooperation with the Arab states and Turkey returned to the guidelines of the İnönü doctrine for the next two and a half decades and concentrated on Westward foreign policy initiatives. The general view in Turkey was that the Baghdad Pact had been a fiasco that caused serious disappointment both in the Turkish political elite and the public. (Mufti 2009, 42) Not surprisingly, Turkey strengthened the European orientation in its foreign policy and signed the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community. However, several incidents caused disillusionment with the Western powers. These events took place parallel with the Turkish domestic political changes leading to the emergence of the Islamist parties.⁵² 1965 brought about the first sign of change. Externally, the erupting Cyprus conflict left Turkey without its Western allies, and even the Arab countries sided with the Greeks.⁵³ Domestically, a new, conservative and rural political elite started to emerge that did not distance itself entirely from the relations with the Arab regimes.⁵⁴ With the election of the conservative Süleyman Demirel as Prime Minister in 1965, a slight change in Turkey's Middle East policy started to materialize. At the same time, Turkish policy towards the region was cautious and was led by the principle of non-interference. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 120) The first signs were visible in the Arab-Israeli conflict, where Turkey loosened the pro-Israeli stance and rather sided with the Arab interests. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Turkey opposed Israel's occupation of the Arab territories and in 1967 and 1973 did not let the US use the NATO bases inside Turkey for shipping arms to Israel. Later, in 1975 Turkey voted positively on the UN General Assembly resolution designating Zionism to be a kind of racism. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 123; Mufti 2009, 42)

⁵¹ The pact was turned into an ineffective organization, called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) that was dissolved after the 1979 Iranian revolution.

⁵² On the emergence of the Islamist parties the dissertation will further elaborate on.

⁵³ In 1963 the Greek Cypriot archbishop, President Makarios III threatened to change the constitution of Cyprus to a new one underlining the Greek rule. This caused intercommunal violence. In 1964 Turkey threatened to intervene in Cyprus but after strong warnings from the United States used only air power in support of the Turkish communities. After the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974 the US stopped arms shipment to Turkey.

⁵⁴ The dissertation will further elaborate on this question.

In the 1950s, the Turkish position in the Middle East was rather a reflection of the Turkish role in the Western alliance, because the Turkish leaders rather focused on fulfilling the Western expectations. In the 1960s the situation changed, the Turkish-Western alliance weakened over the Cyprus conflict, and the Islamists emerged as a remarkable political force on the domestic front. This approach strengthened from the 1970s and Turkey started to initiate relations with Third World countries. It joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1976 as a full member and gave permission to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to open an office in Ankara. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 126) After the military coup in 1980, Turkey became isolated from the West ⁵⁵ that pushed Turkey towards its own neighbourhood, mainly the Arab countries. However, the military and the Kemalist diplomatic corps tried to adhere to the İnönü Doctrine. (Mufti 2009, 57) The Muslim conservative background of the elected prime minister, Turgut Özal ⁵⁶ from 1983 strengthened the background of an “Arab opening” even further. The president, Kenan Evren visited the 1984 OIC Summit. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 127) Following these developments the fear emerged that Turkey will turn to the East and abandon its relations with the West. Giving up bilateral relations with Israel would have ultimately created a special relationship between the Arabs and Turkey. However, it was not in Turkey’s interest; in reality this was out of the question for any Turkish governments. ⁵⁷ The fact that they downgraded the Turkish-Israeli ties to the lowest level was more of a reflection of Israel’s act of challenging the regional status quo. ⁵⁸ Turkey always emphasized the importance of the existence of Israel, and at the same time too much involvement in the Arab affairs and Islamic solidarity would have contradicted secularism. Turkey joined the OIC only with reservations to some points in the Charter of the organization. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 126) With the emergence of the Kurdish question in the 1980s Turkey could not hold up the İnönü Doctrine in its full form, and got pulled into the conflicts of the region. Kurdish nationalism flamed up after the 1979 revolution in Iran and with the Iraq-Iran war from 1980, which created a power

⁵⁵ The European Community (EC) decided to suspend the Ankara Agreement officially and therefore froze its political relations with Turkey as a result of the military coup d’état on September 12, 1980. The European Parliament also decided not to renew the European wing of the Joint Parliamentary Commission until a general election being held and a parliament established in Turkey (Erdemli 2004, 4). The US was also critical towards Turkey.

⁵⁶ Turgut Özal’s origins differed from most of the political elite. He was born in Malatya in a Conservative Muslim Anatolian town (Mufti 2009, 58)

⁵⁷ On Turkish-Israeli relations see: (Araş 2000)

⁵⁸ In 1980 Israel declared Jerusalem the unified capital of the Jewish State, in 1982 waged a war in Lebanon.

vacuum in Northern Iraq. The Turkish policies in Eastern Anatolia ⁵⁹ enhanced the tensions between the state and the Kurdish population, which resulted in the start of the Kurdish insurgency. Since 1984 more than 40 000 people have died in the military clashes between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurdistan Worker's Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – PKK).

The Turkish leaders always emphasized their desire to be part of the West and continue the integration process. Even though Turgut Özal represented the Anatolian, Muslim conservative identity, his sympathy towards the West was much stronger than any attempt to strengthen the relations in the Arab world. He had a strong belief in the Western political system, technological advancement and industrial development. Nevertheless his identity also influenced his views on Turkey and the region: he often came up with the proposal of being a bridge between the West and the Middle East. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 129) Özal initiated the accession process to the European Community in 1987. (Erdemli, 2004, 4) The economic consideration was of primary importance in Turkey's approach towards the Middle East. Supporting the Anatolian entrepreneurs' and business interests, Özal created incentives also to expand to the East. (Laçiner 2009) The gradually rising Anatolian businessmen took this opportunity to make investments in the region and boost their export capacities. This attempt was quite successful until the second half of the 1980s, when the regional instabilities curbed (Kurdish insurgency, end of the Iraq-Iran war, later the Gulf War) the Turkish ambition towards the East.

Suddenly, after the end of the Cold War Turkey lost from its strategic importance in the eyes of the West. Sensing these changes, Özal started to pursue a new foreign policy line towards the neighbouring regions. During the Gulf Crisis Turkey abandoned its decades long neutrality towards the issues of the region. He believed that participation in the Western alliance's efforts in the crisis could prove the strategic importance of Turkey once again and at the same time increase its chance to be admitted to the European integration. (Laçiner 2009) This caused serious domestic political problems, since most of the political forces, including the military leadership disapproved of Turkey's involvement in the military operation in Iraq. The opposition considered Özal's decision adventurous that pulls Turkey in the "swamp of the Middle East". During the war, a strong influx of (mainly Kurdish) refugees occurred, and the decrease in cross border trade was

⁵⁹ Especially the decision on the Eastern Anatolia Project: a water dam complex in the areas mainly populated by Kurds.

deterioration for the Eastern Anatolian region. Saddam Hussein in retaliation began to arm the outlawed PKK. Turkey's involvement in the conflict did not contribute to the Turkish accession to the European Union, but cost at least 20 billion USD. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 129-130)

Turkish foreign policy was influenced by two contradicting domestic factors in the 1990s. From one side, the military started to gain momentum based on several military deals as an effect of the Gulf War. The military basically created its own structures for foreign policy making and showed readiness to be engaged with the US and Israel in the Middle East. (Mufti 2009, 92) The second factor was the emergence of the Islamists. The Islamist element had been strongly present since the 1970s, however, it became especially strong during the 1990s.⁶⁰ It was exclusively connected to this Islamic appeal that Turkey turned its eyes towards the Muslim communities in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The rise of the Islamist oriented Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) was a clear sign of these developments. During the 1994 elections the RP received most of the votes in important cities of Turkey⁶¹. In terms of foreign policy they advocated for stronger relations with the Middle East and followed through on an anti-West and anti-Israel rhetoric. The leader of the RP, Necmettin Erbakan was inaugurated as Prime Minister in June 1996. (Yavuz 1997, 73) During his almost a year-long premiership he made fundamental changes in Turkey's foreign policy orientation.

Parallel and in contradiction to the efforts of the Kemalist deputy Prime Minister Tansu Çiller from the conservative True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi – DYP) who tried to convince the West about Turkey's Western orientation, Erbakan initiated an important reorientation in the country's foreign policy. His first official visit led to Iran, where he signed an agreement on the purchase of 20 billion worth of natural gas. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 135-136) He visited several Muslim countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He ambioned a new role of Turkey in the East and tried to pursue an activist foreign policy. He initiated the Developing Eight, or D – 8, that would have been the tally of the G 8 cooperation. Turkey advocated for the lifting of the embargo against Iraq and Iran. Erbakan kept foreign policy in his own hands and formed it according to the party's ideological stance. (Bilgin 2008) However, Erbakan miscalculated the power of the Kemalist elite, especially the military. He knew that his plan needed to be gradual, thus

⁶⁰ For the history of modern Turkish foreign policy see (Hale 2013; Hale 1994; Bozdağlioğlu 2004)

⁶¹ The RP received almost one-fifth of the votes and gave mayors for major cities such as Istanbul or Ankara. (Yavuz 1997 70-71)

he tried not to deteriorate the relations with the West and not even with Israel. In fact, during the 1990s the Turkish-Israeli relations were flourishing, powered by the bilateral military agreements. (Araş 2000; Altunısık 2000; Inbar 2001, 120) The army disapproved of the new foreign policy orientation of Turkey. Erbakan not only pursued a foreign policy following Islamist ideas, but also embraced Iran and Syria, which heavily supported the PKK. (Mufti 2009, 126) The military used political, economic and legal tools to force the Erbakan government's resignation, which happened in June 1997.⁶² Despite the attempts of the RP, the relationship between Turkey and other Muslim countries did not improve, but rather deteriorated. After the resignation of Erbakan the military openly expressed its disapproval of the country's relationship with other, mainly Muslim countries.

Between 1997 and 2002, the frequently changing coalitions did not follow a unified line of foreign policy in the region. First the Mesut Yılmaz's⁶³, then Bülent Ecevit's governments⁶⁴ returned to the "Inönü Doctrine". Turkey tried to balance its relations in the Middle East, starting to tone down the contacts with Israel and to mediate disputes with the neighbouring countries. Still signing important military agreements with Israel the Turkish diplomacy tried not to exaggerate the Israeli friendship. This became manifest especially after the second intifada broke out in the Palestinian Territories in 2000. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit accused Israel of genocide in 2002. (Mufti 2009, 144) A serious military conflict was about to break out in 1998 with Syria over the water distribution of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. After a few-days long military stand-off at the borders, the two countries came to an agreement and Syria exiled Abdullah Öcalan the military leader of the PKK. (Sezgin 2002) Ecevit's main purpose was to create a relatively stable and secure external environment for Turkey, in which it can take care of the domestic problems (economic crises, earthquake, etc.). For this period of time Turkey returned to the "peace abroad" notion, which became disrupted a few years later.

Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and 2003 was shaped by different factors. The external threats and systemic constraints during these decades limited the space for manoeuvre for Turkish foreign policy. After the establishment of the new state, the

⁶² On the connection between the 1997 military coup and the RP, see: (Çağlar 2012)

⁶³ Mesut Yılmaz formed his second coalition government in June 1997 and ruled as prime minister until November 1998. During his period the Turkish government tried to follow a more commercial line, in which the Western relations played a more important role. (Kalaycıoğlu 2002)

⁶⁴ The two coalitional governments of Bülent Ecevit faced a period in foreign policy when "peace at home, peace in the world" seemed possible again. After the end of the Balkan wars the antagonism with Syria over the water issue and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan promised a fairly quiet period for Turkey, when Turkish leaders could concentrate on the Western relations. (Sezgin 2002)

introversion came from the unstable external environment, the Turkish leaders made all efforts to avoid the upcoming world war and concentrated on state building. In the Cold War environment Turkey joined the Western alliance, which also shaped the Turkish foreign policy behaviour and generated a “soft-isolationism” as a general principle. This attitude was visible in its relations towards the neighbouring countries. Even though in certain periods Turkey started to make foreign policy steps towards the East, the main approach was reluctance and caution. The wounds after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire did not heal; at the same time, most of the Arab states that were important for Turkey became allies of the Soviet Union. The “soft-isolationism” and the “Inönü Doctrine” were the main guiding principles of Turkey in its policies in the Middle East. However, after the end of the Cold war the environment changed and the conflicts of the bipolar world did not force Turkish isolationism any more. The domestic changes of Turkey also predicted changes in the foreign policy course of the Turkish Republic. The Kemalist-led last coalitions returned to “soft-isolationism”, however, the events after September 11, 2001 changed the whole set-up of Turkey’s regional environment. This environment created opportunities and also forced Turkey to slowly become a more influential actor and drop the “Inönü Doctrine” as guiding principle.

External Factors

Turkey’s unique geopolitical position predestines that both regional and global systemic pressures affect its behaviour. There are both internal and external factors behind the changes of Turkey’s foreign policy attitude. To fully understand the changes that happened with the AKP’s emergence in power, it is necessary to make an overview of the external factors that will later lead to the domestic variables. The following external pressures, constituted by the global and regional processes exercised an influence on Turkish domestic factors and generated a gradual and later rapid change in Turkish foreign policy. By the beginning of the 2000s, foreign policy activism emerged.

As mentioned earlier, the introversion of Turkish foreign policy was much influenced by the Cold War environment. The external pressures on the decision makers were in connection with Turkey’s geostrategic location. Turkey was located on the edge of the Western-Eastern stand-off, thus it was not surprising that the US decided to include both Turkey and Greece in the newly formed NATO in 1952. (Hale 2013, 121-123) Based

on the several-decades long threat from Russia and later the Soviet Union, targeting the control of the Turkish Straits – thus looking for a free exit for the Soviet fleet from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea ⁶⁵ – Turkey did not have any realistic options to remain independent unlike during WW II. The Turkish proximity to the Soviet mainland posed a strategic threat for the Soviet Union, not to mention the fact that the Turkish control over the straits lessened the Soviet military threat from the Mediterranean basin. Nevertheless, NATO membership raised the self-confidence of the Turkish decision makers in the 1950s; the Menderes government agreed to deploy the Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil.⁶⁶ (Seydi 2010; Göktepe)

From the 1960s Turkey distanced itself from the US foreign policy in its region. The domestic political problems, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the issue of Cyprus can be all blamed for the occasional tensions between Turkey and its Western allies. However, this has never changed the strategic importance of Turkey for the Western alliance and vice versa. Turkey's foreign policy identity was significantly shaped by the fact that it was an integral part of the Western bloc and parallel by antagonising its Eastern neighbours. The West required a rather inactive foreign policy from the Turkish decision makers, especially towards the allies of the Eastern Bloc.

The end of the Cold War brought a significant change in the set of systemic constraints on Turkey. "The end of the Cold War had ended the stable externalities that had governed Turkish foreign policy since 1945" (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 119) Turkey lost that geostrategic importance and with it the anchor of its foreign policy identity. In this new era Turkish foreign policy had to redefine itself in a fast transforming new external environment. Europe's attention turned towards new challenges: the raging war in the Balkans and the integration of the Central and Eastern European countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US also diverted its attention towards the reintegration of Europe and to the tackling of newly emerged conflicts in the Balkans or the Middle East. Turkey was not the irreplaceable bastion of the West anymore. (Hale 2013 194-226) and the recipe of the previous four decades of relatively quietist foreign policy became outdated, to the effect that the question, whether they still belong to the West emerged inside Turkey. (Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu 2009, 62-63)

⁶⁵ Turkey was approached several times by the Soviet Union to take over the control of the Turkish Straits, or provide a free access for the Soviet navy. (Hale 2013, 48-50, 61-62; Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu 2009, 28-30)

⁶⁶ The deployment of nuclear weapons this close to the Soviet Union was partially responsible for the Cuban missile crisis

The end of the Cold War brought problems on other fronts as well. Certainly the easing of the conventional pressures from the north were evident enough. Even though the possible military threat from Russia, especially from the middle of the 1990s onwards could not be ruled out, they clearly receded. (As mentioned before, this military threat was the original impetus that diverted Turkey out of its independence towards the Western alliance.) (Mufti 2009, 88) The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the flames of nationalism and the power struggles in the Middle East transformed the external environment around Turkey. Turkey was encircled by wars and military conflicts all around and more and more external pressures impacted the decision makers to take a proactive stance. The beginning of the 1990s brought a new enthusiasm of expanding Turkish influence towards the newly independent Turkic areas (Hale 2013, 207-226) and at the same time stepping up as an influential actor in the Yugoslav war. (Egeresi 2013e, 43-44) From the Middle East multiple security threats emerged: the Gulf War, the enormous number of Kurdish refugees entering Turkey and the desperate war against the PKK.

However, the Turkish foreign policy's activism was less perceivable after the death of President Turgut Özal in 1993. Özal tried to increase Turkey's foreign policy impact in the Turkic republics, in the Balkans and the Middle East (Laçiner 2009), however, it did not dispose of the necessary capabilities. In the beginning, Özal tried to project Turkish influence through diplomatic, economic and cultural means. However, Turkish economy could not finance its ambitions and the readiness to accept the Turkish influence was also questionable from the potential recipients' side as well. There were other candidates for regional influence including Russia, Iran and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia as well. The ongoing conflicts in the Balkans, the instabilities in the Middle East and Russia's growing influence prevented any serious Turkish penetration. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 130-136) Turkey was not only unable to provide significant regular financial support through its development aid in these areas, but could not become an influential actor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict either. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012; 649-652) Even though the Soviet Union had collapsed, Russia maintained its influence in its close neighbourhood through the Commonwealth of the Independent States. Russia used the Kurdish and the Turkish-Greek conflicts together with its allies in the Middle East to hold Turkey in check. (Mufti 2009, 109-118)

The post-Cold War years marked a transitional period in Turkey's security environment. The four decades of the Cold War made the whole external environment and the systemic pressures stable, and predictable. The period of the transition ended this

predictability. Domestically the activation of suppressed identities, especially from the Kurds came to pose a threat to the existence of the political regime. External forces could use Turkey's internal problems for their advantage; Iran and Syria heavily used the Kurdish card against Turkey in their conflicts. (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 157, 171)

The original Kemalist view of "peace at home, peace in the world" generated inactivity in the foreign policy of Turkey, which was a proper answer to the Cold War security environment around Turkey. However, the external security threats in the post-Cold War era started to force Turkey out of the traditional introverted foreign policy line (Mufti 2009, 121) towards a more complex apprehension of endorsing Turkish national interests beyond its borders. Mufti points out the paradoxical phenomenon that "the peace in the world" slowly started to contradict the "peace at home" doctrine. (Mufti 2009, 122)

Especially the Kurdish question and the fight against the PKK turned out to be fundamental in this regard. In the beginning the different militant Kurdish groups committed terrorist attacks in the countryside. After the military coup of 1980 more and more Kurdish leaders voiced their dissatisfaction. A wide range armed conflict broke out in 1984 with ambushes, terror attacks and attacks against political targets. (Egeresi 2012, 98-99) The Turkish Army commanded tens of thousands of soldiers to the Eastern districts and pulled the area under a tight police control. In 1987 the Turkish government introduced state of emergency in eight governorates. (Egeresi 2012, 98)

The intensity of the conflict grew significantly in the 1990s, owing to the regional and global political changes and the improvements in the organization of the Kurdish militants. The PKK became capable of conducting organized attacks and moving massive number of militants that demoralized the Turkish civilians and caused serious damages to the Turkish security forces. Ankara answered with commanding even more security forces to the East, thus further escalating the situation. (Egeresi 2012, 99-101) The international environment gave the PKK a serious advantage. After the Gulf War the Iraqi Kurdistan region started to act relatively independently and provided a safe-haven for the PKK troops and other militants. In spite of the Turkish army's multiple cross border interventions, the PKK kept its strength and capabilities. During the 1990s the PKK built up a wide network of bases mainly outside of the Turkish borders (Lebanon, Syria and Iraq) and occasionally penetrated the country through the mountain areas. (Barkey and Fuller 1997) The most problematic was Syria, where the Assad regime gave not only logistical, but also financial help to these organizations that were fighting against Turkey. (Sezgin 2002, 47-63) The Turkish government also had to coordinate its foreign policy

actions with its military strategy. After the military standoff between Syria and Turkey in 1998, the Assad regime expelled the PKK's leader, Abdullah Öcalan⁶⁷ and the Turkish-Syrian relations started to warm up again. Turkey had to react to the domestic insurgency of the Kurds with activating its foreign policy as well in its immediate neighbourhood. The key to it was that Ankara started to settle its disagreements with Syria and Lebanon. (Sezgin 2002, Bishku 2012, 45-47)

The end of the Cold War meant a fundamental change in world politics, the transition to a US-led unipolar world. The third Gulf War weakened Iraq significantly and strengthened the autonomy of the Northern Kurdish populated provinces.⁶⁸ However, the American interventions were yet to create a power vacuum in the area. Only 10 years later the military intervention in Afghanistan had a strong destabilizing effect in the whole region, however, it was not yet a game-changer. The American presence and the lack of stability did not directly affect the Middle East, since Afghanistan was far-away. On the regional scene, the real change was brought about by the American intervention in Iraq and the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. The fall of Iraq created a vacuum in the power balance of the region. The international campaign of rebuilding security and creating democracy in Iraq and the raging war, the continuous terror attacks and the tensions between the Sunni and the Shiite population all pointed towards a mid-to long-term regional power struggle. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 meant a blow to the American influence in the Middle East and created a power vacuum that called for other regional actors to step in. Turkey was one of these regional powers. The political and security implications of these events were not negligible, not to mention the possible economic gains from being an important player in rebuilding Iraq. The US requested the authorization from the AKP government in 2003 to use of Turkish soil and bases in the intervention in Iraq but the parliament voted against this proposal. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 29-132) This decision caused serious tensions in the American-Turkish relations and raised Turkey's credibility in the Middle East. With this decision, Turkey proved that it is ready to pay stronger attention to its immediate neighbourhood and take part in the stabilization efforts.

⁶⁷ Öcalan was captured by Turkish Special Forces in Kenya in 1999. Since then he is held in a high security Turkish prison. (Sezgin 2002, 50-63)

⁶⁸ The Operation Desert Shield and the Operation Desert Storm against Iraq deteriorated Baghdad's political and military power, thus the Northern independent areas could widen their independence.

It was not only the external threats and the changes in Turkey's security environment that triggered activism in Turkish foreign policy but its relations with the European Community. It was PM Turgut Özal who reintroduced the goal of joining the European Union among the main goals of Turkish foreign policy. After Özal's decision to officially apply for membership to the European Economic Community in 1987 (Erdemli 2003, 5), Turkey made efforts to get closer to the European track once again.

The question of the European integration cannot be underrated, there are both pragmatic and identity based reasons behind it. Since the end of the 19th century Turkey's leadership has always projected the desire to gain acceptance as a European state. Regardless of the fact that Turkey joined the NATO, the main goal has always been being part of the elite club of Europe. From the pragmatic side, Turkey aimed at strengthening its ties with Europe for simple economic gains; being part of an ongoing integration process promised higher turnouts in trade and investments, and more importantly would have given assurances against being left out. From a political perspective, Turkey's relations with the West, especially with the US had had their ups and downs, thus they needed Europe as an anchor.

Turkey applied first to the EEC relatively early in 1959 without realizing the actual meaning of this application. It was rather a political declaration and signalling the will of Europeanization of the country. The application did not lead to negotiations on membership, it was rather regarded as an important step forward, the EEC and Turkey signed the association agreement in 1963. (Szigetvári 1998, 5) Fulfilling the requirement of the agreement generated serious economic problems in Turkey and caused domestic disagreements that blocked the integration process for decades. Following Greece, PM Süleyman Demirel, handed in the application for the second time in 1980, however, the military coup of the same year dropped the accession off the agenda. Many observers believe that Turkey missed a historic opportunity. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 75) The European countries reacted with strong criticism of the military coup and its aftermath. By this time the promotion of democracy and human rights had become a priority over other possible foreign policy gains from the Turkish accession. (Hale 2003)

The 1980 coup meant a serious setback in the EU-Turkish relations, despite all the efforts of the military regime. The EU imposed sanctions on Turkey, the fourth financial protocol of the association agreement was suspended and several critical statements were released on the status of the human rights in Turkey. In 1982 the EC-Turkey Parliamentary Committee was suspended as well. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 76) In the 1970s

only the Islamist political groups voiced that the Judeo-Christian European elite club does not want Turkey to be one its members, now the suspicion arose in wider political groups. This psychological crisis went further with the accession of Greece in 1981. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 77)

The parliamentary elections in 1983 that ended the military regime slightly eased the tensions between the EC and Turkey, which still remained critical. The Özal leadership introduced neoliberal economic reforms and gradually reached an agreement with the military to release the political prisoners, who were imprisoned as a result of the 1980 coup and the Turkish parliament stopped approving death penalties. Özal made Turkey's future membership in the EC a focal pronouncement of his foreign policy goals. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 77) As an acknowledgment of these reforms the European Parliament adopted the decision on reviving the association agreement in 1988. As a result of the positive feedbacks from Europe Özal was convinced that the time has come for Turkey to join the EC and handed in the official Turkish application. (Ataman 2002) Presumably, Özal was aware of the fact that the decreasing tensions between the Soviet Union and the US would eventually lead to the loss of Turkey's geostrategic importance, and so the accession to the EC would be much more difficult. At the same time, there was a consensus in the society and the political elite about European integration. This is why it came as a shock and deep disappointment that the EC deferred Turkey's membership for an indefinite period. After the official application, more and more obstacles emerged, mainly in the form of resolutions by the European Parliament⁶⁹ on critical political issues that offended Turkey.

This critical approach was made worse by the new definitions of Europeanness based on cultural factors. (Rostoványi 2004, 354-355; Rostoványi 1999) Europe, which opened its arms towards Turkey during the Cold War changed its attitude towards the once so important ally. This led to stronger isolationism from the EU side and to strengthened Turkish foreign policy efforts to prove Turkey's European credentials and to establish stronger links with the European Union. One of the most important steps came in 1995 with signing the Customs Union Agreement with the EU. The customs union caused a serious trade deficit in the first years for Turkey, which triggered wide domestic discussions on the positive and negative factors of the integration process. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 81)

⁶⁹ The European Parliament passed resolutions discussing the Armenian, the Cyprus and Kurdish questions (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 79)

After almost a decade of reforms and the successful accession to the customs union the Turkish public expected that the EU would open its doors and offer a “roadmap” for Turkey. The expectation was that since Turkish governments had been cooperating with the EC for decades, and Turkey was a NATO member and now part of the customs union, consequently it should join the EU together with the post-Socialist countries. However, the expectations soon turned into disappointment again. The Luxembourg summit of the European Council in 1997 did not list Turkey among the candidate countries that could start the negotiations. This was a serious break in the mindset of the Turkish leadership. (Öniş 2000) Different leaders heavily criticized the EU, however, they still hoped for the negotiations to start soon and did not stop the reform agenda. The Helsinki summit in 1999 named Turkey among the candidates for membership, but unlike the other candidates Ankara did not receive a date for starting the negotiations. (Öniş 10-11) This decision was made only in 2004, and negotiations were launched in 2005. The Helsinki decision was an important positive feedback towards Turkey, however, it also had very important effects on Turkish politics. It forced Turkey once again to prove its democratic credentials and to prove that it belonged to the EU and that it could act according to its values also in its foreign policy.

Internal Factors

After analysing the main external influences, this dissertation gives an analysis and an explanation of the Turkish foreign policy changes through the internal framework that was specified earlier, using Schweller’s four variables. (Schweller 2004, 170-181) The questions of social cohesion and the government’s vulnerability give answer to the question, how much the society supports the existing institutions, accepts their legitimacy and poses a threat to the existing government to stay in power. Elite consensus and elite cohesion give an answer to how much the elite creates one group and to what extent clashes are expected between the decision makers and the others. Major changes and difficult decisions are only possible in a state of consensus. These factors emphasize that it is not states that make decisions but their leaders do.

The first section analyses the transformation process of the society from the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The power of the Anatolian masses due to a slow territorial shift to the cities and regional centres. This started to pose new claims both in

domestic and foreign policies. With their slow emergence in the political and economic hubs the social cohesion inside the Turkish society changed and their claim became represented more and more in the leadership. A slow conservative shift occurred and besides the conservative and nationalistic, less elitist parties the Islamists gained strength. The social acceptance of the old elite was decreasing and a claim for a new representation emerged.

The second and the third sections try to explain the changes inside the political and the economic elite groups. These sections concentrate on the clashes within the elite groups and on the slow demise of the old political elite with the gradual rise of the new Islamist political elite. This progress went parallel with the strengthening of a new business elite and a middle class in Anatolia. The growing power of this elite and the newly emerged claims of the masses both contributed to the changes in the political arena. Their claim aimed at the political representation of their Muslim conservative identity that the old elite failed to answer. The new political and economic elite initiated changes in the foreign policy direction of Turkey as well.

The fourth and the fifth sections deal with two questions that influenced Turkish internal changes the most: the EU accession process and the violent conflict with the Kurds in the Eastern provinces. These two factors affected both the elite groups and the whole society. The concluding section gives an overview of how the external influences (elaborated on in the previous sections) are filtered through these domestic factors before translated into certain decisions of the foreign policy executive. This will give an opportunity to verify the first hypothesis of the dissertation.

Transformation inside the Turkish society: top-down modernization versus bottom-up development

Approximately 80 years after the establishment of the modern Turkish state the transformation created the claim inside the society for a fundamental change. This change influenced not only the internal political arena, but Turkish foreign policy as well. In the last century of the Ottoman Empire the need for modernization became unavoidable. The state elite identified the main reason behind the decline in the military superiority of the West. The top-down modernization efforts already started in the 18th century and became more concentrated from the middle of the 19th century with the consecutive reforming

edicts, collectively known as the Tanzimat (Reorganization, 1839-1871).⁷⁰ The aim of the reforms was to adopt the Western military and administrative culture. As an important element of the modernization efforts separate schools were established for the military and civil bureaucracy, which became the main sources of the Westernized knowledge and lifestyle. This contributed to the exclusivity of a bureaucratic and military class that embraced secular positivist ideas and mentality. As a result, the early modernization process never stepped over the social boundaries of the elite groups, consequently never penetrated the whole society. (Zürcher 2004, 50-70; Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 36-40)

WW I brought a devastating defeat and resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. This moment created an opportunity for the new military and bureaucratic elite to reshape the power relations inside the Turkish society. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk leading the secular positivist groups won the War of Independence that resulted in a widely recognized legitimacy of the new elite's political power. With the creation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 the question of modernization and westernization resurfaced. (Zürcher 2004, 133-165) The so called Kemalism, or Kemalist principles have been defined retrospectively on the basis of the 6 arrows, (six principles: nationalism, republicanism, populism, secularism, statism, revolutionism)⁷¹ which were revealed in 1931 at the Congress of the ruling Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) and finally became institutionalized in 1937, when they were incorporated into the Turkish constitution. (Zürcher 2004, 181)

In Atatürk's view, following the post-Tanzimat ideas, culture and civilization were inseparable (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 46), the path of modernization required the full engagement with the Western ideas and the disposal of everything which represents the "old order". Some authors describe the Kemalist project as "tutelary democracy" in which Atatürk and the Turkish elite elevated Turkey from the demise of the Ottoman past and placed it on the track of a modern nation with secular and democratic foundations. (Zürcher 2004, 177-179; Davison and Parla 2004, 2-5) The state-building project was carried out by a very thin social class, the bureaucratic-military elite on a distinctive and exclusive ideological basis of secularism, rationalism, statism, nationalism. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 51) In their view, the Turkish people, the masses were still oriental, therefore did not arrive to the level of political maturity to implement and act according to Western democracy. (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, 51) "Social engineering, seen as corollary to

⁷⁰ On the Tanzimat period see: (Zürcher 2004, 50-70; Mufti 2009 10-14),

⁷¹ On the six arrows see: (Davison and Parla 2004)

positivism, became the reformist elite's model for a rational reconstruction of Turkish society". (Göle 1997, 48)

In the multi-ethnic, multicultural Ottoman Empire the glue of cohesion was Islam. After the dissolution of the empire the need for such a glue diminished and in the eyes of the positivist modernist elites religion became the main source of backwardness. Secularism was considered to be the prerequisite of Westernization rather than of democratization. (Göle 1997, 49) Gellner calls this phenomenon "didactic secularism", a moralistic teaching of how to conduct one's life. (Gellner 1981, 68) The Westernization project and the Western-oriented policies aimed at moving away from the Islamic traditions and practice, and from the Middle Eastern civilization as a whole. The main process of the cultural Westernization started with the exclusion of Islam from every aspect of the state, and enhanced the creation of the Turkish nationalism. (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 53) Although, a relatively concentrated group of the political, military leadership and elite attained the new cultural and political identity, the rural population remained almost untouched by the reforms. (Göle, 1996 50) The reforms focused on the main cities, political, and economic centres, but never penetrated deeply into the rural masses of Anatolia. (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 54) The imposed secularization process further widened the social gap between the elite groups and the rural population. According to Yavuz, this process "...subordinated religion to the political realm, and alienated society from the state... ". (Yavuz 1997, 64) This became the starting point of the serious political struggle between secularists and Muslims (later Islamists) for power and the government position.

Şerif Mardin created an often used classification and framework for the analysis of the above mentioned transformation of the Turkish society. (Mardin 1973; Mardin 2005) According to his argumentation the Turkish society had a centre and a periphery and the confrontation between these segments survived the modernization process. The original roots of this cleavage lie in the contrast between the Ottoman bureaucracy and the segmented structure of Ottoman Anatolia. (Mardin 1973, 171) This cleavage further widened with the imposed modernization process. (Mardin 1973, 183-184) As a result, the distance between the central elite and the illiterate, religious groups of the periphery greatly increased (Sunar and Toprak 2004, 160), minority groups that opposed the changes were literally ruled out from politics, namely the Kurds and the religious Muslim communities. (Polat 2013, 4)

The Turkish leadership had to rebuild the identity of the new Republic, but the war-torn economy as well. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire they inherited only fragments of the previous economic system and the first attempts of building a liberal, market based economy were seriously distorted. The main engine of the economic development became the state, growth was based on state-sponsored investments in the heavy industry. After the first free elections in 1950, the DP government started economic reforms in the direction of free trade policies and market economy. (Sunar 1990) At the same time, Turkey continued approaching the West, which came with the price of an urgent state-led development in certain fields. After the accession to the NATO in 1952, the Turkish state invested heavily into its critical security infrastructure. The upgraded transportation system improved the mobility of the massive rural population and fulfilled the demand of the growing industry. It caused migratory effects soon and in the course of the 1950s rural population started to move to regional industrial and city centres (Berik and Bilginsoy 1996, 40-43) and became more and more self-aware and organized. Ayşe Öncü highlights this process as “Istanbul exploded in the post-war decades to become a city of peasants.” (Öncü 1994, 292) The originally Kemalist cities experienced an influx of the Islamic identity from the areas which were at best partially touched by the Kemalist reforms. At the same time, from the 1950s a large number of skilled, blue collar workers moved to Germany and later to other parts of Western Europe, leaving a vacuum after them in Turkish society. This vacuum was filled up eventually by the incoming rural population. The failure of the import-substituting economic model also increased the influx of the rural population. (Keyder 1994, 61) Using Mardin’s model (Mardin 1973) we can explain this series of event as follows: From the 1950s, the periphery started to move to the centre and influence it. The primacy of the Kemalist elite started to grade down, even though it remained unquestioned owing to the guardianship of the army. From the 1960s the growing presence for Islamic movements became visible and resulted in the growing popularity of the Islam-oriented political parties.

The artificially created cultural and social distance between the centre and the periphery made the clash between the old elite and the new uprising social groups unavoidable. The Islam of Anatolia arrived in the cities, including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Their arrival introduced new needs in the urban areas, new social formations were created. A growing claim for political representation emerged, this time not in a faraway hidden spot in Anatolia, but in the cities. Göle argues that the “very project of modernization, based on external references, alien to local customs and traditions has

perverted the relationship between the secular elites and the people. The established elites no longer provide familiar model for the newly rising social groups to identify with...” (Göle, 1997 52) Islamism filled up this gap in the society and provided Muslims from the periphery and the urban centres a guide of conduct for their daily lives other than the Kemalist modernist project. (Göle, 1997, 52) The Islamic movements started to answer the needs and aspirations of these new social groups. “Islamism became the political expression of a conflictual link between an Islamic-Turkish identity and a secular Western modernity.” (Göle 1997, 53)

Fear from the Communist threat and the possible communist infiltration to the Turkish society was also an important factor in this transformation process that changed the status of Islam and Islamism. From the 1970s, communism emerged as a response to poverty and the growing needs of the political masses in the urban and rural population centres. The idea of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis⁷² was created by a rightist-conservative civil society organization, the Intellectuals’ Heart (Aydınlar Ocağı – AO) in order to unify the conservative rightist political groups in Turkey against a possible Communist threat. (Çetinsaya 1999, 369) It incorporated and compromised Turkish nationalism and Islam, factors that were defined incompatible by Atatürk himself. (Çetinsaya 1999, 363; Kurt 2010, 117) “According to this Islam is one of the components of Turkish culture among many others, and does not have any superiority over other constituents“. (Arıkan 1998, 126) Following this view, Islam was part of the Turkish greatness, the last stage in the historical evolution of the Turks achieving their goal to rule the world. (Arıkan 1998, 126)

The internal political chaos paired with important changes in the international environment (the Islamic revolution of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) triggered the third military coup in 1980. The military rule in 1980-83 brought the renewed attempt of social engineering. After closing all political parties and other organizations that had activities related to Islamism or leftist ideologies. Dozens of people were executed, thousands imprisoned, half a million arrested and even more blacklisted for their previous political activity. (Hale 1994, 251-256) In order to curb the two decades of political and social fragmentation, and to weaken the leftist/Communist groups the Turkish military introduced the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which combined Turkish nationalism and Islam working as a new glue to plaster the deep cracks of the Turkish society that emerged during the preceding two decades of violence and turmoil. (Arıkan

⁷² Turkish-Islamic Synthesis became very influential ideology of the 1980-1983 military regime. (Kurt 2010, 117-118)

1998, 126) The very fact that the military regime took the doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as guidance in the aftermath of the 1980 coup signalled an important step in the transformation of the Turkish society: the gradual decline of the old elite and the emergence of other nationalist and Islam oriented elite groups.

Another element in the social transformation was the emergence of the civil society. The process started at the end of the 1970s and was accelerated by the liberalization reforms of Özal.⁷³ Turkish civil society was traditionally weak, and controlled from above by the state through corporatist structures, hindered by the elitist structure of the society itself. (Toprak 1992, 89-92) The top-down style reforms left no space for an evolving civil society under the close and thorough state-led control. Statism destined the Turkish civil society to be fragile and vulnerable from the very beginning. (Burak 2011, 60) In the 1950s the emergence of the multi-party politics paved the way for a new civil society to be established, but the establishment of new labour unions and other basic organizations did not contribute to the emergence of a sound democratic civil society that can oppose the state. The consecutive interventions of the military in state affairs and the restrictive polity further narrowed the space of the civil society. According to Burak the 1982 constitution following the coup of 1980 was particularly designed to reduce citizen participation in politics and to repress pluralistic democracy in which trade unions, voluntary associations and professional associations had played an open and active role in politics. (Burak 2011, 63, Toprak 1988, 126-127) However, the revival of the civil society started shortly after the new constitution stepped into force. Along with the economic reforms came liberalization in political freedoms and rights of citizens. Some of the legal obstacles were removed⁷⁴ to open up possibilities for freedom of expression. Establishing civil organizations, unions and political parties became possible once again.

There is one more element to be described: the radical changes in the lifestyle and the level of life. From the 1970s growing interaction and economic relations with Europe, the mass media revolution and the continuous feedbacks from the numerous migrant workers raised the expectations of the society regarding the standards of living. By the

⁷³ Following Burak's study (Burak, 2011) on the development of the Turkish civil society I apply Keane's definition on the term civil society (Keane, 1998). According to this definition the civil society represents the total of all the voluntary economic and cultural institutions that are concerned with activities outside of the state domain, they influence, put pressure on the state, but maintain their autonomy vis-à-vis the state itself.

⁷⁴ Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the 1982 Constitutions were removed (Çaha 2001, 40-41)

1980s, Turkey experienced a revolution in its social and economic expectations. (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu 2009, 19) Consumerism and the possibilities provided by market economy raised a new urban middle class. This new urban middle class created a new type of civil society which was interested in market economy and liberalism, a new openness to the outside world, but deeply rooted in the Islamic traditions. They grew up from the rural population that migrated to the urban industrial centres. The democratization process resulted in the expansion of political and economic opportunity spaces in favour of Islam related forces. “The locus of decision-making shifted from the traditional bureaucratic elites to the political elites”. (Burak, 2011, 65)

The internal transformation of the Turkish society questioned some of the main pillars of the structure created by the Kemalist nation-building programme. This became the basic societal change that, parallel, led to the emergence of the new political and business elites that already had the power to speak up for their interests and claim their own right in governance. The changes in the society, the periphery’s slow but continuous move to the centre reached its critical point in the 1980s and continued further in the 1990s. The “old” Kemalist elite was losing its power, on the other hand a new conservative, and religious middle class and elite was on the rise. In Schweller’s terminology these changes can be interpreted by the strong weakening of the elite cohesion and consensus, and the social cohesion behind the old governing groups and a slow rise of a new elite became inevitable. However, owing to the military’s constant intervention into domestic politics all of the regime’s vulnerability was high, which acted against the military leadership’s will. To see an effective change in Turkish foreign policy even this factor had to be changed. The following parts of this dissertation will make an analysis of the changes inside the elite and the elite society relationship. This will give an opportunity to understand the foreign policy moves of Turkey in the different periods and understand the reasons behind the internal claim for a more active foreign policy.

Transformation of the political elite groups

As defined earlier, Schweller’s variables, elite consensus and elite cohesion give an answer to how much the elite creates one group and to what extent clashes are expected between the decision makers and the others. Major changes and difficult decisions are only possible in a state of consensus. This chapter will show, how a new elite group emerged, while the cohesion of the old governing political elite loosened. Arguably the

major fractures inside the Turkish elite can be observed between the Kemalist versus Islamist/Muslim positions. To continue the previous section's line of thought, firstly this chapter will elaborate on the rise of a new Islamist political elite, then on the gradual weakening of the Kemalist elite groups.

Emergence of the Islamist political elite

Islam was and still is a major element defining the identity of the Turkish society. In the Ottoman period Islam served as an unavoidable source of legitimacy. Islam was the provider of the unity of state and religion, the basis of the state itself and more than that, a symbol of the unity of the whole Turkish society. However, Islam was not homogeneous and reflected the distinction between the elite and the rural masses. The Quran-based well defined and scripted Sunni-Hanafi Islam became the religion of the central authorities and population centres, while underdeveloped Anatolia followed an oral-culture-based heterodox Islam. As a consequence, religion, which was the main unifying symbol inside the society contributed to the elitist structure, which was held up after the collapse of the Empire. (Yavuz 2009, 17) This predefined the relationship between state and religion for the Republican elite. The reforms of the Tanzimat were not against Islam, exclusion of the religion was never a goal of the reformers. The elites of the new Turkish Republic brought fundamental change, their modernization was based on the antagonism between state and religion, demonizing the role of Islam. (Yavuz 2009, 23) Yenigün argues that Republican reforms against Islam represented a major rupture that would eventually turn Islam into an oppositional identity. (Yenigün 2005) The new Republic suppressed the role of Islam, further institutionalizing the relation of religion and state. One of the six arrows, secularism (laiklik – laicism) was a leading idea behind this process.⁷⁵ Islam sank to the level of the individuals, therefore ceased to be a source of legitimacy for the state.

Instead, Kemalism became an artificial source of legitimacy promoted by the state and a narrow group of the elitist society. The Kemalist elite of Ankara and the Western urban population centres claimed the right to exclusively define the new identity of

⁷⁵ The deep secularizing reforms aimed at both Islamic institutions and Islamic practices. As symbols of continuity with the past the institutional elements of Islam were either abolished or recreated for the purposes of the Republic. The abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 transferred its functions on the TBMM, and this way became state functions. This reform symbolically cut the edges of the past on a way to a new, secular understanding of modernization, in which they emphasized the subservient role of religion to the state. The Department of Religious Affairs (DRA) was established by the TBMM in 1924 for the coordination of the religious life and institutions connected to Islam. (Yavuz 2009, 22-23)

Turkey. However, the extensive attempt of social engineering never truly penetrated the masses of Anatolia; the society of the provinces remained relatively untouched by the central reforms. The main characteristics of the centre became secularism, elitism, modernization and Westernization. The periphery was defined as their antithesis: provincial, backward, rural, uneducated, strongly connected to and identified with Islam. (Bozdağlıoğlu 2008, 46-51; Davison and Parla 2004, 5-7)

As a result of the democratic opening of 1950s and the fact that the ruling Democratic Party (Demokrat Partisi – DP) did not deny connection to Islam meant the first opening. The following three decades of the multi-party system brought further changes, which resulted in a deeper role of Islam in the society; internal movement of the rural population to the industrial urban centres, the growing socialist threat in the Cold War period; the intensified interaction between state and society. As a result of the multi-party system a new opportunity of representation opened up for the unrepresented public. After the 1960 military coup, the 1961 liberal constitution allowed for new social constructions, political groups, associations, charity organizations and student ensembles. However, the centre-right government of Süleyman Demirel⁷⁶ could not deal with the deepening economic crisis and the political instability, and the state sank into chaos with universal strikes and growing violence. In this atmosphere Necmettin Erbakan established the National Outlook Movement (Millî Görüş – MG)⁷⁷, which followed a religio-political agenda. Connected to the movement, the first openly Islam oriented party, which questioned Kemalism, the National Order Party (Mili Nizam Partisi – MNP) was established in 1970. His second party, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP)⁷⁸ was the first ever Islamist party to participate in coalitional governments in 1974 and between 1975 and 1977. (Yıldız 2003; Yeşilada 2002, 64-67) Erbakan became the defining figure of the Islamic oriented political map in Turkey for the succeeding three decades.

