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Individuality, Collectivity, Locality and Transnationality in Armenian Genocide Processing
INDIVIDUALITY, COLLECTIVITY, LOCALITY AND TRANSNATIONALITY IN ARMENIAN GENOCIDE PROCESSING

Doktori értekezés / Doctoral dissertation

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**Table of Contents**

List of Charts.................................................................................................................. 6

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 7
   1.1. Approaches, Scientific Background ...................................................................... 10
   1.2. Defining the Terms Genocide and Armenian Genocide ....................................... 17
       1.2.1. **Genocide** ............................................................................................... 17
       1.2.2. **The Armenian Genocide** ........................................................................ 19
   1.3. New Aspects of the Study ..................................................................................... 24
       1.3.1. **Setting up and Testing Hypotheses** ......................................................... 26
       1.3.2. **The Methodological Framework** .............................................................. 29
   1.4. Geographic and Temporal Scope of Examination ............................................... 34
   1.5. Sources .................................................................................................................. 37
   1.6. Expected Results and Applicability of the Study ............................................... 39
   1.7. Structure ............................................................................................................... 40

2. Antecedents and Initial Circumstances ...................................................................... 41
   2.1. Armenians in Ottoman Territories between the Mudros Armistice and the Treaty of Lausanne ........................................................................................................... 41
   2.2. Changes in the Regional Power Structure: Russia(s), the Ottoman Empire and Turkey 47
   2.3. Constant Crisis in the Republic of Armenia ........................................................... 48
   2.4. Initial Migration Waves of Armenians to the United States of America ............... 51
   2.5. Armenians in the Kingdom of Hungary .................................................................. 54
   2.6. Common features of Armenian Refugee Communities' Identity ......................... 57

3. First-Generation Revenge: Operation Nemesis ......................................................... 59
   3.1. Origins and Working Methods ............................................................................. 59
   3.2. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 70

**Chart 1. Assassinations Committed by Operation Nemesis** ..................................... 73

4. The Sounds of Silence................................................................................................. 74
   4.1. Armenian Refugees in the United States. Almost Complete Silence .................. 74
   4.2. Pragmatism and Force in the Armenian SSR ....................................................... 78
   4.3. Armenians as a State-Constituting Minority in Lebanon ..................................... 84
       4.3.1. **Initial Establishment** ............................................................................... 84
       4.3.2. **Independent Lebanon and the First Civil War** ....................................... 87
   4.4. Hungary, a Station on the Way to the West ........................................................ 88
   4.5. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 94

5. Outburst of Memories ................................................................................................. 98
   5.1. Changes in the International Political Environment ............................................. 98
   5.2. The Thaw in the Armenian SSR ........................................................................... 99
   5.3. Armenians as an Organised Community in the United States ............................ 108
   5.4. Armenians in Recovering Lebanon ...................................................................... 112
   5.5. A Quinquennial and a Decennial Commemoration in Hungary ......................... 115
   5.6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 118

6. The Phase of Third-Generation Revenge .................................................................. 122
List of Charts

Chart 1. Assassinations committed by Operation Nemesis p. 73
1. Introduction

The Armenian genocide is one of the well known large-scale collective traumas of the 20th century, one that still has an active impact today. Due to repeated and in many cases similarly structured genocides, the problem has remained pertinent for almost a century. The often forbidden or restricted processing of the trauma is still a serious source of conflicts. The phenomenon has therefore been present in scientific and political discourse in various countries for the past century.

For readers less familiar with the Armenian genocide, its effects are most visible in the field of international politics. The relations of various countries are often determined or influenced by the actual states’ approach to the event. Armenian genocide recognition, denial or avoidance may cause conflicts between states with different approaches. This is a quite significant dimension of the aftermath of the genocide. However, historical traumas do not influence only the actors mentioned above, but first and foremost the communities of survivors and their descendants. Occasionally some international political actors are strongly influenced by the activities of these Armenian communities and vice versa. Naturally, the traumatic event has had the strongest impact on ethnic Armenians.

The mass trauma and exile has led to the memory of the Armenian genocide becoming a core element of post-genocide Armenian identity. Therefore it is not surprising that Armenians sharing the memory of this trauma have tried to react on both individual and collective levels. There even exists a distinctive term for the communities of these refugees and their descendants. Sp’yur’k’¹ in Armenian derives from the verb sp’r’vel, which means to be scattered. According to Levon Abrahamian this post-genocide exile is equivalent to the modern origin myth for the Armenian diaspora. (Abrahamian [2006] p. 328.)

Even if sp’yurk’ communities had forerunners, the genocide caused the greatest change in the size and especially qualitative aspects of those that existed earlier. Masses of Armenian refugees either founded new communities or ‘refreshed’ already existing

¹ The transliteration of Armenian words follows the phonetics of the Eastern Armenian dialect. (See Appendix 1.) Transliteration of Armenian names follows the most frequently used latin transliteration of the given name.
Armenian communities. The latter had been constituted mostly of traders, entrepreneurs in small industry and people occupied with financial activities. The terms for these early communities are gagh’t’ojakh or gagh’t’avayr, meaning community (ojakh=family or extended family) or place (vayr=location) of emigrants (gagh’t’el=emigrate). The genocide and further difficulties in the homeland made the Diaspora communities grow rapidly. Examples of such include Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s war redrawing the Sèvres borders of Turkey and the Soviet occupation of the short-lived democratic Republic of Armenia. These political events were paralleled by a constant humanitarian crisis. This crisis was the main cause of further emigration. This process will be described in detail in Chapter 2.

Besides influencing Armenian communities and countries in conflict the Armenian genocide also contributed to a serious improvement in international law. Reflecting on this large-scale tragedy as well as the extermination of Assyrians during World War I, Raphael Lemkin created the term genocide (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum [2014]) and undertook legal efforts to avoid such events in the future. (Yeghiayan, Fermanian [2008] p. xxxiii.) His work was finally appreciated when he contributed to the preparation of the Nuremberg trials and the formulation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. However, these phenomena show that his early efforts had not been taken seriously, as the Holocaust had not been prevented.

Concerning that era, Hitler’s infamous Obersalzberg Speech a week before attacking Poland is well known: “Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?” (Hitler [1939 – 1998]) As research on his earlier views on the Armenian genocide show, he was well aware of the fact of mass-destruction of Armenians. Numerous people in high positions during the Weimar and Nazi period, including some of his confidential functionaries, had been to the Ottoman front. He was informed both about Pan-Turanism and the racist concepts about Armenians promoted by the Young Turk regime. (Bardakjian [1985] pp. 28, 31-32)

The Armenian genocide later appeared in various UN documents. The United Nations War Crimes Commission Report of May 28, 1948 confirmed and warned that the Triple Entente labeled the developments in the Ottoman Empire as “crimes against humanity and civilization”. The UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in its report on July 2, 1985, known as the Whitaker report, states: “The Nazi aberration has unfortunately not been the only case
of genocide in the twentieth century.” (Whitaker [1985]) Among other examples, the report mentions the Armenian genocide, basing the evidence of this crime on various sources.

By examining these legal examples it becomes apparent—even without mentioning political moves concerning the Armenian genocide—that this mass atrocity has influenced various actors of international politics in even less obvious ways. Relations between states, developments in the field of international law and the everyday life of Armenian communities are only a few superficial examples.

The most recent international legal debate around the Armenian genocide is the Perinçek v. Switzerland case at the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR]. The trial has evolved from Turkish Workers’ Party leader Doğu Perinçek’s speeches held in Switzerland denying the fact of the Armenian genocide. After all judicial forums found him guilty in Switzerland, he applied to the ECHR. The judicial procedure has evoked numerous demonstrations by local Turks and Armenians and historical and legal debates. The Government of Armenia and the Government of Turkey are also present at the hearings as third parties. The most recent hearing in this case was held on February 28, 2015. The verdict shall be announced around the time of submitting the related dissertation.

Some current examples, also from the political field, are worth mentioning. It is well known to the public that Turkey recalled its ambassador to the Vatican after Pope Francis recognised the Armenian genocide. The same step was repeated in the case of the ambassador to Austria upon recognition by both Chambers of the Austrian Parliament, to that of Brazil after the recognition by the Brazilian Senate, and to that of Luxembourg similarly because of parliamentary recognition. Similar problems occurred in 2011 when the French National Assembly voted in favour of criminalising Armenian genocide denial, even though when the Senate had not confirmed it at the time.2

The aim of the present study is to analyse the basis of relations among various actors in the field of international politics in a broad and deep manner, with a focus on the motives of various Armenian communities. The main question is how final political developments were related to the inner socio-political progress of various Armenian communities and how these paths of progress can be derived from individuals processing the Armenian genocide. The latter constitute the phenomena indicated by the

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2 The Senate finally rejected the move.
term ‘individuality’ appearing in the title. Collectivity means the reactions to the Armenian genocide by Armenian organisations or groups of Armenians to be examined in the present dissertation. Exact definitions for these expressions are provided further down in the introduction.

Many of these organisations constitute transnational networks, the framework within which they had the possibility to communicate with each other. Under the term *transnationality*, relations are understood as being between Armenian non-state organisations or between states and Armenian non-state organisations for cases of cross-border relations. (For a summary of the rich sources and conceptual debates on the issues and definitions of transnational relations and non-state actors see: Szörényi [2014] p. 15-20) In this particular case Armenian political parties working in the diaspora—besides political parties being involved in Lebanese legislation and the Armenian SSR or future Republic of Armenia—religious organisations, charity and cultural organisations can be mentioned as Armenian non-state organisations. The relations between them will be analysed in detail in the present dissertation.

Most of these organisations have established local branches in the Armenian diaspora. These are not only organisations which aim for the preservation of Armenian identity, but are also subjects of the state in which they are established. Therefore, the environment determined by the host state and host society has a significant impact on their work. This factor is understood under the term ‘locality’ in the title.

### 1.1. Approaches, Scientific Background

There has been a variety of reactions to a genocidal trauma, based on in relevant scientific sources. It should be noted that there are various ways of interpreting the Armenian Genocide. Large-scale scientific processing of the topic started only after 1965 in various Armenian communities due to a strong social influence. For example, the socio-political environment in the United States ensured a relatively free and democratic environment for scholars, while in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] the issue depended mostly on the actual political approach.
Various institutions of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia [NAS RA] and its soviet-era antecedents had employed scholars dealing with the issue since 1965. According to the field experience of the author of the present dissertation, currently the NAS RA is still following that approach. This situation has evolved partly for the reason that before the change of regime no specialised institution had been studying this topic. Therefore scholars analysing the problem from different perspectives had been present in various institutions. Another reason for ‘individual’ Armenian genocide scholars in Armenia’s academic institutions involved in humanities and social sciences is that the genocide ruined nearly all aspects of Armenians’ social and everyday life. Therefore it has been and is still an organic part of the country’s public, political and scientific discourse. For these reasons it is not unusual for an institution to demand, encourage or support some of its scholars’ research concerning the Armenian genocide.

A concentration of scholars in the topic characterises The Institute of History of NAS RA. The institution runs a separate department to study the question. Due to the institute’s general profile their research is conducted within historical science. Through their work historians try to include the study of the contemporary history of Armenia and Armenians, and that of the Armenian diaspora in their research, though these fields are analysed by other departments. Historians at the institute have been in a special situation since the change of regime in Armenia, given their task is not only to analyse and introduce new historical discoveries and to use new methods: they must also clean the historiography of the homeland from the distortions of the Soviet system, which also seriously influenced the historical discourse about the Armenian genocide.

After the antecedents mentioned above, scientific processing by a separate and specialised institution in the homeland started in 1995, years after the state’s gaining independence. The works of different institutions, research teams and scholars have been collected recently by the Museum-Institute of the Armenian Genocide [AGMI]. The institution works under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia. AGMI is the only academic institution in Armenia that is

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3 The institution was founded in 1935 as the Armenian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1943 it started to operate separately from the latter as the Armenian Academy of Sciences, operating until 1993. Since then it has been operating as the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia.

4 The official English translation of the institution’s name that is also used on the letterhead of the institution is National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia Museum-Institute of the Armenian Genocide. The institution most frequently uses the name Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute and the abbreviation of this as AGMI.
occupied solely with the issue of the Armenian genocide, recently publishing a related international review. The library of the institution provides insight into different approaches and maintains relations with scholars as well. Even documents opposing the evidence of the Armenian genocide are present in the institute, providing free access to being informed about each approach. Scholars of the institution analyse events from a multidisciplinary perspective, incorporating humanities and social sciences from historical science to literature, political science, sociology, ethnography and other disciplines. The institute also aims to analyse the present aspects of the issue.

The earlier gap between Soviet Armenian academic circles and diaspora Armenian research was bridged by the research and publication activity of experts from the homeland in foreign institutions. This activity abroad was frequently dangerous for them in the Armenian SSR. Therefore, in the beginning, manifold means of interpretation were present due to various political circumstances. Hereinafter only those institutions involved in Armenian studies which operate in the countries which are embraced by the geographical scope of the present dissertation are going to be listed.5

In the United States several research groups are present. Let us start with two local founders of scholarly research programmes on the Armenian genocide. Historian Vahakn N. Dadrian, one of the most renowned scholars of the Zoryan Institute conducted studies in various fields of social science. His wide-scale earlier studies had enabled him to develop an approach that is multidisciplinary, involving international law and sociology to complement historical science. In his works of a historical nature he proves the existence of the Armenian genocide with relevant historical sources, such as German reports on the traumatic event.

A significant institution in the field operates at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The Armenian Studies Program evolved from previous courses on Armenian literature and history. Ronald Grigor Suny was the first professor to lead the program in

5 Major institutions in Europe: “Armenian Studies department at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, INALCO) in Paris, France, Chair of Armenian Language and Literature at University of Provence (Aix-Marseille University), France, Chair of Armenian Language and Literature at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy, Chair of Armenian Studies at Department of Philology of the University of Bologna, Italy, Calouste Gulbenkian Professorship of Armenian Studies at the University of Oxford, UK, Department of Armenian Studies at Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium, Department of Armenian Studies at University of Salzburg, Austria.” – Gomidas Institute (UK), Armenian Institute (UK), Institute for Armenian Questions (Institut für armenische Fragen, Germany), The Chobanian Institute (Institut Tchobanian, France), Sayabalian Institute for Armenian Studies (Institut Sayabalian d'Etudes Arméniennes, France), Mediterranean Institute for Armenian Studies (Institut Méditerranéen de recherches Arméniennes, France), Armenology Institute of Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania).” (Simavoryan [2015])
the 1980s (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Armenian Studies Program [2014]); he also established a Turkish-Armenian research team in 2000. The Armenian Studies Program was also directed by Gerard G. Libaridian, similarly one of the most significant scholars on the issue. The most essential aspect in their view is that they analyse the genocide together with Turkish scholars mainly within historical science. (Libaridian, [2004] pp. 278-279) In the opinion of the author of the present dissertation this may purify their activity from extreme results. It is possible for them to publish their results in a way which does not cause anger in Turkish society in which it is likely that many people are descendants of the perpetrators of the genocide. Naturally the results of any scholarly research should not be adapted to the expectations of its future readers. However, various modes of expression may broaden the gap between contemporary Turks and Armenians.

Despite his similarly existing cooperation with Turkish scholars Dadrian warns his counterpart of the fact that scholars and the content of scientific research should not pursue to a compromise with Turkish results in content. He warns that seeking compromises of expression bears this possibility. A certain analysis in his opinion should not have been ‘balanced’ in a way which reflects the ‘mathematical’ average of Turkish and Armenian – often politically biased – opinion. (Dadrian [1998] pp. 73-130)

Besides these strongly conflicting parties Armenian studies programs including research on the Armenian genocide are available at various other universities and institutions in the United States. The scholars running the Armenian Studies Programme previously led by Richard Hovannisian at the Department of History at the University of California, Los Angeles follow principles similar to Dadrian’s. The above-mentioned initiator of the programme mainly examined events from the perspective of historical science. His colleagues have contributed to the programme from the perspectives of other fields in the humanities and social sciences. He was also the first lecturer of Armenian studies at Fresno State University. The program at the latter continues to operate today. Among his followers are Dikran Kouymjian, for example, who developed the initial courses offered in a more complex study program. Stepan Astourian started to develop a full-fledged program in Armenian studies at UC Berkeley (University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies [209-2015]) in 2002.

In Lebanon the leading institution for Armenian studies is Haigazian University, which originated from the Haigazian College in the mid-1950s. The university had kept
its original title as a College until 1992 when it was changed to Haigazian University College. The current name was authorised in 1996. Recently a research centre focusing on the Armenian diaspora has been also established there. (Haigazian University [2009]). The university has been offering an academic program in Armenian studies and also runs the Haigazian Armenological Review. The periodical is issued once a year and contains articles concerning various issues related to Armenian culture and history, including the Armenian genocide. The university and its scholars, due to their historical, geographical and geopolitical situation, also study political, social and historical developments in the Near and Middle East.

The different approaches listed do not necessarily oppose, but rather supplement each other. There is constant communication between the different parties. Their activities often have common elements, and differences are present mainly in the political and ideological field.

Despite the variety of institutions involved in scholarly research on the Armenian genocide, their establishment started later after the traumatic event than was the case for the study of the Holocaust. In the latter case news of mass killings and deportations, the existence of concentration camps and the systematic nature of these actions reached the international public immediately after evidence was revealed. The Nazis had kept constant and mostly precise documentation about Jews and their fate in the concentration camps. These were analysed in detail during the Nuremberg trials. The wide international recognition of these also ensured the conservation of related data. Therefore these sources have been available for scholars even if some of the survivors chose to repress the memory of the trauma.

In case of the Armenian genocide state authorities had not led as precise an administration as had the Nazis. The perpetrators were tried in Constantinople, and contemporary local public opinion agreed with the legal consequences. The succeeding Kemalist republic, though, interpreted the punishment of the Young Turk leaders as part of the punishment of “the Turks” following World War I. (Akcam [2007] p. 369.) Therefore the documents were hidden from the public and scholars. The latter have limited access to Turkish archives even today. Therefore, the memory of the Armenian genocide was maintained through oral history and a limited quantity of written documents. The latter were either preserved by Armenians, various institutions and subjects of neutral states or states of the Triple Entente and even of the Central Powers, such as Austria-Hungary and Germany.
Therefore in case of the Armenian genocide, a longer time passed between the trauma and scientific research which focused upon it. In this sense the initial phase of research on the Armenian genocide is somewhere between that of the experience of the Jewish and that of the experience of the Roma holocaust. The Roma also had limited written sources, albeit this was caused by the fact that their language had not yet been codified at that time. As will be introduced later, the reason for the relatively late start of massive processing is completely different in the Armenian case. Armenian and foreign witnesses had already published descriptions of the events, and some had also attempted to interpret those before mass-scale processing.

Despite these difficulties, scholars of the Armenian genocide are able to use the results of Holocaust research in cases of identical phenomena. In the same way, numerous scholars of the Holocaust had discovered that the Armenian genocide shows numerous parallels with it. The breakthrough in this cooperation was a conference held in Tel Aviv in 1982. Despite Israel’s political resistance and Turkey’s active lobbying the event was successfully organised and completed. Richard Hovhannisian and Israel Charny were some of the most appreciated scholars participating the event. (Hovannisisan [1991]) The cooperation of numerous Armenian and Jewish scholars has been constant ever since. The range of cooperating scholars has been extended since then. Harutyun Marutyan from the Armenian side was the first Armenian intern at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. AGMI has been maintaining constant relations with various Holocaust memorial and research centres in different forms. This includes regular visits to the Holocaust Memorial Centre in Hungary and discussion with its experts. At the individual level, from the Israeli side, Yair Auron, Helen Fein and Robert Melson have been conducting research on the Armenian genocide, among many others. The aforementioned Israel Charny continues his previous approach to the Armenian genocide and has lately donated his private library to AGMI. (The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute [26. 04. 2015]) This kind of cooperation at the scholarly field is constant even though at the state level Israel has not recognised the Armenian genocide. This political approach originates in a conception of the uniqueness of the Holocaust.

Such examples of cooperation shall be completed with experts on other genocides as well. Armenian genocide scholars often use the organisational facilities of the International Association of Genocide Scholars both at the personal and at the
institutional level. Thanks to this the annual conference of the Association was held in Yerevan in July 2015.

Scientific processing of the Armenian genocide has also started in Hungary. The effects of social or political actions related to the genocide and Armenians regularly influences Hungary’s relations with Turkey and also Azerbaijan, and vice versa. The latter, maintaining close political ties with Turkey, being involved in a deep conflict with Armenia and having committed atrocities against ethnic Armenians throughout the 20th century, also follows Armenian genocide denial as a political principle.

Armenians are a politically and legally recognised minority in Hungary that has attempted to reach recognition of the Armenian genocide at the state level. (Interview with Nikogosz Akopján, author not indicated, Armenia [2005/3] p. 23.) Still, the quantity of scientific publications dealing directly with the genocide is small. Furthermore there are no scientific institutions or permanent research groups in Armenian studies.

Research on Armenians was revived after the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries by Ödön Schütz, who started to teach the Armenian language at Eötvös Loránd University [ELTE] in Budapest in 1957. He was also interested in the history of the Armenian diaspora in the Middle Ages and in modern times. (Krajcsír [2014]) Currently, most publications related to the Armenian genocide are published by Piroska Krajcsír, previously a researcher at the Institute of History of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. Later she lectured on Armenian history and culture at ELTE in Hungary. Other scientists involved in Armenian studies are usually active in research on Transylvanian Armenians. Bálint Kovács, lecturer at Pázmány Péter Catholic University and researcher at the Centre for the History and Culture of East Central Europe in Leipzig offers also a broader perspective concerning the coexistence of Armenians with their host societies and the cultural transfers realised in the frameworks of these relations. He has also completed research on the history of Armenians and of Transylvania in parallel with church and cultural history in the Carpathian Basin. Publications about the religious life of mainly the Transylvanian and also some other Central and Eastern European Armenian communities are available, authored by Kornél Nagy of the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Albeit not working in Hungary, but writing in Hungarian, Emese Pál in the field of art history and historian Judit Pál have contributed to research on Transylvanian Armenian cultural, political and historical developments. Concerning Transylvanian Armenian press sources on the
Armenian genocide, the publications of Loránd Poósz are of note. Besides these research topics, scholarly studies on collective traumas and especially the Jewish Holocaust round out research on Armenians organically, as has been mentioned. Scientific publications on international and ethnic conflicts have to be added to this list as well.

Sources of information, publications and scholarly activity concerning the Armenian genocide in Hungary are organically connected to those of the various approaches already listed. Steady communication has been established within the range of institutions mentioned, and research on the current effects of the genocide is also present. Therefore, the activity of scholars is similar to their counterparts in Yerevan in AGMI and the Institute of History. Cooperation is strengthened through constant contact and common projects. Scholars compensate for the present lack of scientific relations between the academies of science in Armenia and Hungary by maintaining personal professional relations with each other, since 2012.

1.2. Defining the Terms Genocide and Armenian Genocide

1.2.1. Genocide

As the definition found in Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is widely used, it is also accepted by the author and will be subsequently extended.

“[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

– (a) Killing members of the group;
– (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
– (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
– (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
– (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

(United Nations Treaty Collection [1968 – 1974])
However, in parallel with accepting the definition, some debated issues must be mentioned, as certain legal scholars consider this definition inapplicable to the Armenian genocide. The reason for this is mainly the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege* in criminal law. The Convention was adopted in 1948, while the Armenian genocide happened earlier. Albeit the Preamble mentions: “[…] that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity […]” Therefore we should treat genocide not as an international crime, but as a phenomenon that existed long before the emergence of international law.

In the field of political and historical debates concerning the issue it is worth mentioning that this argument for questioning the quality of the Young Turks’ crimes is voiced frequently in the case of the Armenian genocide. While the Holocaust also happened before 1948, its genocidal quality is rarely denied by this argument. Certainly the Holocaust created a well-known basis and rationale for the 1948 convention. Still, if the term genocide can be applied to one given case before the convention – without the intent of applying legal consequences – then it can be analogously applied in other previous cases as a definition, as a methodological term. The present dissertation draft applies a scholarly approach to the Armenian genocide, therefore using the term is not intended to suggest legal consequences.

The Triple Entente labelled the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire “a crime against humanity and civilization,” yet in 1915, as already mentioned, the legal term genocide did not yet exist. This case is the first occurrence of the term “crimes against humanity”. The winning powers of World War I held that punishment of these crimes was possible on the ground of the 1907 Hague Convention. (Akcam [2004] p. 187) The Preamble states: “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.” (International Committee of the Red Cross [1907])

In this sense, a court-martial was set up in Istanbul meeting the demands of the Triple Entente, applying local legislation and local judicature. The aim of the court was to punish the main perpetrators. They were found guilty. Many of the accused though were not present at the trials. Therefore, the legal consequences were appropriate legal
sentences lacking execution. Though the court was set up on the demand of the Triple Entente, the trials did not gain wide-scale international recognition in the long run. Despite these legal developments, there have been serious scholarly and political debates concerning the applicability of the definition of the UN Convention in the case of the Armenian genocide.

The present study does not intend to decide these legal debates, though the author considers it necessary to indicate these matters and underpin the usage of the definition of the UN convention. As has already been mentioned, the Whitaker report also regards the definition as applicable to the Armenian genocide. The document states this based on various sources. The author of this dissertation also agrees with the Whitaker report, knowing the sources confirming its statements. In the current case the author is also convinced that the definition itself is convenient for being applied as a methodological term, as the present study does not have any legal aims and will not serve legal purposes. The latter would be practically impossible, as most probably all perpetrators have died during the nearly one hundred years since the genocide.

Due to its function this definition concentrates mainly on the perpetrators; therefore one extension will be made to it. The extension is a definition focusing on the communities of victims and survivors whom this study focuses on. The criteria were set up by Claudia Card, who considers genocide as an action that aims to destroy a certain community’s social reviving potential. It is obvious that all criteria of the UN convention are embraced by this definition. Her description extends to the possible victim communities and also to any kinds of social groups, and does not differentiate between annihilation and harming the group’s physical existence, social ties and cultural heritage. (Card, Marsoobian [2007] pp. 10, 69.) Using the latter definition, ‘cultural’ and ‘physical’ genocide in the case of Armenians will be treated as potentially the same phenomenon. This is further justified as the victims’ community usually perceives the anti-Armenian actions of the historical period in question in the same way.

1.2.2. The Armenian Genocide

To be able to analyse the effect of the event, taking into attention denialist interpretations of the Armenian genocide is obviously irrelevant. Supposing it had not
happened, survivors would not have had any reactions to it. On the other hand, there are several approaches to the Armenian genocide, even within Armenian historiography, which offer different research frameworks for scholarship.

Some historians treat two pre-1915 pogroms together with the 1915 and ongoing progresses as one single unit. (Flores [2008] p. 39) Another perception holds that only the deportations and massacres that started in 1915 should be considered genocide, while the two previous rows of pogroms are not an organic part of the Armenian genocide. Ruben Safrastyan describes an approach suggesting and verifying with contemporary documents that also the pre-1915 pogroms were committed according to state plans. (Safrastyan [2011]) Interpretations of the end of the events also differ. Some scholars put the end of the genocide at 1916, the end of deportations, while some of them refer to the liberation of concentration camps and the declaration of the French protectorate in Cilicia and Syria in 1918. The latter ensured the return of Armenians who had previously lived in that area. The borders were revised in 1939 and Armenians were once again wiped out of the former sanjak of Alexandretta. Various anti-Armenian and anti-Christian actions were also present until the Lausanne peace treaty. A well-known example of this is the burning of Smyrna’s Christian quarter in 1922. For the latter reason some scholars claim the genocide ended with the Treaty of Lausanne. Most of them do not express these assumptions explicitly, though. It is possible to derive positions from the context of the given works and based on scientific debates with the authors. The reason for this implicit suggestion about the beginning and the end of the genocide is that most of the authors are of Armenian origin; therefore it is natural for them to consider this part of their history as self-evident. Most of the ethnic Armenian authors cited in the present dissertation belong to this group. On the other hand western scholars do not deal with this issue either, as for most of them it is natural that the Armenian genocide started in 1915. In most western sources there are no concerns expressed about the end of the massacres and deportations. These events are commonly and simply mentioned as “the 1915 genocide”, although it is obvious that the extermination of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire cannot be restricted to that one year, as explained above.

Based on organisation, perpetration and the change in state institutions contributing to the execution of these pogroms, these historical events can be considered separate events. This consideration is also described by Hannah Arendt concerning anti-Jewish pogroms. She states that those cannot be direct antecedents of the Holocaust.
(Arendt [1992] p. 13) In the Armenian case, similarly to those described by Arendt, the ways of committing the pre-genocide pogroms, and the different ideological grounds of these actions suggest that these events are separable.

The first row of pogroms happened between 1894-96. The local, mostly Kurdish taxmen in the Eastern Anatolian / Western Armenian areas overtaxed Armenian villages. The first sizeable resistance against these measures started in Sasun in August 1894. Resisting Armenians were punished with armed force, which was supported by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The military unit most involved in the massacres was the Hamidiye, created in 1890, officially for the purpose of keeping order in Eastern Anatolia / Western Armenia. Due to the pressure from the Great Powers of Europe a commission was created for investigating the massacres. No Armenian witnesses testified.

As the situation had not ameliorated, the Social Democrat Hunchak Party organised a protest in September 1895 in Constantinople. Their aim was to call attention to the reforms in the Armenian vilayets that were to be introduced the following month. The demonstration was stopped by force. As a result a new wave of massacres started in the Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Harput and Sivas vilayets. As a protest against these and even later armed actions, a group supported by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation occupied the foreign-owned Ottoman Bank a year later. Their aim was to spark international intervention against the massacres. As a response, even Armenians in Constantinople were massacred.

Armenians’ limited opportunities for self-defence and the well-armed, military-backed attacks resulted in as much as 300,000 Armenian victims in two years. These pogroms were most probably aimed at oppression of Armenian demands for reforms guaranteed by the 1878 Berlin Congress. (On the history of the Hamidian massacres see for example Melson [1996] 44-47, Flores [2006] 28-39, Derogy [1990] 50-52, Chaliand, Ternon [1983] 28-29.)

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6 The term Western Armenia is used for the Western part of territories of the historical Armenian Kingdom. This includes and roughly coincides with the „six Armenian vilayets” of the Ottoman Empire: Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Harput and Sivas. Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire were concentrated mostly in these territories. Because of the historical heritage of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, also the vilayets of Adana and Halep [present day Aleppo] had a higher concentration of Armenian population. Armenians residing in these areas speak the Western Armenian dialect, while the Eastern Armenian dialect has been spoken in the Republic of Armenia and Iran. As Armenians still refer to the former territories as Western Armenia, this term is used in the present dissertation draft without the aim of representing political claims.
Later in 1909 the Sultan started a counterrevolution against the Young Turks. Many of his former functionaries received positions in the countryside. The Adana vilayet was not an exception. Religious sentiments were still strong there, opposing the constitutional demands and plans of the Young Turks. These had been fuelled more by the Sultan’s former followers, then assigned and neglected by the Young Turks. As Armenians were considered supporters of constitutionalism and the new regime, open discrimination against them grew stronger after the 1908 revolution, especially by conservatives and especially in the countryside. (Duckett [2009])

The first row of massacres started in parallel with the counterrevolution on April 13, 1909. The massacres spread from Adana to the south-east, finally reaching the vilayet of Aleppo in Syria. The Young Turk government sent military forces to stop the massacres. As a result a second row of pogroms started at the end of the month, for the troops had joined local anti-Armenian groups. These took part in massacring and looting the remaining Armenian population of the region.

In the trials following the events Christians were often more strictly prosecuted than Muslims or state officers. Contemporary media sources confirm these facts from different sources, as well as the responsibility of Abdul Hamid II at the beginning of the massacres. (Neue Freie Presse [28 April 1909/a] p. 1. Neue Freie Presse [28 April 1909/b] p.4, Neue Freie Presse [28 April 1909/c] p.6., Neue Freie Presse [1 May 1909] p. 2, Neue Freie Presse [30 April 1909] p. 2.)

It is worth considering at least the possibility that the pre-genocide pogroms individually be considered genocide as the previously mentioned Safrastyan argues. It is not an aim of the present study to confirm or reject such assumptions. Thorough examinations should prove these facts. Such analyses would extend the scope of the present study, but it is necessary to indicate that the issue is being debated. A good example of this scientific debate was observed and attended by the author at the conference of AGMI dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Adana massacres. The participants had conducted quite a long debate over whether the Cilician tragedy with its death-toll of 25-40.000 people should be considered as a pogrom, genocide or an integral part of the Armenian genocide. The conclusion of the debate was that the events fulfilled the criteria of the UN-definition. Therefore it can be considered genocide, but further statements can only be made after deeper analyses. However, the latter statement does not aim to deny or underestimate the vulnerability of the Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire.
Only six years after the massacres in Cilicia, during World War I, the Young Turk regime first disarmed Armenian soldiers, deported and killed leading Armenian intellectuals in Constantinople and let the remaining part of the empire’s Armenian population march to the Syrian Desert. These actions were premeditated on purely ethnic grounds, since Armenians had constructed a burden to the unification of all Turkic peoples and the creation of the empire of Big Turan, as the Young Turks intended it. (Chorbajian, Donabedian, Mutafian [1994] pp. 109-110)

The latter extermination process was completed with the anti-Armenian actions of the following years; this is considered the Armenian genocide by the author, based on its method and moral grounds of perpetration. Following amnesty after deportations and massacres Armenians were again exposed to ethnic atrocities due to several processes surrounding the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Those violent incidents were also mainly of a nationalistic nature, albeit less concentrated than the previous process.

The similarities among the actions listed – except for the mass-murder of Armenians – was that the actual political power had been able to use age-old religious tensions for their imperial aims like Abdul Hamid, or for extreme nationalist purposes like the Young Turks. This is similar to how the Nazis were able to use centuries-old Christian-Jewish tensions that had been present before the Holocaust, and which occasionally resulting in Anti-Jewish pogroms.

In case of the genocide it was obvious that the ideology was based on extreme nationalist principles, as has been mentioned. Still, the Muslim inhabitants of the deportation areas could have been fuelled against Armenians with religious arguments, for example. The same was present in the case of the Hamidian and the Cilician massacres. The political reasons for the former are now obvious, while according to British vice consul Fitzmaurice religious tensions were stimulated as follows: “[Inhabitants of Constantinople] were told that the Armenians were attacking mosques and using dynamite, while word came from their Mussulman brethren in towns where massacres had occurred inciting them to do their duty by Islam.” (Melson [1996] p. 74-48) The situation during the 1909 counterrevolution was also labelled by a contemporary Austro-Hungarian newspaper as religious war. (Neue Freie Presse [17 April 1909] p. 1.) This is an indication of the fact that even if the real motives were different, religious elements in the conflict must have been present. Marcello Flores’ general description of the roots of these intercommunity conflicts also coincides with this assumption. (Flores [2006] pp. 43-44)
In contrast to the independent political motives for mass-destruction in the Armenian case, the Hamidian massacres, the Adana massacres and the 1915 genocide were in temporal proximity to each other. Hardly 30 years had passed between the beginning of the Hamidian massacres and the Treaty of Lausanne. Therefore, survivors or eyewitnesses of the one could have witnessed or become victimised by the next. For these reasons the memory of these historical mass-traumas lives in Armenian collective memory as one homogenous unit. This means that reactions to these are reactions to one homogenous unit of events with the dominance of the 1915 genocide, which has been perceived as a single phenomenon by most survivors. Therefore, the psychological effects of these actions can hardly be separated. In this sense, and as the reflections on the 1915 genocide are predominant in survivors’ testimonies, the effects of the Armenian genocide on victims’ communities will not be separated in the study from the effects of the pre-1915 pogroms.

1.3. New Aspects of the Study

Within the description of institutions studying the Armenian genocide, it has been clear that although foreign research on the issue has been widening, it is mostly Armenian scholars who deal with it. From their perspective it is reasonable that most of them see Armenians as a homogenous unit. Thereby most of them analyse the processing of the Armenian genocide and of Armenian communities worldwide as one single process constituted of various cycles. These appear differently in each scholar’s works depending on their fields of activity.

One of the all-embracing theories of Armenian communities’ development is Karlen Dallak’yan’s. He examines the whole historical context from the genocide until Armenia’s gaining independence within two contexts. According to him the cycles of the relations between the Armenian SSR and the diaspora were: the beginning of national unity (1920–mid-1920s), the beginning of class diversification (1925–early 1960s), the beginning of political diversification (1961–mid 1980s) and the reversion of all stratifications (after 1988). To his mind these had been paralleled by the following progresses in the diaspora: the phase of scattering (1920s), the phase of establishment (Great Depression–1965), and the phase of awakening (after 1965) that ends with
It is remarkable how generally accepted phases of collective responses to the genocide parallel these periods of social processes. It has been generally accepted nowadays that the assassination of Young Turk leaders by Armenian avengers was an organised reaction to the genocide in the early 1920s. Another usually voiced fact is that the memory of the genocide was repressed until 1965. Third-generation revenge started in 1975 and lasted until the mid-1980s. Finally the Armenian national movement that started to deal very actively with the memory of the genocide in the Soviet Union started in 1988.

It is apparent that the first period of collective processing coincides with the period of national unity and partly with scattering. The second phase in processing lasted approximately until the end of establishment period, which is also approximately the end of class diversification. The third phase of homeland-diaspora relations can be divided into two parts in collective processing: the beginning of speak-out and the third-generation terrorist movement. The latter two also coincide with the period of awakening in the diaspora. The fourth phase, integration or support of the national movement in the Armenian SSR also coincides with the age of new perspectives on perceiving the Armenian genocide. Certainly periods examined one after another in the present study did not begin or end with a sudden shift. Therefore, in each case the antecedents of the shift also fall under examination that originates in the final phase of the given previous period.

Examining the cycles above in detail it is clear that except for the age of repression or silence there were one or few dominant communities in each period of processing. This role was played by certain intellectuals, wealthy Armenians of the Diaspora and some leading politicians of the 1918-1920 Republic of Armenia during the first phase. They organised Operation Nemesis to punish the escaped perpetrators of the genocide. For the executive phase of the movement Armenian men of different backgrounds were recruited. This shall be described later in detail.

At that time, most probably, the feeling of trauma was still much stronger than that of belonging to the new host states. In addition, the political failure of the first republic deprived Armenians of conventional means to achieve restitution for the genocide or at least practical jurisdiction for the perpetrators.
The phase of silence is not a unique feature of the survivor’s generation, as Holocaust survivors also started to speak out the trauma after a certain period of silence. This phase was not present in Lebanon though, where Armenians were a state-constituting minority. Free discussion on the genocide was open to them. After this period the Armenian SSR and the communities in the United States and Lebanon developed a discourse on the genocide. The timing of the beginning being nearly the same in three isolated communities may suggest a generation-specific response. A decade later Lebanese Armenians were much affected by the Lebanese civil war that incubated the third-generation revenge movement. On the one hand radical responses of the third generation are not unusual, especially if the first generation decides to stay silent. (Molnár [2005] p. 727.) On the other hand the latter phenomenon was again judged differently by each community, while it attracted many activists from various diaspora communities.

Differences were also present during the change of regime and the Karabagh conflict. The diaspora often still concentrated on the recognition of the genocide, while the homeland needed more support in managing its current relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The home state’s society did not necessarily have a different view on the genocide. The ethnic conflict and war with Azerbaijan combined with the blockade imposed on them were, however, more pressing than the memory of the genocide.

To conclude, on the one hand there were visible phenomena which naturally led scholars to results expressing the cyclical nature of processing. On the other hand, it also becomes clear that each Armenian community’s actions were at least partly adaptations to the norms in each period. For instance, repression did not end at the same time in each community. The third generation revenge movement attracted Armenian youth from many countries, but its centre was certainly the radical wing of the Lebanese Armenian community. Many Armenians also kept their distance from such violent steps even in Lebanon, just as in other countries of the diaspora or in the homeland. Albeit certain kind of solidarity has been present in each Armenian community.

1.3.1. Setting up and Testing Hypotheses

The question is how the double-faced nature of the process can be exactly characterised and measured, and what exactly internal and external effects influenced
the developments of processing. There are three main factors to be taken into account: the systems of the host societies, the power of Armenian identity and the historical background in which Armenians found themselves in different periods after the genocide. Basically three hypotheses may be based on these factors. The first two raise and contribute to proof or falsification of the third.

1. The different ways in which host societies accepted the Armenian communities influenced them to follow diverse directions in genocide trauma processing.

The way of being accepted as an independent variable contains public opinion on Armenians in the host country, the relations of majority and Armenian minority society and their institutions. These factors will be analysed in order to show how much the social, political, economic and cultural environment provided a chance for local Armenians to express their opinions at a social level. It is a question of how and whether the four dimensions listed above ensured Armenians’ ability to establish Armenian NGOs, cultural associations, press products, schools, institutions of social science and religious, political, lobby and revenge organisations.

