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The Role of the European Parliament in the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy

Analysis of the legislative amendments of the European Parliament

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Doctoral Dissertation

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1. TABLE OF CONTENT

2. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
AMOS	Analysis of Moment Structures
BUDG	Committee on Budgets
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CNS	Consultation Procedure
COD	Co-decision Procedure
COMAGRI	Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development
CONT	Committee on Budgetary Control
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives (Comité des représentants permanents)
DEVE	Committee on Development
DG AGRI	Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
DP	Direct Payment
EAFRD	European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
EC	European Commission
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
EFD	Europe of Freedom and Democracy
ENVI	Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European People's Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Greens-EFA	The Greens – European Free Alliance
GUE-NGL	European United Left/Nordic Green Left
HR	Horizontal Regulation
INI	Own Initiative Report/Procedure
LISREL	Linear Structural Relations
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
NFI	Normed Fit Index
NI	Non-Inscrits

OGC	Opinion-Giving Committee
OLP	Ordinary Legislative Procedure
PES	Party of European Socialists
QAP	Quadratic Assignment Procedure
QMV	Qualified Majority Vote
REGI	Committee on Regional Development
RFI	Relative Fit Index
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
SCMO	Single Common Market Organization
SEA	Single European Act
SEM	Structural Equation Modeling
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
S&D	Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

3. TABLES, FIGURES AND GRAPHS

Tables

Figures

Graphs

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„We are taken today… It is your turn tomorrow”

Dr. József Kádár

Vállaj, 1944

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

In the last 25 years, the treaties of the European Union significantly changed the institutional balance of the EU and the role and power of its various institutions in the legislative procedure. In this period, the most important milestones were the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. Out of these four treaties the Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993 and introduced the co-decision procedure making the European Parliament a co-legislator, and the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009 and extended the scope of policies falling under co-decision, are the most important.

The role of the European Parliament in EU decision-making has been the subject of many previous analyses. Some of them dealt with the power of the EP relative to other EU institutions like the European Commission and the Council, while others compared the EP's power under different EU legislative procedures (Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Kreppel, 2002; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Lucic, 2004). Another group analysed factors influencing the adoption of EP amendments (Kreppel, 1999; Shackelton, 1999; Kardasheva, 2009).

Research was more intensive in the 1990s and in the early 2000s when treaties were radically changing the legislative landscape of the EU and naturally attracting significant scientific attention. Nevertheless, after the Treaty of Lisbon, no analysis has been written dealing with the measurement of the changing power and legislative influence of the European Parliament.

The legislative instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy for the 2014-2020 EU programming period were finally adopted at the end of 2013, after a long and complicated process. All the EU decision-making institutions – the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Council and the European Parliament – took part in this legislative and decision-making process.

The antecedents of the 2013 CAP reform date back five years earlier. The legislative changes in the framework of the "Health Check" of the CAP in 2008 aimed at

simplifying the system of direct payments and to strengthen the market orientation of the CAP (EC, 2007). As part of the process of the 2013 reform of the CAP, the European Commission launched a public debate on the future of CAP in 2010. Those expressing their views in the public discussion suggested that the CAP should ensure the stability of the income of European farmers in exchange for the public goods they produce. Additionally, the CAP should take part in developing rural territories, boosting the rural economy and helping in the fight against climate change (EC, 2010).

Parallel to the public debate of the European Commission, the European Parliament also defined its position regarding the future of the CAP after 2014. The EP's position took the form of two own initiative reports. The Lyon Report, which was adopted in 2010 emphasised the need for a CAP with a market focus, which is more just, sustainable and increasingly focused on environmental aspects (EP, 2010). The Dess Report in 2011 highlighted the need for an enhanced emphasis on food safety, strengthening the role and bargaining power of producers along the food chain as well as fostering the development of rural areas (EP, 2011).

Informed of the political priorities of the EP, the European Commission tabled the legislative proposals of the 2013 CAP reform in autumn 2011. This was the kick-off of a negotiation process lasting for more than two years. During this process all the decision-making bodies of the EU, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council – the latter under the coordination of the Member State holding the rotating Presidency – sought to advance their own positions.

Political agreement on the key elements and the legal framework of the CAP was reached and signed in June and September 2013 by the Commission, the EP and the Council. At the end of that year, both the Parliament and the Council adopted the final regulations of the CAP for the 2014-2020 programming period.

From the point of view of the European Parliament, the key question regarding the 2013 CAP reform was whether its role and power increased after the extension of the co-decision procedure to the CAP legislation by the Treaty of Lisbon.

There are a number of preliminary expectations concerning the potential impact of the extension of the co-decision procedure on CAP decision-making. These were based on previous theoretical analysis as well as the experiences of other EU policy domains falling under the co-decision procedure.

Three main areas have been defined and investigated: 1) the changing balance in the interinstitutional relations of EU bodies, 2) the impact on EP decision-making (if the EP will be able to make a decision) and 3) the impact on the policy outcome of the CAP reform (Swinnen, 2015). Out of these three, this dissertation contributes to the analysis of the first point by analysing the relationship between the EP and the Council.

Regarding the relationships among the EU institutions, based on previous theories and expectations the extension of co-decision procedure ought to decrease the influence of the European Commission while the increasing power of both the European Parliament and the Council (Crombez et al. (2012), Greer and Hind (2012)). Greer and Hind (2012) drew up four possible scenarios regarding the inter-institutional relationships after the extension of the co-decision procedure. Out of these four, the first one is the so-called "conventional" scenario, which anticipates the growing power of the EP at the expense of the other two EU institutions (cited by Swinnen, 2015). This dissertation is partly about the analysis of this conventional scenario by investigating the evolution of the EP-Council relationship.

Besides analysing the general role of the EP as an entity, previous related analyses also dealt with the internal structures of the EP byconcentrating on the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) and its members. Roederer-Rynning (2003, 2010) stated that the extension of the co-decision procedure resulted in the increased influence of COMAGRI. Additionally, according to her

expectations, (Roederer-Rynning, 2015) ideological cleavages might become more salient as the legislative power of EP increases (cited by Swinnen, 2015).

The analysis presented in this dissertation covers the analysis of the influence of COMAGRI, its members and substitute members as well as the rapporteurs. Additionally, the social network analysis presented in this dissertation seeks to measure ideological fragmentations in the legislative procedure.

This dissertation is a case study which analyses the role of the European Parliament in the legislation of the highest-budget common EU policy, the Common Agricultural Policy in two consequtive EU programming periods, 2007-13 and 2014-20. The research is based on the legislative amendments tabled by the European Parliament to the CAP legislative proposals. Regarding the 2007-13 EU period – before the Treaty of Lisbon applied – the EP took part in the CAP legislation under the consultation procedure. But in the 2014-20 EU programming period, the EP was already a co-legislator under the co-decision procedure. Therefore, the comparison of the two EU programming periods means the comparison of the two EU legislative procedures and the role of EP in it.

In this dissertation, the role of the European Parliament is analysed from various point of views in line with applied research methods. The presentation of the adoption rates of EP amendments in each of the legislative procedures and in each decision-making phase, the analysis of the factors that have an impact on the adoption of amendments as well as the network analysis of the MEPs who tabled joint amendments help explain the role of the EP in the legislation and decision-making of the 2013 CAP reform. Nevertheless, this dissertation neither aims to analyse the policy outcome of the 2013 CAP reform, nor to analyse the content of the amendments in the dataset.

During the elaboration of this dissertation, one of my objectives was to apply novel methodologies that have not been applied for the analysis of EU legislation and political decision-making yet. Other EU policies could be analysed with these

methods in future work, provindg an opportunity to compare the decision-making and legislation of other EU policies with that of the Common Agricultural Policy.

The dissertation is structured as follows: the introduction is followed by the literature review, then the objectives, research questions and research hypotheses are defined. The presentation of the research methodology and the dataset is followed by the analysis, which is divided into three separate chapters. First, I present the analysis based on the adoption rates of EP amendments. This is followed by the analysis of the factors influencing the adoption of amendments as well as the SEM model of these factors. Finally, I analyse the relationships among the Members of European Parliament by applying social network analysis. The discussion and the summary of the results can be found at the end of the dissertation.

Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I give an overview on the most relevant literature used and assessed in the course of my research. This literature review chapter is organised as follows: first, I give an overview on the evolution of the role of the European Parliament in EU decision-making with focus on the comparison of the consultation and co-decision procedures. Then, I group the literature by the key methodologies applied in this dissertation. In this section, first I concentrate on the articles applying amendment success rates, then I continue with the analyses using logistic regression to identify the factors influencing amendment adoption. This is followed by a short overview on the application of structural equation modeling in the context of political science. Finally, I give a brief overview on the most relevant articles and analyses connected to social network analysis and its use in political science and EU decision-making.

2.1. Literature related to the role of the European Parliament in EU decision-making: consultation vis-à-vis co-decision

There is an extensive discussion in European studies and in political science about the role of EU institutions in EU-level decision-making. In this debate, significant attention is devoted to the role and the power of the European Parliament. Previous research mostly concentrated on the power of the EP under various legislative procedures. In the context of this analysis, the impact of the introduction of co-decision procedure is relevant. Did it really increase the power of the European Parliament in EU legislation?

The legislative procedures of the EU

There are four principal legislative procedures in EU-level decision-making. The treaties of the European Community and the European Union constitute the milestones of the evolution of the role of the EP in the EU law-making process.

The Single European Act introduced the co-operation and the assent procedures in 1987. The Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force in 1993, introduced the co-decision procedure. This earlier version of the co-decision is called co-decision (I). The Treaty of Amsterdam modified the co-decision procedure. This modified version of the co-decision procedures is referred to as co-decision (II).

Tsebelis and Garrett (2001:372) summarized the key changes between co-decision (I) and (II). 'Under the reformed codecision procedure, the conciliation committee is the last stage of the legislative game. The proposed legislation is dropped if the representatives of the Council and Parliament cannot agree on a joint text (Art. 189b(6), Amsterdam Treaty); that is, the member governments decided to remove the last two stages of the original codecision procedure - the Council's final proposal to the Parliament, and Parliament's decision whether to reject it.'

The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001 and entered into force in 2003. It extended the scope of the co-decision procedure to further EU policy areas. The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the co-decision procedure, which is now called the 'ordinary legislative procedure'. The Treaty of Lisbon also renamed the assent procedure as consent procedure and repealed the co-operation procedure. Besides the 'ordinary legislative procedure', the Treaty of Lisbon defined the 'special legislative procedures': the consultation and consent procedures are now the special legislative procedures of the European Union.

Table 1. - The evolution of the legislative procedures of the European Union

<table>
<tr><th>EU Treaties (year of entering into force)</th><th>Cooperation procedure</th><th>Assent procedure</th><th>Consultation procedure</th><th>Co-decision procedure</th></tr>
<tr><td>Treaty of Rome (1957)</td><td colspan="2"></td><td>Introduction</td><td rowspan="2"></td></tr>
<tr><td>Single European Act (1987)</td><td colspan="2">Introduction</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Treaty of Maastricht (1993)</td><td>Decrease the scope of procedure</td><td rowspan="3"></td><td>Decrease the scope of procedure</td><td>Introduction</td></tr>
<tr><td>Treaty of Amsterdam (1999)</td><td>Decrease the scope of procedure</td><td>Decrease the scope of procedure</td><td>Amendment: making the procedure more efficient; Extending the scope of procedure.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Treaty of Nice (2003)</td><td>Decrease the scope of procedure</td><td>Decrease the scope of procedure</td><td>Extending the scope of procedure</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Treaty of Lisbon (2009)</td><td rowspan="2">Repeal</td><td>Rename: consent procedure</td><td>Decrease the scope of procedure</td><td>Extending the scope of procedure.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Rename: special legislative procedures</td><td>Rename: ordinary legislative procedure</td></tr>
</table>

Source: own composition

The consultation procedure

The consultation procedure was introduced by the Treaty of Rome and is the simplest legislative procedure of the EU as it has only one reading. During this procedure, the European Commission first tables a legislative proposal. Under this procedure the Council must request the EP's position, though the Council is not obligated to take it on board. It is the sole decision of the Council – after receiving the supporting or rejecting opinion of the Commission on the amendments of the EP –, if it integrates the EP amendments into the final text of a regulation or not. Nevertheless, it is obligatory for the Council to have the opinion of the European Parliament. Without the consultation with the EP, the adoption of the legislative instrument is not legal and the Court of the European Union can nullify it. If the Council intends to modify the legislative proposal it has to consult the Parliament again. In sum, without the EP's opinion, the legislative instrument can't be adopted. (EP, 2015).