The Kemalist reform agenda never effectively answered the needs of the masses of Anatolia. Erbakan built on the growing discontent of the religious Sunni-Muslim Anatolian farmers and a conservative Anatolian lower middle class⁷⁹. Yavuz explains this

⁷⁶ On the rise of Demirel's Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP) see: (Sherwood 1967)

⁷⁷ On the establishment of the MG see: Çınar 2008, 28-30, on the political parties connected to the MG see Yıldız 2003)

⁷⁸ The MNP was banned after the military coup in 1971 and Erbakan fled to Switzerland. He returned to Turkey a year later and reorganized the political movement.

⁷⁹ Small businessmen and shopkeepers of the cities in the East

phenomenon as a class based rebellion against the secularist-Kemalist state. (Yavuz 2009, 49) Erbakan provided a new approach to modernization, which did not leave the marginalized classes in Anatolia behind. In his views the incorporation of the Islam and the Ottoman social and moral values into the value system of the political and economic leadership was desirable, in opposition to imported Europeanization. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 5-9)

The crackdown on the socialist and communist movements did not change the economic problems, the lack of political representation and the feeling of insecurity in the society. After a short period of time and the suspension of martial law the leftist movements using their extended networks returned to the streets, student movements and trade unions began to revitalize again and a period of political violence flared up. The fragmentation of the Turkish society along political (left vs. right), ethnic (Turkish versus Kurdish) and religious (Islamist vs. Kemalist) lines reached to the point that worried the Turkish military and the 3rd military coup became inevitable in 1980, during which all political parties and movements were banned. (Hale 1993, 251-256)

1980 was a turning point in the history of the Islamic political movements in Turkey. The first political calls of the Islamists after the 1950s did not exceed the efforts to extend individual rights of religious freedom. The Islamist parties were reluctant to speak openly against the Kemalist secular system, hiding their political agenda behind symbols and mainly focusing on providing social services to the needy and religious communities. (Çetinsaya 1999, 368-369) However, with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis Islamic activism became systematically recognized as part of the anti-Communist political centre-right. Islam started to be discussed in the framework of nationalism, and Turkish identity became intertwined with Islam. Being Turkish became equal to being Muslim (not questioning one's religiousness or secular affiliation). (Çetinsaya 1999, 374-375) The personality of Turgut Özal, the first prime minister after the military re-established the civilian rule in 1983 is already a good example of this change. As a deeply religious man, coming from the countryside, he represented the neglected population of the East that was regarded as backward. The Turkish elite did not view Özal as fit for the Prime Ministry or the Presidency, which in their heart it belonged to a blond, French-speaking Istanbulite. (Mufti 2009, 58) His neoliberal reforms, the measures that introduced new norms in Turkish economy deeply transformed the society.

After the military coup in 1980 the military led governing body immediately started economic reforms. The failed policy of import-substitution was suspended, and

already in the period of the interim military rule between 1980 and 1983 the reforms aiming market liberalization started.⁸⁰ In 1983 in the elections after the military coup Özal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP)⁸¹ surprisingly received the majority in the Turkish National Assembly and was requested to form the government. Özal, as an advocate of economic liberalization kick-started the liberalization process and the deep structural changes. "The new liberal economic policies of the government and the environment of freedom of enterprise contributed to the start of a new era in Turkish society." (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009, 20)

In the predominantly Islam countryside the economic role of the small and medium enterprises was on the rise, enhanced by the binding force of Islam. Family values and religion became sufficient to support the success of these communities, even though the compatibility of Islam and business life was seriously questioned. (Tuğal 2002, 99-101) In parallel with the Islamic society that gradually penetrated the centre of the Turkish society, a new business elite⁸² grew up, originating from Anatolia and the originally backward rural provinces of Turkey. Coming from a conservative background, they were exposed to Islamic values from a very early age and later on they were connected to the social services provided by the local Sunni/Sufi orders (e.g. dormitories during university years, etc.) (ESI 25) They came from a marginalized milieu, the backward areas of Turkey which were left out from the state led developing efforts. The 1980s brought the first social groups that were able to challenge the official Kemalist state policies. Yavuz (2009, 54) emphasizes the fact that Islamic identity was not a catalyst but rather instrument of redefining the power relations in the Turkish politics and economy. Applying Mardin's categorization (Mardin 1973), the periphery slowly penetrated the centre and started to claim its own rights.

The new bourgeoisie became the main supporter of the Islamic movement and their support reached their climax in the middle of 1990s. After the military lifted the ban on political parties, Erbakan established the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) in 1987. Both the MG and the RP changed their political agenda putting the emphasis from the poorest to the claims of the new Muslim economic elite. After the death of Turgut Özal

⁸⁰ Turgut Özal took up the leadership of the economic reform process as head of the State Planning Organization and later undersecretary of the Prime Minister's office and state minister. (Mufti 2009, 58-59)

⁸¹ On the history of the ANAP see: (Kalaycıoğlu 2002)

⁸² The emergence of the new Anatolian bourgeoisie has a wide literature. Here a few examples will be mentioned: (Acar, Demir and Toprak, 2004; Çokgezen and Özcan 2003; ESI 2005; Buğra 1998; Keyder 1994; Rubin 2005)

in 1993 a new era began to take shape in Turkey: the ANAP could not be the exclusive force of the centre right any more, and Islamists funded and supported by the new elite reached a major success in the 1994 municipal elections, receiving almost one-fifth of the votes. (Yavuz 2009, 62)

Other changes strengthened the power of the Islam-oriented movements. The 1980 military coup hit the socialist organizations hard and created a vacuum in the society. Islamic charities and organizations, providing social services started to fill this vacuum. This change through the growing Islamic networks enhanced the position of the Islamist political parties. A similar effect was conducted by Özal's neoliberal reforms, and the decline of the state's role in the economy. The drawing back of state institutions and the cut in welfare subsidies created a growing social need for a substitute that was filled in by Islamic religious groups and the new Anatolian bourgeoisie. The religious entrepreneurs became major stakeholders of promoting the Islamic discourse in the Turkish society. (Keyder 1994, 64-65)

The results of this process had become visible by the mid-1990s, first after the historic victory in the municipal elections, and soon after that when Erbakan was assigned to form a coalition government. The RP reached these political successes using the social networks, local associations and social welfare programmes that they had built up in the previous periods. (Yavuz, 1997, 73-75) As a result of these processes, the RP received 21% of the popular votes in the 1995 elections. (Yavuz 1997, 71) After long negotiations with different parties, the RP entered the coalition and Erbakan became prime minister. The short period of his premiership (June, 1996-June, 1997) proved the difficulties of his populist agenda, especially with the instable economy that was hold tight by the IMF and the politics monitored closely by the military. The changes in the foreign policy of Turkey, looking eastward and the strengthening relations with Muslim countries pleased the new bourgeoisie. On the other hand Erbakan did not touch the main patterns of Turkish relations with the West. (Yavuz 1997) The customs union with the EU just started to operate (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 81), Turkish-Israeli relations were flourishing (Makovsky 2000), and connections to the main NATO allies stayed balanced. But Erbakan and the radical wing of the RP pushed for an Islamization policy angering the military and the secular Kemalist establishment, which resulted in the so-called "soft military coup" starting from February 28, 1997.⁸³ (Yeşilada 2002, 68)

⁸³ This is the reason why this coup is commonly referred to as the February 28 process (Yavuz 2009, 64-66)

The dividing lines inside the RP started to reveal after 1994. A younger generation of politicians grew up since the start of the MG. This new generation alongside with the new and strong Muslim entrepreneurial class claimed less radical, less populist and more pragmatic policies from the RP. After forming the government it became evident that Erbakan would follow a hardliner approach, implementing populist decisions, which are not totally favoured by the middle class entrepreneurs, but rather the poorer strata of the society. The MG also went through an internal transformation following the needs of the new elites and middle class (Yavuz 69-70) As a result of an evolutionary process the RP presented itself as a democratic party losing its strong anti-regime rhetoric, searching for the opportunities in the framework provided by the Turkish Republic. (Yavuz 2009, 70)

After the 1997 military intervention the RP was banned and several of its politicians were imprisoned and banned from politics. The new Islamist party, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – FP) was established in 1997, with a systemic, centrist and conservative political portfolio, promoting free market and not necessarily opposing the West. (Yeşilada 2002) The younger generation of politicians stressed the necessity of a pragmatic political path, not forcing their religious views anymore. After the 1997 “failure”, the reformist generation started to claim its place in the movement’s leadership with politicians like Abdullah Gül, or Bülent Arınç. (Yavuz 2009, 75-77) The previously mentioned class related differences played a major role in the break inside the MG. The Anatolian middle class needed a value-based but liberal political line, stable conditions for their business and less confrontation with the Kemalist elite. The older and more conservative politicians of the MG were not able to provide this for them, the reformists led this time by Abdullah Gül⁸⁴ represented their interests suitably. The split became inevitable by 2000 after the military closed down the FP. Erbakan and the hardliner groups established the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi – SP) and the reformists started a new liberal political path with the AKP in 2001. (Yavuz 2009, 75-77; Yıldız 2003, 51)

The transformation of the Kemalist elite

In the second part of this section the focus will be on a parallel progress, the decline of the “old” elite. It might seem that the AKP grew into power only against the Kemalists, but the picture is more complex. Until the rise of the Islamist parties the main political competition was between centrist parties and some nationalist elements. After

⁸⁴ Erdoğan was banned from politics after the February 28 process, thus he was not allowed to participate at the elections. He joined the government to become the Prime Minister only in 2003.

decades in power, these groups (with the same political figures on the top) discredited themselves to a certain level, which paved the way for a new political elite. The analysis of the military is also unavoidable. Parallel, the political power of the military generated growing criticism from different segments of the society, which culminated after the 1997 “postmodern coup”. These two elements were also important contributors to the paradigm change of Turkish foreign policy.

After 1923 a radical transformation started in the Turkish society and the new elite emerged around the political leadership. Only those could keep their higher social status, who were able to adapt to the new circumstances. The new Republican elite defined itself as a modern, progressive Kemalist intelligentsia (*ilerici Atatürkçü aydınlar*), and excluded all the other social groups from the leadership, especially the pious Muslims who held the Ottoman Empire with a sense of nostalgia. The Kemalist elite established the new Republic and did not release the leadership until the 1950s, when they declared the country ready for the democratic transformation. (Göle 1997: 50) Kemalism is not a homogenous political theory, rather a set of values followed by different political groups with different political approaches. (Davison-Parla 2004, 1-2)

The CHP was formulated on the political left by Atatürk himself. It was the strongest political party until the 1970s, but started to lose ground in the political chaos. The CHP is a symbol of the old Kemalist order, well respected for building up the Republic, however, created an autocratic, state centred nationalist structure. (Güneş-Ayata 2002, 102-104) As a reaction to the social pressures and the international politico-economic trends in the 1970s, the party managed to adapt to the changes caused by the heavy industrialization. (Tachau 1991) The new social democratic stance added the worker classes and the small peasantry from the most developed rural areas to the elite-urban middle class voter basis. (Güneş-Ayata 2002, 104-105)

The 1980 military coup caused a serious trauma in the Kemalist political groups: the Kemalist organizations, along with the Islamist and socialist structures were closed down and banned from politics. (Güneş-Ayata 2002: 104-106) The breakdown created a fracture inside the leftist Kemalist group and the CHP lost its role as their sole representative. The CHP was not re-established for more than a decade, and other secular-Kemalist parties emerged. The two main ones were the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP) established by the previous leader of the CHP, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (Kınıklıoğlu 2002) and the Social Democratic Populist Party

(Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti – SHP), led by the Erdal İnönü⁸⁵. The latter later merged with the new CHP in 1993. (Güneş-Ayata 2002: 106-109) The disintegration of the leftist-Kemalist political elite caused a serious blow to the Kemalist political unity. Different parties with relatively similar ideologies competed against one another for the same voters, causing that none of the main leftist-Kemalist parties could easily gain the majority. After the 1980 coup, only the DSP was able to form a coalition government⁸⁶ (Çarkoğlu 2000) which collapsed after the 2000-2001 economic crisis. (Çarkoğlu 2002) The main problem was the Kemalists' inability to redefine themselves in the new environment. The CHP built its political programme around the heritage of Atatürk and took up a hardliner secularist stance against Islamism. However, at the time of radical external and internal changes secularism was not satisfying answer anymore. The CHP as the heir of the Kemalist principles consolidated secularism and the notion of social democracy (Güneş-Ayata 2002, 103-104), but could not provide a new vision after the Özal period.

From 1980, the changes inside the society brought new demands that took shape in a conservative turn⁸⁷ in political representation⁸⁸. (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009, 1-28) The first conservative leaders were not breaking with the Kemalist tradition, but rather focused on economic liberalization, and embraced the social demand for culture, traditions and most importantly religion. Doing this, they did not question the Kemalist-secular basis of the Republic or the six arrows, or got into open confrontation with the military.⁸⁹ The emergence of a new pro-systemic right wing party (Ergüder and Hofferbert 1987, 37) gave a real chance for party competition on the left-right continuum. (Ergüder 1991, 153)

The decade of the ANAP leadership brought a radical change in economic, political and social terms at the same time. The inward-looking country opened up, and the Turkish-Islamic-Synthesis paved the way for Islam on the political level. Özal

⁸⁵ Erdal İnönü was the son of İsmet İnönü, Kemal Atatürk's close friend, brother in arms and the second president of the Turkish Republic

⁸⁶ After the 1999 general elections the DSP formed a coalition with the conservative ANAP and the nationalist CHP. Bülent Ecevit took the position of the prime minister

⁸⁷ The strengthening Islamist movements were also part of this conservative turn.

⁸⁸ Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu define Turkish conservatism that combines several strands of irreconcilable strands of thought: liberal economics, traditionalism, sociocultural parochialism, primordialism, xenophobia, religious activism. (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009, 27)

⁸⁹ Even Turgut Özal did not question the military openly. However important disagreements occurred between him and the military leadership. He became the first civilian president against a retired general (Hale 1994, 282) and in 1990 Necip Toruntay Chief of Staff handed in his resignation. (Hale 1994, 292)

renewed the liberal-traditionalist heritage of the DP⁹⁰ with the aim of creating a synthesis of liberal economic approach and conservative-religious thoughts. (Öniş 2004) After his death the party's power decreased due to a less charismatic leader and the party's serious corruption scandals.⁹¹ (Kalaycıoğlu 2002: 47-56) Established on the same political platform (Acar 1991) the DYP successfully challenged and hijacked the ANAP's ideological position and took over the leadership (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, 47-51) Led by the „big political survivor”, Süleyman Demirel the DYP governed Turkey in the middle of the 1990s, however, could not handle the external changes, the economic crises and the internal identity search of the country.

Even though nationalists and ultranationalists are not (necessarily) coming from Kemalist circles, they can't be ignored in understanding the changes inside the political elite and the political representation. On the Turkish political (far)right the Nationalist Action Party (Milletçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) monopolized the representation of the openly nationalist groups. The originally⁹² relatively radical party (Arıkan and Çınar 2002, 26) retuned its programme after the 1971 coup the party in order to widen its political voter base and became part of the ruling coalition by the mid-1970s. The party introduced the Turkish-Islamic-Synthesis, which was later internalized by the military leadership after the 1980 intervention. (Arıkan 1998, 125-126) The party with its radical anti-communist call lost its appeal at the end of the Cold War, however, could not redefine itself until the end of the 1990s, the death of Türkeş. (Arıkan 1998, 127) The new leader, Devlet Bahçeli represented a modern and new face on the far right. He turned against the party's old radicalism and opened towards the voters on the conservative right promoting democratic values, traditions, cultural conservatism, and Islam. The new ideology was a mixture of idealism, strong nationalism and limited Islamism. (Arıkan and Çınar 2002, 34-38) The party gained strength again and became part of the 1999 ruling coalition. (Çarkoğlu 2000, 151) The MHP was able to show an alternative to the corrupted and discredited old leaders of DYP, ANAP or the CHP. However, the 1999-2002 series of

⁹⁰ There are views that the ANAP was substantially different from any other parties established before (Ergüder 1991, 153), but others discover the DP legacy in ANAP's political programme (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, 45)

⁹¹ After the death of Özal, Mesut Yılmaz took the leadership of the party, which participated in two different coalitions between 1997 and 2002, but with much less successes. The corruption scandals against the party leadership further weakened the party's position, which in 2002 failed to enter the Turkish parliament (Kalaycıoğlu 2002; Çarkoğlu 2002)

⁹² The first charismatic leader of the party was Alparslan Türkeş. (Tepe 2000, 62), a strong leader of the MHP. He represented the far right of the political spectrum, he was accused of racism and later tried with charges of fascist and racist activities.

crises wiped out the ruling coalition, so the MHP did not enter the parliament in the 2002 elections. (Alper and Öniş 2004) Even though new ideology of the MHP does not fall far from Islamists, (Arıkan and Çınar 2002, 34-38) Bahçeli's political programme and its popularity was one of the signals of the prospective radical change in Turkish politics.

Examining the dynamics of the electoral results in Turkey leads to the observation that by the end of the 1990s the ruling political elite discredited itself. (Grigoriadis and Öniş 2010, 264-265) Their political parties lost voters' trust, sank into internal debates or corruption scandals, but most of all, they failed to reinvent themselves in the new external and internal situation. In the middle of internal identity search of Turkey and recalibration of its role in the new world order the old Kemalists and conservatives failed to provide a new vision for the country. This process coincided with the internal transformation and the rise of the Muslim bourgeoisie and their growing demand for political representation. The consecutive crises starting from the 1997 military coup until the 1999 earthquake and the 2000-2001 twin financial crises (Alper and Öniş 2004) contributed greatly to the willingness of the society for a change. After 1997, the military seemed to be open for this change as well, and the emergence of further democratization and limiting itself for developments in the EU accession process.

The military itself is an unavoidable segment of the Islamist-Kemalist fraction. The military regards itself as the protector of Kemalism and as such the values and existence of the Republic. (Sakallioğlu 1997, 154) The military has never been involved in the day to day decision-making, however, always kept an eye on the political and social developments of the country. (Hale 1994) The leadership has always relied heavily on the civilian political elite influencing their decisions and political strategies. The constant fear of politicians from military interventions became an important characteristic of the evolution of the Turkish republican political sphere. The military's political role became institutionalized after the 1980 coup. The expanding of the institutional autonomy of the military became a tool of reducing civil control. Their political autonomy, "which has been defined as its ability to go above and beyond the constitutional authority of democratically elected governments, can include not only direct but also indirect influences on the government." (Pion-Berlin 1992, 85) The military used its institutionally based prerogatives to issue policy suggestions and warnings to the civilian leadership⁹³. However, it is important to mention here that the military always returned

⁹³ One of these warnings was issued 28 February, 1997, which led to the resignation of the Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan. (Çağlar 2012, 28-29)

the political rule to the civilian sphere, it accepted the rule of the civilians and the notion of democracy. (Sakallioğlu 1997, 153-154)

After the 1980 coup a set of institutions were established as tools of civilian-military co-operation, and also helping strengthened military influence in politics. The most direct military influence was established through the National Security Council (NSC). The 1982 constitution changed the ratio of the members to the advantage of the military and gave exclusive rights of making recommendations to the council of ministers in a widest range of political issues. (Hale 1994, 256-258) The power of the presidency became also a similar element, where the informal assumption was that the president will either come from the retired generals, or the civilian president will never override the will of the military. Sakallioğlu (1997, 156-162) reviews other areas of the military influence: the military budget, which was never subjected to parliamentary debate, or the exclusive rights in intelligence gathering or the arms and military production or the economic share.

94

The military was the most popular institution based on its role in establishing the Turkish Republic and its symbolic value in the society. (Altınay 2004, 13-32) However, this popularity started to erode as a result of multiple factors at the second half of the 1990s (Aydinli, Özcan and Akyaz 2006), resulting from the liberalization process, which started in the 1980s. The intensified interactions with Western societies as a “demonstration effect” strengthened the need for further democratization from the society. This process became visible with the EU accession process and the emergence of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. One of the main criticisms of Turkey from the EU was the lack of civil control over the military, that became manifest after Turkey was not nominated EU candidate in 1997.

Islamist parties were always in the cross-hairs of the military’s suspicion. After every military coup the Islamist parties were closed down and most of their members imprisoned, or banned from politics. (Hale 1994) The military hampered the political representation of Islamic interests, but the claim became stronger by time. The growing influence of the Islamists in politics and the economy claimed a new power balance against the military. The legitimacy of the infamous February 28 process in 1997, contrary to the previous coups in the midst of political chaos was questioned by most segments of the society. Namely, in 1997 the military forced the democratically elected, (relatively)

⁹⁴ On the military’s economic power see (Parla 1998)

moderate Islamist government to step down, leaving deep scars in the tissue of the Turkish democracy. (Aydinli, Özcan and Akyaz 2006) As a result of these developments, although the military remained one of the most trusted state institutions (Aydinli, Özcan and Akyaz 2006), the untouchability of it started to be questioned.

EU accession can be regarded as the ultimate goal of the Kemalist Westernization programme, thus it facilitated a military-civilian consensus at the end of the 1990s. The disappointment of not becoming an official candidate in 1997 triggered internal review processes inside the Turkish society and the military itself. They realized that the EU accession process can offer a solution to urgent internal problems, including the Kurdish question, economic instability and a promise of Turkish unity. In order to achieve these, the military agreed to start the democratization process, limiting the military's prerogatives on the way. (Aydinli, Özcan and Akyaz 2006) This was an important turning point in the Turkish political history, since the army, a national symbol agreed to limit itself and at the same time as a result of internal and external forces lost its untouchability. This opened a way for a radical internal political change in Turkey, which happened in 2002 when the AKP stepped into power. It is not a coincidence that the AKP's main agenda focused on the EU accession process and the further democratization.⁹⁵

The role of the business elite

The interests of the business elite heavily influenced Turkish foreign policy decisions as well. Kirişci argues that Turkish foreign policy activism is strongly interrelated with the interests of the main Turkish business associations and business groups. According to Kirişci, the main decisive factor behind the paradigm change in the Turkish foreign policy towards the East was motivated and supported by these business elite groups, especially the Anatolian bourgeoisie. (Kirişci 2009) ⁹⁶ To understand the transformation inside the business elite and their impact on Turkish foreign policy, a thorough analysis is necessary, similar to the previous description on the changes inside the political elite groups.

The newly established Turkish Republic inherited a dysfunctional economy. After a devastating decade of wars and losses of territory the Turkish Republic faced the task

⁹⁵ See on this for example: (Dağı 2009, Çınar 2008, 120-121, Cizre b141-142)

⁹⁶ On the emergence of the Anatolian bourgeoisie see also: (Acar, Demir and Toprak, 2004; Çokgezen and Özcan 2003; ESI 2005; Buğra 1998; Keyder 1994; Rubin 2005)

to build not only a new state, but also a functional economy from a very poor basis. The inherited characteristics showed a rather rural, agriculture based economy, with a very narrow non-Turkish entrepreneurial class, and masses of unskilled and agricultural workers. In the Ottoman Empire, the most prestigious professions were connected to the military or the bureaucracy; most of the skilled workers, merchants, tradesmen were of non-Turkish origins. After the wars, most of these groups vanished or left the country due to population exchanges, leaving the new Republic with strong bureaucratic and military personnel and masses of unskilled labour. (Acar, Demir and Toprak 2004, 166-167) The republic lacked the culture of entrepreneurship and the necessary financial institutions to build up a sufficient private sector. The necessary infrastructure was either non-existent or ruined by the war, and the huge debt inherited from the Ottoman times also made it more difficult to kick-start the economy. (Zürcher 2004, 165)

The emergence of the new business elite

The state stepped in as the main controller of the economy, which necessarily led to the emergence of an economic elite, close to the governing political elite. This pattern widened the existing gap between the small Kemalist elite groups in Istanbul and Ankara and the Anatolian masses even further. The economic elite had to build up a strong relationship with the state leaders in order to get state investments and capital for businesses, therefore political and economic power melted together. (Acar, Demir and Toprak 2004, 167-168) The state strongly controlled the economy and followed the model of import-substituting development coupled with heavy industrialization and major infrastructural programmes during the Cold war. This caused major distortions in the structure of the economy. This, together with the political instability led to the constant crisis of the Turkish economy. (Barkey 1990)

Turkey was characterized by a strongly protected, closed economy in the first six decades of the republic. The relatively small amount of trade concentrated on the Western partners, while from the East, Turkey imported only oil and natural gas.⁹⁷ The Kemalist bourgeoisie supported the international opening, but fostered trade relations mainly with Western partners. The first changes occurred after signing the Ankara Agreement with European Economic Community in 1963, but as a result of the internal political situation and then the intervention in Cyprus meant a strong setback in the Western relations. The

⁹⁷ The data regarding Turkish trade was retrieved from the Turkish Statistical Institute: <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>

Kemalist business elite didn't initiate business ties with the Arab countries, Turkey's trade was minimal with its closest neighbours.

The period of PM Özal brought a radical change in the economic structure and also in the trade relations of Turkey. With the neoliberal reforms and easing the trade related restrictions, the Turkish economy turned to export oriented growth. The total sum of less than 11 billion USD Turkish foreign trade reached over 42 billion USD (Laçiner 2009) by the end of the decade, the export volume grew from 2, 9 billion to 20 billion USD. (Laçiner 2009) Özal handled the state debt spiral and made long awaited structural reforms, regulating state spending and creating a stable background for the growth in the private sector. For the first time of the Turkish Republican history Turkey became a regional economic power, which this time started to search for new markets in its neighbourhood. Contrary to the Kemalist value set and the "Inönü doctrine", Turkey's export oriented policies raised consciousness towards the Middle East. Even though Özal did not give up Kemalism in his foreign policy, yet relations improved with the region in the economic sphere. Laçiner (2009) argues that Turkish trade in the Middle East "exploded" in this period; by the middle of the 1980s it reached from less than a billion USD to almost 6 billion USD (partially because of the rising petrol prices). A massive demand was created in the Middle East for Turkish industrial and manufactured products. By 1985, 42% of these products were exported to the Middle East, and the agricultural products mainly went to the European markets. Besides, Turkish investors started to show interest in the Arab region. In 1978, only 22 Turkish companies were present in at least one of the Arab countries, by 1990 this number rose to 300. These companies made contracts worth of approximately 18 billion USD. (Laçiner 2009) The government supported the exporting and investing companies in the Middle East with cheap credit constructions, and Turkey became a major creditor for Iraq and Iran as well. The Iraq-Iran war disrupted the booming Turkish-Middle East trade relations and caused a major setback from 1986. Trade volumes started to grow again at the end of the decade, but couldn't reach the same dynamics as they had had in the first half of the decade.⁹⁸

The other major change that occurred in the Turkish socio-economic sphere was the emergence of the new bourgeoisie in Anatolia. During the times of state-led economy the main capital sources were accumulated in the hands of the secular industrialists, connected to the political leadership. The small and medium sized enterprises could

⁹⁸ Source of data: website of the Turkish Statistical Institute, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

obtain capital from the banking sector, which only financed “reliable” and already successful ventures. (Çokgezen and Özcan 2003, 2064-2067) The first tangible idea to solve the capital shortage came from the social-democrats, namely the CHP, which promoted the programme of using the remittances sent home by the migrant workers as investments. (Çokgezen and Özcan 2003, 2067) Several from today’s giant holding companies⁹⁹ were established by the financial support of the European diaspora. However, the remittances¹⁰⁰ would not have been enough to substitute the credit structures offered by the financial intuitions of the country. With regard to the fact that the Anatolian new business owners were religious Muslims, they had to follow the Islamic rules also in their financial transactions (Tuğal 2002), however, Islamic banking was not allowed in Turkey before Özal’s time. The first interest-free banking institutions or special finance corporations were established after 1983 and started to operate on the savings of religious people and gave interest-free lendings to the entrepreneurs. (Çokgezen and Özcan 2003, 2069-2070)

Özal, being close to the identity of the Anatolian businessmen supported their expansion and growth with a favourable taxing system and by activating Turkish foreign economic relations. (Laçiner 2009) A new class of businessmen grew out with a totally new identity and business needs very much in antagonism to those of the Kemalist old economic elite. The “Muslim Calvinists”¹⁰¹ created their own business and social circles. They needed political stability inside the country and stable external relations to promote their growing export capacities. Their economic approach was conservative right wing economic liberalism, not favouring too much state intervention. Coming from the experience that the state redistribution of wealth always favoured the Kemalist groups in the republic’s history, they favoured lower taxes, quotas and customs. (Keyder 1994, 61-62) Having their own local interests and realizing the opportunities coming from unexplored areas in Turkey’s vicinity, the new Anatolian businessmen became the

⁹⁹ Such as Kombassan, Büyük Anadolu Holding, Yimpaş, Ittifak, Aksaray Holding, etc.

¹⁰⁰ The savings of Turkish workers in Europe rapidly increased in the 1970s from around 100 million USD to 1,5 million USD at the middle of the decade. The Diaspora accounted for two thirds in this amount (Çokgezen and Özcan 2003, 2068)

¹⁰¹ The emergence of a new group of Islamic businessmen brought change in the original understanding of Islam as well. The new bourgeoisie, educated and successful social stratum became highly critical not only of the Kemalist policies and the Istanbul based business elite, but of the old Muslim mentalities against the market relations. The ethics of a new “entrepreneurial Islam” was on the rise (Adas 2006), became an important defining element of the politics followed by the AKP. The new concept of “good Muslim” emerged, of a hard-working, good entrepreneur, who regards work of an act of worship. Because of these features some analyses call this new middle and elite classes of the Turkish society the Islamic Calvinists. (ESI 2005)

pioneers of the Turkish-Middle Eastern business relations. Companies producing relatively cheap and good quality furniture and manufactured products started to build their relations in the Middle East and other Muslim regions. (Kirişçi 2009, 43) The Anatolian entrepreneurs gradually got integrated into the international market and by the early 1990s the Anatolian companies were highly competitive in the international business environment.

The Kemalist business community kept its exclusive character and did not incorporate the new participants, namely the new Muslim bourgeoisie. During the 1980s, the rise of their businesses reached the level of confrontation with the old business elite. A particular episode took place in 1990, when a group of Muslim businessmen were excluded from a business meeting of Turkish business associations and their Soviet counterparts in 1990. As a result the Muslim business community established its own representing umbrella organization, the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği – MÜSIAD). (Buğra 1998, 530) The MÜSIAD, established in 1990 by young Islamic oriented businessmen became the main symbol and contributor of this new economic orientation of Turkey. (Tuğal 2002) By representing their common interests, MÜSIAD reached agreements in new markets and provided its membership, organized business trips, briefings and business meetings European, Asian North African and Middle Eastern business partners. (Gümüşçü 2008, 4-5) Thus, MÜSIAD became a very strong and important agent of reducing the cost of information for the provincial bourgeoisie and helping the opening up of the Turkish market. MÜSIAD had an important stake in the reorientation of Turkish external economic relations.

Even though Turkish export and import numbers were gradually growing during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s with the Middle Eastern and the North African region, in Turkey's overall trade relations these two regions started to lose their relative weight. The sum total of the exports and imports started to grow again in the mid-1990s, reaching above 6 billion USD and until 2002 continued its gradual growth.¹⁰² Turkey's main import product from the region was oil and natural gas. Besides Saudi Arabia and Libya, slowly Algeria started to grow up and after the 1996 agreement between Iran and Turkey, Iranian natural gas import grew suddenly. (Bozdağlioğlu 2004, 135-136, Oktav 2004) After the start of the Gulf War, Turkey joined the embargo on Iraq that hit very

¹⁰² Source of data: website of the Turkish Statistical Institute, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

hard the economy of the Eastern Turkish provinces. Hundreds of millions USD worth of trade vanished and Iraq ceased to be an important trade partner of Turkey for more than a decade. (Laçiner 2009; Barkey 2000) In this period, trade with Syria grew significantly owing to the strengthening trade connections with the Eastern Turkish provinces. A remarkable growth can be seen in the trade with Israel. However, the growing numbers in this respect are not representative, since the bulk of the Turkish-Israeli trade were military related equipment. (Eisenstadt 1997)

The premiership of Erbakan has not changed these trade patterns. Even though he opened politically towards the East and emphasized the relations with Muslim countries¹⁰³, his period was not long enough to implement major changes in the economy. Important to mark the fact that under the watching eyes of the military and the Kemalist elite he did not alter the foundations of Turkey's foreign and especially trade relations. In contradiction to his rhetoric, Erbakan did not touch the Turkish-Israeli agreements (moreover, newer deals were signed during his premiership) and did not annul the Customs Union with the EU. One big exception was the 23 billion USD agreement with Iran on importing Iranian natural gas, which immediately became visible in the trade data. (Bozdağlıoğlu 2004, 135-136, Oktav 2004)

The fact that trade relations started to grow again in the Middle East and North Africa can be understood through the internal pattern of the Turkish industrialist society. The new Anatolian businesses reached their strength by the mid-1990s and started to export again to the neighbouring countries and regions. There was a steady growth of exports to Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and to the Gulf region.¹⁰⁴ The same trend can be seen in the membership data of the MÜSIAD. The number of the members constantly grew and reached almost one thousand by 1996 and two thousand by 2003. (Gümüşçü 2008, 5) These data clearly indicate that the new Anatolian bourgeoisie reached a very strong position by the end of the decade, clearly demanding a liberal, open economy, internal and external stability especially with the neighbouring regions where they conduct their businesses. The strong potential in further growth in the region was only exploited after 2002 by the AKP government.

¹⁰³ On the foreign policy orientation of the RP see: (Bilgin 2008)

¹⁰⁴ Source of data: website of the Turkish Statistical Institute, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

Situating the old business elite

After examining the emergence of the new economic elite in Turkey, the dynamics of the old elite needs to be analysed. Clearly before the emergence of the Anatolian bourgeoisie, the Kemalist businessmen were the only economic interest group that were influential on or influenced by the political elite. The interrelatedness of these groups was very strong. However, before the 1980s the ISI economic model and the limited capacities in the economy curbed the possibilities of the private sector. This changed after Özal's liberalization process. The "old business elite" was favoured in the international opening, state tenders and privatizations, and developed their wealth remarkably. Their main objective became pursuing an environment in which business community has a solid, uncontested status. (Buğra 1998, 526)

The renaissance of the economic entrepreneurship and the venture capitalism provided a fertile ground for both the old business bourgeoisie and the new business community to grow up. The old business elite, comprised of different big holding companies, was able to build up the business relations under the heavy control of the state. This elite group, concentrated its businesses in the main population centres. They constituted an exclusive elite group of merchants and industrialists who mainly originated from the Western parts of Turkey, associated themselves with the Kemalist project of Westernization and modernization, and dissociated themselves from the notions of Islam. (Buğra 1998, 526)

On the spearhead of these notions stood the most influential business association of the Turkish community, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association's (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği – TÜSIAD). From the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s a new generation became influential inside TÜSIAD, promoting further developments on the political front. Even though generational disputes erupted inside the association (and the Kemalist business community), the claim of open foreign policy and strengthened connections to the West emerged. (Buğra 1998, 528) According to their views, Turkey cannot accelerate its growth and competitiveness without intensifying its cooperation with countries, more developed than Turkey. In their reports¹⁰⁵ from the beginning of the 1990s they urge democratization and the de-militarization of the society in order to enhance the country's political stability. (Buğra 1998, 527-528) Their efforts were aimed at the EU accession and strengthened external

¹⁰⁵ The first report urging for democratization and de-militarization was published in 1990 with the title „Perspectives on Democratization” (Buğra 1998, 527)

and trade relations. These businessmen and the TÜSIAD's administration followed the European model of economic and social development. According to their view, "Turkey cannot accelerate its economic growth and acquire the competitive potential required for the 21st century through more intense co-operation with countries that are more backward than herself, but by co-operation with more advanced nations". (Buğra 1998, 526-527) The TÜSIAD's role was to call for a rule-based, democratic system, where political, economic and social rights are guaranteed by law. (Buğra 1998, 534)

Parallel to the emergence of the new economic elite, the chronic mismanagement of the Turkish economy contributed to the political and economic transformation inside the Turkish elite groups. The structural deficiencies of the Turkish economy, the fragile financial structure, the dire need for capital inflows, the constant budget deficit and the high inflation rates required a thorough reorganization. Özal started the economic reforms and restructuring, the Turkish economy was not ready for the effects of the financial globalization, which were further enhanced by the accession to the EU customs union in 1995. The Turkish economy was hit by multiple financial crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001.¹⁰⁶ The crises were direct results of the mismanagement in the economy and the delayed reforms in the financial sector. These crises were associated with the old elite, while the Turkish people and the new economic elite initiated a real change also on the political scene. The new elite remained deprived of political representation, even during this crisis, which strongly called for a change.

By the end of the 1990s the new Muslim bourgeoisie had gained in strength and by the support of different political groups started to become more and more influential. By definition, these groups gave financial support to the conservative movements and political parties that followed Islamic values and promised an economic opening to new markets. They were the main supporters behind the success of the ANAP and they helped the RP in the 1990s. At the beginning of the 2000s Erbakan¹⁰⁷ and his Islamist party's radical views were not enticing anymore, the Muslim entrepreneurs started to line up behind the new political figures and their AKP. At the same time the old Kemalist economic elite could not relate itself to the parties in power and with the internal crisis of the old political elite the influence of the Kemalist businessmen started to decrease. Their support could not be united behind one political party or political leadership, thus in the different scandals in the 1990s their supported parties failed one after the other. Despite

¹⁰⁶ On the crises see: (Alper and Öniş 2004; Öniş 1996; Akyüz and Boratav 2003)

¹⁰⁷ In the aftermath of the February 28 process Erbakan was banned from the politics for 10 years.

these changes the Kemalist economic elite remained strong and promoted the EU accession process and the further strengthening Turkey's economic and political ties with the West.

Effects of the EU accession process

Since the establishment of the European Economic Community, Turkey has been pursuing the accession to it. As a consequence of the Kemalist basis of Turkey, the European integration has always been a top priority. The consecutive governments returned again and again to the ideal as part of the Westernization process, the ultimate goal, which embodies the Kemalist ideal of belonging to the West. The EU accession process is a very important indicator of the transformation inside the Turkish political elite and their foreign policy intentions. The EU accession necessitated painful reforms and external interventions from the EU, thus the reform process had to come from a serious internal commitment to democratization and open foreign policy.

The Turkish efforts to join the European integration played a crucial role in the Turkish political transformation both externally and internally. The dissertation examined the external factors earlier, the shock of 1997 and the positive feedback in 1999. In this section the domestic factors are analysed, how the domestic efforts contributed to the transformation and how the political reform programme “crowned” the long-due democratization process. The rise of the AKP and the new era of foreign political activism are owed to multiple factors. Nevertheless, the reform package after 1999 was a crucial tool in the hands of the Islamist government both in the elections campaign and the post 2002 era to solidify its power. One cannot underestimate the reforms' value, since after 1997 and especially in the run up to the 2002 elections (besides the IMF led economic restructuring process) the EU accession and the political reforms occupied the political discourse.

The Association Agreement (or Ankara Agreement) between Turkey and the EEC was signed in September 1963. (Erdemli 2003, 4) The agreement did not include any commitment from the EEC for final inclusion of Turkey, but put it in prospect in order to promote the democratization process. (Szigetvári 1998, 5; Uğur 2003, 166-167) However, the internal problems, the political chaos and economic instability prevented such developments. The 1971 coup and the 1974 invasion of Northern Cyprus strained Turkish

European relations, and in the midst of the political chaos the EU integration process was dropped from the political agenda. As a result of the 1980 military intervention, the EEAC suspended the Association Agreement with Turkey. (Erdemli 2003, 5) The process restarted only in the 1980s as a result of the neoliberal reforms and the foreign policy opening. The domestic pressure and the logical pragmatic decisions from the leadership led to the official application in 1987, which was denied in 1989. (Erdemli 2003, 5) Entering the customs union was not enough to substitute for the full accession in the Turkish perception.

Öniş argues that the EU possesses an institutionalized framework that transmits influences and pressures that affect the democratization. (Öniş 2003, 9) With the announcement of the Copenhagen criteria, strict political and economic conditionality was set for the Turkish accession that Turkey had to fulfil before starting the accession process. Eventually, Turkey became an official candidate at the Helsinki summit in 1999. (Öniş 2003, 10-11) The Accession Partnership document highlighted a short- and medium term reform agenda. On the political front the document focused on a set of changes covering human rights, minority issues and the extension of individual and community freedoms. The lacking democratic instruments regarding the separation of power, especially in the area of judiciary and the lack of civil control over the military needed to be established. The Cyprus issue was also a crucial question to settle before the Turkish accession. (Öniş 2003, 10-12; Saatçioğlu 2013, 10) Öniş characterizes the set of political reforms as a major challenge to the principles of the “hard-core Republicanism” underlying the highly centralized Turkish state. In the economic sphere the task was to follow a stabilization course and demolish elements of the populist state in favour of a regulatory state. (Öniş 2003, 11)

The Turkish response was the “Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis”, which they submitted to the European Commission in 2001. (Saatçioğlu 2013, 11) The document drew up a schedule for the reform process, however, due to anti-EU and nationalistic domestic pressures, it minimized some of these efforts. The response was positive from the EC, but showed some dissatisfaction about the scale of the reforms, especially on the implementation side. Nevertheless, a deep reform process started under the leadership of the leftist-conservative-nationalist government with several constitutional amendments and new “harmonization laws”. (Saatçioğlu 2013, 11)

The domestic support of the EU accession process enabled the government not only to adopt, but also to implement such reforms. The changes had to touch upon very

sensitive areas, such as the rights of the Kurdish population, or the constitutional amendments that reduced the power of the NSC. In strengthening the rule of law, the successive governments were able to abolish national security courts and death penalty until 2004. In the areas of human rights and individual freedoms, a long set of changes were implemented. These important decisions could only take place with a strong internal support from the political elite and the whole of the society.

In the second half of the 1990s, as an internal reaction to the Luxembourg decision that left Turkey out from the list of the EU candidates, the February 28 process and the serious economic problems the pro-EU and pro-democratization stance of the society became much stronger. According to public opinion surveys, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish society was unhappy with the level of democracy in Turkey and demanded serious reforms.(Öniş 2003, 19; Carkoğlu 2003) This sentiment also became vocal in the political leadership. Most of the major political forces took up either a pro-EU stance, or tried not to speak up against the EU accession, only against the way how the reforms were implemented. Interestingly the conservative parties and the Islamists became the main supporters of the EU integration. It was an interesting development that the CHP made a nationalistic turn and opposed the reform process, thus got excluded from the pro-EU coalition. This is another proof that the Kemalist elite failed to transform itself according to the requirements of the new domestic and international environment.

The commitment of the old and new business elite and the civil society is a striking feature. This dissertation already elaborated on the Kemalist business elite's stance on the democratization process and the further opening of Turkey's foreign relations. The TÜSIAD started a wide-spread media campaign that showed their efforts to influence the political decision-makers. (Öniş 2003, 17; Sugden 2004, 254) The new Anatolian bourgeoisie's stance was different from the Kemalist elite's, but after all it was similarly pro-democratization and pro-EU. (Dağı 2009, 56) Other segments of the civil society were also active using the media and social forums to pressure the political reforms leading Turkey towards the EU-accession. (Öniş 2003, 17) Public opinion polls show that an overwhelming majority of the Turkish society regardless of age, social status or geographical location supported the EU accession process. (Carkoğlu 2003; Carkoğlu 2004)

Avci stresses that neither the left nor the right were "true believers" in the EU, most of the parties left the light Euro scepticism open in case it would be sensible to take a radical turn. (Avci 2003, 154) However, due to the social transformation and the

domestic support, the EU-card became pivotal before the 2002 elections. All the major political forces had to show their commitment to the EU accession in their political campaign as did successfully the AKP and also the previously nationalistic CHP that returned to the pro-EU social coalition. (Öniş 2003, 25)

It has to be stressed here that the EU as a solid anchor played and is playing a crucial role pushing the democratization and liberalization process forward.¹⁰⁸ The society, the business elite and the political forces, which were able to redefine themselves (especially the Islamists and some of the Conservative forces) found the EU-anchor as a means of consolidating a new internal economic and political outset conducive to their long term interests. On the other hand, the old Kemalist establishment including the military was reluctant to pursue reforms, letting them behind in the political competition. From this perspective the victory of the new political interests connected to further reforms and a more active foreign policy has become imminent as well.

The democratization and the effects of the Western influences generated changes inside the Islamic groups. The Islamic elite started to see the Westernization process differently (Dağı 2005) and took political advantage of it. They realized gradually that it is possible to continue the Westernization and keep the Muslim identity, moreover the democratization process makes it possible to curb the prerogatives of the old elite. (Dağı 2009, 45-46) Fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria involved such reforms that frees the Islamic movements from the “bully” of the Kemalist elite and especially the military. (Dağı 2006, 99) The effect of 9/11 and the civilization argument enhanced the changes even further. An Islamist party that embraced and spearheaded the EU accession could create a new role for Turkey as secular model in the Middle East based on the notion of “Muslim Democracy”. (Dağı 2009, 46) This process went along with a philosophical rethinking process in 1990s and culminated after the February 28 process, the desperate need for protection against the Kemalist establishment.