This means we are able to measure whether the conditions for founding and maintaining these institutions were present in each host society. Based on the results of this analysis we can examine what possibilities were given to Armenian communities to have parallel institutions in these spheres. The function of such minority institutions differs from that of the host societies’ in that beside their ordinary activity they have the extra aim of preserving Armenian identity.

As already mentioned, there have been several signs of solidarity between different Armenian communities. Such reactions are possible for two reasons. The first is the common experience which caused similarities. The second is communication between Armenian communities. It contributed to ensuring that the memory of genocide did not fade. The latter statement suggests the second hypothesis.

2. The more intensive communication the present between Armenian communities, the more similarly they acted.

Possibilities of communication can be measured through pan-Armenian press or publishing, inter-community mass-migrations and social and political events
which were organised by more communities. These might also influence the ways of processing the trauma by approximating reactions.

Surveying Armenians in the United States in the late 1970s, Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller found that six individual processing strategies exist. They conducted another study in Armenia and Mountainous Karabagh in the early 1990s. They again reflected on the mass trauma of the genocide in addition to the Karabagh conflict, and the 1988 Earthquake in northern Armenia. They found the same results in these different Armenian communities in different periods, related to various traumas. They also note that these traumas had endangered the same human and social values. (Miller, Touryan Miller [2003] pp. 32, 79, 81-82, 103.) Thus it is highly probable that these individual processing strategies are present in each Armenian community affected by the traumas mentioned above.

It is highly possible that reacting to collective traumas has similar effects in each human being and in each group subjected to such traumas. We cannot excluded the possibility that the memory of later traumas affecting a certain group – let it be ethnic or social – is tied to earlier traumas either. In their studies Miller and Touryan Miller only surveyed Armenians, and their definitions are applied to this specific ethnic group. Still, it is highly probable that parallel responses to various traumas are much more general than those described when particularly characterising groups of ethnic Armenians.

The supposable existence of all individual approaches in contrast to their apparently periodic and geographically different manifestations on the collective level suggests the third hypothesis.

3. If the experience had the same effects at the individual level in different host countries and historical periods, but different results at the collective level, it suggests that the demand for processing and the potential of collective responses following all six approaches were present in each Armenian community, irrespective of their location or social-political-historical background. On the other hand the ways of collective processes differed by host countries.

Having examined the first two hypotheses, it will become clear which effects were caused by host societies and which resulted from Armenian common experience. Based on this examination the third hypothesis is also reasonable and possible.
1.3.2. The Methodological Framework

Before analysing the results of collective processing, individual processing strategies must be listed and defined first. These were examined by Miller and Touryan-Miller through interviews conducted long after the genocide, thereby these are named narrative reactions. This label is going to be analysed and explained in detail together with the strategies. The primary psychological reactions of survivors before they started interpreting the trauma for themselves were mostly symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]. This psychiatric disease is characterised by various physical and mental disturbances: “[1] regular shifts between uncontrollably intruding memories and emotional numbness, [2] ‘inexplicable’ somatic symptoms; somatisation⁷, [3] labile vegetative regulation⁸, [4] sensitisation⁹, [5] emotional numbness.” (Kulcsár [2009] p. 30)

Post-traumatic stress disorder after similarly massive traumas also influences the following generations. Survivors frequently have problems in establishing normal relations with their children. The next generation is either considered reparation for the lost lives or as the ones who will take revenge. (Molnár [2005] p. 536) In the latter case it must be noted that international recognition and jurisdiction in the given case most probably eliminates the reasons for revenge. This can be observed in the Jewish case, for example. Generally parents from the first generation of survivors tried to protect the next generation too strongly. For this reason, though the first generation may have chosen repression or speakout, the second generation still bears the trauma. If they opt for repression, parents from the first generation are unable to communicate with empathy with their children in general. Thus the unconscious transmission of the hidden memory evolves in them. Members of the second generation may feel guilty if they cannot or are not willing to meet their parents’ expectations. (Molnár [2005] p. 537.) If the first generation chooses repression and transmits it to the second, the third generation may break with its ancestors. This shift may result in radical responses often called third generation syndrome. (Molnár [2005] p. 725.)

In the specific case of Armenian survivors, as Miller and Touryan Miller have observed [1.] avoidance and repression mean that the survivor is not able to deal with

⁷ Facing persons, places, objects related to the trauma causes unpleasant physical symptoms
⁸ Nervous functions non-consciously regulated by the vegetative nervous system. For example the functioning of internal organs, or blood circulation.
⁹ Giving constantly stronger responses to a certain repeated and usually important stimulus.
the traumatic experience. This may also mean a conscious avoidance of occasions that can re-evoke the experience. [2.] **Explanation and rationalisation** is the chosen strategy if the survivor starts to find rational explanations of the disaster. Examples can vary from belief in a divine plan or the historical fate of the nation to rational explanations. [3.] **Resignation and despair** can be observed if a given survivor, confronted with the relentlessness of the traumatic experience, consciously refuses to speak about it. In contrast to conscious repression, this does not mean avoidance, but active refusal of dealing with the trauma and pressuring others to refuse it as well. The author of the present dissertation also lists under this strategy the phenomenon where a given person refuses to deal with the trauma for other reasons. [4.] **Reconciliation and forgiveness** works analogously with the healed wound. This means that the survivor still feels the pain caused by the experience, but thinks optimistically about the future. This strategy does not necessarily mean reconciliation with the perpetrators, but rather with the traumatic experience.10 [5.] **Outrage and anger** is an extreme feeling of anger although it does not lead to physical aggression. Usually it has verbal manifestations. The last strategy is [6.] **revenge and restitution**, whereby a given survivor uses physically aggressive means to deal with the experience. Miller and Touryan Miller also list symbolic aggression under this definition. For example, this is the case where survivors consider negative phenomena in the perpetrators’ lives a form of divine revenge. (Miller, Touryan Miller [1991] pp. 191–199, [1999] pp. 158-160.) While such symbolic revenge does not have physical manifestations, the author of this study considers it outrage and anger. These strategies may appear independently from each other and do not create a scale. Hereinafter the usage of one word from Miller’s and Touryan Miller’s double-worded expressions is equal to their original term. The term rage shall also be considered equal to outrage and anger.

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10 Numerous analyses about post-traumatic growth (see for example Kulcsár 2005, Kulcsár 2009) explicitly describe how a person can reconcile with a situation itself, even if it is related to a certain other person or a group of people. “Traumas – except for natural disasters – are characteristically social traumas. The root of social trauma is transgression – violation of norms – that always means the lack of love and compassion, when the transgressor (the "perpetrator"; the "guilty") maltreats – physically, financially, emotionally harms – forsakes, betrays, deceives or cheats the victim […]” (Kulcsár 2009, pp. 102-103. own translation) In psychological terms Miller’s and Touryan Miller’s term for reconciliation and forgiveness stands close to acceptance. “Acceptance is a positive attitude towards uncontrollable/unchangeable situations.” (Ibid, p. 41.) Acceptance is not equal to the psychological term of forgiving (ibid, p. 103.) that requires a personal object, the perpetrator. Accepting unchangeable personal or collective loss and having an optimistic view of the future in parallel does not presuppose an object. Certainly, such an attitude can also lead to forgiveness in certain cases.
A seventh reaction is introduced by the author of the present dissertation, based on Card’s definition of genocide. If genocide is the destruction of social vitality of a given group then reconstructing this vitality explicitly in return for what is lost, i.e., social, political, intellectual and institutional networks and activities, for instance, then these are reactions to the genocide. This type of response may appear in establishing or re-establishing old sources of social vitality. If the survivors or the succeeding generations try to reach peaceful jurisdiction or reach the recognition of the event, including official commemoration by the host state and condemnation of the genocide, these can be also considered reconstruction. These measures namely serve the reconstruction of the victims’ dignity lost during the genocide. In the same way, peacefully demanding financial restitution also represents the reconstruction of the financial wealth and dignity of the forerunners. In addition, recalling memories about the times when these sources of social vitality were still intact must be also mentioned. The latter strategy can be present in interviews with survivors, written memoirs and also literary works related to the genocide. Aida Alaryarian also confirms similar tendencies of trauma processing and commemorating in other fields and in general as well. (Alayarian [2008] p. 54.)

Most of these narrative responses can be found among psychological variants of Post-traumatic Growth. Such strategies include, for example, a growing need for community, discovering new walks of life, and searching for meaning. (Kulcsár [2005] pp. 21-29.) The need for community can be discovered in reconstruction. Realising new walks of life while still remembering the trauma is reconciliation in Miller’s and Touryan-Miller’s terms. The search for meaning is the equivalent of rationalisation. The psychological terms are a result of scholarly research in narrative psychology. Furthermore, these strategies can be observed within personal narratives of a given trauma or as a result of the narrative of that trauma. Therefore, the strategies found by Miller and Touryan-Miller are defined as narrative reactions.

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11 When the traumatised person gains the ability to take a positive approach to the trauma that has affected the given person. This approach also enables the given person to reach a higher level of development of personality than before the trauma.

12 Rationalisation may be interpreted as a way of post-traumatic growth if the given person interprets the genocide as a trauma that was needed for him or her to become a stronger or wiser person, for example, or if they project the need for the same values to the whole traumatised community. Reconciliation in Miller’s and Touryan Miller’s terms is an obvious example of post-traumatic growth. “The main characteristics of post-traumatic growth are:

- a stronger appreciation of life and change in priorities
- experiencing relationships characterized by more cordial and deeper intimacy
In many cases survivors reported that post-traumatic symptoms repeatedly afflicted them even decades after the genocide. On the other hand, there were also survivors who already started to show narrative responses under the period of the trauma. Both variants are general in any collection of interviews with survivors. Most probably there was a constant move from post-traumatic symptoms to narrative strategies and vice versa. As Miller and Touryan Miller also mention, their categories are only ideal types of responses. Therefore, shifts or intermingling between these strategies at the same time in different fields of survivors’ everyday life cannot be excluded. Added to these facts, during the progress of processing shifts between PTSD and narrative reactions are also logical. These individual strategies may appear in many spheres at the social level. For example, in the fields of arts, science, activity of NGOs working in the social sphere, education and politics. All the listed individual ways of processing may appear in these spheres in collective forms, as we have already seen some examples of it.

There have been numerous attempts to prove that there is a connection between individual psychology and certain social and political phenomena throughout human history. Most of the scholars who have prepared such analyses are convinced that the connection is obvious. On the other hand, each approach to this issue depicts the roots of it in different psychological phenomena or different processes between individual and collective phenomena. (Kiss [2011] pp. 18-43.) After World War II Bowlby and Ainsworth created attachment theory, which supposed that the loss of basic family and social ties results in searching for these ties in a broader social context. The initial phenomena leading to the creation of this theory were mass trauma suffered during World War II and the great number of orphans. (p. 38. ibid.) Armenians also went through a mass trauma and started new life after the genocide with masses of orphans.

Repression may be a result of unwanted post-traumatic intrusion of memories. Thereby, the given survivor may decide to avoid those memories consciously after considering, i.e., interpreting them as harmful during inexplicit narration. The main condition for resignation is also previous narration for the given person. Based on that interpretation the given traumatised person can refuse and condemn remembrance and speaking out. Rage and revenge are also obvious results of narration, if the person sees the real or alleged perpetrators’ verbal or physical punishment as a solution. Reconstruction of social ties and institutions in a new form, for example, is also possible as a result of narration, if the given survivor considers it as the solution to the trauma.
Using the explanation offered by this theory seems plausible for analysing the connection between individual and collective responses of Armenians to the genocide.

Collective processing in the case of Armenians – and most probably also in the case of other victim groups may — appear in various social spheres, as has been mentioned. Artistic processing means artistic works about the issue. In this case the most relevant and most quantifiable works at the collective level are literary works. These require a broad scope of organisational activities, from creation to printing, publishing and distribution. Books also reach a broad audience. Furthermore, it may be assumed that the Armenian communities actively take part in such activities, as literature in Armenian is a way of maintaining their identity. Furthermore, a certain grade of tolerance towards Armenians is also a precondition for translation of these works into various communities’ host society’s language.

Scientific processing appears in research related to the genocide. This also requires an active organisational mechanism, from research to publications or education involving many people. However, this field can be treated rather as an indicator of related problems, as describing and analysing a phenomenon does not necessarily mean that a given scholar identifies with it. It means that analysing repression, aggression or reconciliation does not automatically result in the given scholar’s personally being repressive, aggressive or reconciled.

Activities of NGOs working in the social sphere as reactions to the genocide may seem unusual. But if we take into consideration that many foundations worked to help survivors and maintain Armenian identity in the diaspora, these gain significance as well. In parallel to these phenomena, applying Card’s genocide definition, re-establishing social ties within a community also may indicate a counteraction to genocide.

Last but not least political processing in this case means political developments within Armenian communities and the impact of Armenian communities’ activity on the host countries’ policy concerning the Armenian genocide. The latter can be measured through the political actions of the host country aiming at the recognition of the genocide. Declarations, official commemorations at the state level and foreign policy sanctions imposed on states not recognising the genocide can be listed among indicators. The correlation between host state sanctions against non-recognition and the influence of Armenian communities on local politics concerning official recognition is quite strong. If we take a list of countries (The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute,
Recognition, States [2007 – 2014]) having recognised the genocide it turns out that many of these have active or extended Armenian communities.\textsuperscript{14}

Beside the analysis of host societies’ influences, the Armenian sense of community has to be examined as well, especially to test the second hypothesis. Communication between various Armenian communities has been possible on the one hand through personal relations which cannot be measured precisely. On the other hand, there exist data indicating that in cases of large-scale inter-community migration the newcomers can strongly influence local Armenians’ ideas. Beyond the private sphere, communication between Armenian political, religious and social organisations has to be considered. Concerning communication, written language also has to be taken into account seriously. The growth of identical press products or literary works in the same period in numerous communities means a growing intensity of communication. This can be reflected in literary works if they could be found in other communities as well, or if they were issued at various places at the same time. Online publishing nowadays has the same role.

Taking into consideration the results derived from testing the first two hypotheses, it becomes clear which factors were responsible for which collective output. Thereby it will become possible to state whether each of the examined factors contributed to the demand or the means of articulation of trauma processing. Thus, the truth value of the third hypothesis also lies in the factors proving the first and the second.

1.4. Geographic and Temporal Scope of Examination

The uncertain number of Armenian communities worldwide and the fact that examining genocide processing in all of them would result in a hardly analysable set of data. Therefore sampling of data is necessary. The sample contains Armenian communities that have large proportions of Armenians, living worldwide, or those politically or legally recognised by their host states.

Armenians may compose the majority or a minority in certain countries. They are a majority in the Republic of Armenia, where Armenians make up the numerical

\textsuperscript{14} In some other cases, especially in case of lately achieved Western European or EU member states or various institutions of the United States this is also a sign for anti-Turkish moves of the host countries.
majority of the country and dominate the processes of the cultural, economic, political and social environment. The state can nowadays be considered the kin-state or home-state of Armenians. Conversely, during certain periods the Armenian SSR that existed in the same geographic space was not accepted by various organisations of the diaspora as a kin-state. The reasons will be analysed in further parts of the study.

The Armenian minority communities may have partly or totally different features. This means that they are not dominant in shaping either the political, social, cultural or economic environment of the host state. In addition, they also constitute a numerical minority in their host societies. Further, they may have their own institutions in one or more of these fields. Armenian minority organisations may be formed according to their communities’ own needs. This means that they have a certain kind of explicit or implicit autonomy. (For a wide scale interpretation of this term see, for example, Győri Szabó [2008] pp. 60-61.) At the same time a total lack of these factors may be also present. Both the majority and three minority communities will be examined in the present study.

If a given Armenian community consists of refugees of the genocide, then these members most probably needed to process the trauma caused by the genocide. Naturally, we cannot prove beyond a doubt that that refugees all fled to earlier existing communities, but this is highly probable knowing the scope of mass-migration. In a similar way the number of the Armenian communities worldwide cannot be defined, because it is possible that they are present as an insignificantly small group in some host countries. They would surely not have the ability or the authorised possibility to establish organisations. Besides, they may not be officially registered as Armenian communities. However, they still may opt to pursue the preservation of their Armenian identity. Therefore, such groups of people can be named Armenian communities, if we consider the definition of Armenian community as groups in which more Armenian persons cooperatively aim for and realise the maintenance of their identity.

Besides characterising the possible qualities of Armenian communities, those of the host societies must also be defined. A host state is a political and territorial entity other than the previous Republic of Armenia, the Armenian SSR or the present Republic of Armenia, where Armenians have constituted the politically, socially and culturally dominant ethnic group. A distinction must be made in the case of the Armenian SSR though. In its case we will not apply the term host state or host country, but host environment instead, as the local numerical majority of Armenians was characterised by
a very limited extent of possibilities to influence the central imperial power’s decisions in Moscow.

A host society is the community of citizens of the host countries, including their educational and cultural institutions and NGOs. There is usually a wide debate about the qualities of organisations that can be labelled as NGOs. In the present case non state-founded, voluntarily created cultural, educational, sports, youth and relief foundations, societies, associations and groups in these fields, political lobby groups and terrorist organisations both of the Armenian community and host society are understood under this term.

In accordance with the cultural and political establishment of the host countries, western democracies are represented by the United States in the present dissertation. A large number of Armenians have been present there, compared to the gross number of Armenians worldwide. Similarly, some countries of the eastern bloc will be analysed. Within this group is the home state founded as the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, later the Republic of Armenia. From this area also Hungary will be examined, where Armenians have recently been a politically and legally recognised minority. The progress of the Armenian minority in the country furthermore is very similar to that of other Central and Eastern European countries. In the next group of the Near and Middle East Lebanon will be examined. The Lebanese social and political sphere traditionally has good relations with their Armenian minority. Armenians are a state-constituting minority there, as has been already mentioned.

The situation in the Republic of Turkey will be not analysed. This needs explanation, as Armenians living there are in closest proximity to the genocidal trauma. Geographically, most of the places emptied of Armenians lie in Eastern Anatolia / Western Armenia. Due to the extension of the historical Kingdoms of Armenia, this area is known as Western Armenia in Armenian historiography. Granted, it had become an ethnically diverse region during the centuries of Byzantine and Ottoman rule. However, Armenians were concentrated in this area until the genocide. Since then, the remaining Armenian community has been exposed to repeated ethnic discrimination. These facts suggest that the situation in the country should be examined as well. On the other hand, a representative examination of the activities of Armenians living there is impossible to conduct. There are different estimates about their number, between 60,000 and 120,000. (Peroomian [2008] p. 20.) They constitute a religious minority in Istanbul. There they maintain their own organisations, publishing companies and newspapers. Contrary to
this, in the other parts of the country, among others in Eastern Anatolia / Western Armenia most Armenians hide their identities, despite being the descendants of survivors. They are the ones still most directly bearing the heritage of the genocide, while the activity of Istanbul Armenians does not represent them. The latter have tried to establish relations with them and to maintain a public discourse with them, but this is rather a supportive than a representative role.

Concerning the temporal scope of the examination, the starting point is the collapse of the Republic of Armenia in 1920. From that moment on Armenians were incorporated as a minority by all host countries. Despite their ethnic majority in the Armenian SSR they constituted a political minority in the Soviet Union. The small member state had minor influence on the centralised imperial system. This also means that they had to follow the politics of Moscow, hence they were not allowed to outline and realise their own political actions.

The study is going to follow genocide processing until the end of 1991, a year marked by the Armenian SSR’s gaining independence but before the escalation of the Karabagh conflict to open warfare. At this time all the initial circumstances collapsed. The Republic of Armenia became the indisputably accepted kin-state of Armenians after gaining independence. On the other hand, the war and its effects resulted in dynamic changes concerning local Armenians’ identity. (Մարության [2013]) Also, in this period the relations between the kin-state and the diaspora changed in other areas, beyond acceptance of one another. This period also brought a complete change in the international political environment. Therefore, after 1991 none of the initial socio-political circumstances existed any longer. The complete liberty of genocide processing and the revolution of information technology brought serious changes, diversity and several rapid shifts of processing. Examination of the post-1991 period therefore could fill another similar project.

1.5. Sources

The study relies on both primary and secondary sources. The former are mainly interviews conducted by the author after 2009, mostly in Armenia, and to a lesser extent in Hungary. Interviewees are partly contributors to social sciences in Armenia, who had the possibility to work in various Armenian communities. They thus have a wider
perspective on the issue and on trauma processing in different host states. Another part of subjects are ‘ordinary’ people of Armenian nationality who usually confirm the results of large-scale surveys conducted on this issue. Primary sources also include legal documents such as peace treaties or international conventions. Furthermore the collections of interviews conducted with genocide survivors and their descendants published in printed sources constitute a transitional group between primary and secondary sources.

Secondary sources include analyses of related issues. Among these are descriptions of different aspects of social and everyday life which Armenian communities face in different host states, or of historical documents about certain political or historical events. There are some relatively old sources among the latter. For example, the Armenian SSR’s political principles toward political parties of the Armenian diaspora written in 1924 is among those. Unfortunately, there are certain issues on which few current sources are available. These are usually related to specific political events that have lost their pertinence, such as Armenians’ position in the Lebanese civil war. Due to the political environment in which those sources were written, they often contain cold-war approaches, applied both in the Eastern and the Western Bloc. Colleagues at the department of Modern History at the NAS RA Institute of History have significantly contributed to the author’s progress in analysing these sources. This applies especially to the examination of those written in the Armenian SSR. On the other hand, in the case of some historians, for example Nikolay Hovhannisyan, Soviet terminology is still present in their latest publications, though their knowledge of the topics they analyse is acceptable and and their use is inevitable. Therefore, rejecting Soviet-time sources and accepting current ones without criticism is not a reasonable approach.

Secondary sources are going to be presented in several groups: monographs, edited volumes, articles published in periodicals and journals, on-line references and legal sources. The language of these is mostly English, and to a lesser extent Hungarian, Armenian, German and Italian. Concerning the languages using Latin-based alphabets, available sources will be represented in alphabetical order by author. Armenian sources will be listed separately in Armenian alphabetical order because of differences in the alphabets and its letters vis a vis Latin-based counterparts. Occasionally, if a publication has several translations, these may confirm each other’s content. For example in
Armenian survivors’ testimonies, to achieve the most substantial interpretation of their experience we may rely on translations.

It must be noted that in several cases – especially in monographs and edited volumes – Armenian publications contain only the initial letter or an abbreviation of the author’s first name. In case the reconstruction of full names is not possible from other sources, for example library catalogues, only the initials or abbreviations will be indicated.

1.6. **Expected Results and Applicability of the Study**

If the hypotheses are proved in case of the examined communities – those that well represent Armenian communities worldwide – then it is probable that the Levon Abrahamian’s conclusion particularly concerning the case of the genocide can be strengthened. In his opinion there are some minor differences concerning the world view of Armenians in the home country and the diaspora that are caused by the differences between the host states’ different social circumstances. (Abrahamian [2006] 327.) However, he does not apply this statement to the genocide explicitly. Should the present hypotheses be verified, his statement can then be extended to the differences between different host states, diversifying the diaspora-homeland contrast.

Studying the ways of handling the memory of the Armenian genocide may also contribute to a deeper understanding of processing other mass traumas. The particularly approximate cases are those originating from ethnic and political conflicts, e.g., genocides, crimes against humanity, war crimes or civil wars. On the other hand, the analysis also broadens the scope of observing the effects of damaging a certain ethnic group’s cultural heritage.

In addition, Armenian communities maintain worldwide inter-community networks. Therefore current knowledge about civil society, global non-governmental organisations or non-state actors and their transnational activities will be also extended. At the very least the analysis of this ethnically based particular segment will contribute to general studies on the topic. Along with theoretical approaches this study also offers a modest base for practical management of the issues mentioned above.
1.7. Structure

The dissertation is constituted by chronological chapters following the present introduction of general and methodological issues. Comparison of the given Armenian communities is clearer if the international political environment, host society effects, and inner modes of progress are compared within a short period. Hence, after having tested the hypotheses in these shorter periods, it will become possible to draw the conclusions on each chronological chapter in detail. These will form the basis for drawing general conclusions at the end of the study.

The second chapter describes the antecedents and the initial circumstances in all examined geographical areas such as pre-genocide developments of the host societies and the local Armenian communities. The third chapter deals with the first-generation revenge movement, i.e., Operation Nemesis, as a collective response. The fourth chapter describes and analyses the reasons why the period between the 1920s and 1965 is generally labelled as the period of silence. There were several anomalies in most communities in this period and various reactions contradict the assumption of repressing the trauma of the genocide.

The fifth chapter deals with the progress started with the Khrushchev thaw leading to the beginning of speak-out in 1965 in the Armenian SSR and the United States. Also, the reactions of the Lebanese community will be introduced, even if collective reactions on the trauma started earlier there. The sixth chapter is an analysis of Armenian third-generation revenge movements from the antecedents of their operation in 1975 until the mid-1980s. The related organisations had a wide range of connections in the diaspora. Therefore these ties will be introduced with the examined countries’ communities, based on a general description of the phenomenon in general and of its mainly Lebanese origins. The seventh chapter deals with the change of regime and the Karabagh conflict and the 1988 earthquake in the Armenian SSR. The traumas suffered by Armenians in the Soviet homeland have evoked the memory of the genocide. For this reason the historical trauma was perceived from a different perspective than in the previous periods. Naturally Armenians in the other communities were commiserating with those living in the SSR.

The final chapter will draw conclusions from the previous analyses of shorter periods. The hypotheses shall be confirmed or rejected and new future directions of application of the dissertation based on the conclusions will be introduced. The chapter
shall also mention current developments in Armenian communities worldwide. This serves the purpose of finding ways to apply the analysis of the current situation and developments since 1991.

2. Antecedents and Initial Circumstances

After the 1918 amnesty for deportees until the 1923 Lausanne Treaty a complex progression of military and political actions influenced the future of Armenians. The relevant political processes are the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the tsarist Russian Empire. The Bolshevik revolution’s effects started to reach the South Caucasus at almost the same time, about half a year before the armistices. The collapse of the two empires and turmoil caused by the political vacuum gave rise to Triple Entente’s various aspirations in the region. New political aspirations also started to evolve in Turkey and the South Caucasus. Three newly emerged nation states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia further coloured this picture. This sometimes chaotic system of political actors, international relations and the effects on Armenian refugees will be introduced in three main steps. The first of these is the advance of the Triple Entente’s actions. The second is the complexity of relations between Russia and Turkey, especially concerning the Turkish War of Independence and the Bolshevist expansion. The third is the local struggles of the Republic of Armenia.

After introducing the political conditions, the situation of Armenian refugees in the examined areas will be analysed. This includes the United States of America and Hungary, outside of the conflict area of the Middle East. Armenians had migrated to these places long before the Armenian genocide. The antecedents of Armenian immigration to these places will also be described along with the Armenian communities’ progresses in these host countries.

2.1. Armenians in Ottoman Territories between the Mudros Armistice and the Treaty of Lausanne

The first official step to granting freedom to Armenians was realised on October 19, 1918. On that day Ahmed Izzet Pasha granted amnesty to Armenian deportees.
Some days later as grand vizier he signed the Armistice of Mudros. The document stated several measures that directly or indirectly influenced Armenians still subjected to the transforming Ottoman Empire. The army had to be completely demobilised and the Triple Entente gained the possibility of becoming involved in any case where their security was at risk. Armenians also gained advantages through this. The transforming empire was controlled by the Triple Entente and thereby they also had the practical possibility become involved should further massacres have occurred. Article 4 of the armistice also demanded that Armenians interned by the state and as well as prisoners “[…] be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.” (Maurice [1943])

The document also stated territorial changes. Among these were the French Mandate in Syria, the sanjak of Alexandretta and the southwestern part of Eastern Anatolia/Western Armenia, i.e., the former Cilicia, which had the greatest impact on Armenians. With the appearance of French troops Armenians’ security was backed by direct guarantees. Many of them moved back to those areas, or those who had not been insulted before no longer had to fear massacres in the future. Numerous survivors stated that they had the possibility to start a new life in the area. In some cases those deported from Eastern Anatolia / Western Armenia could take refuge at their relatives’ homes in these territories. (Svazlian [2005] p. 87)

To secure the future situation of Syria even under the French mandate a mainly Armenian voluntary army corps was recruited by the French at the final stage of the war. Three battalions consisted of Armenians, along with one of Syrians, besides a light artillery unit. These comprised the Eastern Legion or Legion d’Orient. The soldiers had fought successfully against the 8th Army of the Ottoman Empire units in September of 1918. (Elphinstone Kerr [1973] p. 31)

After the armistice the Triple Entente had not taken into attention that a new political power was shaping on the ruins of the empire, besides the government in Istanbul. Part of the Ottoman army loyal to Mustafa Kemal had kept on fighting to regain the empire’s lost territories. His government in Ankara was established on this base, and it operated in parallel with the Istanbul government. Kemalist activity seriously influenced the peace process and the extended row of border modifications in the peace treaties, signed with the often changing sovereign rulers of the South Caucasus. This aspect will be mentioned while analysing the situation of the Republic of Armenia.
Led by their own interests, the Triple Entente partly confirmed the Mudros Armistice with the Peace Treaty of Sèvres. The important aspect of the new borders that continued to exist also in practice was that the sanjak of Alexandretta (Hellenic Resources Institute [1920 – 2014/a]) stayed part of the territories under French mandate, as has been mentioned. Besides providing Armenians security in this area, this action may have also suggested symbolic meanings for genocide survivors. Aleppo, the biggest city of the area, was an important crossroads and a “logistic centre” on the deportation routes. Musa Dagh, one of the two well-known successful Armenian movements, also belonged to this region. The biggest concentration camps of Deir ez-Zor, Ras al-Ayn and Rakka were also confirmed as belonging to Syria. The French mandate over the centres of annihilation may have confirmed the message that the Triple Entente held the future of Armenian deportees and refugees under control.

The peace treaty of Sèvres also ensured the majority of the Armenian vilayets to Armenia, at least in part.15 (Hellenic Resources Institute [1920 – 2014/b]) As will be seen introducing the situation in the east, most arrangements of the Treaty were not realised due to several political processes influencing the region. This does not influence the fact that Armenians until this very day praise Woodrow Wilson, who supported their aspirations within his complex plan for peace resolution.

One of the practically realised measures of the Sèvres Treaty was the foundation of the court-martial in Constantinople. (Hellenic Resources Institute [1920 – 2014/d]) It had found unrefutable evidence of the fact that the massacres and deportations of Armenians had been committed under the commandment of Ismail Enver Pasha, Minister of War, Ahmed Jemal Pasha, governor of Constantinople, Minister of Navy, and Mehmed Talaat Pasha, Minister of Interior, through the contribution of the

15 "ARTICLE 89.

Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarisation of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier.

ARTICLE 90.

In the event of the determination of the frontier under Article 89 involving the transfer of the whole or any part of the territory of the said vilayets to Armenia, Turkey hereby renounces as from the date of such decision all rights and title over the territory so transferred. The provisions of the present Treaty applicable to territory detached from Turkey shall thereupon become applicable to the said territory. The proportion and nature of the financial obligations of Turkey which Armenia will have to assume, or of the rights which will pass to her, on account of the transfer of the said territory will be determined in accordance withArticles 241 to 244, Part VIII (Financial Clauses) of the present Treaty." (Hellenic Resources Institute [1920 – 2014/b])
Committee of Union and Progress\(^\text{16}\) [CUP] and several state organisations. The leadership of the previously ruling CUP was sentenced to death.

Local public opinion supported the trials and also condemned the genocide. (Akcam [2004] p. 182) In spite of this, the legal process was not successful. Some of the leaders fled on board a ship to Odessa and further to west from there. Mehmed Talat pasha and Ismail Enver pasha, both members of the Young Turk triumvirate, were also accompanied by Nazim bey, a prominent member of the CUP and also of the Special Organisation set up to carry out genocidal measures against Armenians. The fourth Young Turk leader on board the Lorelei was Behaeddin Shakir, founding member of the party and also most probably responsible for the implementation of the Armenian Genocide. (Yeghiaian [1990] pp. 97-101)

This aspect of the aftermath of the Armenian genocide caused the grievance still shared by many Armenians, whereby they did not receive the slightest reparation for the trauma, and that their pain has not been unequivocally recognised by the international community and worldwide public opinion until this very day. As will be obvious in the further parts of the study, the practical lack of legal consequences also led to violent actions by Armenian survivors’ and future generations.

The Treaty of Sèvres resulted not only in legal procedures and territorial losses for the collapsing empire. It imposed strict measures for the protection of minorities for the future. In addition, it rehabilitated the basic human rights of various minorities. These articles were presumably aimed at Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians. Among these is the invalidation of forced conversions to Islam. The Treaty also contains obligations to search for interned and disappeared persons. Moreover, under the aegis of the League of Nations, complaints of survivors and relatives of the disappeared or exterminated persons should have been handled. The restoration of pre-war properties is also mentioned by the Treaty, and it lists more details on re-establishing homes and businesses “[…] of the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of pressure since January 1, 1914. […]” as stated in Article 144. (Hellenic Resources Institute [1920 – 2014/c])

In contrast to the Treaty of Sèvres, the agreement that sealed the row of wars in the region, the Treaty of Lausanne, had to recognise practical territorial changes. At that time, in 1923, the Kemalist leadership was undoubtedly on the way toward declaring the

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\(^\text{16}\) Abbreviated as CUP, known also as the Young Turk Party or Ittihadists, derived from the Turkish name of the organisation: İttihat ve Terrakki Cemiyeti
republic, while the Bolshevik power in the former Tsarist Russian territories had already been established. The new peace treaty still included obligations for the Republic of Turkey for protecting non-Muslim minorities. Although Turkey had to guarantee the rights of its minorities, the document did not include any obligations on retrospective reparations for deportees. (Hellenic Resources Institute [1923 – 2014]) On the other hand, it must be noted that both treaties define the term minority in the related geographical areas as the group of non-Muslim subjects. This definition does not follow the ideological changes that had taken place at the end of the Ottoman era and in the Republic of Turkey.

Similarly to the Treaty of Lausanne, many Armenian survivors and refugees were aware of the emerging Kemalist power’s strength in Anatolia. Most of those who had been in the concentration camps in Syria or those who had fled to Lebanon stayed there after the World War as well. Repeated massacres of Armenians in Cilicia during the Turkish War of Independence (Svazlian [2005] p. 85.) did not encourage these people to return to their homes. The newly formed French mandates and later independent states of Syria and Lebanon had become safe nests for Armenian immigrants.

Armenian communities had lived in both countries even before the genocide. Unfortunately there is no comparable census data available, but the number of Armenians was not significant. Only some thousands of Armenians lived in the predecessor to Lebanon, the former Mount Lebanon Mutassarifate. (Abramson [2013] p. 191.) In 1895 the sanjak of Latakya had an Armenian population of 1600. A further 500 people were counted in the Turkish villages surrounding the city in 1911. The total number of inhabitants in the sanjak of Latakya was 22,000 in 1895. In the southern part of the mutassarifate there lived about 700 Armenians in 1895. (Թոփուզյան [1986] p. 50.) There is no detailed data known by the author about the number of Armenians in the other parts of the mutassarifate, but the total population of the administrative unit was between 300,000 and 400,000 in 1895. (Tabar [2010] p. 2.) Furthermore, it must be noted that this area does not completely coincide with the borders of Lebanon under the French Mandate and since independence. Yet it well represents the proportion of Armenians.

Even if the Armenian community was not sizeable before the genocide, Armenians mostly held important positions in state administration or belonged to the intelligentsia of Lebanon. Thus they acquired a well-respected status in the region. The
proportion of Armenians shifted from the beginning of the genocide. The reason for this was that local Muslim and Arabic leaders felt that the actual jihad – as World War I was perceived by Muslim religious leaders – did not aim to fight against Armenians but against Italians. Therefore Syria and Lebanon provided shelter for the refugees. (Թոփուզյան [1986] p. 105.) This role became more significant due to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Kemalist hostilities in the nearby areas, the safety provided by the French mandate and the failure of constructing an independent Armenia.

Most charity organisations that operated within Eastern Anatolia / Western Armenia were moved to Syria and Lebanon after the war. Among these were hospitals, orphanages, charity funds, schools and manufactures aiming to reintegrate Armenian survivors into society. These institutions were usually established or run by European missionaries. Some of these still operate, with updated functions. Among the missionaries protestant pastor Jakob Künzler, and his wife Elisabeth from Switzerland, Maria Jacobsen and Karen Jeppe from Denmark, Alma Johansson from Sweden (who continued her work in Greece after the war) and Bodil Katharine Biørn from Norway must be mentioned. All of them are still revered by Armenians.

These missionaries recorded their experiences, which is important for scientific processing. These people were citizens of neutral countries. This fact gives special value to their memoirs and diaries, as scholars denying the genocide often discredit sources recording the deportations and massacres. Such critics often stressed that sources published in the countries of the Triple Entente were used for war propaganda by the Triple Entente. This claim is not feasible in case of these missionaries’ sources.

The continuation of the aforementioned people’s relief work was extremely important for Armenian survivors for many reasons. Even in the new host countries of Syria and Lebanon, Armenian survivors and refugees very often lived in refugee camps. The inhabitants often lacked basic human needs and the public health situation was inappropriate for living in such places for a longer term. (Թոփուզյան [1986] p. 171) Armenian refugees there lived isolated from the host societies. To achieve sustainable long-term solutions it was necessary for both for refugees and the host states to support integration into the host societies. The missionary relief institutions contributed to all these processes. An example of such is the activity of Near East Relief, which will be introduced later.
2.2. Changes in the Regional Power Structure: Russia(s), the Ottoman Empire and Turkey

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia changed the geopolitical situation of the South Caucasian region in the short run. Continuing war against the Central Powers would attract the attention of the Bolsheviks, and social pressure since the February revolution also drove Russia to lay down its arms. The armistice in December of 1917 was followed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March of 1918. The other party to it in the South was still the Ittihadist government. The treaty resulted in Russian withdrawal to the pre-war borders.\(^{17}\) (Yale Law School, Lilian Goldman Law Library [2008] This means they had lost all previously occupied territories of Eastern Anatolia /Western Armenia.

In practical terms, by that time Bolshevist Russia did not oppose voluntary secession of various non-Russian territories, among these the South Caucasian region. (Suny [1993] pp. 128-129.) Therefore, Lenin decided to withdraw Russian troops from Ardahan and Kars, and left these territories to Armenian militias. The latter were unable to hold back the Ottoman army. After this event, the treaty determined the circumstances of the region until the Treaty of Moscow. Other treaties of local significance will be examined during the analysis of the situation of the Republic of Armenia.

The Treaty of Moscow was signed on March 16, 1921, between Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevist Russia after it had established its power in the South Caucasus. It determined new territorial changes. Beside the two already mentioned regions, Nakhijevan was also ceded from Armenia to Azerbaijan with a small territorial addition. The Sharur district of former tsarist Sharur-Daralagez uyezd was attached to the northwestern part of Nakhijevan. Both Turkey and Russia pledged to guarantee settlement in territories. Responsibility for this also applied to each South Caucasian Soviet Socialist Republic. Following the principles of this agreement the Treaty of Kars defined the present borders of the Republic of Armenia.

\(^{17}\) The Turkish-Russian Additional Agreement [to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk] "Article 1. To that end the Russian Republic undertakes to withdraw to the other side of the boundary line as it was before the war all its forces now in the said provinces as well as all its officers both civil and military in a period of from six to eight weeks from the signature of the present treaty." (Yale Law School, Lilian Goldman Law Library, 2008)
Article XI of the Treaty of Moscow ensures that those inhabitants who lived in the territories that had been under Turkish sovereignty before 1918 be able to freely leave their homes with their personal properties. The same applied to the inhabitants of Batum on the other side. (Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft [1921 – 2014/a])

Reflecting on the Treaty of Moscow, a legend was born among Armenians. It is a quite publicly known story in the Republic of Armenia. During fieldwork conversations about the peace process after World War I with ordinary people they often claim that Lenin had sold Ardahan and Kars for gold, jewellery and other treasures to the Turks. Some storytellers vividly depict the caravan of fabulous treasures. In their opinion this is why the Bolsheviks withdrew their troops from these regions, where only Armenian militia stayed, who fought for their native lands. However, it is much more feasible that the Bolsheviks were considerably more preoccupied with stabilising their power within Russia and protecting the western borders from Entente intervention. Therefore fighting on another front would have been irrational for them. On the other hand, this is a good example of rationalisation, albeit not of the memory of the genocide, but of territorial losses. This is not surprising, as the world war, the genocide and the dismemberment of Armenia are closely related issues in Armenian collective memory.

2.3. Constant Crisis in the Republic of Armenia

As seen in the previous descriptions, the Republic of Armenia was placed between two powers. Additionally, both the Ottoman Empire and tsarist Russia were going through transformations. The former turned into the Republic of Turkey, while the latter — with almost a year of transformation — turned into Bolshevik Russia. The latter granted independence to the South Caucasus for reasons mentioned above. After the short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, Georgia proclaimed independence on May 26, 1918, with Armenia and Azerbaijan following suit on May 28.