Figure 1. – The consultation procedure



Source: European Commission

Crombez (1996) concludes that the Parliament is powerless under the consultation procedure as its opinion to the Commission proposal is not binding. However, he also emphasised that there is one tool in the hands of the EP to make its position adopted: it can delay legislation by not issuing an opinion, and block other legislation if its opinion is ignored.

Tsebelis and Garrett (2001:372) also claim that 'prior to the passage of the SEA and the creation of the cooperation procedure, the Parliament had scant legislative influence, even after its direct election in 1979 … …when the consultation procedure applies, the Parliament's influence is limited to the threat of delaying legislation'.

These positions are in line with Lucic's point of view (2004:2-8) that the role of the European Parliament is 'advisory, modest and limited' under the consultation procedure.

Besides the above articles, a number of authors – Westlake (1994), Laruelle (2002); Jupille (2004); Thomson et al. (2006) – concluded that the EP has a limited power under the consultation procedure. Although this view is also shared by Kardasheva (2009), she – together with Crombez (1996) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) – also emphasises that the EP can block the legislative procedure by delaying the issuance of its opinion, which is a powerful tool in the hands of the EP.

Contrary to the above conclusions, in their comparative analysis between the consultation and co-decision procedures, Selck and Steunenberg (2004:30) claim that the European Parliament 'is closer to the [final policy] outcome under consultation than under co-decision.' Nevertheless, they also claim that under the consultation procedure it is hard to differentiate between 'power' and 'luck': whether the adoption of EP amendments is attributable to the EP's power or just simple luck.

The co-decision – ordinary legislative – procedure

The ordinary legislative procedure follows the same steps as the former co-decision procedure.[1] First, the Commission tables the legislative proposal. In the first reading, the European Parliament adopts its position by a simple majority, while

[1] In this dissertation, the notions of 'co-decision procedure' and 'ordinary legislative procedure' are used as synonyms in line with the Treaty of the European Union. Nevertheless, for the period before the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 'co-decision' is exclusively used.

the Council by qualified majority vote (QMV). If the Council approves the position of the EP, the act is adopted and the legislative procedure is completed.

If the Council does not approve the position represented by amendments to the law by the EP, then the Parliament receives the Council's position and has three months to make a decision. This is the second reading. If the EP either approves the proposal as amended by Council or makes no decision the act as amended by the Council is adopted. But the EP may also reject the Council's position by an absolute majority of its Members. In this case the act is not adopted and the procedure ends. Additionally the EP can also adopt, by an absolute majority of its Members, amendments to the Council's position, which are then put to the Commission and the Council for their opinion.

If the Council during the course of its second reading, voting by a qualified majority on the Parliament's amendments and unanimously on those on which the Commission has delivered a negative opinion, approves all of Parliament's amendments no later than three months after receiving them, the act is adopted. Otherwise, the Conciliation Committee shall be convened within six weeks.

The Conciliation Committee consists of an equal number of Council and Parliament representatives, assisted by the Commission. The Committee has six weeks to agree on a joint text supported by a QMV of the Council and by a majority of the EP. The act is adopted if both the Council and the EP approve the joint text. The procedure stops and the act is not adopted if the Committee does not reach an agreement on a joint text by the deadline or if either of the two institutions fails to approve it by the deadline.

The Lisbon Treaty added 40 further legal bases to the ordinary legislative procedure – including the Common Agricultural Policy – under which the Parliament now decides on legislative acts on equal footing with the Council. Hence, today, the ordinary legislative procedure applies to 85 legal bases and is the most widely applied legislative procedure in EU decision-making (EP, 2015).

Figure 2. - The co-decision procedure



Source: European Commission

Already in its resolution on the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Parliament stressed that the Treaty has major shortcomings and it 'does not provide a real co-decision procedure, which would have meant that the EP and the Council would have had the same decision-making powers over any legislative act, since the

Council is allowed to act unilaterally in the absence of an agreement with the EP, and also applies this procedure only to a limited area'. (EP, 1992, Point 2. (c))

Steunenberg (1994) also claims that the co-decision procedure does not really improve the Parliament's position and that it does not increase the power of the Parliament. In his opinion, under the co-decision procedure – similar to the consultation and cooperation procedures – the European Commission is the most influential EU institution.

Tsebelis (1995) and Tsebelis et al. (2001) state that at the end of the co-decision procedure, the Council can make a 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer to the EP.[2] It gives the Council the agenda-setting power, which earlier belonged to the EP. Therefore, under co-decision, the EP's power is decreased by the loss of its agenda-setting power.

Crombez (2000) claims that the co-decision procedure weakens the influence of the European Commission, which may weaken the power of the EP as well. It is because the policy position of the European Parliament is generally closer to that of the Commission's. Both represent EU-level interests contrary to the national positions of the Member States represented in the Council.

Contrary to the conclusions of the above articles, the dominant part of the relevant literature concludes that the EP gained significant power via the introduction and extension of the co-decision procedure. In many of its resolutions – EP, (1992); EP, (1995) EP, (2008) – the EP defined itself as an equal co-legislator with the Council under co-decision. The main conclusions of the relevant articles are summarised in Table 2.

[2] This offer can only be tabled by the Council under the 'co-decision I.' after the unsuccessful negotiations in the Conciliation Committee, as stipulated in the Treaty of Maastricht. According to the 'co-decision II.' as stipulated by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council can't make this offer, therefore, the legislative instrument is not adopted.

Table 2. - Summary of the main conclusions of relevant articles

Consultation procedure		Co-decision procedure	
Article	**Main conclusion**	**Article**	**Main conclusion**
Westlake (1994)	The European Parliament doesn't have a real legislative power.	*Steunenberg (1994)*	*The introduction of the co-decision procedure didn't increase the legislative power of the EP.*
		Tsebelis (1995)	*The agenda-setting power of the EP decreases in the co-decision procedure.*
		Crombez (2000)	*The power of the EP can decrease under the co-decision procedure.*
Crombez (1996)	The influence of the European Parliament is weak.	Corbett et al. (1995)	The adoption rates of EP amendments are higher under the co-decision procedure.
		Crombez (1997)	The EP became an equal co-legislator with the Council. The EP has more legislative power under co-decision compared to consultation.
Tsebelis and Garrett (2001)	The legislative influence of the EP is minimal: the only way for the EP to influence the legislation is to delay it.	Jacobs (1997)	Under the co-decision procedure, the rejection rates of EP amendments are lower than in any other EU legislative procedure.
Laruelle (2002)	The plays a minor role under the consultation procedure.	Scully (1997a)	The co-decision procedure increases the legislative influence of the EP and the MEPs.
Lucic (2004)	The role of the EP is modest and limited.	Steunenberg (1998)	In the co-decision procedure, the final political outcome is closer to the ideal policy of the EP.
		Shackleton (1999)	Under the co-decision procedure, the Council can't hinder the EP to influence the legislation significantly, therefore, the power of EP increased.
Jupille (2004)	The consultation procedure is an interaction between the European Commission and the Council: the role of the EP is marginal.	Tsebelis et al. (2001)	The adoption rates of EP amendments are higher under co-decision than any other EU legislative procedure.
Thomson (2006)	Negative opinion on the role of the EP under the consultation procedure.	Tsebelis és Garrett (2001)	The EP became an equal co-legislator with the Council under co-decision.
Kardasheva (2009)	The EP's power in the consultation procedure is very limited.	Hix (2002)	The Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam increased the power of the EP.
Selck és Steunenberg (2004)	*The policy position of the EP is closer to the political outcome under the consultation procedure than under the co-decision procedure.*	Selck és Steunenberg (2004)	The EP can be considered a real co-legislator.
		Thomson et al. (2006)	The EP managed to increase its power during the transition from consultation to co-decision.
		Jupille (2007)	The introduction of the co-decision procedure resulted in the enhancement of the legislative power of the EP.

Source: own composition

Conclusions in italics show the minortiy positions of authors.

2.2. Previous research analysing EP amendments

Success rates of EP amendments

As previously noted, the simplest way to analyse the legislative influence of the European Parliament is to calculate the success rates of EP amendments and apply them as indicators.

There are conflicting views on the applicability of the ratio of adopted EP amendments as an indicator for the legislative power of the EP. Many believe that these success rates do not provide a well-founded argument to describe the legislative influence of the European Parliament. They claim that simple success rates don't give any information regarding the importance or weight of the EP amendment concerned. Tsebelis et al. (2001:576) claims that 'counting success of amendments may not mean very much about the influence of different actors'. Shackleton (1999:5) also says that 'numbers [of successful amendments] alone do not offer an adequate view of the impact of the Parliament'. 'There is one significant theoretical objection to the use of empirical data in order to assess the importance of different institutions in EU law-making. Under complete information there would be no parliamentary amendments because if such amendments were to be accepted by other actors they would have been incorporated in the initial Commission proposal and if they were not acceptable [to the Council] the EP would not offer them' (Tsebelis et al. (2001: 575))'. Consequently, the existence of the EP legislative amendments is the proof either for the imperfect flow of information or other non-legislative policy or political considerations among the three EU institutions.

Nevertheless, most of the articles dealing with EP amendments apply EP amendment success rates as indicators for the EP legislative power. In conclusion, the high number of articles analysing the amendments of the European Parliament (Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Kreppel, 2002; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Lucic, 2004; Yordanova, 2010) justifies that there is room and reason for

measuring the role and influence of the European Parliament via the success rates of adopted EP amendments.

Logistic regression

As also mentioned previously in the research methodology section of this dissertation, logistic regression can be used to model the impact of the independent (explanatory) variables on the dependent (explained) variable. In previous EP-related literature, Kreppel (1999), Lucic (2004), Kardasheva (2009) and Burns et al. (2009) applied logistic regression to measure the impact of explanatory variables on the adoption of amendments. The summary of the outcomes of this type of analysis can be found in Table 3.

Table 3. - Factors increasing the adoption of the amendments of the European Parliament – Summary of conclusions of relevant articles

Article	Cooperation procedure	Consultation procedure	Co-decision procedure
Kreppel (1999)	First reading amendments		
	Clarification amendments		
	Recital amendments		
	Internal unity of EP behind the amendment		
Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999)	First reading amendments		
Lucic (2004)	First reading amendments		
	Non-policy amendments (less important amendments)		
Kardasheva (2009)		The European Commission supports the EP amendment	
		The legislative proposal is of outstanding importance.	
		The EP can link the legislative proposal to a co-decision legislative file.	
		The amendment is tabled to a legislative proposal in the field of human rights	
		The legislative proposal is urgent.	
Tsebelis et al. (2001)	The European Commission supports the EP amendment		The European Commission supports the EP amendment
Shackleton (1999)			The adoption rates of EP amendments tabled in a compromise form are higher.

Source: own composition

Structural Equation Modeling

Structural equation modeling is mostly used in social sciences – primarily in sociology, marketing and political science –, and also in psychology. In political science, it is used to describe voters' behaviour and decisions as well as the factors influencing them. Now, I will give a brief overview on some of these articles and studies.

De Vries et al. (2008) analysed the effects of family background on voting preference in case of the Dutch elections. Among the characteristics of the family background, they investigated the impact of educational attainment, father's church membership and church attendance, his party preference and occupational status on voting preferences of children. In their model, they used the characteristics of family background as explanatory variables. Their conclusion was that the party preference of the father when the child is 15 has a larger impact on the child's voting preference than the personal characteristics of the child itself. The father's church membership and self-employed status were found to have no significant impact on children's voting preferences.