After the election victory, the AKP continued the EU accession process and the serious reforms, successfully curbing the power of the military and decreasing their political influence. By 2004, the continued reforms established measurable civil control and gave international legitimacy and credibility to the new Turkish government. Interesting though, that after the start of the EU accession negotiations the Turkish government slowed down the reform process which questioned the commitment and the

¹⁰⁸ On the anchor dilemma: (Uğur 1999)

real motif behind it. The 2006 progress report dismissed the Turkish developments and following it, several chapters were frozen. (Turkey 2006 Progress Report)

The EU accession played a crucial role in the internal transformation process as a solid anchor of reforms, an important symbol of modernization and opening in foreign policy. The demand from the society had become strong by the end of the 1990s and only those political groups could stay in the front which adapted to these changes. Some parts of the old Kemalist elite failed to do so, but the biggest winner of this process was the new Islamist elite. They “made their peace” with the Westernization process and were able to use it as a tool to gain external and internal credibility and decrease the power of their main opponent the Kemalist elite. The start of the accession negotiations was an important sign of a new and powerful Turkey, which is important for its Western partners.

Implications of the Kurdish issue

The Kurdish question is one of the unavoidable issues that clearly formed Turkish foreign policy in the last decades of the 20th century and has remained one of the most important elements until today. The Kemalist social engineering project only framed the Turkish nation as unity and the Turkish nation state did not take account of the minorities. This created the idea in the majority of the Turkish society that the people of Turkey are one homogeneous nation, and they perceive the denial of unity as a vital threat to the state. (Heper 2007, 3) The new republic treated the ethno-religious differences as a threat to its very project of establishing a new state, based on national characteristics. (Yavuz 1998, 3) Historically, the Kurds were not differentiated in the Ottoman Empire; they were part of the Muslim community and played an integral part of the society. As Muslims, they were equals, thus the new Turkish nationalistic ambitions to assimilate them were striking and triggered antagonism, resistance and eventually military conflict. The Kemalist leadership was determined to assimilate the Kurdish groups in the body of the Turkish nation using education and even force (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 17) The first violent clashes occurred in the 1920s and the 1930s, when Kurdish tribes started occasional attacks in the Southeast of Turkey. Effectively, the Kurdish resistance started the moment Ankara’s governing power reached their areas. The continuous rebellion was suppressed shortly after the death of Atatürk, due to the lack of unity and leadership in the Kurdish rebel groups.

The multiparty politics of the 1950s further eased the Kurdish problems providing less state control and promising more freedom. Thanks to the liberalization of the economy, most of the Kurdish entrepreneurs had the chance to invest in the developed areas of Turkey, thus became more connected to the central government. (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 13-14) The turbulent times of the 1960s brought a new phenomenon; the emergence of the socialist parties opened an opportunity space for the Kurdish leaders to claim their national rights under the umbrella of an internationally backed and recognized movement.¹⁰⁹ The internal fractures of the Kurdish groups and the discrepancies between the Kurdish nationalistic and socialist ideologies decreased their effectiveness substantively. However, this period allowed for the emergence of the predecessors of the rebel ideologies and the education of the leaders of the main parties of the resistance, such as the PKK. (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 15)

The aftermath of the military coup in 1980 brought the renewal of the violent resistance. The military junta was determined to abolish every activity and political behaviour that could be used against the state and the main Kemalist principles. The harsh and oppressing policies of the 1930s returned: the socialist and Kurdish parties were banned, along with the freedom of speech and the free usage of the national Kurdish dialects. The strict military control did not suppress, but, on the contrary, ignited the Kurdish nationalistic feelings that strengthened the Kurdish separatists. (Egeresi 2012, 97-98) Several Kurdish movements that had appeared in the 1970s were banned in 1980 and their members got imprisoned. The most radical leaders moved to Lebanon, where they received military training under Syrian tutelage. (Egeresi 2012, 98) After the necessary training and preparations in 1984, the PKK had enough strength to start a military operation in the South-eastern areas of Turkey. Between 1984 and 1999¹¹⁰ tens of thousands of people died in the intensive military operations, the majority of them Kurdish rebels and Turkish soldiers, but Turkish and Kurdish civilians were also heavily affected by the continuous terror attacks and the military actions.

The connection between the external pressures and the domestic variable is highly visible in the Kurdish question and the insurgency of the PKK. The Kurdish question became a tool of foreign and security policy in the hand of the Turkey's Eastern neighbours. As Barkey and Fuller states, the Kurdish question casted a long shadow on

¹⁰⁹ The socialist ideology gave the umbrella for the Kurds to start their political activities and create their own political parties, which rather followed Kurdish nationalist or in some cases separatist agenda.

¹¹⁰ The date of capturing the PKK's leader, Abdullah Öcalan.

all of Ankara's foreign policy concerns, ranging from relations with the US and Europe until the Middle East and even Russia. (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 157) Turkey's answer for the international pressure was the simplification of the question: Ankara did not acknowledge the existence of the non-violent resistance and the Kurdish claims, and with this, the PKK became the sole representative of the Kurdish rebellion in Ankara's eyes. The Turkish leadership identified the PKK with terrorism and immediately responded with military actions. At the same time, under the international pressure against the oppression of the Kurdish minorities, Ankara transformed the Kurdish issue into Turkey's greatest vulnerability. (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 157) The Turkish leadership discovered that the Kurdish problem had rendered the country vulnerable to those neighbours with which it had had long-standing disputes by providing them with an opportunity to embarrass or even harass Ankara. (Olson 1995) It has to be mentioned as well that the Kurds eagerly accepted the regional assistance.

The most obvious connection between the external security threats related to the Kurds and Turkish foreign policy can be found in the case of Syria: The Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad always openly supported the PKK with arms, training and money, and provided shelter for its leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The Turkish-Syrian divide was heavily damaging to Turkey's role in the Middle East, though it had a very strong impact on turning Turkey's attention towards the region and making Turkish foreign policy more active there. The Turkish-Syrian relations look back to strong tensions that rooted in the territorial claims of Syria over Alexandretta (the Turkish province of Hatay). (Knudsen 2003, 209) The antagonism, fuelled by the Cold War and the "Inönü-doctrine", reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s. The conflict manifested between Syria and Turkey over the division of the runoff of the Euphrates. Until the 1980s the previous French and British colonial agreements provided a good basis for the question on water division (Araş, Bülent 2004, 92), however, in the 1980s Turkey launched the Southeast Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi – GAP) (GAP 2005) and Syria started an extensive agricultural development programme. The GAP included vast irrigation systems, hydroelectric power plants that required huge amount of water in the catch-basin of the Euphrates.

Turgut Özal managed to prevent a military and a political conflict, but the problems re-emerged in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s the tensions grew remarkably again and the Turkish leadership tried to handle the Kurdish issue through military means. The military campaign against the Kurds coincided with the growing tensions between Syria

and Turkey again. In Turkey, the rise of the Islamists was stopped temporarily with a coup in 1997, however, the old elites tried to do everything to stop the threats possibly connected to them. The fears of the society and the Kemalists triggered the mobilization on the Syrian borders and a few-days long military stand-off. The Assad regime ousted the PKK leader Öcalan and stopped supporting the PKK openly. Syria and Turkey signed an agreement and started to stabilize their relations. (Sezgin 2002: 50-63) In 1998 the Syrian-Turkish conflict¹¹¹ almost led to conventional war between the two countries, however, the definite and immediate steps of the Turkish foreign policy and military elite proved to be effective. The fact that Syria stopped providing shelter for the PKK and its leaders meant an effective loss of power for the organization. In 1999 the Turkish Special Forces detained Öcalan in Kenya and brought him back to Turkey. (Sezgin 2002, 50-63) From 1998-1999 a more co-operative period started between Ankara and Damascus with the development of the political, economic and cultural relations. The foreign policy opening went hand in hand with the success in curbing the Kurdish resistance.

With regard to Iraq President Özal showed growing activity in its foreign policy and joined the international military campaign of the Gulf War, not following the “Inönü-doctrine” and the Kemalist military leaders’ will. The power-vacuum in Iraq and later the American no-fly zone over the Kurdish areas in the Northern-Iraq provided a perfect safe-haven for the PKK insurgents. The Turkish-Iraqi relationship deteriorated due to multiple causes: After the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq became insolvent and could not pay back its debts; in retaliation Özal shut down the pipelines carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean following the sanctions ordered by the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Baghdad became concerned about the ongoing construction of the GAP. During this period, the Turkish troops conducted regular cross-border operations to Iraqi territories – with the approval of Saddam Hussein. However, in the 1990s Baghdad started to reject the Turkish requests (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 170-172), which affected the Turkish security needs negatively. After the Gulf War, under the umbrella of the Operation Provide Comfort the Turkish military interventions continued in Northern Iraq, which led to growing international pressures. Özal changed his strategy and started negotiations with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. As a result, the PKK announced a temporary ceasefire. (Barkey 2000) After Özal’s death in 1990, the PKK restarted its

¹¹¹ More on the Syrian-Turkish conflict in 1998 see: (Makovsky 1999)

insurgency due to the collapse of the talks and the renewed Turkish military operations in Iraq.

From Turkey's point of view, the most sensitive issue regarding Iraq was the eventual disintegration of the country and the emergence of an independent Kurdistan calling for the unification of all Kurds in the region. In the beginning, Özal favoured the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) of Masud Barzani and started to cooperate with them against the Talabani-led PUK (Patriotic Union Kurdistan) in their internal conflict. (Hale 2000, 309-310) The continuous operations in Iraq and the growing autonomy of the Northern Kurdish areas against the central government were against Turkish interest. However, the relative stability of the country and the positive economic effects of joining the UN operations were still much more favourable than the unpredictable situation after a possible disintegration of the country. As much as in the case of Syria, the Turkish foreign and security policy slowly had to become active towards the Middle East, the "Inönü-doctrine" became insufficient after the eruption of the Kurdish insurgency. Fighting the Kurds in the region needed military, diplomatic and financial means at the same time.

Iran also tried to use the Kurdish minorities to regularly remind Turkey of its own vulnerabilities. (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 171) Iran had serious problems with the growing uncertainties in Northern Iraq and the expanding Turkish influence there. The Iranian leaders were concerned by the Turkish support to Azerbaijan and possibly of the support of Azeris of Northern Iran. (Koknar 2006) Iran provided support to Talabani's PUK and not the Barzani-led KDP, which had close ties with Turkey. (Gündoğan 2003) Iran's growing influence in Iraq could also be connected to the fact that the Turkish-Israeli relations grew much stronger, the strategic rapprochement covered the fields of military, politics and economy. After the mid-1990s, parallel with Erbakan's foreign policy turn towards the Muslim world Iran became stronger in the Kurdish areas of Iraq that already disturbed the Turkish and the Western interests. (Makovsky 1999b) it became clear already in the 1990s that the growing strategic threat from Iraq and Iran will necessitate continuous diplomatic and military activity towards the East.

The Kurdish question has always been a neuralgic point of Turkey's threat perception. That is why the neighbouring countries have always been able to play the Kurdish card in their conflict with Turkey effectively. The different Turkish governments made different decisions in their foreign policy, however, their answer to the PKK's threat and the Kurdish question was rather similar. Military actions, repressive and restrictive

policies became the standard, no matter if the Kemalists, or the Conservatives governed Turkey. The Kurdish issues could be handled mainly in the domestic realm until the 1990, but slowly the Kurds penetrated the Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian areas and the conflict became regional. The 1998 crisis between Syria and Turkey proved that the question of the Kurds needs continuous focus of the Turkish foreign policy towards its neighbours, the times of the “Inönü-doctrine” is over. Diplomacy, political (and economic) cooperation proved to be the most efficient solution to handling the Kurdish question.

Summarizing the results

The primary goals of the new elite after the establishment of the Turkish Republic were to create a functioning nation state and to build up a long term structure of institutions based on Western notions of democracy. The external environment was futile and hectic, with constant security challenges that threatened the mere existence of the new state. The growing Soviet threat and claims for the Turkish Straits, later WW II and the security threats of the Cold War environment all influenced the first decision-makers and the successive governments to be more cautious in their foreign policy decisions. This is why Atatürk created the notion of “peace at home, peace in the world”, which later became identified with the desired foreign policy behaviour of the Turkish republic.

Until the 1990s Turkey’s external environment was characterized by a constant, but predictable threat, both on the global and the regional scale. The threats generated by the Cold War and the constant proxy conflicts in the Middle East made the Turkish elite cautious, and – except for a few occasions – the Turkish governments did not deviate from the original foreign policy path of Atatürk until the mid-1980s. The foreign policy answer of Turkey for the external threats was an inward and Western-looking approach and seclusion from the immediate neighbours in the Middle East defined by the “Inönü-doctrine”.

As defined in Schweller’s theoretical framework (Schweller 2004) the external influences are filtered through the internal factors. Social cohesion and the regime’s vulnerability show until what extent the society and the main interest groups accept the incumbent political power, and how much the government is influenced by the interests of the different groups. After 1923 the whole Turkish society had to be reinvented. A strong gap emerged between the political-economic elite of the main cities and the “backward” Anatolian masses. The Kemalist elite concentrated mainly on the nation-

building processes, and followed an inward-looking and exclusionist foreign policy approach. The Cold War environment and the threats coming from the Soviet proxies triggered a unified reaction: The Turkish elite tried to tilt towards the West, but stayed inactive in terms of foreign policy at the same time. This was especially true in the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey. The unstable relations with the Arab countries and the emergence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were a new elements that defined Turkey's regional environment. The political elite groups – Including the military – tried to answer these threats with the tools provided by İnönü's foreign policy strategy. Following the "İnönü-doctrine" Turkey effectively blockaded itself from the neighbouring region until the mid-1980s.

Owing to the wide social gap between the Anatolian masses and the political elite, the interests of these social groups were not articulated for a long period of time, the society did not question the legitimacy of the political elite, and thus it recreated itself through democratic elections. Even though different parties were opened and closed, the successive parliamentary elections brought newer and newer coalitions, the main personalities behind the political parties remained the same. The society accepted the legitimacy of their leaders, and only started to question the foreign policy orientation relatively late in the 1980s.

As a reaction to the heavy losses of Turkey and the external economic shocks on the Turkish economy in the interwar period and during WW II the leadership decided to protect the Turkish economy more vehemently and to give an internal impetus for the growth. The creation of the ISI was also influenced by external security threats. The accession to the NATO in 1952 brought the obligation for further industrialization and infrastructural developments. The masses in the countryside that had previously been occupied in agriculture started to move to provincial population centres and bigger cities. As Mardin coined this process, the Turkish periphery slowly took over the centre. (Mardin 1973) With the internal migration of the uneducated and skilled workers, a different set of values emerged in big cities. These groups of conservative and Muslim newcomers started to claim new services in the cities, which opened the way (first for the socialist political organizations and later) for the Islamic charities and Islamic oriented political groups. Parallel to this process the MG started to gain strength in Turkey promising new representation, new economic goals and living standards.

With the slow transformation of the power groups in the society, the transformation of the foreign policy of Turkey was also inevitable. The new political

groups were more open to active foreign policy and trade towards the East, based on ideological, religious (Islamic solidarity) and economic interests (the Eastern Anatolian SME's were rather connected to the neighbouring countries and not to the West). In the 1980s the tensions decreased with the Soviet allies in the Middle East, which made a more open foreign policy orientation possible. The transformation of the society became visible with the election of Turgut Özal in 1983, who started to pursue a new foreign policy approach and started a global opening. The Turkish entrepreneurs gradually emerged in the Middle East, however, after a few years, the new external challenges in the beginning of the 1990s washed away these developments. Under these new circumstances, the society's claim for a change became more visible in the growing strength of Erbakan's Islamist oriented party, the RP.

The end of the Cold War and the different security threats in Turkey's immediate vicinity strengthened the demand for a more active foreign policy. The growing nationalistic sentiments inside the society and the nationalistic oriented parties claimed influence in the Turkic areas and the Muslim conservative groups demanded intervention in Bosnia. Enhanced activity became also necessary towards Iraq to handle the Kurdish question and reclaim the Turkish interests. The external challenges and opportunities that emerged in the reshaping regional and world order was "filtered through" the Turkish society. The external and internal influences were slowly pointing at the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

During the examination of the regimes' vulnerability, the role of the military cannot be avoided. The military elite always played a stabilizing role in Turkish politics, it has always been the most respected public institution in Turkey. However, the military has traditionally been a guardian of the Kemalist notions, and this way the protector of Turkey's independence, and inward-looking foreign policy. But their role is ambiguous, the military has a decisive part in the regime's vulnerability. The four military coups in the Turkish republic's history proved the fact that if an incumbent government deviates too much from the Kemalist track, the army would not hesitate to intervene. This fact left the political regimes vulnerable, thus fast changes became extremely risky for any political group. Stepping up against the socialist movements, the military supported the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, thus let the Islam oriented parties to gain strength. The radical changes that PM Erbakan tried to introduce in Turkey's domestic and political policies triggered the February 28 process. However, the last military coup left the military vulnerable as well, which opened the way for meaningful changes. Despite the fact that

the military remained one of the most trusted state institutions (Aydinli, Özcan and Akyaz 2006), its untouchability started to be questioned. This meant that the window of opportunity for a change opened up.

The Kurdish issue had also an important role in Turkey's foreign policy transformation as both an external and an internal threat. The Kurdish question has always been a neuralgic point of Turkish foreign policy. Since the very beginning, the decision-makers aimed at creating a unified Turkish nation and feared the possible separatist objectives of any minorities. The Kurdish groups became the most organized minority in Turkey and in 1984 started armed conflict in the Eastern areas of Anatolia. They questioned the legitimacy and the policies of the regime in Ankara and initiated an armed insurgency. The Turkish political and military elite answered this threat with military means, both inside and outside the country and penetrating mainly inside the country. The connection between the external pressures and the domestic variable became the most visible in the insurgency of the PKK. The Kurdish question became a foreign and security policy tool for Iraq and Syria that made Turkish leaders vulnerable. These neighbouring countries got an effective instrument in their hands to harass and blackmail Ankara. The 1998 incident with Syria, which almost led to war (Sezgin 2002) and the growing problems in Iraq proved that Turkey needed a proactive approach and a comprehensive cooperation with its regional partners in order decrease its vulnerability. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought a new warning of the Kurdistan region; namely that the Kurdistan region can influence the Turkish domestic arena, Turkish politicians are only able to offset it with active foreign policy approach. The growing tensions with the Kurds and the cross border features of the conflict triggered also a need for a more active foreign policy. Since the Kurdish problem constitutes the most important threat in the public's perceptions as well, the active counteractions against the insurgency has always received wide support in the society.

After having built up an analysis on the first two factors, the second two variables have to be examined. Elite consensus and elite cohesion give an answer to how much the elite creates one group and to what extent clashes inside the elite group and the different decision makers influence the foreign policy outcome. One of the major fractures inside the Turkish elite at the moment can be observed in the Kemalist versus Islamist/devout Muslim angle. The once leading secularist Kemalist political groups, represented mainly by the CHP, lost their power during the 1980s and 1990s and failed to redefine themselves. The military is an unavoidable segment of the Islamist-Kemalist fraction. The

military regards itself the protector of Kemalism, and as such, the protector of the values and the existence of the Republic. (Sakallioğlu 1997, 154) On this basis, the military intervened several times in politics, the army heavily pressured the civilian political elite, so that they changed their decisions and political strategies. This role started to erode from the second half of the 1990s. One of the major objectives of the AKP was to decrease the military's power on politics. Fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, the AKP started to establish civilian control over the military. The military's role in the different coups, especially in the so-called postmodern coup in 1997, taught the lesson for the AKP's leadership. (Dağı 2009)

By the end of the 1990s, a relatively cohesive elite group was in the making. The new political elite of the Muslim conservative (in some understanding Islamist) politicians grew stronger and stronger. The Islamist movements slowly penetrated the whole society and gained their support in the cities of Anatolia and the wider countryside, and eventually in the main Kemalist strongholds of Istanbul and Ankara as well. The developments, such as Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul and later Erbakan, the head of the openly Islamist RP signalled an irreversible shift in power towards a new political elite. This elite had different political ideals and different foreign policy orientation.

Parallel to the strengthening of the new political elite, the new Muslim conservative business elite gained power as well, mainly from the cities and regional centres of Anatolia. Besides the original Kemalist elite that was concentrated in Istanbul and the main cities, from the end of the 1970s a new group of businessmen started to emerge, different in its character. The Muslim entrepreneurs from Anatolian cities and towns started to become influential factors and used their informal networks of Islamic solidarity for their interests. Islamic solidarity was a strong motif behind securing a growing market share in Muslim regions. In contrast to the old business elite, the Anatolian Tigers projected an Eastward-looking strategy; they have built up strong relations with the neighbouring Middle Eastern region and searched opportunities in the Muslim countries of the fast growing Southeast Asia. Parallel with their emergence, the patterns of Turkish external economic relations were transformed. New trading partners from the East gained importance and previously neglected regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa became (re)discovered. Numerous small and medium sized companies grew strong and diversified their trade relations. Their main interest was a stable environment for economic growth and government support for expansion abroad. The AKP provided the necessary background for the emergence of Turkish companies

outside Turkey. It became apparent that the interests of the business elite heavily influenced Turkish foreign policy decisions as well. Kirişci argues that Turkish foreign policy activism is strongly interrelated with the interests of the main Turkish business associations and business groups. According to Kirişci, the main factor that was behind the paradigm change in the Turkish foreign policy towards the East was motivated and supported by these business elites, especially the new economic elite of Anatolia. (Kirişci 2009)

The interests of the old economic elite, the Kemalist businessmen lie rather in the Western economic orientation, for them, political stability and liberal economic policies are the most important factors. Similar to the Anatolian business elite, their claims aimed at a more active foreign policy, however, they concentrated on an opening towards the EU and pushing for a rapid accession process. Their claim was more and more included in the new policies of the Turkish governments in the 1990s; and in the beginning of the AKP's first governmental cycle from 2002 the EU accession became the most important foreign policy priority for Turkey. The TÜSIAD emphasized the importance of the EU track. According to their views, Turkey cannot accelerate its growth and competitiveness without intensifying its cooperation with countries more developed than Turkey itself. (Buğra 1998, 528)

The EU became an active element of the transformation of the political elite, through its anchor role in Turkish politics. The efforts to achieve the accession had wide support inside all political elite groups and the majority of the society. Interestingly, the old elite groups started to become more and more Eurosceptic, based on their internal disputes reacting to the criticism of the EU in the Kurdish question, on the pressure of the IMF on the Turkish economy and on their own failure to redefine themselves. On the other hand, the new elite together with the old economic elite made efforts to step forward in the EU accession process. The Muslim conservative political elite embraced the EU accession and strengthened their domestic support. There was also a side effect of supporting the EU accession and to make difficult reforms. With these reforms and an active EU approach the military's power over the politics and the risk of a next coup could have been reduced. The AKP put the EU accession to the top of its foreign policy agenda in 2001.

Having analysed the external security and political influences on Turkey and the internal transformations, the results verify the first hypothesis of this dissertation. By the beginning of 2000s an elemental change in the foreign policy orientation of Turkey

became inevitable. The external pressures and the new internal political claims predestined the outline of the new foreign policy system, though, the question remained open, when and how the transformation will occur? During the course of the 2000s the AKP, which was elected in 2002 started the negotiation with the EU, but at the same time, built up a strong regional influence of Turkey.

III. Turkey as a rising regional power

By the 2000s, both the external and the internal factors anticipated that Turkey would gradually pay more attention to its neighbouring regions, and the traditionally passive foreign policy would become an active one. The signs of this transformation had become unmistakable by the end of the 1990s. After a long struggle, the EU provided Turkey with a candidate status, which strengthened the European line in Turkish foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the party which had a strong pro-EU reform agenda could obtain the victory at the 2002 parliamentary elections. Internally, the consecutive economic crises, the 1997 postmodern military coup, the fast changing governments turned the attention away from the needs of the strengthening new elite and middle classes that had different claims in the political, economic, and cultural realms. In the beginning of the 2000s, a new and energetic Turkey was in the making, yet it was not exactly sure, which party and which politicians would take up the leading role.

The AKP, which was established in 2001 by the popular young and reformist politicians of the RP, was born in the midst of a political power vacuum in Turkey. After the death of Turgut Özal in 1993 the turbulence of the Turkish domestic politics returned once again. One decade of hectic domestic politics, changing coalitions and political stagnation was not tolerable for the population anymore. Seizing this moment the AKP could step in, providing answers for both the pro-European and both the Islam-oriented, conservative societies. Most importantly, with the support of the Anatolian bourgeoisie they had the financial means to conduct a successful campaign. As a result, the AKP won the 2002 elections with an overwhelming majority and could start a one-party government with only one party, the CHP in opposition. (Carrol 2004)

The 2002 elections clearly opened a new page in Turkey's foreign policy and its stance in its own region. In the first years, the AKP government had to prove itself for the domestic constituencies and the military in order to politically survive. The pro-European policies, the strict reform agenda and the close cooperation with the EU kept up their popularity both internationally and internally. The military and the Kemalist elite did not have the legitimacy and the power to initiate a coup against this party with such a level of support, that had been building up a religious-conservative and democratic agenda at the same time. The AKP balanced its policies between the domestic and external pressures in a pedantic way. As a result, in 2005 Turkey was celebrating the start of the

accession talks. However, by 2005, the whole environment of Turkey was in a state of transformation. The US invasion of Iraq generated security threats from the East, which the new government had to give an answer to. Also, owing to the growing Anatolian businesses Turkey became more and more interconnected with its neighbourhood to the East. Based on the external environment and the internal incentives the need emerged for a comprehensive and consequent foreign policy strategy towards in this direction. The two main factors that triggered this rapid change were the Iraqi and the EU factors, however, other elements, such as Syria or Iran also played a role in it.

Overview of Turkish foreign policy and the influencing external factors

The AKP had a clear and articulated agenda for the EU accession, however, did not dispose of a similar strategy in other fields of foreign policy in the beginning. Nevertheless, the external environment was changing rapidly around Turkey. At the end of the 1990s two main strategic lines became visible: strengthening ties with the Western partners and pressing the issue of the EU accession and, on the other side, there could be an “Eastern opening”. However, the security environment of Turkey changed fast. The events in the beginning of the new decade created new problems and security threats for Turkey that had to be tackled. By the time the AKP effectively stepped into power at the end of 2002, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US-led intervention in Afghanistan and the forthcoming invasion of Iraq had presented strong challenges in the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 119) Besides the EU accession efforts, the imminent invasion of Iraq was the most urgent foreign policy question the AKP had to face. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 128)

“Before November 2002, the AKP leaders had devoted relatively limited attention to defining their foreign policy, but for their determination to press ahead with their bid for EU membership.” (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 119) In 1999 the road to the EU accession seemed much easier, than it became in reality. After the positive decision of the EU in 1999, there was a remarkable growth in the support for the EU accession both in the Turkish population and the Turkish elite. (Çarkoğlu 2003) It was obvious prior to the beginning of the new century that this would become the first foreign policy priority of any government in Turkey, no matter which political parties would constitute the governing coalition. Already before the parliamentary elections in 2002, the AKP started to support the political reforms in favour of the accession to the European Union, which

paved the way for an image of a reform-oriented party. After the AKP had stepped into power, it became clear, that in parallel with creating a reform agenda, the Turkish leadership had to keep an eye on the hesitating European leaders constantly. The leadership of the AKP was welcomed during their visits in the US or in several European destinations, but Germany and France were not overenthusiastic. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 120)

During the course of the first years in government, the AKP followed a pro-EU reform agenda, which was confirmed by the EU and most of the EU member states. However, the need for a critical decision on the Turkish accession process made some politicians and European governments raise their objections against the very principle of the Turkish accession. The strongest opposition came from Austria, Germany and France. Angela Merkel German Chancellor proposed the idea of a special or a privileged partnership for Turkey instead of the promise of a full accession. The French political parties were divided on the Turkish issue, President Chirac supported the Turkish government, the main opposition party and its leader (later President) Sarkozy firmly opposed the very fact of it. (Lagro 2008) As a general pattern, the conservative, Christian-democratic parties opposed the Turkish accession, on a cultural-religious basis, simply questioning the fact whether Turkey belongs to Europe.

Despite these strained relations between the EU and Turkey, the support in the Turkish society was still high for the accession and the AKP continued the reform agenda for domestic political purposes.¹¹² (Rada and Rada 2007, 10-11) However, the unresolved issue of the status of Cyprus threatened with serious troubles in the EU-Turkish relations. The urgent need emerged for at least a timeline of negotiations before May 2004, the accession of the Greek half of the island to the EU. It was already obvious, prior to 2003, that the Greek-Cypriots' accession would further complicate the bilateral ties between the EU and Turkey. After their accession, all the EU-Turkish agreements and protocols would have to be extended on Cyprus with active legal ratification from Ankara. This meant according to the Ankara Protocol of the agreement on the Customs Union¹¹³ that Turkey needed to open its ports for ships operating under the flag of Cyprus. Knowing the serious

¹¹² The reform agenda and the pro-EU stance kept up the AKP's popularity, and at the same time it served as a „shield” against the accusations of being Islamist party that is against the Kemalist foundations of the Turkish state. The reforms kept the government safe from a possible military coup and also gradually contributed to the stronger and stronger civil control of the military.

¹¹³ The document is available on the website of the European Union: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/customs_unions/article_414_en.htm

repercussions of such a scenario, the Turkish government supported all local and international efforts, finding a long-lasting solution for the conflict. The AKP supported the peace negotiations of the Greek and Turkish sides, and the mediation of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. (Çelenk, 2007, 351-352) Following the UN's active contribution to the settlement of the conflict along the "Annan-plan" the two sides prepared for a referendum on April 2004, just a few days before the date of the Greek Cypriots' accession to the EU. The majority of the Turkish Cypriots, backed up by the Turkish politicians supported the Annan plan, because this would have meant the accession of their fellows to the EU and at the same time a solution of a problem, which threatened the Turkish accession the most. However, there was no such a pressure on the Greek side and the Greek Cypriots rejected the referendum on the unification of the island. (Sachs 2004)

The failure of the Annan plan caused serious disappointment in Turkey, especially the fact that the Turkish side of the island did not receive any compensation for their supportive stance in the negotiations, while the Greeks joined the EU. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 122-123) At the European Council meeting at the end of 2004 the Greek Cypriot leader, PM Papadopoulos wanted to use its leverage in the negotiations against Turkey in order to receive further advantages inside the EU. However, the majority of the EU Heads of State and Prime Ministers were strictly in favour of a positive decision. The European Council agreed that the Turkish accession negotiations could start on 3rd October 2005. In return, the Turkish government agreed to sign an additional protocol to extend the effect of the Customs Union on the new member states, including Cyprus. The 'Negotiating Framework for Turkey' a document created by the European Commission included further conditionalities, from which the most important (and for Turkey disappointing) clause was the one, which stated that the negotiations are "open-ended", the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed.¹¹⁴

Even though the starting date of the negotiations was set, the general opinion in the EU started to change on the accession of Turkey. The growing tensions with the Muslim communities inside the European societies turned the positive atmosphere into a slightly negative one. (Rada and Rada 2007, 22) The difficulties of integrating the 10 new member states did not help the issue of the Turkish accession either. The conservative

¹¹⁴ The document is available: Negotiating Framework (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005) URL: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf

turn became visible in 2005 with the elections' success of Angela Merkel in Germany. The French and the Austrian governments raised their concerns as well. Turkey signed the additional protocol, however made a provision that this act would not amount to the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 123-124)

After October 3, 2005 the negotiations started, but almost immediately stopped. The initial target date for the Turkish accession was 2014, until which the negotiations would have had to agree on 35 different chapters. Negotiations started on 6 chapters, and closed one chapter on science in less than a year. However, without a resolution of the conflict in Cyprus the continuation of the negotiations became hopeless. The Turkish government showed willingness to effectively extend the customs union on the Republic of Cyprus in return for easing the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The initiative failed due to the opposition of the Greek Cypriot president, Papadopoulos. (Çelenk 2007)

These events toned down the euphoria and Europe – instead of embracing Turkey – started to search for excuses how to slow down any advancements in the accession process. Negotiations started in only about a third of the chapters (fourteen)¹¹⁵ and only one has been concluded so far¹¹⁶. Furthermore, in 2006 the EU Council blocked the opening of eight chapters¹¹⁷ (because Turkey did not accept the Amendment of the Ankara Agreement in its relations with Cyprus and did not open the Turkish ports and airports for ships and planes under the Cypriot flag). The year of 2007 brought even further tensions in the Turkish-EU relations. The election of President Nicolas Sarkozy in France strengthened the group of European leaders who were not favouring the Turkish accession. President Sarkozy announced that France blocks five more chapters¹¹⁸. Sarkozy also initiated the creation of the panel of the wise men, who would have made a decision on the borders of Europe. Even though, the European Council did not approve the French president's idea, it further burdened the relationship. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 127)

¹¹⁵ These chapters are: Free Movement of Capital, Company Law, Intellectual Property Law, Information Society & Media, Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy, Taxation, Statistics, Enterprise & Industrial Policy, Trans-European Networks, Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments, Science & Research, Environment and Climate Change, Consumer & Health Protection, Financial Control.

¹¹⁶ Science & Research

¹¹⁷ Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment For Companies & Freedom To Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture & Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union, External Relations

¹¹⁸ Economic & Monetary Policy, Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments, Financial & Budgetary Provisions, Institutions and put their reservation on the already blocked chapter on Agriculture & Rural Development.

Obviously, this triggered domestic repercussions inside Turkey, and the Turkish government slowed down the reform agenda remarkably. As an encouragement and confidence building measure the EU proposed to open negotiations in a few more chapters, however, the Turkish government seemed less eager to react positively to the warnings and requests. The European Commission called on Turkey for the continuation of the reform agenda, however, the Turkish government started to work more and more on its “Eastern” foreign policy initiatives and reacted less to the signals coming from Europe. After an unsuccessful trial to settle the Cyprus conflict under UN auspices, the Republic of Cyprus announced in 2009 the freezing of the negotiations in six additional chapters¹¹⁹. This caused a serious disappointment for Turkey and a push for building a new foreign policy course that Turkey had already started a few years earlier.

However, at the end of the decade a contrapositive process emerged. After the AKP’s second victory in 2007 Turkey not only had the potential and capabilities of being an influential actor, but started to behave like one and started to articulate its regional claims. The growing self-esteem of the Turkish leadership and the diversification of foreign relations caused political repercussions in the EU. (Evin et al 2010, 7) This coincided with the realization from the European side that Turkey became a clear economic and political factor in its neighbourhood that can serve as an important asset for the EU’s foreign policy and economic purposes; Turkey could be a credible intermediary of the European interest to its neighbouring regions. (Kirişçi, Tocci and Walker 2010, 24-28) “Turkey may represent an asset to the Western alliance precisely because its policies in the neighbourhood are distinct and not simply a replica of American and EU policies in the region.” (Evin, et al 2010, 29) Turkey’s real potential lied in helping the region to integrate deeper in the global system, thus conduce to the realization of Western interests in the neighbouring areas.

“The future of Turkey-EU relations is really about what the EU will decide it wants to be, a decision, which Germany and France will be key to determine.” (Çağaptay 2013a, 16) The negative attitude of France and Germany changed after 2009 – President Sarkozy ceased to openly speak about the privileged partnership. In the environment of a formulating worldwide financial crisis, the strong Turkish economy proved to be an important and strategic partner. The EU started to anticipate a positive agenda in its Turkish relations.

¹¹⁹ Freedom of Movement For Workers, Energy, Judiciary & Fundamental Rights, Justice, Freedom & Security, Education & Culture, Foreign, Security & Defence Policy

Turkey's Western relations were only one side of the coin, after 2002, the AKP had to handle the changes on its Eastern borders. Following the terror attacks on 11th September 2001 the Turkish leadership showed the greatest sympathy towards the US and PM Bülent Ecevit sent his personal condolences to President Bush.¹²⁰ The Turkish forces joined the international coalition in Afghanistan and remained supportive in the international stabilizing efforts as well. However, Iraq was a totally different case. Turkey feared that the effects of the Gulf Wars will be repeated and the negative spill over effects of the instabilities in Iraq will seriously affect the stability and the economic interest of Turkey. In the midst of the PKK insurgency the general fear was that after the collapse of the Saddam regime, the Kurdish leaders will seize the opportunity to create their own state. In this case Kurdish areas could have given a backup support for the Kurdish insurgency in Eastern Turkey and a safe haven for the PKK fighters. Bülent Ecevit – and from 2002 – PM Abdullah Gül were against the invasion of Iraq. However, it became obvious soon, that President Bush was determined about his military plans and the Turkish politicians could not influence him. It was not in Turkey's interest to antagonize the US with not providing sufficient support. The best solution seemed to be letting the American troops on Turkish soil and in return the Turkish forces were ready to enter Northern Iraq watching the Kurds from a closer distance. (Çağaptay 2004)

Nevertheless, the AKP's leadership attempted to reach results in the disarmament of Iraq. Abdullah Gül – as a foreign minister – held consultations in Middle Eastern capitals, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt met in Istanbul, even a Turkish minister travelled to Baghdad to head off the prospective invasion of Iraq. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 131) After seeing that the diplomatic efforts could not avert Washington from its Iraqi plans, the Turkish government demanded 92 billion USD aid to cover the future losses, caused by the war. Washington was ready to provide financial support, but much less, than Turkey demanded.¹²¹ Despite the pragmatic interests behind joining the invasion and providing access to Turkish soil for the American military, eventually the Turkish parliament did not support the military intervention in 2003, due to the revulsion of most of the society and the main elite groups. Because of this decision the American military and political leaders became furious,

¹²⁰ Hürriyet Daily News January 6, 2002.

¹²¹ The US government agreed to provide 6 billion USD aid in grants and further 24 billion USD in loan guarantees (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 132)

however, this did not hinder the invasion, which started 20th March 2003. (Çağaptay 2004)

The lack of Turkish foreign policy strategy on Iraq and the lack of foreign policy experience became apparent in this case. Soon after the rejection, the Turkish parliament voted for a resolution that allowed the NATO forces to use Turkish airspace and later reaffirmed the American troops' access to the Incirlik airbase in Eastern Turkey. The Turkish political leadership tried to make sure that the military would be part of the stabilization efforts in Iraq, especially in the Kurdish areas. Turkish troops, however, were not invited by the Provincial Governing Council eventually. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 132) This way Turkey did not become part of the imbroglio of the Iraqi war, at the same time lost its leverage to influence on the Kurdish areas.

The invasion of Iraq and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime had two important consequences for the whole region, thus influenced significantly the Turkish foreign policy as well. As mentioned earlier, the AKP had not had a consequent foreign policy strategy on Iraq and the Middle East before the American troops started the invasion. However, with the fall of an important political actor in the region, a new situation emerged. The fact that Iraq meant a serious security threat was not new, but the fact that a power vacuum emerged predicted a regional resettlement. This situation called for influencing and stabilizing the whole region and a chance for stronger regional role of Turkey. The AKP government tried to live up to this opportunity and turned its attention to the East, especially after the virtual halt of the EU accession process in 2006.

Most importantly, the Turkish governments had to be ready to handle the Kurdish question, the situation in Northern Iraq. After the Turkish parliament failed to provide its support for the American invasion, Washington put Turkey aside and the Kurdish Regional Government filled in the space. The American leadership could not afford to lose their support, thus did not let Turkey into Iraq as the Turkish military leadership planned. They feared that President Barzani would initiate the break-away of the Kurdish territories. Even though the US government proclaimed the support for the territorial integrity of Iraq and the goal of creating an inclusive new government, Turkey stayed uneasy about the possible scenarios of the future of Kurdistan. The conflict became deeper because of the issue of Kirkuk, a city with mixed population and a huge amount of oil reserves. Turkey opposed President Barzani's claim for the city, because with Kirkuk the Kurds could have financed the creation of a state. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 134)

According to the agreement between Syria and Turkey that was signed in 1998, the PKK was forced to leave Syria. (Sezgin 2002) The main forces moved to Iraq, from where they planned their attacks against Turkey. In the autumn of 2003, the PKK unilaterally ended the ceasefire, that they proclaimed in 1999, and renewed its attacks in Eastern Turkey. (Larrabee 2008, 8) Turkey pushed for an agreement with the US, however, they did not manage to reach one. The strenuous situation was further intensified by the Turkish military leadership that suggested unilateral actions in Iraqi territories, in the form of cross-border military operations. The idea was dropped, but it burdened the already tense US-Turkish relations further. (Larrabee 2008, 8-9) With the US inaction the PKK gained strength and continued its armed resistance in Anatolia. Erdoğan visited Washington and convinced President Bush about the need of a security cooperation. The Iraqi-American Turkish cooperation included sharing intelligence information and allowed for targeted Turkish operations limited only against PKK bases. This became very important step forward towards settling the bilateral ties with the US and also creating the atmosphere for cooperation with Iraq. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 135)

Erdoğan paid a historic visit to Baghdad in 2008, which was the first high level political visit to Iraq from the Turkish side in 20 years. Erdoğan aimed to improve the ties with Baghdad and at the same time to find an ally in its fight against the PKK. Owing to the continuous military operations, the relations between the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey deteriorated. However, both the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government were interested in bringing Turkey closer and to develop an interest based cooperation. In 2009 the Turkish government was open to settle the long dispute over the distribution of the water of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Most importantly, by 2009 the Iraqi leadership started to support the Turkish efforts against the PKK and even Barzani spoke sympathetically about the military operations. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 135-136)

The American invasion of Iraq changed the power-balance of the Middle East and reshaped the whole region. In this new environment Turkey had to create a new approach towards the most important partners, Iran, Israel and Syria. These countries posed the most important external influences on Turkey that generated the activation of its foreign policy towards the region. Apparently with Iran and Syria the most important issues to tackle were related to the demise of Iraq and the PKK's activity. The Turkish decision, not to participate in the invasion of Iraq put Tehran and Ankara on the same side, and

allowed for a positive atmosphere. The Iranian-Turkish cooperation was necessary against the Kurdish separatists that fought in Iranian territories as well.¹²² Iran's efforts to fight against the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê – PJAK), which had bases close to the PKK in the Northern Iraqi territory, brought the two countries closer together. Their cooperation did not exceed sharing military intelligence, however it was an important breakthrough in their common efforts.

The economic cooperation became an important element with Syria that moved the relations from conflicted to cooperative. Syria became the showcase of the new Turkish foreign policy approach from the second half of the 2000s. The “zero problems with the neighbours” policy¹²³ became operational in the relationship between Turkey and Syria. After the warming up period between them, Ankara ambitioned to mediate in the historic conflict of Israel and Syria. (Taşpınar 2012, 137)

After the standoff on the Turkish-Syrian borders in 1998 brought a fundamental change in the bilateral relations. As mentioned earlier, the crisis that almost ended in a military conflict created an atmosphere of cooperation. Syria expelled the PKK and its leaders and in return Turkey let more water to Syria through the Euphrates. Two years later, Turkey was represented at the funeral of Hafez Al-Assad on the highest level. The rapprochement of the two countries was strongly motivated by the war in Iraq, which disrupted the Turkish-Iraqi trade relations. After the loss of the Iraqi market there was a need to find a strong trade partner in the immediate neighbourhood. As a result of the rapprochement, the trade volume jumped significantly only in a few years' time. Syria had a crucial role in Turkey's efforts to diversify the sources for natural gas and crude oil. According to the original plans, the Egyptian and Syrian natural gas could have reached Turkey, which started to elaborate on the plans of regional distribution of electricity. (Araş and Aydın 2005, 33-34)

From 2003 a positive atmosphere characterized the bilateral Turkish-Syrian relations. The flourishing cooperation between Damascus and Ankara slowly made it possible for Turkey to develop a strong influence inside Syria and at the same time to become the “gate” for Assad's international opening. The changes inside Syria predestined this scenario. After the death of Hafez al-Assad, his son Bashar stepped into

¹²² During Erdoğan's visit to Tehran in 2004 an agreement was signed on the cooperation against the Kurdish separatist organizations. (Larrabee 2008, 9)

¹²³ The new foreign policy approach that was initiated in the second half of the 2000s will be elaborated on in details in the forthcoming sections of this chapter.

power in 2000. However, the young president of the country was deemed to be a leader with soft hands. Syria, which had been struck by an economic crisis had to face a political and foreign policy crisis as well in 2005, when following the Hariri assassination the Syrian army was forced to leave Lebanon. (Zisser 2006) The Turkish influence gradually grew in Syria, which had positive effects on regional stability. Turkey tried to play a mediating role between Syria and Israel in 2006 and 2007. The secret negotiations almost reached an agreement in 2008, however, they collapsed after Israel's military operation in Gaza at the end of 2008. (Taşpınar 2012, 137) The Turkish-Syrian relations reached their peak in 2007 with the signing a free trade agreement. Their bilateral relations were strong from the beginning of the AKP rule, but improved even further by the second half of the decade. The Assad regime became one of the most important regional partner of Turkey. The threat, which was the most important characteristic of their relations in the 1990s was changed in the 2000s to cooperation and Turkey's growing influence.