Becoming independent was not a simple action though. On the one hand, various efforts of the great powers had influenced the resolution of territorial issues. Georgia was subject to German interests and British troops were present in Baku. The Ottoman Empire also demanded free transport route access to Azerbaijan.
The three states were also ethnically intermixed. On the other hand, the old borders of Russian administrative units remained in the region, which did not have the slightest relation to any combination of ethnic claims. (Cornell [2001] p. 56, 57, 135.) For this reason, the states went to war against each other. In addition, Armenia was also fighting against Turkish and later Kemalist forces in the south-west. The situation was even more complicated, as the Armenian National Congress resided in Tiflis\(^\text{18}\), outside of the territories of the Republic of Armenia, until gaining independence. The institution was dominated by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.\(^\text{19}\)

The first international treaty concerning the three South Caucasian states dealing with the territories of those was the treaty of Batum on June 4, 1918. The treaty contradicted Armenian military advances that had been topped with the successful battle of Sardarapat.\(^\text{20}\) According to the treaty, Armenia also lost the district of Alexandrapol.\(^\text{21}\) Afterward, invading Ottoman troops started to massacre Armenians there as well. (Ohandjanian [2007] pp. 178-180, 185.) The Armenian defence forces still fought on for these areas.

As is obvious from the above-mentioned facts, the existence of the independent state did not necessarily simplify arranging solutions for the issues of Armenians. Besides chaotic domestic and military situations, they were represented practically by two delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. One of these was that of the Republic of Armenia, led by Avetis Aharonian, chairman of the National Assembly. The other was the delegation that represented mostly Western Armenian and Diasporan Armenians led by Boghos Nubar pasha, a well-experienced Armenian diplomat from Egypt. The territorial claims of the two did not coincide. Aharonian represented more moderate claims restricted to Eastern Anatolia / Western Armenia, with access to the Black Sea. Boghos Nubar pasha also claimed Cilicia. The latter of the two gentlemen considered the aims represented by the former as insufficient and irrelevant for Armenians. However, they managed to establish a joint delegation that demanded all territories that were initially demanded by each original delegation independently. Thus, the demanded

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\(^\text{18}\) Present-day Tbilisi.

\(^\text{19}\) Also known as the Dashnak Party, derived from its Armenian name: Hay hegov’okhakan dashnakts’utiun.

\(^\text{20}\) Also known as Sardarapat.

\(^\text{21}\) Roughly present-day Shirak marz of Armenia. The city of Alexandrapol is present-day Gyumri. It was named after the wife of tsar Nicholas I, princess Alexandra Fyodorovna. Therefore most probably the Armenian form Alexandrapol is correct, but it is also often written as Alexandropol, according to Russian spelling.
territories extended from Cilicia to the Black Sea at Trebizond.\textsuperscript{22} (Hovannisian [1971] pp. 260, 278.) The Treaty of Sèvres finally determined the new borders of Armenia, including the Ottoman vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis in whole or in parts, leaving the decision to US president Wilson.\textsuperscript{23} (Hellenic Resources Institute [1920 – 2014/b]) On the other hand, as has been mentioned, this treaty was not realistic.

Only some months later the treaty of Alexandrapol reconstructed the Armenian border roughly in accordance with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. (Defense Council of Western Armenia [1920 - 2014]) The former was signed on December 2, 1920, between Kazim Karabekir on behalf of the Kemalist forces and Alexander Khatisyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. Compared to the borders settled by the Sèvres Treaty only some months earlier, Armenia lost huge territories. This was the first international treaty signed by Kemalists. It was also one of the first practical revisions of the Treaty of Sèvres.

At the same time, not only Kemalists, but the Entente powers also tried to revise the Treaty of Sèvres. They demanded that Georgia assure Batum to them at least as a free port, including the free movement of the Entente powers on the route to and from there. News of this and a feared Kemalist advance in the region caused the Bolsheviks to immediately start to concentrate their forces on the South Caucasus. (Debo [1992] pp. 358-359.) This step naturally favoured local Bolshevik leaders, who finally joined forces with the Bolshevik forces of Moscow in the region as a whole. This action was completed with the invasion of the Republic of Armenia and the proclamation of the Soviet republic on the on the same day the Treaty of Alexandrapol was signed. From this date on Soviet-Armenia also lost the status of an unequivocally accepted homeland among many Diaspora Armenians. This status was reconstructed only after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Finally, as the new political force of the South Caucasus had been stabilised and the emerging Kemalist power seemed to become a more significant factor, the Treaty of Kars finalised the borders determined by the Treaty of Moscow in October of 1921. (Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft [1921 – 2011/b]) It was signed by the leaders of Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Since the start of the genocide, Eastern Armenia had been hosting masses of refugees fleeing the genocide. According to various estimates, there had been about

\textsuperscript{22} Present-day Trabzon, also known as Trebizond, Trapezund and Trapezunt.

\textsuperscript{23} The exact text has been already cited in footnote Nr. 11.
300,000 (Hovannisian [1973] p. 48.) refugees in the country, including thousands of orphans. The city of Alexandrapol for example, had become a massive orphanage centre. Until Communist power prohibited the operation of foreign orphanages (with the exception of Russian ones), Near East Relief [NER] 24 and among the aforementioned missionaries Bodil Bjørn ran an asylum for Armenian children. The overall circumstances of refugees were similar to that of their counterparts in Syria and Lebanon. Sheltering them was a constant problem, and the public health situation in their communities also raised serious concerns. Due to a poor harvest and extremely cold winters 200,000 Armenians died within the first year of the republic. (Suny [1993] p. 127.)

The country was also struck by a serious humanitarian crisis. It was not only the huge number of refugees that caused this situation. The constant war against mainly Turkish and Azerbaijani, and to a lesser extent Georgian, troops had exploited not only the economic system, but also the inhabitants of the Republic of Armenia.

2.4. Initial Migration Waves of Armenians to the United States of America

The Armenian community in North America was not numerous before the genocide, although it definitely existed. Approximately 2000 Armenians migrated to the United States and Canada between 1890 and 1900, the majority of them as a consequence of the Hamidian massacres. The massacres in Cilicia resulted in the first shift in the scale of migration. Between 1909 and 1915, 9000 Armenians moved to the region. This means an annual average of 1800 immigrants instead of the previous total 1500 between 1900 and 1906 or 1000 between 1907 and 1908. Growth was ultimately caused by the genocide. 66,000 Armenians arrived between 1915 and 1918. They were followed by a further 30,000 between 1918 and 1923 (between the Mudros Armistice and the Treaty of Lausanne). The estimated number of Armenians in the United States by 1925 was roughly 100,000. (Waldstreicher [1989] pp. 13, 36-38.) This number increased over the 20th century, whenever an Armenian community faced a serious crisis, whether this happened in Lebanon, Iraq, Iran or the Armenian SSR.

24 American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief until 1919. (Near East Relief [2015])
The cause of Armenians was well-known in the United States for many reasons. One of the first documentations of the Armenian genocide was presented to Americans by Henry Morgenthau, ambassador of the United States to Constantinople until the state entered World War I. He constantly informed not only the Department of State, as per his duty, but also the American press. From his memoir first published in 1918 we see the efforts he made to maintain and also communicate this neutral position to the Ittihadist leadership of the Ottoman Empire. Still, he had to balance between his neutrality and his moral stand to provide humanitarian assistance to Entente-related and Armenian, Greek and Assyrian inhabitants and subjects of the empire. (Morgenthau [2000])

A renowned Armenophile of the period was President Woodrow Wilson. He had supported the plan to establish the independent state of Armenia. He intended to grant Armenia the territories that should have been attached to the state according to the Treaty of Sèvres. The defeated states, having participated in the war, expected that Wilson could play the role of a fair judge when outlining the complexities of peace treaties. He accepted this duty, but his plans and principles were neither supported by the victorious powers, nor by the Senate.

He travelled to Europe with a less experienced delegation that gradually provided more space to demands contradicting his original principles. In the United States Republicans gained majorities in both the House and the Senate in 1918. Opposing Wilson, they rejected the United States’ entry to the League of Nations that was a core element in Wilson’s post-war plans. They also strongly opposed the fact that no Republican representative was present in his delegation. The way the peace treaties were finally formulated and signed disappointed even his supporters in the United States. The President even attempted to convince the public about the reasonability of his ideas in the framework of a US-wide tour, giving forty speeches defending his position. (Hahner [2006] pp. 217-220.) Still, for his efforts he has been well regarded by Armenians until this very day.

Besides Ambassador Morgenthau’s story another memoir, one of the first by an Armenian survivor, was also widely known in the United States. Aurora Mardiganian’s Ravished Armenia was not personally written by her, as she had not spoken English at the time. She had told her story to an interpreter, and a journalist recorded it in written form. Though the young girl had suffered post-traumatic symptoms even years after her escape, she often expressed her gratitude for her survival and the future that was granted
to her in the United States. She also notes that she considered it essential to share her painful memories. This kind of expression of optimism for the future and speaking out the trauma at the same time is the strategy of reconciliation / forgiveness. She also often applies the strategy of rationalisation. Her explanation for the genocide is that Armenians had been exterminated for their religion in a Muslim environment.

From her strongly Christian perspective this is a reasonable explanation. In Ravished Armenia the Ottoman Armenian upper and middle class was overrepresented, but Mardiganian intended to help all her misfortunate compatriots by fundraising. She often stressed her devotion to raise awareness among Americans of the genocide and to support Armenian refugees still suffering in the Near East. The original issue of the book contains a blank charity check. (Mardiganian [1918])

A short description of Mardiganian’s view on the issue of the genocide and the future of Armenians — reflecting the role she perceives for herself in it — appears in her dedication: “God saved me that I might bring to America a message from those of my people who are left, and every father and mother will understand that what I tell in those pages is told with love and thankfulness to Him for my escape.” (Mardiganian [1918] p. 5)

Her joint efforts with Morgenthau, Woodrow Wilson’s popularity and the work of Near East Relief were successful. First of all, they could contribute to the provision of relief to Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks in the Near East. This coincided with the trauma processing strategy of reconstruction. Mardiganian’s efforts concentrated more on the collective level by contributing to these activities with her individual work and approach. Finally, her book also appeared on screen in 1919. Her devotion to the issue was strong enough that she was able to play herself in the film Ravished Armenia. (Apfel [1919]) Due to the publicity surrounding the new technology of cinematography, the issue attracted even more awareness.

Near East Relief also had various other means of gaining popularity for the issue of Armenian, Assyrian and Greek Refugees. Besides visiting American homes to raise funds personally, charity stamps could also be bought from the foundation; a system of charity money-boxes was also used. The latter were distributed among supporters, who could send these boxes back to the Fund. Some of these stamps and boxes are now in the possession of AGMI in Yerevan and part of the newly opened general exhibition.
NER also operated orphanages and schools in various places in the Near East. (Avakian [2009]) The Republic of Armenia was also a beneficiary of the operations of the organisation. Near East Relief, similarly to Bodil Biørn, had also taken care of orphans in Alexandrapol until it became politically impossible. Rather popular picture postcards were taken of masses of the children in the vicinity of the Saint Arsenije Russian orthodox church to express gratitude to their American benefactors. (The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute [2007-2014/a]) The foundation also often cooperated with missionaries. (The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute [2013])

The United States did not support only Armenians in the Near East. Similarly to Aurora Mardiganian, as was noted when discussing data about the local Armenian population in the United States, many others took refuge there. Refugees’ attempts to first contact local Armenians to support their settlement are recorded in many memoirs. They mostly managed to be employed as lower-skilled factory workers. (Waldstreicher [1991] p. 45.) Numerous Armenians settled down in California, where the climate was similar to that of the Armenian Highland. Thus, Armenians in California often found work in farming. (Avakian [1977] pp. 35, 50-52.)

Besides ‘average’ refugees, former Armenian political leaders also turned up in the United States after the collapse of the independent Republic of Armenia. Most leaders of the Republic of Armenia and the Dashnak Party fled to Western Europe and the United States. Armen Garo\textsuperscript{25}, former ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to Washington, for example, stayed in the United States and started operations to prove his and his party’s political potential. A detailed description of these will be found in the next chapter. Furthermore, all three historical parties started to establish organisations in the diaspora.

### 2.5. Armenians in the Kingdom of Hungary

Sporadic immigration of Armenians to Hungary had existed before, but massive Armenian settlements evolved in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, in Transylvania. At that time Armenians from neighbouring Moldavia fled as a result of violent local political conflicts. Due to their skills acquired in trade and finances, they achieved upward

\textsuperscript{25} His original name was Garegin Pastrmachyan in Eastern Armenian, Karekin Pastermadjian in Western Armenian.
mobility very quickly, thereby many of them became part of the Hungarian noble class. The pastors of the community merged with the organisation of the Roman Catholic Church, though they could maintain their liturgy and the Armenian language at church services. The result of this union was the creation of the Armenian Catholic Church in Transylvania and the granting a bishop’s see for Armenians there. (Merza [1913]) Similar moves occurred in the surrounding countries.

Armenians in the 19th century lost their independence within the Catholic Church. Due to intermarrying with ethnic Hungarians most Armenians assimilated. Their Armenian identity consisted of a sense of common Armenian heritage and attending Armenian Catholic church service, which gradually decreased. (Polyák [2007]) Several changes of the social and economic circumstances in Hungary in the 19th century also encouraged Armenians to leave their settlements for other locations and start activities different from their traditional ones. (Krajcsir [2011] pp. 196-197) This naturally fortified assimilation.

Therefore, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, a handful of Transylvanian Armenian intellectuals attempted to revive their Armenian cultural heritage, including the language. As Gyula Merza wrote in 1895 about Armenians’ “ethnographic decay”, namely losing identity in Hungary: “At long last we must raise our voice to save at least the ruins of our local Armenian ethnographic individuality.”26 (Merza [1895])

The renowned ethnographer Kristóf Szongott started to publish the Armenia review, which successfully contributed to universal research on Armenians in Hungary and worldwide. The group did not succeed in awakening Armenian consciousness and re-Armenisation of local Armenians. The main reasons for this were the narrow number of intellectuals contributing to his project and the limited working capacities of these people. (Գևորգյան-Բագի [1979] p. 26) Armenians were, however, perceived by the ethnic Hungarian majority as an ethnic minority positively contributing to the country’s life.

The upper class of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was well informed about the fate of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The author of this dissertation a few years ago was given the task of searching newspaper front pages, for coverage of the Armenian genocide in Austro-Hungarian newspapers. According to Yerevan Armenian historiography, the research included the Hamidian and the Adana massacres. Although

26 Own translation, original text in Hungarian: „[V]ahára fel kell szavunkat emelnünk a hazai saját örmény néprajzi individualitásunknak bár romjaiban való megmentésére.”
not many front pages were found, the examined daily newspapers had described the massacres. The Hamidian case was also documented, although the newspapers concentrated on the most cruel or most outstanding events of the massacres. The Cilician pogroms were described in these daylies in detail. There were certain differences between newspapers. For example, the significance of the issue in Pester Lloyd published in Hungary was higher than that in Neue Freie Presse published in Vienna. On the other hand, the issue had both more and steadier significance in Prager Tagblatt, published in Prague.

However, the Hungarian daily showed many signs of solidarity with Armenians. On the other hand, the Monarchy proved to be politically passive in relation to the massacres. This was mainly caused by the much higher relevance of the concerns about the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Monarchy. (Merenics [2013] pp. 80, 85-86.) Regarding newspapers, it could be also stated that part of the articles were obviously based on consular reports from the Ottoman Empire and occasionally recited those reports verbatim. (cf. Ohanjanian [2013] pp. 162-169.)

After this general practice of newspapers, surprisingly no articles were found by the author of this study about Armenians in the post-1915 period. That the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was allied with the Ottoman Empire in World War I is a factor. Thus, it might have been politically infeasible to weaken the ally by charging it with any crimes. Germany followed the same strategy. (Schaeffgen [2006] p. 38.) On the other hand, it is astonishing that the same kind of diplomatic reports as during the Cilician massacres reached Vienna (Ohandjanian [2005]) but those about the genocide did not appear in the press.

Regarding this issue Loránd Poósz has found only one article dealing with the Armenian genocide in Budapest, on July 4, 1915, in the daily newspaper, Est. It alleged that Armenians had massacred 30,000 Turks in the Vilayet of Van. The article relies on information provided by its local correspondent. The arguments supporting this fact are rather poor. Furthermore, the article also declared that even though this incident happened, none of the Ottoman newspapers informed their readers about it, in favour of Armenians. Poósz undoubtedly finds these statements to be a result of censorship. Beside this, not even the Transylvanian Armenian, nor Romanian press informed the local population while local Armenians were well aware of deportations and massacres. (Krajcsir, Dzsotján [2010] p. 140) He also states that Austro-Hungarian newspapers he observed attempted to create a friendly atmosphere towards its allies. They depict the
Ottoman empire as “brothers fighting and bleeding in our alliance.”27 (Krajcsir, Dzsotján [2010] p. 139)

In conclusion, Armenians who decided to settle down in Hungary could have calculated with an environment that had shown solidarity with Armenians since the early modern period until World War I. On the other hand, the non-Armenian population most probably was not well informed about the genocide and censored Austro-Hungarian press products created a pro-Ottoman atmosphere. While settling down in a previously massively Armenian-inhabited but by the time ethnically mixed area, they did not have equal support in their adjustment with those who took refuge in still vivid Armenian communities. An extra factor that had complicated the situation in Hungary is the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including the previous Kingdom of Hungary. Due to the collapse of the empire those of Armenian origin living in Transylvania either stayed there and became citizens of Romania or migrated to Hungary.

2.6. Common features of Armenian Refugee Communities’ Identity

Based on the description of the circumstances determining Armenian refugees’ lives in the above-mentioned countries, it can be stated that there have been numerous differences to which they had to adapt. These originate from the social and political environment of the new home countries and also from the establishment of Armenian communities in each place. They still have general identity components, as refugees of the genocide had come from the same social and political environment. Even their pre-genocide social class had not caused differences between those who had survived the deportations and massacres within the Ottoman Empire.

One of the common features is the Armenian Apostolic religion. Though other Christian churches also influenced and converted Armenians, during the genocide this was the most common religion among survivors. The reason for this is partly that various Protestant churches had intensively extended their activities to Armenian-settled areas of the Ottoman Empire as late as in the 19th century. (Fodor [2010] p. 56.)

27 Original text: „a szövetségünkben küzdő és vérző testvérek”
Furthermore the Armenian Catholic Church had been active mostly in Central- and West-European diaspora communities. (Matevosyan [2013])

Most refugees spoke Armenian as their first language. Many of them in ethnically mixed areas also commanded either the Turkish, Kurdish or Arabic languages or spoke these as first language. The predominant language among them was still Armenian, specifically variants of the Western Armenian dialect. Armenians also have a religious attachment to their literature and written documents. The reason for this is that according to legend, Mesrop Mashtots, inventor of the Armenian alphabet, experienced divine inspiration to create the letters. He is a canonised saint of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

Naturally, later on, as was the case in Central and Western Europe, writing and the possession of the written language was the privilege of the clergy. There has been a very rich culture of Armenian manuscripts since the Middle Ages. Naturally, these sources had been overwhelmingly of a religious or scientific nature as insofar as the church had practiced science. Armenian book printing also has a long tradition. The 500th anniversary of the first printed book was celebrated with an official jubilee year by Armenians in 2012. Therefore most Armenians have been proud of their written heritage, as was the case during and after the genocide. For example the Matenadaran28 in Yerevan holds a quite sizeable and heavy item, the Msho Char’entir, the Homilies of Mush in English that had been preserved by two refugees in two parts until they reached Eastern Armenia safely.

Armenians also have the conviction of a common origin and common history, which is a common factor in the identity of ethnic groups. Attachment to the homeland is also quite strong among them. It can be assumed that these factors were even more intensive when the refugees had just left their homeland. They were all attached to Western Armenia, and the difference caused by perceiving the kin-state nature of the Armenian SSR in divergent ways had not yet divided Armenians.

The experience of the genocide was also a central element of refugees’ identity. Since then this factor has become a part of Armenian identity, as the refugees took this grave memory with themselves. As they intermingled with already existent Armenian communities or with the inhabitants of the Soviet republic, almost every Armenian

28 Officially named as Mesrop Mashtots Scientific Research Institute for Ancient Manuscripts. (Մեսրոպ Մաշտոցի անվան հին ձեռագրերի գիտահետազոտական ինստիտուտ)
family has had a personal connection with the traumatic experience both in the diaspora and in the homeland.

In conclusion, usually the Armenian language, both written and spoken, Armenian Apostolic, or at a smaller extent some other Christian religion, the consciousness of common origin and history, and the memory of the genocide are mentioned as the most strongly determinant elements of Armenian identity. Attachment to the historical homeland can be considered a general element of Armenian identity. These are commonly accepted by scholars, while obviously each scholar sets his or her definition of Armenian identity. (cf. Abrahamian [2006], Walker [1991] pp. 15-70, Malkasian [1996] p. 45, Suny [1993] pp. 3-5, 7-10, Libaridjan [2004] p. 5)

3. First-Generation Revenge: Operation Nemesis

3.1. Origins and Working Methods

The following chapter deals with one of the first collective reactions to the Armenian genocide. It is not going to follow the system of analysis applied in the previous chapter and the next ones. That is to say, the activity of first generation avengers is not going to be analysed through the localities of origin of Armenians participating, but from a global perspective. The reason for this is that the ties between the members of Operation Nemesis were related to a wide range of geographical and political units. Armenians from Western Armenia, the failed Republic of Armenia and the United States also participated. This means that the majority of the Armenian communities in the sample of the present study contributed to the movement. On the other hand, Armenians in Italy, Switzerland, Germany and many other places also took part in the actions. The network of contributors was quite complex.

In the case being analysed, one of the six individual types of processing is represented, namely aggression. In contradiction to this, to realise and organise aggression on a collective base requires much more than individual seeds of aggression. In cases of collective aggression funding and operating revenge organisations must also be supported by certain convenient external circumstances.
The hereby examined Operation Nemesis, a series of revenge actions, with one exception were executed immediately after the beginning of the examination period. Armenians who survived and remained within the Sèvres borders still faced many hardships, including Anti-Christian and Anti-Armenian atrocities. On the other hand, a group of assassins and the network of their supporters was already aiming to punish the former leaders of the Young Turk Regime. Their target persons were mostly those responsible for the Armenian genocide, among them the leadership of the previously ruling Committee of Union and Progress party. As has been already mentioned, the punishment of these persons had remained practically unfulfilled with conventional legal means.

It is worth mentioning that such violent actions with their radical means and results may also emerge on the grounds of other reasons and conditions. A revenge movement of the early 20th century obviously cannot be compared with later ones. The conditions ensuring maintenance, loopholes offering certain means of success and even the ways of committing actions may be different.

Considering the probable similarities between first and third generation revenge groups, some necessary conditions of Operation Nemesis are hereby applied. Analysing the phenomenon, Michael M. Gunter states the following about its ideologically closest parallel, the third generation Armenian revenge organisations of the 1970s and 80s: “Terrorism is a phenomenon that usually stems from the failure of its perpetrators to develop sufficient political or military strength to present their case in a more conventional manner.” (Gunther [1986] p. 30.) This condition was also present in the case of Operation Nemesis. After World War I Armenians spread to new host countries worldwide, and they proved unable to articulate their aims in the sphere of international politics – see for example the unsuccessful efforts of Armenians at the Lausanne Peace Conference. These aims had not been attained by the short-lived independent Republic of Armenia of 1918-1920 either, as it seen in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the state turned to conventional means, but executed its plans in a nonconventional way. As will be introduced in the present chapter, the Dashnak party leading the Republic Of Armenia admitted its previously loyal members and collaborators to the secret service of the Republic. This, of course, is a conventional organ of any state. Members of the organisation committed assassinations against the young Turk leaders, which is not a conventional way to resolve interstate conflicts. We must take into account that the trials of thy Young Turks that could have meant a conventional solution to achieve
justice in the case of the Armenian genocide also failed. Therefore, turning to non-conventional ways and means could have been reasonable.

For a long period participants committing the murders of Operation Nemesis had been considered lonely assassins who attempted to take personal revenge. It has been proven though, that the operation was a series of especially well organised actions. The group was politically rooted in the Dashnak Party. Armenian parties had very modest popularity among Armenians in the Ottoman era (Melson [1996] p. 50.), but even in this case, the violent actions previously committed signalled that the potential of radical solutions had been preceded within the Dashnak Party before that period.

Various authors charge Operation Nemesis with having committed different varieties of assassinations. Some of them consider only the committed against previous Young Turk leaders as realised by Operation Nemesis. Jacques Derogy, having completed research in the Dashnak archives in Boston, found that the attempts on the lives of those responsible for the 1918 Baku massacres of Armenians were also perpetrated by Nemesis’ members. This is also confirmed by Arshavir Shiragian, one of the avengers.

There are numerous interpretations of these atrocities. Armenians consider them the result of ethnic tensions within the newly established state of Azerbaijan. The intelligence and financial elite of the capital was constituted mostly of ethnic Armenians. This clearly contradicted the principles of constituting an ethnic Azerbaijani state. (The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute [2010-2015]) The massacres aimed to wipe out Armenians from Baku. Azerbaijani historiography sees this event as the total opposite of the Armenian counterpart. This view usually holds that Armenians were the ones who started to massacre Azerbaijanis in Baku to ensure their dominance. Finally, some other sources consider these events a civil war. (Cornell [2005] p. 58.) The opinion of historians working outside of the South Caucasian region is placed between these variants.

Finally, assassins of Operation Nemesis also committed less known actions. The latter ones targeted Armenians who had collaborated with the Young Turk authorities. The chronology of assassinations is illustrated in Chart 1.

According to scholarly sources the reason for the movement is usually limited to the genocide or the impunity of those responsible. Frequently, the assassinations are considered the action of a homogenous group, despite its geographic extension. Despite this fact, according to some sources dealing with the inner working principles of the
revenge organisation, various ways of how organisers and perpetrators adapted to the opportunities given by the actual local environment can be reconstructed. Preparation of the assassinations was coordinated by Armen Garo, ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to Washington, who stayed in the USA even after the failure of the Republic. (Hosfeld [2005] pp. 24-25.) The radical wing of Dashnaks maintained local networks in Boston, Paris and Geneva as well. Shahan Natali,

29 member of the central committee of the party, was responsible for fundraising. Financial support for direct preparation of the assassinations reached the perpetrators through him. (Derogy [1990] p. 73.) It is visible therefore that the actions demanded a wide range of efforts in the fields of organising the financial, material, and personal background, which occasionally failed to remain secret. For example, the German Embassy to the United States had informed the German Auswärtiges Amt [Foreign Office] before the attack committed by Arshavir Shiragian

30 in Rome that there was a group of assassins directed from Boston operating in Berlin. This resulted in the arrest of numerous Armenians living in Berlin, but none of them were a member of the organisation. (Hosfeld [2005] p. 304.)

Why US Intelligence did not inform Germany is an interesting question. Their attention may have been distracted from the action, or they may not have deemed it necessary to warn Germany. Soghomon Tehlirian’s, Talaat Pasha’s assassin’s trial had been already finished by that time, and this fact may not have suggested the further probability of such preparations. On the other hand, a fundraising campaign in Boston could easily have been hidden or masked. The headquarters of both the American organisation of the Dashnak Party and Near East Relief were to be found in Boston that time, and both were interested in saving Armenians. Near East Relief had been regularly organising fundraising campaigns for survivors remaining in the Near East, obviously and exclusively for humanitarian reasons. Therefore Dashnak fundraising for other aims could be masked as a charity action for saving Armenian refugees in the Near East. Most probably the sympathy that had awakened in Americans could have also supported such a campaign remaining undercover.

Preparation for the assassinations was successful even in spite of the concerns of the German Foreign Office. Looking back to the early 20th century era from the present age of cooperation against terrorism and organised crime, or international databases on

29 Originally Hakob Ter Hakobyan in Eastern Armenian, Hakop Der Hakopian in Western Armenian transliteration.

30 Shirakyan in Eastern Armenian.
these issues and such criminals, it must be stressed that both the uncontrolled or only slightly limited movement of financial sources and persons had created very convenient environment for Operation Nemesis.

Concerning the perpetrators of Operation Nemesis, Arshavir Shiragian was the most active assassin of the movement. There were no men at military age in his family during World War I, and the house of his family had served as a secret hiding place of notable Armenians. During wartime he smuggled weapons and served as a courier for Armenian intellectuals and politicians. He also had good relations with Dashnak party members and was often commissioned by them. Thus, from the age of fourteen he had had the opportunity to adapt to and be raised for the party. He first killed Vahe Ihsan, an Armenian collaborator with whom he and his family had conflicts during the war. As Shiragian depicts the situation, Ihsan constantly observed their house and once even held an investigation in it. In this case the young assassin had a personal motive. After the murder he went into hiding for a time, then acquired a forged Nansen-passport and travelled to Armenia. There he became a registered member of the secret service. He was under the command of Ruben Der Minassian, Minister of War. (Shiragian [2013])

Shiragian was ordered to travel together with Aram Yerganian through Tiflis to Baku, where the latter should have been married to a Tatar woman to create a safe local basis for Operation Nemesis in their home. His attempt already failed in Tiflis, where he was imprisoned together with Yerganian. Finally, he was released due to the solidarity of his Armenian fellow prisoners and the efforts of an Armenian deputy to the parliament of Tiflis. (Derogy [1990] pp. 133-142.) After the incident and after the failure of the Republic he assassinated Said Halim Pasha in Rome. He worked together with the local Armenian Embassy from early 1921 and kept in contact with the Dashnak Central Committee members who coordinated the action. (Shiragian [2013])

Soghomon Tehlirian and Misak Torlakian were even tried for their actions, but the organisers of the operations used the legal circumstances of the states trying them and public opinion of these countries effectively during the trials. Soghomon Tehlirian is the more popular of the two. He is the most widely known perpetrator of the movement in both the Armenian and international public. Many Armenians consider

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31 Yerkanyan in Eastern Armenian.
32 Expressing Azerbaijani in that period. (Nahapetyan [2015])
33 Which was still operating at the time, though the Republic no longer existed.
34 In his memoirs Shiragian refers to the Central Committee as "the organization".
him their own Robin Hood, mainly as a result of his trial in Berlin, after which he was acquitted by the criminal court, and due to which the fact of the Armenian genocide was presented to a broader public in Germany. Being a previous ally to the Ottoman Empire, the country had backed the Young Turk regime and also supported the annihilation of Armenians. (Dadrian [1996])

Tehlirian had made long preparations by exploring his victim’s daily routine, lifestyle, and usual routes taken by them within Berlin in a well-organised way with a group of Armenian supporters. Talaat Pasha had lived incognito in Berlin, and he was able to take refuge in the city because of the atmosphere protesting against the Peace Treaty of Versailles. This environment still justified Germany’s actions in accelerating and fighting the world war. Therefore, old allies could also feel safe there. (Hosfeld [2005] p. 17.)

Tehlirian shot Talaat Pasha in the street, and he did not try to escape from the spot after the assassination at all. It is not known whether he had been commanded to do this, but the fact that his legal defence was organised rather promptly and effectively suggests the high likelihood of this assumption. He and the organisers of the action trusted the support of German eyewitnesses to the Armenian genocide, who were summoned to the trial as expert witnesses. This hope was not weakened by the fact that Germany still tried to hide evidence about the genocide in the post-war period. (Shaefgen [2006] p. 39.) Dashnaks started fundraising for Tehlirian’s defence immediately after the assassination. They were supported with remarkable amounts, mostly from wealthy diaspora Armenians. 200,000 German Marks of the final amount of 700,000 were gathered in Boston. The local Tehlirian Defense Committee in Berlin collected 400,000 Marks, while the remaining amount was transferred to Paris, from where Aram Andonian, journalist, one of the Armenian intellectuals arrested and deported on the 24th of April, 1915, took the secret ciphered telegrams proving the existence of central orders on the deportations and massacres to Berlin with the contribution of Boghos Nubar Pasha. (Yeghiaian [2006] p. xxvii)

During the trial Tehlirian’s defence attempted to rely on his existing epileptic seizures, and aimed to prove that he was non compos mentis when committing the murder. While hearing the eyewitnesses, besides those who had been present at the assassination, Tehlirian’s personal acquaintances were also questioned, and their accounts proved the existence of his epilepsy. On the other hand, expert witnesses, except for the medical and weapons experts, served the purpose of proving that the
deportations and massacres had been terrible and cruel enough to result in Tehlirian’s epileptic shocks, and finally in his committing the murder while suffering mental disturbances. For the former reason, the event was considered Talaat Pasha’s trial.

One of these expert witnesses was Johannes Lepsius, the Lutheran pastor who had ensured alimentation and medical services for Armenians in need and had maintained orphanages since the Hamidian massacres. From 1912 to 1914 he participated in the constitution of a system of reforms for Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, and later he tried to support Armenians during the genocide. (The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute [2008]) His activity was even recorded in Franz Werfel’s novel, The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, probably the most popular literary work about the Armenian genocide in the international sphere.

The second expert witness was general Otto Liman von Sanders, commander of the Fifth Army of the Ottoman Empire. It is worth mentioning his experience of the events, even if his attestation did not influence the result of the trial. According to him, the deportation of Armenians had been ordered by the Young Turk leadership, but he made the local executive bodies responsible for the cruelties committed against the victims, and he denied that German units had been present at the locations of deportation. Similarly to numerous, still popular explanations excusing the Young Turk regime, his attestation did not explain that if the CUP had been suspicious about Armenians — assuming that they would have allied with the Russians on the Eastern front — then why would it have been necessary to deport all Armenians, living even hundreds of kilometres away from the Russian front on non-operational territories and why the deportations took place irrespective of age and sex. His attestation also contradicts Armin Wegner’s photo documentation of the genocide (Armenian National Institute [1998-2014]) who had hidden his negatives on the inside of his belt risking immediate execution. Later he had written the foreword to the first issue of the trial’s records.

The next expert witness was Bishop Krikoris Balakian, who had been among the deported intellectuals and was aware of the existence of the telegrams ordering the genocide. Among non-professional witnesses the wife of one of Tehlirian’s friends, Christine Tersibaschian of Erzerum, was heard, who did not know about the background of the murder. She had not known Tehlirian before, but she had passed his home village with her fellow deportees and confirmed that the action initially and officially known as resettlement had turned into a massacre within a few hours. Her
description coincided with Tehlirian’s. She had also completely shared the experience of Bishop Balakian. Based on their and Lepsius’ attestation the court was convinced that the genocide had taken place and Talaat was one of those responsible for it. Therefore the cipher telegrams delivered to the court by Aram Andonian were not recorded among the evidence proving extenuating circumstances. (Hoffmann [1980] pp. 53-70.)

The psychiatric experts’ opinion was not unequivocal, but most of them held it possible that the accused had become epileptic due to the massacres and that he was *non compos mentis* when committing the murder. (Shaefgen [2006] p. 43.) Tehlirian really had epileptic seizures. According to the interpretation of his defenders, he had witnessed the extermination of his family, and was lying under the corpses of his closest relatives when he experienced his first epileptic seizure. They also claimed that Tehlirian dreamed he was ordered by his mother to murder Talaat the night before the attack. According to one of his roommates it occasionally happened that Tehlirian spoke or had epileptic seizures while sleeping. The position stressed by the defence most probably gained ultimate confirmation by the account of this witness. (Hoffmann [1980] p. 41.) On the other hand, the thorough organisation of the assassination suggests that he was in a clear state of mind.

After the two-day trial Tehlirian was acquitted due to his epilepsy. The verdict met with quite a dubious response. This can be explained by the already mentioned protest against the Treaty of Versailles in Berlin and the sources already published about the Armenian genocide after the war. Being aware of Taner Akcam’s research it is not surprising that some newspapers published in Ankara and Constantinople supported the verdict. (Yeghiaian [2006] p. xxiii, Hosfeld [2005] pp. 12-13.)

Shortly after Tehlirian’s trial Misak Torlakian, the assassin of Bihbud Khan Jivanshir was captured. The victim held a position in the Azerbaijani government as Minister of the Interior. After the attack Torlakian did not surrender himself to the Turkish police in Istanbul. Later the French captured and maltreated him, when he was finally extradited to the British who tried him in London. Even when he was captured Torlakian had been claiming that he had killed the person responsible for the Baku massacres that he himself had also experienced. Similarly to Tehlirian’s trial, the evidence of the mass killings of Baku was supported by numerous Armenian and Russian eyewitnesses having resided there, thus the court accepted the concept of
defence. Torlakian was found guilty but not responsible. He was finally expatriated to Greece from where he finally escaped to the United States.

In his case, as already mentioned, the experience of Tehlirian’s trial could have already been applied. Torlakian simulated epileptic symptoms. According to the psychologist’s expert testimony he also referred to psychological diseases of his parents. (Եղիայան, Արաբյան [2008]) Furthermore, according to his newly created biography, he had been born in Baku, had witnessed the local massacre of Armenians, and experiencing the extermination of his family he had started to have epileptic seizures. In reality he was from Trebizond and he had settled down in Constantinople after the war. He was the brother-in-law of Manoug Arslanian35, responsible for the execution of the local plans of Operation Nemesis. Except for one sister who stayed alive but was kidnapped to a harem he really lost his family due to the genocide. He himself could avoid deportation because he had served as a volunteer in the Ottoman artillery, and later he joined an Armenian self-defence unit operating in his birthplace. He also served in the army of the Republic of Armenia as a drill officer, but having conflicted with the government he was dismissed. By that time he had already been in contact with Stepan Dzaghigian and Aram Yerganian. After having left Armenia, he intended to create his own network to bring war criminals to account. (Derogy [1990] pp. 114-116.)

It becomes clear observing Torlakian’s case that he had had the intent to take revenge even independently from his connections with the Dashnaks. Based on Shiragian’s experience, the fact that he knew and cooperated with Dzaghigian and Yerganian also suggests that he had close ties to the secret service. It is also obvious that the organisers of Operation Nemesis could take advantage of the environment of Constantinople, including the presence of Entente forces. This strategy of theirs was also successfully combined with the exploitation of the weaknesses of the local authorities. This was valid for Tehlirian’s attack against Mgrditch Haroutounian as well.

All three assassins of Jemal Pasha, Minister of the Navy and the mayor of Constantinople, member of the Young Turk triumvirate, were able to temporarily escape. The second to last attack against Behaeddin Shakir and Djemal Azmi in Berlin should have taken into account the sympathy of the German public and jurisdiction already influenced by Tehlirian’s trial, but that was unnecessary in that case, as they

35 Manuk Arslanyan in Eastern Armenian.
escaped the investigation, as mentioned above. The attack was well-designed and as Arshavir Shiragian mentions, most of the prominent members of the operation arrived in Berlin to prepare it. (Shiragian [2013])

Besides the death of those mainly responsible for the Armenian genocide, Operation Nemesis stopped mainly due to decreasing financial sources. There may have been personal conflicts and personal interests in the background as well, as other party members attempted to make Shahan Natali, responsible for the financial sources, accountable, but he proved to be unwilling. Other intra-party conflicts could also have contributed to the end of the attacks. (Derogy [1990] p. 166.) Concerning external circumstances it must be also taken into account that after Mustafa Kemal’s successful military campaign and the Treaty of Lausanne and Kemal’s later reform movement, the international political environment was seriously influenced and attention was drawn to the fact that Turkey could be a useful and strong ally to various states indulgent with Turkey. (Hovannisian [1991] p. 104, Hovannisian [1999] p. 132) Therefore it would have been harder to achieve less strict sentences or release for future assassins. As Shiragian complained about the atmosphere of Berlin in 1922: “The civilized world had turned its back on the Armenian nation during the deportations and massacres, and now we felt that it had deceived us after the war. People were still mourning their dead while the Allies competed to win the favor of Turkey, which was on the rise again. […] The Western world seemed to reward Turkey, acceding to its demands for territory and power.” (Shiragian [2013])

Generally the individual circumstances were given to the initiation of the Operation, as part of the assassins had lost their families during the genocide, had witnessed arrests in Constantinople or had seen their homes destroyed. For the reason that not one of them was deported, it is more probable that they acted on behalf of the community, therefore they gave a collective response to the Armenian genocide.

Concerning the collective manner of the actions, the activity of Operation Nemesis cannot be observed as a homogenous unit of actions. As observed, there was an initial method of hunting for Armenian traitors. In these cases, as indicated by Arshavir Shiragian, the murderers were commissioned by the Dashnak Party in Constantinople, which received support personnel from the Republic of Armenia and commissioned assassins who were not members of any official state body. (Shiragian [2013]) This kind of cooperation was also obviously transnational, as it was carried out by members of the governing Dashnak party and secret services of the Republic of
Armenia, the Dashnak party organisation operating in the Ottoman Empire and civilians positioned close to the latter.

The second way of managing assassinations was when numerous avengers, such as Shiragian, and most probably Dzaghigian and Torlakian, were members or at least close cooperators of the secret service of the Republic of Armenia. Therefore, such assassination plans and their execution are called semi-conventional. Partly conventional because of being committed by a state organ, but unconventional as a means to resolve international conflicts. The attack against Fatali Khan Khoisky is the only successful assassination committed this way. The failed mission of Shiragian, and Yerganian to Baku through Tiflis to make up a centre for the operation can be also added to the list of such attempts. These actions show similarities with the Eichmann-trial in the case of the Jewish Holocaust. Eichmann was kidnapped and delivered to Israel by members of and closely related persons to the secret service – a state organisation – but the way how it was managed did not follow international legal norms (Lipstadt [2011]), therefore it could be considered as nonconventional.