Powers and Cox (1997) analysed the impact of satisfaction with economic reforms on voting behaviour in Poland. In their SEM model, the explanatory variables include age, gender, education, work (blue or white-collar), size of community of residence, party membership, level of disapproval of the communist system, income and its trajectory, and religiosity. They investigated the impact of these variables on the satisfaction with economic reform, then how this influences party preferences. They concluded that income and attitudes towards transition are the key variables determining satisfaction with economic reform, while attitudes towards the communist system influence voting preferences.

Leimgruber (2011) investigated the impact of personal characteristics and political values on voting behaviour in Swiss elections. Among personal values and characteristics, he analysed security, conformity, tradition, universalism, benevolence as well as education, gender, income, age and religion. Among

political values, he took measured the individual's views on the following: the armed forces, equality of opportunity, Swiss tradition, law and order, social security and taxation of high incomes. The objective of this research was to explore the indirect role of personal values and characteristics in voting behaviour via political values using a structural equation model. Leimgruber's main conclusion was that personal values and characteristics have only an indirect impact on voting behaviour, and only by way of political values rooted in personal values.

Barbaranelli et al. (2007) also applied structural equation modeling to investigate the impacts of personality traits on voting intentions in the United States presidential elections. In their model the dependent variable was the intention to vote – either for George Bush or for John Kerry in the 2004 elections–, while the explanatory variables were made up of personal traits of the voters, including age, gender, demographic variables, etc. Their conclusion was that personality variables accounted for 16% of variance of voting intentions, while gender and age accounted for no more than 3%.

Besides the above articles, Flores–Ramakrishnan (2011) used SEM for analysing the political participation of Asian-American citizens, while Chang (2010) used SEM in the context of institutional decision-making, which is close to political decision-making described in this dissertation.

In conclusion, there are some analyses connected to European politics in broad sense which apply structural equation modeling, but to date, SEM has not been applied to analyse the political processes of the EU and the decision-making of the European institutions.

2.3. Social network analysis in political science

The term 'network' is frequently used to describe clusters of different of actors who are linked together in political, social or economic life. Networks are capable of spreading information or engaging in collective action (Peterson, 2004).

According to Börzel (1997:1), a policy network is a "set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals".

Schneider (1992) defines two main meanings of policy networks. First, policy networks are used to characterize a decision-making system without a clear hierarchy. Second, a policy network describes any pattern of relationship among actors.

Marsh and Rhodes (1992) argues that network structures can define the agenda and outcomes of a policy network.

The 'Rhodes model' of policy networks (Rhodes, 1997) has the assumption that three key variables determine the characteristics of the policy network in a policy domain: (1) the relative stability of a network's membership; (2) the network's relative insularity; and (3) the strength of resource dependencies among members.

Wasserman and Faust (1999) define the underlying principle of the network approach as follows: (1) actors and actions in a network are interdependent rather than independent of each other; (2) linkages between actors are channels for the transfer of material or immaterial resources (e.g. money, personnel, information, political support); (3) network structures may either enable or constrain the actors involved and (4) structure (social, economic or political) is a lasting pattern of relations among actors.

The political networks in the institutional and governance structures of the European Union have already been subject of previous scientific analysis. Kaiser (2009) states that given its complex multilevel governance structures, the European Union (EU) is an obvious focus for studying policy networks as informal coordination mechanisms between state and non-state or public and private actors.

Besussi (2006) states that each European policy is developed within networks characterised by a hybrid mix of individual actors embedded in a system of national, sub-national, supra-national, intergovernmental and transnational relations.

Peterson (2004) identified three key features that justify the use of policy network analysis for the EU' multi-level governance. First, the EU can be considered as a polity in which decision rules and dominant actors vary greatly between different policy sectors. Second, EU policy-making is highly dependent on technical knowledge, which risks to depoliticisizing the policy process. Third, European policy-making takes place in a 'labyrinth of committees that shape policy options before policies are 'set' by overtly political decision-makers such as the college of Commissioners, Council of Ministers, or European Parliament' (Peterson, 2004:2).

Peterson (2004) states that most of the analyses that employ policy network approach in EU studies aim at using this approach to help explain or predict policy outcomes in a particular EU policy domain. In his view, policy network analysis is a powerful analytical tool at EU level, but he also points out (Peterson, 2004:12) that 'policy network analysis may not answer many important questions about EU governance' as policy-making in Brussels is dominated by a rapidly changing and diverse set of interest that hinders stable networks to set up and operate.

Richardson (2000:16) adds that 'EU governance … [can be] best described as uncertain agendas, shifting networks and complex coalitions'. In sum, supporters of this view pose the question whether stable networks exist in Brussels at all.

Regarding the European Commission, Patz (2011a) analysed the network of 84 Commission expert groups and subgroups. He claimed that 'how groups interrelate can tell us more than just looking at individual groups. It can tell us how policy fields are linked and, which public or private organisations are actually responsible for this connection'.

Regarding the European Parliament, Patz (2011b) analysed the links between 28 voluntarily formulated EP intergroups – i.e. cross-party groups of MEPs supporting

a special issue – with focus on the membership of UK MEPs in these groups. He found that 'UK MEPs' membership in intergroups is … shaped by their left-right political group affiliation. The Conservatives, EFD & non-affiliated members cluster together as do the Socialists, Labour, Greens and the United Left'. Patz (2012) also analysed the network of the EP Committees. One of his conclusions was that the Committee of Agriculture and Rural Development 'seems to be a bridge between Transport (TRAN) and Regional Affairs (REGI).

Political network analysis has already been conducted in various EU policy areas. Ansell et al. (1997) and Ansell (2000) analysed policy networks in the field of the European regional development policy. These papers confirm that "networks that connect supranational, national and regional actors form a multi-level governance", i.e. the governance structure of the EU. The conclusions of these papers state that these networks ensure 'the exchange of resources in the form of information and technical assistance' and that in these multi-layer networks each actor can play multiple roles (Ansell et al., 1997:370). Ansell (2000) also concludes that the EU is a 'concrete illustration of a networked polity'.

Mérand et al. (2011) applied network analysis in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Their conclusion was that the dense network of stakeholders of CSDP shows strong links between bureaucratic actors from Brussels and Member States. Patz (2013) analysed information flows and networks in the context of EU policy-making in the case of the post-2012 reform of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy. His main finding was that the network of advisory committees in EU fisheries policy, although focused around Brussels, is wider in the European societal sphere. He also claims that 'affiliation opportunities provided by committees, ad-hoc coalitions, umbrella organisations or specialised conferences exist in all policy domains, and by studying event affiliation of organisations or individuals one should be able to study Europe-wide networks in a multitude of fields' (Patz, 2013:243). He concludes that 'with sufficiently complex network data … information flows in policy-making may be better and better understandable … [and] it would give a more reliable account of how EU politics functions' (Patz, 2013:244)

To date, research combining social network analysis with the analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy is very limited. Daugbjerg (1999) examines the influence of the agricultural policy network on the 1992 MacSharry reform. His main conclusion is that the core members of the CAP policy network share the same views regarding the objectives of the CAP. It indicates that this policy network has a high degree of cohesion. He concludes that "policy networks and the broader institutional context within which they are embedded play important roles in policy reform processes." In his view, the MacSharry reform is a moderate reform as "the existence of a cohesive policy network … limits the opportunities for fundamental reform. Members of such a network can form a strong coalition resisting change." (Daugbjerg, 1999: 423). This analysis confirms that the structure of policy networks influence policy reform outcomes.

Peterson (2004) analysed the policy network of the Common Agricultural Policy. He found that the 'EU's agricultural policy network is a true policy community' in which decision-making is shared between the network of product-specialised officials and the Agricultural Council. The Commission and the Council Secretariat facilitate communication within the CAP policy network. Peterson also found that the 'CAP seems to lend credence to the general hypothesis that as the focus of policy activity becomes more international, a supranational network dominated by experts can be expected … to emerge' (Peterson, 2004:16). In the context of the Common Agricultural Policy, Moschitz et al. (2009) analysed the network of national-level organic farming policy networks in 11 European countries. One of his conclusion that relates to this paper is that the density of policy networks is higher in case of net contributor Member States of the EU. Henning (2009) applies quantitative network approach to analyse the interactions between the private and public stakeholders in the field of the CAP-related lobbying activities in an EU-15 versus EU-27 comparison. One of his key conclusions was that 'the integration processes of the CAP implies a continuous shift of institutional decision-making power from the Council to the supranational level, i.e. the Commission and the EP' (Henning, 2009:175).

Chapter 3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this research is to come up with quantified, measureable evidence and explanations in order to get a better understanding of EU legislation and decision-making, specifically about the role of the European Parliament in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy. Besides the overall objective, there are a number of specific objectives in this research. This set of objectives can be best defined alongside the key methodologies used.

The first objective is to compare the legislative influence of the European Parliament in the consultation and the co-decision procedures. Here, the goal of the analysis is to see how the Treaty of Lisbon changed the influence and power of the European Parliament with regards to the CAP, i.e. whether the legislative influence of the EP increased from consultation to co-decision in one of the most important policy areas of the EU.

The second objective of the research is to identify and test those factors and characteristics – explanatory variables – which determine the success of adoption of EP amendments. The main question here is which explanatory variables have a significant impact on the legislative outcome at the three decision-making level of the legislative process.

The related SEM analysis aims at identifying those groups of variables, factors, which have an impact on the adoption of EP amendments at each of the stages of decision-making. Structural equation modeling is used to get a better understanding of the decison-making of the EU with focus on the European Parliament as well as to identify the primary factors that influence political decisions and the political-legislative outcome. The main research question is to determine what factors – or clusters of factors – influence EU decisions, measured by adoption of EP legislative amendments. Therefore, SEM is used as a research tool to analyse the observed and latent explanatory and results variables related to the EP amendments and their adoption. SEM can tell us about the magnitude and relations between these factors, and how they impact legislation.

Finally, the objectives of social network analysis of the 2013 CAP reform are threefold. First, to identify the most important EP Groups and Member States, defined as the most active ones tabling legislative amendments. Second, to highlight the most important, most powerful and most frequent relationships among the Member States and EP Groups. And third, to get to know which factors influence the establishment of relationships among MEPs, therefore among Member States and EP Groups.

3.1. Research questions and hypotheses

Based on previous research and literature and in line with the research objective set above, three key research questions have been formed and three related hypotheses have been defined.

The first research question is related to the institutional evolution and the absolute and relative power of the European Parliament. It aims to explore how the introduction and extension of the co-decision procedure changed the legislative power of the EP. In the framework of this research I investigate the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon and its extension of the co-decision procedure. Based on this, the first research question is as follows:

> ***Research question 1. Has the legislative influence of the European Parliament increased in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy after the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon?***

The key question is whether the EP is more powerful under co-decision compared to the consultation procedure. This question aims at confirming the conclusions of Tsebelis et al. (2001), Tsebelis and Garrett (2002), Hix (2002), Kreppel (2002), Selck and Steunenberg (2004) and Thomson et al. (2006), but is contrary to the conclusions of Greer et al (2012). In line with the research question and based on the relevant literature, I define the H1. hypothesis as follows:

H1. hypothesis: The European Parliament increased its legislative influence in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy with the extension of the co-decision procedure by the Treaty of Lisbon.

The second research question is connected to the factors influencing the adoption of EP amendments. It aims to examine if there is a statistically significant relationship between the characteristics – or groups of characteristics – of MEPs and the adoption of EP amendments. Therefore, the second research question is as follows:

Research question 2. What variables and groups of variables influence the adoption of EP amendments in the Common Agricultural Policy and to what extent?

In their articles, Kreppel (1999), Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999), Schackleton (1999), Tsebelis et al. (2001), Lucic (2004) and Kardasheva (2009) all concluded that the adoption of EP amendments are influenced by the characteristics and type of amendments as well as the patterns of the decision-making process.

The structural equation modeling arranges the observed variables into pre-defined factors. Its objective is to investigate if the preliminary set model describes the relationship between the observed and latent variables punctually and in line with their real relationship. This way the model contributes to the better understanding of the legislative process as well as the factors influencing the policy outcome. In line with the research question and based on the relevant literature, I define the H2. hypothesis as follows:

H2. hypothesis: The characteristics of the amendment as well as the proposing MEP and his or her Member State have an impact on the adoption of EP amendments at each decision-making level of the EP in the field of the CAP.