Turkey – against the will of the US – strengthened the economic cooperation with Iran as well, especially by buying natural gas. (Coşkun 2010; Flanagan 2013, 170) According to the agreement that was made by the Erbakan government, Turkey started to import natural gas from 2001. (Gürzel 2012, 144) In order to decrease the vulnerability based on importing natural gas only from Russia, Turkey started to search for other options. Besides the Nabucco project – which would have transported Azeri natural gas to Turkey – Ankara initiated stronger cooperation with Tehran. (Flanagan 2013, 171) In 2007 the Turkish and the Iranian ministers signed a memorandum of understanding on building a new pipeline to have the capacity of re-exporting Iranian natural gas to Europe. (Gürzel 2012, 144)

In May 2010, the US and most of the EU members were concentrating on declaring further sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear programme. However, Turkey did not line up with its Western allies, instead, – together with Brazil – announced a nuclear swap programme for Iran.¹²⁴ Even though the swap deal had been designed according to the demands of the US, it did not address every aspects, thus did not become approved by the US.¹²⁵ (Gürzel 2012, 141; Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 72) The development of eventual military nuclear capacities in Iran was a threatening scenario for

¹²⁴ The Tehran Declaration stipulated that 20-percent –enriched nuclear fuel had to be provided to Iran to be used in its research reactor, in exchange for the removal of a big amount of low-enriched uranium to Turkey (Gürzel 2012, 141)

¹²⁵ On Turkey's mediating role between Iran and the US see also. (Balogh 2009)

Turkey as well. Turkey as member of the NATO is protected by its “nuclear umbrella” against any possible aggressor countries, including a nuclear Iran. Thus, Turkey has always supported regional non-proliferation, which could have provided more regional security. According to Gürzel, Turkey has always disposed of a small amount of US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Incirlik airbase, which could have given Turkey self-confidence in its non-proliferation policies. (Gürzel 2012, 143) This fact lowered the threat perception created by the Iranian nuclear programme, however, it never vanished. The Iranian nuclear ambitions generated concerns not only in the political groups inside Turkey, but in the AKP as well. Most of the Turkish politicians believed that aligning themselves with the Western policies and imposing newer sanctions would only delay the Iranian nuclear capacities and would not be able to curb them. (Gürzel 2012, 144)

The AKP governments’ “zero problems policy with the neighbours” implicated a gradual intensification of Turkish-Iranian relations. Based on the mutual sympathy of the religious elites, this could have been a possible option, however, Turkey could not become a reliable partner for Iran. Iran has perceived Turkey as a competitor. (Gürzel 2012, 145) On the other hand, Iran’s challenge towards Turkey was further complicated by the strengthening bilateral trade ties. Starting with the signed deal of gas (and oil) supply to Turkey, the two countries became strongly interdependent, contributing to the complexity of their relations based on cooperation and threat.

With the announcement of the “zero problems with the neighbours” policy, Turkey ambited a mediating role in global conflicts. One of these examples was PM’s foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s mediation effort in the Iranian-US relations and Iran’s nuclear agenda, which was announced by Prime Minister Erdoğan. (Sözen 2010, 110; Balogh 2009) With a possible step forward in the Turkish mediating ambitions the threat level posed by Iran as an important regional factor could have been reduced significantly for Turkey. Not to mention the fact that these nuclear developments in Iran posed a greater threat to Israel in the region. The Turkish ambitions for a stable neighbourhood included the idea of decreasing the possibility of an Israeli pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which could lead to a regional armed conflict.

As a heritage of the 1990s, in the first periods of the AKP government’s rule Israel was regarded as a strategic partner and a regional ally. The mutually beneficial cooperation was based on Turkey’s request for advanced Israeli military technology and Israel’s need of easing regional isolation. The bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel in this period can be characterized by the coexistence of politically critical

approaches and strong economic, military and political cooperation. However, the start of the second intifada triggered the criticism of the Ecevit government in 2001, but these new accents of the Turkish foreign policy started to reveal from 2003. PM Erdoğan became openly critical about Israel's policies in the Palestinian territories, and even called them a state terror in 2004. (Çağaptay 2005) The relations were further strained after the success of Hamas in the Palestinian elections and the official visit of the Hamas delegation to Turkey in 2006. The second Israel-Lebanon war in the same year added to the disagreements and made these relations even tenser, which triggered Turkey-wide demonstrations against Israel. (Larrabee 2009, 19) However, the strategic relationship remained in place, the weapon purchases and the military field exercises ¹²⁶ were generally accepted areas of their bilateral cooperation.

Despite the fruitful cooperation, it became obvious already in 2008 that the Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations were about to change; parallel to Turkey's engagement in the Iranian nuclear negotiation, which bothered Israel seriously, growing criticism towards Israel's Gaza policies emerged. After the 2007 inter-Palestinian split, Israel and Egypt decided to impose a blockade around the Gaza Strip. Turkey has been criticizing Israel for violating human rights in Gaza. This went even further with the Israeli Operation Cast Lead, which left at least 1300 dead in Gaza and hundreds more injured. The Turkish Prime Minister swiftly condemned the Israeli actions, however did not condemn the rocket attacks of Hamas. The Turkish Prime Minister further escalated the tensions at the World Economic Forum in Davos, when harshly criticized the Israeli President, Shimon Peres. (Eligür 2013, 439) The Operation Cast Lead was especially painful for the Turkish leadership because it coincided with the mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Turkey felt betrayed by the Israeli counterpart when they were not informed on the military intervention under preparations. The turning point of the bilateral relations was the flotilla incident in 2010, ¹²⁷ which eventually lead to the deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli political relations and even to lowering the level of diplomatic representations.

¹²⁶ Turkey, the US and Israel conducted the latest annual exercise of their air forces, the Anatolian Eagle in 2008 (Eligür 2013, 433) and that of their navies, the Reliant Mermaid in 2009 (Eligür 2013, 440)

¹²⁷ The Turkish Islamist civil society association, the IHH organized a flotilla in May, 2010, which was sailing towards the Gaza Strip with allegedly humanitarian aid on board. Their aim was to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza. The Israeli commandos boarded the leading ship, Mavi Marmara and were attacked by the activists. In response they used live ammunition and the action killed 9 Turkish citizens. (Eligür 2013, 440)

By the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 Turkey's relations with its long-time allies, the US, the EU and Israel had deteriorated, a new foreign policy line became visible, and those countries who used to be foes in previous historical periods became closer allies. Turkey reacting to the external environment, which generated strong security concerns and foreign policy opportunities at the same time, answered with a new active approach, and a systematic initiative to influence the whole region. Especially, starting from 2009, the appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu to the post of Foreign Minister, Turkish foreign policy could be termed as a quest for regional soft power.

Transformation inside Turkey – the internal factors

After analysing the main external influences, the general pattern of the Turkish foreign policy until 2011 and the soft power ambitions of Turkey, this dissertation tries to give a thorough analysis and an explanation of the Turkish foreign policy changes through the internal framework that was specified earlier, Schweller's four variables. (Schweller 2004, 170-181) The task of this chapter is to link the soft power ambitions and opportunities with the realities created by the external and internal environment of Turkey. Through Schweller's four variables this dissertation explains how the foreign policy of the 2000s and the growing will of the society are connected and how the desires of the old elite groups and strong social groups fall back. The separation of the sections follows the logic in the different issues and connects the four variables to them.

The first section – following the logic of the previous main chapter of the dissertation – examines the questions of social cohesion and the government's vulnerability, how much the internal changes gave a proper basis to the total transformation of the country's foreign policy. The society's support to the institutions and the policies built up by the AKP government and the legitimacy remained to be questionable for quite a long time, not to mention the vulnerability of the government.

The AKP's emergence and rise to power was based on the retrogradation of the secularist elite and the banning of the old Islamist elite. Thus those threats and social ambiguities coming from both the antagonist, secular elite groups and the social groups that clearly echoed their dissatisfaction with the rise of an Islamist party to power remained. The first task of the AKP was to assure its legitimacy towards the society and then try to handle the questions of reaching a consensus, if not a stable, majority among

the obviously not cohesive elite. The second section analyses, how much the Turkish elite transformation continued in the 2000s. The continuation of the processes that started inside the Turkish elite from the 1980s and the slow demise of the secular, exclusive groups in politics all lead up to two parallel results: the growing division of the Turkish society and the desperate clashes of the two antagonistic elite groups. Breaking the pattern of the analysis set up in the previous chapter, the regime vulnerability must be examined in this section as well, namely because the AKP governments legitimacy was questioned and threatened on the elite level both by the military and the old political elite several times. As part of the elite coherence, the chapter sheds light on the leadership factor and the consequences of the strong leadership pattern in the Turkish political culture, namely the “Erdoğan factor”. Also, the external ally of the AKP government, the Hizmet movement will receive its own section. Since the EU accession process played a crucial role in the elite transformation, the dissertation will include it as an internal factor within the second section. Following the logic of the previous chapter, the Kurdish question and the influence of the mixture of violence and reconciliation with the Kurds will be analysed in the third part.

The last section overviews the relationship of the external influences and these domestic factors before translated into certain decisions of the foreign policy executive. This section gives an explanation, how much the domestic changes and the internal processes affected the foreign policy of Turkey and how much the new ambitions can be understood through the framework of this dissertation. This section reveals the contradictions of the foreign policy ambitions and their barriers decoded inside the Turkish society. The Turkish soft power ambitions had their barriers inside the cleavages of the Turkish domestic environment. This section will provide for a connection to the subsequent chapter that explains the Turkish soft power ambitions and the new foreign policy line of Turkey along the concept of Ahmet Davutoğlu.

Power relations and political affiliations inside the Turkish society

The shift inside the Turkish society towards the conservative right did not stop during the 2000s, it continued after AKP’s rise to power. The classification of Turkish domestic politics along the lines of the centre-periphery argument by Mardin (Mardin 1973; Mardin 2005) remained still valid after 2000, however, some supplements must be added to cover the last period of the Turkish society’s internal adjustments. According to

Hale and Özbudun “the superimposition of the class, centre-periphery and the secularist-religious cleavages has led to a particularly deep and potentially explosive division, a real dichotomy, in Turkish politics.” They underline that multiple and parallel divisions inside a society, especially if they are possibly reinforcing one another, pose a serious challenge to democratic stability. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 34)

In the centre-periphery cleavage it is important to underline that both the centre and the periphery had changed by the 2000s, the latter one substantially. After the elections in 2002, the only two political groups that stayed in the parliament were the AKP and the CHP.¹²⁸ According to some assessments the latter remained the strongest opposition party and for years the only group in the parliament that signed up to defend the centrist values. On the other hand, the AKP seemed to be the representative of the peripheral forces. Both of these allegations are oversimplifications and exaggerations, especially the one referring to the AKP. As explained earlier, during the previous decades the periphery of the Turkish society penetrated the centre both on the lower and the elite levels. However, the periphery still existed in 2002 and still exists today that provides for the unique social pattern of the AKP’s voters. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 33-39; Çarkoğlu 2007)

The AKP accounts for a multilevel voter base, which changed the whole structure of the Turkish political power balance and the “political game field”. There is no direct lineage with the older Islamist political parties and the leadership has never claimed to. The AKP emerged as the downstream of MG movement, however it was not the descendant of Erbakan’s parties.¹²⁹ The AKP allured only about half of the voters from Erbakan’s party, the rest were coming from the conservative religious but not necessarily the Islamist part of the political spectrum. Polls showed that the rest of the voters came from the supporters of the centre-right ANAP and DYP parties and the far right MHP. The AKP managed to recreate a pool of political support, similar to the one Turgut Özal created in 1983, a wide social basis, mainly from the rightist and conservative sections of the society, with some segments from the centre left, winning the not strictly secular groups from the CHP. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 37; Çarkoğlu 2006, 164, 171)

¹²⁸ The AKP received 34, 28% of the votes, which awarded the party 363 seats in the 550 seats Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The CHP received 19,39%, that was worth for 178 seats. Other parties did not manage to cross the 10% election threshold. (Çarkoğlu 2002; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu 2007, 24-31)

¹²⁹ Partially as a self-defending strategy against the military and its attempts to categorize the party as Islamist, this way to initiate the closure of it following the 1982 Constitution.

The AKP created a basis of supporters, which is not only interesting from the perspective of their political affiliation, but also from a sociological point of view. As the previous chapter discussed, the rise of the AKP was parallel to and interdependent from the emergence of a new Muslim bourgeoisie, the new devout Muslim conservative business generation. Yavuz underlines the driving force of this new business elite group behind the “cross-class” coalition supporting the new political party’s power. The composition of this social alliance embrace the rural population, the working classes from the cities, the small tradesman, the urban-slum dwellers and the new well-offs: businessmen, emerging academia and intellectual, religious Muslim middle classes. (Yavuz 2006a, 4-7) The equation includes both the losers and the winners of globalization and the different crises of the last few decades. This means that the AKP had the pool of the big masses among its supporters, thus the populist political rhetoric worked well. On the other hand, the political agenda was not empty populism, thus a strong and wide group of politically and economically influential supporters aligned with the new policy lines of the AKP.

The cross-class feature of the AKP’s voter basis had another important consequence on the political development of the AKP and the Muslim and Islamist groups. The strong power of the business elite and the growing middle classes curbed the influence of the poor and the marginalized, thus did not allow for the radicalization. (Öniş 2006, 212) It would be a big mistake to neglect this element, since the moderate direction in the development of the AKP and its policies, the West, EU conform reforms and the government’s policy lines compatible with Kemalist/secular military and political institutions were among the most important reasons, why the AKP could strengthen its power.

There were two parallel developments in the society: a growing support and participation from the marginalized groups besides the new Muslim elite, which widened the pool of support for the AKP; and a strong polarization of the society along religious and cultural lines. Even though, the AKP showed a rather moderate political stance and acceptance towards the claims of the seculars, the main cleavage of the society, the original faultline between Islam and secularism remained the main the divisive force inside the social structures. (Hale and Özbudun 2010 38)

The parliamentary elections in July 2007 brought a landslide victory for the AKP, which received 46, 58% of the popular votes.¹³⁰ This was second time a record in Turkish political history, when a government managed to increase its votes in its second term. After the DP in 1954, the AKP reached this record in 2007 with a higher percentage of the votes than in 2002. This success was due to the AKP's successful reform policies, the stabilized economy that started skyrocketing and the successes in foreign policy, including the start of negotiations with the EU.¹³¹ The coalition of the secular powers, the CHP and the DSP received 20.88%, and the far-right MHP 14.27%. The AKP strengthened its power and the opposition became fragmented, which helped the AKP to reach deals with the MHP on certain Islam related issues. (Bahar 2007)

The AKP realised that through the export oriented policies, the Anatolian Tigers have the chance to grow faster and further and in a proof of that the newly developing cities of Anatolia (such as Kayseri, Gaziantep, Aksaray, Bursa, Konya or Malatya) started to develop as well. The growing business opportunities and the increasing workplaces generated a growth in the popularity of the government in these constituencies. The strengthening of the businesses abroad slowly started to take effect in the domestic political environment of Turkey as well. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişçi 2011, 714-715)

Hale and Üzbudun underlines that the 2007 elections show growing polarization inside the Turkish society, which was further strengthened by the constitutional crisis of 2007.¹³² (Hale and Üzbudun 2010, 41) The seclusion of the voting groups grew further and the gap between the secular and the conservative-religious groups extended. Studies showed that the AKP voters – in general – were more religious, more rural, less educated and coming from lower strata of the society. The CHP and the AKP voters differed in education, income and occupation; however, they constituted the majority of the Turkish society. Nevertheless, this fact did not change the cross-class character of the AKP, since the Anatolian businesses and the middle classes remained loyal. With these voting patterns, the Turkish political construction started to move from its elitist features to a stronger representation of the poorer majority. These changes revealed in geographical patterns too. The AKP voters came from the majority of the areas in Anatolia, at the same

¹³⁰ For an overall analysis of the 2007 general elections in Turkey see: (Çarkoğlu 2007; Yavuz 2009, 239-266)

¹³¹ The launching of the negotiations with EU in 2005 counted as an important success, regardless of the fact that months later the negotiation process halted in the major chapters.

¹³² The constitutional crisis, which was caused by the political dispute of the secular elite and the AKP on the election process of the new president will be further elaborated on in the next section of this dissertation.

time the CHP and the secular forces were victorious in the Aegean and the Marmara regions, which are historically more developed and home of strong industry and tourism. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 42)

Transformation of the elites' role and the empowerment of the AKP regime

The AKP forms a relatively cohesive political elite group with strong political and economic support from the Muslim bourgeoisie. There have been interest-clashes inside the governing political party that remained or were solved inside the AKP, they only became visible around the end of the examination period of this dissertation. Turkey is a decentralized polity, in which state actors often constraint the primary decision-maker, in this case the prime minister. This dates back to the Ottoman period, when a strong and autonomous state was created in order to extract the necessary resources and provide the capacities to wage war. (Sasley 2012, 554-555)

Hale underlines that “foreign-policy making is one of the least well-studied aspects of Turkish foreign policy”. (Hale 2000, 205) To understand the radical changes in the foreign policy of Turkey in the 2000s and to understand the elite consensus in the Turkish society, a short explanation is necessary for the positioning of the stakeholders in the decision-making.

During the period of the AKP governments and especially from the second half of the 2000s the domestic political changes of Turkey continued. New power centres were created inside the government that shaped the foreign policy ambitions of the country. The positions and stakeholders, influencing the Turkish foreign policy are built up in a triangle. (Makovsky-Sayari 2000) Certainly, the two main institutions of this sort were the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Ministry. PM Erdoğan has always been the most influential actor inside his governments, thus he held his hand on the strategic decisions of the country's foreign policy. It is not a wonder that the new foreign policy ambitions of Turkey were created by his advisor, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became foreign minister only years later in 2009.¹³³ With regard to the traditionally strong position of the army and their institutionalised influence since the 1980 coup predestined the military's and the ministry of defence's strong power in creating foreign policy in Turkey. The 1982 Constitution made the military an indispensable decisions-maker in strategic policy

¹³³ On the power relations and the leadership of the AKP see: (Yavuz 2009, 99-108, 118-143)

decisions. Their power could be exercised both indirectly, by putting political pressure on the government, or directly through the National Security Council. (Egeresi 2013a, 3) There are less influential, however, occasionally emerging players in the “foreign policy game” of Turkey. Depending on the personality, the president could make changes in political decisions and the parliament as well. However, their influence remains in the shadow of the first three. With the EU reforms and the AKP’s systematic changes in domestic politics, the power of these institutions decreased and became more and more subject to the decisions coming from the civilian-political power centres.

With the growing influence of the business circles and the strengthening role of the business interests in foreign policy agenda of Turkey a set of new actor emerged. According to Kirişçi and Kanptanoğlu the trade and investment related ministries, such as Ministry of Energy, Trade or Transportation and even the Ministry of Interior started to widen their role in foreign policy making. (Kirişçi and Kanptanoğlu 2011, 711-714) The Undersecretariate for Foreign Trade inside the Prime Minister’s Office became especially influential. The latter served as direct link between the business lobby groups and the government. The weakening of the visa regimes against third countries and the termination of the visa requirements against several Middle Eastern countries were good proofs of their power. Turkey’s economic and state level penetration to Africa is also connected to this direct link. Ismail Cem, during his term as foreign minister initiated an “African opening”, however, his own bureaucracy stopped him in his efforts. The AKP government made the decision to develop its relations with Africa later. In the first round 15 embassies were opened and Turkey applied to be an observer in the African Union. (Kirişçi and Kanptanoğlu 2011, 713-714)

Returning to Mardin’s (Mardin 1973; Mardin 2005) argument on the centre-periphery relations, the centre stopped to exist the way it had existed during the two decades after Özal stepped into power. The internal fights and the changes in the old secular elite consumed the unity and the possible cohesion of the old elite groups. Moreover, by the 2000s the compact and coherent elite groups ceased to exist that would have represented and defended the interests of the society of the centre. By the rise of the new bourgeoisie, the centre was not any more the old and secular elite. The new Islamist elements entered it from the periphery and with the support of the majority of the periphery they managed to take them over. This meant the political step forward of a new strata of the society and the further demise of the old centre of the Turkish society. The

centre in the centre-periphery system of axes moved towards the periphery, thus its values and the interests changed as well.

It became obvious that those political groups that claimed to represent the old elite were not able to do so anymore, since the composition of the centre had transformed. The old equation of representation, namely that the CHP represented the secular, exclusive and old elite, the centre of the society partially lost its validity. The AKP became the representative of the marginalized, the new middle class and the new business and the political elite. And this created new cleavages; the centre was occupied by two antagonistic groups based on religious, political and cultural differences.

Even though, the AKP based its power on a strong and wide political and social platform, it did not change the fact that it had to face a de facto alliance of the old elite forces. The AKP after its rise to power, was in a dire situation facing the unintended, however, possible cohesive alliance of the political, judicial, military elite groups. During the first decade of its power the AKP had to face the strongly secularist factions teamed up against a possible Islamist threat to the country posed by the AKP itself. (Çınar 2008; Cizre 2008a; Yavuz 2009, 144-170) From the political front the CHP, which received almost 20% of the votes in 2002, making it the only opposition party that managed to step over the 10% parliamentary threshold and the incumbent, strict secularist president Ahmet Necdet Sezer (until 2007) were the representatives of the secular elite. Even though the demise of the old elite made the secularist groups weaker during the decades that passed, their position was still strong in different state institutions that could interrupt with the AKP governments will and political moves. During this period the Constitutional Court, majority of the judicial bodies, the academia, the universities and higher educational administration including the Council of Higher Education were counted as secularist strongholds. (Cizre 2008a, 135-136; Çınar 2008, 118) The biggest threat to the government's stability and the one that mostly questioned the government's legitimacy was the military.

From both the old and the new political elite's point of view this could have been described as a "zero sum game". Consequently, the AKP had to produce proper foreign and domestic policy responses or defensive strategies to these internal threats. The analysis of the classification of these strategies is not the task of this dissertation, nevertheless the line of the clashes has to be drawn up to understand the changes inside the elite. The threat perception of the old elite was based not exactly on the actual policy steps of the AKP, but rather on cultural-religious and identity related assumptions. Also

on the other side of the society and the elite, the threat perception of the AKP and its political halo strengthened the identity based communization that led to the accelerating spiral of threat perception and antagonism. Hale and Özbudun (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 34) point out that at the end of this spiral, the secularist state elites had strengthened their tutelary attitudes that led them to actions aiming at questioning the legitimacy and the power of the incumbent AKP governments not neglecting possible undemocratic tools either.

The AKP as a Muslim-Democratic party and the EU accession process from a domestic point of view

The fact that the AKP, an Islamist oriented party took up the accession to the EU as one of the most important policy goals seems a genuine act in foreign policy. However, it stems from a set of reasons in the background that were both results of organic development inside the Islamist movement and the pragmatic calculation of the AKP leadership. To understand the internal changes inside the elite of the Turkish society, thus the elite consensus and the regime's vulnerability, this section examines the domestic aspects of the start of the EU accession process and the AKP's strategy to use it as a tool to decrease its vulnerability.

The MG movement had long regarded Europe and the West as the main source of problems in all Muslim states, until the pragmatic changes occurred in 1990. In their view, the Kemalist elite only followed the European development and became the puppets of the West, thus more Europeanization would have led to the loss in independence. The MG regarded the EU as a block of Christian countries that wanted to colonize Turkey that did not handle it as an equal partner. As a result of this line of thought, the EU accession of Turkey would have meant the assimilation of Muslim Turkey to the Christian majority in Europe. (Dağı 2009, 47-49)

However, the MG reviewed its thoughts on the West and especially Europe. After the 1995 general elections, when the RP stepped into power, Erbakan toned down his Eurosceptic rhetoric. Eventually, the February 28 process that forced the Erbakan government's resignation resulted in a general change of view inside the MG. The EU became the protector of human and religious rights, and showed a way of defending Turkish democracy and the Islamist groups against the abuses of the secular elite and the military in general. (Dağı 2009, 49) This coincided with the fact that Turkey was left out of the 1997 list of candidates to the EU and a set of reforms were necessitated in order to

start the accession negotiations. These reforms aimed at the demilitarization of the government and the strengthening of the civil control, which in effect meant the weakening of the military leadership at the same time. (Dağı 2009, 50-51; Çayır 2008, 74; Duran 2008, 87-88)

The 1999 Helsinki decisions of the EU that included Turkey as a possible candidate for EU membership, was welcomed by all segments of the Turkish society including the Islamist and conservative Muslim circles. (Dağı 2009, 49; Duran 2008, 87-88) The political leadership in the MG, both Erbakan's and the Erdoğan-led reform sides saw the potential in the EU to create possibility for a more democratic political system, thus a possibility for a party coming from an Islamist background to stay in power, withstanding the pressure of the military. (Yavuz 2009, 1-4; Usul 2008, 179-184) It is equally important that the business elite of the MG circles, especially the Anatolian businessmen were in favour of the new and strengthening relations with the EU. The Customs Union that came in to effect in 1996 proved to be profitable for their businesses, creating interdependencies that they were reluctant to give up. They demanded a new wave of liberal democratic reforms in Turkey and as part of it, stronger emphasis on the economic relations of Turkey mainly with the East, but also with the West. The EU accession, or at least the accession process strengthened their position in the Eastern markets and provided better access to European services, technologies and ideas that made it favourable for them to start the EU negotiations. Since they provided the financial background of the movement, their will was to be considered in the new phase creating the path of the MG. (Dağı 2009, 56-58)

The decisive moment in the MG history was the court decision in 2001, when the Islamist FP was banned. It is symbolic that Erbakan turned to the European Court of Human Rights to overrule the decision of the Turkish courts. (Dağı 2009, 49) The freshly formed AKP moved from anti-Western attitude towards a pro-EU approach; the EU emerged as the source of the ultimate development that is favourable both in political and economic aspects. Despite this fact, wide circles of the Turkish society, mainly the secular elite, journalists, civil society members and businessmen voiced their suspicion that the party, which rooted in the MG is still incorporating the MG's Islamist mentality, the new line is just a disguise. (Hale and Üzbudun 2010, 34)

After the 9/11 attacks and parallel to the AKP's ascendance to power the narrative of civilizations became strong in the world politics. The EU accession process could provide for a new understanding of Turkish politics and the lost geostrategic position for

Turkey. Through this approach Turkey evolved from the secular model of the East to the Muslim democratic country that embraces both civilizations, thus it can be a bridge between the Muslim world and Europe. (Hale and Üzbudun 2010 20-29; Yavuz 2009, 93-99) In order to play this role the secular character was not enough, a Turkish Islamic identity was required that was deeply rooted in the history of the region. This was the basis of the redefinition of the Turkish model that Ahmet Davutoğlu further refined¹³⁴. For the Arab countries it became an appealing option to follow a new model of a Muslim government, rather than the hypocritical secular model of Turkey. The Muslim leadership did not seem a puppet of the West regardless of its eagerness to accede to the EU. The Muslim world seemed receptive of the AKP's new identity based on human rights and democracy. (Yavuz 2009, 93-99)

The AKP started the rhetoric of being a Muslim democratic party (Ahmadov 2008, 26-27; Yavuz 2009; Duran 2008; Tepe 2005; Nasr 2005; Hale 2005; Carroll 2004) on the basis of Christian democrats for two reasons. On the one hand, it was a defensive argument against the military leadership proving that the party was not Islamist, thus it did not threaten the Kemalist basic principles and the existence of the republic. On the other hand, the comparison to the Western European Christian parties made it possible to create an argument acceptable for the EU that a religious party could be democratic at the same time and its religious character will not hinder the EU accession process.

It was not only the new identity character of the AKP that helped the steps forward, but the parallel modernization rhetoric as well, which slowly convinced the secular business circles that favoured the new reform agenda. The EU served as a tool for the AKP to prove its new policy line and its commitment to democracy instead of establishing an Islamist state. The EU reform packages and the ultimate goal of the accession could partially convince many strong actors in the Turkish society and business life that the AKP is not a mere continuation of the FP. It seemed evident that it was not possible to establish a devout Islamist state inside the EU. On the other hand, the strengthened EU anchor provided the promise of stability on two fronts: strengthened civil control could provide for the political stability of the AKP government after a turbulent decade; while closer economic cooperation with the West promised more stability on the markets, which had been an absolute necessity after the twin crises at the

¹³⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu's concept on the new foreign policy line of Turkey and its soft power will be elaborated on in the upcoming sections of this dissertation.

beginning of the decade. Both of these incentives were convincing for the business elite regardless of their religious beliefs and cultural background (Usul 2008, 180)

The AKP had an inherently ambiguous approach towards the military, which derives from its own past and the party's birth. The possibility of a new and strong military intervention and a court decision on closure was still strong. This experience and the fear of the military, thus the desire and the political will to curb the military's power became a strong motivation in the AKP governments' democratization reforms. The AKP leadership realized that the EU demands for democratization and human rights coincide with its own attempt to protect itself against the Kemalist, especially the military establishment. (Dağı 2006) This realization came from the fact that, the more Turkey distanced itself from the West, the more the Kemalist regime and the military could play a tutelary role, thus intervene in politics. The fact is that the Kemalist state ideology in this respect became trapped by its own logic: the more Turkey became European, the less the Kemalist elite could control the country. (Dağı 2009, 51) Following the logic of the approach to the West the military agreed on the gradual decrease of its political power in order to facilitate Turkey's future in the EU.

The question of civil control already became an important political issue during the leadership of Turgut Özal as a tool of preparing for possible EU membership.¹³⁵ The military leadership (although not unanimously) supported the idea of the accession to the EU and to this end they accepted some cut-back on their power.

The AKP as part of the EU reform processes, continued the policies aimed at restricting the military's power in politics. In 2003, a new law abolished the regulation that had put the military leadership in the chairs of the NSC and raised the number of its civilian members. The next important step was to initiate the control of the army's budget, which had long been an untouchable and undisputable element (Kurt and Toktas 2010, 392). The Chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök cooperated with the government but several time raised his reservations on some decisions, however always let the reforms through for the sake of the EU accession process. (Egeresi 2013a, 5) However, at the end of 2005, just after the official start of the accession negotiations the clash between the army and the government seemed closer and closer. With the halt on the EU negotiations in 2006, the EU accession did not provide an anchor as strong as before for the AKP.

¹³⁵ President Özal managed to abolish the ban of several politicians to enter politics and made decision on reducing military trainings close to Greek areas. (Egeresi 2013a, 5)

Challenges to the new power and the AKP's political responses

The events leading up to the early parliamentary elections in 2007 demonstrate that even though the AKP government emphasized its conservative over the Islamist identity, the polarization became unavoidable both in the society and the Turkish politics. The cleavage between the secular and the Islamist elites did not decrease, thus a breaking-point was imminent. The AKP and its secular opposition reached the crisis point around the election of the new president in 2007, after President Sezer left his office. The AKP appointed its own candidate for the presidency, the core member of the party, previous prime minister and the incumbent foreign minister, Abdullah Gül.¹³⁶

At a first glimpse, the AKP had an easy task to push its will through, since the Turkish rules of election allowed for such a step. Under the Constitution, the presidential elections needed a two-third majority of the members' votes in the parliament in the first two rounds; in case of an unsuccessful voting, an absolute majority in the third and the fourth rounds was enough. Since the AKP did not have a twothird majority, it was likely to succeed in the last two rounds. However, the CHP and several secular lawyers claimed that it was not only the decision that required the qualified majority of the members, but the opening of the session in the case of presidential elections. The CHP boycotted the voting, thus this requirement could not be fulfilled. The AKP took the case to the Constitutional Court in return, which still had the majority of members with secularist affiliation. (Yavuz 2009, 240-243) In parallel the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Yaşar Büyükanıt issued a warning on the website of the military implying that the army is ready to intervene in any case necessary to defend the Turkish state's basic principles. Eventually the Constitutional Court endorsed the claim of unconstitutionality. The only possibility to resolve the deadlock of the presidential elections was to call for early parliamentary elections. (Egeresi 2013a, 6) As mentioned earlier the new elections ended with the landslide victory of the AKP, where they obtained two-thirds of the seats.

The main reason behind the constitutional crisis was the fear of the secular political circles to lose an important position. The office of the President was the symbol of the secular republic, which could not be given up to the devout Muslim political powers. At the same time, the president had the discretionary rights to appoint judges and

¹³⁶ On the 2007 Constitutional crisis see: (Egeresi 2013a 5-6; Yavuz 2009, 239-267; Hale and Özbudun 2010, 89-92; Cizre 2008b 149-153)

university leaders, thus through obtaining the office of the President the AKP could open a new door to other “citadels” of the secular opposition. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 65; Shankland 2007, 358-359) However, after the elections, in the course of which the MHP also entered the parliament and the AKP received the qualified majority, it was not possible any more for the CHP to block the successful election. (Yavuz 2009, 254-258) Consequently, in August 2007 Abdullah Gül was elected to be President of the Republic of Turkey. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 65)

The crisis – again – revealed the deep gap between the military and the AKP. Although, the civil control under the EU reforms brought the weakening of the military’s power, with the appointment of the new Chief of Staff, Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt in 2006, the clash became unavoidable. After the constitutional crisis, in which Gen. Büyükanıt had voiced his strong opinion and deepened the crisis, the military called for a retreat and stopped the political attacks against the government. This was also in connection with the strengthening conflict in the East against the PKK, which hitched the attention of the Turkish army. (Yavuz 2009, 246-250; Egeresi 2013a, 6)

Shortly after this double political defeat the secular forces had to face a third one on the headscarf issue. Namely, a new amendment of the constitution lifted the ban on wearing headscarf at the universities. The AKP approved the new law on headscarves in the beginning of 2008 with the support of the MHP. As a result, Prosecutor General Abdulrahman Yalçinkaya filed charges against the AKP on the basis of violation of secularism and demanded the closure of the party. The case triggered the attention and the indignation of the international community. The closure of the AKP would have meant a new quasi-coup, the undemocratic turn of the Turkish political history and the immediate end of the EU accession process. Eventually, the Constitutional Court did not approve of the closure of the party, only the confiscation of the party’s assets, thus the AKP remained in power. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 89-92; Arat 2010)

In retaliation, the biggest show trial of the Turkish political history started with the winding up of an alleged clandestine organization, the Ergenekon¹³⁷. The case was initiated to demolish the so-called “deep state”, a conspiratory organization with close links to the secular elite and the military leadership. (Jenkins 2009, 14-23) The theory of the “deep state” had emerged decades earlier, however it manifested as a result of the clash alongside the religious-cultural gap. According to this theory, there is a group of

¹³⁷ The name Ergenekon refers to the myth of the ancient Turks. (Jenkins 2009, 43)

people that penetrated the state bureaucracy, the government and the state institutions and tried to manipulate the governmental decisions and the elite by force. (Egeresi 2013a, 6-7; Aydinli 2011, 230; Economist 02/02/2013) The Ergenekon is allegedly a part of the “deep state” and its purpose was to weaken and eventually overthrow the AKP government.

After 2008 a series of arrests was conducted against retired generals, journalists, university professors. As a result of the scandal including the mass arrests, the critical approaches against the government decreased significantly and Turkey became more occupied with the freshly erupted international financial crisis, though, the Ergenekon case proceeded in the background. The momentary “silence” was interrupted by the emergence of a new scandal, the Balyoz (Sledgehammer), which was very similar to the Ergenekon. In this case, General Çetin Doğan allegedly organized a group of retired generals with the aim of forcing the government to resign following different terrorist attacks on Turkish soil. (Jenkins 2014; Egeresi 2013a, 7) The weakened and threatened military also changed. The last few Chiefs of Staff Ilker Başbuğ and Işık Koşaner followed a less critical rhetoric towards the AKP and the government. They remained silent after the eruption of the Ergenekon and the Balyoz scandals and the arrests of the generals and journalists, critical towards the government. (Egeresi 2013a, 7)

However, the process of building civil control and at the same time weakening the power of the secular, military elite continued. A referendum was organized in 2010 (exactly on the day of the 30th anniversary of the 1980 military coup), in order to curb the rights of the military courts that have been long used to persecute civilians for charges related to threatening the republic (e.g. for Islamist affiliation). As a result of the referendum, these military courts were only allowed to hear and try the members of the armed forces. (Dobrovits 2010, 8-9)

Parallel to the slow process of strengthening the civil control, taking the leadership of the Higher Education Council took place. It is a legitimate aim of a government to have a sound possibility of showing directions for the country’s academia, however to gain strict control is questionable. The AKP’s aim to gain the steering wheel through the Council of Higher Education could be regarded as legitimate, since its main goal had been since 1982 to monitor the universities, whether they abide by their main goal: to ensure that universities produce good, law-abiding citizens who act within the confines of the military-drafted 1982 constitution. (Dobrovits 2010, 10-11) The AKP took steps to diminish the military control over the Board and appointed a new chairman, as well as

started to fund new scientific projects raising the level of R&D in the Turkish university system. (Yildirim 2014) There were still some infringements on academic freedoms, but there was improvement and slowly the old secular elite became played down.

A strong ally of the AKP – the Hizmet

As part of discussing the ruling elite and different influential segments of it, the Gülen movement or the Hizmet (“The Service”) cannot be disregarded. This transnational movement is based on religious Islamic credentials and provides social and educational support to the poor families all around the world. The Hizmet was established by the Turkish Islamic scholar, Fetullah Gülen. The movement became active in interfaith dialogue and through its investments became a strong economic and influential intellectual player in many countries in the world. By the 2000s the Hizmet became Turkey’s largest Islamic oriented movement. Gülen served as a preacher and Islamic scholar until the end of the 1990s in Turkey, however, he had to flee Turkey over charges of planning to topple the secular government. He was sentenced in absentia in 2001. (Bülent and Ömer 2000)

The Gülen movement and its controversial activities have been both welcomed and criticized by scholars and politicians around the world, the judgement has always been dependent on the political stance of the ones making the assessment. During the 2000s the movement became a strong ally of the AKP and provided help for its internal social agenda, its domestic and foreign policy goals. The AKP and the Hizmet are both from Islamist origins, however, the two traditions differ slightly. The AKP is the reform wing of the Islamist MG, a political party, which redefined itself as Muslim democratic. The Gülen movement’s roots go back to an Islamic tradition that some scholars call “civil Islam.” In this “civil Islamic” concept, Islam is not concerned with politics per se but it is focused on the spiritual development of individual Muslims and the promotion of human development (Park 2008, Tol 2014) The Hizmet is not a political movement, rather an altruistic organization, however, its growing influence always generated suspicions in the governing regimes.

Despite the differences, the AKP found it useful to have a strong ally in the civil sphere that is strongly influential among the masses and the Islamic elite to build a coalition against the tutelary secular elite. The fast successes of the AKP in curbing the military’s role in politics was only partly due to the EU accession process, the Hizmet played a critical role in it. The wide group of Gülen supporters in the state bureaucracy,

namely the judiciary and the members in the police force provided their support for the ambitions of the AKP. Hence, the AKP disposed of not only the party's support but the policemen, judges and bureaucrats. Some important circles of the Anatolian bourgeoisie emerged from the Gülen movement as well, and became genuine supporters of the AKP for their foreign policy attitude and the integration of Turkey in the world market and its opening towards the East. (Tol 2014, Park 2008)

The Gülen movement, through its international network of schools, civil altruistic and philanthropic institutions, the interconnected and cooperating chain of businessmen, intellectuals, educators, journalists made a strong footprint inside Turkey and abroad. The movement made a great contribution to changing Turkey's image worldwide and to the creation of the new Muslim democracy model. (Balci 2014) Internally, the Hizmet and Gülen threw in their support and protection to help the AKP survive the 2007-2008 constitutional crisis and initiate the counter-measures, namely the Ergenekon and the Balyoz trials. The Hizmet – in cooperation with the AKP – established a firm position for itself within the Turkish bureaucracy and the world as an archetype of “passive” and “liberal” Islam. (Tol 2014)

The Gülen movement became interconnected and interdependent from the AKP government for a certain period, thus also had the possibility to have a say in the policy decisions. There was a general agreement in the main lines of the foreign policy between the influential circles of the Hizmet and the leadership of the AKP until 2011, thus this cooperation strengthened the elite consensus.

The leaders of the AKP and the Erdoğan factor

One of the most important elements in the development of the AKP is the power of its leader and the contradictions in his leadership. What makes the party remarkably strong, makes it at the same time vulnerable and questions the original purposes of the party itself. The AKP's leadership that aimed at transforming the party's original identity from Islamism to Muslim Democracy is not capable of fulfilling this aim¹³⁸. The personality of the charismatic leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan contributed greatly to the popularity and the power of the AKP, on the other hand it prevents the AKP and thus Turkey from achieving the original goal of more democracy. Inside the party and the parliamentary faction, the main ruling element is the loyalty to the leadership, namely the

¹³⁸ It is important to note that there are authors that question the Muslim democratic character of the AKP, eg.: Göl speaks about a hidden agenda of Islamizing the state institutions. (Göl 2009, 805-807)

loyalty to Erdoğan himself. This generated serious hard feelings and disappointments within the party, however, it did not change the general pattern of Erdoğan's power. (Yavuz 2009, 100-101)

The Turkish political culture by tradition is strongly personality and leader centric. (Yavuz 2009, 118) Turkey's elitist culture and the political socialization has always led to the creation of strong leaders and politicians in Turkey. The possibility of new and strong political leadership was naturally decoded in the Turkish political system. The elitist political culture of Turkey made it obvious that the AKP, which was established by a core group of reformist Islamists would put the limelight on the new generation of political leaders.

According to Yavuz (Yavuz 2009, 120), any discussions on Turkish contemporary politics must start with PM Erdoğan, since all important policy decisions are made or at least influenced by him. Consequently, despite the fact that the AKP is part of the Turkish multi-party system, the prime minister commands a high percentage of the important policy decisions, which make some of the other leaders in the party and thus the governing elite irrelevant. This leads up to three different conclusions of the political sphere of Turkey. Firstly, as Yavuz suggests, Erdoğan fails to realize that the AKP is no longer an opposition group that has to fight the secular regime or the old elite. It became a ruling party of the democratic Turkey, which means, some anti-democratic steps, or show trials rather undermine, than strengthen his power. (Yavuz 2009, 121) On the other hand the AKP is struggling with Erdoğan's torn political identity and diverse loyalties. He is loyal to the original constituency of the AKP, the Islamist and devout core group from Anatolia and the poorer districts of the major cities, on the other hand he believes in the power of the liberal market economy and the Western-style economic development. He came from the countryside and was raised in a conservative Muslim and poor neighbourhood of Istanbul. He came from the excluded, marginalized groups of the elite-based Turkey. He had to climb up the social ladder and on his way he became a protégé of Erbakan and the Islamist movement. His class background predestined the feeling of exclusion and strong insecurities, which were strengthened by the February 28 process and his arrest in 2001. The strict backlashes and the systematic weakening of the military can be accounted for this factor as well. However, the prime minister's personality led to undemocratic domestic incidents and the abuse of power, which will be discussed in the last chapter of the dissertation. (Yavuz 2009, 123-130; Shankland 2007, 361-362)

The second element of the prime minister's personality that has to be taken into account is his strict control of power not only in the government but inside the party. After his arrest as a result of the closure of the FP in 2001, he was banned from public activities for 10 years. After the AKP won the elections, the first AKP government was formed by Abdullah Gül. It took months to overrule the decision and make it possible for Erdoğan to take over the position of the Prime Minister. (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 18-19; Cizre 2008a, 5; Shankland 2007, 361-362) During this interim period, the main decisions and strategies were formed by him and his close political circles. What is most important from this aspect is the fact that the new foreign policy line of Turkey was also designed by the prime minister's close advisor, Ahmet Davutoğlu.

The third element that must be mentioned, which is important in the foreign policy of Turkey is that the double loyalties of Erdoğan became visible in his foreign policy. It was a centrally made decision to turn the country's foreign policy priorities to the East and toward Muslim countries, and at the same time to threaten the West, while keeping the commitment of EU accession intact. In another example, Turkish policies towards Israel showed the same pattern. In the first years Erdoğan followed a close cooperation with Jerusalem. It was only after the Gaza war in 2009 that the relations worsened with Israel to initiate closer relations with Hamas and began the alienation of Israel in order to gain sympathy in the Arab World.¹³⁹

To understand the dynamics inside the governing elite group, the personality of the "second in line" has to be analysed as well. Abdullah Gül was the main character behind the reformist group's break up with the original Erbakan-led political movement. (Yavuz 2009, 135-136) Since Erdoğan was banned from politics by court, after 2002 Gül became temporarily the prime minister. His background differs significantly from Erdoğan's, Gül is a politician that received his education in Europe. Consequently, he developed a difference in his view on the outside world and a different civilizational outlook. Gül comes from the Anatolian city of Kayseri, one of the main centres of the rise of the new Anatolian bourgeoisie, thus he not only had a connection to and the trust of the new elite, but he is one of them. His lead and his decision to split with Erbakan and to create a new political party was strongly backed up by the MÜSIAD. (Yavuz 2009, 142). As opposed to Erdoğan, who represented the marginalised, Gül was a representative of the new winners of the neoliberal economy in Turkey.

¹³⁹ On the Dynamics of the Turkish-Israeli relations see: (TPQ 2013; Kosebalaban 2010; Eligür 2012)

After Erdoğan's return to politics in 2003, Gül became foreign minister and deviated slightly from the main and original foreign policy line. Gül became a proponent of the West inside the AKP, a strong supporter of Turkey's accession to the EU, and less supportive of the new Turkish opening to the East. (Yavuz 2009, 136) His candidature to the presidency leads to two conclusions. On the one hand, as one of the founders of the AKP, a credible ally of Erdoğan was appointed to be the president. On the other hand he was moved away from the leadership of Turkish diplomacy to make the space for the changes that lead to the rise of Ahmet Davutoğlu's new concept in foreign policy.

Ahmet Davutoğlu was a university professor in Turkey and an intellectual coming from the small southern Anatolian town of Taşkent. He is coming from a religious background, but received the best education in Turkey. Coming from Anatolia, he was also influenced by the changes of the Anatolian provinces and the new demands for a new foreign policy that favours Muslim partners. He started to work out his new foreign policy concept during the 1990s and became the foreign policy advisor of PM Erdoğan between 2003 and 2009. After the departure of Gül he received a relatively free hand to accomplish his foreign policy plans that were already started to be put in practice.¹⁴⁰

Implications of the Kurdish issue during the 2000s

The problematic relationship between the state and the Kurds did not change after 2002, it remained undefined and in a sense, avoided. Consequently, the relationship between the majority of the Turkish society and the minority, the Kurds themselves remained also problematic.