Besides these, the majority of assaults were committed after the failure of the Republic of Armenia. The organisers of the movement and coordinators of the assassinations this time were Armenian ex-diplomats and the Dashnak Central Committee, having lost the role of state actors. The latter shall thus be considered a non-state actor. These assassinations were completely nonconventional because neither the method, nor the organisation, planning and execution of them were conventional. The attacks were designed, financed and executed by a transnational network of non-state actors all across the Armenian diaspora in various countries and continents.

In the third case, the collectivity of the actions was present not only in the motives of the Operation, but also in committing the assassinations. Organisers successfully found financial supporters among Armenians in the diaspora, most probably within the wealthy stratum, because it was mostly they who could avoid the Ottoman Empire taking their fortunes, or conversely they were those that had settled down in Armenian pre-genocide communities, and could amass wealth.

The assassinations could not have been realised without the external, necessary conditions, such as the fact that the movement of financial sources was uncontrolled and could be disguised. Furthermore, the movement of persons was not strictly controlled in the era. The assassinations could further not have been realised without taking advantage of public opinion and legal opportunities in the affected countries – serving
as local supporting factors – nor without the opportunities given in the short time when
the international balance of power in the post-World War I period was unclear. Similarly, the deficiencies of international law also contributed to the manifestation of revenge and aggression. There had not been any mechanisms to enforce the punishment of genocides in particular. Paradoxically, the violent actions of Operation Nemesis were needed to achieve broader consciousness of the issue of the Armenian genocide in the international public. This also gave impetus to the creation of the definition of genocide. (Hoffmann [1980] p. ix)

3.2. Conclusions

The first part of the conclusions about Operation Nemesis can be drawn when it concentrated on the assassination of Armenian traitors and when a state organ of the Republic of Armenia using nonconventional means to carried them out. These phases are outside the period of examination, though they support the analysis of the fully nonconventional phase of the movement. In the case of conventional operations the home state of the Armenians was responsible for the operation, while there was no host state when designing and planning assassinations, but only where the realisation was planned or carried out. The host states for the latter should have been Georgia and Azerbaijan, but they are not part of the sample. Still, we can conclude, based on the knowledge acquired concerning the attempts of this type of revenge operations, that the local environment also had an influence. The imprisonment of Yerganian and Shiragian in Tiflis can be mentioned as an example. Local authorities in that case actively burdened the attempt. On the other hand, their escape and the fact that Yergainan fled after the successful attempt was supported by the local network of the Armenian secret service, Dashnak party members and fellow countrymen.

Hunting down Armenian traitors was similar in its features to the final nonconventional phase, as designing and executing the operations involved members of the Armenian secret service and local Armenians in Constantinople, and both Dashnak party members and civilians standing close to the party.

As has already been concluded, Operation Nemesis had collective features. On the other hand it also had some particularities that were characteristic of the movement in the nonconventional period. It can be stated that local differences in the preparation phase of the assassinations existed. Fundraising was completed mainly in the United
States, France and Switzerland. The plans of execution originated in the United States, a
country that provided refuge to some of the failed Dashnak leaders. At the places of
assassinations, each avenger adopted to local lifestyles to stay hidden. Later, during the
trials, for example, attempts to influence local courts and local public opinion took
place. It also turned out that the assassins could take advantage of local circumstances,
e.g., the chaotic situation in Constantinople under Entente occupation.

It is also worth mentioning that the members of the group originated from a
limited range of countries, and there were no participants from other home countries,
such as Lebanon or Hungary from the present sample, for instance. On the other hand,
there were certain repercussions of the most well-known assassinations. In Hungary
Domonkos Korbuly labelled the assassination of Tehlirian a “heroic act,” and he
claimed that the victims of the attacks cannot be considered victims, as they would have
received the same sentence under Armenian jurisdiction. (Korbuly [1942] pp. 102, 104)
This can be considered rage. The evidence for such impacts in Lebanese Armenian
society need a more thorough analysis through study of the local press, as scholarly
sources do not provide any information on this issue.

Therefore, whatever the strategic relations within the movement, being
intertwined irrespective of the location of the members, these locations had a large
influence on the movement. The types of activities were diversified by location.
Thereby, it can be stated that Armenians participating in the movement adapted to the
given host states’ norms or the circumstances of the places of operation. This suggests
that the first hypothesis can be applied to the case of Operation Nemesis in the
examination period. On the other hand, there is no other apparent collective response
from that era that could be compared to Nemesis. The truth value of this hypothesis
being proved is limited by these facts. However, referring to the particular case of
Operation Nemesis, it proves to be feasible.

Newly established diaspora communities were probably not yet deeply attached
to their host states. It also appears that concerning the operation methods of Operation
Nemesis, the transnational network of the organisation maintained very intensive
internal communication using earlier networks, such as that of previous Armenian
diplomats and Dashnak party organs. Especially the likeness between the strategies
applied during Tehlirian’s and Misak Torlakian’s trials proves that communication must
have existed within the group. In these cases it led to the same results. Therefore, even
if in this particular case Armenian communities were not as separated from each other
as, for example, half a decade later, it can be declared that communication within the movement was intense, regardless of geographic distances. Further, the results of the activity were in parallel similar or identical to each other. Therefore, the second hypothesis is also confirmed in this case.

It is obvious that the demand for responding to the trauma was surely present in the case of Operation Nemesis. It must be also noted that not each and every Armenian took part in the assassinations. On the other hand, the states touched by Operation Nemesis were all influenced by the methods of manoeuvres by the avengers. Contrary to this, the host countries of the movement did not influence the type of response, but only the way of sharing working phases between geographic locations to express one given response, i.e., aggression. Therefore, in this case the third hypothesis can be accepted with this limitation.

Despite all drawbacks the group continuously influenced Armenian public opinion. In the present day, Armenians have different approaches to Operation Nemesis. Some of them consider its actions necessary, as the perpetrators of the genocide were not punished. They maintain their assumptions even if they personally reject homicide as a solution to any conflict. Another group considers the assassins national heroes or freedom fighters. A less radical third opinion also exists. Those standing for this state condemn murders in general. They usually reflect on the fact that the assassinations had called attention to the issue of Armenians and the existence of the genocide as a harmful phenomenon in human history.
## Chart 1. Assassinations Committed by Operation Nemesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Perpetrator(s)</th>
<th>Victims, earlier position, (cause of assassination)</th>
<th>Place of assassination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 March 1920</td>
<td>Arshavir Shiragian</td>
<td>Vahe Ihsan (born: Yesayan), provided the Young Turks with a list of Armenians</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June 1920</td>
<td>Aram Yerganian</td>
<td>Fatali Khan Khoyski; head of the Azerbaijani government</td>
<td>Tiflis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Soghomon Tehlirian</td>
<td>Mgrditch Haroutounian, provided the Young Turks with the list of Armenian intellectuals before April 24 1915</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 1921</td>
<td>Soghomon Tehlirian</td>
<td>Mehmed Talaat pasha, Minister of Interior of the CUP government</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July 1921</td>
<td>Misak Torlakian</td>
<td>Bibbud Khan Jivanshir, Minister of Internal Affairs of the government of Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 6 December</td>
<td>Arshavir Shiragian</td>
<td>Said Halim pasha; Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire 1913-1916</td>
<td>Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 1922</td>
<td>Aram Yerganian</td>
<td>Behaeddin Shakir founding member of the CUP</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arshavir Shiragian</td>
<td>Djemal Azmi (Governor of Trapezunt)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 1922</td>
<td>Stepan Dzaghigian</td>
<td>Ahmed Jemal Pasha, governor of Constantinople, Minister of Navy</td>
<td>Tiflis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bedros Der Boghosian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artashes Gevorgyan/Kevorkian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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36 Various sources differ in date.
37 Only those assassinations are listed in the chart, of which all data are known. There is one attempt against a supposed Armenian traitor that does not correspond with these criteria.
4. The Sounds of Silence

Scholars of the history of Armenians in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, deem the fact that Armenians remained silent about their collective trauma until 1965, the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the genocide, almost commonplace. This statement is true only with certain limitations, as will be described and analysed in the present chapter. If repression is the strategy that characterised that period, it must certainly not have any imprints in any documents. Naturally, it is necessary to analyse the reasons for repression. On the other hand, in certain cases there are existing written sources, records of political actions and even architectural works related to the Armenian genocide from various states from the sample.

Numerous scholars besides Dallak’yan have mentioned that the reason for repression was that Armenian communities had not yet been established in the host countries. The same reasons are mentioned for silence in the case of the Holocaust as well. (Molnár [2005] p. 725.) Still, some scholars of the Armenian genocide also pay attention to the fact that the period of repression was longer than that of the Holocaust. They usually consider this a result of the lack of political acceptance of the Armenian genocide worldwide. Some of them also mention impunity and the failure to create an absolutely free homeland that could support collective trauma processing. We will now proceed to examine the degrees of divergence this process had in each country in the sample of this study and the exact reasons for repression.


After Aurora Mardiganian’s cry for help, literary works on the Armenian genocide were not published until a very late period. The survivor generation did not publish their memoirs until the 1970s, even though numerous survivors recorded those in written form. A very practical reason for this was, as Rubina Peroomian states, that Armenians lacked command of the English language in that period. She also stresses the fact that very few Armenian intellectuals survived, and members of lower classes had
not acquired the knowledge about the creation of literary works in the period. (Perroomian [2012] pp. 34, 49.) This was most probably accompanied by the lack of a full-scale network, for writing to translation, publishing and trade.

Most first generation Armenians published their memoirs later, from the 1970s on, and unknown memoirs continue to be published. This proves that many first generation Armenians wrote individual memoirs in this period. For the above-mentioned reasons, publishing these works was not realised immediately after writing of the memoirs. In many cases, they were published by the second or third generation returning to their repressed history, after having been brought up with the aim of complete and quick adaptation to the host society. These members of the first generation were not as lucky as Aurora Mardiganian, who had mentors around her. They arrived in the United States without a firm financial background, and had no benefactors in the host country. It must be added that they most probably did not have any infrastructure for publishing in Armenian yet. On the other hand, publishing for only the Armenian community also very likely did not encourage ‘foreign’, that is majority publishers to support such projects. Why already established Armenians did not support such efforts is an interesting question. The reason for this can be that publishing for the community could not have been as attractive in the short run as organising a revenge movement that aimed to impact international politics. On the other hand, the following mostly political reasons could also have discouraged the whole community from speaking out.

The generation of survivors had faced something totally different from the facts known about the popularity of Mardiganian’s story. Usually wealthy US Citizens had been aware of the genocide. They had supported the relief operations, could have afforded Mardiganian’s book, watching The Auction of Souls and donated when fundraising was organised. On the other hand, Armenians having arrived in the country as refugees usually lived under quite poor circumstances.

In the places they worked as low-skilled factory workers, they usually conflicted with the Irish. Due to their financial background, Armenians accepted much lower wages. Moreover, if the Irish started a strike, Armenians were usually employed temporarily to replace them. As a result of this divergence of the two groups, Armenians neither integrated with, nor assimilated into, but instead separated from the

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38 Addition suggested by Harutyun Marutyan.
It must be mentioned that Armenian charity organisations such as the Armenian General Benevolent Union [AGBU] regularly aided Armenians in need. In Fresno, California, for example, this activity effectively reduced poverty among Armenians. ([Uğurlu] [2000] p. 78.) This indicates solidarity within the community and wealthy benefactors.

On the other hand, Armenians were subjected not only to social discrimination, but also political discrimination as well. The Johnson-Reed Act in 1924 determined an annual quota of 150 Armenian immigrants to the United States. (Powell [2005] p. 18.) Compared to the previously known data this was a serious cutback. For this reason Armenians did not feel welcome in the United States any more, therefore they could not decide to raise their voices.

An additional political reason for Armenians’ status in the United States was altering due to a matter of foreign policy. Political stability was established in Turkey by the middle of the 1920s. It was clear that the new state could be a useful ally to the United States as well, as has been mentioned above. Therefore, the latter stopped criticising its future partner, one that had continued discrimination against its ethnic minorities and had not distanced itself from the crimes committed by the Young Turk Regime. (Akcam [2004] pp. 12, 59-61.)

The latter facts likely contributed significantly to the lack of articulation of Armenians’ issues towards the majority in the political field. Alongside the lack of literary responses, this was the second sign of repression. No Armenian lobby groups were organised for the recognition of the genocide or to regain Armenian independence or any forms of political sovereignty. Scientific research on the topic by Armenians had not existed in that period.

Contradictory to these facts, there was a surprising development related to knowledge about US Armenians in the period. Unfortunately, as this development is quite new, no scholarly analyses are available at the moment. Furthermore, the author of this study has not had the opportunity to conduct research on this issue in person. The Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of CIA, constantly observed the press

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39 Assimilation means adopting the host culture completely while rejecting the own culture. Integration is the phenomenon of accepting both the host and the own culture. Separation evolves if the given person or group rejects the host culture and preserves only the own culture. Marginalisation stands for the phenomenon if the given person or group rejects both the host culture and the own culture. For a more detailed description of these definitions see for example: Friedman, Shalini [2004], 42-43, Berry, Kim, Bosky 1987.
products of Armenian political parties in the United States between the World Wars and during World War II. It turns out of in these reports that: “[a]ll the Armenian press in the United States is active in keeping the Turkish Armenian massacres fresh in the minds of its readers. Fearful that the Axis atrocities of the present war [World War II] will eclipse the atrocities of the last when the final reckoning comes, they are anxious to keep alive the Armenian case against Turkey.” The article mentions that the Dashnaks were the main supporters of gaining territories from Turkey in the post-World War II settlement, while the Ramkavar Party had accepted the Armenian SSR as the home state. Unfortunately, nothing else is written about the other parties’ positions on the Armenian genocide, besides the Dashnaks mentioned in the article. (Sassounian [2013]) Still it is clear from the source that the Armenian party press had reflected on the genocide, even if the way of their reflections is not known. Therefore, it must be stated that repression was not complete.

The possible reason for this limited appearance of the question is that in all likelihood the intellectual, financial and infrastructural background was concentrated in the hands of political parties. Individuals did not possess or have access to these facilities at the time.

If more could be known about the local support of the parties, then we could state exactly how much the community itself had influenced the parties to handle this issue or vice versa. On the other hand, masses of refugees without quality educational backgrounds had arrived in the United States at the time of the genocide, and the community had almost lacked intellectuals. The small intelligentsia was most probably concentrated around the parties, cultural and charity organisations. As happened in case of the Dashnaks, even the party leaders had had the same functions in the homeland at the turn of the century. Most probably an elite very similar to the previous was re-established in the diaspora in personal terms. It is questionable whether they had strong ties with factory workers. The fact that, for example, literary works or memoirs about the genocide had not been published in this period suggests that the more direct bearers of collective suffering had been busy with something else, not the memory of the genocide nor the aim of regaining territories from Turkey. Therefore, the majority of Armenians had supposedly avoided dealing with the trauma. As has been mentioned, conscious refusal of dealing with the issue was not present in the United States.
4.2. **Pragmatism and Force in the Armenian SSR**

The Armenian SSR underwent a serious ideological shift after the collapse of the independent republic and the establishment of Soviet power. Two of the three historical parties had been based on socialist ideology. The Dashnak party had been a member of the Socialist Internationale. The Social Democrat Hunchak Party bore this label in its name. Their views still seriously differed from the principles of official power in the Armenian SSR. The third historical political organisation of Armenians, the Liberal Democrat Ramkavar Party, was originally not a bearer of socialist ideology. (Adalian [2010] p. 482.)

Just as Armenians in the diaspora did not unequivocally accept the SSR as a homeland, parties followed similar approaches. The expelled Dashnak party naturally did not accept the Soviet homeland. The Ramkavars and the Hunchaks did the opposite after having considered the issue. The Communist elite in the homeland had followed strict guidelines in this field. Head of the Council of People’s Commissars in Armenia, Aleksandr Myasnikyan, wrote what was most probably the first analysis and determinative action plan written in the Armenian SSR about diaspora Armenians. In his work he strongly opposed the Dashnak party, which had been their enemy as it was their predecessor. Even if he also criticised the two further historical Armenian parties, he considered cooperation with these organisations as vital for the creation of a communist homeland. He projected Armenians of the diaspora as instruments for spreading the communist world revolution. (Մյասնիկյան [1924] pp. 8-9, 6.)

The issue of masses of Armenian refugees had become essential for the newly established communist leadership of the 1920s. This had constantly been a subject for Soviet Armenian political leaders, reminding them of the Armenian genocide despite restrictions. Finally, cooperation between Armenian organisations became broader-scale than a mere political step. The Armenian Assistance Commission (Hay Ognut’yan Komite) had been established by diaspora and Soviet Armenian intellectuals to achieve cooperation for the development of refugees’ social circumstances.

‘Re’-patriation of Armenian refugees in Soviet Armenia was a result of broad scale Armenian cooperation. The process involved public promotion of the possible return, gathering refugees willing to settle in Armenia, organisation of their travel and accommodation. Cooperation and organising work in the diaspora communities was
realised through the local Armenian National Fronts (Դալլաքյան [1997] p. 137.) They spread brochures, kept in touch with Soviet Armenian authorities and contributed to the management of travelling. Numerous survivors interviewed by Verjiné Svazlian were not only “re”-turnees but also active organisers of the operation. The costs were partly covered by membership fees of diaspora Armenians. Moving to Soviet Armenia obviously needed supporting propaganda work. Local Armenian newspapers in the diaspora often served to publish calls for repatriation. After settling to Armenia they even had the chance to found factories for their fellow countrymen. (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 101, 112, 155) The “Great Home Turn”40 (Ստեփանյան [2010] p. 73.) of tens of thousands started in the 1930s and reached its peak between 1946 and 1948.

Numerous districts of Yerevan were built due to the “re”-turning masses. Furthermore, these parts of the city were named after the places from which the inhabitants fled. Therefore, besides some newly built Soviet districts and parts of the capital built until the 1920s, all the districts have names beginning with the prefix of certain places in abandoned Eastern Anatolia / Western Armenia, adding new meaning to place names. Thereby even during Stalinism the capital of the Armenian SSR bore a certain type of reconstruction of the old homeland. Numerous interviewees of Verjiné Svazlian were proud of having contributed to the construction of these districts and moving into them. (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 101, 153, 87, 135, 206, 235, 253, 254, 258) Nowadays the prefixes are used only officially: in Eastern Armenian vernacular only the names of places from the historical homeland remained.

Mostly in the 1920s a city center was designed for the capital of Armenia. Construction lasted until the 1940s-50s. Yerevan was a small town before gaining independence and becoming part of the Soviet Union. Becoming a capital, it needed serious infrastructural modernisation and construction. The centre was constructed according to the plans of Aleksandr Tamanyan. It displays many elements of traditional Armenian architecture and ornamental decorations such as arches, winegrape and pomegranate motives and some characteristic animals of the Caucasus. Tamanyan participated in planning various other buildings and districts in the capital such as Nor Arabkir. Later Yerevan itself and the centre in particular became a national symbol for Armenians.

40 Մեծ հայրենադարձություն, Mets hayrenadardzut’yun
The initiation of the plans coincided with Lenin’s policy of korenizatsiya [indigenisation, nativisation] therefore the representation of national symbols in this form was allowed. The policy of korenizatsiya also allowed a broader aspect of nationalism than visual representation. Introduction of hayrenasirutyun [love for the (Soviet Armenian) homeland] instead of the classical nationalist azgasirutyun [love for the (Armenian) nation] allowed limited representations of the national culture. The language also underwent serious modernisation in the first decade of Soviet Armenia. As already known to the reader, until the genocide the main intellectual centres had been in Eastern Anatolia/Western Armenia. Therefore the Western Armenian dialect was institutionalised and canonised. The Eastern Armenian dialect had to be made fit for literary, scholarly and also political and ideological use. (Suny [1990] pp. 145-151) At a practical level, therefore, the maintenance and representation of national culture, the question of refugees and repatriation still remained issues for Soviet Armenian politics for decades. On the other hand, the issue of the Armenian genocide as a traumatic experience or as a part of collective memory or national identity was a forbidden topic.

At the operative level, non Soviet-Armenian orphanages and the AGBU could also support the refugees through various activities. Aiding refugees, maintaining orphanages, schools, providing professional practice for orphans was also general in this case. AGBU was the only pan-Armenian organisation which did not collaborate with the Dashnak government of the Republic of Armenia, because it was rooted in the Ramkavar party. Therefore, it could maintain its operations in Soviet Armenia as late as 1937. (Մելքոնյան [2005] p. 191) The Near East Relief orphanages were closed in 1929-30 when the Soviet Armenian government banned the operation of foreign orphanages. (Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute [2007-2014/c]) In the 1930s AGBU still had the chance to finance education and scientific work, establishing universities, libraries and the Matenadaran, and furthermore establishing a new print house. (Մելքոնյան [2005] pp. 189-191) Furthermore, AGBU also supported and actively took part in organisational issues concerning repatriation, even constructing a whole district for repatriates. The organisation finally left Soviet Armenia partly because of continuous criticism by the party-state, which ended up in charges of “anti-Soviet activities”. (Մելքոնյան [2005] pp. 197, 579)
Such charges were not rare in the next periods either, after the last wave of repatriates was settled down in the homeland. They became subject to Stalinist suspicions, assuming that they were western imperialist spies, and supporters of the Dashnak Party. This despite the fact, for example, that explicitly Dashnak Party opponents from Lebanon left for the Soviet homeland. (Messerlian [2014] p. 87) The peak of this persecution was in 1949. The suspicions and tense relations with the diaspora finally started to melt down in the 1960s, when diaspora Armenians began to have the possibility to study in the Armenian SSR (Suny [1993] pp. 228-229.). This applied mainly to those living in “non-imperialist” countries.

Until the 1930s the stillness concerning the issue of the Armenian genocide in literature was also typical of Soviet Armenia. At that time a new generation of writers emerged, who started to deal with questions of Armenian historical and cultural heritage. These authors also recalled the memory of genocide. Some of their works reflected on the events as traumatic phenomena, but at the same time dealt with the possibilities and hope offered by the Armenian SSR. In some cases these works reflected on only one aspect of the question. A very genuine example of genocide processing is a short story entitled Lar Margar (Bakunc [2009] pp. 127-132.) by Aksel Bakunts. The main character Margar had become the supervisor of the irrigation canal of the village he settled in. He had started a new life in the new homeland by bringing up his grandson and planting apricot trees, while he constantly remembered the atrocities. He had let go the memory of his old home through a symbolic act, throwing the keys of his old house into the sea while being transported by ship away from the Ottoman Empire. The short story ends with an image of Margar seeing his grandson at the schoolyard and simultaneously viewing his growing apricot trees. This is a literary representation of the ideal type of reconciliation. Bakunts does not contradict communist ideas, such as equality, for Margar pays attention to providing equal quantities of water to all in the village. In addition, there is no sign in this piece of an attempt to defeat communism. On the other hand, in this period merely mentioning the Armenian genocide was labelled as nationalist. Furthermore, Bakunts used the national symbols of Mount Ararat and apricots in this short story.

41 For example only the trauma, only establishing normal life circumstances, etc.
The same strategy also appeared in the works of Zapel Yesayan, who had witnessed the consequences of the Adana massacres in person. After having been informed about those, she had travelled there as a member of the rescue team of the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople. She wrote her novel Among/Amid the Ruins in 1911, in which she described all she had witnessed in 1909. In the novel she gave an interpretation holding that such violent actions shall be the last sacrifices for creating a multiethnic state where citizenship will prevail over ethnicity. (Nichanian [2002] pp. 200-201) This approach is rationalisation by proscribing a purpose to the massacres. “[H]ope and pride” (Nichanian [2002]) only appeared in this work when resistance put up by the attacked were mentioned. On the other hands as Peroomian describes her approach to the aftermath of the massacres: “Esayan witnessed the signs of an Armenian rebirth on the same blood-soaked land and considered the sprouting of new life as evidence of Armenian endurance, perseverance, optimism, and hard work.” (Peroomian [1993] p. 109.)

Besides devoting strong efforts to charity during the Armenian genocide she started to collect testimonies of survivors in 1916 and also made serious efforts to translate and publish them, all while personally in her own works she skipped the topic of the genocide or did not give thorough descriptions of it. Instead, she tried to escape to orphan rescue. (Peroomian [1993] pp. 109, 112., Ալեքսանյան [2013]) After the Armenian Genocide Yesayan, the previously enthusiastic Armenian patriot, turned against Armenian nationalism. In the 1920s she even moved to Soviet Armenia. Her novel Retreating Forces depicts this progress. She criticises the Eastern Armenian elite for joining Czarist Russian forces in order to realise the dream of an independent homeland and for not fighting independently. At the end of the novel she depicts the new generation who view nationalism as a necessary step to anti-nationalism and thereby to a better world. This coincided with official Soviet ideology. (Nichanian [2002] pp. 230-231)

Despite refusing nationalism, her earlier life and approach to Armenian cultural and historical heritage included the genocide and resulted in liquidation. Writers and poets of her generation in Soviet Armenia had to face extermination, imprisonment or Siberian exile for dealing with the national past. The Union of Writers of the Armenian SSR was filled with artists loyal to the regime after having silenced Bakunts, Yesayan, Yeghishe Charents and Vahan Totovents together with other writers or poets. The charges against them were nationalism and the refusal of communist principles.
Charents’ last poem was a lament in memory of Komitas.\(^{42}\) In this work he describes the greatness of the composer and folk song collector whom he sees as transformed into songs after his death. (Չարենց [2013]) He wrote this while in home custody, from where he escaped to pay his last tribute to the priest upon the delivery of his ashes to Armenia and his funeral. The reason for his arrest was most probably a lecture he held on the Armenian language years before. (Nichanian [2002] pp. 34, 41.)

In Totovents’ case, most probably his past played the main role in his arrest. As Nichanian mentions, the works being labelled as anticommunist by the authorities were all written after his return to Armenia, and thus had passed party-censorship. His other works dealing with acclimating to a new homeland such as the United States are not on the list. (Nichanian [2002], p. 255)

It can be assumed that until members of this generation started to raise their voices, silence about the genocide was spontaneous, as it was characteristic of both diaspora and soviet-Armenian writers. As there was no sign of conscious refusal shown by them, this silence most probably reflects an inability to speak out, therefore it can be considered repression. However, after the 1937-1938 extermination wave, silence was no longer a sign of repression and avoidance, but a present need for dealing with the trauma of the genocide, which was not allowed to gain public space.

Observing the perspective of the communist leadership of the country, it is worth mentioning that their silencing of that generation of writers meant resignation moreso than repression. In this case Armenians of the Armenian SSR were consciously made to refuse to talk about the genocide. According to some authors this could happen because of the Soviet concerns of securing relations with Turkey. (Bobelian [2011])

It was not only the writers of the 1930s who reminded the Soviet Armenian leadership that the genocide had left unresolved issues behind. The communist homeland had to face the problems of refugees as well. The first solution was the ‘Great Home Turn’ that started in the early 1930s. The fact that the state supported this kind of immigration suggested that ‘something’ had happened. Still, it was forbidden to mention the genocide in the public sphere. Even if writers had not expressed criticism toward the communist ideology, neither had they attempted to create an independent Armenian home state. This approach was topped when Stalin finally sent repatriates to Siberian exile, which was the end of even the most minimal tolerance.

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\(^{42}\) The character of Komitas, composer and folk music collector, will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter.
4.3. Armenians as a State-Constituting Minority in Lebanon

4.3.1 Initial Establishment

For many Armenians Lebanon was only the first stage of exile to the West, mainly France and the United States. The community still remained sizeable. The first census reflecting a steady number of Armenians in Lebanon is that of 1932. The ethnic group was represented in the country by 34,992 Armenians, which meant 4% of the total population. (Maktabi [1999]) Before the 1975 civil war the community reached its maximum number of 200,000 persons. (Այվազյան [2003] 292.) During the French Mandate Armenians, probably due to their number, proportion within Lebanese society and their earlier presence, had gained broad authorities.

Within some decades Beirut had become the cultural and political centre of the diaspora. The Armenian community had founded and maintained schools from elementary to university level. All three historical parties had been established in the country. The community did not lack its own press products, charitable and cultural organisations, either. The Armenian Apostolic Church had also been operating there. After its long traditions in the southern parts of the Ottoman Empire, including Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, the Holy See of Antelias became the second religious centre. This was caused by the Armenian SSR’s being not equivocally accepted in the diaspora. As the Holy See of Ejmiatsin was located within Soviet Armenia, its authority was not accepted by many believers and members of the clergy in the diaspora. Therefore a suburb of Beirut hosted the old-new Catholicosate, by uniting the originally Holy See of Cilicia with the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem. (Դալլաքյան [1997] pp. 184–185, Այվազյան [2003] p. 292.)

The community created the first memorial to the genocide. This architectural response was a memorial chapel within the religious complex of Antelias. On the other hand, Lebanese Armenians at that time lacked the institutional transfer mechanisms regarding the memory of the genocide. Armenian minority education was not a single system of education: moreover, many students still studied from books written in the Ottoman period. These materials had encouraged students to praise and obey Abdul
Hamid II. (Թոփուզյան [1986] 282.) After the Hamidian and the Cilician massacres this is highly surprising. Concerning the deficiencies of education, the main space of transferring the traumatic memories most probably remained within the family.

Lebanese Armenian literature was reconstructed by survivors of the genocide. The representative of the older generation was Hagop Oshagan, a well renowned literary critic, while the younger ones were Vahe Vahian, Antranik Zaroukian and Simon Simonian. (Migliorino [2008] p. 66) The latter had not published any literary works during this period, but founded the literary newspaper Spyurk, which was widely read throughout the Armenian diaspora and also in Soviet Armenia. The periodical started to suggest a new view to the Armenian diaspora. It suggested “a shift from the idea of the Armenian communities as nations in exile to a new conception of them as ‘permanent’ transnational diasporas.” (Migliorino [2008] pp.123-124) Hagop Oshagan’s student, Moushegh Ishkhan also belonged to the younger generation after settling in Lebanon. He also continued the work of his master and shared much of his views. His works were Published in Hairenik, the newspaper representing the Dashnaks’ views. (Hamazkayin Armenian Educational and Cultural Society [2014])

Oshagan, as a member of the generation that had experienced the genocide as an adult, constantly criticised Armenians who wrote about the genocide, especially those who published their memoirs as literary works. He thought that this approach would bring a halt to the development of Armenian literature. He attempted to develop a unique artistic representation of the genocide in five piece written during its occurrence, which demanded keeping distance from the events. The collection of these was published under the title Imperial Song of Triumph. Within these stories he elaborated on many topics from revenge to optimism and repression. (Peroomian [1993] pp. 188-190) He refused Soviet Armenia and its policy toward the diaspora. Further, he did not accept his peers. He considered their ways of expression as not following the trends of world literature, placing an obstacle to the development of Armenian literature and thus not reaching proper literary quality. This is a conscious refusal and condemnation of publishing memoirs that are not of a literary nature. This attitude means resignation. The remnants, his unfinished novel, offers another method of processing, namely rationalisation. In this work he explains the genocidal atrocities as the ancient Turkish desire for killing and looting. (Peroomian [2012] pp. 23, 32, 41-43, 58-59)

Oshagan’s former student, Moushegh Ishkhan depicted life in the Armenian diaspora with much doubt in his first book The Songs of the Homes, published in 1936.
He was influenced mostly by Western Armenian authors and also the effect of classical Eastern Armenian literature of the 19th century besides the writers’ generation of the 1930s. In parallel with the bitterness of the memories, longing for the homeland and lost relatives, he also expressed being confused in a foreign environment and feeling uncertainty regarding the future. He also frequently expressed concerns about the Soviet homeland. This approach was different from many of his counterparts’, but he was renowned by them. For example Vahe Vahian wrote enthusiastically about his work. (Դեմիրճյան [2014]) Ishkhan’s above-mentioned views about Armenian diaspora life do not fit in the system of trauma-processing strategies of the present dissertation. They are mostly similar with the views of those of his compatriots who moved to the Armenian SSR from the diaspora and did not accept the local communist system. This phenomenon will be described later concerning Verjiné Svazlian’s interviews. By the late 1940s his thoughts turned to returning to his old home near Ankara, to the old homeland, and creating an Armenia which can embrace all Armenians. (Դեմիրճյան [2014]) This can be already interpreted as reconstruction.

Ishkhan’s appreciative critic Vahe Vahian’s schooling was interrupted by the genocide. In the period of silence he published two collections of his poems. Sun-Rain43 dealt directly with his experience as a deportee and survivor. Concerning deportation marches, his reflections are ultimately bitter, but he mentions Soviet Armenia with strong optimism as a possible solution for creating a safe and prosperous homeland for Armenians. Golden Bridge44 touches questions similar to those in his first book, with the same bitterness, concerning the memories of his sufferings. (Bardakjian [2000] pp. 248-249)

Antranig Zaroukian, thinking similarly to Vahian, also repeatedly returned to the memories of genocide. His first poem already reflected on the Armenian genocide, but his most significant work on the memory is People without Childhood, a serial of autobiographical short stories published in 1955.45 He depicts the reality of Armenian orphan life with all its difficulties. His conclusion is enthusiasm about life and living as an Armenian. (Ճանպազեան [2015]) This reflects optimism in the future despite the darkness of the memories, thus reconciliation.

43 Arev-Andzrev Արեւ-անձրեւ
44 Voski kamurj Ոսկի կամուրջ
45 Manku’yun chunets’ogh Martik Մանկութիւն Չունեցող Մարդիկ
4.3.2. Independent Lebanon and the First Civil War

Lebanon became independent from the French Mandate in 1943. After the French left, those belonging to the Armenian Apostolic religion were granted four mandates in parliament and Armenian Catholics were represented by one more deputy. The total number of members in the Lebanese parliament was 99 (Abraham [1997] p. 2.) in the confessional political system that was based on religious identities. The system was disproportionate in general as well, but it is obvious that other confessional groups of Armenians had no possibility for representation.

The first broader political conflict broke out between the representatives of the French Mandate and the Lebanese political elite pursuing independence. This was visible between the two World Wars along with the slowly advancing process of passing state administration of the mandate to locals. The French kidnapped and imprisoned the first Lebanese Prime Minister and the President, to replace them with other persons loyal to the institutions of the mandate. (Benke [1987] p. 45.) Armenians at that time stayed loyal to the independent Lebanese political elite and criticised the French. The only pro-French deputy of the Dashnak Party, Movses Der Kaloustian, was in short condemned by the Central Committee of the party in Cairo. (Messerlian [2014] p. 86)

After the resolution of the conflict the next one and a half decades was the period of relative consolidation. This ended with president Chamoun’s efforts to concentrate power in parallel with his pro-American steps. He intended to run for a third term as President, which contradicted the constitution. His opposition had been continuously silenced. Finally, the 1958 civil war erupted upon the casus belli of a journalist opposing him being assassinated. (Benke, [1996] pp. 429-431.) On the other hand, this was the period when, after the Suez Crisis, unlike other Arab states, Lebanon did not break diplomatic relations with the Western powers. This caused religious tensions in the country. On the other hand, it must be noted that the Cold War already determined the international political environment, therefore anti-Western elements were considered as supporting the Eastern bloc. The civil war ended with a diplomatic solution after the intervention of the United States and the United Nations. (United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon [2013])
Before this conflict there was a grave inner clash even within the Armenian community, which had little to do with the Presidential elections of 1958 and more with the election of Catholicos Zaven I, originally the Prelate of Aleppo. He was a candidate of the Dashnak Party. Lebanon, Cyprus and Syria equivocally recognised him, while there was a strong opposition formed within the Armenian community of Lebanon. The group attempted to cede from the pro-Dashnak wing of the Armenian Apostolic Church under the leadership of Archbishop Khat, whom they and Etchmiadzin recognised as the head of the Holy See of Cilicia. However, the authorities of Lebanon did not permit this. (Messerlian [2014] pp.135-140) The Armenians of Lebanon participated in the first civil war because of this conflict, with each party’s supporters on the side of the relevant majority forces. The Dashnaks chose the pro-Chamoun pro-US bloc while the leftist parties backed the other party in the conflict. (Messerlian [2014] )

4.4. Hungary, a Station on the Way to the West

Numerous Armenian families immigrated to Hungary since the beginning of the 20th century. Armenian public life after World War I did not indicate though that the country would be only a temporary home for refugees of the genocide. Eghia Hovhannesian estimated the number of Armenians in Hungary between 4000-4500, of whom 1800-2000 were supposed to live in Budapest. It must be taken into attention that by the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary Transylvanian territories became part of Romania, thereby the traditional Armenian population of Hungary remained beyond its new borders. Still, many Transylvanian Armenians fled to Hungary. Roughly 80-90 “Eastern Armenian” families also arrived in Budapest after World War I, as Hovhannesian names and depicts them. (Hovhannesian [1934] pp. 275-276) His monograph is one of the main sources on Armenian community life in Hungary between the two world wars.

General social and political circumstances in the country were determined by strongly nationalist tendencies until World War II. The main aim of Hungarian foreign policy was to regain territories attached to neighbouring countries after World War I. Most spheres of public life were subordinated to this endeavour. The Great Depression affected Hungarian economic life very gravely. (Hill [2003] pp. 40-41, Brubaker et al. [2006] p. 74) Both of these circumstances led Hungary to enter World War II on the
side of the Axis Powers. The country also became one of the scenes of the Holocaust. After the war the initial plural political system was replaced by communism. This phase coincided with the late Stalinist period in the Soviet Union.

A small group of Armenian intellectuals maintained relatively active cultural life in Budapest. Originally the Masis Association\textsuperscript{46} created an organisational framework for that purpose. The members of the association merged into the similar and already existing (Magyarországi Örmények Egyesülete [1921]) Association of Armenians in Hungary\textsuperscript{47} in 1924. In the same year, the community received a priest sent by the Armenian Mekhitarist Congregation in Vienna. The new pastor, Athanas Tiroyan, had previously been the priest of Elisabetopolis, Transylvania. Another event occurred the same year: the Armenian-Hungarian Trade Corporation\textsuperscript{48} was formed. Its founders also established a scholarship program supporting the study of Armenians from Hungary at the Mekhitarist Congregation in Venice. Inviting Armenian artists and notable intellectuals was a way of keeping contact with other Armenian communities and the Soviet homeland. (Hovhannesian [1934] pp. 272, 274)

In parallel with these civilian initiatives, the Armenian Catholic Church also remained active. After the sudden death of Athanas Tiroyan his brother Hagop followed him as the priest of Armenian Catholics in Budapest. After his death the Mekhitarists appointed a new priest, Father Vartanessian who already temporarily served in the Armenian Catholic Chapel at 52 Andrássy Avenue during Hagop Tiroyan’s illness. Hovhannesian lamented that Armenian community events were gradually getting rare and that by the time of writing his book there was no one to provide religious service for Armenians in Budapest. (Hovhannesian [1934] p. 272) The gap was filled until 1946 by Father Vartanesz Antal Pungutz. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish in Budapest [1964/a])

It is noteworthy that the Armenian Catholic parish in Budapest also participated in the protection of local Jews. According to the information of the staff of the museal collection and archives in the present Armenian Catholic Church, about 1500 Jews were provided with certificates of baptism by the parish. Thanks to the research of Bálint Kovács some as yet unpublished photocopies of letters or certificates, originally written in 1944-46 were given to the future parish priest. Dániel Antal Kádár proved that he also

\textsuperscript{46} Masis egyesület
\textsuperscript{47} Magyarországi Örmények Egyesülete
\textsuperscript{48} Örmény-Magyar Kereskedelmi Részvénytársaság
regularly visited the Budapest ghetto and provided documents for pursued Jews. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1946/a], [1946/b], [1946/c], [1946/d], [1946/e], [year unknown/a], [year unknown/b]) The collection of these documents also contained a photocopy of a prayer written to the priest during the Holocaust, on August 12, 1944. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1944])\textsuperscript{49} The motives of the personnel of the parish are not clear: it could have been simply empathy or humanity. Further results may be expected by the advance of organisation and cataloging in the archives of the parish. Still, it is worth mentioning that it is possible that Fathers Pungutz and Kádár were at least partly motivated to save Jews because of the Armenian experience.

Such a small community did not always have the possibility to deliver its message to the majority of society. Domonkos Korbuly decided to share the Armenian perspective with Hungarian readers in an issue that he personally published independent of publishing companies. He follows the Armenian question from the Berlin Congress until the trials of Nemesis-members. Numerous views from his book could be cited here, including reflections on the Berlin congress, the Hamidian massacres, the Young Turk revolution, the Adana massacres, World War I, the genocide, the peace treaties and Operation Nemesis, including the trials of the avengers.