The third research question is about the application of social network analysis in the context of EU decision-making. This question aims to explore what factors influence the cooperation of MEPs in the network as well as the structure of network.

Research question 3. When tabling joint amendments to CAP legislative instruments, do the characteristics of MEPs influence their cooperations?

According to CEPS-Votewatch (2012:10), party affiliation influences the cooperation among MEPs in the European Parliament: the EPP and S&D Groups of the EP vote together in more than 70% of all legislative cases. Based on this, it can be fairly expected that MEPs from these two groups tie with each other when tabling joint amendments.

A different approach might also be tested: Patz (2011b) suggests that EP Groups from the same political side cluster together: the EPP with the EFD and non-affiliated members on the right-wing political side, while the Socialists and Democrats cluster with the Greens and the United Left on the left-wing.

In a similar analysis focusing on a network of intergovernmental relations, Thurner and Binder (2009) concluded that dominantly Nordic, net contributor Member States formed a network, and relationships between actors from these Member States were the most frequent.

Also, in line with the concept of 'Core Europe' or the 'Europe of Concentring Circles' (Stubb, 1996), one could expect that MEPs from either founding Member States or MSs which joined the EU before 2004 (EU-15 countries) would be engaged in a closer network structure compared to MEPs from late entry states (EU-12 countries).

As Thurner and Binder (2009:88) state, 'established long-term relations may imply lower transactions costs of … coordination'. Additionally, this statement reinforces the expectation that MEPs from Member States with closer geographical, historical,

economic, political or linguistic connections form relationships more frequently. In line with the research question and based on the above detailed relevant literature, I define the H3. hypothesis as follows:

> ***H3. hypothesis: When tabling amendments to CAP legislative instruments, the characteristics of MEPs and their Member States influence the cooperation and networks among them in the European Parliament.***

Besides the above three key hypotheses, there will be more sub-hypotheses defined in the relevant chapters of the analysis based on previous theory.

3.2. The novelties of the research

Although there is extensive literature related to this research topic, there are a number of the novel elements in this research. First, the legislative instruments of the CAP have not yet been the subject of EP amendment analysis. Previous analyses dealing with EP amendments covered a number of policy areas including environmental (Burns et al., 2009; Tsebelis, 1994; Tsebelis et al, 1999) or health and safety issues (Lucic, 2004). Kreppel (1999; 2002) analysed a dataset gathered from a variety of policy areas, including social affairs, energy and transport. Nevertheless, to date amendment analysis has not been applied to the field of the Common Agricultural Policy studies. Besides, there are a number of novelties presented in this dissertation which are connected to the applied methodologies. These are as follows:

1) This research is the first one to compare and measure the legislative influence of the European Parliament between the consultation and co-decision procedures in the Common Agricultural Policy via amendment analysis. As a result, the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EP's power in the EU's agricultural legislation can be quantified and analysed.

Although Selck and Steunenberg (2004) compared these two legislative procedures with regards to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the transition from the consultation to the co-decision procedure in light of the Treaty of Lisbon has not been analysed yet.

When calculating amendment success rates, amendments have been categorised according to their characteristics and the internal decision-making phase they were proposed in. Based on this, five categories have been defined: draft report amendment, open amendments, compromise amendments, amendments tabled by opinion-giving committees and plenary amendments.

Previous research only focused on one type of EP amendments: either plenary amendments (Yordanova, 2009) or open amendments (Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Tsebelis et al., 2001;), but the simultaneous analysis of various types of amendments during the legislative procedure of a policy area has not been conducted yet.

Additionally, during the 2013 CAP reform, I also created the categories of 'agricultural policy amendments' and 'CAP reform amendments' to calculate success rates along these categories, which is also a novelty in CAP-related research.

2) Unlike previous researches, this research applies MEP- and Member State-related explanatory variables to see their influence in the adoption of EP amendments. Previous research tested a number of explanatory variables including type of amendment, internal EP unity, number of readings, recital amendment (Kreppel, 1999) rapporteur's amendment (Tsebelis, 1995), but to date the MEP and Member State-related variables have not been incorporated. Testing these variables is a novelty compared to previous analysis in the context of both the CAP and the European Parliament.

   Another novel element in this research is that both in calculating success rates and in the use of logistic regression, there are three dependent variables in line with the key stages of the EU legislative procedure: (1) adoption by the EP Committee in charge; (2) adoption by the EP plenary session, and (3) adoption by the Council. While previous analysis only focused on one of

these decision-making points, my approach enables us to identify and compare the success rates and the significant explanatory variables at each of these three stages.

The application of structural equation modeling in the study of political decision-making and legislative processes of the European Union, including the European Parliament, has not been the subject of exploratory nor confirmative factor analysis. Obviously, this is also true for analyses based on the legislative amendments – and the connected variables – of the European Parliament.

The novelty of the SEM approach is that most of the confirmative factor models that were applied in political science analysed political participation or voting patterns – factors influencing the voting decision of voters – with the use of structural equations (Powers and Cox, 1997; Barbaranelli et al., 2007; de Vries et al., 2008; Leimgruber, 2011). It has not been applied for analysing the EU's legislative procedures.

3) To date, social network analysis has only been applied in the context of the European Parliament to see the relationships among EP committees (Patz 2011b, 2012). Nevertheless, the network of MEPs – labelled by their party affiliation and nationality – has not yet been analysed. Second, in the European parliamentary context previous analyses on national and party coalitions in the EP were based on EP plenary voting results (CEPS-Votewatch, 2012; Votewatch, 2014). This research expands the scope to national and party coalitions embedded in the jointly tabled EP amendments. Previous network analyses in the CAP (Daugbjerg, 1999; Moschitz and Stolze, 2009) investigate the consultation procedure. This present research investigates intra-EP political networks in light of the extension of the co-decision procedure to the CAP in 2009 by the Treaty of Lisbon. Finally, social network analysing methods have been already applied in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy (Mérand et al., 2011) and to a special segment of the CAP, i.e. organic farming (Moschitz and Stolze, 2009), but a comprehensive social network analysis of the CAP has not been undertaken.

Chapter 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5. Success rates of EP amendments

When calculating success or so-called adoption rates, the ratio of the number of adopted amendments to the total amendments introduced is calculated. This is the simplest way to analyse the legislative influence of the European Parliament.

In some views, success rates of EP amendments 'alone do not offer an adequate view of the impact of the European Parliament' (Schackleton, 1999:5). According to their views, success rates are a procedural aspect of the decision-making process which do not say much about the outcome of decision-making in terms of policy. Nevertheless, most of the articles dealing with EP amendments – Shackleton (1999), Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999), Kreppel (1999), Tsebelis et al. (2001), Kreppel (2002), Lucic (2004), Kardasheva (2009) – while acknowledging the limitations. use the EP success rates as indicators for the EP legislative power.

In this research, various types of success rates of EP amendments have been calculated:

- for both legislative procedures, i.e. consultation and co-decision procedures, which makes it possible to compare the legislative influence of the EP under various procedures;
- subset by type of amendment: draft report amendments, open amendments, amendments of opinion-giving committees;
- success rates compared to the total number of amendments as well as to the amendments adopted at the previous legislative phase.

6. Logistic regression and Structural Equation Modeling

Logistic regression

In order to measure the joint impact of variables, I developed a logistic regression model. Binary logistic regression is a form of regression which is used when the dependent variable is categorical, or - as a special case - binary. Logistic regression can be used to model the impact of the independent (explanatory) variables on the dependent (explained) variable. The impact of predictor variables is usually explained in terms of odds ratios. Logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event (value) occurring. Logistic regression is widely used to solve classification problems, therefore, I also use it in this research.

In previous EP-related literature, Kreppel (1999), Lucic (2004), Kardasheva (2009) and Burns et al. (2009) applied logistic regression to measure the impact of explanatory variables on the adoption of EP amendments.

In the logistic regression, I tested 20 explanatory variables[3] to measure their impact on the adoption of the EP amendments. In the model, I used three dependent variables in line with the three decision-making phases of the legislative procedure: COMAGRI adoption, EP plenary adoption and Council adoption. The testing of explanatory variables has been conducted in relation to the total number of amendments.

When testing the variables I use two approaches. First, I analyse all the variables simultaneously using a standard regression analysis,[4] then I test the variables using a Wald model with forward stepwise selection of variables. 'Any stepwise procedure for selection or deletion of variables from a model is based on a statistical algorithm that checks for the 'importance' of variables, and either includes or excludes them on the basis of a fixed decision rule. The 'importance' of a variable is defined in terms of a measure of the statistical significance of the coefficient for the variable.' (Hosmer, Lemeshow, 2000:137). The Wald stepwise selection method with entry testing based on the significance of the score statistic, and removal testing based on the probability of the Wald statistic.[5]

[3] The six EP Groups have been tested as separate variables.
[4] In SPSS this is referred to as 'ENTER' method
[5] http://www.cob.unt.edu/itds/faculty/evangelopoulos/busi6220/logreginspss.pdf

7. Structural Equation Modeling

A structural equation model is also developed within the framework of my research. It is based on the variables that might be extracted by knowing the MEP – and his or her Member State – who tabled the amendment.

Structural equation modeling is a multivariate technique combining aspects of multiple regression and factor analysis to estimate a series of interrelated dependence relationships simultaneously. SEM estimates a series of separate, but interdependent, multiple regression equations simultaneously by specifying a structural model. The structural model expresses the relationships among independent and dependent variables, even when a dependent variable becomes an independent variable in other relationships.

SEM is a type of confirmatory analysis, in which the relationships are specified prior to the analysis. Based on theory, experience and research objectives, the researcher preliminary defines which independent variables predict each dependent variable. The estimation of multiple interrelated dependence relationships is not the only unique element of structural equation modeling. SEM also has the ability to incorporate latent variables into the analysis. A latent variable is a hypothesized and unobserved concept that can only be approximated by observable or measureable variables (Hair et al. 2006).

Based on the limited preliminary theory and my personal experiences I drew up a structural equation model, which contains five latent explanatory variables and three latent result variables. Again, the clustering of observed variables into latent explanatory variables as well as the relationships among both the latent and observed and between the latent variables have been preliminary defined based primarily on my personal expertise regarding the legislative procedures in the European Parliament.

4.4 Social Network Analysis

Similar to Mérand et al. (2011) I use social network analysis not as a theoretical concept but as a methodological tool to analyse the data. The network analysis of the decision-making of CAP within the European Parliament is a new domain of research that might help to get a better and more sophisticated insight into a key segment of EU decision-making.

Social network analysis is based on an assumption of the importance of relationships among interacting units. Relations defined by linkages among units are a fundamental component of network theories. Network models may be used to test theories about relational processes or structures. The key feature of social network theories or propositions is that they require concepts, definitions and processes in which social units are linked to one another by various relations. Both statistical and descriptive uses of network analysis are distinct from more standard social science analysis and require concepts and analytic procedures that are different from traditional statistics (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). According to De Nooy (2003), social network analysis is a methodology that can detect patterns of formal and informal social relations within a social space.

Social network analysis is inherently an interdisciplinary endeavour. The concepts of social network analysis developed out of a propitious meeting of social theory and application, with formal mathematical, statistical and computing methodology (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

The network analysis in this research is based on jointly tabled EP amendments during the 2013 CAP reform. The relationships of MEPs embedded in these joint amendments have been converted into relationships among EP Groups and Member States. Then, the key characteristics of these networks have been analysed with focus on the factors influencing the interactions between the MEPs. Using SNA I apply the indicators of degree, weighted degree[6] and density both for the total

[6] The weights are the number of of interactions between the actors of the network.

network and for the individual nodes. Additionally, I calculate betweenness centrality to see what actors play an intermediary role in the network. I also apply QAP correlation to see if the similarity between the actors along a certain variable correlates with the strength of the tie between them in the network. Finally, I calculate homophily indices to measure the strength of the individual communities or clusters of the network.