During the first decade of the AKP in power, the government could not establish a coherent policy to tackle the Kurdish question, though it needed redefinition. By the 2000s, the polarization of the Turkish society continued not only in the political sphere, but along ethnic lines as well. (Yavuz 2009, 173) The confrontation moved from the state sphere to be a conflict into the society. The several-decades long antagonism with the Kurds and the military confrontation with the PKK since 1984 transformed the views of the Turkish society of the Kurds, creating a negative general view of them. The fast changing governments and the ongoing military campaign during the 1990s did not help

¹⁴⁰ Source of the information: Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmet-davutoglu.en.mfa>) (accessed: 02 January 2016)

to find solution to this problem. Eventually, the PKK became interchangeable with the Kurds and the Kurdish society in general discussions. (Yavuz 2009, 173-174)

The AKP's successful economic stabilization program and the strong reforms created an expectation towards the government to tackle the Kurdish question fast, and find solutions that the Kemalist elite had not been able to do so. The AKP and PM Erdoğan himself tried to use the Kurdish question to weaken the Kemalist political elite and to gain more votes from the Kurds and the Islamist oriented voters. The AKP portrayed the situation as the fault of the secular state and the Kemalist elite that created the division inside the society on purpose. (Yavuz 2009, 174) According to this view, the Kurdish question was not and has never been handled with the proper approach, namely the problem was not rooted in nationalism, but in forced secularism and Kemalism. This way a new dialogue with the Kurdish society, based on the Islamic and cultural common ties and similarities would have the potential to end the conflict.

The AKP's rhetoric had some valid points, however, the Kurdish society was also far from being united and coherent. (Bacik 2011) A significant ratio of the resistance movement and some legal Kurdish opposition parties based their identity rather on secular and leftist oriented ideologies, than on the Kurdish traditions or Islam. These groups were hardly receptive to the government's faith-based rhetoric, since their ideological background was rather based in the socialist international movement. The main social background was the urbanized intellectuals and workers of the Kurdish society, not the traditional, tribal and religious groups. (Yavuz 2009, 176) The PKK went through a remarkable transformation during the two decades of armed fight against the state. The serious losses in manpower and the limited results that they gained from the fight led them to the creation of new aims and strategies. Their aim changed from being unequivocally separatist to fight for their rights inside the Turkish state as well (e.g. claim for a bi-national state through a new constitution) in the 2000s. The main goal of the ethnic and secular Kurds was to use the democratization process and the reforms to widen their legal possibilities for self-determination. (Egeresi 2012)

It is important to mention that a large group of Kurds had already got assimilated in the Turkish society, which process was enhanced by the rise of the new Anatolian elite. These Kurds live in major cities and became important elements of the majority society. For them the Kurdish question is perceived from a different angle, thus they are not satisfied by the AKP's policy choice either. (Yavuz 2009, 176-177)

The majority of the Kurds belong to the religious Muslim society of Turkey, however, for them the decision to identify with religion was the possibility to create an “oppositional identity” against the Ottoman state and especially the Kemalist secular reforms. The conflict of the state and the Muslim Kurds strengthened after Özal’s reforms, when the neo-liberal turn and the market economy pauperized most of these people. Most of them found it easy to identify with radical Islam movements, thus lot of them joined Sufi orders in Turkey. (Yavuz 2009, 177-179) In their case the call for more Islam could have been a possible strategy, however, the AKP formed government and thus their role was inseparable from the state and the Turkish identity. The Muslim Kurds, similarly to other Kurdish groups strongly cleaved to their Kurdishness, when confronted with the Turkish identity. Despite these facts, it became obvious that most of the Kurds that voted for the AKP were coming from the religious Muslim communities. (Yavuz 2009, 186)

The AKP, before it came to power, had voiced its stance against state ideology and the military interventions in Kurdish areas. In their views the Kurdish question was partially a problem that was held on the surface by the Kemalists and the military, in order to justify certain policy steps and the military’s exclusionism and spendings. (Yavuz 2009, 174) However, with the resurgence of the PKK attacks in Eastern Anatolia in 2005 the AKP government had no choice but to give up the disregard of the Kurdish issue. Erdoğan followed a two-track policy line, both involving foreign and domestic political set of tools. On the one hand the PKK, using the general state of turmoil in Iraq started to build out new bases on the territory of Iraq. The Turkish government and the military had to try their utmost to step up against the separatists through cross-border operations and diplomatic channels to convince the US and the local Kurdish leaders to neutralize the PKK’s activities. (Hale and Özbudun 2009, 132)

On the other hand, the demilitarization inside Turkey and the new democratic reforms brought certain measures that gave more rights to the minorities, thus the Kurds as well. The extension of rights were rather spectacular and did not bring deep changes in the lives of the Kurdish communities. Such measures were the launching of Kurdish language radio broadcasting, Kurdish programmes on the Turkish state television and the right to use the language in certain school, or the opening of the first Kurdish television in 2009. (Flesch 2004, 60; Rada and Rada 2007, 23; Yavuz 2009, 198-199) The economic development of the South-eastern regions of Anatolia became a tool to gain popularity among the Kurds and tackle the situation. The finishing of the South-Eastern Anatolia

project, the huge system of water dams brought employment opportunities and remarkable development to the region. (Rada and Rada 2007, 28)

Nevertheless, Erdoğan failed to realize that in this environment the original approach that was coming from the AKP might not be successful in the long run. The “single flag, single state, single nation” policy was not satisfying for the Kurdish separatist and anti-state groups, the problems could not be solved through the denial of the existence of ethnic groups and the dealing only with citizenship. (Yavuz 2009, 177-181) Separatism could not be handled by substituting the Kurdish identity with the religious Islamic one, especially since most of the PKK fighters or supporters rather belonged to the secular movements. This approach changed in 2009, when Erdoğan openly acknowledged the Turkish state’s mistakes and crimes in the past against the Kurdish minorities in Turkey and made further promises and crimes in the past against the Kurdish. The AKP started the process of the “Kurdish opening” and besides the domestic measures to provide the Kurdish community with rights the Turkish secret services started a dialogue with the PKK. However, the process did not end well. As confidence-building measures, the Turkish authorities gave amnesty to the first groups of PKK fighters, who were received in the Kurdish regions as heroes. The event ruined the credibility and the support of the “Kurdish opening” policy of the AKP and slowly made it obsolete. The main problem was that Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, who had been in prison for more than a decade by 2010-2011 did not approve of the cooperation with the Turkish state, and the Turkish authorities rejected any compromise and dialogue with him. (Egeresi 2012, 104-106) By 2011, it became apparent that the AKP could not resolve the Kurdish problems, the Turkish state had to return to military tools. The new faith-based approach did not reach success, and the change of the external situation in Iraq led to the restart of the intense armed conflict.

Summarizing the results

The Millennium brought a significant change in the regional environment of Turkey, and a new external influencing factor emerged from the Western allies, namely the EU responded positively to Turkey’s request for accession. After the 9/11 attacks in New York the Middle Eastern neighbourhood started to receive new features and with this change Turkey’s traditional patterns of foreign responses became obsolete. Although,

the international coalition's military operations in Afghanistan in 2002 influenced the region only partially, the American intervention in Iraq one year later happened in a country, which shared a common border with Turkey. The region has always held instabilities, and regular conflicts, however, the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime created an entirely new situation. A regional powerhouse ceased to exist, creating a power vacuum. This situation called for the regional reorganization of powers and a serious security gap that all countries of the region had to find for a response to.

The power gap created a new challenge for Turkey that included an opportunity of power projection and a security concern that needed a definite response. The regional resettlement and the unavoidable spill over effects that the Iraqi invasion brought with itself all pointed at a revised Turkish role in the Middle East, where the Turkish government longed for a more predictable and stabilizing factor, extending its power. Iran, Israel, Syria and Lebanon were the targets of the Turkish regional influence beyond Iraq. With Iran and Syria the most important issues were the questions of stable economic relations and the strengthening the stabilization processes to compensate for the loss that the intervention in Iraq generated. The second most important issue was security related, and referred to the present state of the Kurdish question; how could Turkey co-operate with these countries in order to ease the fight against the PKK and to ease their resistance.

The EU also played a remarkable role as an influencing factor on Turkish foreign policy behaviour. In the first half of the 2000s the successive Turkish governments followed a track that aimed at the earliest possible accession to the European Union. To achieve this aim several difficult domestic reform packages went through and Turkey fulfilled more and more from the accession criteria. As a result, the Turkish domestic power relations changed and the military – alongside with the old elite – lost from its power and a more democratic Turkey had emerged by the middle of the decade, when the accession negotiations were finally launched.

However, shortly after the launching of the negotiations the internal dynamics of the EU, the rather xenophobic political turns in European public opinion and the Turkish inability to compromise with Cyprus led to a disappointment and a halt in the Turkish accession process. In 2005 Turkey set 2014 as the target date of accession, but less than a year later it became obvious that this date was overambitious. The partial collapse of the negotiations and the EU's negative attitude towards Turkey contributed to the already forming new foreign policy strategy that started to prioritize the Eastern relations and toning down the Western contacts, however, not entirely giving them up.

The Turkish policy change was perceived in the EU only a few years later, especially when the economic crisis hit Europe, which did not shake Turkey to the same extent. By that time the Turkish economy and the political influence had grown remarkably in its neighbouring region and on the global scale as well. By the end of the decade Turkey reached the level of a rising middle power that ambitioned to enter the elite club of the ten strongest economies in the world. The EU, under the circumstances of the financial crisis and on the verge of the collapse of the Eurozone, started to change its views on Turkey and its policies. The civilizational argument, which was rather a post-9/11 feature and a reaction to the domestic problems with Muslim immigrants in certain EU member states, had started to fade away and Turkey's prestige was on the rise again. Turkey became a positive role player in its region pursuing a neoliberal approach: development, more cooperation and stabilization. In this atmosphere the EU toned down its voice calling for urgent reforms in Turkey.

In order to analyse Turkey's foreign policy choices and the vast transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the 2000s the domestic political environment must be examined as well. Returning to Schweller's theoretical framework on the four internal variables (Schweller 2004) it must be examined how the above mentioned external influences are filtered through the internal realities and how they create foreign policy responses. Firstly, it is a sensible decision to analyse the social cohesion and the regime's vulnerability in light of the changes inside the Turkish society. The political and social processes of the previous decades did not stop inside the Turkish society during the 2000s. The emergence of the periphery as against the centre went hand in hand with the growing political consciousness of the marginalized groups in the countryside and especially in provincial centres. The mainly rural population demanded a stronger representation in politics and changed the voting patterns in Turkey. After the decade-long political crisis in the 1990s and the twin financial crises, a new power was needed on the political map of Turkey that represented the majority of the population and not the old elite that was blamed for the demise of the country. The majority of the population in the countryside was looking for the representation of their devout religious value system and their interest in development. The AKP, with an Islamist past and representing a new and energetic elite provided this new image that attracted the most votes in the 2002 general elections.

The 2000s accounted for two parallel developments within the Turkish society that defined the social and the political patterns. On the one hand, throughout the examined period, the support and the popularity of the AKP were constantly growing

both in relative and in absolute terms, which was partially the result of the AKP's successes in political mobilization of the previously inactive marginalized groups. The AKP thus became the second party after the DP that was able to increase its votes in government between the general elections in 2002 and 2007. The strength of the AKP and the new elite was based not only on its growing number of supporters but the already solid position and the further possibilities of increase in the capacities of the new Anatolian bourgeoisie and the middle classes who remained the strong supporters of the conservative right and the Muslim identity of the AKP.

The second pattern that strongly emerged during this period was the continuing polarization of the society along religious and cultural cleavages. The AKP tried to downplay and ease this fault line with moderate policies, but it was reinforced by the mobilisation of the marginalised religious and Islamist constituencies. The supporters of the new and the old elites differed remarkably along educational and religious lines and according to their position in society. With the growing number of active voters from the rural population the secular elite and the middle classes were losing their relative position and power.

It became obvious by 2007 that the AKP is not losing, but gaining more popularity and the social embeddedness of the party allowed for a growing self-esteem of the new elite and the AKP. This meant that the regime enjoyed a growing support, including its foreign policy actions and an increasing majority of the society showed sympathy. At the same time, the 2007 and the 2011 general elections underlined that the society could not and did not want to question the government's legitimacy. On the other hand, the growing cleavage inside the society warned that without proper domestic responses, a strengthening antagonism and a strong democratic deficit would emerge.

The growing popularity of the government was mainly due to its successes in its foreign policy and economic growth. The long neglected countryside produced a remarkable economic development that created more jobs and better living conditions. The increasingly stronger business relations with the neighbourhood and the Eastern partners contributed to these changes and thus it was strongly supported by the majority of the Turkish voters. The foreign policy successes, especially after the 2007 elections all added up to a growing popularity. The picture of a strong Turkey and the concept of the Turkish regional leadership or soft power became attractive to also some voters who were previously supporting the secular elite. As a result of the dissatisfaction with the EU negotiations in 2006, the majority of the population articulated a negative opinion about

Turkey's belonging to the West and started to support a turn towards the East, a foreign policy move that the AKP had already initiated on different grounds. The instabilities of the neighbourhood and the possibilities created by the power vacuum induced the Turkish government to act along the interest of its new elite and business sector and establish strong relations in the East. First, in the Middle Eastern immediate neighbourhood; on the other hand, the foreign policy efforts were welcomed by the rural population and after the success, the majority of the society that favoured the idea of the re-established greatness of the Ottoman Empire. By the second half of the 2000s the majority of the society was backing a new and active foreign policy of Turkey in directions other than the West.

The Kurdish question remained both an internal and an external factor in Turkey's case. Even though the AKP tried to follow a different approach in tackling the Kurdish issue, the question remained rather neuralgic and caused further cleavages inside the Turkish society. The AKP during its first government did not consider the interethnic differences and tensions a serious concern, thus the leadership did not establish a proper Kurdish policy. The leadership of the AKP (especially PM Erdoğan) tried to define the problem on a religious basis. However, the ethnic conflict could not be appeased by simply stating that all Turkish citizens and Muslims are equal, i.e. by moving the antagonism from ethnic lines to religious-cultural differences. Even though most of the Kurds were religious, their identity also included 'Kurdishness'. On the other hand, most of the PKK fighters and the insurgents were rather secular and leftists. Consequently the fact that the AKP neglected the Kurdish question on a religious-cultural basis did not solve the conflict but rather contributed to it.

As an external factor, the Kurdish question did not cease to exist, however for a few years it calmed down abroad. Externally, the US invasion of Iraq and the new Kurdish policy of Bashar al-Assad downgraded the PKK's insurgency against Turkey, however, the second half of the 2000s brought renewed fights both in Iraq and on the Turkish borders. Turkey needed stability; to reach that military response, cross-border diplomatic influence and regional responses were needed.

Analysing Turkish foreign policy from the angle of the elite cohesion and elite consensus highlights the huge transformation in decision making and the antagonism of the old and new elite groups that almost led to the collapse of the AKP government in 2007. This happened despite the strong support of the majority of the society and underlined that the government still had vulnerabilities.

The cleavage of the elite groups and the demise of the old elite continued during the 2000s. With the strengthening of the AKP, not only the marginalized groups, but the Anatolian well-offs received more political leverage. The old secular elite still disposed of political and economic power, however their exclusivity slowly faded away. The society's "centre" became the stage for the clash of two elite groups, which differed along religious, cultural and political features. The antagonism of these elite groups mostly materialized as a "zero sum game".

Even though the political representation of the secular old elite slivered, they had been holding onto their key positions in the state structure, such as the presidency, the academia, the judiciary and of course, the leadership of the military. The first years of the AKP's power was spent in a constant struggle against the secularist institutions trying to delegitimize the government. The biggest threat to the government's legitimacy was the military. The AKP had to create the proper answers to these internal threats both in its domestic and foreign policy. However, the government did not have an easy task, since the threat perception of the old elite was not based on pragmatic policy related issues, but rather cultural religious lines. In order to secure its power the AKP had to both weaken the old elite and convince the majority of them that their threat perception was overexaggerated.

The way leading to the EU accession process became an excellent tool for the government to counterbalance the Kemalist intentions of delegitimizing their power. The view of the Islamists slowly changed during the 1990s, and especially the February 28 process created a strong influence. The democratization, required by the EU accession was an advantageous external influencing factor for the AKP and the new elite to strengthen their power and create the democratic checks and balances that can result in the government's stability. The other tool that the AKP used was the redefinition of their own identity from being an Islamist party to Muslim Democratic credentials. Following the ideological pattern of the European Christian democratic parties the AKP tried to convince the secular elite that they did not follow the path of their predecessors. On the other hand, this new identity allowed for the cooperation of the secular business communities aiming at the EU integration. Embracing and leading the EU reform processes in Turkey the AKP allured some segments of the old business elite and could efface the military for a short while. The pre-negotiation reform packages were strongly built upon the democratization of Turkey, including curbing the power of the military.

The AKP, with the EU reform packages slowly acquired control of the privileges of the army and strengthened the civil control over it.

However, with the suspension of the EU negotiations in 2006, the AKP could not hold the foreign policy successes in the EU as a protective shield against the Kemalist elite and the military itself. Appointing the Abdullah Gül to the presidency ended in a constitutional crisis, which did not stop with the landslide victory of the AKP in the 2007 general elections. The “headscarf issue” almost resulted in the closure of the governing party that would have left the country in a state of general political and economic chaos. The political crises of 2007 underlined that the AKP government’s vulnerability did not decrease and the only way of creating a strong and legitimate government was to continue decreasing the prerogatives of the old elite. The years after 2007 seemed suitable, since the military’s focus shifted from domestic politics towards the Eastern borders and the fight against the PKK on the Iraqi borders. The AKP started the retaliation for the 2007 military “coup attempt” and the biggest show trials of Turkish history started against secular generals, journalists and leaders of the academia, the Ergenekon and the Balyoz cases. The government slowly played down the role of the secular elite in controlling the education as well. By 2010 the military lost control of the Higher Education Council, one of the last citadels of the old elite.

By the end of the second term of the AKP, the regime’s vulnerability decreased remarkably, this made it possible to follow a unique and non-interrupted foreign policy line. The elite consensus was created in a unique way in the AKP’s case. Based on the strong cohesion inside the new elite and the social support (materialized in the 2007 elections) the AKP became able to grow over the old elite and endorse its political will. The division inside the old elite and their continuing demise made it possible that using their political popularity, economic and foreign policy successes slowly overcome the military and push out the seculars from key positions. By 2010 the AKP held the presidency and had majority positions in the academia, the Higher Education Council, the National Security Council and curbed the power of the military leadership.

Turning to the cohesion of the leadership, the governing elite group it must be noted that in the 2000s the strengthening of the Muslim bourgeoisie continued and the devout elite and middle class widened. The business elite was committed to the government and supported their foreign policy opening. During the first few years the Turkish EU accession process was very much favourable, since it went hand in hand with two phenomena: the reforms positively affected Turkey’s business environment and the

EU as an anchor pulled the Turkish economy out of the financial crisis. On the other hand, the EU-Turkish rapprochement enhanced the “value” and the position of the country and of its economy in the Middle East and among third world countries, thus the Turkish political and economic aspirations could be better secured. It is not a surprise that after the slow-down in the EU negotiations, the business elite played an important role of turning the political leaders’ attention towards the East. The new foreign policy approach of a more positive and active role of Turkey in its region was welcomed by the new bourgeoisie and they took advantage of it. Not only the business elite supported the Turkish policies but most of the civil organizations and influential political and civil oriented groups. The strongest of these was notably the Hizmet Movement that played a crucial role in weakening the military’s role and as well as became critical in helping the AKP in its ambitions to play the role of a regional leader. The umbrella of the Hizmet Movement spread the positive image of Turkey, played a source of attraction and influence and helped the Turkish businesses to emerge in new markets.

In the examination of the elite consensus the structure of the AKP’s political leadership has to be taken into consideration. The Turkish political culture is by definition elitist and centred around strong personalities. This is not different in the case of the AKP itself, the political leadership has been built around the main leader, the prime minister and his closest circles. During the 2000s, after the AKP’s rise to government, the political power of the prime minister also grew and the main strategic lines of the foreign policy was defined by him and his advisors. Even though in the beginning, Abdullah Gül played a really strong role in the party, his role as a foreign minister did not create a strong different line, he basically followed the route that was declared by the prime minister. On the other hand, a new personality, the foreign policy advisor, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu became very influential and developed the new foreign policy of Turkey, based on the interests of the new political and economic elite. The new active and ambitious foreign policy of Turkey was launched already in the middle of the 2000s and was inaugurated as a main foreign policy strategy after the victorious 2007 general elections. Davutoğlu became foreign minister only a few years later, when Turkey’s foreign policy spread its influence all over the region along the strategic lines that were defined by him.

IV. The new Turkish foreign policy concept and Turkish “soft power”

The new regional environment around Turkey and the external influences on the Turkish foreign policy together pointed into the direction of a more active foreign policy of Turkey coming. The regional opening started with the new power vacuum in the Middle East: a security threat and an opportunity, where the Turkish government must have stepped up. The growing chaos in the close neighbourhood meant a strong security threat, not only through the spill-over effects, but the relaunched military activities of the PKK, which found a safe haven in the bordering region of Iraq. At the same time, Syria became more open to the Turkish political and business interests. The death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 and the inauguration of Bashar al-Assad brought a turning point for the Turkish-Syrian relations. After 1998 Syria ceased to support the Kurdish militants and opened its market for more Turkish goods and investments. Similarly the Turks became stronger and stronger in Lebanon as well.

The changes that started in the region affected Turkey. The vacuum called for a power that improved the region's security and conveyed the message of stability. In order to fulfil its economic, security and political interests, Turkey must have stepped up as a stabilizing power in the region and played a role of a moderator in different conflicts. To achieve this goal the new foreign policy of Turkey must have focused on gaining credibility and “winning the hearts and minds” in the region. Davutoğlu built up his concept in order to initiate the soft power of Turkey in the whole Middle East and later extend it further to its wide neighbourhood.

After the EU accession had been downgraded in the Turkish foreign policy agenda, the “Eastern opening” started to focus on gaining the attraction of the countries in the neighbourhood based on economic, political and cultural attraction. In this context the negative change in the relationship between Turkey and Israel became explainable. In order to gain the confidence of the Arab countries, the Turkish government loosened its relationship with Israel. Its successive foreign policy mistakes came in handy and Turkey could blame the Israeli leadership for the worsening ties, moreover, Turkey could step up as the saviour of the Muslim countries. The 2006 Lebanon war did not pull the trigger, however, the 2008-2009 Gaza bombings resulted in a severe diplomatic breakdown between the two countries. The deteriorated relations reached their deepest point after the

Mavi Marmara incident, when the Turkish flotilla was held up by the Israeli coast guards and during the incident several Turkish citizens died. The incident allowed Turkey for setting up for a saviour of the Palestinians and a strong leader of the region.

Between 2007 and 2011 Turkey developed into a strong and ambitious power in its region, the “Ankara Moment” arrived. Turkey’s foreign policy became active and successful, the country acquired not only regional but global influence. Turkey became a regional economic hub and influential actor in its region. (Balogh et al. 2013) Davutoğlu, as the Prime Minister’s advisor and as foreign minister created a new foreign policy strategy that the next sections will elaborate on.

New conduct of foreign policy – the concept of the strategic depth

Turkish foreign policy changed after 2002, not only in its means, but the level of activity as well. Traditionally it relied on the assumptions that it inherited from the Ottoman times and the early periods of the Republican era; the tradition of the balance of power and the experiences of the Kemalist revolution all led to a degree of isolationism combined with artificial modernization and Europeanization. This also included a suspicion with foreign powers (Sèvres Syndrome) and based on the İnönü doctrine, a self-distancing practice from other Middle Eastern states and especially the Arab leaders.

The slow transformation of the foreign policy started already during the Özal era. After the victory of the AKP and later Erdoğan’s rise to power in 2003 he initiated a strong transformation in the foreign policy making. The foreign ministry still remained one of the most important places for foreign policy making, however, at the same time the Prime Minister’s office pulled in some critical elements of foreign policy portfolio. Erdoğan strengthened the office of his chief foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoğlu, this way the previously relatively powerless advisor’s office became an important policymaking powerhouse. Davutoğlu, based on his earlier strategic studies used the influence of his office to finalize his concept of Turkish foreign policy activity, and to underpin the Islamic oriented vision of the AKP. In the first few years Davutoğlu did not expose himself to the media, he coordinated the policies of Turkey from the background slowly accomplishing his concept of the strategic depth. Even though Ahmet Davutoğlu became minister of foreign affairs only in 2009, his foreign policy vision was decisive in his previous position as an advisor to the prime minister. In his work, the Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) he laid down the basis of a new Turkish foreign policy reaching

beyond Özal's activity. (Davutoğlu 2001) According to Murinson (2006, 947) the origins of Davutoğlu's doctrine can be traced back to multiple layers and attempts of foreign policy conducts. First, Özal's Neo-Ottomanist approach can be seen in its ambitions to extend the Turkish influence in the areas of the former Ottoman Empire. Second, the multi-dimensional and Islam oriented foreign policy approach of Erbakan in the 1990s has been mixed with Davutoğlu's own innovative approach.

In Davutoğlu's vision Turkish foreign policy would have to live up to its potential and become a regional political power, as well as a role-player in global politics. It is an articulated element of the Davutoğlu concept to transform Turkey into a strong regional and global actor through the exercise of soft power¹⁴¹. In his book (Davutoğlu 2001) and his articles¹⁴² he defined the position of Turkey in the international community based on the thought that Turkey is surrounded by different regions towards which Turkey must pursue different foreign policy approaches. The main defining factors are the distance and the location of these regions and partner countries, this way the geostrategic and the traditional, geocultural location. Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire possesses a great geographical depth, which places Turkey at the centre of many geopolitical areas of influence. According to his thesis, the geostrategic location of Turkey and its regional cultural connections, its economic and military capabilities, the region's common history with the Ottoman Empire and the similarities in their identity all mount up to the fact that Turkey has to ambition the role of regional leadership. Davutoğlu in fact made a new distinction of the spheres of influence in the areas around Turkey. In this new set up the Middle East became one of the most important zones of Turkish ambition for influence. (Hursoy 2011, 150-152; Murinson 2012; 7-16)

According to this assessment Turkey must not drift with the global political currents defined by the will of main global powers, but it must live up to its possibilities and capacities in its actions. Even though Turkey disposes of significant military capabilities, with regard to the region's particularities Turkey should rather rely on its soft power possibilities.

¹⁴¹ The dissertation defined the concept of soft power in the chapter that clarifies the theoretical background. The applicability of the soft power concept in the Turkish environment will be further elaborated on.

¹⁴² Davutoğlu created and articulated his concept through different articles and speeches, beside his book the Strategic Depth. A few examples of his works: (Davutoğlu 1994; Davutoğlu 2008; Davutoğlu 2009; Davutoğlu 2010a; Davutoğlu 2010b; Davutoğlu 2010c; Davutoğlu 2011; Davutoğlu 2012a; Davutoğlu 2012b; Davutoğlu 2012c; Davutoğlu 2013a)

Davutoğlu's concept on foreign policy laid down the following main pillars (Davutoğlu 2008; 79-84; Hursoy 2011, 151; Murinson 2006, 951-952):

- multidimensional foreign policy in accordance with the interests of global powers;
- “zero problems with the neighbours” policy;
- promotion of the most important values and norms through foreign policy in the region, and through the increase of influence. To this end Turkish diplomacy must reconcile the concepts of liberalism and democracy with the notion of security;
- rhythmic diplomacy, a never seen activity to be established towards abroad, with the tools of classical diplomacy and introducing other, new tools as well;
- Turkish foreign policy must rely on the interdependence in the economies of the region's countries.

In the centre of Davutoğlu's concept the pursuit for international security and peace, regional stability through multilateral cooperation can all be found. He emphasizes – following neoliberal assumptions – that the countries of the region will eventually cooperate based on economic and political interdependencies. (Hursoy 2011, 156-158; Fidan 2013, 92-93) However, seeing the historical legacy in the region, the conflicts and political stand offs are unavoidable, which eventually lead to war. According to this concept the resolution of these conflicts must be found through political dialogue and cooperation. Turkey must find its role and activity defined by this framework. (Davutoğlu 2013b) Davutoğlu's concept correlates definitely with the original Kemalist idea of “peace at home, peace in the world”. However, there is a significant difference regarding the level of activity. In this new concept the activity and the regional leadership of Turkey can contribute to its security. The interdependencies and the continuous cooperation can guarantee the security of the region. (Hursoy 2011, 156-158; Fidan 2013, 92-93)

Davutoğlu's concept of the strategic depth was built on new geographical imagination, which had been supported by the changing external and internal conditions. Turkey which had become one of the important actors in the regional order and the global system experienced this transformation in tandem with its unique conditions. (Kalin 2011, 6) This is a new non-Euro-centric perspective, in which Turkey had become one of the important actors in the regional order and the global system. A new Turkey emerged in

the 2000s as a result of a new geopolitical imagination on the one hand and Turkey's economic and security-based priorities on the other.¹⁴³

Aims and tools of Davutoğlu's new foreign policy

At this point it is worth recalling the facts that have been defined in the chapters that elaborated on the theoretical background of soft power definition. Power is relational (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9-11), it depends on the interaction of different actors in their international relations. A country needs not only to have assets for influencing other countries, but it has to be using these capacities on purpose and the other actors have to realize and recognize that power. (Oğuzlu 2007, 82-83)

It is clear that Turkey explicitly pursued soft power ambitions primarily in its regional vicinity, but at the same time it disposes of global power ambitions. The assessment of Turkey and the Turkish soft power in the Middle East changed significantly in the last decade and a half. While Turkey had been considered as problematic ally, with an unstable economy and regular coup d'états, the 2000s changed this image. The proactive diplomacy of the AKP, the regional stabilizing and mediating efforts, the democracy promotion and cultural projection, the increasing economic and development outreach programme all induced a positive return from the region.

According to Nye's theory of soft power there are three ways to achieve a country's goals: first, by using coercion or threat (eventually also by using war as a foreign policy tool); second, economic pressure, financial incentives can be useful tools as well; third, by the use of the country's soft power.

In general, military capacities are associated with power, thus the bigger and more developed the army of a country is, the more threat it projects and the more security it can create for itself. Although military power and power projection still remained necessary, in the information age the emphasis has shifted to the soft power means. Out of the four options Nye defined as to how the military can be used, two, fighting and coercive

¹⁴³ We might accept the evaluation of Tarik Oğuzlu that Turkey is in a broader sense not a classic soft power, but rather a civilian power, that he defines with economic instruments. He believes that Turkey, however not exclusively, but as a main feature of its foreign policy tries to shape the behaviour of other countries with its economy. Turkey has been showing a tendency of persuasion for more than a decade. However, this does not mean that Turkey uses its hard power capacities for persuasion, or economic coercion. Rather through its economic expansion it reaches these results. (Oğuzlu 2007)

diplomacy are hard power modalities, but alliance building, peacekeeping and military aid are in the co-optive range of the power definition. (Nye 2011, 39-48)

In Nye's framework economic power holds an intermediary position. A well working economy and credible development can create soft power as well. (Nye 2011, 52) Turkey's successful development model attracted and influenced more countries than its military potential. Economic power is undeniably basis of both soft and hard power. The Turkish economy with its growing export and investments raised the regional perception of Turkey remarkably. Slowly the Turkish economic power was used to set or at least influence the regional agenda for economic cooperation, free trade zones. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişçi 2011; 709-710) At the same time Turkey started to use its economic power to project soft power through their aid projects and financial support. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012) Turkish companies became the representatives of the Turkish image all around the world and thus contributed to Turkish soft power. (Keneş 2013)

Nye argues that the combination of soft power and hard power adds up to the so-called smart power capabilities of a country. (Nye 2011, 23) The mixture of both soft and hard power elements can create the optimal foreign policy behaviour for a country in order to reach certain goals. It is obvious that Turkey has had strong hard power capabilities at its disposal, through its strong military capabilities and the strong economic basis for a long time.

Soft power explains areas of influence and attraction, which are not directly connected to the hard power capacities of a country. There are multiple sources of soft power, or sources of attraction. Nye puts them into three categories: a country's culture, its political values and the conduct of foreign policy. It is hard to deny the effect of the Turkish culture and the its embeddedness in its region. Even though the Ottoman history has negative connotations and collective memory in the region, it still provides for the cultural commonalities, where the Turkish cultural products still fall on a fertile ground. Speaking about the political values, Turkey's democratic traditions and history are undebatable, even though there have been important discrepancies in the history of Turkish development. A political system that prioritizes freedom and liberty, fundamental rights and provides the citizens with the right of political choice is much more attractive for external viewers than any autarchic versions. Based on this, one of the main pillar of Turkey's soft power is its democratic experience. (Kalin 2011, 9)

The following sections will have an analysis of Turkey's capacities and the background of its active regional behaviour aiming for creating a regional leader status. First the use of the military and economic capacities the hard and the intermediary tools of power will be examined. These are the factors and capacities, which are not necessarily understood in the framework in the strict meaning of soft power, however became a very important element in Turkish power projection and attraction, especially in the case of economic growth. After these elements this dissertation will analyse the factors of the Turkish soft power sources, the attractiveness of the Turkish political values, shortly the Turkish model and finally the cultural attraction, enhanced by public diplomacy.

Military capabilities and hard power of Turkey

As Nye argues, according to conventional (classical or neo-classical realist) assumptions on state power, the most important factor behind a country's security and influencing capabilities is the size of the armies and the used military technology. Even though Nye immediately admits that by the 21st century the once so obvious fact that power equals with military capacities has changed, it is worth briefly examining the Turkish military power. Coercion and coercive power capacities are still important elements, even though they have lost their exclusive importance. Turkey is lying at the crossroads of different unstable regions with non-resolved military conflicts, Turkey – through its past had also unresolved antagonism against its neighbours¹⁴⁴. Keeping up the strong military capacities is still inevitable for Turkey due to its geopolitical environment. It is also important to mention again that that classical hard power tools can be used for soft power behaviour and soft power strategies for hard power gains. Hard power is based on commandment or coercive behaviours using force, sanctions, bribes or payments. (Nye 2004, 8)

Analysing Turkey's hard power capabilities, the absolute numbers show a significant military power both in global and especially in regional comparison. Turkey disposes of one of the biggest and strongest militaries in the region and has developed military technologies of its own. According to data from 2013, the size of the conscripted

¹⁴⁴ Several examples can be brought up in order to exemplify this problem of the Turkish neighbourhood. However, the most obvious cases are connected to the long-standing Turkish-Kurdish conflicts. In 1998, the Syrian regime's support to the PKK lead almost to a fully-fledged war between Turkey and Syria. (Makovsky 1999a; Sezgin 2002) The fight against the Kurdish rebel groups triggered several cross-border operations from Turkey's side, entering the territory of Iraq multiple times. (Araş and Polat 2008)

Turkish military reached almost a million, of course most of them not in the fighting troops. (Egeresi 2013d, 4) Even though the relative ratio of the military spending compared to the GDP slightly decreased in the last decade, in absolute terms it meant an increase (because of the massive economic growth that Turkey experienced after 2003). During the year of the AKP's rise to power the Turkish military spending reached up to almost 4% of the GDP, in 2012 it was only about 2.3%. In 2012 Turkey was the 15th in the world rank of military budget, way ahead of several regional partners. (Balogh et al 2013, 3-4)

The Turkish military improvements manifested not only in technology, but in the development of new operational capacities. After two decades of fighting against the Kurdish separatist movement of the PKK, the Turkish military became increasingly sensitive of the asymmetrical warfare. Owing to the continuous fight on the Eastern borders of Turkey against the PKK and to the technological developments Turkey kept its second biggest army in the NATO and its primacy against most of the regional opponents in military means. This was based on regular purchases of foreign technologies and the investments in the Turkish defence industry.¹⁴⁵

Generally, in an analysis of the hard power of Turkey it would be a mistake not to mention the impact of the size of the population. As a result of the demographic boom after the 1950s Turkey's population started a continuous growth. This population became the basis for a strong military and at the same time of a vast and strong internal market in the last few decades. The Turkish hard power became apparent vis-à-vis most of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours, and slowly Turkey outnumbered Iran as well.

Economic performance as a source of power

It is of a distinguished importance to have a closer look at the fast growing economy of Turkey that in a certain way became a source of self-esteem and regional attraction. (Szigetvári 2013a, 29) The performance of the Turkish economy and the transformation of its actors provided the basis for the changes of the Turkish society and the governing elite as well as has become a source of self-esteem and regional attraction.

¹⁴⁵ For example: The Altay programme that was launched in 2007 and aimed at developing a Turkish tank. The first prototypes were released in 2012. (source: <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/altaymainbattletank/>)

Within the previously introduced theoretical framework of hard power and soft power, economic power has a position that lies in-between. Growing economic capacities generated more resources for stronger and better military technologies in Turkey, but at the same time they provided a strong source of attraction as well for the neighbouring regions. Turkey fast became a model for economic growth in its different regions. (Keneş 2013; Oğuzlu 2007, 88) Turkey became not only capable of creating sanctions, but in a way, at a later stage to avert or ease the effects of international sanctions (for example against Iran). (Araş and Aydın 2005; Coşkun 2010; Habibi 2012) Turkey's rising economic performance, good quality but at the same time affordable export products and the growing number of Turkish investors improved the perception of Turkey itself. Different Turkish brands became obvious bases and carriers of Turkish soft power. Companies as the Turkish Airlines¹⁴⁶ or BEKO¹⁴⁷ have had positive impacts on the credibility of the respective country as well.

The performance of the Turkish economy and foreign trade relations have been receiving a strong attention. From the second half of the 2000s Turkey entered the group of the most dynamic economies in the world and especially its engagement with its neighbourhood was regarded as an attractive step. The Turkish economy grew by 8.9% in 2010 putting Turkey the third after Singapore and China. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişçi 2011, 706)

It is undisputable that Turkey's regional ambitions are based on its strong economic growth that restarted soon after the AKP's rise to government. After the twin crises in 2000/2001, strong external help and economic reforms were required to solve the economic and financial problems. This economic development on an unprecedented scale in Turkish history provided an appropriate ground for a strengthening self-esteem and continuous growing budget for foreign policy expansion. During the first decade of the AKP rule the GDP/capita tripled and the GDP's absolute value grew five-fold. By 2011, with only one year of economic decrease in 2009 (as a result of the world financial crisis) Turkey became the 17th biggest economy of the world, this way entered the group of G20. It is not surprising that the government set the goal of joining the elite club of the

¹⁴⁶ Turkish Airlines became a very important tool of the AKP's expansive foreign policy vision. The company tries to provide direct connections from Istanbul to every destination, where Turkish economic interests might emerge. As a result, Turkish Airlines flight reach to most of the African, Asian and Middle Eastern destinations. (Keneş 2013)

¹⁴⁷ BEKO is a Turkish brand owned by the Koç Holding that produces household and domestic appliances in a fair quality, but cheaper than the average European competitors. (Akhmedjonov, Oğucu and Suvankulov 2012)

10 strongest economies by 2023, the 100th anniversary of the modern Turkish Republic. (Akdeniz 2013, 2; Bayazıt 2013)

By the 2000s the transformation of the Turkish economy reached the stage when the Anatolian companies grew stronger and became influential on the political issues as well. Their main goal was and has been to emphasize new directions in Turkish foreign policy. They especially lobbied for an Eastern opening first concentrating on Turkey's immediate neighbourhood, then a few years later reached out to more distant destinations outside of the Middle East, especially in the Muslim countries of Asia and the African continent. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişci)

As a result of these changes, Turkey's role among the interdependencies of the region underwent a profound re-adjustment. On the one hand, by 2005, the Middle Eastern neighbourhood had become the second biggest trading partner after the EU. Between 2003 and 2012, Turkey's trade with Middle Eastern Arab countries grew nine fold. Another striking comparison would be the share of Turkey's neighbourhood in its overall foreign trade; it grew from 3,9 billion USD in 1991 to 88,3 billion USD in 2008 (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişci 2011, 707) Not only the numbers in trade prove this, but the massive emergence of Turkish companies in all neighbouring areas.¹⁴⁸ Only in the Middle Eastern region, the presence of the Turkish companies has become unavoidable. According to the estimates of the USAID, by 2008 Turkish companies covered 95% of the almost 3 billion USD worth of regional construction sector. Turkish companies emerged in Egypt, Turkish banks started co-operations in the Gulf region and Turkish food industry became widely distributed.¹⁴⁹ Until 2012 Syria was one of the most important targets of the Turkish businesses and the economic diplomacy of the Turkish government. The emergence of the Turkish companies was not only subsidized by the chambers and business councils but the state also provided cheap credits to boost investment there. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişci 2011, 709)

To enhance these results, Turkey initiated several state financed programmes and subsidies. The booming economy and the absolute political majority provided self-esteem for progressive foreign policy initiatives, such as a visa free zone in the Middle East and

¹⁴⁸ The presence of Turkish companies also serve as an independent foreign policy and soft power tool. Through the good experience with the Turkish products and the companies the local population could grow more confidence and sympathy towards Turkey.

¹⁴⁹ The two most popular brands in the neighbouring region became Eti and the Ülker companies. The latter can be regarded as a symbol of the success of the Anatolian bourgeoisie that had a strong connection to the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. (Rubin 2005)

free trade agreements. (Evin, et al 2010, 13) The first Turkish free trade agreement in the Middle East was signed with Syria in 2004 and then soon with Egypt (2005) and Jordan (2009). With the aim of initiating the first steps towards the free move of businesses and labour Turkey started to liberalise its visa policies. Between 2009 and 2013 Turkey waived the visa restrictions for Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Iran and Kuwait. During an Arab-Turkish economic forum, foreign minister Davutoğlu openly stressed the importance of the free movement of people and the creation of free trade zones to encourage greater economic activity. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişci 2011, 709)

Prior to the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring, Turkey initiated a free economic zone and a model for simplified border-crossing for the Middle East. With these plans and initiatives Turkey pursued two different aims: On the one hand, they provided a much easier access to the economies of the region for the Turkish businessmen. This applied especially to the Anatolian businesses; the AKP followed the interest of these business rewarding their support both politically and financially. Secondly, the foreign policy vision of Davutoğlu had a clear instruction to strengthen the interdependencies in the whole region this way creating stability and security. (Murinson 2006, 951-954; Hursoy 2011, 151) For the first decade of the AKP's rule the foreign economic policies became effective tools of the ambitions of Turkish regional leadership. This was especially true for the Turkish-Syrian relations. From one of the strongest foes in 1998, Syria by the second half of the 2000s had become a strong Turkish ally and economic partner. (Araş and Polat 2008, Mufti 2002)

“Softer tools” of Turkish power ambitions

Turkish norms, political value system and Neo-Ottomanism

Central to the Turkish political system is the so-called Turkish model, a democratic political system established after 1923, which, however, included authoritarian and elitist tendencies or the proneness to military coups. In the last few decades, however, with the EU accession in sight, the political reforms delivered some solutions that reduced Turkey's democratic deficit to some extent. Nevertheless, Turkey's attractiveness in the region¹⁵⁰ is not connected to its democratic political model alone, but

¹⁵⁰ The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) conducted a research in 2012 in several Middle Eastern countries and realised that 69% of the respondents gave positive opinion about Turkey,

can be derived from a set of political, cultural values and norms that could be referred to as the Turkish model.

Oğuzlu (2007, 88) defines Turkish model along different cultural and political variables. According to this concept, the Turkish model is a unique complex of external perceptions and the image that Turkey wants to convey towards the outside world. One of the most important elements of the model is the relationship between state and religion. Turkey is one of the most successful Muslim countries that partially entered the West through NATO and is on the threshold of entering the Western elite club of the EU. Through Turkey other regional and Muslim countries can have the chance to have an advocate in the developed world, and at the same time Turkey can play as an honest mediator. However, despite its Islamic values, Turkey is the only successful country in the region separating religion from the state. Turkey can offer a secular political system, however the country is still Muslim. This became especially true after the election of the AKP, where the conservative Islam economic and political forces secured their power.