His most general view is that public opinion about Turkey and the Ottoman Empire in Hungary had been misled. As was noted in the previous chapter, censorship did avoid the topic of the Armenian genocide during the First World War. The reason for later pro-Ottoman and pro-Turkish sentiments had been, according to Korbuly, the successful revision of the Peace Treaty of Sèvres and Kemalist success in regaining lost territories. The strongly nationalist leadership of Hungary also attempted to reach similar success, which was partly realised by the time of World War II. As the author of the monograph characterises Hungarian public opinion, it was willingly shaped to accept the Kemalist solution as a feasible model: Armenians with their demands were considered similar to the leaders of countries neighboring Hungary.

Thus, contradicting public opinion in Hungary, Korbuly attempts to depict the situation of Armenians as identical to that of Hungarians. In his opinion both peoples had been betrayed after the World War, lost enormous parts of their historical homeland

\textsuperscript{49} Since the organisation and cataloging of the related documents is still in progress, further developments in this issue and other documents that may supplement the materials used for the present dissertation may be still expected.
and became victims of the great powers. He also mentions the burn of Smyrna, which he writes was interpreted to Hungarian readers as an event evoked by local Greeks and Armenians with a strongly pro-Turkish sentiment. (Korbuly [1934] pp. 3, 104, 106, 108) He also provided a plan for restoring Armenia, including the Erzerum, Van, Bitlis vilayets, access to the Black Sea, and roughly the previous Trebizond vilayet beside Karabakh⁵⁰, Ganja⁵¹ and Nakhijevan. These coincided with Wilson’s plans. Additionally, the author sketched an autonomy plan for Kurds in Western Armenian territories and population exchange of ethnic minorities between Turkey and Armenia, including the resettlement of Armenians to the previously Western Armenian territories he mentioned. (Korbuly [1934] pp. 114, 115)

It is not clear what he means by population exchange of ethnic minorities, especially since he suggests Kurdish autonomy in Kurdish-inhabited would-be Armenian territories. It most probably means settling ethnic Turks behind the Sèvres borders and ‘repopulating’ those areas with Armenians from Soviet-Armenian territories. The latter assumption can be based on the fact that Armenians had practically disappeared from the Eastern Anatolian/Western Armenian territories. It is further not clear how he would solve Armenia’s secession from the Soviet Union. It must be noted, on the other hand, that besides the fact that he expressed rage by showing sympathy towards the assassins of Operation Nemesis, he supported conventional methods in general. He considered the perpetrators as executors of the verdicts of the Constantinople Trials. The latter offered a conventional solution for the Armenian genocide, even though it failed. Besides, suggesting such a complex system of actions in order to create an independent Armenian state with conventional means as described above suggests that he was for peaceful reconstruction of the country and Armenians after the genocide. Thereby the major intent in his work was reconstruction.

It is not known how popular his book became among Hungarians or Armenians in Hungary. Being a leading member of the Armenian Catholic community and the Association of Armenians in Hungary suggests that his opinion either reflected or influenced Armenians living in Hungary. A special factor in his perspective is that he was not even an Eastern Armenian newcomer but a descendant of Armenians settled in Hungary for a long time. Showing solidarity with contemporary Armenia and Armenian refugees is therefore an element that is rooted rather in collective Armenian than

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⁵⁰ It is not clear whether it concerns Mountainous Karabakh or Mountainous and Lower Karabakh.
⁵¹ Previously Elisavetpol
personal and individual experience. It appears that through transforming characters and events of Hungarian history and especially the situation around the Trianon peace treaty, he attempts to offer an acceptable perspective for even the Hungarian reader supporting Hungarian revisionism of the period.

In the effort to share their experience with the Hungarian public, Armenians got unexpected support from an important contribution of world literature. The Forty Days of Musa Dagh by Franz Werfel was published in 1932 in Austria. The novel was translated into Hungarian two years later. It received a great deal of attention from writers of the ethnic majority.

Lajos Kassák, a renowned contemporary writer, poet and editor, wrote a lengthy essay on the book in the most significant review of contemporary Hungarian literature, Nyugat. He wrote: “I don’t know how Hungarian readers will receive Franz Werfel’s new novel, I wish it became successful, since this success would not only mean the praise of the writer, but also that of the reader. Serving life with such noble literature through a thousand pages is a majestic act.”

He also highlights the fact that the fight of the main hero, Gabriel Bagradian, leading the people of five villages to the Mount of Moses, Musa Dagh, is a parallel of the tragedy of modern intellectuals. Before the decade of the Holocaust this is not only a reflection on the novel, but also a portentous forecast. He also reflects on the fact that the novel creates a special atmosphere for readers, who can feel that whatever happens in the story may happen to their own relatives or themselves. This thought indicates that the novel was appropriate for creating solidarity between the Armenian people and the circle of readers.

He also offers a perspective of rationalisation. He explains the genocide with criminal psychology. The reason, according to him, “[…] is the psychology of the assassin, the criminal wants to get rid of its stall.”

This approach is not surprising for the reason that he analyses the novel from a literary perspective. In that field he compares the book to Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, a work centred around psychological motives. Besides, he offers a motive for the struggle of Armenians for survival and for the behaviour of each character or each interest group among the defenders of the mountain. He finds human nature behind the wisdom of the

52 Original text: „Nem tudom milyen fogadtatásra talál a magyar olvasónál Franz Werfel új regénye, - szeretném, ha sikere lenne, mert ez a siker nem csak az író hanem az olvasó dicséretét is jelentené. Ezer oldalon át ilyen nemes irodalommal szolgálni az életet: magasztos cselekedet.”

53 Original text: „[…] a gyilkos pszichológiaja, a bünnöző meg akar szabadulni büntérsától.”
priest, the children giving up their obedient nature to their parents, people seeing ultimate despair or strong hope behind the same phenomenon. He also explains many processes behind Armenians’ actions with crowd psychology. This is what he sees behind the single factor of fatality. (Kassák [1934])

We cannot exactly reconstruct how much he influenced public opinion in Hungary, a country heading to events very similar to those of the Ottoman Empire during the Young Turk regime. On the other hand it must be highlighted that both he and the Nyugat literary review were determining factors of contemporary literary life and later became an essential part of the Hungarian literary canon. Therefore, it can be supposed that his message received widespread attention in the Hungarian literary audience. Both Korbuly’s and Hovhannesian’s books on Armenians in Hungary and the Armenian question were published in 1934, in the same year as The Forty Days of Musa Dagh. A more detailed analysis on the publishing process and the origins of these sources shall be made to draw a conclusion about correspondence between the origins of these publications. On the other hand, it is also obvious that Kassák’s majority response of rationalisation and Korbuly’s rage and reconstruction were not synchronous.

After the mid-1930s, like Hovhannesian’s laments predicted, Armenian community life became very limited. The cultural associations ceased operation, and as thereby only the church provided an organisational framework to maintain the identity and community within the group. Based on the documents processed in the archives of the church by the time of preparing the present dissertation, (not even the quinquennial or decennial) anniversaries of the beginning of the genocide were not officially commemorated until 1960. This may have been caused by various factors. The passivity of community members, emigration of Armenian refugees, the crisis of World War II, concentrating on rebuilding after the war, the establishment of communist power and Stalinism. Concerning the latter, most probably the reason the Armenian Catholic Church was not constantly persecuted by the state was that the Armenian SSR was part of the Soviet Union. The community even received a community space in 1950 in Semmelweis Street, Budapest which was used as a chapel. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1951])

In conclusion, processing the Armenian genocide was limited, albeit existent in the period generally labelled as collective repression. The Armenian community, as far as very small quantity of sources available indicated, showed the need for speakout and
applied the strategy of reconstruction and rage. There was also a group of Hungarians, most probably well educated intellectuals, who had the opportunity to show solidarity towards Armenians, offering the approach of rationalisation of the genocide. Connections with other Armenian communities and pan-Armenian organisations existed, albeit with a limited scope. Taking the length and the quantity of these short interludes with public attention, most probably these did not have a significant impact on the community’s views on the genocide.

Limited solidarity of the majority, working cultural associations and limited connections to other Armenian communities were not enough to keep Armenians in Hungary. As Eghia Hovannesian characterises the situation, by 1934 only 40-50 Armenian families stayed in Budapest, who were mainly owners of small businesses, small-scale merchants, carpet weavers and renovators. (Hovannesian [1934]) This is not surprising not only for the reason of pro-Turkish public opinion, but also for the grave impacts of the Great Depression on the country’s economy.

4.5. Conclusions

The social and political phenomena experienced in the period often labelled as the period of collective repression already show diversification of Armenian communities’ responses to the genocide. It can also be stated that the influence of the political spheres of the host states show clear influence on processing the trauma. In all host states the legal environment also affected progressions. We can mention, for example, the Johnson-Reed act, the constitution of Lebanon and the legal sanctions put on Armenian writers in the 1930s in Soviet Armenia. Naturally in the latter case the legal system was much more dependent on the political system than in the other states. The role of the social environment in the given countries also showed its effects, such as conflicts between Armenians and the Irish in the United States. Another similar example was the dual system of the Armenian minority in Lebanon, which was divided by party interests. Still, in parallel Armenians participated in the clash of the majority and French interest groups following the political alternatives of the Lebanese majority. Armenians faced similar duality as newcomers and assimilated Armenians in Hungary.
Still the most relevant response to the genocide was given by an author whose family had been established in Hungary long before.

All these differences in environments of the host states resulted in different establishments of the diaspora communities. Finally, the different legal, political and social environments of the host states also resulted in diverse means of trauma processing in the period examined in this chapter. Armenians in the United States rather stayed silent about the trauma in public. The only exception was the case of Armenian political parties and their press products. As mentioned, it is not likely that they effectively influenced broad masses of Armenians. The diaspora in Lebanon had chosen another way, as they had the possibility. Consciously commemorating the trauma by constructing the memorial chapel does not clearly fit into any type of response intended for examination. Still, it surely does not mean repression, as is suggested to be characteristic for this period. On the other hand, a distinction must be made in the case of Lebanese Armenians. Most probably the organisation of the church and wealthy, long established members of the Lebanese society took the commission to build the memorial chapel. The class of refugees was touched by the genocide in another, not only psychological, but also material way that meant an everyday struggle for them.

Literature offers some more insight into this society. It is remarkable that the first generation of writers who survived deportation, were held in concentration camps and experienced life in orphanages turned to optimism, which means reconciliation in Miller’s and Touryan Miller’s definition. This shows that successful reintegration of these children into society created a positive attitude to life. This cannot be observed in the case of the older generation like Hagop Oshagan, who passed another way through postwar Constantinople to Lebanon and had a very different experience of non-acceptance in the post-genocide period. He also gives mixed responses to the experience. It is also visible how his views influenced his student, Moushegh Ishkhan. The latter being not devoted to the political principles of his counterparts, attempted to create his own way of interpreting the Armenian genocide.

Speaking out the trauma also started in the 1930s in the Soviet homeland. Some literary works even expressed reconciliation. On the other hand, for ideological and also supposedly political reasons, the leadership rejected this move. Afterwards, society avoided the topic. Through these facts it can be stated again that different social, political and legal environments influenced Armenians to follow different directions in trauma processing.
The limited acceptance of Armenian claims in the host society’s public opinion in Hungary resulted in expressing rage and reconstruction. It must be noted though, that this statement can be based only on one single issue. As could be seen, the explanation for the reasons for these reactions was constructed through painful issues well known to the Hungarian public. On the other hand, it is possible that the success of Forty Days of Musa Dagh may have supported speakout within the Armenian community in Hungary. However, the types of responses were not influenced by rationalisation, as offered by one of the main reflections offered by the majority. These were also very limited. It can be stated that the responses were adapted to public opinion. To summarize, the first hypothesis proves to be valid in this period.

Communication in this era was present mostly due to inter-community mass migration and diaspora press. The most plausible example for the former is the Great Home Turn to the Soviet Union. As could be understood from numerous memoirs of interviewees of Verjiné Svazlian (Svazlian [2011]), inter-community communication most probably often happened among repatriates and natives. The fact that the communist regime had not tolerated repatriates for the reason of being alleged imperialist spies spreading ideas dangerous to the communist system suggests that communication between repatriates and locals could have been a tool to approximate Soviet Armenian public opinion to that of the diaspora. The regime’s allegations resulted in barbarous actions even against those who had freely accepted life in a communist state. And yet if the communist leadership had not directly feared the memory of the genocide, they possible were afraid of the possibility that repatriates would bring anticommunist views from the original host states. Communication and sharing views with each other en masse had existed. Most probably it also affected the whole community, not only the political leaders. In parallel, many repatriates accepted Soviet Armenian norms.

The direct result of this kind of communication on genocide processing is not known in this period. A probable example can be the repatriation of writer Zapel Yesayan, or rather fear of her, and her persecution by the communist state. She, as one of the few Armenian women playing a political role, may be such an example. She had lived in Paris before having ‘re’-turned to the Armenian SSR and being persecuted. It is possible that the communist regime intended to obstruct convergence to various diaspora ways of genocide processing. As this is only an assumption, the hypothesis in this case cannot be confirmed. Most probably the fear of convergence in the political
ideological field had been present in a much stronger way. On the other hand, there is certain probability of the fact that the inter-community effects of communication after the Great Home Turn also existed in the field of genocide processing.

Communication also happened through numerous diaspora Armenian periodicals and newspapers, such as the Hayrenik in Boston or Spyurk in Beirut. The latter was also available for Soviet Armenian authors, as its editors were pro-Soviet. That they also offered enthusiasm towards Soviet Armenia means it is not a surprise that it was not prohibited in the communist homeland. On the other hand, it is already known to the readers that the latter even had an intent to introduce another way of perceiving the worldwide masses of Armenians, one which was promoted among the readers of Spyurk. Although it is not clear whether in the latter case acceptance of living in scattered communities and accepting the Armenian SSR as the home country reflected the readers’ view from the beginning, or whether readers who had such presumptions started to read the periodical later, or as a third possibility, whether Spyurk was able to convince its readers independent of their original opinions. In case of press products, no significant effect of unifying various approaches is present, as most diaspora communities still maintained collective silence. Only the Lebanese Armenian community produced visible collective responses en masse. Therefore, similar responses in this period most probably originated from the collectivity of trauma and the similar need of Armenian communities to adapt to new host societies and host environments besides Lebanon. Therefore, the second hypothesis in this case is partly rejected, but it can be maintained in the case of communication within mass migration. A confirming factor is developments in Hungary. The Armenian community there did not receive huge waves of migration like the other examined ones. They did not maintain intensive connections with other Armenian communities and it is remarkable that however limited the response to Korbuly’s book, its processing strategies did not coincide with those of the other communities.

It is visible in the case of all host states that the demand for processing the trauma was present during the period between the early 1920s and 1965. There is still not much known about the individual level, as no scholarly research about individual reactions had been conducted. On the other hand, the presence of demand and various ways of processing is obvious, irrespective of the given communities’ location. Still, the outcomes of this demand were different in each home country and in most cases in various strata of society also. Therefore, the third hypothesis is confirmed.
Finally, the common statement of scholars whereby explicit processing of the genocide had been non-existent in this period, as Armenians were busy with being accommodated in the host countries, must be strictly limited. First of all, it can be seen that except for in Lebanon, Armenians had serious difficulties with acquiring acceptance in the host state’s — or in case of the homeland, in Soviet — ideological environment. Such struggles demanded serious efforts from the members of the community. This strive for adapting to local circumstances may have indirectly influenced and slowed down explicit processing strategies of the genocide. On the other hand, in each case several political and legal actions of the host states indirectly impacted Armenian genocide processing. This most probably had a much graver impact on the progress of speaking out the trauma.

5. Outburst of Memories

5.1. Changes in the International Political Environment

In the mid-20th century a range of global changes took place. Some of these changes were recognised by various Armenian organisations or interest groups later, only in the 1970s and 80s, when lobbying for the recognition of the Armenian genocide. After World War II and the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide was not an isolated mass-murder of the first half of the 20th century any more. There was a lesser-known intellectual and spiritual connection between the Jewish and the Armenian victim communities. Franz Werfel’s The Forty Days of Musa Dagh was one of the most popular books in the ghettos in the Third Reich. (Hovannisian, [1999] p. 159.)

Despite facing mass human destruction again, several years must have passed by until the international community could find a response to the traumas of the World War and the Holocaust as well. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was signed in 1948 and entered into force in 1951. As has been mentioned, one of its chief proposers, Raphael Lemkin, intended to create a definition, a legal term and an execution mechanism to condemn such mass atrocities. The initial force behind his efforts was the experience of the Armenian and Assyrian
genocides. Although the Convention became well-known because of the Holocaust, Lemkin’s earlier efforts could not have remained completely hidden.

The international community also directly dealt with the Armenian genocide approximately simultaneously with signing the genocide convention. This resulted in the specific document, the 1948 United Nations War Crimes Commission Report mentioned in the Introduction of the present dissertation. These circumstances may have had a supportive effect on placing the Armenian genocide into a broader international context. Despite these facts the benefits of these efforts became a basis for activists urging Armenian genocide recognition more than two decades later. These developments will be described in the next chapters.

The end of World War II was shortly followed by the emerging Cold War that provided a different framework of existence for Armenian communities. The ambiguous relation between the Soviet homeland and diaspora communities was placed into the structure of the bipolar world order. Some years later new circumstances deeply affected international relations. Stalin’s death and the thaw of the Khrushchev era in the 1950s naturally not only influenced the direction of international relations: Armenians in the SSR were granted numerous freedoms.

5.2. The Thaw in the Armenian SSR

1965 is considered the date when the silence around the Armenian genocide was broken. Certainly, as indicated in the introduction to the present study, this period did not start without certain transitional events of the previous period. Generally, the signs for a shift were already apparent in the 50s. In the Armenian SSR transitional events started in a concentrated way in the second half of the 1950s. As a result of these preparations, a range of responses can be examined in the period that is most often labelled as the beginning of collective speak-out.

The second experiment for collective processing after the 1930s started in the Khrushchev era. Paruyr Sevak’s philosophical and epic poem, The Unsilenceable Belfry, written in 1957 and published in 1959, was among one of the earliest attempts in this period to reflect on the genocide. The work is about Komitas, the Armenian clergyman, folk music collector and composer who was deported among the first group

54 Also translated as Ever-Tolling Belfry.
of Armenian intellectuals in 1915. The composer turned dumb, because of experiencing the events of the genocide. Thereby Sevak expressed a need to break collective silence.

He described the early life of Komitas, beginning with his school years in Ejmiatsin, following his way through the Armenian homeland and his travel to Berlin. Addressing the horrors of the genocide, he does not attempt to give them any interpretation. Even when writing about the direct aftermath of the genocide he writes with highly bitter pessimism. By remembering the losses he also depicts how nature washed away the memory of Armenians, but he also asks how all this can be forgotten. ("Ղողանջ եղեռնական" in Ունակ [1959]) On the other hand, the poetry ends in optimism. It describes the Armenian State Conservatory being named after Komitas. The message of this part is that as long as his melodies are played by youngsters studying them and played in concert halls all around the world, Armenians stay alive and the genocide is not complete. ("Ղողանջ մարմնավորված երազի" in Ունակ [1959])

Hovhannes Shiraz, another emblematic member of this generation, also started to publish his works on the genocide and Armenian heritage in the late 1950s. His most famous genocide-related work is The Armenian Dante-esque, calling for the establishment of a spiritual monument for the victims of the Armenian genocide. (Hovannisian [2007] p. 103.) All throughout the poem he often uses outrageous expressions for the perpetrators of the genocide. (Շիրազ [2015]) However, in the final scene he describes a blossoming Armenia which “[...] Pulls out revenge of your yatagan by blossoming [...]”55 (Շիրազ [2015] pp. 374) This Armenia he would even exhibit in a museum as a conclusion of his work.

Similarly to them, Silva Kaputikyan also started to turn toward the issues of Armenian national identity in the same period. (Տեր-Մինասյան [2001] p. 176.) Her poem of 1961, Midway Reflections (Silva Kaputikyan’s House-Museum [2011/a]) lists and deals with various trauma-progressing attitudes, including revenge and resignation. She gives an extensive explanation of the strategy she chooses, and calls Armenians to follow her. This approach asks for commemoration in a peaceful way, without the intent of blood-thirsty revenge, and for building the new homeland (symbolised by Yerevan) instead of the lost lands of the refugees (symbolised by the city of Van, the city of

55 "[…]Քո յաթաղանից վրեժ է հանում` ծաղկումով ահա [...]" in Չհուշ [2015] pp. 374)
origin of Silva Kaputikyan’s family). The main message of the poem can be assumed in its following sentence: “You must take revenge by living […]” (For the poem in Armenian see: Կապուտիկյան 1956-60 – 2010) This optimistic attitude fulfills the criteria of reconciliation by remembering the trauma and having a positive attitude to the future.

Among the authors of Armenian prose of the same period, Hrach’ya K’och’ar wrote his novel Nahapet in 1964. (Kocsar [2008]) The main character, Nahapet – even his name is symbolic, meaning forefather – after experiencing the massacre of his wife and family, settled in a different environment in a different village than that he used to live in, started farming and founded a new family with a similarly widowed woman, Nubar, who lost her child, too. Beside the intent to rise from the tragedy of the Armenian genocide, the novel frequently indicates respect for the Soviet ideal of life, while some episodes introduce ways of interpreting communism by average Armenians living at the periphery of the Soviet empire. In addition to the demand for genocide remembrance and representation of the memories, the novel expresses an optimistic view on the future. The political system did not silence such opinions in this period, therefore literature represented the atmosphere of a thaw after the Stalin era. For this work, K’och’ar posthumously received State Prize of the Soviet Union in 1967. (Kocsar [2008] p. 197)

K’och’ar published one more book after Nahapet, a collection of four short stories. There he again calls for a need for commemoration and finding a way to handle the issue of post-genocide Armenian identity. In one of the short stories he describes a simple old man who wishes to return to his home village in Turkey. The Soviet Armenian authorities handle the issue in a very obtuse manner. The innocent request for remembering wins in the end. On the Bridge of the Euphrates he recalls a memory of deportation without any reflection on it. Our Mother Tongue embraces some independent stories about the overwhelming power of the Armenian tongue for its speakers. The White Book describes the final years of a historian who did not give up analysing Armenian history even when going blind. His last work remained physically unwritten, because his daughter forgot to refill his standish with ink. K’och’ar describes the books written blind as respecting national heroes but reviewing their role, learning from their mistakes and outlining a bright future. (Kocsar [2011]) The latter clearly expresses the need for both for the reforms of Soviet policy and the traditions of Armenian historiography.
This move in literature continued even after the Khrushchev-era. In the 1970s and early 1980s many of the above mentioned works were reprinted (See for example Silva Kaputikyan’s House-Museum [2011/b]) or been adapted for film. (Մալյան [1977]) Similarly, most authors of the 1930s writers’ generation were rehabilitated by the state and their works became authorised for publication.

The thaw in literature was an indicator, and most probably also a catalyst to political progresses concerning the genocide issue. As a result of social pressure, state permission was granted in March of 1965 for a public competition to plan and construct a memorial for the victims of the Armenian genocide. Possibly not even the political leadership of the Armenian SSR, nor the central power in Moscow could have predicted that the new approach suggested by the new writers’ generation would lead to spontaneously organised mass-demonstrations in 1965 demanding the lands of Western Armenia. Such initiatives had been banned before and were also prohibited after the 1965 events in the Soviet Union. On April 24th, the 50th anniversary of the imprisonment and extermination of Constantinople’s Armenian intelligentsia and the beginning of deportations, demonstrations emerged in the capital. A possible resistance to Soviet central power was defeated by the efforts of the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party and other state leaders. This was reflected by the president of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR, Nagush Harutyunyan, who stated the following shortly after the demonstrations:

“...until World War II, the Medz Yeghern [the Armenian term used for Armenians’ extermination in the Ottoman Empire before the creation of the term genocide] of 1915 was unprecedented not only in the history of our people, but in the entirety of humankind. An entire people, an entire nation coming from the depths of millennia was killed, was dying.

We condemn genocide [genotsid] or zhoghovratsbanutian [“folk murder”] with all our heart and soul.

There is and there cannot be either juridical justification or any motion of prescription for genocide.

Genocide, be it the horrifying slaughter of Armenians in Der [Z]or or in the banks of the Euphrates in 1915, or the torturing death by massacre of the other peoples during World War II in Majdanek and B[u]chenwald, must...
always be condemned without reservations, and its perpetrators must be condemned by all of humankind”56 (Matiossian [2013])

This approach not only raises the issue of genocide commemoration to the state level, but a broader perspective of the speaker can be observed by associating the Armenian genocide with the crimes of the Nazi regime, the system the Soviet Union had fought against. The Soviet Union deemed the Nazi ideology and the supporters of it as enemies, therefore in this speech, a possible mode for the genocide issue’s implementation into Soviet ideology is represented. As Hovannisian mentions, after 1965 such attempts had appeared more and more frequently among Armenians. (Hovannisian [2009] p. 16.)57

The competition for the construction of the monument inaugurated a new approach to diaspora Armenians, as they also were given the opportunity to participate. Construction was realised by voluntary financial or work contributions of citizens of the Armenian SSR. Despite these facts, the memorial was banned from the city centre, therefore its location became Tsitsernakaberd, a hill in the surroundings of the centre of Yerevan. By choosing this place the state willingly or unwillingly adapted the location of the memorial to Armenian funeral and burial traditions. Armenian cemeteries were mainly located either in the secular centre of the settlement, or near the centre, or at the outskirts of the settlement, and in the latter two cases necessarily at a high place. (Marutyan [2009] p. 42)

Finally, the Armenian Genocide Memorial Complex became a sacral place in the officially atheist Soviet social and political environment for its strong symbolism. The eternal flame and the surrounding open circular walls of the monument symbolise resurrection and eternal life of the victims’ souls, while the obelisk belonging to the monument represents the rise of the Armenian nation.

The monument was opened in 1967. The inauguration ceremony was synchronised with the celebration of the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia. (The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute [2007 – 2014/b]) After this, the memorial complex served yearly on April 24 as the place for mass-processions, which were

56 The location names Der Zor and Buchenwald were mistyped in the original article as “Der or” and “Büchenwald”.
57 “It was not until the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide in 1965 and the growing attention paid in the media and in official circles to the Holocaust in all its ramifications that the Armenians began to find some means to externalize the question and to broaden remembrance of the genocide to include certain educational and political circles.”
attended by state leaders. From the 1970s on the political leadership of the country started the official commemorations on each memorial day. (Marutyan [2009] p. 39.)

For humanities and social sciences the Armenian genocide had been a forbidden topic before 1965. Mentioning the trauma was labelled as nationalism, in the same way that it had been treated and characterised in literature. A forerunner of new approaches during the Khrushchev era was the aforementioned Verjiné Svazlian, who had lived in Egypt before moving to Armenia, and who is the daughter of Garnik Svazlian, one of the main ideologists of the “Great Home Turn”. Due to her personal past she started to research the heritage of the Armenian Genocide. Her work in this field began in the mid 1950s, when she started to visit places where immigrants from the diaspora were settled en masse. She had officially researched their dialects, folk poetry and traditions; on the other hand, she had been hiding another archive collection, in which she had systematised the memoirs of genocide survivors. These will be analysed later. In this section we will continue to explore the atmosphere of scientific work in the field.

According to Svazlian’s accounts, her interviewees first – fearful of repeated persecution – would not let her into their homes, even if she asked for their cooperation in documenting the folk culture of these migrants. Moreover, she still had to make great efforts when she asked them to share their painful memories with her. (Interview: Svazlian Verjiné [02nd 06. 2011]) Facing these facts it is evident that research related to the genocide had not been supported by state power and gathering information on this issue had been a hard task.

After the thaw, that which was observed in literature and politics began to apply to social scientists and experts of humanities, who were given the opportunity to research some questions related to the genocide, albeit in a restricted way. Only those events which had been recorded during the genocide in (written) documents and that were in connection with resistance were permitted for research. For the reason that the memory of the genocide had been maintained mainly by oral history, several distortions can be observed within the historiography of the Armenian genocide in the Soviet period. These still affect Armenian collective memory. For example, besides some well-documented resistance movements against deportations in Van and the Musa Dagh among few others, many small-scale resistance operations have been discovered and analysed only recently. The official Soviet ideology did not allow the promotion of an image of Armenians’ innocent helplessness during the genocide either. These are the reasons historians turned towards the above mentioned resistance movements until 1965
and why these movements are occasionally overemphasized while suggesting a lack of self-defence at other places. (Marutyan [2009] pp. 32-33.) The existence of such Armenian efforts at other, little-known places has started to appear lately; thereby average Armenians have had even more limited access to this information than do historians. The ‘lack’ of resistance still undermines the self-esteem of many Armenians, who rely on the collective self-image suggesting that Armenians had been slaughtered like sheep during the genocide.

With the intent of completing historical research in the examination period, Verjiné Svazlian made several efforts after 1965 to introduce survivors and their experiences during the genocide on television, and to make access to their memoirs public. Her attempts were not supported by the state in the pre-1965 era. (Interview: Svazlian Verjiné [02nd 06. 2011]) Therefore 1965 did not mean the end of restrictions of remembering and commemorating the genocide. The efforts of Soviet Armenian leaders and the assumable early resistance by Moscow suggest that the central power had rather tolerated than supported the state-determined frameworks, while the Soviet Armenian political leadership attempted to find the balance between social pressure and the central power.

Having viewed the collective responses to the genocide, to compare them to individual strategies, the latter must be reconstructed. In the already mentioned collection of interviews with survivors, there are 26 (Svazlian [2011]) Historical Memoir-Testimonies of Soviet-Armenian citizens recorded until 1970. Two testimonies of these have been maintained as manuscripts from the period before Svazlian’s research. Three of the interviews (cursive numbers in the footnotes) only described the events experienced by the survivors without mentioning their future life or interpreting the genocide in any way.

Further, two survivors expressed outrage and anger towards the perpetrators (bold numbers in the footnotes). One of them states: “[…] Let our new generation understand well what kind of hypocritical, bestial, criminal, plundering, ruthless, unjust, perfidious enemy we lived with in order to maintain our existence. […]” (Svazlian [2011] p. 350) Another also mentions that, in his opinion, Turks are brutes. (ibid. p. 505.)

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Twenty-one interviews, the vast majority of the examined testimonies, reflect a positive image on the future of refugees. They usually finish the description of the genocide by telling how they started a new life, founded a new family, had built their homes, started work and farming and becoming active members of the Armenian SSR’s society. The possibility of a new start is emphasised by most of them, which had most probably been offered by the ‘Soviet dream’, by the promise of equality, education, work, home, financial security and social welfare. Even if these had been limited by the totalitarian regime, Armenians had been deprived of these completely during the genocide.

On the other hand, as recorded in several memoirs, the simple fact of being a repatriate was enough for Siberian exile. This suggests that choosing way of life other than that offered by the ‘Soviet dream,’ or criticising the official principles of the political-ideological system was politically intolerable. Some interviewees also describe temporarily returning post-traumatic symptoms, but the vast majority still remembered the genocide while reflecting positively on the future.

These individual responses before the thaw do not necessarily correspond to the tendencies observed on the collective level. For example, with one exception all interviews reflecting on the aftermath of the genocide recorded before the period in question already express the strategy of reconciliation. This individual strategy was overwhelming until the end of Soviet times, following the philosophy emphasised by the actual state and party ideology. Other approaches were also present at the individual level, albeit at a lesser extent. However, concerning the small number of memoirs recorded before the mid 1950s, it cannot be stated for sure whether the later dominance of reconciliation had been caused by the official ideological principles, or whether these principles had been created and shaped by the approach of survivors.

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of reconciliation had been caused by the official ideological principles, or whether these principles had been created and shaped by the approach of survivors.

Several trauma processing strategies were surely present at the individual level in Soviet Armenian society. Furthermore, the existence of the remaining approaches cannot be excluded. Only one of these, reconciliation and forgiveness had become official state strategy. It has been mentioned that in the Stalin even this individual strategy, was not permitted. It should be noted that demanding Western Armenian lands was a collective demand during the 1965 rally; one raised by numerous demonstrators. As the means for it were not determined as violent by protesters, this meant reconstruction [of the homeland]. This move was also rejected by the state. As the mother of one of the participants says, such demonstrators were immediately exiled to Siberia. Specifically, her son had not returned back even at the time of Svazlian’s second interview in 1973. (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimony Nr. 269)

It can thereby be assumed that in the examination period in the Armenian SSR only one genocide processing strategy appeared and remained consistently at the collective level, which was permitted and/or encouraged by the Soviet member-state and the central power and the official ideological principles. This was namely reconciliation by remembering the painful past, but viewing the ‘Soviet dream’ as a positive future.

Beside this fact, further research and analyses are needed to prove whether public commemoration evolved from an earlier grass roots initiation that was represented by the writers’ generation of the 1930s. This would have been an exceptional phenomenon in a totalitarian regime. On the other hand, a top-down effort for controlling the commemoration processes was also present after the thaw, represented by the attempt of literary authors and political leaders. They consciously and explicitly tried (had) to interpret the need for speaking out and commemoration within the official ideological framework of the Soviet state. The latter phenomenon does not clearly suggest the direction of the process, but offers the possibility of a meeting point of top-down and bottom-up moves, which could also have been a unique phenomenon in the Soviet Union.
5.3. Armenians as an Organised Community in the United States

The move for admitting the Armenian genocide into public discourse in the United States did not start without local antecedents. The main boost for public processing originating in the host society was the drive for tolerance. The social, racial and ethnic equality movements in the “land of the free” started in the 1960s. The issue of the Armenian genocide could be placed into this context.

The fate of Armenians during the genocide was very often the same in the Ottoman Empire as that of African Americans being sold at slave markets. For example Aurora Mardiganian was personally victim to such a crime. She depicts her situation as one which was characteristic of Armenian deportees: “The farmers wanted the girls to work as slaves in the field. The others wanted girls for a different purpose – for their harems or as household slaves, or for the concubine markets of Smyrna and Constantinople. Musa Bey demanded ten medjidiehs, or about eight dollars, American money, apiece.” (Mardiganian [1918] p. 84.) Uprooting a whole ethnic group in its native lands was also similar to the historical experience of Native Americans, even if the genocide committed against them had been still going on in the 1970s with forced sterilisations. (Card, Marsoobian [2007] pp. 237-238.) Armenians therefore could adapt to the new grassroots social movements.

Another convenient circumstance for speaking out was that Armenians already had an established system of institutions in the United States. The Armenian National Committee of America and the Armenian Assembly of America tried to raise awareness among members of Congress. (Papazian [1999]) In Boston a memorial commission had been established for the 50th anniversary of the genocide. It published numerous booklets about the Armenian Genocide. One of these materials contained documents of the Young Turks on the genocide. (Kazarian [1965])

It was previously mentioned that there had not been any American Armenian literary responses in the period of “silence”. On the other hand, the Hairenik periodical issued in Boston had published memoirs of Armenians living elsewhere from the 1920s on. One such memoir was that of Armen Anush. He had been deported from the surroundings of Urfa. In the beginning he shared the fate of most orphans raised in Syria. After a short period of education in Lebanon he returned and started working in Syrian schools. His memoirs were published in a series in the Hairenik periodical in
1957-58. (Anush [2007] pp. xiii-xiv.) One of his poems was published even earlier in Hairenik in the late 1920s. In that piece he reconstructed the memory of genocide. He described his call for vengeance in those days. Still, his later strategy at the time of writing the poem was a mystified sacred reunion with the homeland. This does not correspond with any of the processing strategies. The closest definition to this could be reconstruction, but as he does not describe the ritual act in detail, nothing certain can be stated. (Anush [2007] pp. 121-122.) Another similar memoir was that of Shahen Derderian. His memoir finished with optimism. That approach had spread to the American Armenian community from Lebanon, where he did not belong to the mainstream of Armenian literature.

It was also commonplace that there had not been scholarly research on the genocide until 1965. Some members of the younger generation of that time were already employed by American universities. Richard Hovhannisian, for example, started lecturing and conducting research on Armenian history. Since 1962 he has been the cornerstone at the Center for Near Eastern Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has been responsible for various programs: undergraduate, graduate and research projects in Armenian studies (concerning the genocide among other topics) ever since. (Perry, Hovannisian [1995])

Another well known scholar of the Armenian genocide started his work on the topic a decade later. Vahakn N. Dadrian had conducted studies in various fields before becoming a scholar of the Armenian genocide. After having received secondary education, he studied mathematics at the University of Berlin. He decided to spend a semester in Vienna, where he became acquainted with Franz Werfel’s The Forty Days of Musa Dagh and started to become interested in the Armenian genocide. His interest led him to scientific research. About his personal motives he stated: “I did not believe that humans are able to do such crimes.”59 (Գուլակյան [2013]) After that, he studied modern history, international law and sociology. He moved to the United States and in 1970 devoted himself completely to the research of the Armenian genocide. (Zoryan Institute [2009])

It can be stated that the reason for this complete silence about the genocide was that Armenians had not been established in the fields of social sciences and humanities before. The lack of an Armenian intelligentsia started to fade after the second generation

59 Own translation, original text: “Չէի հավատում, որ մարդիկ ունակ են այդպիսի հանցագործություններն անել.”
grew up. They already had the possibility to turn toward the history of their homeland and kin people as well appreciated scholars and citizens of their host country or in international scholarly circles.

As a result of this revival, Armenians held commemorations in many cities of the United States on April 24th, 1965. They held either public gatherings or marches to achieve recognition of their pain. The Armenian Apostolic Church organised religious commemorations in churches. Majority politics could not avoid the effects of this campaign, either. Future President Ford, for example, addressed the House of Representatives as follows: “Mr Speaker, with mixed emotions we mark the 50th anniversary of the Turkish genocide of the Armenian people. In taking notice of the shocking events in 1915, we observe this anniversary with sorrow in recalling the massacres of Armenians, and with pride in saluting those brave patriots who survived to fight on the side of freedom during World War I.” (Congressional Records [2001] p. 6091.)

The march of Armenians in Los Angeles had raised the demand among the participants that a constant place for commemoration be established. The organisers’ and participants’ need for annual commemorations from that year on met each other. The campaign for a permanent place of commemoration soon succeeded, even though the Turkish government protested against it. The Armenians’ move was supported by the city of Montebello, California. The local municipality granted them a public park. Plans for the eight-column memorial resembling an Armenian church were authorised in 1966, while construction started in 1967. Due to these efforts, the second such monument outside Armenia was erected in Montebello. The memorial was unveiled in April of 1968, some days before the memorial day of the Armenian Genocide. (Armenian Genocide Martyrs Monument [2010])

The demand for speakout resulted in manifold actions concerning the Armenian genocide, as is visible. Raising social, political and scholarly awareness was achieved through peaceful means. Therefore, it is most probably surprising that some years after the beginning of collective processing Gurgen Yanikian chose an extreme way of reflecting on the events that had happened half a century before. He himself was a survivor of the genocide as a child. After the genocide he was educated in Russia. Later, he moved to Iran where he had held a well respected position as an engineer and owner of a state-financed construction company. He arrived in the United States after World War II. After his arrival he gave up his former career and decided to devote himself to
literature and arts. He decided to enrich Armenian culture with his works. (Kalaydjian [2013])

On January 27, 1973 he extended an invitation to the Turkish consul general and his vice consul in Santa Barbara. He pretended to hold precious Ottoman antiquities in his possession. During the meeting in a café he shot both diplomats dead. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for this act. As the materials of his trial testify, he committed his act both on personal and collective grounds. He had lost 26 members of his family: this was the personal issue he took revenge for. The wider global injustice against the whole of Armenian people had also troubled him deeply. (People v. Yanikian [1974])

In any case, he differs from the avengers of Operation Nemesis. He was a lone assassin without an institutional background. There was no organised attempt by any supportive organisation to find a collective excuse or a systematic strategy in his case. We know that the cases of Tehlirian’s and Torlakian’s trials were different. Another serious dissimilarity in his case is that Yanikian had been a survivor of the genocide. As is known about the assassins of Operation Nemesis, none of them lived through the deportation marches and slaughters in person. Their most personal attachment to the Armenian genocide was the loss of relatives in some cases.

Still, in Armenian public opinion both in the homeland and the diaspora, he is considered a successor of the avengers of Operation Nemesis. On the other hand, he is also supposed to be the founder of the third generation revenge organisations. The latter will be analysed in the following chapter in detail. After considering its features it will be compared with the case of Yanikian. The reactions of the latter organisation to his attack and his reflections on third generation Armenian avengers will also be analysed in the following chapter.

As visible from the examination of this era in the Armenian community of the United States, there was no leading strategy of collective processing of the genocide. The social movements that had protested against the injustices hidden by the political regime of the country and lasting racial discrimination supported Armenians. The general social mood had also supported expressing their displeasure with political ignorance of their trauma. Except for Gurgen Yanikian’s sentence there was no restrictive step taken by the state. This legal action was not adjusted to his certain case, but applied age-old legal rules.
Therefore, most probably for the political and legal system, strategies outside of aggression were acceptable. Also, by not having found any certain local strategy in the preparation phase, only those strategies transmitted from the Lebanese and Syrian Armenian community were obviously present. These were namely reconciliation, genocide-time rage [aggression] and the obscure mystical reunion with the home country. Still, no certain effects of these diaspora reflections had been adopted by the Armenian community as a general strategy, nor were various general strategies.