Chapter 5 THE DATASET

This research is based on a newly collected and processed dataset, which contains the amendments of the European Parliament tabled to eight legislative proposals in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy. Most of these legislative proposals were in the legislative packages of the European Union for the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework: four proposals relate to the 2007-2013 EU programming period, another four relate to the 2014-2020 EU Financial Framework. These legislative instruments are the most important ones in the Common Agricultural Policy as they define the rules for the use of the CAP budget for a 7-year EU programming period. These four regulations are the Direct Payment Regulation, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development Regulation, the Single Common Market Organisation Regulation and the Horizontal Regulation.

The two consecutive EU programming periods reflect two legislative procedures: the four regulations concerning the 2007-2013 term were adopted under the consultation procedure, the four regulations relating to the 2014-2020 period were adopted under the co-decision procedure.

Table 4. - The analysed legislative instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy

Common Agricultural Policy Regulations	Consultation procedure	Co-decision procedure
	2007-2013	2014-2020
Direct Payment Regulation	Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009	Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013
EAFRD Regulation	Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005	Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013
SCMO Regulation	Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007	Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013
Horizontal Regulation	Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005	Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013

Source: own composition

In case of each of the above legislative instruments, all the amendments tabled in the European Parliament by any MEPs at any stage of the legislative procedure have been merged into the dataset. Amendments in this context mean textual amendments tabled to the original text of the legislative proposal highlighted by track changes.

The total number of EP amendments tabled to the eight legislative proposals is as follows:

Table 5. - The number of EP amendments tabled to the CAP legislative proposals

Common Agricultural Policy Regulations	Consultation procedure	Co-decision procedure
	2007-2013	2014-2020
Direct Payment Regulation	931	2,575
EAFRD Regulation	426	2,471
SCMO Regulation	98	2,596
Horizontal Regulation	25	972
Total	***1,480***	***8,614***

Source: own composition

Depending on the phase of the legislative procedure within the European Parliament in which the amendments were tabled, another categorisation of the amendments is also possible.

Table 6. - The number of EP amendments tabled to the CAP legislative proposals by type

Type of EP amendments	Consultation procedure	Co-decision procedure
	2007-2013	2014-2020
Draft Report Amendments	185	719
Open Amendments	1,063	6,749
Amendments of Opinion-giving Committees	128	533
Compromise Amendments	45	279
Oral Amendments	3	0
Plenary Amendments	56	334
Total	***1,480***	***8,614***

Source: own composition

Draft Report amendments are tabled by the rapporteur of the file at the initial part of the legislative phase in the EP. Then, any MEPs can propose amendments to the legislative instrument. These are the so-called open amendments. Besides the committee of the EP responsible for elaborating the EP report – in case of the CAP, COMAGRI – other EP committees also have the possibility to express their

opinions on the legislative proposals. These opinions mostly take the form of textual amendments too. They are now called the 'amendments of opinion-giving committees' (OGC amendments). Before the vote in COMAGRI, the rapporteur of the file forms compromise amendments. These compromise amendments are mostly the mergers of previously tabled draft reports, open and OGC amendments. Oral amendments can be tabled by COMAGRI Members just before the vote on the file in the COMAGRI meeting. After the COMAGRI vote, the file is tabled to the forthcoming EP plenary session. Before the plenary session, only the COMAGRI, the EP Groups or 40+ MEPs have the opportunity to propose plenary amendments. This categorisation of EP amendments makes it possible to calculate adoption rates of EP amendments of any type at any stage of intra-EP decision-making.

The novelty of the dataset is that it contains a number of variables that might be attached to a single EP amendment. These variables not only reflect the characteristics of the amendment, but also the characteristics of the MEP who tabled it. Additionally, knowing the MEP who proposed the amendment a number of variables can be defined regarding the Member State or political affiliation of the MEP as well. It is important to note that the dataset only contains those amendments to which variables can be attached, and hence for which the proposing MEP can be identified. In case of plenary amendments and oral amendments this is not the case. Amendments of opinion-giving committees reflect more the position of another EP committee, so they are excluded from the dataset. In sum, the dataset contains all the draft report amendments, open amendments and compromise amendments with all the variables attached to them. In case of compromise amendments, the previously merged original amendments can be found in the dataset. In this context, this is called 'extraction'. The complete list of analysed official EU documents on which the dataset is based can be found in Annex I.

Variables in the dataset are coded in a binominal table, using 0 and 1 for coding. The list of variables of the dataset as well as the methodology applied for the coding of the variables can be found in the following table.

Table 7. - Explanatory variables in the dataset

Groups of variables	Variables	Coding	
Amendment-related variables	Compromise amendment	1, if the amendment was adopted in a compromise form	0 otherwise
	Draft Report amendment	1, if the amendment was tabled by the rapporteur in the draft report	0 otherwise
	Joint amendment	1, if the amendment was tabled by more than one MEP	0 otherwise
	Recital amendment	1, if the amendment was tabled to the 'Recital' part of the legislative instrument	0 otherwise
MEP related variables	Male	1, if the MEP is male	0 otherwise
	Multiple terms	1, if the MEP is not in his/her first EP term	0 otherwise
Member State related variables	Agricultural Member State	1, if the MEP is from a Member State in which the agricultural output / GDP ratio if above EU average	0 otherwise
	Cohesion Member State	1, if the MEP is from a Member State which is eligible for funding under the Cohesion Fund of the EU	0 otherwise
	Constituency	1, if the MEP is from a Member State, whose territory is splitted into constituencies in the European Parliamentary elections	0 otherwise
	EU-15 Member State	1, if the MEP is from a Member State, which was already a member of the EU before 2014	0 otherwise
	Net contributor Member State	1, if the MEP is from a Member State, whose financial balance to the EU is negative	0 otherwise
Institutional-political variables	COMAGRI Member	1, if the MEP is a Member of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development in the EP	0 otherwise
	COMAGRI Substitute Member	1, if the MEP is a Substitute Member of the Committee on Agricultre and Rural Development in the EP	0 otherwise
	Party affiliation	1, for the Group in the European Parliament the MEP is a member of	0 otherwise
	Same government	1, if the party affiliation of the MEP is the same as the party affiliation of the in-term government in the Member State of the MEP	0 otherwise

Source: own composition

These variables are all coded for all the amendments in the dataset.

In case of the Member State related variables, all 26 Member States – the number of Member States from which MEPs tabled amendments (MEPs from Malta didn't table any amendments) – are coded. Similarly, regarding party affiliation, all the EP Groups – ALDE, ECR, EFD, EPP, Green-EFA, GUE-NGL, S&D - and the Non-Inscrits MEPs are coded. Further grouping of Member States – e.g. pro-CAP reform MSs – or EP Groups – e.g. large EP Groups (EPP and S&D) is also possible. Information regarding the classification of Member States in terms of the variables 'Agricultural Member State', 'Net contributor Member State', 'Cohesion Member State' can be found in Annex III.

Additionally, it might be possible to extend the list of variables, primarily if only a particular segment of the EP decision-making is analysed. During the research I have already defined the category of 'policy amendments'. These amendments aim at changing the policy direction in the legislation. These are neither clarification nor

extension amendments (Kreppel, 1999). Policy amendments might be sub-broken to define pro-reform amendments.

In the dataset there are three dependent variables. These are related to the three internal decision-making points of the legislative procedure, two of which are inside the European Parliament. These three stages are as follows:

1. COMAGRI vote: this is the first stage of EP internal decision-making in which only Members (or Substitutes) of the Committee take part. It is the strongest filter among the three stages as most of the EP amendments are rejected at this stage.

2. EP Plenary vote: during the EP plenary session, Member of the EP vote on the amendments adopted by the COMAGRI in the previous stage as well as on the plenary amendments. In most cases the EP plenary confirms the decisions of COMAGRI, adopting almost all COMAGRI-supported amendments.

3. Final Regulation: this stage shows which EP adopted amendments are finally incorporated in the text of the legislative instrument after consultation or negotiation with the Council.

In this research I consider an EP amendment to be adopted if it has been – at least partly – adopted and the amendment is part of an official EP position – adoption by the COMAGRI and the EP plenary – or the text of the amendments – at least partly – is incorporated (built into) the text of the final legislative regulation.

It shall be noted that in case of compromise amendments, if one compromise amendment is adopted, the amendments replaced by it – i.e. the draft report, open or OGC amendments that have been previously merged into the compromise amendment – are all considered to be adopted.

However, it shall be noted that not all the compromise amendments are the merge of previous – draft report, open or OGC – amendments. These compromise amendments cannot be extracted and are put into the dataset in their original form.

In the dataset, joint amendments – i.e. amendments tabled by more MEPs jointly – are also extracted in a way that the amendment is multiplied by the number of proposing MEPs. Each row contains the variables for one MEP, either tabling the amendment individually or jointly. It is inevitable to unequivocally match the MEP related variables to the amendment.

Chapter 6 AMENDMENT SUCCESS RATES

This chapter aims to give a comprehensive overview of the success rates of the amendments of the European Parliament in the Common Agricultural Policy for both the consultation and the co-decision procedures. The calculation of the success rates makes it possible to compare the influence of the European Parliament under the two EU legislative procedures with the help of quantified indicators. The primary objective of this chapter is to test the H1. hypothesis of this work:

> ***H1. hypothesis: The European Parliament increased its legislative influence in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy with the extension of the co-decision procedure by the Treaty of Lisbon.***

To test this hypothesis, I compare the amendment success rates between the two legislative procedures. I also compare the two legislative procedures in terms of amendment success rates broken down by the four analysed legislative instruments as well as by the type of amendment.

This chapter is organised as follows. First, I analyse the role of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council and then I analyse the relationship between the EP plenary and COMAGRI. The third and fourth section of this chapter help to get a better understanding of the intra-EP decision-making during the 2013 CAP reform with focus on the role of opinion-giving committees and the rapporteurs. Finally, I draw conclusions. This chapter of the dissertation is based on the paper of Fertő-Kovács (2015)

6.1. General overview

The legislative power of the Parliament is best reflected by its ability to influence the final policy outcome during the negotiations with the Council. Nevertheless, it is also worth seeing the internal evolution of decision-making in the Parliament. Table 8 contains the success rates of amendments in each of the three phases of decision-making. The final column shows what percentage of the total number of

Parliament amendments was finally adopted by the Council and incorporated in the final regulations.

Table 8. – The success rates of EP amendments by CAP regulation
(% of adopted amendments compared to total)

Common Agricultural Policy Regulations	Consultation procedure			Co-decision procedure		
	COMAGRI-adopted	Plenary-adopted	Final regulation	COMAGRI-adopted	Plenary-adopted	Final regulation
Direct Payment Regulation	30.2	30.3	9.2	5.4	5	3
EAFRD Regulation	36.9	36.6	11.5	18.6	18.6	13.6
Horizontal Regulation	28	28	16	32.4	30	12.4
SCMO Regulation	51	51	5.1	23.7	23.7	13.6
Total	***33.4***	***33.4***	***9.7***	***17.7***	***17.4***	***10.3***

Source: own calculation

In the 2013 CAP reform, 17.7% of Parliament amendments were adopted by COMAGRI and 17.4% by the plenary, while 10.3% of all amendments were incorporated in the final regulations. Under the consultation procedure 9.7% of all amendments were incorporated in the final regulations, thus there was a slight increase in the Parliament's power under co-decision. However, absolute figures show a more striking difference between the two legislative procedures: an approximate 10% under consultation means 140 adopted Parliament amendments, while 10% under co-decision covers 860 adopted amendments.

For the Direct Payments Regulation, the COMAGRI adopted 5.4% of the amendments and the Parliament plenary adopted 5%, while 3% of all DP amendments were adopted in the end legislation and can be found in the final DP Regulation. In case of the EAFRD Regulation, both COMAGRI and the Parliament plenary adopted 18.6% of the amendments; 13.6% of the amendments are incorporated in the final regulation. Regarding the SCMO Regulation, both COMAGRI and the Parliament plenary adopted 23.7% of the amendments; 13.6% of the amendments are incorporated in the final regulation. Concerning the Horizontal Regulation, 32.4% of all amendments have been adopted by COMAGRI and 30% by the Parliament plenary, while 12.4% of the amendments were incorporated in the final regulation.