Turkey (at least partially) succeeded in its attempt to launch a Western style modernization. Turkey became the ally of the West and turned its face away from its region for a long time. However, starting from President Özal, and especially during the AKP period Turkey returned to its region and started an economic and political conversation in good faith a possibility for cooperation. Even though, until the middle of the 2000s the connection between the Ottoman Empire and the modern Turkish Republic had been denied, the AKP restarted the discussion on the heritage of the past. Turkey is an inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, thus it has a responsibility to keep up the stability of the region and at the same time connect it to the West. (Murinson 2009, 947-949)

Tukey's foreign policy activism, based on regional power projection brought the concept of Neo-Ottomanism to light yet again. The first emergence of this notion occurred during Özal's period and the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy. (Taşpinar 2012, 128) Based on the new economic capacities Özal started to build Turkey's influence in the neighbouring regions. This trend continued and transformed to be more and more a regional political endeavour during the beginning of the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War as part of the self-redefining process, Turkish foreign policy tried to find its new geopolitical role. During the AKP period the concept of Neo-Ottomanism received

which means Turkey became one of the most popular countries in the whole region. (Akarçeşme 2013b) Turkey frequently declared that it was willing to be a source of inspiration rather than a model (Akarçeşme 2013a), because they admitted that every country had its own dynamics.

a double meaning that can have both a positive and a negative meaning based on the context it is articulated in. (Taşpınar 2012, 128-130) Davutoğlu's early works elaborated on the concept itself that was implied in his main strategic concept, the strategic depth. (Davutoğlu 2001) Even though his main aim was to criticize unipolar power based international relations, as well as the Eurocentric approaches to the international relations, he gives an explanation to a new understanding of the Islamic civilization. According to this, the Islamic civilization rather than the Islamic community, the "Umma" is the role player of the clash of civilizations. He suggested that the existing civilizational crisis could only be overcome by a civilizational dialogue and a free exchange of values. (Murinson 2006, 949)

According to Davutoğlu, for Turkey to become a Muslim regional power it needs to practise caution and to calibrate its foreign policy according to the strategic global parameters that were set by the great powers. (Murinson 2006, 950) In this, Turkey has to work on dismissing the Western artificial antagonism between the Islamic civilization and the West. At the same time the Kemalist foreign policy and the Westernization of the country undermined some intrinsic values of the Turkish foreign policy. However, Özal's period and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis changed the picture and introduced both nationalism and the Islamic values as pillars of Turkey's international stand. Özal partly emphasized the Ottoman past and the Islamic culture as a sort of (soft) power. These ideas got integrated into Davutoğlu's concept and this way the AKP's foreign policy doctrine. His antagonism to the Westernization of Turkey and the Islamic civilization based ideas became manifested in his Neo-Ottomanist ideas. (Kramer 2010, 7)

The projection of the Ottoman revival was welcomed by some, mostly in the Turkish diaspora and in the West, because the emergence of Turkish influence had the potential to generate stability in certain regions. The re-emerging idea of the Pax Turca aimed at a rather pragmatic interest based foreign policy with ideological elements. On the other hand, the West not only praised but criticized Neo-Ottomanism, because of Turkey's strengthening connections with Syria, Sudan, Iran or Libya. The possible stabilizing role and the presence of a NATO ally and an EU candidate country in these regions was perceived a positive element. However, Neo-Ottomanism generated fear and cautiousness in the Balkans or the Middle East. In this discourse the Turkish attempts of building influence bring back the imperialist hegemonic ambitions of the Ottoman Empire coated in the concept of a softer approach. (Balogh et al 2013, 2)

Even though both positive and negative connotations are attached to Neo-Ottomanism and the concept of the continuation of Turkey's responsibilities in the whole region, it was welcomed that Turkey has never been colonised and therefore can be a leader of its region to grow up to be equal partner of the West. The nature of the AKP government, its political activity and its positive approach to the Middle East adds up to a positive Turkish model that can create credibility in the region. The Islam rooted political affiliation of the governing party and its advocacy for the Muslims all played a crucial part in this endeavour to be an alluring model for its neighbouring regions, especially the Middle East. The fact that political Islam related government made it possible to start the accession negotiation for a country that had been waiting for almost two decades to enter the EU made the AKP unique. If the Islamists could step on the road of liberalisation, then the society could also follow suit.

Turkey as a mediator

The Middle East can be regarded as a distorted region, burdened with instabilities, longstanding and newly emerging conflicts. The end of the Cold War did not end the traditional antagonisms in the region, moreover, new conflicts erupted, further destabilizing the regional environment. Davutoğlu points out in his article (Davutoğlu 2013, 83) that the need for mediation is obvious in this new era. According to his assessment, Turkey's position had been based on the use of diplomacy in an efficient way to help resolve disputes and conflicts.

International mediation can be regarded as one of the most effective tools of the Turkish soft power ambitions. Even though this tool was utilized during the Özal era as well, the AKP used it as an integral part of its regional leadership efforts. Mediation in international conflicts fits in perfectly to the list of soft power ambitions, the regional stabilizing efforts and Davutoğlu' "zero problems policy with neighbours" concept. The main idea behind mediation is for a third power to get involved. This third party is accepted and recognized by both players of that conflict. (Balogh 2009, 19-20) Based on this, Turkey tried to use mediation to influence other countries in conflict with each other in its immediate neighbourhood and at the same time to stabilize them. This way, the Turkish mediation had multiple purposes: to use its cultural, economic, political influence in those conflicting countries and to stabilize them. This way Turkey could ease the systemic threats upon itself and strengthen the position of Turkish businesses through prestige gains in their markets. The most important element in Turkey's mediating efforts

was to live up to the business needs and the expectations to create a safe neighbourhood around Turkey. A safer and secure region and immediate environment provides predictability and stability, which are inevitable elements of the successful businesses. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişci 2011, 716)

However, to conduct a successful mediation policy a number of conditions have to be fulfilled. The parties of a conflict must accept the mediator, its political purposes and the mediator has to prove its impartial approach. (Balogh 2009,20) Turkey and the main Turkish politicians that conducted mediating role had built up this credibility in most areas of the Middle East and several Muslim countries before the Arab Spring. The public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy tools generated trust in the emerging new regional power and most of the countries in the Middle East, Western Asia, or Africa looked at Turkey as a possible mediator. This changed only after the beginning of the Arab Spring, which started to question the Turkish image and Turkey's credibility.

Ankara played a role in several regional conflicts, including interstate adversaries and domestic political turmoil. One of the important successes was the mediation in the Lebanese political crisis between 2006 and 2008. The situation which almost developed into a civil war ended with a dialogue between the Hezbollah and the government in Doha. Davutoğlu defines mediation efforts as “challenges for Turkey”. (Davutoğlu 2013, 83) Turkey's interest to resolve the conflicts in its immediate vicinity is two-fold: on the one hand, these conflicts created direct security threats to Turkey, not to forget about their indirect effects of the influx of refugees, arms or radicals. On the other hand, Turkey started to use the tool of mediation deliberately to influence the regional stakeholders and to develop the international image about itself, from the 2000s. Turkey, together Finland established the Group of Friends of Mediation in 2010 under the framework of the UN.¹⁵¹ This group aims at bringing together not only states, but international organizations and NGOs with the aim of promoting the diplomatic solution conflicts.

International development policy

Development aid is a typical and simple tool of wielding soft power. Although it is connected directly to a country's economic power it should be analysed as part of public diplomacy. Providing humanitarian and development assistance wield a country positive responses from the beneficiaries, thus aid policies contribute to the image building efforts

¹⁵¹ More information on the Group of Friends of Mediation: <http://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation>

of the donor country. (Nye 2004, 55-60) Turkish development aid does not look back to a long past, the first examples of providing development aid to other less developed partners were initiated after the end of the Cold War. It was during Özal's presidency that the Turkish government decided to try to extend its influence in different neighbouring regions. The most important recipients were designated in the traditional Turkish area of influence, such as the countries in the Balkans and the newly independent Turkic republics in Central Asia. In order to institutionalize these efforts the Turkish foreign ministry created its own department an independent unit, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı – TİKA), which was the designated state authority to coordinate and conduct bilateral development policies. The most important aim of the TİKA after its establishment was to provide development assistance to Turkish speaking or Turkic developing countries and to strengthen cooperation with them through projects and economic programmes. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 648)

The TİKA's activities received a wide moral and political support from the Western allies, since Turkish nationalism based policies, especially in Central Asia correlated with the American, European aims of democratizing the ex-Soviet region. All together between 1992 and 2003 the amount of aid added up to 3, 75 billion USD¹⁵². (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 650) The TİKA's main role was to promote the Turkish experience of economic and political development, democratization process and the market-economy. Promotion of the "Turkish model" was already in place in the 1990s, however, with a different meaning and connotation. It was a political and economic development model with a rather secular Muslim population having a Western type economic and political democratic system. The idea was to blend in the newly independent states into the Western political model. During this period, the TİKA accentuated two major goals: The first objective was to further weaken Moscow's influence in its periphery after the fall of the Soviet Union. The second objective was to take up the competition with Iran, which also tried to create a sphere of influence in the Central-Asian areas. This way, the TİKA became a natural soft tool of influence building in these areas. Through the TİKA Turkey became able to deepen its political, economic, cultural and social ties with those countries that became subject to the Turkish development aid policies. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 647-648)

¹⁵² The main recipients of this aid was Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 650)

However, after the first years of highly ambitious actions and programmes, due to domestic political instabilities and the effects of the 1994 financial crisis the development policy lost most of its finances. The TİKA was not able to fulfil its main goals. Until the beginning of the 2000s the international development policies of Turkey had to face some serious shortcomings. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 652-654) The organizational and the financial capacities were scarce and the institutional background was not centralized properly. As a result of the lack of integrity of the domestic system the cooperation with international organizations could not become effective either. The TİKA was not the only institution that was providing some sort of development aid and the resources became scattered among the different competing agencies. After the first few years, the development policy became complicated and confused.

The domestic political problems and the fast changing governing coalitions pushed development aid in the background. The different ministries inside the government also had their differences over the TİKA's structure and financing. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 648) The attractiveness of the Turkish model in such an unstable political environment nosedived. From the second half of the 1990s the slow recovery of Russia started to show and its influence in the ex-Soviet areas appeared again. The Turkish development policies were not influential in these regions any more.

After 2002 the stabilization of the domestic political arena created a new environment for the development policies. Alongside with the stable government the economy's fast growth underlined that Turkey became capable of providing the necessary financial means for the proper development policies. In the aftermath of the 2000-2001 twin crises, the stabilization of the Turkish Lira brought back the credibility of the Turkish economy, thus allured more investors. The fast growing economy provided for the possibilities of reorganizing development aid policies as an effective tool of regional influence once again. The 9/11 attacks, the international intervention in Afghanistan and the American military operation in Iraq in 2003 changed the international and the regional settings around Turkey. Part of these new challenges could be answered only through soft means and the region craved for the international development aid, through which Turkey could build up a strong influence. The TİKA was established to be a simple but straightforward tool of Turkish foreign policy in the ex-Soviet areas, however, in the new international and domestic environment after the 2000s it rather became an effective tool of the multi-dimensional foreign policy ambitions of the AKP governments. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 649)

Furthermore, the area of development became an integral part of Turkey's active foreign policy directions. In 2005 the organizational shortcomings of the TİKA were handled and professionalized and the financial sources were multiplied. In 2004 339 million USD, in 2005 601 million USD, in 2009 already 707 million USD was spent on international development goals from the Turkish budget. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 658) This growth was measurable both in absolute terms and relative to the GNI. Following to the foreign policy goals new destinations became appraised. The Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods started to receive more and more aid from Turkish sources, most importantly the development aid became a tool of political influence in certain region, as well as tool of creating stability. It is not surprising that the most important partners of the Turkish development aid policy became Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq (including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region) and the Palestinian Territories. (Mutlu 2014; Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 657)

Owing to the fast growth of the Turkish economy, thus the governmental budget, the growth of the development aid did not stop during as an effect of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. By 2011 the total development assistance of Turkey reached 2,3 billion USD/year, out of which 1,3 billion USD was provided by the government. Turkey aimed its assistance at regions hit by natural catastrophes, or wars and local conflicts. Their purpose was to provide humanitarian assistance as well as contributing to the rebuilding efforts of the countries. This way not only did they build an influence in the reconstruction efforts in conflict zones, but gained the trust of the local people as well, preparing the ground for Turkish soft power extension. (Fidan 2013, 94-95; Mutlu 2014)

There is an undeniable link between the Turkish political influence and the development aid policies. Turkey, now an important regional and global player could not refrain from participating in global actions for sustainable development, poverty reduction, and the global fight against terrorism through development. Not to mention the fact that the participation in such international actions also contributed to Turkey's rising image. The allocation of the development assistance follows and followed the Turkish governmental and corporate interests. In addition to helping the reduction of global poverty and helping the economic development of regions lagging behind, Turkey started to expand its aid policy into new regions in accordance with its multi-vector foreign policy initiatives.

Turkey adjusted its aid policies to regional interests and geopolitical changes. This happened after both the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as well. Turkey tried to move

in to the power vacuum that emerged after the collapse of Afghanistan and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime also with soft power means. The Turkish government adopted the peace-building concepts of the international community and intensified its contributions to the establishments and the preservation of peace and security. The Turkish forces not only participated in the international peace-keeping operations, but Turkish development agencies, first and foremost the TIKA contributed to the rebuilding of the education and health sectors in three provinces in Afghanistan. (Mutlu 2014) Iraq became much more complicated, because of Turkey's ambiguous relationship to the Kurds there and the ambivalent approach of the American military leadership to the Turkish presence in Northern Iraq. However, the soft means were more welcomed than a military intervention and the TIKA managed to established several projects on Iraqi soil. (Mutlu 2014; Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 657)

Another exemplary, rather ideological decision was to create a strong commitment in the to aiding the Palestinian Territories. Ankara used this step not only to strengthen its relationship with the Palestinian leadership and create a feeling of support in among the local population, but rather to establish a stronger sympathy in the whole Middle East. Parallel with to the deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relationship from the second half of the 2000s Turkey became very active with the TIKA in Palestinian projects. The office of TIKA was opened offices in Jerusalem and Ramallah in 2005 and soon the first industrial development programmes started in the Gaza Strip as well. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 657)

Ankara requested support in several political question in return for their development assistance. As an example, in 2009 Turkey requested support in its UN SC membership bid. At the same time, the development policies have been profitable for Turkish companies as well. In certain cases the Turkish companies received concessions or the immediate execution of the reconstruction programmes. Indirectly, the political sympathy induced further gains for the Turkish companies creating new markets for them in different countries.

By the end of the 2000s Turkey elevated itself into the exclusive group of the top donor countries, through which image the Turkish government tried to establish more influence in the neighbouring regions and slowly in faraway areas, such as the African continent. Turkey was placed first of the emerging donor countries already in 2006 on the G-8 meeting in Moscow. (Demirtepe and Özkan 2012, 660)

Public diplomacy and cultural attraction

Culture and public diplomacy are among the most important tools to wield attraction from other partners, to generate a positive perception. In order to gain this attraction, the spontaneous and unorganized influences must be mixed with deliberate and controlled actions by the state. (Nye 2004, 113-114) Modern Turkish public diplomacy started to build up wider and wider set of tools. For this purpose the Turkish government has started to use the tool of public diplomacy to a greater degree. The Turkish governments started to use public diplomacy not only openly but rather deliberately. However, a comprehensive framework was only created relatively late in 2010 with the creation of a separate office coordinating the public diplomacy activities. Its duties include the projection of the new narrative of the stronger, self-confident, economic and soft power Turkey. Turkey as an emerging power has created a new Turkish narrative with multiple dimensions and faces. The task of the new Turkish diplomacy has been to tell the story of the new Turkey to a wide range of audience across the globe. (Kalin 2011, 5) However, Turkey must build a new identity which not only convinces the external world by the image of Turkey to convey the message of a rising, regional power, but creates an immense domestic transformation as well. Not only needs the image of Turkey to convey the message of a rising, regional power but the domestic reality also needs to adopt the new identity.

The Turkish public diplomacy started to use education as a major tool, providing several scholarships to students from the Eastern and Southern partner countries. A huge number of scholarships were provided by to Middle Eastern countries. The wide scholarship programme of the Turkish state could be both categorized as a cultural tool and the tool of soft power, however, the students receive strong cultural influences. By the end of the 2000s Turkey offered around 4 000 scholarships for university studies in Turkish universities. The scholarship programme mainly included Asia, Middle East, the Balkans and Africa. Scholarship programmes are always long term investments. Most of those students, who finished their studies in Turkey take their sympathies towards Turkey home and indirectly contribute to its cultural influence. (Akarçeşme 2013a; Akarçeşme 2013b)

The visa liberalisation initiatives of Turkey was received very positively in the Middle East, thus played a major public diplomacy role. Not only the number of incoming tourists grew significantly but also projected the image of a regional power that established new beneficial regional regimes. (Kaptanoğlu and Kirişçi 2011, 709)

Not only those state-led activities, programmes or deliberate governmental actions started to have influence on other countries, especially in the immediate region of Turkey, but also Turkish civil organizations, state and private businesses. (Kalin 2011, 21; Altınay 2008, 59) Even though, their effectivity and accuracy can be questioned, their influence became an undisputable factor in the region. One of the most important examples could be Turkish film industry, which produced strong attraction and foreign policy and soft power gains for Turkey. On the one hand, Turkish soap operas slowly became more and more popular, on the other hand certain movies worsened the Turkish-American and the Turkish-Israeli relations.¹⁵³ By the end of this period Turkish cinematography, Turkish television shows reached regional popularity and recognition. Some pieces of Turkish culture became world-known, such as the novelist Orhan Pamuk, who received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2006, as the first Turkish citizen to be honoured. Not only the high culture, but the popular cultural products of Turkey started to spread, first in the neighbouring, mainly Muslim countries, and by the second half of the 2000s in the Gulf and spread further.¹⁵⁴ “Made in Turkey” became a recognised label in television industry all over the region and beyond. Even though this was not and could not be planned by the state as a means of soft power, the development in the economy and the state funds sponsoring movies have led to the strengthening of the Turkish cinema. This, of course created stronger capacities and possibilities for the creation of more and better quality products that flooded the neighbouring regions. (Akarçeşme 2013a; Akarçeşme 2013b)

Influencing the region through Turkish companies was partially a government supported programme. The capacities of the Turkish (mainly Islam oriented) companies and their growing ability to build up presence abroad became a tool of projecting Turkish soft power and conveying values followed by the Turkish government itself. Some companies became a worldwide recognized brand such as the Turkish Airlines, which opened dozens of new destinations in the last decade. (Akarçeşme 2013a; Akarçeşme 2013b; Keneş 2013)

One could not speak about Turkish cultural diplomacy without mentioning the Hizmet movement and its effect on the Turkish image abroad. The movement in broad terms is a loose network of volunteers and civil organizations who promote educational

¹⁵³ Such movies were the Valley of the wolves: Iraq and Valley of the wolves: Palestine.

¹⁵⁴ It is important to note, that by the time of finishing of this dissertation, the Turkish soap operas and televised shows already reached Europe, including Hungary and changed the demand. These Turkish shows replaced the traditionally strong position of the South American soap operas.

activities along with the dialogue among faiths and religions. The schools and different charity organisations that were opened by conservative Muslim businessmen all around the world contributed strongly to Turkey's visibility and the positive country image. The movement acted independently from the Turkish state, as a result their activity became beneficial from the Turkish soft power point of view. By the beginning of the 2010s the number of these institutions operated by the Hizmet reached over 1000. The Hizmet had started building the positive image of Turkey even before the AKP launched the new active foreign policy approach of Turkey. (Akarçeşme 2013a; Akarçeşme 2013b)

V. Soft power in question?

The previous chapter highlighted that by the beginning of the Arab Spring and the 2011 general elections, the Turkish foreign policy reached its zenith. Davutoğlu's concept on Turkey's elevated regional role manifested and its regional soft power started to turn from ambition to reality. The concept of "zero problems with the neighbours" revealed the unlimited possibilities of cooperation with new partners and old adversaries, such as Syria. Turkish companies, ranging from SME's to transnational corporations entered the markets in the Middle East and the Turkish government provided the necessary political and financial support for their presence abroad.

By 2011, Turkey became influential and an admired political focal point in the Middle East, at the same time, the extraordinary growth of the Turkish economy positively affected the economies of the whole region. Turkish investments penetrated almost all of the regional markets, Turkish investors favoured Libya and Syria especially. (Murinson 2013, 20-22) The political processes were all leading to a Turkish leadership in the region, where good cooperation with Egypt and Iran could have elevated this position even further. Owing to the successes in foreign policy and the economy, the Turkish government's domestic political support remained strong, which was further underpinned by the strengthening of the new business elite and the fact that the old Kemalist political elite had become side-lined. The society itself had been cracking into shivers, however, the continuous successes kept it intact and the unease of the Kemalist groups did not burst out. The 2011 general elections brought a strong victory of the AKP again¹⁵⁵, thus the cleavages of the society were not revealed. Despite this fact, the antagonism of the Kemalist-secular and the Islamist-conservative groups continuously grew and started to prise open the limits of political indifference. This became evident only in 2012, when the inconsistencies and the problems emerged in foreign policy and the economy's expansion started to slow down, that without the continuous external success stories the domestic problems could not be controlled easily.

The start of the Arab Spring in 2011 brought a fundamental change in the whole region, which seemed an excellent opportunity for Turkey to extend its soft power and to emerge as a normative power that could show the way towards real democratization for

¹⁵⁵ The AKP received 49,9% of the votes, which resulted in receiving 327 seats in the Grand National Assembly. This result meant another rise in the popular votes and the legitimacy of the AKP, however, not in the shares of seats, owing to the Turkish elections system. (Başkan and Güney 2013, 170)

the Arab people. (Dal 2013) However, the initial successes and the positive image building in the cases of Tunisia or Egypt, where Turkey did not really have any political or economic factors at stake, Libya and Syria brought a strong dilemma. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 62-70; Taşpınar 2012, 126-137) In these cases, aligning with the international efforts of military intervention or sanctions seriously jeopardized the Turkish interests on the ground. Eventually, the Turkish military participated in the Libyan interventions and had the chance to reach a positive turnout through showing that the government and the Turkish model was in support of the will of the people against autocracies. (Dal 2013, 721-722; Murinson 2013, 20-21) In the case of Syria, Turkey made the decision of stepping forward towards a full normative foreign policy direction, and started the support of the anti-regime forces. Turkey's soft power position and ambitions seemed to be secured. (Dal 2013, 722-723) In the middle of 2012 it seemed that the "Ankara Moment" was not only living on, but even developed further and Turkey could fill up the power vacuum after the political turmoil in Egypt, fulfilling the Turkish soft power ambitions. However, by the summer of 2013 the whole picture started to change both inside Turkey and its regional environment.

Turkish foreign policy and the Arab Spring

When the Arab Spring started in the beginning of 2011, the political leadership of Arab countries started to lose control over the escalating situation. Turkey, along with its Western allies followed a rather pragmatic approach. Until the proper assessment of the situation, the government did not intend to react harshly and played the role of a status quo power. Interestingly, this in a way contradicted the previous years' Turkish foreign policies, which were rather norm driven. (Dal 2013, 716, 720) The support to authoritarian leaderships, even if it was only temporary, was following Turkey's desire for a stable neighbourhood and a gradual democratic transition there. Turkey played along the norms of stability and peace in the whole region, and to reach this end, it tolerated the crackdowns on different demonstrations. It started only after months and brutal actions of the regimes in Libya or Syria to change the normative approach from stability support to the support of the people's will. According to Dal (2013, 716, 720), with the beginning of the Arab Spring the normative shift in Turkish foreign policy accelerated the frequent use of normative and value oriented messages.

Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth policy testified it perfectly, since it is a moral and value based foreign policy concept. This ascertainment is especially true for Turkey's neighbourhood. Even though the new foreign policy approach looks very much pragmatic and *realpolitik* driven, the values and the norms play a strong role in them. The fact that Turkey started to define itself as a soft power in the region might underline and verify this. "When Turkey had little influence in its region, it mattered little, whether Ankara had a normative foreign policy or not... When Turkey increased in power and influence, the question of values became a much more important issue." (Dal 2013, 715)

Turkey's foreign policy understanding, which was developed under the AKP government idealized foreign policy, the "zero problems with the neighbours" policy already conveyed a normative position in itself. While playing a leadership role in the region, Turkey was able to create a strong self-esteem and a normative claim to define values for the countries of the region to follow. PM Erdoğan in one of his speeches emphasized that "the communities that perceive themselves as the crushed, worn propelled, victimized and downtrodden, and the communities that have no belief in justice and sincerity, make it impossible to establish peace and stability on a global scale. This is what we have emphasized in our foreign policy." (Erdoğan 2010)

Öniş (2012, 46) defines Turkish foreign policy before the Arab Spring as a policy, based on the logic of the Westphalian international system. According to this argumentation, Turkey's decision makers were rather interested in following an interest-oriented policy line, which is based on the logic of non-intervention in other states sovereignty and domestic politics. The concept of the Turkish soft power and the "zero problems with the neighbours" policy, however, started to create an internal contradiction inside its own logic, and the execution of the Turkish ambitious soft power politics questioned its own core idea.

The Arab Spring itself brought a new dilemma for the Turkish foreign policy and the internal contradiction of the Turkish soft power ambitions came to light. The internal transformation of most of the countries in the Middle East, especially when the demonstrations and the backlashes from the governments turned violent, the Turkish leadership faced the challenge that foreign policy efforts of more than a decade became jeopardized. Another dilemma emerged regarding the non-interventionist approach as well. The Arab Spring meant the end of the "zero problems with the neighbours" policy. (Öniş 2012, 48) Turkish foreign policy prior to the Arab Spring was built on stable, but at the same time undemocratic regimes. From this point of view, the Turkish democratic

political model seemed even more attractive to the people in the region. The demonstrations and the falling regimes consequently created a new scenario. Generally, the people looked at Turkey as a champion of the Western values that would help them find their own democratic way, however, the firm stance against autocratic regimes would have jeopardized the strong economic interests. (Murinson 2013, 19-20)

In the very beginning the Turkish foreign policy followed a cautious line, trying to avoid participation and unambiguous statements. The Turkish leadership welcomed the reforms and the democratization, but it was reluctant to pick a side between the regimes and the demonstrating masses. At the beginning of 2011 Turkey, as most Western powers played a very cautious, status quo role and did not choose side in its comments. However, the Turkish leaders realized shortly that the support for the democratic transition in Tunisia can be helpful in their regional ambitions. After the support of the stability of Tunisia and the Ben Ali regime Turkey also started to call for the slow democratic transition there. This way the Turkish leadership started to follow an internationally recognized value of democratization and the organization of the new elections in Tunisia. In Egypt Turkey followed suit. After the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, PM Erdoğan supported the free elections and the democratic transition. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 62-63; Taşpınar 2012, 135)

Even prior to the time Mubarak was ousted, Turkey openly favoured political reforms and the transition towards a more pluralistic society and political order. The reference point was the Turkish democratic experience. The support for the democratic transition in Egypt's case coincided with Turkey's soft power ambitions. The relatively short period before Mubarak resigned allowed for Turkey to flaunt in the position of the supporter of the will of the people.

The effects of the Arab Spring spread to Libya as well and only weeks after the first demonstrations in Tunisia an internal conflict erupted between the Eastern and the Western halves of the country. Muammar Gadhafi's regime started to push back the opposition forces, when the Western countries decided to initiate an international intervention and the launching of a no-fly zone. Interestingly, when Turkey already had been campaigning for the democratic transition of Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey opposed the NATO military intervention to curb the fights between the rebels and the regime's security forces. The NATO strikes initiated the weakening of the regime and the removal of Gadhafi and the possibility of the start of a democratic transition. Turkey received negative feedbacks from the international community, especially from its NATO allies

for not taking its own share in the Libyan conflict. (Öniş 2012, 52) It was hard to understand how Turkey opted to support political transition in Egypt and Tunisia but not in Libya (Murinson 2013, 20-21; Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 64-65; Taşpinar 2012, 126-137)

Turkey had different interests in Libya than in the previous two countries. Namely, Turkey was in a dire position in deciding between foreign policy consistency and credibility and the interests of their huge number of citizens and companies living and operating in Libya.¹⁵⁶ In the Arab region Turkey in 2011 was concerned to evacuate its citizens from most of the dangerous areas, where the demonstrations got out of control. One of these locations was Libya, from where Turkey needed to evacuate tens of thousands of its citizens. After the necessary evacuation process, Turkey decided not only to stop criticizing the NATO involvement in the airstrikes of Libya but insisted to hand over the operational command of the airstrikes to NATO. Turkey took the side of the NATO efforts and started to participate in the humanitarian dimension of the intervention. The Turkish foreign policy accused the French that intervened the first time in Libya that they interrupted the Turkish efforts of convincing Gadhafi of stepping down and organizing new elections. Even though Turkey failed to follow the same policies as in Egypt and had to comply with its responsibilities as a NATO member, in rhetoric it tried to keep up the newly earned image of being a supporter of democracy. It is interesting to mention that the first international intervention under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle that was initiated and approved in the UN was in Libya. The R2P principle was enough for Turkey to build up the necessary rhetoric to convince the domestic and the international audience. (Murinson 2013, 20-21; Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 64-65; Taşpinar 2012, 126-137; Dal 2013, 721-722)

Turkish foreign policy faced the most serious challenge in Syria. The decision on how to proceed with the relations with the Assad regime became the strongest dilemma for the Turkish foreign policy. Syria was the test case and the biggest success story of the Turkish soft power ambitions and the “zero problems with the neighbours” policy. Syria, from a hostile neighbour that almost started a war in 1998¹⁵⁷ turned into be one of the most important economic partners of Turkey. The AKP even tried to facilitate making

¹⁵⁶ The Turkish investments in the Libyan construction sector reached 7,6 billion dollars, all the Turkish investments might have equalled to 15 billion dollars. In 2011, at least 25 000 Turkish citizens worked and studied in Libya. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 64; Lindenstrauss 2011, 107; Taşpinar 2012, 135)

¹⁵⁷ More on the 1998 conflict see: (Bishku 2012; Mufti 2002; Sezgin 2002)

Syria a good partner of the West as well. During the Arab Spring the Turkish government followed a more cautious approach with regard to the Assad regime, the stakes were much higher than in any of the previously mentioned cases. (Taşpınar 2012, 126-137) Not only Turkey was inconsistent in its policies regarding Syria, but the international community also seemed to be less supportive of opposition groups compared to the other countries. Initially, Damascus was urged to start democratic reforms and called on to hold general elections. The EU imposed some sanctions against the regime, however, the international community did not step up the way as it had done in Libya. Turkey made a U-turn in its Syria policy in mid-2012, when it became clear that apart from calling for reforms it also supported opposition groups and militants against the regime. (Dal 2013, 722-723) This was the moment when it became obvious that the Turkish government realized that Turkey's international credibility can be only maintained through a radical turn in its approach towards the Assad regime. From soft criticism, the Turkish government moved to confrontation and the calling for a UN-led political solution that included the ousting of the regime's leaders. As a result, Turkey's relations with Syria deteriorated and Turkey's interests became less manageable. The tensions led to direct military actions against each other: the Syrian regime shot down a Turkish plane in the summer of 2012 and the first exchange of fire on the Turkish borders happened in October 2012. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 69; Lindenstrauss 107-109)

Turkey tried to continue its positive attitude towards Iran and the Iranian foreign policy that it had started years earlier. Under the pressure of the international sanctions, Iran was also more open to welcome Turkey's initiatives from strengthening political and economic relations. From Turkey's side, these were mere calculations to achieve more stability in the region through cooperation. During the reign of the AKP governments several important agreements were signed between the two countries covering most areas of possible economic cooperation. By 2011 Iran became one of the most important suppliers of crude oil and natural gas on the Turkish market. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 72) Since Turkey followed a negative attitude towards the international sanctions on Iran, most financial transactions occurred from Turkish companies, and hundreds of Iranian companies moved to Turkish soil. (Habibi 2012, 4-5)

Nevertheless, the economic cooperation went hand in hand with growing political tensions. The regional resetting that emerged as a result of the Arab Spring and the political transformation affected the Turkish-Iranian relationship in a negative manner. (Bakir 2011) Both countries tried to propagate their own political model and this way

their different ambitions of power projection collided. At the same time, Turkey's U-turn from the support of the Assad regime to host the Syrian National Coalition created a new regional antagonism between the two countries. For Iran, the fall of the Assad regime would have meant a serious blow to its regional positions. This clash of interest emerged in Iraq as well, since the Iranian regime supported the strongly Shiite leadership of PM Nuri Al-Maliki as Turkey was opting for a more inclusive Iraqi government. However, Turkey tried to maintain the stable relationship with Iran and play a mediatory role between Iran and the West. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 72-73)

Turkey's relations with Israel further deteriorated in this period and their dynamics did not root in the regional transformation that was brought by the Arab Spring. (Csicsmann and N. Rózsa 2013, 70-71) Turkey in its quest for becoming a regional leader, started to support not only the moderate Sunni Muslim states and groups, but also some of the radical and terrorist organizations. Ankara's desire was to take over Egypt's mediatory role in the region through talking to all stakeholders and use its political position and identity as a leverage. The Turkish government supported the Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah organizations and tried to be supportive towards Iran. These policies offended Israel and made the Israeli governments cautious towards Turkey. After the flotilla incident in 2010, the Palmer committee announced the misuse of arms from the Israeli side, Turkey demanded an apology that Israel refused. The dispute ended up with Turkey expelling the Israeli ambassador from Ankara. (TPQ Roundtable 2013, 184-189) Although the worsening situation on the Syrian front and the growing security related pressures on both sides should have created a positive atmosphere for easing the relations of the two countries, the second Gaza war in November 2012 strained them again. President Obama's visit to Israel in 2013, however seemed to cut through the dead-lock in the Turkish-Israeli relations, advising PM Netanyahu calling PM Erdoğan and make an official apology. At the same time, this phone call did not lead to a short breakthrough in those bilateral relations. (Carlstorn 2014)

The first year of the transitional period triggered as an effect of the Arab Spring, seemed to elevate the Turkish influence in the Middle East even further. Turkey could use its ongoing regional initiatives to raise its popularity enhanced by the political rhetoric of openly supporting the democratic changes in the Middle East. During the first periods, Turkish leaders managed to even „upgrade” this influence promoting the Turkish model as an example for political development. (Ülgen 2011) These efforts were supported by the West. The timing was advantageous: popularity of the Turkish leaders rose

significantly¹⁵⁸, other regional competitors, like Egypt lost their strength; the circumstances seemingly allowed for Turkish regional political dominance and growing economic influence through „soft” means.

After 2012, Turkey started to lose from its regional influence, the “Ankara Moment” was disrupted by massive external pressures. Joining the NATO’s military intervention in Libya was necessitated by the economic interests of Turkey (Robins 2013, 391-392), which finally questioned the original idea of the “zero problems with the neighbours” policy and the Turkish image started to deteriorate. (Akgün and Gündoğar 2014, 19-24) The “ZPWN 2.0”¹⁵⁹ (Oğuzlu 2012b) or “the compass of popular legitimacy” (Robins 2013, 397) gave a new basis for the Turkish foreign policy makers to intervene in the region on grounds of legitimacy. However, the conflict in Syria showed that the Turkish capabilities fall far from the expectations: “the longer the Syrian imbroglio has continued, the less plausible has Turkish leadership appeared in the Middle East, let alone further afield.” (Robins 2013, 397) The deterioration of Turkish-Egyptian relations meant not only a blow to Turkey’s prestige in the Middle East, but triggered serious economic costs as well. Turkey’s resolute stance on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood brought negative responses and lost opportunities from the Gulf States. Reportedly Turkey lost investments from the Gulf. (Sağlam 2013) The Turkish government’s reaction to the military’s step up against President Morsi in Egypt cemented the impression that foreign policy decisions are based on ideology, and not on principled positions. Owing to this, Turkey was steadily losing regional leverage and facing isolation. (Robins 2013, 397; Akdeniz 2013, 5) Akdeniz argues that “the challenges posed by what began as the Arab Spring...are impossible to face alone not only for Turkey but also for the EU. Developments have brought about a more difficult foreign policy environment for both in their common neighbourhood.” (Akdeniz 2013, 5) Owing to the change in the regional reputation of Turkey, the deteriorating relations with important regional partners and the deepening general instability in the neighbourhood all hindered the Turkish economy living up to its foreign trade potential. (Sağlam 2013) After 2012, the trade volume between Turkey and the Middle Eastern and Northern African countries

¹⁵⁸ 69% of the respondents had a positive view of Turkey in the Middle East in 2012. Egypt ranked only the second in with 65%. (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012)

¹⁵⁹ The abbreviation refers to “zero problems with the neighbours” policy 2.0

dropped.¹⁶⁰ 2013 showed, how instability and certain foreign policy moves can influence the results in Turkish trade.

The EU played an external influencing factor as well. After the AKP's second victory in 2007 Turkey did not only have the potential and capabilities of being an influential actor, but started to behave like one and started to articulate its regional claims. The growing self-esteem of the Turkish leadership and the diversification of foreign relations caused political repercussions in the EU and the debate started on "who lost Turkey?" (Oğuzlu 2008; Evin et al 2010, 7; Adam 2012, 140-141; Özek and Oğuzlu 2013, 689)

As Çağaptay articulated, Turkey's Islamization process was moderated by the geopolitical realities and similarly to its Islamist partners the Turkish government was not able to escape Western realities, such as the long-standing EU membership ambitions, the NATO membership or Turkey's strong attachment to the global economy. Despite the ideological vision of the AKP leadership, the westward pulling factors became stronger. At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Turkey as a potential stabilizing factor having direct access and good relationship with different movements in the region became an undisputable asset for the West. Even though Turkey tried to walk its own path, the hectic political changes in the whole region questioned its ability to avoid the Western alliance. (Çağaptay 2013b, 1)

Turkey emerged as an economic powerhouse interconnected with the West and strongly attached to its Eastern neighbourhood as well. During the 2000s, especially after the twin financial crises, Turkey became strongly enticing for foreign, especially Western capital. At the same time, the Turkish trade patterns started a gradual change and the Eastern and Southern partners became robust parts of Turkish foreign economic relations. By the end of the decade, less than half of Turkish foreign trade was conducted with Western, mainly European partners. (Çağaptay 2013a, 5) This change did not mean a decrease in the Western trade, but rather a significant growth on the other front.

Transformation in Turkish foreign policy during the period of the Arab Spring is not necessarily negative from neither the Western, nor the Turkish perspective. EU and US leaders gradually started to realise that Turkey could be a tool, with which the Western values could have been channelled in to the Middle East in the midst of drastic domestic changes. (Çağaptay 2013a) As an effect of the strong economic performance and the new

¹⁶⁰ Source of data: website of the Turkish Statistical Institute, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

active foreign policy of the Turkish governments, Turkey itself became an independent actor of the Middle East. (Kirişci, Tocci and Walker 2010, 24-28; Evin et al. 2010 29) This would have constituted an important asset for the US and Europe in affecting the Arab states in transition. However, in order to achieve this goal the Turkish government would have had to fulfil different criteria. The first of these criteria would have been to act along the lines of international values and norms, and thus not to fuel identity and religion based conflicts. Turkey must have had to cease the conflict with Israel, the strong ally of the US in the Middle East. Turkey would have needed a consistent foreign policy and an inherent and successful democratization process. The latter was especially visible in the first half of the 2000s, when several democratization packages were implied and ratified in Turkey in order to enable the negotiations to be started with the EU.

However, Turkey showed proneness to succumb to authoritarian tendencies. “Turkey’s accession process continues to represent the best guarantee that the country’s domestic transformation will proceed towards higher standards of democracy.” (Evin et al. 2010, 32) Çağaptay argues that the Turkish “economic miracle” was driven by a blend of political stability, European money and access to emerging markets and Muslim-majority economies. (Çağaptay 2013b, 7) To follow this pattern the continuation of EU integration is still crucial.

“The future of Turkey-EU relations is really about what the EU will decide it wants to be, a decision which Germany and France will be key to determine.” (Çağaptay 2013b, 16) In 2005, France and Germany were the advocates of alternative ways to the Turkish accession process.¹⁶¹ This attitude changed after 2009 – President Sarkozy ceased to openly speak about the privileged partnership and President Hollande never took up the negative attitude in the Turkish negotiation process. Furthermore, Hollande gave his permission to lift the French veto on opening the chapter on Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments. As a result of the new “positive agenda” the warming up process between Turkey and the EU started from the beginning of 2013.¹⁶² However, the Gezi Park protests¹⁶³, the excessive use of force by the Turkish police

¹⁶¹ It was president Sarkozy, who proposed a privileged partnership status to Turkey instead of full accession and German Chancellor, Merkel took up the same line of rhetoric.

¹⁶² After the presidency of Cyprus of the EU.

¹⁶³ May 2013 brought a major appearance of the discontent in the Gezi Park. It was triggered by the government’s plan to build a shopping mall resembling a military building from the Ottoman era in the heart of Istanbul and a new law banning the vending of alcohol after 10 pm in convenience stores. The demonstrations escalated into violence between the protestors and the police. (Egeresi 2013a, 2-3)

against the protestors and later on the government's acts of curbing the independence of the judiciary postponed the restart of the negotiations until November 2013.

The domestic environment of Turkey after the 2011 elections

Tensions inside the ruling elite

The AKP forms a relatively cohesive political elite group, with strong political and economic support from the Muslim bourgeoisie. There are interest-clashes inside the governing political party that became visible after 2012. First strong criticisms emerged inside the party during the Gezi Park protests, over how Erdoğan managed the demonstrations. (Egeresi 2013a, 4-5) Later in 2013, as the corruption scandal revealed the internal cracks appeared again. Nonetheless, these cracks inside the governing elite have not widened up enough to remarkably decrease the cohesion of the government and the governing elite. Although, the shadow of the 2014 presidential elections became perceptible. According to the AKP's own internal rules, no politician can hold on to the same political position for more than three terms. For Erdoğan himself the 2014 presidential elections offered a possibility of saving his political power. However, a simple re-election would have been enough, he also planned the transformation of Turkey's political system into a half presidential one. (Dobrovits 2010, 8; Çağaptay and Jeffrey 2014, 17-19) Erdoğan's plans and efforts strengthened the differences inside the party (Abdullah Gül was seen as a leader reluctantly opposing Erdoğan's views), but with him the AKP remained the strongest party.¹⁶⁴ Although this period does not fit in the period of examination of this dissertation, it must be noted that Abdullah Gül was politically side-lined after he finished his term as a president.

At this point, the connection between the AKP and the Hizmet movement is worth mentioning. Fethullah Gülen and his religious movement had been a strong ally of the Islamist political groups and the AKP government, however, the relationship started to deteriorate behind the scenes around 2011 and became public during the Gezi Park demonstrations in 2013. The members of the Hizmet's wide network reached high positions inside the Turkish state bureaucracy and economy, acquiring strong influence

¹⁶⁴ The result of the presidential elections proved that this was still not enough, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received 51,79% of the votes, thus obviated the need for a run-off.

on domestic and foreign policies. However, the dispute between Erdoğan and Gülen reached the point, where the AKP started to accuse the Hizmet of building a parallel or “deep” state that aimed at toppling the Turkish government. The “witch-hunt” against the Hizmet has proved to be serious inside the Islamist elite, however, the break between the movement and Erdoğan did not prove to be fatal. (Egeresi 2013a; Balci 2014) Based on these events, the observation that the Turkish government had room for manoeuvre and the possibility to conduct foreign policy, relatively unconstrained from the inside in the present set up, is well grounded. We cannot precisely rate, how much the break with the Hizmet movement decreased the cohesion of the Islamist elite, but it certainly caused inconveniences that contradicted the AKP’s foreign policy goals (e.g.: Erdoğan’s campaign for the extradition of Gülen from the US, or the closure of the highly evaluated school network run by the Hizmet movement both inside and outside Turkey).

The Kemalist political elite’s position did not strengthen significantly in this period, although, the strongest Kemalist political party, the CHP changed its leadership. In 2010 the previous leader got caught in a scandal and resigned, and another experienced politician, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu took his place. (Tosun 2010) He tried to revitalize the party, but could not reach a breakthrough in the period of examination of this dissertation. However, the political opposition proved to be successful in hindering the ratification of a new constitution, which would have replaced the one that was set by the military in 1982. Even though, it was time for amendments, the question of the constitution became a symbolic question. (Özbudun 2012)

Events after 2011-2012, destroyed the Turkish efforts of creating a stable regional setting for political and business purposes. The Syrian civil war and its spill over, the deteriorating connections of Turkey with some influential regional players, the disintegration of Iraq, especially after the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) terrorist group established their so called caliphate, all added to the changes of the board where Turkish businessmen had to “play”. It is not surprising, therefore, that the gradual restart of the EU accession negotiations was welcomed by both the old and the new business elite. The EU was still the main economic partner of Turkey (at least 40%) providing a stable and enormous market for Turkish goods and at the same time a stable source of investments. (Akdeniz 2013, 1) The instabilities in the Middle East coinciding with a positive campaign from the EU’s side could result in a turn back to the more stable market. The Kemalist business elite had been supporting this idea for a long time

(Hürriyet Daily News 14 September 2013), and now a possible push from the new bourgeoisie can give a strong impetus to speed up the return to the EU track.

Further polarization of the Turkish society

After examining the first two factors from Schweller's theory, the second two questions of social cohesion and the government's vulnerability must be examined. At first sight, one can observe at least a steady or even growing popularity of the AKP government. The consecutive successes in local and parliamentary elections suppose unquestionable legitimacy of the governing elite.

The general elections in 2011 ended with a very high turnout of 83.1% of the eligible voters. The AKP received a record number of votes¹⁶⁵ that accounted for 49.9% of the total votes at the ballots. With this performance the AKP became the only party in Turkey's political history that had managed to increase its popularity in three consecutive general elections, this time with 3.3%. Nevertheless, the number of seats that the AKP acquired decreased slightly from 341 to 327, due to the peculiarities in the Turkish election system. Two opposition parties managed to step over the 10% threshold and entered the parliament, the CHP and the MHP. The CHP, due to its strong negative campaign increased its representation by 5%. The Kurdish minorities also became represented by the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi – BDP) candidates, who ran as independents, so that the parliamentary threshold would not be an obstacle for their entry. (Başkan and Güney 2013, 170-171) Obviously the AKP started its new term, suppressing the external and the internal challenges with strong legitimacy and integrity. However, these challenges became obvious already in 2012 and 2013.

Even after the heavy-handed crackdown on the Gezi Park demonstrations and the corruption scandals at the end of 2013, the AKP received almost 40% of the votes at the 2014 local elections and Erdoğan won in the first round of the presidential elections. (Çağaptay and Jeffrey 2014, 17-18) However, the picture is more complex, social differences and social distress lie in the background. Even though the government has managed to build strong popular support, the government policies resulted in the polarization of the society.