The Armenian community in this case did not go beyond the question of the right to represent the issue of the Armenian genocide in public. They did not raise demands to establish schools, publish newspapers or books, fund organisations or pursue the revival of their institutions, facilities and works aiming at social revival. For this reason, the events of this period cannot be considered reconstruction, but as expressing the demand for commemoration instead.

5.4. Armenians in Recovering Lebanon

The first civil war was followed by political stability and economic growth in the 1960s. This supported the cultural blossoming of the Armenian community. On the other hand, the Ba’ath revolution in neighbouring Syria supported the growth of the Lebanese Armenian community. Many Armenians left Syria for the freer and democratic atmosphere in Lebanon. (Այվազյան [2003] p. 292) Many intellectuals from the neighbouring country brought previously Syrian Armenian press products with them and re-established them in Beirut, or the authors merged with the editors of already existing Lebanese Armenian periodicals. Literary life was significantly refreshed by this move. The most significant authors from this refreshment were the poet Zareh Melkonian and Karnig Attarian, editors of periodicals previously, in the period of silence. (Migliorino [2008] pp.123-124)

On the other hand, political life of the Armenian community in Lebanon did not ameliorate after the civil war. Tensions were ever growing. The reason for this was that the Dashnak Party supported President Chamoun at the beginning of the civil war. During the war some members of the party also built up good relations with his opposition. Thus, after the conflict situation was resolved, the Dashnaks supported President Chehab. He dissolved the parliament and made changes in the electoral
system in order to include the former opposition in legislation. Taking the relationship the Dashnak Party members had built up with the former opposition, Armenian parties belonging to Chamoun’s opposition from the beginning felt neglected in Lebanese political life and overwhelmed by the Dashnaks. Tensions also grew between those who opposed and those who supported Dashnak dominance within the Armenian Apostolic Church in Lebanon. The state still recognised the latter. (Messerlian [2014] pp. 163-166)

Besides local tensions, the thaw in the Soviet Union also had an effect on Lebanese Armenians. Some of them could travel to the Armenian SSR. In 1958 Antranik Zaroukian travelled to the communist homeland for the first time. Shortly after that he started to write about the issues of Soviet Armenia and the Diaspora. Even if Soviet Armenian authors criticised him and his works, he attempted to maintain a positive image of the Armenian SSR and appreciate its role as the homeland for Armenians. (Bardakjian [2000] pp. 247-248) His book People without Childhood was published in the first half of the 1960s in Yerevan (NAS RA Fundamental Scientific Library [2015]). Simon Simonian followed his example by visiting Soviet Armenia during the Khrushchev thaw. He even supported the publishing of Soviet Armenian authors’ works, which were not approved for publishing by Soviet Armenian censorship. (Կոզմոյան [2011])

Karnig Attarian, a very active member and high representative of the Lebanese Communist Party, published various works around 1965. His lengthy poem Book of Pain and Reparation60, written in 1964, embraces the issue of the hopeless and seemingly incurable pain on the one hand, and maps out a detailed recognition that the wound caused by the genocide will probably never disappear. On the other hand, he starts to offer phenomena of contemporary life offering a positive perspective. The final item on this list is Armenia. He cites Silva Kaputikyan’s Midway reflections concerning taking revenge by living. Paruyr Sevak is also among the authors who served him with mottos for the poem. Similarly to Silva Kaputikyan’s case, Attarian also chose an optimistic message by Sevak. (Ադդարեան [1964]) In 1968 he published a collection of poems under the title Live – Die61. In numerous poems he addresses the issue of Armenian emigration and life in the diaspora. He also repeatedly idealises the Soviet

60 Մատեան Ցաւի Եւ Հատուցման,
61 Ապրիմ-Մեռնիմ
Armenian homeland, mentioning it as “the opposite side of the Araxes river” (Ադդարեան [1968]) His works are also good examples of communication with the intelligentsia of the Armenian SSR. It is not clear whether optimism in his works is an attitude adopted from Soviet Armenian writers or is only similar to their thoughts by coincidence. Though being a communist, it is highly probable that his approach at least partly evolved from his political views, which were represented by the homeland.

Moushegh Ishkhan represented another approach, filled with more optimism than his early works. He expressed the need for maintaining the Armenian identity, especially the language. His poetry in the late 1950s was about leaving a message to the future generations. The aim of this message was to recreate the historical glory of the Armenian homeland in the future. (Դեմիրճյան [2014]) This can be interpreted as reconstruction. His works in the took a turn and examined human suffering from a broader perspective, not from that of the nation, but that of mankind. He explains suffering in these works with human nature. (Դեմիրճյան [2014]) This approach reflects rationalisation.

Lebanese Armenians also held demonstrations in 1965. Being the most active diaspora community politically, representatives of Armenian political, social and religious institutions were present more than in other communities. (Koldaş [2003]) The commemoration on April 24 also included unveiling of the Armenian genocide memorial in Bikfaya, at the summer residence of the Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia, who resides in Antelias in the remaining parts of the year. The bronze sculpture was financed by the Armenian Apostolic Church. Construction started in the early 1960s. Commemorations since 1965 vary between the memorial chapel in Antelias and the monument of Bikfaya. (Murachanian [2011], Armenian National Institute [1998-2015])

Surprisingly, these developments did not reach the academic sphere. Haigazian College was opened in 1955. The Armenological Faculty has been operating since the foundation of the institution. In the beginning, the faculty had limited infrastructural opportunities but attempted to hire the most renowned armenologists from Lebanon and the diaspora. The institution — benefitting from the Khrushchev thaw — maintained active relations with youth and sports organisations, cultural associations and excursionist clubs of the Armenian SSR. This cooperation also continued under Brezhnev’s rule. (Սանճեան [2000] pp. 11-13) Despite having the most appreciated
scholars as lecturers, scholarly research and publications concerning the genocide did not start until 1970. The first article in the Haigazian Review, the main Armenological forum in Lebanon, was published about the two Armenian delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. The next year two articles followed about the Ottoman-German alliance and the issue of Western Armenian territories. (Յովհաննիսեան [2000] p. 98, 99, 104) The following editions were printed directly before or during the second civil war. A possible reason for the delay of scientific processing is that most lecturers received their education before or immediately after the genocide, having received a more classical education in history, literature and Armenian language than that concentrating on contemporary issues. On the other hand, as is highlighted in the summary of Armenian historiography in the Haigazian Review: “It is hard to pick any issue of the review which does not contain various articles concerning the history of the diaspora.”62 (Յովհաննիսեան [2000] p. 110) This means that Lebanese Armenian scholars were interested in the practical consequences of the genocide.

5.5. A Quinquennial and a Decennial Commemoration in Hungary

The Khrushchev thaw was followed by the revolution of 1956 and grave retaliation by the re-established communist dictatorship. The sanctions aimed mainly against the participants of the revolution and those who fought against invading Soviet troops affected the whole population. The strictness of the regime ceased finally in 1963 when general amnesty was granted to political prisoners, albeit amnesty had been also granted in smaller waves after 1959. (Békés et al. [2002] pp. XLIX, L)

The Armenian Catholic Parish was not active in commemorating the Armenian genocide. The traumatic events were commemorated in 1960 and 1965. Besides these years there is not any evidence for such efforts. In 1959 for example the leaders of the community gathered to confer about current issues on April 24 but there is no mention about the genocide in the record of the event. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1959]) In 1960 the invitation for the commemoration calls to mourn over the victims of ‘deportations’ as the genocide is named in the letter. It mentions 1.5 million victims. The program was planned for April 24 and contains a choir

62 Original text: "Դժվար է մատնացույց անել Հանդես ի որեւէ համար, որտեղ չլինեն Սփիւռքի նորագույն պատմութեանը նուիրուած տարաբնույթ յօդուածներ:"
accompanied mass and the speech of a professor at the Theological Academy, Imre Timkó. A notable statement can be read at the end of the invitation: “At the same time this mourning service is a service of gratitude for the fact that there are Armenians still living in the world, but mainly for the fact that the Soviet empire opened its doors before our Armenian brothers living in masses in the ancient homeland and ensured that they live a peaceful, civilised Armenian life in their own republic.”\(^63\) (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1960]) It is obvious from the text that the parish attempted to show adaptation to the Soviet system. Also the optimism can be found in the text, and gratitude to the Soviet Union which reflects the strategy of reconciliation.

1965 bore a commemoration mass and an interesting document that was sent to the parish and was aimed to a newspaper editorial. The invitation to the mourning service mentions that the fiftieth anniversary joins Armenians together worldwide. It stresses as well that survivors of the genocide and their descendants also live in Hungary, therefore the community can commemorate the events with a special focus. The parish again invited a guest choir and Imre Timkó who by the time became the dean of the Theological Academy. According to Armenian traditions, the mourning mass was also accompanied with a shared meal for the community. The mass would be held on 24 April 1965. The community planned unveiling a memorial tablet for the victims in the chapel. The document similarly to the one of 1960 mentions 1.5 million victims of the genocide that is named “shaking and inhumane massacre”\(^64\). (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1965/a])

One more reflection on the Armenian genocide is available from 1965. Avetisz Tarpininan, a survivor informed the weekly newspaper Ország-Világ about the Armenian genocide. The initiating impact to write the letter and the informing article was the mourning mass he took part in. The attached letter is more informative concerning the author’s motives, aims and processing strategy. “I think with aching and grateful heart of the facts that I could find a new fatherland and a peaceful home in Hungary, I have settled down with the memories of my old family and founded my new one whose love is soothing and consoling for painful memories and for lost ones. I still feel necessary to send a short informant to Mr Chief Editor in the attached article about

\(^{63}\) Original text: “Ez a gyászistentiszteletünk egyben hálaladó istentisztelet is azért, hogy a világon még léteznek örmények, akik megemlékezhetnek eről az ünnepéről, de főleg azért, hogy az ösi hazában nagy tömegben élő örmény testvéreink előtt a Szovjet birodalom megnyitotta kapuit és lehetővé tette, hogy önálló köztársaságukban békés, kulturált örmény életet élhessenek.”

\(^{64}\) Original expression: „megrendítő és embertelen lemészárlás”
the past 50 years of the Armenian people in order to inform the community of readers of your honourable newspapers who are interested in the situation and conditions of Soviet Armenia."  

His description of the old pain and the relief his new family means to him and how they bear the memory of the old ones shows the strategy of reconciliation. He feels the need for commemoration and has an optimistic view of his survival and the future. This parallels his views he introduces about Soviet Armenia in the proposed article: “That was the time when Soviet Armenia was created where the refugees established and built up the capital of the country, present day Yerevan with new vitality and enthusiasm. There in accordance with their talent and cultural development, the Armenian people served people’s advance with universities, academy [of sciences], an opera and a space observatory and built orphanages and rest homes for the needy. World renowned scientists, artists, doctors are educated in their small country in order to serve also this way the greatest achievement of mankind, that is peace.”

This approach also expresses optimism about the future while remembering the genocide. Thereby it can be stated that Tarpinian found it important to share his approach and that of the Armenian SSR to genocide trauma processing with Hungarian public. It also becomes visible how he adapts his need for commemoration to communist ideology, praising the opportunities offered by the Soviet Union to Armenians.

Keeping in touch with other Armenian communities was though limited in this period. Several documents of the Armenian Catholic parish in Budapest mention that they usually received guests from other Armenian communities. Still, even father Kádár’s travels were not always authorised. He wrote a letter to the Passports Department of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs in 1964 when his travel had to be cancelled and his passport was refused. His destination does not turn out from the document, but most probably he intended to visit the Mekhitarist Congregation in

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65 Original text: „Fájó és hálaltelt szívvel gondolok arra, hogy Magyarországon új hazát és békés otthon találtam, elveszett rokonságom emlékével új családot alapítottam, akiknek szeretete megnyugtatás és vigasz a fájó emlékéért s az elveszettekért. Mégis szükségét érzem, hogy az örmény nép el-mult 50 évéről rövid tájékoztatot juttassak el Főszerkesztő Úrhoz a csatolt cikkben a b.[ecses] hetilapjaikban Szovjet-Örményország helyzete és viszonyai iránt érdeklődő olvasó közönségük tájékoztatására.”

66 Original text: “Abban az időben alakult meg Szovjet Armenia, ahol a menekültek új életkedvvel és lelkesedéssel létesítettek és építettek fel az ország fővárosát, a mai jerevánt. Ott az örmény nép tehetségének és kulturális fejlettségének megfelelően, egyetemmel, akadémiával, operával, csillagvizsgáló intézettel szolgálta a népi haladást, ezekben kívül árvaházakat, szeretet etthonokat építettek a gondozásra rászorulóknak. Kis országukban világhírű tudósokat, művészeket, orvosokat nevelnek, hogy általuk is szolgálnassák az emberiség legnagyobb javát: a békét.”
Vienna, because he mentioned in the letter that he would need medical treatment for his heart disease. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1964/b])

Finally father Kádár could stay in Vienna for medical examinations and treatments. During these he applied for extending his stay at the embassy of Hungary to Austria. His application was accepted. Thereupon he could travel to the Mekhitarist Congregation in Venice, to Padua visiting an Armenian family and Rome where he stayed with Armenian priests. Finally he returned to Vienna when also the catholicos from the Holy See of Ejmiatsin was there on visit. Besides meeting high rank Armenian priests and the catholicos, the priest points out that there is constant and regulated book exchange between Ejmiatsin and Venice in case of new publications which proves constant institutional communication also between Armenian Catholics and the Armenian Apostolic Church. Father Kádár also mentions that he had received and offered various invitations and had experienced that he, Hungary and Armenians of Hungary are appreciated and respected in abroad and by the guests who accepted Kádár’s visits. He adds some remarks on occasionally critical articles published in the West he suggests censorship. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1966])

Such kind of visits meant limited exchange of information and approaches. On the other hand, it is visible from the documents that an obligate conformity was present in Hungary adapting rather to the communist state ideology than directly to the Armenian SSR’s approach to the memory of the Armenian genocide. This can also be confirmed by the fact that travelling to the Soviet homeland was restricted and other ways of communication were also limited. Traces of these relations can be found in the archives of the parish, such as an issue of the newspaper Masis issued in Beirut reporting about the meeting of pope Paul VI with the Armenian patriarch. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1964/c]) There was still no massive travel connection or correspondence between the Hungarian and other Armenian communities. The documents found show uncoordinated nature of these.

5.6. Conclusions

The initial phase of the period of speak-out had brought various reactions both at the collective and individual levels. More detailed knowledge on the latter is limited to
the Armenian SSR. In each host state or host environment examined in this chapter had showed a powerful need for speaking out the trauma. Soviet Armenia represented a central ideology that met also collective needs represented by local literary authors. Scholarly processing of the issue had also taken a new direction, albeit within state-accepted ideological frameworks. These moves also coincided with recorded individual responses of that era. A serious political shift contributed to the fact that these new directions were able to appear in the public. The general approach to genocide trauma processing was reconciliation.

The atmosphere in the United States had also changed by that time. The major shift that paralleled Armenians’ needs to speak out was not political as in the Soviet Union, but rather social. It has to be noted that social movements had a much broader space in the United States than in its superpower-counterpart. Armenians also started to raise their voice around 1965, similarly to their soviet-Armenian kin people. Their approaches were though quite manifold and had not result in a single principle in trauma processing at the collective level. The fact that the United States did not have an ideological oppression mechanism especially not strong and strict as the Soviet Union, appears to be a considerable reason to that.

Lebanese Armenian society both faced a cultural blossoming and a grave political conflict. The responses in this period show the strategy of reconciliation and idealisation of the Soviet Union by leftist Armenian writers. Publishing their works in the Soviet Union shows their conformity also with the Soviet system. The fact that the roots of reconciliation had been previously present in both places shows that this similarity is a result of earlier moves but communication may have intensified it and enriched Armenians’ reconciliation processing strategy.

In the Soviet case local ideologists and central political forces finally accepted the need for collective trauma processing. On the other hand, they had determined the ways of it. In the American case no state limitation was made to the issue besides the intolerance of aggression. Finding no leading approach appears to be a result of tolerance of any other trauma processing strategies. The drive for speak-out though was fuelled by similar local social needs.

In Hungary a clear influence of communist party-state ideology can be observed. The state applied direct control on the Armenian Catholic Parish through the State Authority for Church Affairs father Kádár was obliged to write his travel reports and the Ministry for Domestic Affairs. Therefore praising Soviet Armenia and emphasising
communism and the Soviet Union for saving Armenians is not surprising. It must be noted again that the quantity of available sources on the issue is very limited at the moment. Concluding, the effect of the political environment of the host state clearly influenced the responses of the Armenian community. A good example for this is the difference between Tarpinian Avetis’ letter and article. The letter expresses his personal experience with the memory of the genocide. It does not contain any reference to the USSR or Soviet Armenia as good examples. In the article he aimed to the public he though puts the emphasis on how the Soviet dream was realised in the Armenian SSR.

Therefore it can be stated that the first hypothesis is true in this case with the addition that in the case of the Armenian SSR not host society, but host environment shall be mentioned. Finally this host environment had determined social progresses there due to the totalitarian nature of the state. It becomes obvious analysing the developments of that era that diverse host environments and societies resulted in diverse ways of processing.

The phase and the direct antecedents of the beginning of speak-out took place in the Cold War environment. Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s new principles in foreign affairs brought changes and the 1960s except for the two Cuban Crises passed by relatively peacefully. The possibilities to communicate between the two blocs were still restricted and limited. Mass migration was absent from this period.

On the other hand it must be noted that if the case of Hungary is observed, which had relatively low intensity of communication with other Armenian communities, the standardising effect of the communist ideology in case of shaping the processing strategy of reconciliation at the collective level is obvious. It appears to be much more powerful that the possible effect of the low level of communication with the Armenian SSR. In addition albeit leftist intellectuals of the Lebanese Armenian community maintained intensive connections with Soviet Armenia, acceptance and praising the Soviet homeland was obvious. On the other hand, reconciliation had been present in both places before this period and both communities built it up again with their own efforts. More intensive communication only resulted in exchanging already similar thoughts and not changing each other’s approach. Additionally, publishing Soviet Armenian authors’ non-authorised works in Lebanon also meant that not even Hunchak and Ramkavar-related or communist intellectuals of the the Lebanese Armenian community fully agreed with the homeland’s policy. In this case communication even meant a way for achieving the diversity of thoughts. Finally, if it is considered that
Lebanese and Syrian Armenian literary sources had been published in the United States, but had not had a major impact on local responses, then a dominance of local influences can be stated also in the case of the American Armenian community.

Considering the abovementioned facts, it seems plausible that in the period of the beginning of speak-out local political and social factors influenced genocide processing in a much stronger way than communication. The spread of information depended much more on the political environment. The observed progresses suggest that information was only spread within politically given borders. Armenian communities in the Eastern bloc communicated with each other and socialist or communist parties in the diaspora; and the political ideology became determinant for the content of communication. A particularly good example is Father Kádár’s case who had the possibility to travel beyond the Iron Curtain, still the views he reflected to the public and the party-state was determined by communist ideology. Therefore the second hypothesis is rejected in this phase.

The demand for trauma processing at the collective level was present in each examined community. Probably the best example for this is the demonstrations of 1965. Information about the individual level is available only from the Armenian SSR and in one case from Hungary. Collective processing was broadly present in Armenian public in the examined states, not only in particular social strata or political moves. Mass demonstrations were often self-organised. Therefore it is highly probable that individual demand for processing was present in the given period in each community.

The result of mass-demonstrations and further kind of articulation of the demand for processing the Armenian genocide was manifold. The results differed by community. Based on these statements, the third hypothesis is true as well. Demand being present and different results mean different ways of processing based on the same need.

The first and third hypotheses were found true in the case of the beginning of speak-out. One limitation to this statement is that there are very limited possibilities to analyse parallel individual strategies in the examined states. Therefore the connections between individual and collective processing strategies are not clear in Lebanon and neither in Hungary. In case of the Soviet Union it is clear that there was an intellectual move for the strategy of reconciliation coinciding recorded individual reflections. The only exception at the field of collective reactions is demanding Western Armenian Lands at the 1965 rallies that was oppressed by the state. A question for further
clarification is whether the literary authors expressed individual demands or they affected individuals to accept the strategy reconciliation. Additionally, it also remains unclear whether the coincidence of social needs and political allowance remained true after the local communist ideology adopted reconciliation as an accepted strategy.

6. The Phase of Third-Generation Revenge

Gurgen Yanikian is usually mentioned as the forerunner of third generation revenge. At the time of committing the assassination of the two Turkish diplomats, he was definitely a lonely assassin of the first generation of survivors. Later, as the third-generation revenge movement evolved, he was more and more frequently mentioned as the father or godfather of the movement. Armenian avengers perceived him as an inspiration. Yanikyan also held the third generation in high regard for fulfilling their duty as he did. There is a famous interview conducted with him in prison that seems to be proof of this assumption. There he mentions the actions of Armenian youth in general as necessary to call attention to the trauma. (Yanikian [year unknown]) Still, labelling him as the first member of the third-generation revenge groups is obviously a retrospective assumption. The third generation revenge movement had much more complex reasons than that which could be evoked by the act of one person. Various processes influencing various diaspora communities paved the way for the second wave of collective aggression. One of these is the third generation syndrome related to posttraumatic stress. As Gunter notes, many of the participants of third-generation revenge organisations were grandchildren of survivors. (Gunter [1986] pp. 76, 81) Still, much more complex background was needed to the evolution of revenge organisations.

We must take into consideration that fact that the new era of collective responses to the Armenian genocide started in the Armenian diaspora in 1975. The move for speak-out and peaceful commemoration was followed by aggressive reactions at that time. The third generation revenge movement launched its operations that year. This coincides with the beginning of the second civil war in Lebanon. The temporal synchronicity is not random, for the movement had evolved from the chaotic situation that also sparked the civil war.
6.1. The Evolution and Operations of Armenian Third-Generation Revenge Groups

Because of the tense relations between Israel and Palestinians, a growing number of refugees had been arriving in Lebanon. Their rights were not clarified until 1969. In the same year the state became party to the Cairo Agreement that obliged Lebanon as an Arab state to protect Palestinians. Until that time Lebanese state authorities regularly conflicted with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Later, Israeli forces regularly intruded into the southern parts of the country. Such operations had become regular by 1972-73. For this reason, the relation between the Lebanese state and Palestinian refugees became tense. Additionally, the big proportion of Palestinians upset the fragile confessional system, as 400,000 newly arrived Sunni Muslims appeared among Lebanon’s citizens. The previous quotas were disproportionate to the new composition of the Lebanese polity. (BENKE [1996] pp. 431, 434–435, Հովհաննիսյան [1982] 14.) These tensions led to the civil war of 1975 that lasted for nearly one and a half decades.

The Armenian community had lived in the same, constantly tense and from time to time militant environment of the majority. The number of Armenians in Lebanon had reached its maximum size of 200,000 persons by 1975. The double-faced nature of the Armenian minority as depicted in the previous chapters was still present. Moreover, roughly 60,000 Syrian and Palestinian Armenian refugees did not receive Lebanese citizenship after fleeing from neighbouring countries thanks to the Ba'ath revolution and Palestinian-Israeli tensions. (Այվազյան [2003] p. 292) Thereby, these masses shared the fate of the masses of Palestinian refugees.

Intra-community social tensions still meant that the Dashnaks continued to have close contacts with the leadership of the country, while the Ramkavar and the Hunchak Parties started to support the opposition radical Lebanese National Movement. (Հովհաննիսյան [2006] pp. 617-618.) Being on the same side of the conflict, the members and supporters of the latter parties were able to establish close contacts with radical Palestinians opposing the Lebanese political leadership.

Lebanese Armenian youth had been raised in the atmosphere determined by conflicts affecting everyday life. Social and political tensions were present in the
political sphere of the host state for decades, despite the prosperity of the 1960s. Given the conflicts within the Armenian minority described in the previous chapters and above, intracommunity clashes also created an aggressive environment for the socialisation of the Armenian youth. Furthermore, Lebanese Armenian education had not prepared the youth for final residence in Lebanon. For example, the Arabic language had not or not been thoroughly taught to them until World War II. (Թոփուզյան [1986] p. 283) Thereby it was the first generation growing up after the war that was educated to be part of Lebanese society without the hope of creating an independent homeland. They faced a situation whereby they faced the prospect of losing the safety of their second homeland due to civil war.

As described above, the Hunchak and Ramkavar Parties had been supporting the Armenian SSR. The Soviet homeland seemed to be a relatively safe place compared to Lebanon, a country struck by humanitarian crisis, conflict with Israel and eventual civil war. Therefore, the first target of the attacks was not surprising. It was the World Council of Churches, an organisation that supported emigration from Soviet Armenia to the West. (Gunter [1986] p. 27) It is clear that the support for emigration from Soviet Armenia meant weakening the accepted Armenian homeland from the pro Soviet-Armenian perspective. This is how the first revenge organisation, ASALA\(^{67}\) evolved. On the other hand it must be noted that Monte Melkonian, member of ASALA who later separated from the organisation, notes that Hunchak and Ramkavar political views only fuelled ASALA in the beginning. According to his views, the organisation did not have clear political guidelines after its birth, which he considered critical and an obstacle to the success for the organisation. (Գասպարյան-Մելքոնյան, Մելքոնյան [1996] p. 200)

Targets of the organisation were mainly persons and locations symbolically representing the Republic of Turkey. Chaliand and Ternon characterise the phenomenon as a classic example of media terrorism for the reason that one of the aims of ASALA-members was also to call attention of international public opinion to the non-repaired trauma of their community. (Chaliand, Ternon [1983] p. 5.)

ASALA had maintained consistent relations with Palestinian terrorists and Armenian diaspora-communities. The organisation had acquired operation principles

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\(^{67}\) Armenian Secret Army for the Deliberation of Armenia, Հայաստանի ազատագրության հայ գաղտնի բանակ – HAHGB in Armenian
from the former and necessary material, political and recruiting support from the latter. It had extended its operations to countries lenient with Armenians. As a result, they had drill camps in Cyprus and France. After the arrest of their members they attempted to keep the courts of the given countries under pressure. Those captured in France and Switzerland were sentenced to especially mitigated punishments. (Gunter [1986] pp. 34, 44, 103, 110, 112-113)

ASALA was attractive for Armenian youth worldwide. The organisation had not only Lebanese, but also French and American members. Fearing ASALA’s becoming a general and single drawing force for young Armenians, the Dashnak party founded the Justice Commandoes for the Armenian Genocide-Armenian Revolutionary Army [JCAG-ARA]. Their aim was explicitly to block youngsters showing solidarity with ASALA from joining the latter organisation, as ASALA was very popular among Lebanese Armenian youth in general. Rivalry between the two revenge organisations occasionally resulted in attacking each other. The other counterforce for ASALA was the structure of the organisation itself. The leader known as Hagop Hagopian or Mujahid had kept members under his strong personal control, even committing cruelties against them. (Գասպարյան-Մելքոնյան, Մելքոնյան [1996] p. 206)

The cruelties committed against ASALA members by their own leader resulted in inner conflicts. These were mirrored in sabotaging numerous attacks by the members. (Gunter [1986] pp. 47-53, 55, 71, 103.) The above mentioned reasons were the motive for the creation of the ASALA-RM68. Besides, the organisation lost its centre in Beirut and had to move to the Bekaa Valley, where Syrian forces could rigorously control them. After the split the original organisation led by Hagopian shortly lost its support and strength. (Gunter [2011] pp. 67, 68)

Monte Melkonyan, and his wife, Seda Gasparyan-Melkonyan, strongly criticised both of ASALA’s eras and attained some valuable information about each organisation’s military strategy. They mention that the aim of ASALA’s and ASALA-RM’s attacks was the creation of a “free, independent, people’s democratic Armenia”, “only Armenian homeland”, “union with Soviet Armenia”, “revolutionary people’s democracy”, “deliberation of Armenia” without defining the content of these. (Գասպարյան-Մելքոնյան, Մելքոնյան [1996] p. 201)

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68 RM stands for Revolutionary Movement.
On the other hand, they also mention that JCAG-ARA – which they do not consider separate from the Dashnak Party – followed a concentrated strategy of applying pressure on diplomats worldwide to accept Armenia’s Sèvres borders and recognise the genocide. They also consider the organisation as following the post-genocide Dashnak strategy. In their interpretation the JCAG-ARA’s success in media appearances was not haphazard but the result of a conscious political plan, even though the organisation started operation nine months after ASALA. (Գասպարյան-Մելքոնյան, Մելքոնյան [1996] p. 201) On the other hand, we should keep in mind what is already known from the analysis of Operation Nemesis: the aim of that organisation was not only the achievement of international recognition for the Armenian genocide – through the trials of the assassins, for example – but also an and aggressive delivery of justice.

Besides organisational collisions within ASALA and mutual counterattacks, another reason resulted in the fading of third generation Armenian revenge actions. The level of awareness of the Armenian genocide in the international public sphere had been growing consistently in the examined period. It was recognised by the Permanent People’s Tribunal in France. The organisation was created by intellectuals for the scientific examination of the genocide. April 24th, the memorial day for the genocide, had been pronounced as a memorial day in the United States for several years. The genocide was also mentioned in UN document drafts. Various states had issued declarations about recognising the Armenian genocide. Thus, the movement had reached this goal successfully. (Schaefgen [2006] p. 81.) By 1985 the attacks had come to an end.

Another conclusion of the revenge operations is that the members of the organisations had still not experienced any conventional solution for the trauma of the genocide. This could still serve as a necessary condition for aggression. In this case, again, similarly to Operation Nemesis, the possibility of using nonconventional methods serves as a sufficient condition for action. On the other hand, offering conventional solutions like recognition of the Armenian genocide or declaring memorial days decreased tensions. Other conventional means like investigation and legal proceedings against members of the organisations combined with the former can possibly prevent or hinder such actions in the future.
6.2. **Ties between Armenians in the United States and Third-Generation Armenian Revenge Organisations**

Armenians in the United States were also affected by the attacks. American Armenian citizens also participated in the movement. One of them was the already referred American Armenian Monte Melkonyan. He became the leader of ASALA-RM in the 1980s. He had been arrested in France, where he was imprisoned for six years. The reason for his sentence was not violence, but carrying falsified documents. (Arax [1993])

The other infamous American Armenian member of ASALA was Suzy Mahseredjian. She and a fellow avenger, Alex Yenikomshian [Yenigomshian in Eastern Armenian], were preparing for their next attack when the bomb they should have armed exploded in their hotel room in Genève. The latter was blinded and received a severe injury to his arm due to the explosion. The two were tried in Switzerland. After receiving severe sentences they were expelled from the country. (Gunter [1986] pp. 43-44) Not even the latest move of ASALA helped them. The October 3 Group of the organisation started a new wave of attacks to keep Swiss authorities under pressure.

One of the members of the latter groups was another American Armenian, Vicken Tcharkhutian. He admitted four attempts against United States targets in which he participated. These were the only attacks of Armenian third-generation avengers in the USA. Compared to the total number of attacks worldwide, which numbered around 168 according to U. S. Intelligence estimates (CIA [2013]), this is a rather small number. Two of those admitted by Tcharkhurtian were not even recorded by U. S. Intelligence. He admitted these attempts only years later when he was arrested in California. One was an attack against a carpet store. The aim of threatening the owner was to convince him to finance ASALA. The second attack not mentioned by the CIA was organised against the Swiss consulate in Los Angeles in February 1981. Two more attempts were recorded by the CIA, targeting the Swiss Bank Corporation and an Air Canada warehouse. (Murphy [1987]) In Los Angeles the office of the Swiss Bank Corporation was attacked in 1982. A recently declassified CIA document also confirms the assumption that the operation of ASALA in the United States had started after the capture of Yenikomshyan and Mahseredjian. Later the actions stopped. (CIA [2013])
It must be mentioned that Armenians well knew that committing any kind of violent attacks in the United States was not feasible. Gurgen Yanikian, as a first-generation survivor and avenger, was given life imprisonment for the double assassination he had committed. The court did not take his age or the trauma suffered by him during the genocide into consideration. The techniques that had helped members of the well-organised Operation Nemesis half a century earlier were useless in his case. Most probably this warning and the strong condemnation of terrorism by the United States contributed to the low number of attacks and the small number of American Armenian members.69

On the other hand, when Miller and Touryan Miller were conducting their interviews, they found that several Armenians in the United States showed solidarity with third-generation Armenian revenge organisations. (Hovannisian [1991] p. 199.) This fulfils the criteria of rage, as was mentioned in the introduction. This position is supported by the two authors.

There were two kinds of open and public communication between Lebanese and American Armenians in this period. One of these was the mass migration of Lebanese Armenians to the United States. The other was one-sided information that reached American Armenians through American media sources. This strategy was similar to those applied by Muslim fundamentalist terrorist organisations. This was the result of the nature of partly media terrorism applied by Armenian avenger groups. The publicity Armenian terrorism gained in American media sources and the appearance of Lebanese refugee immigrants and their communication with already established American Armenians are probable causes for the appearance of rage in the American Armenian community.

6.3. Literary and Scientific Responses to the Genocide in the American and Lebanese Armenian Communities

The 1970s brought changes in the quantity of literary responses to the Armenian genocide in the United States. Memoir writing and publishing gained popularity among first-generation survivors. The majority of these were written in English. Most of these accounts represented reconstruction of the lost homeland and exactly documented the

69 There are not any exact surveys about the membership, but most sources list mostly Lebanese Armenians among members of the groups.

Peroomian mentions two exceptions that were memoirs written in Armenian. One of these was that of Hambardzum Gelenian, known under the pseudonym Hamastegh. Another author writing in his mother tongue was Aram Haikaz. He was an exception also in the sense that his approach to the memory of the genocide was quite optimistic. (Peroomian [2012] p. 95) Based on this fact it can be stated that he applied the strategy of reconciliation in his memoirs.

Scientific processing in the American Armenian Community was colourful in the period of the third generation attacks. The Armenian Review issued in Watertown, Massachusetts provides a good example of this. The journal did not only publish scientific articles between 1975, the beginning of the period and 1988, the start of the next era, but also historical documents, book reviews, summaries of Soviet Armenian developments and Armenological symposia. Besides, the review deals mostly with the history of Armenians and Armenia, concentrated more on the late Ottoman period and in some cases on the relations between Armenians and other nationalities living on or near the Armenian Plateau. Among analyses of political parties the Armenian Revolutionary Federation is highly overrepresented. To sum up the journal’s activity, it introduces other amenological scholarly works of the period, including monographs and edited volumes.

In the field of late Ottoman history, the base of studies does not differ from those representing the limited official scientific approach in Soviet Armenia. Articles analysing and introducing written historical documents are overwhelming, though memoirs and oral history sources also appear occasionally. The Cold War perspective of the works published in the Armenian Review is naturally much different from those published in Soviet Armenia. Third generation revenge is an issue that is not present in Soviet Armenian scientific analyses. The periodical differs from this approach only by dealing with these attacks in the late 1980s. The issue of the roots of the movements is represented. In 1975 one, and in 1976 two articles dealt with the situation of Lebanese Armenians. One further article is a review of Arshavir Shiragian’s memoirs, thereby touching the issue of first-generation avengers. Only one article studies the condition of
Lebanese Armenians in 1977, while the year of 1978 lacks this issue. 1979 brought an increase in dealing with this topic with two articles. Similarly to 1978, no other items dealt with the Armenian community in Lebanon between 1980 and 1982. The one article of 1983 is followed by four in 1984, reaching the peak for the topic. This may indicate a reaction to the developments of 1981-82, the activity of the October 3 group, considering the fact that a certain period of time must expire before scientific analyses on a given event can be written. It should be mentioned that one of the articles of 1984 (for the contents of the above mentioned issues see: The Armenian Review [2008]70) is the book review of Chaliand’s and Ternon’s Resistance and Revenge. The monograph deals with first-generation revenge, but mentions that the basic idea for the issue originated in the authors’ reactions to the third-generation revenge movements. The monograph is also used as a reference in the present study.

Lebanese Armenian academic life somewhat followed the tendencies of the 1960s, but again there were some publications that were printed in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Levon Vardan wrote a chronology of the Armenian genocide in the Haigazian Review and later he published the results of the same research in a more detailed way in a book in 1975. In 1973 he authored an article dealing with the question of responsibility for the genocide. In 1977-78 Zaven Messerlian analysed the phenomenon of Pan-Turkism in contrast to the aspirations of Nazi Germany, while in 1981 he studied the foreign policy of the United States concerning the Armenian question. (Յովհաննիսեան [2000] pp. 98, 99, 104)

Concerning literary works, Vahe Vahian wrote Monument in Memory of Vahram in memory of his son. After his genocide-related works, this was, surprisingly, his most

optimistic. Although the Armenian genocide is not in the direct focus of this issue, the atmosphere of the Lebanese civil war had a certain effect on it. (Bardakjian [2000] p. 249) Antranik Zaroukian similarly turned back to yearning after his school years in Dreamlike Aleppo. In this novel he tries to follow his childhood friends’ lives, thereby this is a continuation of his novel Men without Childhood that has been mentioned already, though it reflects more on the issues of current life. (Bardakjian [2000] p. 248) Moushegh Ishkhan also returned to his past. Not regarding the topics depicted in his art, but his views about diaspora Armenian life and his doubts about the future. (Դեմիրճյան [2014]) As it has been stated, this trauma-processing strategy does not coincide with any of the seven used in the present dissertation. Simon Simonian, in his Mountain and Fate, analyses the fate of Kemal Atatürk’s adopted daughter Sabiha Gökçen, whose Armenian origin is supposed by many Armenians. (Մելքոնյան [2013]) She can be considered a symbol of continuing anti-Armenian actions and forced assimilation. Besides the above mentioned authors, Zareh Melkonian emigrated from Lebanon to the United States in 1968. (Keushkerian [2010]) This shows that the tense political environment was not acceptable for all Armenians in Lebanon. Not even for Ishkhan who did not share the views of local leftist Armenians. Concerning literary works, a slight shift from the issue of beginning a new life in the previous period is apparent in these works. Obviously the civil war as a local factor affected these authors.

6.4. The Position of the Armenian SSR

There was no significant change in literary and scientific responses to the Armenian genocide. These spheres followed the principles determined in the 1960s that lasted until the change of the regime. On the other hand, intellectuals of the Armenian SSR gave certain responses to the issue of the Lebanese civil war.

The communist ideology partly showed solidarity with the Lebanese opposition. In most sources written during the civil war, Armenian authors often criticised Lebanon for allowing imperialist capital to flow into the country. On the other hand, the situation of Armenians was not analysed in connection with terrorist organisations. The usual reason for their being mentioned was their situation and position in the civil war. Nikolay Hovhannisyan, author of a contemporary analysis of the situation, mentions that Armenians, especially Armenian communists, were fighting side by side with
opposition forces. Հովհաննիսյան [1982]) In reality, Armenian communists in Lebanon were not a sizeable force, and the sources also underestimate or do not mention the ARF as a considerable political force in the Lebanese Armenian community. Most probably the official communist ideologists would not have tolerated an interpretation that places the activity of Armenian revenge organisations into the framework of a national struggle.

Considering individual responses, Verjiné Svazlian recorded 85 interviews between 1971 and 198571. One survivor mentioned the wish for returning to her birthplace, and a high level of optimism. She mentioned that she hoped for the return of her grandchildren to the land that should become part of Armenia again. This reaction is therefore a mixture of reconstruction and reconciliation (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimony Nr. 9. the latter marked with grey background).

Further, two survivors expressed outrage and anger towards the perpetrators (bold numbers in the footnotes). The first testimony in this group only states the intensive hatred the given survivor felt against Turks. (ibid. p. 431) The second such interviewee, expressing outrage and anger said: “[…] The Turk’s favourite way of killing was to slaughter the Armenian, to dismember the Armenian’s body and to watch the blood flowing like a fountain. You see, he would thus go to Allah’s paradise…” (Svazlian [2011] p. 501) In one case an earlier intent for revenge was expressed by a survivor (underlined number in the footnotes). He stated that though he had planned revenge for a long time, he was unable to attack unarmed people, children or women. (Svazlian [2011] p. 503.) One more survivor characterized a local Armenian resistance operation as revenge. (marked with a question mark in the footnotes.) Svazlian states that based on historical research this was self-defence (Svazlian [2011] p. 428), therefore this response cannot be clearly classified as revenge, rather as rage towards Turks.

Ten of the interviews represent the strategy of rationalisation (framed numbers in the footnotes). These describe the most different interpretations of the reasons for the genocide from Turks’ jealousy of Armenians’ wealth, their need for Armenians’ goods, to some mythical descriptions as Talaat Pasha's gambling with one prominent Armenian

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leader or Russians selling the Armenian lands to the Turks for treasures. (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 203, 213, 230, 235, 241, 249, 276, 280.) In two cases the escape of the given person or of numerous survivors is rationalised. One of these describes the escape of the interviewee as a miracle. In a further case the survival of the participants of the Musa Dagh resistance is explained through a miraculous apparition that stopped soldiers from further attacks on the mountain and its inhabitants. (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 290, 307)

Thirteen interviews do not mention the aftermath of the genocide at all. The rest and still the majority of the interviews expressed some kind of optimism about the future, thus reconciliation can be considered as overwhelming among individual responses known from this era. In contrast to the latter group, another response type appeared between 1971 and 1985. People who were exiled (interviews marked with ‘ex.’ in the footnotes) or experienced financial hardships after repatriation (interviews ‘sh. ex.’ in the footnotes) shared their views. These people reflected on their postgenocide life, but without the optimism of the majority of interviewees. Therefore their responses do not meet the criteria of any processing strategies. (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 119, 120, 247)

These tendencies also indicate that revenge was not a characteristic processing strategy in the Armenian SSR. The majority of responses still reflected reconciliation, thereby these coincided with the strategy encouraged and authorised by the state.