We can conclude that the Direct Payment Regulation has the lowest level of amendments adopted at all three levels (COMAGRI, Parliament plenary, and final regulation). The Horizontal Regulation has the highest level of adoption within the Parliament followed by the SCMO Regulation. The adoption ratio of amendments in each of the final SCMO and EAFRD Regulations equals 13.6%.

6.2. The increased role of the Parliament *vis-à-vis* the Council

Table 9. contains the ratios of finally incorporated Parliament amendments to the number of Parliament amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate with the Council. These success rates of Parliament amendments, which show the power of the Parliament *vis-à-vis* the Council, are broken down by amendment type and CAP regulation. The main conclusion of this part of the analysis is that for the four CAP regulations, 59.2% of those adopted by the Parliament plenary were finally built into the final CAP regulations. This ratio is 60.2% for the Direct Payment Regulation, 57.1% for the SCMO Regulation and 73% for the EAFRD. In the Parliament negotiation mandate 41.4% of the amendments can be found in the final Horizontal Regulation. So we can conclude that the Parliament managed to make almost 60% of the amendments in its position (Parliament plenary adopted amendments) adopted by the Council during the trilogue negotiations. It shows a significant increase under the co-decision procedure compared to the consultation procedure: this figure is practically doubled (29.1% under the consultation procedure).

As for draft report amendments, 59.3% of the Parliament plenary adopted amendments – amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate – were adopted after the trilogue negotiations and finally built into the final regulations. This ratio is 60.8% for open amendments, 66.3% for compromise amendments, 41.8% for the amendments of opinion-giving committees and 43.5% for plenary amendments.

Table 9. - Success rates in the trilogue negotiations by amendment type and CAP regulation

(EP amendments in the final regulation compared to EP plenary-adopted – in %)

Type of amendment	Common Agricultural Policy Regulations	Consultation procedure	Co-decision procedure
Draft report amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	19.7	65.8
	EAFRD Regulation	41.2	80.3
	Horizontal Regulation	50	42.1
	SCMO Regulation	16.7	59.7
	Total	***23.3***	***59.3***
Open amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	36.2	61.3
	EAFRD Regulation	32.2	74.2
	Horizontal Regulation	75	40
	SCMO Regulation	3.3	55.6
	Total	***32.5***	***60.8***
Compromise amendments*	Direct Payment Regulation	7.3	68.6
	EAFRD Regulation	50	72.2
	Horizontal Regulation	n/a	44
	SCMO Regulation	n/a	67.9
	Total	***11.1***	***66.3***
OGC amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	0	100
	EAFRD Regulation	11.1	48.3
	Horizontal Regulation	0	40
	SCMO Regulation	n/a	0
	Total	***9.1***	***41.8***
Plenary amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	13.3	25
	EAFRD Regulation	0	44.4
	Horizontal Regulation	n/a	71.4
	SCMO Regulation	n/a	0
	Total	***11.8***	***43.5***
Total	Direct Payment Regulation	30.5	60.2
	EAFRD Regulation	31.4	73
	Horizontal Regulation	57.1	41.4
	SCMO Regulation	10	57.1
	Total	***29.1***	***59.2***

Source: own calculation

*All types of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based on their original figures (non-extracted).

Box 1. Policy amendments

In the framework of the amendment analysis, I also categorised the amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate by policy type. The results show that agricultural policy amendments in the four CAP regulations have been adopted by the Council at an above-average rate (51.2%). With this rate of acceptance, we can conclude that the Parliament became a real co-legislator with the Council, i.e. if one player in a two-player decision-making process manages to make more than 50% of its positions adopted by the other, it can be considered to be a

decision-maker on equal footing. The higher adoption rate was in the case of the EAFRD Regulation (57%), while the lowest was in the case of the Horizontal Regulation (40.2%).

Table 10. – Success rates of agricultural policy amendments
EP amendments in the final regulations compared to EP negotiation mandate (percent)

Type of amendment	Direct Payments Regulation	EAFRD Regulation	SCMO Regulation	Horizontal Regulation	Total
Total number of amendments	39.8	47.2	47.3	37.1	**43.8**
Agricultural Policy amendments	49.2	57	54.7	40.2	**51.2**
CAP reform amendments	48.8	65.7	52.4	60	**56**

Source: own calculation

Calculation based on non-extracted compromise amendments.

As for "CAP reform amendments", 56% of these amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate were finally adopted by the Council. The highest acceptance rate was in the case of the EAFRD Regulation (65.7%), while the lowest was in the case of the Direct Payment Regulation (48.8%).

In sum, our major findings are as follows. First, regarding all types of amendments, these ratios show significant increase compared to the consultation procedure. Second, the Parliament appears to be the most powerful *vis-à-vis* the Council concerning compromise amendments (66.3% success rate). The high success rates of both the compromise and the draft report amendments highlight the key role of rapporteurs. Third, amendments of opinion-giving committees and plenary amendments have the lowest levels of success rates (41.8% and 43.5%, respectively), which might mean that these types of amendments had limited influence on the final policy outcome. Finally, more than 50% of the agricultural policy amendments and the CAP reform amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate were incorporated in the final regulations, which appears to make the Parliament an equal partner with the Council during the trilogue negotiations.

6.3. The relationship between the Parliament plenary and COMAGRI

In this section I analyse how much the Parliament plenary was able to influence the final policy outcome and how much the Parliament plenary wanted to or could change the position taken by COMAGRI. Table 11. contains the success rates of amendments in the Parliament plenary-COMAGRI relationship. Taking into account the total number of amendments tabled to all four CAP regulations, 96.4% of COMAGRI-adopted amendments were supported by the Parliament plenary under co-decision. This figure is 89.2% for the Direct Payment Regulation, 99.8% for the SCMO, 98% for EAFRD, and 90.5% for the Horizontal Regulation.

As for the total number of 'draft report' amendments, the Parliament plenary adopted 98.6% of those adopted by COMAGRI. Regarding open amendments, the Parliament plenary adopted 94.8% of those amendments that were previously adopted by COMAGRI. Concerning compromise amendments, the Parliament plenary adopted 98.5% of those adopted by COMAGRI.[7] As for the amendments tabled by the opinion-giving committees, the Parliament plenary adopted 98.2% of those adopted previously by COMAGRI.

[7] For these figures, Compromise amendments are not extracted.

Table 11. – Plenary to COMAGRI success rates by amendment type and CAP regulation

EP plenary-adopted amendments compared to COMAGRI-adopted (%)

Type of amendment	Common Agricultural Policy Regulations	Consultation procedure	Co-decision procedure
Draft report amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	95.7	88.4
	EAFRD Regulation	100	100
	Horizontal Regulation	100	96.9
	SCMO Regulation	100	100
	Total	***97.2***	***98.6***
Open amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	96.6	88.2
	EAFRD Regulation	98.3	97.8
	Horizontal Regulation	100	86.3
	SCMO Regulation	100	99.6
	Total	***97.5***	***94.8***
Compromise amendments*	Direct Payment Regulation	100	94.6
	EAFRD Regulation	100	100
	Horizontal Regulation	n/a	92.6
	SCMO Regulation	n/a	100
	Total	***100***	***98.5***
OGC amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	42.9	100
	EAFRD Regulation	94.7	96.7
	Horizontal Regulation	100	100
	SCMO Regulation	n/a	100
	Total	***81.5***	***98.2***
Total	Direct Payment Regulation	95	89.2
	EAFRD Regulation	98.1	98
	Horizontal Regulation	100	90.5
	SCMO Regulation	100	99.8
	Total	***96.6***	***96.4***

Source: own calculation

*All types of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based on their original figures (non-extracted).

There were 334 amendments tabled to the Parliament plenary session, 47.9% of which were proposed to the SCMO Regulation, 29.9% to the DP Regulation, 12.3% to the EAFRD and 9.9% to the Horizontal Regulation. The Parliament plenary

Table 12. - The success rates of plenary amendments by CAP regulation

Common Agricultural Policy Regulations	Consultation procedure			Co-decision procedure		
	Number of plenary amendments	Plenary-adopted (%)	Final regulation (%)	Number of plenary amendments	Plenary-adopted (%)	Final regulation (%)
Direct Payment Regulation	53	28.3	3.8	100	4	1
EAFRD Regulation	3	66.7	0	41	22	9.8
Horizontal Regulation	0	0	0	33	21.2	15.2
SCMO Regulation	0	0	0	160	1.9	0
Total	***56***	***30.4***	***3.6***	***334***	***6.9***	***3***

Source: own calculation

adopted 6.9% of all plenary amendments. In the final regulations, 3% of all plenary amendments can be found.

In this section I draw three conclusions. First, the Parliament plenary largely adopted the COMAGRI position. Only a very few number of COMAGRI-adopted amendments have been rejected by the Parliament plenary. It appears that the policy direction was set by COMAGRI and not by the Parliament plenary. Second, the success rates of Parliament plenary amendments are very low. It seems to indicate that the Parliament plenary does not greatly influence the Parliament's policy direction. And third, there is not a real difference between the co-decision and the consultation procedures: first, under both legislative procedures the Parliament plenary overwhelmingly adopts the COMAGRI position, and second, the success rates of Parliament plenary amendments are very low.

6.4. The role of opinion-giving committees

There were five opinion giving committees (OGC) tabling amendments to the four CAP regulations: BUDG, CONT, DEVE, ENVI and REGI. OGCs tabled 533 amendments to the CAP regulation, which is 6.2% of the total number of amendments.

Table 13. – The numbers and success rates of OGC amendments

EP committee	Number and share of amendments		Success rates - compared to the total			Success rates
	Total number	Share (%)	COMAGRI-adopted (%)	Plenary-adopted (%)	Final regulation (%)	Final to plenary (%)
BUDG	47	8.8	2.1	2.1	2.1	100
CONT	137	25.7	11.7	11.7	5.8	50
DEVE	38	7.1	21.1	21.1	13.2	62.5
ENVI	179	33.6	7.3	6.7	3.4	50
REGI	132	24.8	13.6	13.6	2.3	16.7
Total	***533***	***100***	***10.5***	***10.3***	***4.3***	***41.8***

Source: own calculation

Regarding the total number of amendments tabled by OGCs, the calculations show that 10.5% were adopted by COMAGRI and 10.3% by the Parliament plenary,

while 4.3% of the OGC amendments were adopted after the trilogue negotiations and therefore built into the final regulations.

OGCs had the highest influence on the Horizontal Regulation with an amendment success rate of 8.3% in the final regulation, followed by EAFRD (5.3%). Broken down by OGC, we can see that the BUDG committee had the greatest impact – highest adoption rate of amendments – on the EAFRD Regulation (4.4%). CONT and REGI had the highest level of influence on the Horizontal Regulation, with 16.2% and 3.1% of their amendments in the final regulation, respectively. DEVE and ENVI were the most influential in the EAFRD Regulation, with 38.5% and 4.1% adoption rates, respectively.

We can draw four conclusions regarding the role and influence of OGCs in the 2013 CAP reform. First, the most active OGC was ENVI, tabling 33.6% of the total number of OGC amendments. Second, OGCs in general had minimal influence on the final CAP policy outcome: slightly more than 4% of the OGC amendments were incorporated in the final CAP regulations. Third, DEVE was the most successful OGC, as 13.2% of its amendments can be found in the final CAP regulations.[8] Finally, OGCs influenced the CAP policy outcome in the Horizontal and EAFRD Regulations the most, but had a very minor influence on the Direct Payment and SCMO Regulations.

6.5. The role of Parliament rapporteurs

There were three Parliament rapporteurs for the four CAP legislative proposals in the 2013 CAP reform: Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos for the Direct Payment and EAFRD Regulations, Michel Dantin for the SCMO Regulation and Giovanni La Via for the Horizontal Regulation.

[8] These results should be treated with caution, as 76% of them were amendments, which had a minor connection to the most sensitive CAP policy issues. These amendments mostly contained references to developing or third countries, development cooperation or agreements in light of the CAP reform.