¹⁶⁵ In absolute terms the number of votes for the AKP rose with almost 5 million between 2007 and 2011 (Başkan and Güney 2013, 170)

Foreign policy and economic successes of the AKP era eased or covered up serious problems in the society. The first AKP government handled the economic crisis, the reform packages and the promise of EU integration gave answers to certain social claims or at least a promise that at a certain point problems will be taken care of. The fast growing economy and the rising level of living standards provided serious support for the AKP, especially in the countryside. Even if they did not find a solution to the Kurdish issue, the signs of efforts boosted political support also from the Kurdish populated areas.¹⁶⁶

The new political successes in the regional vicinity of Turkey, the diplomatic and economic expansion hid the polarization inside the Turkish social structures. Kemalists were always suspicious of the AKP; nevertheless, they also lacked any unifying force or a political party that can channel in their anxieties. The suppressed tensions inside the society were revealed exactly when the light of the “Turkish star” started to fade away in the Middle East in 2012. The first demonstrations started in the summer of 2012 against the new restrictive amendments in the abortion law, but these movements stayed relatively peaceful. May 2013 brought a major appearance of the discontent in the Gezi Park. These protests were the symbolic appearance of the dissatisfaction of the young secular generations with the AKP government. The protests escalated, the violent clashes between demonstrators and the police left several dead and wounded. The Gezi Park events brought serious criticism from the EU causing the postponement of the restart of the EU accession negotiations until November 2013. (Akdeniz 2013, 8)

The Gezi Park protests ended approximately a month later, nevertheless, the social tensions did not decrease. In order to control the opposing ideas, the AKP initiated radical and undemocratic actions.¹⁶⁷ The banning of Twitter and Youtube or pressuring media outlets to lay off journalists drew serious internal and external criticism. (Hürriyet Daily News 02 April 2014; Rettman 2014) After the corruption scandals broke out in December 2013, the government took even more radical actions pulling the police under stricter control and restricting the independence of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu, HSYK). Even though the controversial law, which strongly decreased the judicial independence was abolished by

¹⁶⁶ The candidates of AKP won high percentage of the Kurdish majority areas in the latest parliamentary and local elections. (Egeresi 2015, 7)

¹⁶⁷ The time frame of the dissertation ends in the summer of 2013, though, the explanation of the domestic events that occurred afterwards contribute to the explanation.

the Constitutional Court in April, it signalled the government's intention of enhancing state control. (Today's Zaman 11 April 2014) A second round of arrests against police officers started in the summer 2014. The AKP has been blaming the scandal and the economic difficulties on an international conspiracy by a parallel society, a deep state inside Turkey that was planning a coup against the present government. These groups from the parallel society are financed from abroad, and the Hizmet movement became a primary suspect. Taking actions against the Hizmet movement and its institutions harmed Turkey's international prestige and alienated the numerous followers of Fetullah Gülen in Turkey. (Egeresi 2013a)

The polarization of the Turkish society became obvious. In the absence of a unified opposition group there was no political alternative to the AKP on any side of the political spectrum. Even if the discontent was growing inside the society, a big proportion of the population supports the government. Nevertheless, the immediate actions (making new laws regarding the police, appointing new prosecutors, banning social media sites) could only tackle and repress the problems for a period of time.

New steps in the Kurdish questions

The Kurdish opening in 2009 and 2010 did not prove to be an entire success. By 2010 Turkish nationalists and Kemalists called for ceasing this political programme and the support for the AKP government slightly decreased as a result. The Turkish parliament adopted a few reforms, allowing for the Kurdish political campaign in local language and opening a Kurdish faculty at the University of Mardin, however, these confidence-building measures did not reach their goals. (Egeresi 2013c, 5) The AKP's initiative did not offer enough flexibility for the Kurds and the PKK, thus it was doomed to fail from the beginning. Both the Turkish government and the military excluded the possibility of negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, who was still the sole leader of the PKK, serving his life sentence in a Turkish prison. The Kurdish opening started to slowly fade away from the second half of 2010, which meant the increase in military operations and the return of the armed conflict. At the same time, several Kurdish politicians were imprisoned for charges of cooperating with the PKK. (Egeresi 2013c, 5)

After the collapse of the Kurdish political dialogue, the AKP tried to continue the negotiations with PKK representatives in Oslo. From the Turkish side, Hakan Fidan, head of the Turkish Intelligence services was in charge. He managed to secure a temporary

truce for the period of the 2011 general elections, however the fights returned shortly afterwards. The intense clashes continued for a year, with hundreds of cross-border Turkish operations, PKK attacks and abductions also in the Eastern parts of Turkey. The situations resulted in political instabilities in the Eastern part of Turkey, thus the AKP must have acted according to the seriousness of the situation. (Egeresi 2013c, 5-6; International Crisis Group 2012) PM Erdoğan admitted at the end of 2012 that the Turkish government restarted the negotiations with the PKK. The transparent and public negotiation process was new in its kind, since it involved the real leadership of the PKK, including Abdullah Öcalan himself. After the first indirect negotiations, Öcalan (sending three letters) instructed the Kurdish organizations operating both inside and outside Turkey to declare a unilateral ceasefire by 21 March 2013; and if the negotiations go forward, to empty the Turkish areas by the summer. Öcalan's starting point was not the creation of a new federal state, but rather the expansion of the rights of the Kurds and the redefinition of their status inside the Turkish political nation. (Egeresi 2013c 7-8)

Although the negotiations ended unsuccessfully in the timeframe of the dissertation, the negotiations brought hope for a new start in Turkish-Kurdish relations. PM Erdoğan stood behind the new negotiation process. With the new measures he tried to achieve two results. On the one hand, to gain the support of the Kurdish politicians in the National Assembly in order to rewrite the constitution. On the other hand, Erdoğan wanted to prepare for his planned new political role as the President of Turkey.¹⁶⁸ The changes in the laws, where the AKP needed the support of the independent Kurdish politicians were key moments to push the country towards a new half-presidential system.

Summarizing the results – Turkish foreign relations in light of the external challenges and internal problems

From 2012, external and internal problems disrupted the positive regional image of Turkey and the “Ankara Moment” started to “melt down”. The explicit conflict with Syria showed that those strong economic relations cannot be represented anymore in the region. Parallel, the pace of growth of the Turkish economy decreased. The discrepancies in the political rhetoric and the reality emboldened the secular opposition groups and

¹⁶⁸ As mentioned earlier Erdoğan prepared for changing the Turkish political system and running for the presidency at the 2014 presidential elections. The Kurdish negotiation process can be understood in this framework as well.

people moved to the streets of Istanbul for the first time in 2012 and then to the Gezi Park in 2013. The crackdown on the demonstrators and the antidemocratic practices that started to proliferate spoiled Turkey's positive image. The international criticism did not ease, but strengthened the government's response to the new domestic challenges. (Rettman 2014; Egeresi 2013b, 4-5; Akdeniz 2013, 8)

At the same time, in Turkey's foreign policy, similar negative changes happened. The government could not adapt to the new realities after 2012 and favoured normative foreign policy to pragmatic decisions. When the Egyptian military ousted the Morsi government and President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi took power, Turkey denounced this political act. Slowly, the Turkish-Egyptian political relations severed. (Akdeniz 2013, 5) The Turkish foreign policy's acts spoiled the adjudication of Turkey in the Arab World and brought the displeasure of some leaders in the Gulf area, such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. (Sağlam 2013)

According to Nye, to obtain soft power, a state must focus on its cultural attractiveness, its political model and has to follow enticing foreign policy. Earlier the "Ankara Moment" created the perfect leverage and economic power for Turkey to gain influence in its region. However, – as it was discussed earlier – the cultural, value-based and ethical attraction played a crucial role in it. The Turkish model was alluring in the region, because it showed the possibility to have a strong and Middle Eastern, Islam-oriented government, but at the same time, the country can remain closely related to the Western values and democracy. Stronger cooperation with Turkey offered multiple benefits: the economic interrelatedness and interdependence brought more Turkish products, investors and know-how to these countries; on the other hand, Turkey could provide a gate towards the West, their interest could be channelled in through Turkey. Thus, Turkey seemed to be an attractive partner at the end of the 2000s, not only because of its political model, but the openness and the ambitions to foster stronger relations with the countries in the Middle East and other neighbouring regions. The stabilization process, the mediation efforts, the economic initiatives such as the free trade zone or visa liberalization all pointed at the image of a positive regional leader to be followed.

The rapidly changing regional setting around Turkey created an unstable security environment. After the escalation of the crisis in Syria and later the deterioration of the Turkish-Egyptian relations, the Turkish reaction led to losing important trading partners. The economic and foreign policy successes of the "Ankara Moment" fortified the power of the AKP government, but at the same time suppressed serious domestic tensions and

pressures. The strong popular support of the government gave legitimacy and the demise of the opposing elite groups made it impossible to counterbalance the AKP. Nevertheless, this did not mean unanimous support for the government's policies. After almost ten years of the alienation of the Kemalist groups, the domestic dissatisfaction could not be covered up anymore by the reinvigorated glory of Turkey. The Gezi Park demonstrations reflected this polarization of the domestic environment, the contradiction between the Turkish government's rhetoric and the reality. And at this point the Turkish domestic politics started to contradict and hinder the foreign policy ambitions.

The domestic problems had negative effects on the foreign relations and the Turkish economy as well. One of the main pillars behind both the dynamic economic growth and the growing regional political influence was political stability and predictability. The democratic deficit of Turkey demolished the credibility of the Turkish support of democratic changes, the instability and the government's heavy-handed reactions harmed the picture that Turkey had tried to communicate earlier. The economy was also hit by the domestic instabilities; their result was immediately visible at the Turkish stock exchange (10% drop) and the depreciation of the Turkish Lira at the first days of the crisis. (Akdeniz 2013, 8) The Turkish economy is highly dependent on the continuous inflows of foreign investments, which finances the high current account deficit. The key to high investments and the access to cheap loans would serve as the basis for political stability. The economic problems and the lack of stability have been raised by different business groups, research institutes and members from the civil sector.¹⁶⁹

Social cohesion can be perceived in the meaning that the government enjoyed high support from the society, thus allowing it to manoeuvre and create its own foreign policy. High ratios of the AKP voters were from the Anatolian rural population and were concerned rather by the domestic politics than foreign policies. However, the different scandals and the Gezi Park protests showed growing vulnerability of the government that the AKP controlled with undemocratic measures that harmed the AKP's own foreign policy and economic goals. At this point, the domestic political environment contradicted the AKP's foreign policy ambitions that hindered to achieve the AKP's ambitious plans, such as to rise up to be one of the 10 biggest economies in the world by 2023. Even if this

¹⁶⁹ Erdoğan compared Israel's actions during the operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip to Nazism and publicly called it genocide. (Today's Zaman 24 July 2014)

goal might be virtually impossible to achieve, to keep up the steady economic growth Turkey needs stabilizing factors securing the inflows of foreign investments.

As result of the external and the internal changes, Turkey's fast rise started to slow down. The Arab Spring changed the external environment in which the Turkish foreign policy seemed to be fitting in, however, these external effects had results in the Turkish domestic fora as well. As a result of these changes Turkey visibly lost from its soft power, however, did not lose it all. The question of the possibility of the continuation remained. Further approach towards the East, or a rapprochement with the EU, the historical foreign policy direction of Turkey are both possibilities for the future.

Conclusion

The dissertation's main aim was to make a thorough analysis of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The leading question was, how a country, which followed an introverted foreign policy for decades would suddenly ambition regional leadership (in the Middle East); and where the limits of such a political, military and economic endeavour are? The dissertation described the main concept of the new Turkish foreign policy, characterized by Ahmet Davutoğlu's strategic depth doctrine as well. This dissertation examined the course of Turkish foreign policy through three periods: The first period started from the establishment of the Turkish republic after WW I and finished at the beginning of the 2000s, the emergence of the AKP. The second period of examination covered the first two governments of the AKP, the time of a new Turkish foreign policy and a new Turkish regional role to emerge. The last and the shortest period covered the futile changes in the Middle East, the beginning of the Arab Spring and its effects on Turkish foreign policy.

The dissertation used two different theories for the analysis, Randall Schweller's neo-classical realist theory and Joseph Nye's soft power explanation. The main schools of international political theories, the realist and the liberal traditions left a gap open in explaining states' foreign policy decisions. They didn't give sufficient explanations on the specific role of the state in foreign policy decisions and the nature of the interactions between the systemic and the unit level variables. Neo-classical realism works with explicit distinction between state and society and assumes that the state's foreign policy responses to international constraints come as a product of state-society interactions. Systemic pressures are translated through unit level intervening variables, primarily the decision-makers' perceptions and the domestic state structure. The decisions are made by actual existing leaders or elite groups, based on their assessment of the international incentives.

Randall Schweller used four unit-level factors to explain states' foreign and security policy choices in a changing external environment. These factors are elite consensus/ disagreement, the regime's vulnerability, level of social cohesion and the cohesion of the elite groups. Social cohesion and the regime's vulnerability show until what extent the society and the main interest groups accept the incumbent political power, and how much the government is influenced by the interests of the different groups. Elite

consensus and elite cohesion gives an answer, how much the elite creates one group and to what extent clashes inside the elite group and the different decision makers influence the foreign policy outcome. The dissertation introduced these four factors in the analysis of the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process. The Turkish leadership had to work through domestic political institutions, mobilize certain parts of the society and maintain the interest of important stakeholders in their efforts to answer the constraints posed by the regional or the global environment.

After the 2000s, Turkish foreign policy became more active, and by the second half of the decade, Turkish politicians started to openly speak about Turkey's regional ambitions, and eventually the Turkish regional soft power. To create a thorough understanding of this concept the dissertation brought in the so called soft power concept, which was first developed by Joseph S. Nye.

Power is relational, it can be understood in international actors' interactions. Nye's theory focuses on softer tools rather than the military capabilities and capacities, which are generally associated with power. In this framework, economic power holds an intermediary position. A strong economy and credible development can create soft power as it became apparent with Turkey's successful development model that attracted and influenced more countries than its military potential. Soft power explains areas of influence and attraction, which are not directly connected to the hard power capacities of a country. There are multiple sources of soft power, or sources of attraction, which can be categorized in three groups: a country's culture, its political values and the conduct of foreign policy. It is clear that Turkey explicitly pursued soft power ambitions primarily in its regional vicinity, but at the same time it disposes of global power ambitions. The image of Turkey in the Middle East has changed significantly from the beginning of the 2000s. The proactive diplomacy of the AKP, the regional stabilizing and mediating efforts, the democracy promotion and cultural projection, the increasing economic and development outreach programme all induced a positive return from the region.

The main purpose of the dissertation was to describe the factors that caused the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. This work gives an explanation, how it was possible that during the 2000s the foreign policy pattern that characterized the previous decades changed in a relatively short period. As the first hypothesis of this work states, both external and internal factors made it inevitable that from the beginning of the 2000s Turkey would change its foreign policy from a rather introverted pattern to activism.

The establishment of the Turkish Republic brought about a new state in a new environment. The founders' main concern was to create a working state structure and to establish a functioning institutional system following the Western ideals. Consequently, the first period after the establishment of the state meant isolationism. "Peace at home, peace in the world" defined the external and internal needs of the new Turkish state. After the first period, the external environment was very futile and hectic. The course of WW II and the Cold war did not change the level of threat that led to the continuation of Turkey's cautious foreign policy line. Until the 1990s, Turkey's external environment was characterized by a constant, but predictable threat. The foreign policy answer of Turkey for the external threats was a Western-looking approach and the separation from the immediate neighbours in the Middle East.

The 1990s brought a remarkable change in the regional environment of Turkey. From the middle of the 1980s the tensions eased between the Eastern and the Western Blocks, consequently the Arab countries, which were allies of the USSR became more open for cooperation with Western allies. Turgut Özal, the first civilian prime minister after the 1980 coup started a new foreign policy approach and started the global political and economic opening of Turkey.

The end of the Cold War brought both serious security threats to the immediate neighbourhood of the country and the decline of Turkey's geostrategic importance. The 1990s started with the Yugoslav wars, the Gulf war and the Armenian-Azeri conflict, all on the borders of Turkey. These external factors, coupled with the Kurdish insurgency, created a demand for foreign policy activism. With the Gulf war, enhanced activity became necessary towards Iraq to handle the Kurdish claims for independence. The increase of nationalistic sentiments inside the Turkish society also contributed to this process.

According to Schweller, the external incentives are filtered through the internal variables. After 1923, a strong gap emerged between the Turkish political-economic elite of the main cities and the Anatolian masses. The Kemalist elite concentrated on the nation-building processes, and followed an inward-looking foreign policy approach. The Cold War environment and the threats coming from the Soviet proxies triggered attraction towards the West and a certain level of inactivity in foreign policy, especially in Turkey's neighbourhood. As a result of the "Inönü-doctrine", Turkey limited its interactions with the neighbouring regions until the mid-1980s.

The social gap between the Anatolian masses and the political elite remained wide for a long period. However, external influences on the Turkish society triggered change. The accession to the NATO obliged Turkey for industrialization and infrastructural developments. The more conservative and religious masses in the countryside started to move to provincial population centres and bigger cities; the Turkish periphery slowly took over the centre. The political parties followed this change and new parties that answered the needs of the newly urbanized groups could gain strength. The new political groups were more open-minded to active foreign policy and trade towards the East, based on ideological, religious reasons and on their economic interests. In the 1980s the tensions decreased with the Soviet allies in the Middle East, which made an open foreign policy orientation possible. During the 1990s, due to internal problems, the often changing governments and the financial crises, Turkish foreign policy did not step out of the quietist pattern. The ambitions of Turgut Özal in the beginning of the decade, to make Turkey a strong regional factor in all directions slowly faded away. The February 28 process underlined that neither the external, nor the domestic conditions are not given for Turkey to become a strong regional actor.

The Kurdish question played both an external and an internal role in Turkey's foreign policy transformation. The Kurds became organized and in 1984 started an insurgency in the Eastern areas of Anatolia. The Turkish political and military elite answered this threat with military means. The growing tensions with the Kurds and the cross border features of the conflict triggered also a necessity for a more active foreign policy, which received wide support in the society.

The most significant fault-line inside the Turkish elite existed in the Kemalist versus Islamist/ devout Muslim angle. The once leading secularist and Kemalist political groups lost from their power during the 1980s and the 1990s and could not redefine themselves according to the new environment. Though, the military remained an unavoidable segment of the Islamist/Muslim-Kemalist fraction. The military has traditionally been a guardian of the Kemalist notions, and this way the protector of Turkey's independence, and thus the inward-looking foreign policy. Their role was ambiguous, because it had a significant part in the regime's vulnerability. The four military coups in the Turkish republic's history proved the fact that if an incumbent government deviated too much from the Kemalist track, the army would not hesitate to intervene. However, the 1997 coup left the military vulnerable as well, which opened the way for meaningful changes and thus a rather activist foreign policy.

By the end of the 1990s the new political elite of the Muslim conservative politicians had grown stronger with the support of a Muslim conservative business elite. The devout Muslim entrepreneurs from Anatolian cities and towns started to become influential factors and demanded an Eastward-looking foreign policy strategy; they have built up strong relations with the neighbouring region and other Muslim countries. Turkish SMEs grew strong and diversified their trade relations. Their growing pressure on politics predicted foreign policy activism as well.

By the beginning of the 2000s an elemental change in the foreign policy orientation of Turkey became inevitable and predictable. The change, however, did not come immediately as a result of the AKP's rise to power, but rather manifested from the middle of the decade. This argument was connected to the second hypothesis of the dissertation. Turkey started to follow an active foreign policy course and ambioned a leading regional role. From the end of the decade the Turkish government started to speak openly about the soft power of the country.

The strategic concept behind this new and active foreign policy was created by Ahmet Davutoğlu. The main aim of his vision was to elevate Turkey to be a regional political power, and in the longer run, a role-player in global politics. Davutoğlu articulated that Turkey would transform into a strong actor through the exercise of its soft power. The geostrategic location of the country and its regional cultural connections, its capabilities, the region's common history with the Ottoman Empire and the similarities in their identity all mounted up to the fact that Turkey has all the important assets in hand to achieve regional leadership.

The main elements of the strategic depth doctrine are multidimensional foreign policy, "zero problems with the neighbours" policy; promotion of the most important values and norms through foreign policy in the region; rhythmic and active diplomacy; interdependence of the regional economies. The concept placed the pursuit for international security and peace and regional stability through multilateral cooperation in the centre of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey started to follow a new and not necessarily non-Euro-centric perspective, in which Turkey had become one of the important actors in the regional order and the global system.

It is clear that Turkey explicitly pursued soft power ambitions primarily in its regional vicinity, but at the same time it disposed of global power ambitions. The proactive diplomacy of the AKP, the regional stabilizing and mediating efforts, the democracy promotion and cultural projection, the increasing economic and development

outreach programme all induced a positive return from the region. Following Nye's soft power theory, it can be stated that Turkish foreign policy makers started to use those tools deliberately that generate positive influence from the subject countries. The most effective tool remained however the success of the Turkish economy. The attractiveness of Turkey of a regional economic engine was only elevated by the political steps, cultural influences, development programmes or the mediation in conflicts. Turkey reached a strong political and economic position in the region using soft power tools by the beginning of the 2010s.

The beginning of the 2000s changed the external environment of Turkey both in the West and the East. The EU responded positively to the Turkish request for accession and the country became an EU candidate. Parallel, the 9/11 attacks and the international interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq made the traditional Turkish foreign policy behaviour obsolete. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime generated a power vacuum and as a result, the reorganization of regional balance of power. The new Syrian leader, Bashar Al-Assad showed more readiness for cooperation with Turkey, and Iran conveyed messages of both competition and cooperation. The power gap and the changed environment created a new challenge but at the same time opportunity for Turkey. Iraq, Iran, Israel, Syria and Lebanon became the immediate targets of the Turkish regional policies that aimed extending Turkish influence. The main reasons behind it were both the security-related and the economic interests of Turkey.

The EU played an important anchor role in influencing Turkish foreign policy behaviour. The reform packages that were the conditions to start the negotiations changed some of the domestic power relations inside Turkey: the military – alongside with the old elite – lost from its power. However, less than a year after the positive decision that Turkey could start the accession negotiations, the EU suspended them in several chapters. This negative turn motivated Turkey to pay more attention to the Eastern relations as well.

The transformation process inside the Turkish society continued in the 2000s. The strengthening of the society's periphery grew together with the political consciousness of the marginalized groups. The population in the countryside searched for the representation of their devout religious value system and their interest in development. The AKP proved to be a suitable candidate for their representation, thus gained more and more popularity in the successive elections. The AKP's influence was underpinned by the support of the Anatolian bourgeoisie. In this period new challenges emerged, the polarization of the society along religious and cultural cleavages continued. The growing

support for the AKP governments in 2007 and 2011 showed that the society could not and did not want to question the government's legitimacy. The growing popularity of the government was a result of its successes in its foreign policy and economic growth. The developing business relations with the Eastern neighbourhood, the economy's fast growth all contributed to the regional popularity of Turkey. As a result of the successes in the East and the Turkish society's dissatisfaction with the EU negotiations, the majority of the population articulated an opinion of concentrating more energy to the Eastern relations.

The Kurdish question remained a strong motivation both as an internal and an external factor. The AKP tried to follow a different approach in tackling the Kurdish issue, but without major successes. The AKP neglected the Kurdish question on a religious-cultural basis and rather contributed to it. As an external factor, the PKK's insurgency strengthened from the territory of Iraq. Turkey initiated both a military response and cross-border diplomatic pressure. The external threats and incentives and the society's interests all led to a more active Turkish foreign policy role towards the East.

The antagonism of the old and the new elite groups almost led to the collapse of the AKP government in 2007. This happened despite the support of the majority of the society and underlined the government's vulnerabilities. With the strengthening of the AKP the marginalized groups and the Anatolian bourgeoisie received more political leverage. A competition of the old and the new elite groups took place along religious, cultural and political features. Even though the political power of the old elite was slowly decreasing, they still disposed of key positions in the state structure. The military remained the most important factor on the regime's vulnerability. In order to stabilize its power, the AKP had to both weaken and comfort the old elite. The EU reforms proved to be excellent tools for this, with the EU reform packages the government slowly acquired control of the privileges of the army and strengthened the civil control over it. After 2007, the government slowly played down the role of the secular elite in most of the areas, thus the regime's vulnerability decreased remarkably. The role of the Hizmet movement contributed to the growing power of the AKP remarkably.

By 2011, Turkey became influential and an admired political focal point in the Middle East. At the same time, the extraordinary growth of the Turkish economy positively affected the economies of the whole region. Turkish investments penetrated almost all of the regional markets, Turkish investors especially favoured Libya and Syria. The Turkish government's domestic political support remained strong, which was further

underpinned by the strengthening of the new business elite and the fact that the old Kemalist political elite had become somewhat side-lined. The start of the Arab Spring in 2011 brought a fundamental change in the whole region, which seemed an excellent opportunity for Turkey to extend its soft power and to emerge as a normative power that could show the way towards real democratization for the Arab people. However, after the first year, external and internal problems distorted the regional image of Turkey. The “Ankara Moment” seemed to be over, the “zero problems with the neighbours” policy became impossible to follow. Inside Turkey the secular opposition groups started to voice their discontent and people moved to the streets of Istanbul both in 2012 and 2013. The crackdown on the demonstrators and some antidemocratic practices influenced negatively Turkey’s positive regional image.

Turkey could not accommodate the new realities after 2012. The Egyptian-Turkish relations severed that affected Turkey’s connections to other Arab countries and brought the displeasure of some leaders in the Gulf area. Turkish foreign policy practice and the Turkish model became partially questioned. Earlier the regional stabilization efforts and the economic initiatives all contributed to the image of a positive regional leader. However, the foreign policy acts of Turkey and the tensions inside the Turkish society started to contradict and hinder the foreign policy ambitions.

Both the dynamic economic growth and the growing regional political influence depended on political stability and predictability. The democratic deficit of Turkey demolished the credibility of the Turkish support of democratic changes. The economy was hit by the domestic instabilities as well. As result of the external and the internal changes, Turkey’s fast rise started to slow down. The Arab Spring changed the external environment in which the Turkish foreign policy lost from its attractiveness.

Bibliography

Acar, Ferice, 1991. The True Path Party, 1983-1989. In: Heper, Metin and Landau, Jacob M., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, IB Tauris & Co Ltd, London, New York, pp 188-201

Acar, Mustafa, **Demir**, Ömer and **Toprak**, Metin, 2004. Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges, *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no.: 6, pp 166-188. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0026320042000282937>

Adam, Laura Batalla, 2012. Turkey's Foreign Policy in the AKP Era: Has There Been a Shift in the Axis? *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 11. no.:3, pp 139-148

Adas, Emin Baki, 2006. The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism. *Journal for Cultural Research* 10, no.: 2, pp 113-137, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14797580600624745>

Africa's hegemon. The Economist 04.08.2006, vol. 378.

Ahmadov, Ramin, 2008. Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party. *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 2&3. pp 15-34.

Akarçesme, Sevgi, 2013a. Turkey's soft-power on the rise despite challenges (1). *Today's Zaman*. 02 April.

Akarçesme, Sevgi, 2013b. Turkey draws on culture for rising soft power. *Weekly Zaman*, 06 April.

Akçay, Belgin and **Yilmaz**, Bahri, 2013. *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Political and Economic Challenges*, Lexington Books, Plymouth.

Akdeniz, Aycan, 2013. EU-Turkey Relations: Towards a Constructive Re-engagement?, *Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation*, URL: www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/08112013104356.pdf (accessed: 21 July 2014)

Akgün, Mensur and **Gündoğar**, Sabiha Seycünel, 2012. The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012, *Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation*, URL: <http://www.tesev.org.tr/tese-v-relased-the-perception-of-turkey-in-the-middle-east-2012-survey-results-in-english!/content/40> (accessed 08 August 2014)

Akgün, Mensur and **Gündoğar**, Sabiha Seycünel, 2014. The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2013, *Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation*. URL: www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/14012014171159.pdf (accessed 21 July 2014)

Akhmedjonov, Alisher, **Oğucu**, Fatma and **Suvankulov**, Farrukh, 2012. Restoring Forgotten Ties: Recent Trends and Prospects of Turkey's Trade with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. *Turkish Studies* 13, no.:3, pp 343-361. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.717840>

Akinci, Uğur, 1996. Municipal Radicalism of Political Islam in Turkey. *The Middle East Journal* 53, no.: 1, pp 76-91.

Akyüz, Yilmaz and **Boratav**, Korkut, 2003. The Making of the Turkish Financial Crises. *World Development* 31, no.: 9, pp 1549-1566.

Alper, E. and **Öniş**, Ziya (2004): The Turkish Banking System financial Crisis and the IMF in the Age of Capital Account Liberalization: A Political Economy Perspective. *New Perspectives on Turkey* 30, pp 25-55.

Altay main battle tank, Turkey. Army-Technology.com. URL: <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/altaymainbattletank/> (accessed 02 January 2016)

Altay, Atıl 2011. Businessmen as diplomats: the role of business associations in Turkey's foreign economic policy. *Insight Turkey* 13, no.:1, pp 119–128

Alterman, Jon B. and **Malka**, Haim, 2012. Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Geometry. *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no.: 3, pp 111-125. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706512>

Altınay, Ayşegül, 2004. *The Myth of Military Nation*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Altınay, Hakan, 2008. Turkey's Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage. *Insight Turkey* 10, no.: 2, pp 55-66.

Altunışık, Meliha, 2000. The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era. *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no.: 2, pp 172-192. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200008701313>

Altunışık, Meliha, 2008. The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East, *Insight Turkey* 10, no.: 2, pp. 41-54.

Altunışık, Meliha, 2011. Challenges to Turkey's "Soft Power" in the Middle East. TESEV Foreign Policy Programme, URL: <http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/21102013113608.pdf> (accessed: 01/01/2015)

Araş, Bülent and **Caha**, Ömer, 2000. Fetullah Gülen and his liberal „Turkish Islam” movement. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4, no.: 4, pp 30-42.

Araş, Bülent and **Polat**, R. Karakaya, 2008. From conflict to cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's relations with Syria and Turkey. *Security Dialogue* 39; no.: 5, pp 495–515. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010608096150>

Araş, Bülent, 2000a. Turkish foreign policy and Jerusalem: Toward a societal construction of foreign policy. *Arab Studies Quarterly* 22, no.:4 pp 31-58.

Araş, Bülent, 2000b. Turkish-Israeli-Iranian Relations in the Nineties: Impact on the Middle East. *Middle East Policy* 7, no.: 3, pp 151-164. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2000.tb00170.x>

Araş, Bülent, 2003. Turkey's Relations with Iran in the Post-Cold War Era. In: Ismael, Tareq Y. and Aydın, Mustafa. *Turkey's foreign policy in the twenty-first century: a changing role in world politics*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate

Araş, Bülent, 2004. Turkey and Iraqi Crisis. In. Araş, Bülent (ed). *War in the Gardens of Babylon: Middle East after the Iraqi war*. TASAM Publ. Istanbul.

Araş, Bülent, 2009. The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy. *Insight Turkey* 11, no.:3, pp 127-142.

Araş, Damla and **Aydin**, Mustafa, 2005. Political conditionality of economic relations between paternalist states: Turkey's interaction with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. *Arab Studies Quarterly* 27, no.: 1&2, pp 21-41.

Arat, Yeşim 2010. Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: implications of a democratic paradox. *Third World Quarterly* 31, no.: 6, pp 869-884. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.502712>

Arıkan, Burak 1998. The Programme of the National Action Party: An iron hand in a velvet glove? *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no.: 4, pp 120-134. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263209808701246>

Arıkan, Burak and **Çınar**, Alev, 2002. The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the state, the nation or the nationalists? *Turkish Studies* 3, no.: 1, pp 25-40. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005706>

Ataman, Muhittin, 2002. Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy. *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1, no.: 1. <http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number1/ataman.htm> (accessed: 12 November 2006.)

Avci, Gamze, 2003. Turkey's Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-skepticism? In: Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry, *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass London and New York, pp 140-160.

Aydinli, Ersel, 2011. Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish "Inner State". *Turkish Studies* 12, no.:2, pp 227-239. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.572630>

Aydinli, Ersel, **Özcan**, Nihat Ali and **Akyaz**, Dogan, 2006. The Turkish Military's March Toward Europe, *Foreign Affairs* 85, no.: 1, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61379/ersel-aydinli-nihat-ali-Özcan-and-dogan-akyaz/the-turkish-militarys-march-toward-europe> (accessed: 29 December 2013)

Ayşegül, Altınay, 2004. *The Myth of Military Nation*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan

Bacik, Gökhan: The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey's Failure to Develop a Political Solution, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34, Number 3, pp 248-265. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.545938>

Bahar, Heymi 2007. The Real Winners and Losers of Turkey's July 2007 Election. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no.:3, URL: <http://www.rubincenter.org/2007/09/bahar-2007-09-07/> (accessed: 02 February, 2015)

Bakir, Ali Hussien, 2011. Turkish-Iranian relations in the shadow of the arab revolutions: a vision of the present and the future. *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*. URL:

www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/2011/7/4/1_1071856_1_51.pdf (accessed 02 January 2016)

Balci, Bayram, 2014. *The Gülen Movement and Turkish Soft Power*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/04/g%C3%BClen-movement-and-turkish-soft-power> (accessed: 30 December 2015)

Balogh, István, 2009. Törökország közvetítő szerepe az iráni atomvitában. *Külügyi Szemle* 8, no.: 4, pp 18-37.

Balogh, István, **Egeresi**, Zoltán, **N. Rózsa**, Erzsébet, **Rada**, Csaba and **Szalai**, Máté, 2013. Kapacitások és ambíciók: a török közel-keleti külpolitika alapjai. *MKI-elemzések* 09, URL <http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/pub/displ.asp?id=MIXDII> (accessed: 30 March 2014)

Bank, André and **Kardağ**, Roy, 2013. The 'Ankara Moment': the politics of Turkey's regional power in the Middle East, 2007-11. *Third World Quarterly* 34, no.:2, pp 287-304. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775786>

Barkey, Henri J. and **Fuller**, Graham, 1997. Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities. *The Middle East Journal* 51, no.: 1, pp 59-79.

Barkey, Henri J. and **Fuller**, Graham, 1998. *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, Carnegie Corporation, New York, Oxford,

Barkey, Henri J., 1990. *State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey*. Boulder: Westview Press

Barkey, Henri J., 2000. Hemmed in by Circumstances: Turkey and Iraq since the Gulf War, *Middle East Policy* 7, no.: 4, URL: http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol7/0010_barkey.asp (accessed: 11 December 2006) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2000.tb00182.x>

Barnett, Michael and **Duvall**, Raymond, 2005. Raymond, Power in Global Governance, In. Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (eds). *Power in Global Governance*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1-32.

Başkan, Fıfız and **Güney**, Aylin, 2013. Turkey's June 2011 Parliamentary Elections. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, no.: 1, pp 165-174. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.656983>

Başkan, Fıfız, 2010. The Rising Islamic business elite and democratization in Turkey. *Journal of Balkan and Middle East studies* 12, no.: 4, pp 399-416. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2010.531207>

Bayazıt, Tayfun, 2013. Building a modern global economy in a century, *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 12, no. 2, pp 75-81

Ben-Aharon, Yossi, 2000. Negotiating with Syria: A first-hand account. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4, no.:2, URL: <http://www.gloria-center.org/2000/06/ben-aharon-2000-06-01/> (accessed: 02 February, 2015)

Beng, Kim Phar, 2008. Turkey's Potential as a Soft Power: A Call for Conceptual Clarity. *Insight Turkey* 10, no.: 2, pp 21-40.

Ben-Meir, Alon, 2007. Syria Does Matter. *Journal of Turkish Weekly*. URL <http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2493> (accessed: 22 March 2007)

Berik, Günseli and **Bilginsoy**, Cihan, 1996. The Labour Movement in Turkey: Labor Pains, Maturity and Metamorphosis. In: Goldberg (ed). *The Social History of Labour in the Middle East*. Boulder, Westview Press, pp 37-64.

Bila, Sibel Utku, 2011. Erdoğan sends Turkish FM to increase pressure on Syria. *Hürriyet Daily News*, 08 July.

Bilgin, Dikici, 2008. Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah. *Turkish Studies* 9, no.: 3, pp 407-421. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840802267363>

Bilgin, Pinar and **Eliş Berivan**, 2008. Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis. *Insight Turkey* 10, no.:2, pp 5-20.

Bilgin, Pinar, 2005. Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of globalisation. *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no.: 1, pp 175-201. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00223.x>

Bilgin, Pinar, 2007. Only strong states can survive in Turkey's geography': The uses of 'geopolitical truths' in Turkey. *Political Geography* 26 no.:7, pp 740-756.

Bilgin, Pinar, 2011. The Politics of Studying Securitization? The Copenhagen School in Turkey. *Security Dialogue* 42, no.4-5, pp 399-412. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418711>

Bishku, Michael B., 2012. Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Checkered History. *Middle East Policy* 19, no.: 3. pp 36-53. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00546.x>

Blainey, Geoffrey, 1988. *The Causes of War*. Free Press, New York.

Blinken, Antony J., 2002. Winning the War of Ideas. *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no.:2, pp 101-114. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/01636600252820162>

Bozdağlioğlu, Yücel, 2003. *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*. Routledge, London and New York

Bozdağlioğlu, Yücel, 2008. Modernity, Identity and Turkey's Foreign Policy. *Insight Turkey* 10, no.: 1. pp 55-76.

Buğra, Ayşe, 1998. Class Culture and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by two Turkish Business Associations. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no.:4, pp 521-539. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800052545>

Burak, Begüm, 2011. Turkish Political Culture and Civil society: An Unsettling Coupling? *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations* 10, no.: 1. pp 59-71.

Çağaptay, Soner and Jeffrey, James F. 2014. Turkey's 2014 Political Transition: From Erdogan to Erdogan? *Policy Notes* 17. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-2014-political-transition> (accessed: 23 July 2015)

Çağaptay, Soner, 2004. Where Goes the US-Turkish Relationship? *Middle East Quarterly* 11, no.:4, pp 43-52. URL: <http://www.meforum.org/657/where-goes-the-us-turkish-relationship> (accessed: 1 March 2014)

Çağaptay, Soner, 2004a. Fixing Turkish-Israeli Relations. Haaretz, 22 July, URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=392> (accessed: 15 February 2013)

Çağaptay, Soner, 2005. The Turkish Prime Minister visits Israel: Whither Turkish-Israeli relations? *Policy Watch* 987, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-turkish-prime-minister-visits-israel-whither-turkish-israeli-relations> (accessed: 23 July 2014)

Çağaptay, Soner, 2013a. Defining Turkish Power: Turkey as a Rising Power Embedded in the Western International System. *Turkish Studies* 14, no.: 4, pp 797-811. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861110>

Çağaptay, Soner, 2013b. The New Turkey and U.S. Policy, *Washington Institute Strategic Report*, URL <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-turkey-and-u.s.-policy> (accessed: 23 July 2014)

Çağaptay, Soner, 2014. *The rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century's First Muslim Power*. University of Nebraska Press.

Çağlar, Ismail, 2012. The Welfare Party and the February 28 Process: A Historical Analysis of Turkish Conservatives' Move to the Center, *Turkish Journal of Politics* 3, no.: 1, pp 22-36.

Çaha, Ömer, 2001. The inevitable coexistence of Civil Society and Liberalism: The Case of Turkey. *Journal of Economic and Social Research* 3, no.: 2. pp 35-50.

Canefe, Negriz and **Bora**, Tanil, 2003. The Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism. In. Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry, *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass, London and New York, pp 120-139.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and **Kalaycioğlu**, Ersin, 2007. *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*. I.B. Tauris & Co. New York.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and **Kalaycioğlu**, Ersin, 2009. *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and **Rubin**, Barry, 2003. *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass, London and New York.

Çarkoğlu, Ali, 2000. The geography of the April 1999 Turkish elections. *Turkish Studies* 1, no.: 1, pp 149-171. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840008721225>

Çarkoğlu, Ali, 2002. Turkey's November 2002 elections: A new beginning? *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7, no.: 4, URL <http://www.gloria-center.org/2002/12/carkoglu-2002-12-03/> (accessed: 4 January 2014)

Çarkoğlu, Ali, 2003. Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU Membership. In. Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry, *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass, London and New York, pp 161-183

Çarkoğlu, Ali, 2004. Societal perceptions of Turkey's EU membership: Causes and consequences of support for EU membership. In. Uğur, Mehmet and Canefe, Nergis. *Turkey and European Integration: Accession prospects and issues*. Routledge, New York, pp 19-46

Çarkoğlu, Ali, 2006. The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: The Bases of the Justice and Development Party in Changing Electoral Space. In. Yavuz, Hakan (ed). *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, Utah University Press, Salt Lake City, pp 163-171.

Çarkoğlu, Ali, 2007. The Rise of the new Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the November 2002 Elections in Turkey. *South European Society and Politics* 7, no.: 3. pp 123-156. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608740708539636>

Carlstorn, Gregg, 2013. Turkey-Israel move towards normalising ties. *Al-Jazeera analysis*. 31 May 2014. URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/turkey-israel-move-towards-normalising-ties-20145317400676553.html> (accessed: 02 January 2016)

Carr, Edwar H., 1939. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Macmillan, London 1939

Carroll, Thomas Patrick, 2004. Turkey's Justice and Development Party: A Model for Democratic Islam? *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 6, no.: 6/7. pp. 22-27.

Çayhan, Esra, 2003. Towards a European Security and Defense Policy: With or Without Turkey. In. Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry. *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*, Frank Cass, London and New York pp 32-51

Çayir, Kenan, 2008. The emergence of Turkey's contemporary 'Muslim Democrats'. In. Cizre, Ümit (ed). *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Routledge, London and New York. pp 62-79.

Cecilia Malmström signs the Readmission Agreement and launches the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue with Turkey. Press Release, European Commission, Brussels, 16 December 2013, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1259_en.htm (accessed: 23 July 214)

Çelenk, Ayse Aslihan, 2007. The Restructuring of Turkey's Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party's Struggle for Power. *Turkish Studies* 8, no.: 3, pp 351-352. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840701489092>

Çetinsaya, Gökhan, 1999. Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of „Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” in Modern Turkish Political Thought. *The Muslim World* 89, No 3-4, pp 350-376. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1999.tb02753.x>

Christensen, Thomas J., 1996. *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Çınar Menderes, 2008. The Justice and Development Party and the Kemalist establishment. In: Cizre, Ümit (ed). *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Routledge, London and New York, pp 109-131.

Cizre, Ümit (ed), 2008a. *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Routledge, London and New York.

Cizre, Ümit, 2003. Demythologizing the national security concept: The case of Turkey, *The Middle East Journal* 57, pp 213-230.

Cizre, Ümit, 2008b. The justice and Development Party and the military: Recreating the past after reforming it. In: **Cizre**, Ümit (ed), 2008. *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Routledge, London and New York, pp 132-174.

Çokgezen, Murat and **Özcan**, Berna Gül, 2003. Limits to Alternative Forms of Capitalization: The Case of Anatolian Holding Companies. *World Development* 31, no.: 12, pp 2061-2084.

Commission of the European Communities, 2006. Turkey 2006 Progress Report. Commission Staff Working Document. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf (accessed: 15 October 2014)

Coşkun, Bezen Balamir, 2010. Energizing the Middle East: Iran, Turkey and Persian Gulf States. *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 9, no.: 2, pp 71-80.

Couloumbis, Theodore A. and **Kentikelenis**, Alexander E., 2007. Greek-Turkish relations and the Kantian Democratic Peace Theory. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 7, no.: 4, pp 517-532. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683850701725999>

Csicsmann, László and **N. Rózsa**, Erzsébet, 2013. A Török Köztársaság az átalakuló Közel-Keleten. *Külügyi Szemle* 12, no.: 1, pp 59-78.

Dağı, Ihsan, 2005. Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization, *Turkish Studies* 6, no.: 1, pp 21-37. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1468384042000339302>

Dağı, Ihsan, 2006. The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Discourse of Human Rights in the Search for Security and Legitimacy, In. Yavuz, Hakan (ed). *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, Utah University Press, Salt Lake City, pp 88-106.

Dağı, Ihsan, 2009. Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: The Rapprochement of Turkish Islamic Elite with the West. In. Zank, Wolfgang (ed). *Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations: Overlapping Integration and Identities*, MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall, pp 43-64.

Dahl, Robert, 1957. The Concept of Power. *Behavioral Science* 3, no.: 2, pp 201-215. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303>

Dal, Emel Parlar and **Oğuzlu**, Tarık, 2013. Decoding Turkey's Rise: An Introduction. *Turkish Studies* 14, no.: 4, pp.617-636. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.20130.861112>

Dal, Emel Parlar, 2013. Assessing Turkey's Normative Power in the Middle East and North Africa Region: New Dynamics and their Limitations. *Turkish Studies* 14, no.:4, pp 709-734. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861113>

Davison, Andrew and **Parla**, Taha, 2004. *Corporatist ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 1994. *Alternative Paradigms the Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2001. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu. *Küre Yayınları*,

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2008. Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007. *Insight Turkey* 10, no.: 1. pp 77-96

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2009. *Statement at the 36th Session of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers*, May 23-25, 2009, Damascus URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-at-the-36th-session-of-the-oic-council-of-foreign-ministers.en.mfa (accessed: 13 March 2014)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2010a. *Address at the 133rd. Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Arab League*, 3 March 2010, Cairo, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-of-foreign-minister-of-turkey-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu-at-the-133rd_-meeting-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-member-states-of-the-arab-league.en.mfa (accessed: 13 March 2014)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2010b. *Statement at the OIC Extraordinary Session of the Expanded Executive Committee Meeting*, June 6, 2010, Jeddah, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey_-at-the-oic-extraordinary-session-of-th.en.mfa (accessed: 13 March 2014)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2010c. Turkey's zero problems foreign policy. *Foreign Policy*, URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/> (accessed: 13 October 2014)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2010d. With The Middle East in Crisis, U.S. and Turkey Must Deepen Alliance. *Foreign Policy*, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-mr_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-usa-on-15-nove.en.mfa (accessed: 13 October 2014)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2011. Vision 2023: Turkey's Foreign Policy Objectives. Speech at the Turkey Investor Conference: The road to 2023. Organized by Goldman Sachs (London, 22 November 2011) URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-vision-2023-turkey-s-foreign-policy-objectives-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-af.en.mfa (accessed: 21 September 2013)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2012a. Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring. *Turkey Policy Brief Series*, International Policy and Leadership Institute, URL http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/bakanmakale_tepev.pdf (accessed: 13 October 2014)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2012b. *Speech at the Opening of the Fifth Meeting of the Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum at the Level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs*, 1 December 2012, Istanbul, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey-at-the-open%C4%B1ng-of-the--fifth-meeting-of-the-turkish-arab-cooperation-forum-at-the-level-of-ministers-of-foreign-affairs_-1-december-2012_-istanbul.en.mfa (accessed: 13 March 2014)

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2012c. Transformation of NATO and Turkey's position. *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs* 27, no.: 1 pp 7-17.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2013a. The Three Major Earthquakes in the International System and Turkey. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 48, no.:2., pp 1-11, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2013.796781>

Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 2013b. Turkey's Mediation: Critical Reflections From the Field. *Middle East Policy* 20, no.:1, pp 83-90. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12005>

Dinc Cengiz and **Yetim** Mustafa, 2012. Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East: From Non-Involvement to a Leading Role. *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations* 11, no.: 1, pp 67-84.