6.5. Armenians Reactivised in Hungary

Independently from third generation revenge, most probably due to the efforts of father Kádár the Armenian community in Hungary experienced a revival in the 1970s and 80s. Regular commemorations about the genocide started in 1970. By the time the mourning masses and commemorations developed their own symbolism. For the reason that the materials of the archives of the parish have not been catalogised yet, besides the documents of the early 1970s some very systematic photo albums serve as primary recordings of Armenian genocide commemorations. An enthusiastic member of the community, a photographer in parallel, dr Tibor Szentpétery assembled these
photographic collections completed with related newspaper articles and invitations to the given events.

Before the photographic period some documents show that the Armenian community also tried to bring the issue of the genocide beyond the community’s borders. Two invitations from the first half of the 1970s show a cooperation between Hungary’s Patriotic People’s Front and the Armenian community regarding genocide commemoration. One of the invitations recorded a joint commemoration where besides the actual quinquennial of the Armenian Genocide also commemorates about the hundredth birth anniversary of Komitas, the Armenian poet and writer Hovhannes Tumanyan and Lenin who were all born in the same year. Most probably the latter was attached to the program not because of the similarly round anniversary but mainly because of being able to adapt the commemoration to communist ideals. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1970]) In the other case there is not much information about the program besides the facts that Anihid Argiropulu would have a speech, famous artists would perform and father Kádár would have a speech and a slideshow about his latest journey to the Armenian SSR. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1973])

One year before that the parish moved to its current location, to 6 Orlay utca in Budapest. More specifically the institution attempted to move to the building, though they had problems with the original owners who did not have the intent to move out of the building. The conflict must have consisted of several claims against Armenians in Hungary and the guests received by the parish, most probably the members or leaders of the community must have received such offences from the inhabitants. A complaint letter to the Ministry of Construction and City Development addresses such issues. It mentions that the parish had received numerous high rank guests from Soviet Armenia and from other Armenian communities including Lebanon. The letter mentions thousands of guests since the establishment of the parish. It also emphasises that Armenians scattered all around the world because of the hardships they had gone through in their history and had been always truthful citizens of their home countries, including Hungary. Regarding the homeland, the letter also stresses that if members of the Armenian community travel to the Soviet homeland, they always express appreciation to Hungary. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/a])
Another letter sent personally to the previous owner states that the Armenian community had been verbally insulted by him. Kádár warns him with mentioning that not only Hungarians, but also the Armenian community suffered from World War II and mentions his role in the rescue of Jews. He also mentions that the institution only aims to preserve Armenian culture that was attempted to be exterminated during the genocide. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/a] [1972/b])

The approach of the former letter expresses the already known strategy of reconciliation being adapted to communist norms. The latter one also expresses reconstruction as the present work of the parish is placed into the context of cultural preservation in contrast to annihilation by the genocide.

In the same year, the commemoration of the church was also attached to prayers for blessings for the new church building on 23 April. Other details about the program are not listed in the invitation. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/c]) In one of his letters written to the parish priest of the Transylvanian Armenian settlement Gyergyószentmiklós72 he mentions also a modest reception after the mass. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/e]) His preach for the mourning mass from the same year is also available in the archives of the parish.

In this message Father Kádár adapts the issue of genocide more to Christian traditions and values than to the communist ideology as in the other documents. He makes a brief summary of Armenian history, concentrating mainly on biblical times and the aftermath of the Great Flood to where Christian Armenian tradition traces back the origins of the Armenian people. He mentions also other values such as the importance of the family. He considers it the strongest cohesive and preserving power of Armenians besides their religion. This issue is paralleled with everyday social phenomena of the period, namely applying contraceptive methods and family planning he strongly opposes. Thirdly he addresses Christian religion and martyrdom. He states that the latter is a warning for Armenians to pursue values and kindness. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/f])

The only appearance of a processing strategy is a citation of an Armenian man from Vienna who told Catholicos Vazgen I: “Our people are wonderful among the peoples of the world. During history they were always suffering defeat and still they keep on living. Other peoples are defeated once, twice – and they surcease. Our people

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72 Present-day Gheorgheni
have suffered defeat and though they live.”73 (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/f] p. 2.) This also reflects optimism, thereby reconciliation.

More details about the Armenian genocide in the same year are available in the travel report of father Kádár. He spent nearly three weeks in the Armenian SSR. He emphasizes the enthusiasm of Armenians, especially the energetic development of Yerevan. He states: “Some decades ago the refugees of the nation-exterminating genocide were sheltered in huts without windows and chimneys, but they did not lose their vigour and optimism.”74 (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/d] p. 3) Father Kádár also had the chance to visit the genocide memorial on Tsitsernakaberd. He was touched by the symbolism of the monument and also Komitas’ music played there. He frequently stresses the importance of cooperation between various institutions of the Armenian SSR and the Armenian community in Hungary and the enthusiasm how Armenians in various host countries and the homeland shall work together for building and peace. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1972/d]) From this document again father Kádár’s suffrage concerning the strategy of reconciliation becomes visible. In addition, the efforts to introduce Armenian-Armenian relations as building peace and communism are also obvious.

Father Kádár’s next travel took place in 1975. In the report for the State Authority for Church Affairs he describes that he spent his travel mainly in Western Europe to raise funds for completing construction works in the new Armenian Church. He also had the possibility to travel to Turkey and Lebanon but he did not use it. The details of the report are not related to the Armenian genocide, but the concluding sentences are. Father Kádár expresses his gratitude for state authorisation of his travel, especially at the sixtieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1975])

In the 1980s a consequent symbolism of the mourning masses commemorating the genocide appeared in the invitations. The related photo albums and the attached invitations recorded that it became a tradition to light a number of candles corresponsive with the number of years passed since the beginning of the genocide. The earliest

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74 Original text: „Pár évtizeddel ezelőtt kémény nélküli, ablaktalan kunyhókban húzódtak meg a nemzetirtó népirtástól megmenekültek, de életkedvük, bizakodásukat nem vesztették el.”
invitation calls for neighbourly love and confessing the Christian religion following the example of Armenian martyrs. The seventieth anniversary was joint with praying for peace and the invitation also expressed the wish that such atrocities shall never happen again in the history of humanity. The invitation for the mourning ceremony of 1986 also indicates the end of reconstruction works in the church and gratitude to that. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1983], [1984], [1985], [1986]) There is an article copied with a typewriter in the album of 1985. The article is supposed to contain the speech of the pope and calls for prayers for peace and the wish that genocide shall never happen again. Therefore it can be stated that the message of the 1985 invitation was adapted to this call. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish [1985])

Generally besides each trauma processing strategy appearing in the documents it is obvious that even the given temporary environment and context put an effect on commemorations. Correspondence with state organs and records about politically determined environment (ie. joint commemorations with the Patriotic People’s Front) resulted in stronger emphasis of reconciliation and its accepted expression in Soviet Armenia. Occasions within the church rather adapted to religious values and principles. Regarding the revenge organisations, it is apparent that neither environments of the two accepted it. It is highly possible that at least during his journeys from 1975 father Kádár had heard about revenge actions. On the other hand it is also probable that neither Hungarian political environment, nor the religious community accepted it, therefore he did not feel encouraged to spread information about this phenomenon. It is also possible that based on his personal religious views he did not consider this issue as noteworthy. It must be also mentioned that connection between the Armenian communities in Hungary and elsewhere was still very limited.

6.6. Conclusions

Many differences between the host societies and host state environment can be observed in the period between 1975 and 1988. Armenians in Lebanon lived in a very

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75 Introduction to the speech: “Róma. Április 24-én délelőtt 11 órakor, a szerda délelőtti nyilvános kihallgatáson, a Szent Péter téren a szentatya a következő beszéddel emlékezett meg áprilisban ünnepelt vértanúnkról /Hárács/”
tense environment. Considering that the memories of the first civil war were not that far back in time, probably many young people met extreme tensions and violence in their childhood. The situation was completely different in the United States where Armenians having become a well-established ethnic group could live not only in social, but also cultural welfare. It is also known, that any kind of violent actions on behalf the ethnic group were strictly condemned. The Soviet Armenian state was still going on the way that started in the 1960s. The official ideology of the Communist Party saw the conflict in Lebanon from the perspective of class struggle and socialist world revolution. Following the approach of the 1960s can be also observed from the limited amount of sources available in Hungary. There is no mention about Armenian revenge actions at all.

The tense environment had led to the outcomes that Lebanese Armenians founded revenge organisations. These were supported at a very limited scale from the United States and had four members from that country. The superpower had not left too much space for violent actions committed by Armenian avengers. Therefore their activities were minimal there. Additionally, local responses represented overwhelmingly reconstruction at the collective level. Rage was present at the individual level, albeit it was a significant strategy as well, but this had not had any collective reverberation. Revenge also existed, but its organising force was resident in Lebanon, not in the United States. The latter was only a place for recruit and in some cases also for ensuring objects to be targeted. Targets were remarkably not in connection with any official state or political organs of the United States. At last, the first group of avengers, ASALA attempted to support Armenians in the Armenian SSR and fought on the ‘right side’ of the civil war by the perspective of the homeland. Therefore there was much attention on Armenians’ situation in Lebanon and their participation in the civil war. Though armed revenge as a means was not officially accepted or interpreted as a result of class struggle in the Soviet Armenian homeland.

Considering these facts, the first hypothesis is verified. The different host environments again resulted in diverse outcomes. General violence had resulted in violence by the Armenian community. Oppressing violence caused a minimal level of physical violence, while a significant level of verbal violence was present. Good social and more accepting cultural circumstances were the bases of reconciliation and reconstruction in the Armenian SSR. Narrow ideological explanations and combatant kinsfolk ‘on the right side’ resulted in sympathetic class-struggle interpretations of the
civil war in Lebanon without mentioning ethnic claims in the Soviet homeland. The case of Hungary highlights that even smaller shift in a person’s environment could have influence what he or she expressed to the public.

On the other hand, several signs of intercommunity cohesion can be observed in this period. One was the solidarity between leftist Lebanese Armenians and the Armenian SSR. This could not have been realised if not any news about Soviet Armenian emigrants would have reached their Lebanese counterparts. Another example for the broader sense of community between Armenians was the fact that also Armenians from other countries but Lebanon had joined the revenge groups. An example for communication between the Lebanese and American communities was quickly spreading broadcasts and mass migration from the former community to the latter. This kind of communication was indirect and one-sided though. The same phenomenon also resulted in rage among Armenians residing in the United States. Similarly, as the news rapidly reached even the limited Soviet Armenian press, the communist home state also showed solidarity with its kinsfolk within the possible ideological frameworks. Communication resulted in approximating reactions. Armenians in Hungary, practically out of the flow of information also avoided the issue of Armenian revenge actions in the public. Thereby also the second hypothesis is proved. In this particular case the phrase communication can be used even in a broader sense, including spreading news and information indirectly and one-sidedly.

7. **On the Way to an Independent Homeland**

The end of the 1980s brought unexpected transformations in the life of Armenians worldwide. The core processes of change started in the Soviet homeland, which was breaking with the social and political establishment, and where it had been established that the Armenian SSR was not unequivocally accepted in the diaspora. The issue that had encouraged democratic changes in the country was strongly connected with the issue of national identity, especially attachment to the historical homeland. The struggle to unite Mountainous Karabakh with the Armenian SSR appeared in parallel with the demand for democratic freedoms. Additionally, the conflict that had appeared
between the Armenian and the Azerbaijani ethnic groups also reminded many of earlier periods of Armenian history, including that of the Armenian genocide. Therefore, the memory became present and vivid again. The third determining factor of the era from 1988 up until independence in 1991 was the earthquake in Northern Armenia. This gravely impacted the Armenian SSR. The desperate situation and the hope for democratic shift changed the relations between the diaspora and the homeland, which was gradually gaining more appreciation.

The democratic issues attracted many institutions from the diaspora, encouraging democratic improvements in the homeland. With the thaw of Soviet power, travelling to the homeland became less risky. The ethnic conflict threatening the inhabitants in the home country also resulted in a stronger sense of community among Armenians worldwide. A devastating natural disaster also attracted the diaspora’s attention and similarly the attention of numerous foreign countries. The earthquake that took place in Northern Armenia on December 7, 1988, shocked the whole world for some weeks. The destruction inspired many Armenians to help survivors, those injured or having suffered serious mental harm, not to mention infrastructural losses. Many Armenian charity organisations have been ‘re’-established in the Armenian SSR since that event. These three processes still determine the present of the Republic of Armenia, therefore these are also important for understanding the current situation in the post-Soviet republic.

The events and progress mentioned above caused a major shift in homeland-diaspora relations, and not only because of the establishment of diaspora organisations in the homeland. With gaining independence the homeland being born seemed potentially able to ‘re’-gain many capabilities and facilities that ensured Armenia would gain in intellectual, cultural, political, organisational and social significance among the Armenian communities worldwide, even though the former such centres of Armenian culture and identity have not stopped their activities in favour of the local and global Armenian community. The Yerevan-centred Republic of Armenia has made many efforts to catch up with cultural, social and political centres of the diaspora.

Not only was the local political and social environment changing in the last three years of the examined period of the present study, but the collapse of the Soviet Union was already in progress. The changes in Armenia started partly as the new age of glasnost and perestroika allowed some freedom for the press and in the public sphere. That is why, similarly to the citizens of many other Soviet Socialist Republics, those of
Armenia also gradually demanded more democratic freedoms. The collapse of the empire seriously affected the ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and also the immediate relief work and later reconstruction in the earthquake zone.

Through this process the significance of the Soviet Union in international politics was also shattered. Besides the breakup of the bipolar world order, new regional dynamics started to work within the growing vacuum of power. The increasing freedom of Armenia made it clear that the state and its citizens had to face and solve new and revived old international and interethnic conflicts autonomously. They found themselves in an area that was also affected by post-Soviet dynamics and those of the Near and Middle East. The memory of the genocide also appeared in this context, as will be revealed in this chapter.

7.1. Democratic and Ethnic Revival in the Armenian SSR

In the autumn of 1987 rumours started to leak out from the Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan that some Azerbaijani members of local kolkhozes were favoured unjustly by their organisations. The incident resulted in violence by the authorities against protesting Armenians. (Demoyan [2008] p. 23) The local conflict served as the last drive for a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous region operating in the city of Stepanakert for secession from the Azerbaijani SSR and reuniting with the Armenian SSR. The resolution was adopted on February 20, 1988, as a result of several days of demonstration by local Armenians, despite the cold winter and snowing.

At the same time another demonstration was going on in Yerevan. This one followed the directions of environmental protectionist rallies that were not unusual in the Eastern Bloc before the end of communism. Participants of the Yerevan demonstrations demanded the closure of the Nairit chemical factory. These rallies had been going on for days when the news from Mountainous Karabakh reached the Armenian capital. The participants of the demonstration in Yerevan soon adopted the demands of their Stepanakert counterparts. At that point the processes of democratic

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76 Oblast’ in the Russian original.
reform and the struggle for the unification of the two territories still mainly inhabited by Armenians was united under the aegis of perestroika.

7.1.1. The Karabakh Conflict

7.1.1.1. Political Antecedents

The social progress in Mountainous Karabakh were not closely connected with the memory of the genocide until 1988, therefore it did not appear in the previous part of the current dissertation. The issue of Armenians residing in the autonomous region had not gained political importance for local Armenians in 1987, though. The area was among the many disputed regions of the South Caucasus after the region was emptied of tsarist powers in 1918. The future autonomous administrative unit had a predominant Armenian majority at the time. The proportion of Armenian inhabitants after World War I was 94.4 per cent. (Suny [1993] p. 188.) It must be noted that the end of tsarist power and the formation of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan was the first period when Armenians and Azerbaijanis (or as the latter were named that time, Caucasian Tatars (Nahapetyan [2015])) appeared in the context of modern nation states.

During the chaotic situation of independence of the three South Caucasian republics, the commander of the British troops in Azerbaijan supported Azerbaijani troops in occupying Mountainous Karabakh. This effort failed because General Andranik’s Armenian troops in the mountains were fighting against them with the support of the local population. (Hovannisian [1971] pp. 86-89)

When Soviet power was established in the South Caucasus, the future of Mountainous Karabakh was not clearly decided by the new rulers. As has been noted, it was impossible to draw ethnically based borders between the Black and the Caspian Seas. Moreover, Stalin, as People’s Commissar for Nationalities, reached a solution in the area where ethnically homogenous regions were attached to countries dominated by another ethnic group. The present conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia are also the result of Stalin’s settlement. One of his principles was that Bolshevik power must be stabilised in the region in such a way that ethnically diverse states must be created. Later, should a given Soviet member state rebel against the system, these ethnically alien populations may be turned against the ethnic majority. In this way, the attention of
the political leadership of the given Soviet member state can be shared. This is how the principle of divide and rule was applied by Stalin in the South Caucasus. (Croissant [1998] pp. 19-20)

In case of Mountainous Karabakh, on July 3, 1921, the following statement was made by the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, which was confirmed by the supreme council of Armenia: “Based on the declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic and agreement between the Socialist Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, henceforth Nagorno Karabakh is declared to be an integral part of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia.” (Washington Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic [2005])

Then, on July 5, the Caucasian Politburo adopted a a completely contradicting resolution that had been resisted by the same organisation even one day before: “[C]oncerning the necessity of national harmony between Muslims and Armenians, the economic linkage between upper and lower Karabakh, and its permanent ties to Azerbaijan.” (Suny [1993] p. 194.) This change happened most probably due to the lobby of the Azerbaijani Council of People’s Commissars. The head of the local communist party had threatened Stalin that in case of an opposite decision the council would resign. (Suny [1993] p. 194.)

If the Soviet central power had the intent to construct an ethnically homogenous region, they failed again in this case. There existed some areas outside of Mountainous Karabakh that were predominantly inhabited by Armenians, while some mainly Azerbaijani inhabited settlements were also included in the autonomous region. Another fact that had weakened the basically ever-weak autonomy was that the territory of Mountainous Karabakh did not have a border with the Armenian SSR. Therefore, maintaining constant relations with the kin state was practically difficult. The two entities were separated by the Lachin corridor. This small belt has a width of about 6-8 km in a straight line, and crossing it via the highway takes about 20 km. Nowadays this connection is steady, as it is controlled by Mountainous Karabakh forces, and since reconstruction the main road has become suitable for everyday use by any means of road transport. Locals are still often reminded that during Soviet times the route was almost inappropriate for maintaining contact with the Armenian SSR. Naturally, during the Karabakh war, the condition of this short passageway and the smaller villages around it was disastrous, as holding them was crucial for both combatant parties. Therefore this area suffered from massive armed attacks.
7.1.1.2. Discrimination against Armenians in Mountainous Karabakh

However, Mountainous Karabakh was incorporated into the Azerbaijani SSR as an autonomous region. It remained an economically backward region throughout the Soviet era. There had not been any major infrastructural developments realised. The inhabitants mostly lived off agriculture. Besides the economic discrimination of the population of the whole area, Armenians as the dominant ethnic group were also discriminated against even within the autonomous region. Even if they had the right to minority education, the situation of Armenian schools was unfair. In many cases there were only two Armenian language course-books in a given class. Armenian history books were not tolerated at all. (Malkasian [1996] p. 27.) Therefore, and due to the high prestige of Russian, many Armenian children attended Russian schools. Through the lack of infrastructural developments local Armenian architectural heritage also started to decay. (Walker [1991] pp. 116-117.)

Because of this discrimination Armenians from the 1960s on had from time to time sent petitions to the supreme bodies of the Azerbaijani SSR or the USSR. Most of these appeals were signed by tens of thousands of Armenians from the Armenian SSR and Karabakh. Being a supporter of such a petition most frequently meant that the given person was persecuted. Many Armenian intellectuals had left Mountainous Karabakh for this reason. At best they could start a new life in the Armenian SSR, but that was not a certainty, either. (Ulubabyan [2010]) As a result of continuous discrimination the proportion of Armenians decreased to 76 per cent by the time of the last Soviet census. (Malkasian [1996] p. 27.)

Compared to these issues, favouring Azerbaijani members in given kolkhozes was a minor problem. On the other hand, this issue was became debatable in public according to the principles of perestroika. Besides, it also was the last drop in the bucket for local Armenians. When they started to march in the streets of Stepanakert, they did so also in the sense of the Soviet constitution that had allowed for the modification of the borders between SSRs upon agreement of the member states concerned. Such an agreement should have been ratified by the USSR77, as Article 78 of the 1977 i.e.

77 The relevant state body is not indicated.
Brezhnev Constitution indicates. (Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [1977])

Knowing the nature of ruling central power in the USSR, such a move could be easily have been realised through a central decision. Reality and central interests followed another path, though.

7.1.1.3. The Response of Azerbaijanis and the Azerbaijani SSR

After the Yerevan rallies adopted the demand for union with Mountainous Karabakh, this news reached back to Azerbaijan. Most probably this process caused a march of thousands of Azerbaijani men from the city of Aghdam, outside of the autonomous region to the nearby town of mainly Armenian-inhabited Askeran inside Mountainous Karabakh. The participants of the march damaged factories and infrastructure within the autonomous region. There were descriptions of many Azerbaijani women throwing their headscarves in the way of the march as an ultimate sign for peace. Still, the men reached Askeran, where they clashed with local Armenians. As a result, two Azerbaijani adolescents were killed. There were 25 injured on both sides. (Malkasian, [1996] p. 52.)

Most probably as the state response, ethnic cleansing against Armenians started in the city of Sumgait. This city close to Baku was established in the Soviet era as an industrial settlement where Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived without geographic separation and without knowing each other for historical ages. The pogroms were executed by a local mob. There are different assumptions about them and questions about whether the whole action was premeditated by the political centre or whether it was a self-mobilised group. However, the power of self-organisation should not be underestimated, either, as Levon Abrahamian notes. (Abrahamian [2006] p. 267.) The responsibility of the Azerbaijani local and state administration is reflected in the fact that the cruelties went on for three days without any intervention by the police. Finally MVD78 troops stopped the massacre while also insulting innocent civilians. The official death toll contains only the number of those killed by the official involvement. (Ambartsumian [2010] p. 25.)

78 Often described as NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) troops, but the latter organisation was dissolved in 1946. The superseding authority was the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs).
It has to be noted that until that time the conflict was between Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijani SSR’s political and administrative system. In the case of Aghdam it was a clash of non-Karabakh Azerbaijanis and Karabakh Armenians. Finally, in the Sumgait case Azerbaijanis organized against their poorly-known Armenian neighbours outside the autonomous region. It can be stated that from the Aghdam violence ethnic Azerbaijanis outside the autonomous region and the Azerbaijani state administration became parties to the conflict. The latter became responsible by acting late. After the Sumgait violence the conflict was extended to Armenians living in Azerbaijan in general. Through these shifts violence reached back to Mountainous Karabakh. The peaceful coexistence of Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the area turned into an ethnic conflict of ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Azerbaijan.

7.1.1.4. The Response of Moscow

Voicing the possibilities granted by the new wave of perestroika did not support Armenians before Gorbachev. As the head of the mega-state he attempted to preserve the status quo of the smaller region of Mountainous Karabakh and also of the South Caucasian states in a broader sense. This kind of ethnic hatred was the opposite of the Leninist principle that different ethnicities in the Soviet Union should coexist peacefully and there should be not any space left for nationalism.

The only and late resolution suggested by the Moscow centre was unprecedented financial support for the autonomous region. 400 million roubles were promised for increasing industrial production, apartment construction, two new water reserves, restoration of Armenian historical monuments, development of Armenian education, establishing a highway between Stepanakert and Goris79, broadcasting Armenian television programmes, constructing a 400-bed hospital and nine to ten new schools. The financial resources for this enormous plan were dubious. (Malkasian [1996] pp. 62-63.) On the other hand, the conflict had been going on through continuing pogroms in Azerbaijan against Armenians, while Azerbaijanis also started to flee from the Armenian SSR.

79 Located within the Republic of Armenia, presently the last larger city before reaching the border of Mountainous Karabakh Republic.
The Gorbachev administration proved incapable of resolving the conflict in the framework of the Soviet Union. Not even the reformed public sphere was enough to realise this aim. Ethnic hatred was too far from the theory of many decades of Soviet power.

7.1.2. Democratic Demands and the Memory of the Genocide in Yerevan

The anti-Armenian violence in Sumgait was in some cases very similar to many atrocities experienced during the Armenian genocide. Besides the criminal actions, the perpetrators also had cultural similarities in both cases in Armenian collective memory. The general consideration about the genocide is naturally not that state administration, the special units and the army had executed the plans of Young Turk Triumvirate and local Turkish and Kurdish mobs used the situation for their own purposes. The generalisation states that the perpetrators were the Turks as such, even if many Armenians acknowledge that they were saved by Turks. A similar generalisation is alive in case of Azerbaijanis, even if many Armenians in Sumgait and later in Baku were saved by Azerbaijanis. (Shahnazarian [2003]) The two generalised groups of perpetrators are culturally close to each other. Their languages are almost identical to each other. The cultural heritages of the two groups are also similar. They also are convinced of their Turkic origin. Furthermore, both shared the pan-Turk idea during and after the Armenian genocide. The fact that Azerbaijan and Turkey have imposed a blockade on Armenia strengthens this assumption in present times. After these detailed descriptions we must add that the general term for Azerbaijanis in conversational Armenian is t’urk’. This means literally Turk.

For the reasons listed above, Azerbaijanis have ‘inherited’ the Armenian collective conviction about the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. According to this, Azerbaijanis also divide Armenians geographically and oppress them in their territories. Certainly anti-Armenian violence is also a part of their confidence.

Armenian protesters in Yerevan thereby very soon adopted the idea (and also voiced it at the rallies) that the Sumgait pogroms are equal to the genocide. They even started to demand the recognition of the Armenian genocide. Harutyun Marutyan prepared representative statistics of banners in the rallies between February 1988 and August 1990 based on contemporary photographs. 370 of the total of 972 banners
represented either the genocide or the Sumgait pogroms. This issue undoubtedly prevailed at the demonstrations. The next most frequent topic, the situation of Armenian culture and language, was displayed on only 86 posters. The issue of Karabakh’s union with Armenia was only fourth place, while referring to the Soviet constitution and the principle of people’s self-determination came in eighth. The issue of Mountainous Karabakh in light of glasnost and perestroika followed the latter. Criticism of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani was only the fourth least significant topic. (Marutyan [2009] pp. 7-8.)

Therefore it is also visible that demonstrators in Yerevan had considerably different aims than those in Stepanakert. Identical issues also had different significance in both places. Inhabitants of the Armenian SSR were more worried about the situation of the Armenian language, culture and the dominance of Russian culture and Soviet central power. On the other hand, it is striking how much the memory of the genocide was awakened.

The opposition protests in Yerevan had created a leading organisation that became the initiating power of the regime change. The Karabakh Committee was attached by its name to the ethnic conflict. The movement itself was named Karabakh Movement in Yerevan. The main aim became the implementation of social and political reforms. The organisation consisted of intellectuals, mainly mainly in mathematical and physical sciences. Therefore, in conversational Armenian, the activity of the Karabakh Movement is often called the revolution of mathematicians or physicists. (Abrahamian [2006] p. 222) The commemoration day of the genocide was extraordinary that year. Young intellectuals erected a cross-stone for the victims of the Sumgait violence on the way to the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial complex. This cross-stone is now extraordinary with its modern cross-symbols. The surrounding and later-erected cross-stones follow the centuries old rich traditions of Armenian cross-stone carving, while the Sumgait cross follows the style of socialist realism.

In the memorial park many wreaths and also banners taken to commemorators that year reflected on the parallel of the Armenian genocide and the Sumgait massacres, or demanded recognition of the genocide. Recognition did not apply abroad only. The genocide has not been recognised in any official state document in the Armenian SSR either, despite the soft state tolerance of commemoration, limited public speech and scientific research.
The Karabakh conflict and the memory of the genocide reflected also on the old Soviet Armenian limitation of historiography as well. As has been mentioned, the official direction in this topic was the analysis of the documented resistance movement to fight against the image that Armenians were slaughtered like sheep. This move though had not spilled down to everyday people until nowadays. Currently, various scholars in Armenia are still attempting to break this tendency of collective memory. Today rich sources of oral history that had not been authorised for publishing earlier are available. Many of these sources contain references to local resistance or self-defence, even if it was not successful. If well-known sources on the genocide are re-interpreted in this sense, numerous examples of resistance can be found.80 There is also a growing number of attempts to analyse less popular or unknown resistance movements. Such a move was introduced at a recent conference of the Institute of History of the NAS-RA. Currently, Harutyun Marutyan has made efforts to share this view with the public. Besides his monograph about the Karabakh Movement (Marutyan [2009]) he has expressed these views at scientific fora and in the media as well.

The failure of historiography was present in 1988. Therefore there was a general belief among Armenians in Karabakh and the Armenian SSR that the ethnic conflict with Azerbaijani is a repeated possibility to resist oppression. This was also considered a chance to show that Armenians are not a group that can be slaughtered. Therefore resistance, self-defence and violence against Azerbaijani in mountainous Karabakh and Azerbaijan were considered issues to prove that this deficiency of Armenians does not exist. These actions cannot be interpreted as revenge for the genocide, though. Rather they should be interpreted as events that reflected on atrocities that were rationalised by the experience of genocide.

The winds of changes caused a widespread use of the term genocide for each and every phenomenon that had caused disadvantage for Armenians during the Soviet period. Forced industrialisation, environmental pollution and ecological destruction were called green genocide. Forced assimilation of Armenians in Nakhijevan, exile from Mountainous Karabakh, the growing number of Armenian children studying in Russian schools in the Armenian SSR and Russian cultural dominance were labelled white or cultural genocide. In the same way official atheism was named spiritual

80 For example, such an interpretation is also possible in the case of Ravished Armenia. If the destruction of traditional Armenian gender roles is stressed while reading the novel, how much women could do for self-defence and resistance after men were exterminated becomes clear.
genocide. In some cases Russian as a spoken language gaining more space was separately called linguistic genocide. These labels have survived to this very day in conversational Armenian. For this reason and because of the similarities between the genocide and the Sumgait massacre, the idea of a continuous genocide since 1915 appeared in public speech and at demonstrations. (Abrahamian [2006] p. 262.)

Such diverse uses of the term genocide may serve as a signal for various phenomena. First of all, such an outburst indicates that many repressed fears and emotions had been hidden behind the official politics of reconciliation. However grassroots moves for speak-out in the late 1950s and in the 1960s were, those Soviet Armenian citizens who chose other processing strategies were not allowed to express their personal convictions in public.

On the other hand, the Soviet dream that existed in those times seemed to be over by 1988. The ethnic conflict with Azerbaijanis and the fact that it cannot be solved within the frameworks of Soviet ideology confirmed that. The lack of free ways to express one’s national identity and democratic social and political demands also supported this belief. By the summer of 1988 the opposition movement became victim of the already bloody oppression by the MVD after a peaceful sit-down strike at Zvartnots Airport. (Marutyan [2009] p. 171.) Through that violent atrocity the ideas of communism became illusions of the past. ‘The people’ were not allowed to rule the system, their voice was not heard and finally their voice was silenced. The image of a bright future that had been vivid in 1965 did not exist any more.

Thirdly, the shock of the ethnic conflict and the blockade following it seriously affected Armenians’ everyday lives in the Armenian SSR and surely evoked a new trauma. As was mentioned in the introduction, Miller and Touryan-Miller found the the processing strategies of the new trauma to be the same as after the genocide. This means also that the new demand for diverse trauma processing strategies is not only the result of growing claims for democracy and the ultimate failure of the Soviet ideology. It is also rooted in the newly present traumas. This is attached to the past in a way whereby present struggles and suffering were tied to the memory of the genocide in Armenian collective memory.

This strategy means that at the collective level society found an explanation for all the miseries of the examined era. This explanation may be irrational to a foreigner, but with the experience of the Armenian genocide in the background it is thought plausible and logical. According to Miller’s and Touryan-Miller’s terms, this means of
processing is rationalisation. This term, in the case of the manifold processes of the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, means that these events were rationalised by the genocide. The original experience gained space as an explanation per se, rather than being reinterpreted in the Armenian SSR, as in the previous periods.

7.2. Beyond Human Destruction

On December 7, 1988, an earthquake struck Northern Armenia, Southern Georgia and the neighbouring region of Kars in Turkey. The seismic activity reached the magnitude of 6.8 on the Richter scale. The epicentre of the tremor was Spitak, Armenia. The old open-air clock at the central square of the town stopped at 11:41 local time. This motive is still symbolised at the rebuilt town hall. Due to this legendary fact the exact time of the earthquake is generally known in Armenia. The first tremor was followed by a second similarly strong one some minutes later.

Spitak was completely in ruins. The nearby larger cities of Leninakan81 (the second biggest city of the Armenian SSR after Yerevan) and Kirovakan82 were also seriously damaged. The death toll of the disaster was about 25-30,000, while nearly half a million people became homeless in mere minutes. (US. Geological Survey [2012]) Many of them suffered serious or at least minor physical injuries. The Soviet press and broadcasts naturally published rather underestimated data about all kinds of losses. The extent of psychological harm was thought immeasurable at the moment.

Rescue work was hard for numerous reasons. First of all it was winter, therefore the search for survivors under the ruins needed to be very quick to find as many of them as possible. How half a million people could be sheltered in the shortest possible time also seemed an unsolvable task. Besides these basic difficulties, other hardships also contributed to slowing down rescue teams. Local infrastructure was seriously damaged. The way by car from Yerevan that normally took two hours then increased to four hours. Local healthcare centres were also damaged and many of the local healthcare personnel were also victims of the earthquake. Therefore, any kind of humanitarian

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81 Present-day Gyumri, previous Alexandrapol.
82 Present-day Vanadzor.
assistance needed to reach the area from Yerevan, which was seriously burdened by the infrastructural damage. (Miller, Touryan Miller [2003] pp. 14-15.)

The mass destruction caused by the natural disaster was not the only reason why Armenians attached its memory to the traumas surrounding the change of regime and thereby also to the genocide. There is a popular belief shared by many Armenians that ‘Gorbachev pushed the button’. In other words he is held personally responsible for the tremor. The fear of Turks and not that of nature or Gorbachev was even more present among the inhabitants of the Northern Armenian areas at the time of the quake. The border of Turkey is very close, and because of the blockade and Turkey’s general support of Azerbaijan, Armenians feared a concentration of Turkish troops on the border. Various survivors have mentioned in their accounts that at the beginning of the earthquake they thought that the Turkish army had started to march against them. On the other hand, locals later believed assumptions that a secret underground Soviet base had operated below Spitak. Some of them still speculate that an explosion in this base caused the disaster. (Miller, Touryan Miller [2003] p. 21.) Being aware of the Cold War environment and the widespread legends of silver bullets of modern technology, this assumption is not surprising. The devastating earthquake still has rational physical and geographical explanations.

Armenia is located in a seismically active zone. Among the locations of the most famous earthquakes of Armenian history, two lie near the destruction zone of the Spitak earthquake. The ruins of Ani, once the capital of the Kingdom of Armenia, can now be seen with special permission from a viewpoint near the Armenian-Turkish border. This can be approached from the main road to Gyumri, not far away from the city. The other well-known tremor in the area is the 1926 earthquake in Gyumri. (D. K. P. Armenia [2006/7], pp. 18-19.) Many buildings were damaged and ruined in that event, though the death toll was quite low. As the guides of the local Museum of National Architecture and Urban life inform, the main quake then followed a weaker quake that had many inhabitants run out of their houses, thus they were saved.

Walking around the city it is striking that many houses built in the 19th century survived not only the 1926, but also the 1988 earthquake. The blocks of flats constructed in the Soviet period, however, mostly collapsed like a house of cards during the last disaster. This was caused partly by Soviet-era planned economy and work morale. According to posterior examinations an insufficient amount and low quality of rebar and cement was used for the construction of those buildings. According to Soviet
construction standards many buildings were not even planned to endure such an intensive quake. (Hadjian [1992] p. 6.) Based on these facts the extent of infrastructural damage is not surprising. The reasons for enormous human loss were already mentioned.

Supposing Gorbachev’s contribution to the disaster was thought a logical explanation for many Armenians. He already had a negative reputation for his inability to solve the Karabakh conflict. He was also criticised by the Armenian public for his empty responses to the democratic claims and later using force to oppress the reformist movement. Some radically thinking Armenians even supposed that the ‘timing’ of the disaster served to cause infertility among many young Armenian women who lacked proper clothing and housing at that time. (Middle aged intellectual woman, 07. 12. 2009.)

As can be understood from various considerations, if the idea that the earthquake was intended and realised by humans could be proven, then it could be called genocide. It resulted in physical destruction, mental and psychological harm, prevention of births and forcing survivors to exist among circumstances inappropriate for living. Most of the victims and aggrieved persons of the earthquake were Armenians. Therefore the destruction – if it had been man-made – would fulfil various criteria of the genocide convention. From this point of view, and adding the already ongoing series of new traumas within Armenian society, the consideration of having perpetrated repeated genocide against them is not surprising. Examining this reaction in Miller’s and Touryan-Miller’s terms, this is a means of rationalisation of the natural disaster.

These assumptions did not decrease in the days after the tremor when the members of the Karabakh Committee were arrested and imprisoned. Gorbachev broke his official visit to the United States and travelled to the Armenian SSR. The mourning and grief did not silence the Armenian opposition, though. One of his infamous speeches was interrupted by a demonstrator who criticised him for the imprisonment of the opposition leaders. In Gorbachev’s opinion mentioning the fate of the members of the Karabakh Committee was an immoral act. (Suny [1993] p. 211)

On the other hand, Gorbachev took other steps that made his alleged responsibility more dubious. Breaking his visit to the United States was a gesture to Armenians. Additionally, he immediately agreed to permitting western rescue teams’ participation in relief work. This was surprising in contrast to aftermath of the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl. The explosion of that time was obvious to observers beyond the
borders of the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev made serious attempts to keep the secret within the borders. Finally, he also accepted the assistance of western medical personnel, but he applied for the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency as late as in 1989 for the establishment of an international assistance team to solve the crisis. (International Advisory Committee [1991])

Another political aspect of the connection between the earthquake and the Karabakh war was the issue of refugees and the homeless. First of all, mostly Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan proper, and to a smaller extent from Mountainous Karabakh, had been settled in the earthquake zone earlier that year. They became homeless twice. After the disaster a conflict broke out between refugees and the homeless of the earthquake. Various persons of the former group stated that they still lived in temporary refugee homes and shelters while many aggrieved by the earthquake received permanent homes easier and earlier. (Shahnazarian [2003]) The reason for this discrimination is not clear, but a possible explanation is that until the Soviet Union collapsed the central government in Moscow supported reconstruction after the earthquake. On the other hand, it is also plausible that there was less central attention turned to the refugees’ situation in the same period the centre was unable to handle the Karabakh conflict.

In both cases, losing homes for Armenians was not ‘only’ a problem of being without a safe shelter. It was also an issue of national identity. Home is a personal universe for Armenians in general, a place for creation where both men and women have their distinct roles. (Abrahamian [2006] pp. 148-155.) This move to create a personal space for the family can be also confirmed by the author of the present dissertation. Field experience suggests that in the buildings in Armenia almost no two flats can be found that are identical to each other. As a new owner moves in, at least replacing walls or rebuilding the balcony is a necessary operation. This habit also shows that losing homes at the time of the genocide most probably caused a similar kind of loss of this kind of personal universes. On the other hand, living in tents in the middle of the desert or in more comfortable, but still overcrowded refugee districts of Syrian, Lebanese or Soviet Armenian cities must also have been a similar experience to that of earthquake survivors. This is most probably another analogy between the genocide and the mass traumas of 1988. Thus, this parallel may also serve as another reason for assuming a continuous genocide, in other words for rationalisation.
7.3. The Main Direction of Processing in the Soviet Union

Concluding the main developments of the ‘period of integration’ by Dallak’yan, it can be stated that the public appearance of the Armenian genocide in the Soviet Union became more democratic. The previously state-accepted general strategy of reconciliation had been fading for obvious reasons. The growing demand for raising the issue of genocide in public had created another general processing strategy, namely rationalisation. In this case it was not the genocide itself being rationalised: other current issues and traumas were explained by that historical experience.