When making an amendment analysis in order to see the role of the rapporteurs, draft report and compromise amendments form the basis of analysis. In sum, the rapporteurs tabled 711 amendments in their draft reports to the four CAP regulations, which is 8.3% of the total number of amendments. Additionally, rapporteurs tabled 279 compromise amendments during the legislative procedure, which is 3.2% of the total number of amendments.

The influential role of the rapporteurs has already been highlighted in the analysis in Table 9. High adoption rates of draft report and compromise amendments show that rapporteurs had significant legislative influence during the 2013 CAP reform.

When analysing the Parliament-Council relationship, we can see that almost two-thirds of the compromise amendments adopted by the Parliament plenary was finally incorporated in the four CAP final regulations. This ratio is 72.2% for EAFRD, 68.6% for Direct Payments, 67.9% for SCMO and 44% for the Horizontal Regulation. Regarding draft report amendments, the power of the Parliament *vis-à-vis* the Council as co-legislator is reflected in the adoption rates for EAFRD (80.3%), Direct Payments (65.8%), SCMO (59.7%) and Horizontal Regulation (42.1%). Nevertheless, it is important to note here that high adoption rates of draft report and compromise amendments do not necessarily reflect the high personal legislative influence of the rapporteurs, although they show the ability of the rapporteurs to build strong political consensus and backing behind these amendments.

Based on the above figures we can draw the conclusion that the Parliament could most effectively defend its position during the trilogue negotiations over the EAFRD Regulation. In this sense, the EAFRD and Direct Payments Parliament rapporteur (Capoulas Santos) and his negotiating team were the strongest during the trilogue negotiations, followed by Michel Dantin.

When comparing the adopted draft report and compromise amendments to the total number of amendments we can see that 78.6% of the draft report amendments were adopted by COMAGRI, and 77.5% by the Parliament plenary in March 2013;

therefore, 46% of the draft report amendments – either solely or in a form of a compromise amendment – were integrated in the final regulations. These figures show that rapporteurs appear to have significant power in internal Parliament decision-making.

Regarding the draft report amendments, the highest adoption rates within the Parliament can be observed in the case of the Horizontal Regulation and the lowest in the case of the Direct Payment Regulation. Based on this, La Via can be considered the strongest rapporteur within the Parliament.

Table 14. – The success rates of draft report and compromise amendments
Adopted EP amendments compared to total (%)

Type of amendment	Common Agricultural Policy Regulations	COMAGRI-adopted	Plenary-adopted	Final regulation
Draft report amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	42.2	37.3	24.5
	EAFRD Regulation	83.6	83.6	67.1
	Horizontal Regulation	96.1	93.1	39.2
	SCMO Regulation	82.3	82.3	49.1
	Total	***78.6***	***77.5***	***46***
Compromise amendments	Direct Payment Regulation	97.4	92.1	63.2
	EAFRD Regulation	94.7	94.7	68.4
	Horizontal Regulation	100	92.6	40.7
	SCMO Regulation	92	92	62.5
	Total	***93.9***	***92.5***	***61.3***

Source: own calculation

When analysing the amendments in the final regulations, the Parliament was strongest concerning the EAFRD Regulation (67.1%) followed by the SCMO Regulation (49.1%). Based on this, Capoulas Santos and Michel Dantin can be considered the strongest rapporteurs. However, it should be noted that Capoulas Santos was weakest concerning the Direct Payment Regulation.

Box 2. Compromise amendments

If compromise amendments are not extracted, the following key pattern can be observed. For the four CAP regulations, there were 279 compromise amendments, 93.9% of which were adopted by COMAGRI, 92.5% by the Parliament plenary – being part of the Parliament's negotiation mandate – and 61.3% were adopted after the trilogue negotiations. Regarding the trilogue negotiations, the success rate is 68.4% for the EAFRD, 63.2% for the Direct

Payment, 62.5% for SCMO and 40.7% for the Horizontal Regulation. These adoption rates are the highest compared to any kind of amendment categories. As almost two-thirds of the compromise amendments can be found in the final CAP regulations, we can conclude that rapporteurs were powerful as they managed to formulate compromise amendments that have strong political support behind them.

It shall be also noted that in the Parliament plenary, 63.9% of the draft report amendments were adopted in a compromise amendment form (352 out of 551 amendments). This ratio is even higher – 75.5% (247 out of 327) – when the draft report amendments are analysed in the final regulations. It means that draft report amendments had a higher chance of being adopted in any stage of the decision-making – plenary, final regulation – in a compromise amendment form. Therefore, it might be supposed that rapporteurs deliberately packed a high number of their 'draft report' amendments in a compromise amendment form to give them a greater chance of being adopted.

6.6. Conclusions

In this chapter, I investigated the role of the Parliament in the legislative procedure after the introduction of the co-decision procedure by using the amendment analysis of the CAP reform under two subsequent periods. Unlike previous research, my research provided an in-depth analysis of CAP amendments with two novelties. First, the categorisation of Parliament amendments by type, and second, analysing the adoption of Parliament amendments in each of the three stages of the legislative process.

The main conclusion of my analysis is that the rate of adoption of EP amendments is higher under the co-decision procedure compared to the consultation procedure along all the observed amendment categories. Based on this we can firmly say that the European Parliament increased its legislative influence in the field of CAP after the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, we confirm the H1. hypothesis of this research.

One of the key conclusions of this analysis is that in the 2013 CAP reform, almost 60% of Parliament amendments adopted by the Parliament plenary were built into the final CAP regulations, compared to less than 30% under the consultation procedure. These results confirm the findings by Corbett et al. (1995) and Tsebelis et al. (2001) that adoption rates of Parliament amendments are higher under the co-decision procedure. These results are also in line with the findings of Crombez and Swinnen (2011) on the CAP reform that the Parliament gains legislative influence in the move from consultation to co-decision procedure. The results also support the conclusions of Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig (2012) that the Treaty of Lisbon increased the influence of the Parliament in legislative terms in the CAP.

In the Parliament-Council relationship, with adoption rates of Parliament amendments between 50% and 60%, we can conclude that the Parliament appears to become a real co-legislator with the Council, i.e. if one player in a two-player decision-making process manages to make more than 50% of its position adopted by the other, it can be fairly considered to be a decision-maker on equal footing. In the 2013 CAP reform, more than 50% of the agricultural policy amendments and the CAP reform amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate were incorporated in the final regulations, which appears to make the Parliament an equal partner with the Council during the trilogue negotiations. In general, this result reinforces the position of Crombez (1997) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) that the Parliament became a real co-legislator with the Council after the introduction of the co-decision procedure. These high adoption rates of Parliament amendments in the final regulation also confirm the findings of Steunenberg (1998), namely that the final political outcome is closer to the Parliament's position under co-decision.

The adoption rates of Parliament amendments by type reveal my main conclusion: the Parliament appears to act most powerfully *vis-à-vis* the Council regarding compromise amendments (66.3% success rate). The adoption rates of compromise amendments are the highest compared to any kind of amendment categories. The high success rates of compromise as well as draft report amendments highlight the

key role of rapporteurs, primarily in gaining strong political support behind these amendments.

Regarding the COMAGRI-Parliament plenary relationship and the role of the plenary amendments, we see that the Parliament plenary predominantly adopted the COMAGRI position. Only a very few number of COMAGRI-adopted amendments were turned down by the Parliament plenary, while a very few Parliament plenary amendments were adopted. It means that the policy direction is set by COMAGRI and not by the Parliament plenary. This reinforces the conclusion by Neuhold (2001) that the Parliament committees are the backbone of the Parliament decision-making procedure. Our findings also support the findings of Yordanova (2010:29), namely that "when legislative acts are adopted in the Parliament plenary…they are largely based on the committee reports".

Finally, I have shown that the role of OGCs in the 2013 CAP reform is very limited. OGC amendments had the lowest level of adoption (41.8%) in the 2013 CAP reform.

This research goes beyond existing literature, by categorising the Parliament amendments and analysing the adoption rates of amendments in each of the three stages of the legislative process. There are conflicting views among scholars of how much the adoption rates of Parliament amendments could be used for measuring the legislative influence of the Parliament. This research aims to contribute to this debate via a more detailed analysis of Parliament amendments.

Chapter 7 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING

The primary objective of this chapter is to test the H2. hypothesis of this work:

> ***H2. hypothesis: The characteristics of the amendment as well as the proposing MEP and its Member State, and also the factors based on these characteristics have an impact on the adoption of EP amendments at each decision-making level of the EP in the field of the CAP.***

In this chapter, I test the H2. hypothesis in two separate but interrelated blocks. First, I test the significance of the observed explanatory variables with logistic regression. Second, I present the structural equation model, and I analyse the goodness of the model fit as well as the explanatory power of the factors defined.

7.1. Logistic regression

Besides the main hypothesis tested in this chapter, there are four sub-hypotheses which I test based on the findings of relevant literature. These hypotheses are as follows:

The odds of the adoption of an EP amendment is higher, if the MEP who tabled the amendment is

H.2.1 - from the EPP or S&D Group of the EP;

H.2.2 - from a net contributor Member State;

H.2.3 - from an EU-15 Member State;

H.2.4 - a Member of COMAGRI.

The key research question is whether the above four variables are statistically significant in any of the two legislative procedures. This hypothesis is connected to the conclusions of Hix et al. (2005) and Yordanova (2009).

The explanatory variables of the logistic regression are as follows:

Table 15. – Explanatory variables of logistic regression

1.	Compromise amendment	2.	Draft report amendment
3.	Joint amendment	4.	Recital amendment
5.	ALDE	6.	EPP
7.	Greens-EFA	8.	GUE-NGL
9.	S&D	10.	UEN
11.	ECR	12.	EFD
13.	COMAGRI Member	14.	COMAGRI Substitute Member
15.	Male	16.	Multiple terms
17.	Same government	18.	Agricultural MSs
19.	Cohesion countries	20.	Constituency
21.	EU-15 MSs	22.	Net contributor MSs

Variables 1-4. are about the characteristics of the amendments themselves, while variables 5-12. are party affiliation variables, i.e. the six EP Groups. Variables 13-17. describe the MEPs as persons and political actors. Variables 18-22. are about the Member State of the MEP who tabled the amendment.

As written previously in the Dataset chapter of this dissertation, there are three dependent variables in this analysis: (1) COMAGRI adoption; (2) EP plenary adoption and (3) Council adoption.

The above explanatory variables will be tested in both legislative procedures. It is important to note that the dataset of the analysis is an ’extracted’ dataset, which means that in case of joint amendments – i.e. amendments tabled by more MEPs jointly – amendments are also extracted in a way that the amendment is multiplied by the number of proposing MEPs. Each row contains the variables for one MEP, either tabling the amendment individually or jointly. This is required to unequivocally match the MEP related variables to the amendment. This way, the dataset analysed regarding the consultation procedure contains 1,927 rows, while the co-decision dataset consists of 16,637 rows.

In line with the ’Research methodology’ part of the dissertation, I apply two forms of logistic regression in this chapter. First, I develop a general regression model, then I apply forward stepwise regression (Wald model).

Consultation procedure

In case of the consultation procedure, the logistic regression has the following results.