Dobrovits, Mihály, 2010. Törökország egy alkotmányos átalakulás felé. *MKI-Tanulmányok* 12. p 12. URL: http://kki.gov.hu/download/3/d9/b0000/Tanulmanyok_2010_12_T%C3%B6r%C3%B6korsz%C3%A1g_egy_alkotm%C3%A1ny.pdf (accessed: 15 March 2015)

Doyle, Michael 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no.: 3, pp 205-235.

Dueck, Colin, 2005. Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy: Explaining America's Peculiar Path to World Power. *Security Studies* 14, no.: 2, pp 195-231. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410500232891>

Dueck, Colin, 2009. Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions, In: Lobell, Steven E. Ripsman, Norin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 139-169.

Duran, Burhanettin, 2008. The Justice and Development Party's 'new politics': Steering toward conservative democracy, a revised Islamic agenda or management of new crises? In: Cizre, Ümit (ed). *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Routledge, London and New York. pp 80-106

Egeresi Zoltán, 2012. A PKK: Marxista Terrorszervezetből Nemzetépítő Gerillasereg? *Pro Minoritate* 21, no.: 2, pp 93-111.

Egeresi Zoltán, 2013b. Az AKP Keresztutak Előtt. *Policy Brief, MKI-Elemzések*. p. 9. URL: http://kki.gov.hu/download/1/69/b0000/Elemzesek_2013_08_Az_AKP_keresztutak_el%C3%94tt_.pdf (accessed: 12 February 2015)

Egeresi, Zoltán 2013a. *A török hadsereg változó szerepe: kiszorulás a hatalomból?* p 11. URL: http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu/documents/1375123131_Egeresi_Zoltan_A_torok_had_sereg_valtozo_szerepe_-_biztonsagpolitika.hu.pdf (accessed: 23 July 2014)

Egeresi, Zoltán 2015. Törökországi Parlamenti Választás: egy korszak vége? *KKI-Elemzések*, E-2015/27. URL: http://kki.gov.hu/download/b/49/01000/T%C3%B6r%C3%B6rsz%C3%A1gi%20parlamenti%20v%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1s_Egeresi_Zoltan.pdf (accessed 12 December 2015)

Egeresi, Zoltán, 2013c. Békefolyamat Törökországban: útban a történelmi kiegyezés felé? . *Policy Brief, MKI-Elemzések*. p. 13. URL: http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/EPVBON/2013-05-02_egeresi_zoltan_bekefolyamat-torokorszagban.pdf (accessed: 12 February 2015)

Egeresi, Zoltán, 2013d. *Mérlegen a NATO-tagállamok: Törökország*. Biztonságpolitikai Szakkollégium. URL: http://old.biztonsagpolitika.hu/index.php?&id=16&aid=1377&title=M%C3%A9rlegen_a_NATO-tag%C3%A1llamok_-_T%C3%B6r%C3%B6rsz%C3%A1g&load=tlanDAqwjXo (accessed: 12 January 2016.)

Egeresi, Zoltán, 2013e. Törökország és a Balkán, *Külügyi Szemle* 12, no.:1, pp 39-58

Eisenstadt, Michael, 1997. Turkish-Israeli military cooperation: An assessment. *Policy Watch* 262. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1141> (accessed: 12 February 2015)

Eligür, Banu, 2012. Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008- June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity. *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no.: 3, pp 429-459. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.662893>

Eran, Oded and **Lindenstrauss**, Gallia, 2009. Not just a Bridge over Troubled Waters: Turkey in Regional and International Affairs. In. *Strategic Survey for Israel 2009*. pp 83-93. URL: <http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2063> (accessed: 12 March 2014)

Erbil, Can and **Oğuş**, Ayla, 2005. The effects of instability on bilateral trade with Iraq. *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 4, no.: 4, URL: <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/article/225/the-effects-of-instability-on-bilateral-trade-with-iraq-winter-2005/> (accessed: 02 February 2015)

Erdemli, Özgül, 2003. Chronology: Turkey's Relations with the EU. In. Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry. *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass London and New York. pp 4-7.

Erdoğan and his generals, Turkey and its army. The Economist, 02 February 2013.

Erdoğan promises EU talks will speed up in 2014. Today's Zaman 1 January 2014. URL: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-335494-erdogan-promises-eu-talks-will-speed-up-in-2014.html> (accessed 23 July 2014)

Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 2010. The Changing Balances and the Rising Importance of Turkey. *Lecture presented at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)*. Ankara, 3 February, 2010. URL: <http://www.usak.org.tr/en/publications/usak-speeches/full-text-of-turkish-prime-minister-r-t-erdogan-s-lecture-on-changing-balances-and-rising-importance-of-turkey-at-usak-house> (accessed 23 July 2014)

Ergüder, Üstün and **Hofferbert**, Richard I., 1987. Restoration of democracy in Turkey? Political reforms and the elections of 1983, In. Lane, Linda (ed). *Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends*, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, pp 152-169.

Erickson, Edward J. 2004. Turkey as a Regional Hegemon- 2014: Strategic Implications for the United States. *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 3, pp 25-45. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1468384042000270317>

Ernest Gellner: *Muslim Society*. Cambridge University press, Cambridge 1981.

ESI (European Stability Initiative), 2005. *Islamic Calvinists, Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia*, Berlin-Brussels-Istanbul, p. 41. URL: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_69.pdf (accessed: 27 July 2014)

Evin, Ahmet, **Kirişci**, Kemal, **Linden**, Ronald, **Straubhaar**, Thomas, **Tocci**, Nathalie, **Tolay**, Juliette and **Walker**, Joshua, 2010. Getting to Zero: Turkey, its Neighbors, and the West, *Transatlantic Academy*. p 50. URL: <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/getting-zero-turkey-its-neighbors-and-west> (accessed 21 July 2014)

Ferguson, Niall, 2003. Think Again: Power. *Foreign Policy* 134, pp 18-23.

Fidan, Hakan, 2013. A Work in Progress: The New Turkish Foreign Policy, *Middle East Policy* 20, no.: 1, pp 91-96. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12006>

Flanagan, Stephen J., 2013. The Turkey-Russia-Iran Nexus: Eurasian Power Dynamics. *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no.:1, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.751656>

Flesch, István. 2004. Konstantinápolytól Brüsszelig. Törökország Rögös Útja az Európai Unió felé. *Európai Tükör*, no.: 8. pp. 55–65.

Frum, David and **Perle**, Richard, 2003. *An End to the Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*. Random House Publishing Group, New York,

Gilpin, Robert, 1984. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Gilpin, Robert, 1994. Hegemonic War and International Change. In. Betts, Richard K. (ed). *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*. Ally and Bacon, Boston.

Gilpin, Robert, 1996. No One Loves a Political Realist. *Security Studies* 5, no.: 3, pp 3-26. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429275>

Giplin, Robert, 2002. The Rise of American Hegemony. In. Cleese-Patrick, Armand and O'Brien Karl. *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001*, Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp 165-182.

Göçek, Fatma Müge, 2011. *Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*. I.B. Tauris, New York.

Godwin, Paul H. B., 2004. China as a Regional Hegemon? In. Rolfe, Jim (ed). *The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition*. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Honolulu. URL <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter6Godwin.pdf> (accessed: 09.04.2014.) pp 81-101.

Göktepe, Cihat, The Menderes Period (1950-1960). *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, URL <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960.html> (accessed, 11 April 2014.)

Göl, Ayla, 2009. The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular. *Third World Quarterly* 30, no.: 4, pp 795-811. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590902867383>

Göle, Nilüfer, 1996. Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist politics: The case of Turkey. In. Norton, Augustus Richard (ed). *Civil Society in the Middle East*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp 17-43.

Göle, Nilüfer, 1997. Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The making of Elites and Counter Elites. *The Middle East Journal* 51, no.:1, pp 46-58.

Gray, Kevin and **Murphy**, Craig N., 2013. Introduction: rising powers and the future of global governance. *Third World Quarterly* 34, no.: 2, pp 183-193. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775778>

Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. and **Öniş**, Ziya, 2010. Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics in Turkey: lessons from the Greek experience. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no.: 3, pp. 259-274. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2010.506823>

Grigoriadis, Ioannis N., 2010. *The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy*. Working Paper 8/2010. Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.

Gül, Abdullah, 2009. Lecture on 'Turkish Foreign Policy In The New Era'. *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, URL <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/338/full-text-of-turkish-president-abdullah-gul-39-s-lecture-on-39-turkish-foreign-policy-in-the-new-era-39-at-usak.html> (Accessed 11 February 2015)

Gül, Abdullah, 2013. Talking Turkey: A Conversation with Abdullah Gül. Foreign Affairs, URL <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/talking-turkey> (accessed 11 January 2014)

Gülalp, Haldun, 1999. The poverty of democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode. *New Perspectives on Turkey* 21, pp. 35-59.

Gümüşcü, Şebnem, 2008. Economic Liberalization, Devout Bourgeoisie, and Change in Political Islam: Comparing Turkey and Egypt. *Working Papers* 19/2008, EUI Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

Gündoğan, Günel, 2003. Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State pragmatism and ideological influences. *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7, no.: 1, URL <http://www.gloria-center.org/2003/03/gundogan-2003-03-01/> (accessed 27 December 2014)

Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe, 2002. The Republican People's Party. *Turkish Studies* 3, no.: 1, pp 102-121. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005705>

Gürzel, Aylin, 2012. Turkey's Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue. *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no.: 3, pp 141-152, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706576>

Güsten Susanne, 2011. Mandate for a New Turkish Era. *The New York Times*, 15 June

Habibi, Nader, 2012. Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions. *Middle East Brief* 62, p 9. URL: <http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB62.pdf> (accessed: 13 January 2016)

Hale, William and **Özbudun**, Ergun, 2010. *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The case of AKP*. Routledge, London and New York.

Hale, William, 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*, Routledge, London.

Hale, William, 2003. Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process. In: Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry. *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass London and New York. pp 101-119.

- Hale**, William, 2005. Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts. *Turkish Studies* 6, no.: 2, pp 293-310. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840500119601>
- Hale**, William, 2009. Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era'. *Insight Turkey* 11, no.:3, pp 143-159.
- Hale**, William, 2013. *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*. Routledge, London.
- Hansen**, Allen C., 1984. Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age. USIA, Praeger Publishers Division, New York.
- Heper**, Metin and **Landau**, Jacob M., 1991. *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, IB Tauris & Co Ltd, London, New York.
- Heper**, Metin, 2007. *The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation*. Palgrave Macmillan, London-New York.
- Hickok**, Michael Robert, 200 Hegemon Rising: The Gap between Turkish Strategy and Military Modernization. *Parameters* 30, no.: 2, pp 105-119.
- Hirschman**, Albert O. 1977. *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Hobson**, John M., 2002. Two Hegemonies or One? A Historico-Sociological Critique of Hegemony Stability Theory. In. Cleese-Patrick, Armand and O'Brien Karl. *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001*. Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp 305-325.
- Hóvári**, János, 2013. A 21. századi Törökország új utakon. *Külügyi Szemle* 12, no.: 1, pp 3-9.
- Hursoy**, Siret, 2011. Changing Dimensions of Turkey's Foreign Policy. *International Studies* 48, no.: 2, pp 139-164. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020881712469458>
- Inbar**, Efraim, The strategic glue in the Israeli-Turkish alignment. In.: *Kirsici, Kemal-Rubin, Barry: Turkey in world politics: An emerging multiregional power*. Boulder, Co. L. Rienner, 2001.
- International Crisis Group**, 2012. Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement. *Europe Report* 219. URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement.pdf> (accessed: 02 January 2016)
- Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu published in AUC Cairo Review on 12 March 2012. URL http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-egypt-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (accessed: 25 September 2014)
- Interview with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey's role in the Middle East, URL <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/02/erdogan-turkey-role-middle-east-201421282950445312.html> (accessed: 22 November 2014)

Jenkins, Gareth H., 2009. Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation. Silk Road Paper. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. URL: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2009_08_SRP_Jenkins_Turkey-Ergenekon.pdf (accessed: 02 February 2015)

Jenkins, Gareth H., 2014. The Balyoz Retrial and the Changing Politics of Turkish Justice. *The Turkey Analyst* 7, no.:12. URL: <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/331-the-balyoz-retrial-and-the-changing-politics-of-turkish-justice.html> (accessed: 02 February 2015)

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, 2002. The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party. *Turkish Studies* 3, no.: 1, pp 41-61. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005703>

Kaliber, Alper and **Tocci**, Nathalie, 2010. Civil society and the transformation of Turkey's Kurdish question. *Security Dialogue* 41, no.: 2, pp 191-215. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010610361890>

Kaliber, Alper, 2005. Securing the ground through securitized 'foreign' policy: The Cyprus case. *Security Dialogue* 36, no.: 3, pp 319-337. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010605057019>

Kahn, Ibrahim, 2008. Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geopolitics? *SETA – Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research* URL: <http://www.setav.org/en/turkey-and-the-middle-east-ideology-or-geopolitics/yorum/253> (accessed: 01 February 2015)

Kahn, Ibrahim, 2011. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey. *Perception* 16, no.: 3, pp 5-24.

Kapsis, James E., 2006. The Failure of U.S.-Turkish pre-war negotiations: An overconfident United States, political mismanagement, and a conflicted military. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no.: 3. URL: <http://www.gloria-center.org/2006/09/kapsis-2006-09-03/> (accessed: 02 February 2015)

Kaptanoğlu, Neslihan and **Kirişçi**, Kemal, 2011. The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy. *Middle Eastern Studies* 47, no.: 5, pp 705-724. <http://dx.doi.org/10.080/00263206.2011.613226>

Kardaş, Şaban, 2013. Turkey: A Regional Power Facing a Changing International System. *Turkish Studies* 14, no.:4, pp 637-660. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861111>

Karveli, Halil M, 2010. Reconciling Statism and Freedom, Turkey's Kurdish Opening, *Silk Road Paper*, URL: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2010_10_SRP_Karveli_Statism-Turkey.pdf (accessed: 02 March 2012)

Kaufman, Edward, 2002. A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars. *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no.: 2, pp 115-127. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/01636600252820171>

Keneş, Bülent, 2013. The effect of ‘soft power’ on Turkey’s rapid development. *Today’s Zaman*. 14 March 2013. URL: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists_the-effect-of-soft-power-on-turkeys-rapid-development_309725.html (accessed: 22 November 2014)

Kennedy, Paul, 1992. *Nagyhatalmak tündöklése és bukása, Gazdasági változások és katonai konfliktusok 1500-2000*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.

Keohane, Robert O., 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Keyder, Çağlar, 1994. The Agrarian Background and the Origins of the Turkish Bourgeoisie. In: Keyder, Çağlar Öncü, Ayşe and Ibrahim, *Saad Eddin Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*. The American University in Cairo, Cairo, pp 45-72.

Keyman E. Fuat, 2013. The new security paradigm and a proactive foreign policy. *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, URL: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3742/the-new-security-paradigm-and-a-proactive-foreign-policy.html> (accessed: 01 February 2015)

Kibaroğlu, Mustafa and **Kibaroğlu**, Aysegül, 2009. *Global Security Watch – Turkey: a Reference Handbook*, Praeger Security International, 2009.

Kibaroğlu, Mustafa and **Russel**, Richard, 2005. Beyond Iran: The Risk of a Nuclearizing Middle East. *Policy Watch* 957, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2255> (accessed: 12 November 2014)

Kindleberger, Charles, 1973. *The World in Depression, 1929-29*. University of California Press, Berkley.

Kirişci, Kemal, 2004. Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8, no.: 1, URL: <http://www.gloria-center.org/2004/03/kirisci-2004-03-04/> (accessed: 02 January 2015).

Kirişci, Kemal, 2009. The formation of Turkish foreign policy: the rise of the trading state. *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40, pp 29-57.

Kirişci, Kemal, 2011. Turkey’s “demonstrative effect” and the transformation of the Middle East. *Insight Turkey* 13. no.: 1, pp 33–55.

Kirişci, Kemal, **Tocci**, Nathalie and **Walker**, Joshua, 2010. A Neighbourhood Rediscovered, Turkey’s Transatlantic Value in the Middle East, *Brussels Forum Paper Series*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States. p 30. URL: www.gmfus.org/file/2111/download (accessed: 2 August 2014)

Knudsen, Erik L., 2003. Syria, Turkey and the Changing Power Configuration in the Middle East: An analysis of political, economic and regional differences. Ismael, Tareq Y. and Aydin Mustafa (ed). *Turkey's foreign policy in the twenty-first century: a changing role in world politics*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp 199-218.

Koknar, Ali M., 2006. Iranian Azeris: A Giant Minority, *Policy Watch 1111*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2476> (accessed 27 December 2014)

Kosebalaban, Hasan 2010. The Crisis in Israeli-Turkish Relations: What is its Strategic Significance? *Middle East Policy* 17, no.:3. pp 36-50. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00449.x>

Krause, Peter and **Van Evera**, Stephen, 2009. Public Diplomacy: Ideas for the War of Ideas. *Middle East Policy* 16, no. 3, pp 106-134. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2009.00408.x>

Kurt, Ümit and **Toktas**, Sule, 2010. The Turkish Military Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces. *Turkish Studies* 11, no.: 3, pp. 387-403. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2010.506737>

Kurt, Ümit, 2010. The Doctrine of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the “Intellectuals’ Heart- Aydınlar Ocağı” as the Ideological Apparatus of the State. *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* 3, no.: 3, pp. 111-125.

Laçiner, Sedat 2007. United States and the PKK: Why did coordinator not help out? *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*. URL: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/42006/united-states-and-the-pkk-why-did-coordinator-not-help-out.html> (accessed: 11 November 2007)

Laçiner, Sedat, 2009. Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism. *Journal of Turkish Weekly*. URL: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-ozalism.html> (accessed: 24 January 2013)

Lagro, Esra, 2008. Why is President Sarkozy Actually Against Turkish Accession to the EU? Facts and Challenges. *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs* 8, no.: 1-2, pp 57-77

Larrabee, F. Stephen and **Lesser**, Ian O., 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. The RAND Corporation.

Larrabee, F. Stephen and **Rabasa**, Angel, 2008. The rise of Political Islam in Turkey. *National Defence Institute*, The RAND Corporation.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, 2010. Turkey’s new geopolitics. *Survival* 52, no.: 2, 2010, pp 157–180. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764686>

Lennon, T. J. Alexander (ed), 2002. *The Battle for Hearts and Minds*, MIT Press. p 352

Leonard, Mark, 2002. *Public Diplomacy*. Foreign Policy Centre, London.

Lindenstrauss, Gallia, 2011. Turkey and the Middle East: Between Euphoria and Sobriety. In. *Strategic Survey for Israel 2011*. Institute for National Security Studies. pp

105-117. URL: <http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2385> (accessed: 01 November 2014)

Lobell, Steven E. **Ripsman**, Norin M. and **Taliaferro**, Jeffrey W. (ed.), 2009. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lobell, Steven E. **Ripsman**, Norin M. and **Taliaferro**, Jeffrey W., 2009. Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy, In: Lobell, Steven E. Ripsman, Norin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1-41.

Lobell, Steven E., 2009. Threat Assessment, the state, and foreign policy; a neoclassical realist model, In: Lobell, Steven E. Ripsman, Norin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 42-74.

Lukes, Steven, 2005. *Power, Second Edition: A Radical View*. Palgrave Macmillan, London

Makovsky, Alan and **Sayari**, Sabri (eds) 2000. *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-new-world-changing-dynamics-in-turkish-foreign-policy> (accessed: 30 December 2015)

Makovsky, Alan, 1999a. Defusing the Turkish-Syrian Crisis: Whose Triumph? *Middle East Insight*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=383> (accessed: 13 November 2014)

Makovsky, Alan, 1999b, Turkish-Iranian Tension: A New Regional Flashpoint?, *Policy Watch* 404, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1282> (accessed 27 December 2014)

Makovsky, Alan, 2000. Turkish-Israeli in the Context of Israeli-Arab tension. *Policy Watch* 502, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1380> (accessed 27 December 2014)

Marcus, Aliza, 2007. *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, New York University Press, New York – London.

Mardin, Şerif, 1973. Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics. *Daedalus* 2. no.: 1, pp 169-190.

Mardin, Şerif, 2005. Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes. *Turkish Studies* 6, no.:2, pp. 145-165. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840500119478>

Mattern, Janice Bially, 2005. Why Soft Power isn't so Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics. *Millenium-Journal of*

International Studies 33, no.: 3 pp 583-612.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031601>

Melissen, Jan (ed), 2005. *The New Public Diplomacy, Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Meral, Ziya and **Paris**, Jonathan, 2010. Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity. *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no.: 4, pp 75-86.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2010.516613>

Middle Eastern elites: Turkish Foreign policy aims to high. Today's Zaman. 24 June 2014. URL: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-351247-middle-eastern-elites-turkish-foreign-policy-aims-too-high.html> (accessed: 02 August 2014)

Minister says Turkey to 'reconsider' EU Customs Union. Today's Zaman. 25 March 2013, URL: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-310708-minister-says-turkey-to-reconsider-eu-customs-union.html> (accessed: 02 August 2014)

Modelski, George, 1987a . A System Model for The Long Cycle, In. Modelski, George (ed). *Exploring Long Cycles*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 112-128.

Modelski, George, 1987b. *Long Cycles in World Politics*, Macmillan Press.

Mohammed, Idrees, 2011. Turkey and Iran Rivalry on Syria. *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations* 10, no.: 2&3, pp 65-77

Morgenthau, Hans, 1985. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Mueller, John, 1989. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolence of Major War*. Basic Books, New York. Quoted in: Nye, Joseph Jr., 2011. *The Future of Power*. Public Affairs, New York.

Mufti, Malik, 2002. Turkish-Syrian Rapprochement Causes and Consequences *Policy Watch* 630, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1508> (accessed: 01 November 2014)

Mufti, Malik, 2009. *Daring and Caution on Turkish Strategic Culture, Republic at Sea*. Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York.

Mufti, Malik, 2011. A Little America: The Emergence of Turkish Hegemony, *Middle East Brief*, no.: 51, Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies.

Murinson, Alexander, 2006. The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish foreign Policy. *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no.: 6, pp 945-964.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200600923526>

Murinson, Alexander, 2012. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century. *Mideast Security and Policy Studies*, no. 97, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. URL: <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS97.pdf> (accessed: 12 July 2015)

Mutlu, Gülay, 2014. Turkey's development aid and the question of its sustainability. *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 30 April 2014. URL: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/2014/04/30/comment/turkey-s-development-aid-and-the-question-of-its-sustainability/> (accessed: 12 July 2015)

N. Rózsa Erzsébet, 2008. A török EU-csatlakozás vitás kérdései. Következtetések a magyar külpolitika számára. In. Vásáry István (ed). *Törökország és az iszlám: az iszlám szerepe Törökország EU-csatlakozásának megítélésében*. Avicenna Közel-Kelet Kutatások Intézete, Piliscsaba, pp 109-132.

Nasr, Vali, 2005. The Rise of "Muslim Democracy". *Journal of Democracy* 16, no.: 2. pp 13-27.

Negotiating Framework (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005) URL http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf

Nye, Joseph Jr., 1990. *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power*. Basic Books, New York.

Nye, Joseph Jr., 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs, New York.

Nye, Joseph Jr., 2011. *The Future of Power*. Public Affairs, New York.

Oğuzlu, Tarik H. and **Kibaroglu**, Mustafa, 2009. Is the Westernization process losing pace in Turkey: Who's to blame? *Turkish Studies* 10, no.: 4, pp 577-593. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840903384836>

Oğuzlu, Tarik H., 2007. Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1, pp 81-97. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357710601142518>

Oğuzlu, Tarik H., 2008. Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West? *Turkish Studies* 9, no.: 1, pp. 3-20. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840701813960>

Oğuzlu, Tarik H., 2012a. Turkey and the European Union: Europeanization Without Membership, *Turkish Studies* 13, no.: 2, pp. 229-243. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.685256>

Oğuzlu, Tarik, 2012b. The 'Arab Spring' and the Rise of the 2.0 Version of Turkey's 'zero problems with neighbors' Policy, *SAM Papers*, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign affairs, no.: 1.

Oğuzlu, Tarik, 2013. Making Sense of Turkey's Rising Power Status: What Does Turkey's Approach within NATO Tell Us? *Turkish Studies* 14, no.: 4, pp 774-796. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.863420>

Oktav, Özden Zeynep, 2005. Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations. *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs* 9, no.: 2, pp 25-48

Olson, Robert, 1995. The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991–1995: From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq. *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 1, pp 1–30. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010696027003006>

Öncü, Ayşe, 1994. Street Politics. In: **Keyder**, Çağlar Öncü, Ayşe and Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (eds). *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*. The American University in Cairo, Cairo, pp 273-298.

Onder, Nilgun, 2008. The Turkish Project of Globalization and New Regionalism. *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations* 7, no.: 2&3, pp. 86-110.

Öniş, Ziya, 1996. Globalization and Financial blow-ups in the semi periphery: Perspectives on Turkey's Financial Crisis of 1994. *New Perspectives on Turkey* 15, pp. 1-23.

Öniş, Ziya, 2000. Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations. *Government and Opposition* 35, no.: 4, pp 463–83. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00041>

Öniş, Ziya, 2003. Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU relations in the post-Helsinki Era. In: Çarkoğlu, Ali and Rubin, Barry. *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. Frank Cass, London and New York pp 8-31.

Öniş, Ziya, 2004. Turgut Özal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective. *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no.: 4, pp 113-134. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200410001700338>

Öniş, Ziya, 2006. The political economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, In: Yavuz, Hakan M. (ed). *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, UT, pp 207-234.

Öniş, Ziya, 2011. Power, Interests and Coalitions: the political economy of mass privatisation in Turkey. *The World Quarterly* 32. no.: 4. pp. 707-724. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.567004>

Öniş, Ziya, 2012. Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest. *Insight Turkey* 14, no.: 3, pp. 45-63

Özbudun, Ergün. 2012. Turkey's Search for a New Constitution. *Insight Turkey* 14, no.: 1. pp 39-50.

Özek, Cerem I. Cenker and **Oğuzlu**, Tarık, 2013. Beyond the Institutional Logics: International Level Systemic Analysis of EU-Turkish Relations. *Turkish Studies* 14, no.: 4, pp 688-708. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.862926>

Özkan, Güner, 2012. Transformation of a Development Aid Agency: TIKA in a Changing Domestic and International Setting. *Turkish Studies* 13, no.: 4. pp 647-664. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.746442>

Park, Bill, 2008. The Fetullah Gülen Movement. *Global Politician*. 31 December 2008. URL: <http://fgulen.com/en/press/columns/26503-the-fetullah-gulen-movement> (accessed: 30 December 2015)

Parla, Taha, 1998. Mercantile militarism in Turkey, 1960-1998, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 3, pp 29-52.

Pintér, Attila, 2004. Mecsetek és katonai barakkok között. A politikai pártok evolúciója a török politikai rendszerben. *Külügyi Szemle* 3, no.: 1 pp. 116-157.

Pintér, Attila, 2013. Törökország külpolitikája a 21. század elején - neooszmán vagy újradefiniált török külpolitika? *Külügyi Szemle* 12, no.: 1, pp 10-21.

Pion-Berlin, David, 1992. Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America. *Comparative Politics* 25 83-102.

Polat, Necati, 2013. Regime Change in Turkey. *International Politics* 50. no.: 3, pp 1-21. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.12>

Rada Csaba and **Rada** Péter, 2007. Törökország európai uniós csatlakozásának biztonsági aspektusai. *Külügyi Szemle* 6, no.:4, pp 3-42

Rada Csaba, 2007. *A felemelkedő Regionális vezető: Törökország képes-e befolyásolni a Közel-Kelet stabilitását?* Master Thesis, Corvinus University of Budapest.

Rapkin, David, 1987. World Leadership. In. Modelski, George (ed). *Exploring Long Cycles*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp 129-157.

Rettman, Andrew, 2014. Turkey's Twitter ban prompts instant EU criticism, *EU Observer*, 21 March 2014, URL: <http://euobserver.com/foreign/123564> (accessed: 2 August 2014),

Ripsman, Norin M., 2002. *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements*. The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania.

Ripsman, Norin M., 2009. Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups. In. Lobell, Steven E. Ripsman, Norin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (ed.). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 170-193.

Robins, Philip, 2003. Confusion at home, confusion abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq. *International Affairs* 79, no.: 3, pp 547-566. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00322>

Robins, Philip, 2007. Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: between a 'post-Islamist' government and a Kemalist state, *International Affairs* 83, no.: 1, pp 289-304. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00619.x>

Robins, Philip, 2013. Turkey's double gravity predicament: the foreign policy of a newly activist power, *International Affairs* 89, no.: 2. pp 381-397. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12023>

Rose, Gideon, 1998. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *World Politics* 51, no.: 1. pp 144-172.

Ross, Christopher, 2002. Public Diplomacy Comes of Age, In. Lennon, T J Alexander. *The Battle for Hearts and Minds*, MIT Press. pp 251-261.

Rostoványi, Zsolt 1999. Európaiság, európai identitás és az európai integráció. In. Forgács Imre (ed). *Az Európai Unió Évkönyve 1999–2000*. Budapest: Osiris.

Rostoványi, Zsolt, 2004. *Az iszlám világ és a Nyugat*. Budapest: Corvina.

Rubin, Barry, 2006. Why Syria matters? *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no.: 4. URL: <http://www.gloria-center.org/2006/12/rubin-2006-12-02/> (accessed: 01 November 2014)

Rubin, Michael, 2005. Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey. *Middle East Quarterly* 12, no.: 1, pp 13-23.

Russett, Bruce, 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Saatçioğlu, Beken, 2013. Turkey-EU relations: from the 1960's to 2012: A Critical Overview. In. Akçay, Belgin and Yilmaz, Bahri. *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Political and Economic Challenges*, Lexington Books, Plymouth, pp 3-24.

Sachs, Susanne, 2004. Greek Cypriots reject a UN Peace Plan. *New York Times* April 25, 2004. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/world/greek-cypriots-reject-a-un-peace-plan.html> (accessed: 11 November 2013)

Sağlam, Erdal, 2013. UAE Investment Casualty of Turkey's Egypt Policy, *Al-Monitor*, 1 September 2013. URL: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/foreign-policy-affects-turkeys-exports-foreign-investments.html#> (accessed 21 July 2014)

Sakallioğlu, Ümit Cizre, 1997. The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Autonomy, *Comparative Politics* 29, no.:2, pp 151-165.

Sarıbay, Ali Yaşar, 1991. The Democratic Party, 1946-1960. In. Heper, Metin and Landau, Jacob M. *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. IB Tauris & Co Ltd, London, New York, pp 119-133.

Sasley, Brent E, 2012. Turkish Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Lobbying for European Union Membership. *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no.: 4. pp 553-566. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.682302>

Schweller, Randall L. 2003. The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism. In. Elman Colin and Elman, Miriam F. (eds). *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 311-347.

Schweller, Randall L., 2004. Unanswered Threat, A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing, *International Security* 29, no 2. pp 159-201.

Schweller, Randall L., 2009. Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics. In: Lobell, Steven E. Ripsman, Norin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (ed). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 227-250.

September 11 attack on the U.S. opens doors for Turkey's economic rescue. Hürriyet Daily News, January 6, 2002. URL <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/september-11-attack-on-the-us-opens-doors-for-turkeys-economic-rescue.aspx?pageID=438&n=september-11-attack-on-the-u.s.-opens-doors-for-turkeys-economic-rescue-2002-01-06> (accessed: 25 October 2013)

Seufert, Günter, 2010. Mehr Demokratie oder eine Stärkung religiös-konservativer Kräfte? *SWP-Aktuell* 75, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit.

Seydi, Süleyman, 2010. Turkish-American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957-63. *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no.:3, pp 433-455. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263201003666035>

Sezgin, Yüksel, 2002. The October 1998 crisis in Turkish-Syrian relations: A prospect theory approach. *Turkish Studies* 3, no.: 2, pp. 44-68.

Shankland, David, 2007. Islam and politics: the 2007 presidential elections and beyond. *International Affairs* 83, no.: 1, pp. 357-371. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00623.x>

Sherwood, W. B., 1967. The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey. *World Politics* 20, no.:1, pp 54-65. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2009727>

Simon-Nagy, Lilla, 2012. *Nyilvános Diplomácia*, Ph.D. Értekezés, Budapest.

Sotirios, Petropoulos, 2007. Rethinking Hegemonic Stability Theory: Some Reflections from the Regional Integration Experience in the Developing World, *Conference Paper: Sixth ECPR-SGIR Pan-European Conference*, Turin, Italy URL http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/turin/Petropoulos-rethinking_hegemonic_stability_theory.pdf (accessed, 09 April, 2014.)

Sözen, Ahmet, 2010. A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges. *Turkish Studies* 11, no.:1, pp 103-123 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683841003747062>

Sugden, Jonathan, 2004. Leverage in theory and practice: human rights and Turkey's EU candidacy, In.: Uğur, Mehmet and Canefe, Nergis, *Turkey and European Integration: Accession prospects and issues*. Routledge, New York, pp 241-264.

Sunar, Ilkay and **Toprak**, Binnaz, 2004. **Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey**, In. **Sunar** Ilkay (ed), *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey*, Bahcesehir University Publication, Istanbul, pp 155-73.

Sunar, Ilkay, 1990. Populism and Patronage: The Demokrat Party and its legacy in Turkey. *Il Politico* 55, no.:4, pp 745-57.

Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy. Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Republic of Turkey. URL <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>

Szigetvári Tamás, 1998. Törökország és az Európai Unió ambivalens viszonya (avagy "törököt fogtam, de nem ereszt"). *Műhelytanulmányok* 13., MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet, Budapest.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2004. *Törökbefogadás: Az Európai Unió dilemmái a török csatlakozás kapcsán*. MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet, Budapest.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2006. Törökország az Európai Unió csatlakozási tárgyalások kezdetén. *VKI Műhelytanulmányok* 72, MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet, Budapest.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2008. Az iszlám jelenléte a török gazdaságban. In. Vásáry István (ed). *Törökország és az iszlám: az iszlám szerepe Törökország EU-csatlakozásának megítélésében*. Avicenna Közel-Kelet Kutatások Intézete, Piliscsaba.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2009. Törökország. In. Novák Tamás and Wisniewski Anna. *Az új EU-tagállamok és a tagjelöltek helyzete a válságban*. MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet, Budapest, pp 60-63.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2012a. Törökország - kistigris az európai periférián? In. Farkas Péter, Meisel Sándor and Novák Tamás (ed). *A változó világgazdaság - útkeresések, tapasztalatok és kilátások: 2. kötet: Európán kívüli régiók*. MTA KRTK Világgazdasági Intézet; Világgazdasági Kutatásokért Alapítvány, pp 132-147.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2012b. Turkey is back: Turkish interest on the Western Balkans. *EU Frontiers Study* 9, Center for European Enlargement Studies, Budapest.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2013a. Törökország gazdasági átalakulása és külgazdasági expanziója. *Külügyi Szemle* 12, no.: 1, pp 22-38.

Szigetvári Tamás, 2013b. Törökország, új regionális hatalom a Közel-Keleten. In. Grünhut Zoltán, Vörös Zoltán (ed). *Az átalakuló világrend küszöbén*. Publikon, Pécs, pp 131-151.

Szigetvári, Tamás, 2014. EU-Turkey Relations: Changing Approaches, *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 14, no.:1, pp 34-48.

Tachau, Frank, 1991. The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980, In. Heper, Metin and Landau, Jacob M. *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, IB Tauris & Co Ltd, London, New York, pp 99-118.

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., 2002 Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited, *International Security* 25, no.: 3, pp 128-161. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228800560543>

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., 2009. Neoclassical realism and the resource attraction, state building for future war. In. Lobell, Steven E. Ripsman, Norin M., Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (ed). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 194-226.

Taşpınar, Ömer, 2011. The Turkish Model and its Applicability. In. *Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective*. Mediterranean Paper Series. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. URL: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/mediterranean-paper_13.pdf (accessed: 10 January 2016)

Taşpınar, Ömer, 2012. Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria. *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no.: 3, pp 127-140. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706519>

Tepe, Sultan, 2000. A Kemalist-Islamist movement? The Nationalist Action Party. *Turkish Studies* 1, no.: 2, pp 59-72. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840008721234>

Tepe, Sultan, 2005. Turkey's AKP: A model „Muslim-Democratic” Party? *Journal of Democracy* 16, no.: 3, pp 69-82.

Tezcür, Güneş Murat, 2009/2010. Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation, *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, URL: <https://ejts.revues.org/4008> (accessed: 02 March 2012)

Tol, Gönül, 2014. *The clash of former allies: The AKP versus the Gülen Movement*. Middle East Institute, Washington DC. URL: <http://www.mei.edu/content/clash-former-allies-akp-versus-gulen-movement> (accessed: 30 December 2015)

Toprak, Binnaz, 1988. The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey. In. Evin, Ahmet and Heper, Metin (ed.) *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's*, De Gruyter, Berlin. pp 119-136.

Tosun, Tanju, 2010. The New Leader for the Old CHP: Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. *Insight Turkey* 12, no.: 4, pp 31-42.

TPQ (Turkish Policy Quarterly) **Roundtable**, 2013. The Evolving Relations of Turkey and Israel. *Turkish policy Quarterly* 12, no.:3, pp 179-190

TPQ, 2013. Turkish Policy Quarterly Roundtable: The Evolving Relation of Turkey and Israel. *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 12, no.:2. pp 179-190.

Tuğal, Cihan, 2002. Islamism in turkey: Beyond Instrument and Meaning. *Economy and Society* 31, no.:1, pp 85-111, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03085140120109268>

Turan, Ilter, 2007. Unstable stability: Turkish Politics at the crossroads? *International Affairs* 83, no.: 2, pp 319-338. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00621.x>

Turkey must refocus on EU, top boss says. Hürriyet Daily News. 14 September 2013. URL: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-must-refocus-on-eu-top-boss-says.aspx?pageID=238&nid=54420> (accessed: 02 August 2014)

TÜSİAD warns of 'dangerous polarization,' calls for reforms. Today's Zaman. 11 April 2014. URL: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-351274-tusiad-warns-of-dangerous-polarization-calls-for-reforms.html> (accessed: 02 August 2014)

Uğur, Mehmet and **Canefe**, Nergis. *Turkey and European Integration: Accession prospects and issues*. Routledge, New York.

Uğur, Mehmet, 1999. *The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma*, Aldershot: Ashgate, p 297

Ülgen, Sinan, 2011. From Inspiration to Aspiration. *The Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.

Ünver, H. Akin 2012. How Turkey's Islamists Fell out of Love with Iran. *Middle East Policy* 19, no.: 4. pp 103-109. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00563.x>

US Representatives introduce resolution against Turkey's ban on Twitter and Youtube. Hürriyet Daily News. 02 April 2014, URL: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-representatives-introduce-resolution-against-turkeys-ban-on-twitter-and-youtube.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64459&NewsCatID=358> (accessed: 02 August 2014)

Usul, Ali Resul 2008. The Justice and Development Party and the European Union: from Euro-scepticism to Euro-enthusiasm and Euro-fatigue. In: Cizre, Ümit (ed). *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Routledge, London and New York. pp 175-197

Usul, Ali Resul, 2014. Is there Any Hope on the Revival of EU-Turkey Relations in the "New Era"? *Turkish Studies* 15, no.: 2, pp. 283-302. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.926236>

Vásáry István (ed), 2008a. *Törökország és az iszlám: az iszlám szerepe Törökország EU-csatlakozásának megítélésében*. Avicenna Közel-Kelet Kutatások Intézete, Piliscsa.

Vásáry István, 2008b. A muszlim demokrácia esélyei Törökországban. In: Vásáry István (ed). *Törökország és az iszlám: az iszlám szerepe Törökország EU-csatlakozásának megítélésében*. Avicenna. Közel-Kelet Kutatások Intézete, Piliscsaba.

Vuving, Alexander L., How Soft power Works, Paper presented at the panel „Soft Power, Smart Power „, American Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto, 2009

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 2002. Three Hegemonies, In.: Cleese-Patrick, Armand and O'Brien Karl. *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001*, Asgate, Aldershot, England, pp 357-362.

Waltz, N. Kenneth, 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Warning Martina and **Kardaş** Tuncay, 2011. The Impact of Changing Islamic Identity on Turkey's New Foreign Policy. *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations* 10, no.: 2-3, pp 123-140.

Watts, Nicole F 2009/10. Re-Considering State-Society Dynamics in Turkey's Kurdish Southeast. *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, URL: <https://ejts.revues.org/4196> (accessed: 02 March 2012)

Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. URL <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmet-davutoglu.en.mfa> (accessed: 02 January 2016)

- Wendt**, Alexander, 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization* 46, no.: 2 pp 391-425. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764>
- Yalvaç**, Faruk, 2014. Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis. *Turkish Studies* 15, no.: 1, pp. 117-138 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.892238>
- Yavuz**, Hakan M, 2006a. Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish Islamic Movement. In: Yavuz, Hakan M. (ed), 2006. *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, UT, 2006. pp 1-19
- Yavuz**, Hakan M. (ed), 2006b. *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, UT, 2006.
- Yavuz**, Hakan M., 1997. Political Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey. *Comparative Politics* 30, no.: 1. pp 63-82.
- Yavuz**, Hakan M., 1998. A Preamble to the Kurdish Question: The Politics of Kurdish Identity. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no.: 1, pp 9-18. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602009808716390>
- Yavuz**, Hakan M., 2009. *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.
- Yenigün**, Halil Ibrahim, 2003. *Islamism and Nationalism in Turkey: An Uneasy Relationship. Conference Paper*. University of Virginia.
- Yeşilada**, Birol A., 2002. The Virtue Party. *Turkish Studies* 3, no.: 1, pp 62-81. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005697>
- Yeşiltaş**, Murat, 2013. The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign Policy. *Turkish Studies* 14, no.:4, pp 661-687. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.862927>
- Yildirim**, A. Kadir, 2014. The slow death of Turkish higher education. Al Jazeera.URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/turkish-higher-education-reform-20147106282924991.html> (accessed: 30 December 2015)
- Yıldız**, Ahmet, 2003. Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook. *The Muslim World* 93. no.: 2, pp 187-209. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1478-1913.00020>
- Zakaria**, Fareed, 1998. *From wealth to power: the unusual origins of America's world role*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, Kindle Edition.
- Zürcher**, Erik J, 2004. *A modern history*. 3rd Edition. I.B. Tauris.

Publications by the Author on the Topic

Articles in Refereed Journals

- **Balogh**, István, **Egeresi**, Zoltán, **N. Rózsa**, Erzsébet, **Rada**, Csaba and **Szalai**, Máté, 2013. Kapacitások és ambíciók: a török közel-keleti külpolitika alapjai. *MKI-elemzések* 09, URL <http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/pub/displ.asp?id=MIXDII>
- **Rada**, Csaba and **Rada**, Péter, 2008. The security aspects of Turkey's European integration, *Foreign Policy Review* 2. no.: 1. pp 18-36
- **Rada** Csaba and **Rada** Péter, 2007. Törökország európai uniós csatlakozásának biztonsági aspektusai. *Külügyi Szemle* 6, no.: 4, pp 3-42

Books and Book Chapters

- **Rada**, Csaba, 2009. Törökország integrációérettségének vizsgálata 2004 óta, *Tanulmányok az európai integráció témaköréből 1.* Savaria University Press, 2009.
- **Rada**, Csaba (ed.), 2008. *Biztonságpolitikai Corvinák.* Corvinus Külügyi és Kulturális Egyesület. Budapest.
- **Rada**, Csaba, 2008. Magyar Honvédség szerepe az államépítésben. In.: Friedman, Viktor (ed.). *Globális felelősség, globális kormányzás*, Corvinus Külügyi és Kulturális Egyesület, Budapest, pp
- **Rada**, Csaba, 2007. The Question of Czech and Hungarian Identities: In.: Csaba Rada (ed.) *Regional Governance in Central and Eastern Europe*, University of Economics, Prague.
- **Rada**, Csaba (ed.), 2007. *Regional Governance in Central and Eastern Europe.* University of Economics, Prague. 2007. pp

International Lectures and Conferences

- Lecture and Conference Paper: *Down to Earth: Turkish Foreign Policy's Return to the EU Track.*, 2013. UACES 44th Annual Conference URL http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/cork/papers/abstract.php?paper_id=155#.VOoKpfmG9UV
- Lecture: *Background and Prospects of the Middle East Peace Process.* Uzhorod, Ukraine, July 1, 2011 CENAA Summer School.