Individual responses were much more colourful. Verjiné Svazlian recorded 53 interviews in this period in the Armenian SSR. Six of the interviewees mentioned revenge as a possible solution for their pain (bold numbers in the footnotes). Interestingly, one of them also had a very positive perspective about the future. (Svazlian [2011], Historical Mamoir-Testimony Nr. 40.) Three survivors rationalised the experience, one by political steps of the Soviet leaders (Svazlian [2011] p. 91.) whereas two explained their survival as a result of God’s mercy. (Svazlian [2011 pp. 302, 385]) Four survivors also expressed the need for political steps or a solution through international law or God’s help – the latter not mentioning violence – in order to achieve reparation to Armenians. Two of these interviewees suggested these kind of peaceful solutions and expressed rage for Turks (Historical Memoir-Testimonies 31 and 40 in the footnotes). These approaches can be listed as ones demanding reconstruction.

While it was not as characteristic in the previous periods (1955-1970 and 1971-1985), numerous interviewees of Svazlian between 1986 and 1991 were repatriates who were critical of the Soviet system. The majority of them were exiled mainly in 1949 (numbers marked with ‘ex.’). The minority of them were repatriates who experienced much more misery in the Soviet republic than before. They completely share the opinion about their perspectives in the Armenian SSR (numbers marked with ‘sh. ex.’). Characteristically of their memoirs, though they touch the issue of moving back to the Armenian SSR, the interviewees naturally did not see any positive aspect of their new life. Many of them even planned to move to the United States. Their memoirs

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83 2, 3, 12, 15, 19, 23, 31, 32, 34, 37, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 57, 66, 73, 95, 114 (ex.), 115, 116, 123, 125 (sh. ex.), 127, 139, 144, 145, 146, 152, 154, 160, 161, 176, 177 (ex.), 178, 181, 184, 198, 207 (sh. ex.), 208 (sh. ex.), 210, 221 (ex.), 242, 244 (ex.), 262 (ex.), 275, 281, 284 (PTSD)
cannot be characterised among any trauma processing strategies, but it is important to note that criticism towards the system grew in the last years of the Soviet Union. As perhaps the most bitter interviewee states: “It’s not only the Turks who have tortured me, the Armenians also have tormented me.” (Svazlian [2011] p. 260) Mixed reactions also indicate a diversification of processing strategies.

Similarly, one of the interviewees also expressed pain and bitterness, surely as a result of his experience of the Gyumri earthquake. Most probably he was still under the effect of post-traumatic stress disorder. His approach well reflects the collective views on the similarities between the destruction of the genocide and the tremor; especially the fact that there were still numerous survivors of the genocide alive who even represented continuity between the two mass-destruction events: “I buried my elder sister in Port-Saïd, my mother and my elder daughter – in Lebanon, my father, brother and sister in Moussa Dagh… My two daughters with their families and grandchildren – all in all 26 people, died during the earthquake on 7 December, 1988 in Leninakan (now: Gyumri). I had taken the bus forty minutes ago to come to Yerevan. I am ninety-three years old; I remained alive, and they, all of them young, were buried in the earth…” (Svazlian [2011] p. 468)

7.4. Responses to the Armenian Genocide in the Observed Diaspora Communities

7.4.1. Keeping an Eye on the Soviet Homeland

In the United States the Armenian community did not give up the struggle for political recognition of the Armenian genocide. In 1987 the Reagan administration successfully lobbied against such an act. In 1989 Senator Bob Dole, at that time Minority Leader, initiated acceptance of April 24 as the National Day of Remembrance for the Armenian Genocide. The move was finally not affirmed by the Senate. This was the result of strong Turkish lobby activity. The government of Turkey labelled the possible outcome of the joint resolution as having the potential to “inflame nationalist passions and historic grievances and incite further violence.” (CQ Almanac 1990 [2015])
Despite the above-mentioned facts, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations unanimously recognised the genocide. The resolution mentions Hitler’s infamous statement about Armenians, thereby tying the Holocaust to the Armenian genocide. Most probably the resolution was a result of solidarity based on the structural peculiarities of the two rows of similarly tragic events. The document even mentions the proposal of Senator Dole mentioned above as a move they supported. (Union of American Hebrew Congregations [1989])

Newly published memoirs in these years were not numerous. Peroomian marks John Minassian’s Many Hills yet to Climb and Bertha (Berjouhi) Nakashian K’etchian’s In the Shadow of the Fortress: The Genocide Remembered. Minassian recalls people from his childhood to whom he wishes to express his gratitude. (Peroomian [2012] p. 243) This approach reflects the strategy of reconstruction. Bertha Nakashian K’etchian’s inspiration to write her memoirs was the fight against denial. As seen in the previous paragraphs, it was part of the general political atmosphere in the United States. She leaves a message to the readers in the preface of her book: “We – the survivors – are living eyewitnesses of the Genocide of the Armenians by the Turks. What was documented in writing and pictures at the time is now being denied…” (Peroomian [2012] p. 278) The struggle for recognition is also considered reconstruction. These works both concentrate on reconstructing Armenians’ dignity, albeit with different approaches.

Scientific responses were much richer concerning the Armenian Review from 1986 until 1991. The periodical provided analyses and reviews of scholarly and literary sources. Many of the articles concerned the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, the Hamidian and Adana massacres, the Armenian genocide, the peace treaties after World War I and the establishment and developments of Armenian diaspora communities. Concerning the processing of the Armenian genocide, this period is not as rich in sources concerning third generation revenge as was characteristic in the previous period. There was one article in the Spring 1987 issue on the media coverage of revenge attacks. On the other hand, some articles addressed processing from other perspectives. Repression was analysed by Lorne Shirinian in the Spring 1990 issue. One article addressed the effects of the genocide in general in the Winter issue of

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84 Armen, Mark and Ayanian, John Z. „Armenian Political Violence on American Network News: An Analysis of Content” (pp. 13-29) Spring 1987
85 Lorne Shirinian „Lost Fathers and Abandoned Sons: The Silence of Generations in Armenian Diaspora Literature” (pp. 1-17) Spring 1990
1989, while the American Armenian community’s activity concerning the ‘Armenian Question’ in the American political sphere is described in two articles. The latter issue obviously includes the legal struggle for recognition and reparation, thereby these articles concern reconstruction, but the observed period of the article also partly covers the period of third generation revenge. (The Armenian Review [2008])

In parallel with these topics another issue started to emerge in the Review in 1986 and continues until the end of the examination period (1991). Already before the beginning of the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijani nationalism and oppressed rights of Armenians appeared in the periodical. The Winter issue of 1986 contained one such article, while the Autumn issue of 1987 contained two. This development indicates that there must have been signs of the emerging conflict. The American Armenian scholarly communities’ activity reflects this issue. Upon the eruption of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict the review deals even more intensively with the problem. There was one article published in 1988, in the Summer issue, about Armenians’ demolishing cultural heritage in Mountainous Karabakh. In 1989 two articles highlighted the issue. Similar to the article of 1988, one of these also describes actual problems like the Karabakh Movement. The Spring issue of 1990 provides one article about the Sumgait massacres. The Summer/Autumn issue of the Review in 1990 had a special focus on the conflict, dedicating half the articles to the problem while the rest of articles dealt with national awakening in other Soviet member states. In 1991 again, all but

86 Staub, Ervin „The Genocide of the Armenians: Psychological and Cultural Roots and the Impact on Survivors” (pp. 55-70) Winter 1989
87 Sinanian, Zaven V. „Coverage of Armenian Issues in The New York Times, 1965-1983” (pp. 31-49), Yegparian, Garen Armenian issues in the Congressional Record (pp. 51-68) Spring 1987
88 Swietochowski, Tadeusz „Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community” (pp. 103-107) in The Armenian Review Winter 1986
89 Astourian, Stephen H. „On the Rise of Azerbaijani National Identity and Armeno-Azerbaijani Relations” (pp. 33-45) Nissman, Donald B. „The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan: The Use of Nationalism for Political Penetration” (pp. 71-73) in The Armenian Review Autumn 1987
90 Gayayan, Haroutiun „The Disappearance of the Rugs from Armenian Artzakh-Karabagh: A Cultural Robbery” (pp. 53-57) in The Armenian Review Summer 1988
92 Shahmuratian, Samvel „The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms Against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan (Volume I: Eyewitness Accounts)” (pp. 126-128) in The Armenian Review
93 Suny, Ronald Grigor „Introduction (A Test for Perestroika)” (pp. vii-x), Mouradian, Claire „The Mountainous Karabagh Question: An Inter-Ethnic Conflict or Decolonization Crisis?” (pp. 1-34) Swietochowski, Tadeusz „Azerbaijan: Between Ethnic Conflict and Irredentism” (pp. 35-49) Mikaelian, Vardges and Khurshudian „Several Issues Concerning the History of Mountainous Karabagh” (pp. 51-65) Abrahamian, Levon H. „The Karabagh Movement as Viewed by an Anthropologist” (pp. 67-80), Mihalisko, Kathleen „Belorussia: Malaise in the Soviet Union's 'Model' Republic” (pp. 81-108),
one issue of the Review dealt with the Karabakh conflict. (The Armenian Review [2008])

Articles about the antecedents and events of the Armenian genocide, the Armenian question, the Lausanne and Sèvres treaties, and finally the Armenian diaspora communities outnumber the articles concerning the Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, it must be mentioned that very few articles addressing trauma processing strategies are available from these years. Still, an intense interest in the homeland’s processes is visible. This meant that communication between communities took place, even with the Armenian SSR.

The earthquake also resulted in showing solidarity with the homeland. Besides providing humanitarian aid to survivors of the event, some of the injured had the possibility to travel and be treated or rehabilitated in the Unites States. Anie Sanantz Kalajian points out that many American Armenians saw their relatives lost in the genocide in the survivors and treated them as such. (Sanantz Kalajian [1995]) The latter approach again reflects the strategy of reconstruction by considering somebody as reparation for genocide-time losses. In the scholarly field, one article of The Armenian Review also deals largely with the earthquake in the Summer 1991 issue. An article that was part of the analysed sample touches the issue of the earthquake together with the Karabakh conflict.94 (The Armenian Review [2008])

The individual memories recorded by Verjiné Svazlian in this period in the United States are not numerous. All of them end their testimonies with mentioning how calm their lives are in the United States. One survivor reflecting on another issue mentions that revenge is not a feasible response to the problem. She relies on her religious beliefs and the Bible when stating this. (Svazlian [2011] Historical Memoir-Testimonies Nr. 11, 16, 234)

These interviews generally reflect both a need for commemorating the genocide and a positive image of post-genocide life, thereby these reflect reconciliation. In the collective field though, reconstruction was characteristic. Both in literature and political

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94 Editors of Novosti Press Agency The Armenian Earthquake (pp. 120-121) „Armenian Tragedy: An Eyewitness Account of Human Conflict and Natural Disaster in Armenia and Azerbaijan” (pp. 118-120) in The Armenian Review 1991 Summer
life, concerning the Armenian genocide, scholarly sources addressed repression, revenge and reconstruction. Additionally, the attitude towards survivors of the earthquake also reflected reconstruction. The increasing number of articles dealing with the Karabakh conflict also indicates solidarity with the homeland.

7.4.2. An Armenian Community Struck by Civil War

Surprisingly, after the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon and the intensive initial conflict between Armenian political parties, cooperation was re-established. All fully Armenian parties and even Armenian members of the Lebanese Communist Party started to work for the security and preservation of the community as much as was possible. (Messerlian [2014] p. 262) The community, however, declined. The number of Armenians decreased to 60-10,000 but the range of between 70-80,000 is probably more valid. (Այվազյան [2003] p. 292) Many institutions had to move to safer places or stopped their operations, including schools, cultural institutions, newspapers and so on. (Messerlian [2014] p. 262)

These processes also had an impact on genocide processing. Only one work was dedicated directly to the issue of the calamities. Antranig Zaroukian’s Love during Genocide offered a description of the last year of the Armenian poet Ruben Sevak. The plot of the novel also touches the issue of his deportation together with that of other Armenian intellectuals including Daniel Varuzhan. (Bardakjian [2000] p. 248) The novel, besides describing the genocide, offers the reconstruction of pre-genocide cultural life.

Karnig Attarian also touched the memory of the genocide, but mainly through the experience of the Lebanese civil war. His collection of short stories, Black and red is filled with the questions of everyday life in the midst of the civil war. In some cases though, some of his characters remember the Armenian genocide, as some phenomena, mainly concerning their being in need or in danger resemble the experience of civil war. (Ադդարյան [1988]) These interpretations mainly recall the memories with the same worries the survivors experienced during the genocide. Therefore these interpretations are mostly about experiencing trauma or posttraumatic life conditions.

95 Սերը Եղեռնին Մէջ, Sere yeghernin mej
96 Սև և կարմիր Sev yev karmir
In the scholarly field, only one article between 1986 and 1991 in the Haigazian Armenological Review dealt with the issue of the Armenian genocide in the last year of the examination period. Zaven Messerlian wrote an analysis on The Study on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. (Յովհաննիսեան [2000]) The first draft of the document included the Armenian genocide, but due to Turkish pressure it did not become part of it. (Sassounian [2014])

Solidarity between Soviet Armenian and Lebanese Armenian communities was maintained during the last period. During the civil war the Armenian SSR regularly provided relief for Lebanese Armenians. Following the Earthquake the Lebanese Armenian community similarly sent donations to the Armenian SSR. They also participated in the reconstruction of Spitak by building 82 houses in the town. Despite this solidarity, relationships between the two communities deteriorated during the times of the Karabakh movement. Even flights between Yerevan and Beirut were not available. The reasons for this move are unfortunately not explained in the related source. (Այվազյան [2003] p. 294) Due to Dashnak fundraising from 1987, Armenians from the United States also aided their kinsfolk in Lebanon. Their aim was to provide 100 US dollars for each Lebanese Armenian student. (Դալլաքյան [1997] p. 184)

To sum up, Armenians in Lebanon in this period were mainly preoccupied with everyday survival for themselves. For this reason it is not surprising that very few responses were provided by the community to the Armenian genocide. Charity campaigns and relief work secured connection to the American and Soviet Armenian communities and thereby most probably also communication with them.

7.4.3. Armenian Solidarity and new perspectives for ethnic minorities in Hungary

The end of the 1980s also brought changes to Hungary. Besides the meltdown in politics following the announcement of glasnost and perestroika, an intensified political debate on ethnic minorities started. This process led to the evolution of the Hungarian minority protection system after the change of the regime. Ethnic groups previously not acknowledged as minorities also emerged as possible beneficiaries of the system. (Dobos [2011] pp. 96-97) The ‘Armenia’ Hungarian-Armenian Association [‘Circle of
Friends’’)\textsuperscript{97} was founded due to the new law on associations that signalled a more democratic environment. (Avedikian, Dzotjánné Krajcsir [1998] p. 11.)

The Armenian community also reacted to the earthquake, as recorded in the documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish. A mourning mass was organised in February 1989 in the memory of the victims of the earthquake. The parish was now without Father Kádár, who had passed away by that time, though the invitation to the mass mentions his work contributing to the reconstruction of the church. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1989/a]) Later, for the commemoration of the Armenian genocide, children survivors of the earthquake were invited to Hungary. The children also participated in the mourning mass which was held on April 22 1989. The symbolism of the latter reflects a possible parallel between the destruction of the natural disaster and the genocide. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1989/b]) The same gesture toward young survivors of the earthquake was repeated when the Armenian Catholic Parish celebrated Saint Gregory the Illuminator, who introduced Christianity as a state religion to Armenia. (Documents of the Armenian Catholic Parish of Budapest [1989/c])

7.5. Conclusions

It can be observed also in the last period examined in the present dissertation that collective responses to the Armenian genocide were various. Armenians living in the homeland experienced again various types of mass-traumas from ethnic cleansing to political crisis and natural disaster. Their reflection on the events was the assumption of a constant genocide against Armenians. This gave an explanation to the trauma at the beginning of the century, to the ethnic discrimination and pogroms in Azerbaijan, and even for the earthquake. Rationalisation became thereby the main collective characteristic of trauma processing in the Armenian SSR. The shift had happened despite the fact that the party-state approach to the Armenian genocide remained the same as in the 1960s. This approach was however not adequate any more, but the demand for free speech resulted in the practical shift of collective processing strategies.

\textsuperscript{97} „Arménia” magyar-őrmény baráti kör
The diversity of trauma processing strategies means that in the United States reconstruction was present both in the literary and political spheres. The scholarly field dedicated attention to repression, revenge and effects of the genocide on the survivors in general. The amount of the latter type of studies was not high. There was a certain level of solidarity present with the disaster-struck homeland. A result of this reconstruction appeared among those who participated in organising and supporting the medical treatment and rehabilitation actions. It must be noted that the Turkish lobby was present in this era in the United States. This is indicated by the results of political moves. Reconstruction was mainly present as the fight for recognition. The latter was not oppressed thanks to freedom of speech, but state organs in the United States provided space for the denialist lobby. Thereby it can be stated that this strong reaction of American Armenians was evoked by the political environment of the home state and was made possible by its legal system allowing free speech.

In Lebanon the civil war determined the everyday lives of the country’s citizens. Due to the chaotic and life-threatening circumstances the Armenian community seriously deteriorated. In parallel, Armenian social, political, cultural and scientific institutions also slowed down or stopped operating. Thus naturally, responses to the Armenian genocide decreased. On the other hand, even if the relations with the homeland were shaken, solidarity in the humanitarian field was present.

Few responses were present in Hungary. Still, the Armenian community in regularly commemorated April 24, even though Father Kádár passed away and the lack of his enthusiastic work surely left an impact on the community. On the other hand, changes in minority policy offered new possibilities to Armenians in Hungary. They showed solidarity with Armenians in the homeland mainly due to the earthquake. There was one response, the invitation of survivor children of the earthquake in northern Armenia for the mass on April 24, which was highly similar to the home state’s approach, indicating continuity between genocide and earthquake victims. Being a member of the Eastern Bloc, most probably Armenians in Hungary easily attained the possibility to host the children, though until the present moment the documents of the parish from 1989 are under catalogisation.

It is obvious in each case that the host environment influenced the means of collective responses. In case of Lebanon, the civil war had an effect on the quantity of collective reactions. In case of Hungary, due to the limited quantity and content of available sources, no general approach can be observed. In the other cases it can be
stated that the local political and social environment influenced the ways of collective processing, thereby the first hypothesis is confirmed in this case.

Communication between the communities was also present in this period. News about the earthquake and about the Karabakh conflict reached a wide range of people all around the world. These issues broke through the Iron Curtain. The civil war in Lebanon resulted in masses of refugees, many of whom left for the United States. Charity programs like hosting survivors of the earthquake or organising medical treatment for them in the United States also surely resulted in exchanging information and views. Relief for the Lebanese Armenian community would not have been possible without connections between Lebanese, American and Soviet Armenian communities. Still, the result of inter-bloc communication is not apparent in this case, as the responses are very diverse despite the existence of exchange of information. For this reason the second hypothesis is rejected in this case.

There are obvious signs for the existence of individual demands of genocide trauma processing. In the Armenian SSR and the United States survivors reflected on the issue individually. There is no data about individual processing strategies in Lebanon and Hungary. However, in the former the background of the literary response of Antranig Zaroukian And Karnig Attarian were probably at least partly personal. Knowing that a small number of survivors and their descendants lived in Hungary, it is highly probable that they also needed to process the trauma individually. This is, however, only a presumption.

In parallel with the diversity of processing strategies represented by Svazlian’s interviewees, only one of these, namely rationalisation, started to prevail in Armenian public life. In the United States only survivors opting for reconciliation were recorded, while the collective response was embodied mainly in the legal and literary struggle for recognition, thereby for reconstruction of the victims’ dignity.

With the above-mentioned limitations concerning Hungary and Lebanon it is obvious that individual demands for processing the trauma caused by the genocide surely existed in the United States and the Armenian SSR and most probably the same phenomenon was present in Lebanon and Hungary. The ways of processing at the collective level, on the other hand, were influenced by the social and political circumstances of host countries and the host environment of the home country within the Soviet Union. Thereby, the third hypothesis is also confirmed in this case.
8. Conclusions

The conclusions of the previous chapters have already explained the results of the analyses completed in them. Hereby a general overview of the verification of the hypotheses is provided. In addition, further methodological suggestions shall be made for future analysis of the same or similar issues. The experience of the author of the present dissertation suggests various specifications and new questions connected to the hypotheses, terms and methods used while completing the analysis.

Following the issues concerning the hypotheses, suggestions and new directions for dealing with Armenian genocide processing will be described. The final chapter also attempts to reflect on practical issues in connection with the Armenian genocide’s aftermath, handling mass traumas and especially man-made traumas. At the time of completion of the present dissertation Armenian communities, various cultural, political, scholarly, religious and social organisations, associations, local administrative bodies and states are commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Armenian Genocide. New directions of the results of the centennial commemoration that are related to the present study shall be also introduced.

8.1. Results of the Analysis, Verification of the Hypotheses

8.1.1. Hypothesis 1

The hypothesis was verified in each period. Limitations to it were most frequently the lack of data. In case of the first generation revenge movement one more serious limitation to the validity of verification was present. There was no other similar movement to which Operation Nemesis could have been compared. Still, locality of the assassins and certain phases of operation all depended on the given environment in host countries.

Collective responses to the trauma were mostly present in environments where establishing associations and various institutions, such as schools, publishing companies, political parties, etc., was allowed for Armenians. Naturally these
institutions could become the sources of collective responses. These could also organise the sharing of individual responses for a broader audience.

Generally, financial security also supported the appearance of collective responses to the genocide. In countries and periods where Armenians struggled for their everyday financial well-being or physical security, the quantity of responses was much lower than in the former case. Such examples can be the United States between the two World Wars or Lebanon during the second civil war. As the example of the Armenian community in Hungary frequently showed, the size and political and social influence and significance of Armenians in the host countries also influenced the quantity of collective responses.

The social and political system in the host countries also influenced their Armenian communities and the Soviet communist environment influenced the ways of processing in the homeland too. The most obvious examples in following the host society’s solutions were the evolution of Armenian third generation revenge organisations in Lebanon, where such violent actions also became part of everyday life in the country. In this case, following new norms appearing in the host environment was voluntary. Similarly, adapting the speakout about the Armenian genocide in the 1960s in the United States to social and racial equality movements indicated a similar process. The latter also show that adaptation to the major social processes could raise the effectiveness of Armenians’ message to the host society.

Besides these two examples of voluntary adaptation, several processes from Hungary and the Armenian SSR indicate that adaptation could also have been motivated by force. It turned out in the 1930s in Soviet Armenia that the memory of the genocide must be repressed at the collective level. Later, during the Khrushchev thaw reconciliation became the processing strategy accepted by the party-state. Opting for other strategies would have resulted in exile, imprisonment or the labelling of one as an enemy of society. In Hungary, where social and political order was determined according to Soviet norms, it was rational to apply genocide processing strategies already accepted in the Soviet Union. Emphasising the existence and accepted nature of the latter, official documents and correspondence with state institutions also became crucial for the Armenian Catholic Parish in Budapest. Some documents of the parish included defence from possible claims against clerical individuals and the institution itself. This is indirect proof of how the religious organisation was treated among others in Hungary, and also how proving the protection of communist values could be realised.
in these documents. In a political system pursuing religions and religious institutions to follow principles accepted in the Soviet Union and emphasise them was not only a feasible solution but also physical protection.

The key idea here is that not even direct regulation for trauma processing was needed to achieve different collective responses in the Armenian communities observed. The mere way Armenians were accepted and treated in their host country or the host environment in the Soviet Union resulted in a variety of collective trauma processing strategies. Even in the latter totalitarian regime, Armenians were able to find a way that was feasible and acceptable within the ideologically determined social and political environment.

An interesting result can be also observed concerning literary and political reactions in the United States in the 1980s and Domonkos Korbuly’s book on the Armenian question in Hungary from the 1930s. From these reactions it becomes clear that if Turkish denialism was strongly present in a given host state and there was at least a certain level of freedom of speech granted, Armenians actively proffered counteractions. This resulted in the struggle for reconciliation in the United States in the 1980s and in Domonkos Korbuly’s harsh statements about the evolution of politically supported pro-Turkish public opinion in Hungary. He did not use the word recognition, but practically encouraged his readers to be aware of the Armenian genocide and to raise solidarity towards Armenians.

The above-mentioned facts suggest that host states and societies, or a centrally shaped host environment in the case of the Armenian SSR, had a central role in paving the path for Armenian genocide trauma processing, both for the possibility and also for the directions of it. Even without directly regulating the life of Armenian communities or genocide trauma processing, the basic social and political establishment of the examined countries could effectively influence the evolution of collective processing strategies. Voluntary and forced adaptation both resulted in a variety of collective trauma processing strategies.

### 8.1.2. Hypothesis 2

In contrast to the first hypothesis, results of the analyses attempting to validate the second led to less obvious results. The hypothesis was found to be true in the case of
first and third generation aggression. It also proved to be partly true in the phase of collective repression specifically concerning the effect of the Great Home Turn and how it could cause approximating views of ‘re’-patriated Armenians and locals of the Armenian SSR. The fact that communication of the Armenian community in Hungary was not intensive with Armenians from elsewhere resulted in a processing strategy completely different from other communities. It may also have partly been caused by the lack of knowledge about existing means of trauma processing. However, even in this case it is highly probable that collective repression in the United States and the Armenian SSR was not caused by communication. The temporal proximity of the trauma and socio-political circumstances discouraging other collective processing strategies in two different ways in the two countries was a more significant force.

In other cases it proved to be true that the social and especially political environment of each community, and especially pressure on them, was much stronger than the power of inter-community communication. This statement was true in the case of the Armenian Catholic Parish in Hungary, which chose to represent reconciliation and adapted the commemorations to communist anniversaries not mainly because they knew the reactions represented in the Soviet Armenian public. The role of political pressure on them was much more forceful: relying on processing strategies of the home state was only a feasible way already adapted to the communist party-state environment. Naturally, they had to know about collective processing in the Armenian SSR, but the low intensity of such kind of communication was most probably enough only for finding a way to adapt to the host state’s needs.

There was a broad scale of communication networks ensuring that Armenians in the home state and in the diaspora could exchange their thoughts and information. In the examination period these networks were represented by Armenian press products, publishers, political parties, charity organisations, cultural and sport associations, church organisations and even revenge organisations. These ensured a transnational flow of information and ideas between communities. The overview of the analysis of this hypothesis shows that those networks that preferred very different opinions and ideologies from other networks could not always effectively ‘convince’ organisations preferring another type of response to the genocide if the values and principles were not similar in each network of organisations. There were exceptions, for example, in how the Dashnak party created a revenge organisation during the second Lebanese civil war.
in response to the creation of ASALA, while the principles and even sometimes the
targets of the two organisations were totally different.

The possible reason for this phenomenon could be that Armenians in a given
democratic host country or in even in the home country during democratisation could
usually choose to join from among various organisations, or to attend their programs or
buy their press products. These organisations usually represented a constant ideology,
constant principles, values, and even trauma processing strategies. It is possible that
Armenians opting for one organisation could leave it and join another representing the
changing views of the individual. This is possible for the reason that, as has been noted
in the present dissertation and suggested by Miller and Touryan Miller as well
(Hovannisian [1991] p. 191) in many cases a given person did not express one pure
processing strategy. Some examples in the present study showed that a given person’s
reactions could change as time passed by. Or one person could choose mixed strategies.
In such cases the personal composition of supporters of a given organisation and a
network of organisations could also significantly change. Thereby a thorough analysis
of the membership and supporters should be made to be able to examine how the
rhetorics or activities of one given organisation resulted in similar processing strategies
in case of individuals. Whether the principles of the organisations in question were
determined by the demands of their membership, or more characteristically an elite of
the members decided about those and individual members should have opted for
another organisation when their views changed should also be analysed. Such an
analysis would exceed the scope of the present dissertation. Such an examination is also
a possible continuation of the present research.

Another issue to be examined further concern the fact that the flow of
information globally was not constant in the examination period. It appears that in the
1970s, when mass media started to quickly process news for television broadcast, an
indirect boost was given to Armenians to exchange information and experience others’
views about ways of processing. The third generation revenge movement even used this
as a tool. The same kind of intensive and rapid worldwide broadcasting also created
solidarity with the homeland in the case of the northern Armenian earthquake and the
Karabakh war. Still, in the latter case, solidarity was not enough to create similar
collective trauma processing strategies in the homeland and the United States and
Lebanon. Therefore, such indirect channels of spreading information shall be considered
in a further analysis, i.e., not only those of the Armenian organisations. In contrast to
these examples, in the case of Operation Nemesis there were no such news providers available, but the power of the trauma was enough to create solidarity towards the organisation.

To sum up, the examination and partial rejection of the second hypothesis raises further questions. The above-mentioned issues may serve as bases for further analyses. Examining the questions raised by partial rejection may shed light from new perspectives on the transnational networks of Armenian organisations and communication within and between them.

**8.1.3. Hypothesis 3**

Verification of the third hypothesis was possible in each case. Besides some cases where there were limited amounts of data about individual responses available, several types of trauma processing strategies were shown within each examined Armenian community at the individual level. This suggests that various responses at the collective level could possibly have been present, even all those existing at the individual level. Still in each period of examination only a part of trauma processing strategies appeared at the collective level. This frequently meant only one in a given host country or in the home country. This shows that the appearance of some strategies or one certain collective trauma processing strategy at the collective level is not a merely occasional result. It has been stated concerning hypothesis 1 that various social and political environments in the examined countries resulted in various collective processing strategies.

It also became visible from the analyses completed that at the individual level processing strategies other than massively apparent ones were also maintained. Besides the first generation of survivors it could be observed that the following generations also felt the need for trauma processing, even in collective forms. Many of the protesters at the 1965 demonstrations in Yerevan were children of survivors, as has been mentioned. Also, numerous members of third generation revenge groups – as the name indicates – were grandchildren of survivors. In Hungary even Armenians who were not relatives of survivors, such as Father Kádár, also felt the need to deal with the issue.

Even if host countries’ and the home country’s environment influenced the types and sometimes even the quantity of obviously articulated responses, there has been no
evidence during the examination period that demand for trauma processing was totally absent from any given community, including Armenians living in the strictest totalitarian regimes. The demand has also been independent from generational differences. Therefore it is apparent that demand for processing the trauma caused by the genocide has been present in each community and obviously existed in each society examined.

Contrary to this, the ways Armenians realised trauma processing at the collective level were clearly influenced by the environment where the given community of Armenians lived. Many examples were touched upon when discussing the results concerning Hypothesis 1. It was also mentioned that the types of collective responses were shaped by the norms of the given host or home state’s society’s norms, the political environment, their way of accepting Armenians and economic conditions in the given country. These factors contributed to achieve uniformity or filtering of collective responses to various extents in each country observed. The uniforming force of host environments appears much stronger than that of intercommunity communication or solidarity in shaping collective responses.

8.2. New Questions and Methodological Suggestions

Conclusions about Hypothesis 2 have already indicated some possible questions for further analysis. Besides those issues, some practical questions also emerged during the examination of Armenian genocide processing in the given communities. Refinement of some definitions already used in this topic is needed, mostly related to individual responses. The reason for this is that usually sources dealing with collective responses developed a methodology for analysing the phenomena they deal with. While in cases of research on individual survivors, the main aim of the scholars was to collect oral history evidence and ‘documentation’ about the Armenian genocide, find the general patterns of deportee and refugee lives and even deaths, and not necessarily analysis of the reasons or the results of those. This was absolutely necessary because of the low amount and often disputed credibility of documents about the genocide.

The fact that survivors also reflected on the ways they attempted to recover from the trauma was most probably an unexpected side-effect of the interviews, albeit also very useful. On the other hand, some approaches related to the interviews conducted by
Miller, Touryan Miller and S vazlian may create methods and suggest ideas for further interviews and elaborating on them.

Their research offers an adequate pattern for interviewing survivors. At present the number of survivors is decreasing due to the time passed since the genocide. Therefore it is now necessary to concentrate on the following generations in a more focused way. Miller’s and Touryan Miller’s research during the Karabakh war showed that following generations facing mass traumas also show the same trauma processing strategies. Additionally, as far as the patterns of collective responses given by second and third generation of survivors show, it is worth collecting their reflections on the memory of the Armenian genocide. Obviously, their testimonies cannot be applied to document the process of the Armenian genocide, but possible directions indicating the possible resolutions of this conflict are also useful for present and future scholars and decision-makers. In addition to that, very valuable information can be gathered from them about post-genocide re-creation of Armenian life and about survivors’ reflections on the genocide. Access to understanding these phenomena may result in a much wider range of knowledge about survivors’ reactions and their path to recovery after the trauma.

Miller’s and Touryan Miller’s terms also need to be completed and specified in the future for one specific reason. The definitions they applied in their study were adequate for their interviews for the reason that they had the possibility to direct questions to their interviewees targeted to post-genocide reflections and trauma processing. They were also able to continue specific questions about trauma processing until they could identify the reaction of the given survivor according to their definitions. For this reason, and also for the reason of meeting very similar reflections of survivors, their definitions seemed to be feasible in general. In spite of this fact, interviews conducted by others having other purposes sometimes make it hard to specify trauma processing strategies of a given survivor Miller and Touryan Miller’s terms. This problem could be overcome with the specification of some definitions. In some cases even renaming a given strategy could lead to avoiding misunderstandings.

The terms reconciliation and forgiveness created a base for misunderstandings at most scientific levels, where parts of the present dissertation were presented. The audience frequently believed though determining the definition of the above-mentioned trauma processing strategy that it meant reconciliation with the perpetrators and Turks in general, as the stereotypical representation of the latter has lived in Armenian
collective memory of the genocide. Reconciliation and forgiveness could be determined under the definition of post-traumatic growth as one quite significant example of it, as was indicated in the introduction. Albeit post-traumatic growth could have also appeared in other strategies, for example in rationalisation.

Connected to this issue, it is also useful to determine what exactly shall be understood under the term “future” in the description of reconciliation and forgiveness. Many of the survivors interviewed by Verjine Svazlian were already elderly people who did not reflect on their own future, the future of their families or members of their families, or Armenians in general. This is not surprising in the case of a person who considers his or her life as already complete. Still, they could reflect on their post-genocide life positively. Some of these survivors did not reflect on their own future, but on their childrens’ and grandchildrens’ or that of the Armenian nation.

In one case mentioned in the last chapter an interviewee of Verjiné Svazlian showed both a very positive attitude to the future and described revenge as a necessary step against “the Turks”. These two attitudes appeared even independently from each other in the interview: the survivor did not characterise revenge as necessary for a happy future: “Now I’m happy with my children and grandchildren. I’m already eighty. I wish our youth good health, long life and the fulfilment of their dreams. May the memory of our innocent victims live forever and I wish peace to their bones. I want to take revenge on the Turks and Kurds because they killed my kinsfolk and I became an orphan. All through my life I was longing for the love of parents.” (Svazlian [2011] p. 161.) It is clear that this survivor had not reconciled with the memory, though according to Millers and Touryan Miller’s terms she reflected positively on the future and expressed a wish that the genocide shall be remembered, thereby she showed the strategy of reconciliation. Still, reconciling with the memory in their terms does not mean still open wounds and surely not the possibility of aggressive reactions. This is an extreme example, but also suggests a necessity to define whose and what kind of future shall be considered and whether only positive hopes about the future are sufficient when characterising a response as reconciliation.

Miller and Touryan Miller also mentioned the issue of considering natural or other disasters striking Turks as divine punishment or revenge. The author of the present dissertation listed this strategy under the term outrage and anger because this approach does not require physical aggression by the survivor. In both cases, how the reactions of those Armenians who talk about divine justice can be characterised if they
do not mention divine revenge still remains a question. It is possible, as some survivors mentioned, that they need a peaceful reconstruction of their pre-genocide life without the wish of taking revenge on perpetrators. In such cases divine justice was considered as the need for reconstruction.

In summary, for actualising research in this field of personal memories and personal perception of collective memory and actualising the already available research, new aspects are needed for conducting interviews. Additionally, clarifying the above-mentioned definition is also useful for discovering future potentials in the above-mentioned research. The same is valid for applying the definitions of processing strategies concerning other oral history resources.

8.3. Practical Aspects and Recent Progresses Related to the Study

It is clear from the phenomena described within the examination period that the trauma of the Armenian genocide had caused serious problems and conflicts within and without Armenian communities. The situation has not changed since the beginning of the 1990s. The trauma is a still living source of conflicts and pain for Armenians and even a means to explain various phenomena within society, domestic and international politics or history. Therefore, the driving mechanisms found behind collective processing are adaptable for current phenomena. Given the liveliness of the trauma it is also obvious that present-day conflicts of Armenians concerning the genocide or phenomena attached to the issue of the Armenian genocide shall be handled and resolved. This would not only serve the interest of Armenians worldwide, but also those of the other parties to this conflict.

It seems obvious that the worldwide recognition of the Armenian genocide could reduce the tensions living on in the Armenian communities worldwide. In a region where geopolitical stability is as fragile as in the South Caucasus it can be considered a serious step towards consolidation. Sources of the present dissertation provide plenty of information about how and why the recognition of the Armenian genocide could reduce conflicts concerning it. Other traumatised communities could also benefit from similar moves in cases of other genocides because of the similarities between various groups victimised in such tragedies.
In parallel, understanding perpetrators and the motives of perpetration is also crucial. This is mainly essential for genocide prevention. Only designing a genocide in a specific case like the Armenian would not have been enough for fulfilling the plan. In this case active involvement of the Muslim majority was present during the genocide. Discovering the personal motives of perpetrators who were ‘ordinary people,’ explaining the mechanisms of similarly perpetrated genocides, and analysing similar social backgrounds in problematic areas can indicate risk factors for a genocide. Unveiling such mechanisms also can support reconciliation in this and other similar cases. Such attempts were present at the 12th Meeting of the International Association of Genocide Scholars in which the author of the present dissertation had the honour to participate. Specifically, a case-study about the Ottoman Empire was presented by Hasmik Grigoryan, C.Sc, junior researcher at the Institute of Archeology and Ethnography at the NAS RA. Such approaches may also decrease the resistance of descendants of perpetrators in the recognition of the genocide. (International Association of Genocide Scholars [2015])

Some approaches to trauma processing have been also emphasised since the centennial commemoration year started. A general demand raised by the State Commission on Coordination of the Events for the Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide was the support and pursuit of Armenian genocide recognition, especially by Turkey, and genocide prevention worldwide. (State Commission on Coordination of the Events for the Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide [2015])

An approach for overcoming the effects of Soviet historiography could also be observed. For example, Harutyun Marutyan has stressed his findings for the public at various times about the role of self-defence attempts, even if many of those were small-scale and a number of them had been unknown. He considers crucial the restructuring of the role of the genocide in the construction or reconstruction of a healthy self-esteem of Armenians, instead of the still existing image of being butchered as sheep, without the slightest attempt of resistance.

The author of the present dissertation had the honour to spend the period of the commemorations around April 24, 2015 in Yerevan in the framework of the Raphael Lemkin Scholarship of AGMI. A massive banner campaign on the genocide was present all over the city, showing different approaches to the memory of genocide. A part of the banners concerned Turkish recognition or worldwide recognition. Another part of the
banners reflected on various topics concerning the genocide. Under the title Rebirth, Armenian institutions like schools or cultural organisations and groups of Armenians victorious in various fields were represented, like the first Republic of Armenia, those who fought in World War II, for example, but also intellectuals of the Armenian diaspora like Virginia Apgar. The title Memory embraced the architecture and cultural heritage of Western Armenia. The characters of Komitas and Aurora Mardiganian were also represented by these banners. The title Gratitude provided space for those foreign missionaries, diplomats and intellectuals who supported Armenians through charity, diplomacy or documentation of the genocide. Under the title From Tears to Productivity, Armenian intellectuals and benefactors of the homeland from the diaspora were displayed. A thorough analysis of these banners shall be made in the future, but it can be already seen from these topics and the people, institutions and groups represented on them that there are various trauma processing strategies represented by them, such as reconstruction or reconciliation. Whether the iconography of some banners reflecting on denial and denialist reinterpretations of history represent rage against the Young Turks, as some symbolic elements of that regime were also represented, shall also be analysed.

Numerous other events also accompanied the commemorations. The victims of the Armenian genocide were sanctified at the Holy See of Ejmiatsin on April 23, 2015. A number of diaspora Armenian artists and intellectuals visited the homeland and attempted to spread their message about the genocide there and abroad. AGMI had more Turkish visitors within one year than in the past fifteen years. Scientific institutions organised a large number of conferences and political and social fora. Some of these can serve as initiations for long-term cooperation with international organisations, states and non-state actors. All the results of such initiatives and actions may serve useful results and further issues for scholarly elaboration.
Transliteration of Armenian letters (based on the phonetics of the Eastern Armenian dialect)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenian Letter</th>
<th>Latin Equivalent</th>
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<td>Ա</td>
<td>A, a</td>
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<td>Բ</td>
<td>B, b</td>
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<td>Դ</td>
<td>D, d</td>
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<td>Ե</td>
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<td>Փ</td>
<td>P', p'</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ք</td>
<td>K', k' (often also transliterated as Q and q)</td>
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<td>Եվ</td>
<td>Yev, ev</td>
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<td>Օ</td>
<td>O, o</td>
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<td>Ֆ</td>
<td>F, f</td>
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