Table 16. - Logistic regression of the explanatory variables
Consultation procedure

Variables	COMAGRI		EP Plenary		Council	
	coefficient	p-value	coefficient	p-value	coefficient	p-value
Compromise amendment	-0.978	***0.000***	-0.905	***0.000***	1.327	***0.000***
Draft report amendment	1.255	***0.000***	1.213	***0.000***	1.082	***0.009***
Joint amendment	0.057	0.674	0.003	0.983	-0.557	0.055
Recital amendment	-0.118	0.433	-0.086	0.576	-0.314	0.377
ALDE	1.677	***0.01****	1.664	***0.011****	0.868	0.467
EPP	1.263	***0.045****	1.244	***0.048****	1.257	0.254
Greens-EFA	1.101	0.099	1.169	0.079	-0.148	0.912
GUE-NGL	2.083	0.059	2.027	0.067	-17.278	0.999
S&D	1.051	0.097	1.039	0.1	0.818	0.463
UEN	0.379	0.617	0.11	0.89	-17.286	0.996
COMAGRI Member	0.085	0.627	0.079	0.657	-0.576	0.132
COMAGRI Substitute Member	-0.07	0.679	-0.095	0.582	-0.829	***0.042****
Male	-0.129	0.359	-0.135	0.343	-0.068	0.814
Multiple terms	0.062	0.695	0.145	0.365	0.657	0.051
Same government	-0.052	0.685	-0.055	0.675	-0.406	0.139
Agricultural MSs	0.323	0.071	0.382	***0.036****	0.394	0.308
Cohesion countries	-0.778	0.158	-0.813	0.143	18.018	0.998
Constituency	-0.212	0.265	-0.203	0.298	-0.428	0.313
EU-15 MSs	1.036	***0.002***	1.432	***0.000***	0.403	0.569
Net contributor MSs	-0.119	0.817	-0.153	0.768	18.364	0.998
Nagelkerke R Square	0.151		0.166		0.128	

Notes: **p<0.01 *p<0.05

Source: own calculation

The results show that the variables ‘Compromise amendment’ and ‘Draft report amendment’ are significant at the 1% level at all decision-making levels. In both cases the variables are positively correlated with the odds of adoption of the amendment. As for party affiliation, ‘ALDE’ and ‘EPP’ are significant variables at 5% in the intra-EP decision-making, in both case, the positive classification increases the odds of adoption both in the COMAGRI and in the plenary. As for the MEP-related variables, only the ‘COMAGRI Substitute Member’ variable is significant and only in case of ‘Council adoption’. Nevertheless, its positive classification decreases the odds of adoption of amendments. Finally, out of the Member State-related variables, the variables ‘Agricultural MSs’ and ‘EU-15 MSs’ are significant, the positive classification increase the odds of adoption of amendments.

The Wald model largely confirms the above results. Among the amendment-related variables, the variables ‘Compromise amendment’ and ‘Draft report amendment’ are significant. Among party groups ALDE and EPP are significant, except at the last decision-making stage, where only the EPP remains significant. Also, similar to the above results, the variable ‘EU-15 MSs’ is significant. In case of all these significant variables, positive classification increases the odds of adoption of the amendment, except the ‘Compromise amendment’ variable in the first two decision-making phases. The only new variable that is significant is the ‘Cohesion countries’ variable, but it is important to note that the positive classification of this variable decreases the odds of adoption of amendments.

Table 17. - Logistic regression of the explanatory variables - Wald model
Adopted amendments compared to total number of amendments

COMAGRI				EP Plenary				Council			
Number of steps	**Variables**	**coefficient**	**p-value**	**Number of steps**	**Variables**	**coefficient**	**p-value**	**Number of steps**	**Variables**	**coefficient**	**p-value**
6	Compromise amendment	-1.000	***0.000***	6	Compromise amendment	-0.946	***0.000***	4	Compromise amendment	1.196	***0.000***
	Draft report amendment	1.235	***0.000***		Draft report amendment	1.196	***0.000***		Draft report amendment	1.371	***0.000***
	ALDE	0.739	***0.000***		ALDE	0.743	***0.000***		EPP	0.709	***0.003***
	EPP	0.328	***0.01***		EPP	0.348	***0.007***				
	EU-15 MSs	1.491	***0.000***		EU-15 MSs	2.027	***0.000***		EU-15 MSs	1.468	***0.014***
	Cohesion countries	-0.34	***0.014***		Cohesion countries	-0.325	***0.02***				
Nagelkerke R Square	0.14			0.152				0.089			

Notes: **p<0.01 *p<0.05

Source: own calculation

Co-decision procedure

In case of the co-decision procedure the results of the logistic regression are as follows:

Table 18. - Logistic regression of explanatory variables
Co-decision procedure

Variables	COMAGRI		EP plenary		Council	
	coefficient	p-value	coefficient	p-value	coefficient	p-value
Compromise amendment	24.253	0.978	6.012	***0.000*** **	4.837	***0.000*** **
Draft report amendment	2.626	***0.000*** **	2.575	***0.000*** **	0.633	***0.001*** **
Joint amendment	0.049	0.609	-0.09	0.336	0.077	0.493
Recital Amendment	0.89	***0.000*** **	0.989	***0.000*** **	-0.139	0.374
ALDE	1.003	0.056	0.734	0.083	0.17	0.688
ECR	0.015	0.978	-0.089	0.842	-0.309	0.482
EFD	0.628	0.276	0.799	0.079	0.62	0.169
EPP	1.801	***0.001*** **	1.398	***0.001*** **	0.751	0.074
Greens-EFA	0.683	0.228	0.259	0.585	0.124	0.793
GUE-NGL	0.707	0.222	0.555	0.243	0.315	0.521
S&D	0.619	0.245	0.38	0.378	0.162	0.706
COMAGRI Members	1.173	***0.000*** **	0.983	***0.000*** **	0.381	***0.003*** **
COMAGRI Substitute Members	1.339	***0.000*** **	1.155	***0.000*** **	0.294	***0.032*** *
Male	0.056	0.502	-0.026	0.755	0.038	0.695
Multiple terms	0.104	0.201	0.07	0.375	-0.006	0.951
Same government	-0.172	0.079	-0.154	0.109	-0.129	0.263
Agricultural MSs	-0.129	0.213	-0.015	0.883	-0.064	0.587
Cohesion countries	-0.728	***0.000*** **	-0.77	***0.000*** **	0.638	***0.003*** **
Constituency	-0.259	***0.007*** **	-0.128	0.171	-0.033	0.768
EU-15 MSs	-0.504	***0.016*** *	-0.609	***0.003*** **	-0.15	0.488
Net contributor MSs	0.108	0.342	0.025	0.826	0.748	***0.000*** **
Nagelkerke R Square	0.691		0.646		0.621	

Notes: **p<0.01 *p<0.05

Source: own calculation

Similar to the consultation procedure, the variables ’Compromise amendment’ and ’Draft report amendment’ are significant, their positive classification increases the odds of adoption of the amendments. But unlike in the consultation procedure, the variable ’Recital amendment’ is also significant in the first two stages of the legislative process.

Regarding the variables connected to party affiliation, only the ’EPP’ variable is significant and only in the intra-EP decision-making stage. Its positive classification increases the odds of adoption of the amendment. Contrary to the consultation procedure, the ’ALDE’ variable is not significant.

As for the variables connected to the MEPs, ’COMAGRI Member’ and ’COMAGRI Substitute Member’ variables are significant: their positive classification increases the odds of adoption of amendments at all decision-making levels. Compared to the consultation procedure, it shows the much stronger influence for the members of COMAGRI under the co-decision procedure.

Concerning the Member State-related variables, four out of five variables are significant in at least one of the decision-making levels. In COMAGRI, the variables ’Cohesion countries’, ’Constituency’, ’EU-15 Member States’ are significant, although the positive classification of these variables decreases the odds of amendment adoption. The first and the third variables are significant at the EP plenary adoption phase with the same impact. Regarding the Council adoption phase, the ’Cohesion countries’ and the ’Net contributor MSs’ variables are significant, the positive classification of both these variables increases the odds of adoption of amendments. Unlike in the consultation procedure, the variable ’Agricultural MSs’ is not significant in the co-decision procedure.

Table 19. - Logistic regression of the explanatory variables - Wald model
Adopted amendments compared to total number of amendments

COMAGRI				EP plenary				Council			
Number of steps	**Variables**	**cofficient**	**p-value**	**Number of steps**	**Variables**	**cofficient**	**p-value**	**Number of steps**	**Variables**	**cofficient**	**p-value**
1	Compromise amendment	23.859	0.98	10	Compromise amendment	6.018	***0.000*****	6	Compromise amendment	4.852	***0.000*****
					Draft report amendment	2.638	***0.000*****		Draft report amendment	0.654	***0.000*****
					Recital Amendment	1.003	***0.000*****				
					ALDE	0.306	***0.017****				
					ECR	-0.682	***0.000*****		ECR	-0.548	***0.001*****
					EPP	0.909	***0.000*****		EPP	0.516	***0.000*****
					COMAGRI Members	0.879	***0.000*****				
					COMAGRI Substitute Members	1.038	***0.000*****				
					Cohesion countries	-0.739	***0.000*****		Cohesion countries	0.766	***0.000*****
					EU-15 MSs	-0.561	***0.003*****		Net contributor MSs	0.801	***0.000*****
Nagelkerke R Square	0.616			0.646				0.62			

Notes: **p<0.01 *p<0.05

Source: own calculation

By comparing the above results with that of the Wald model, we can draw the following conclusions. At any of the two latter stages of decision-making, the 'Compromise amendment' the 'Draft report amendment' the 'EPP', the 'COMAGRI Member', 'COMAGRI Substitute Member', the 'Cohesion countries', the 'Net contributor MSs' and the 'EU-15 MSs' variables are significant, with the same impact as described previously. Nevertheless, there are two variables which proved to be significant in the forward stepwise regression: 'ALDE' and 'ECR'. The positive classification of the 'ALDE' variable increases the odds of adoption of the amendments – which is similar to the impact of ALDE in the consultation procedure –, while for the 'ECR' variable positive classification decreases the odds of adoption. Given that the ECR Group often has an anti-EU position and also that this group consists of many MEPs from the UK who are critical of the CAP, this result is in line with the preliminary expectations.

As a final conclusion regarding the H2 hypothesis, we can confirm that there are a number of explanatory variables in this research which have an impact on the adoption of the EP amendments. The positive classification of some of these variables increase, others decrease the odds of adoption of amendments. Based on these results, we confirm the H2. Hypothesis.

Regarding the four sub-hypotheses of the research we can draw the following conclusions.

According to the H.2.1. sub-hypothesis, the odds of adoption of EP amendments is higher in case the MEP is the member of either the EPP or the S&D Group of the European Parliament. In case of both the consultation and the co-decision procedure, the 'EPP' variable was significant in 9 out of 12 cases. The positive classification of the variable increased the odds of adoption of amendments, therefore, we confirm the H.2.1. sub-hypothesis.

The H.2.2. sub-hypothesis states that the odds of adoption is higher in case the MEP who tabled the amendment is from a net contributor Member State. The results show that the 'Net contributor MSs' variable was not significant in the consultation

procedure. However, in the co-decision procedure it was a significant variable regarding 'Council adoption' dependent variable, its positive classification increased the odds of adoption. As the essence of the extension of the co-decision procedure – and therefore, the objective of the H1. hypothesis of this research – was to measure the legislative influence of the EP towards the Council, therefore, regarding the co-decision procedure we confirm the H.2.2. sub-hypothesis.

According to the H.2.3. sub-hypothesis, the odds of adoption of the amendments is higher in case the proposing MEP is from an EU-15 Member State. The 'EU-15 Member States" variable was significant under both legislative procedures: 8 times out of the 12 analysed cases. During the consultation procedure, the positive classification of this variable increased, however, in the co-decision procedure, it decreased the odds of adoption of amendments. Therefore, we confirm the H.2.3. sub-hypothesis regarding the consultation procedure, but we reject it in case of the co-decision procedure.

Finally, the H.2.4. sub-hypothesis states that the odds of adoption of EP amendments is higher in case the tabling MEP is a member of COMAGRI. The variable 'COMAGRI Members' was not significant in the consultation procedure. Nevertheless, it became significant at all decision-making levels in the co-decision procedure in the standard regression model. Its positive classification increased the odds of adoption of amendments. Based on these results, we confirm the H.2.4. sub-hypothesis in the co-decision procedure, but we reject it for the consultation procedure.

7.2. Structural Equation Modeling

This subchapter analyses the factors influencing the decision-making of the Common Agricultural Policy in light of the observed variables. It analyses whether observed variables are grouped in line with the proposed latent variables and also if they interrelate in the way as it is proposed in the model.

The novelties of this type of research are as follows. On one hand, to date, most of the confirmative factor models that were applied in political science used SEM to analyse the political participation or voting patterns influencing the voting decision of voters (Powers and Cox (1997), Barbaranelli et al. (2007), de Vries et al. (2008), Leimgruber (2011)). On the other hand, as written earlier, the political decision-making and the legislative processes of the European Union, including the European Parliament, have not been the subject of either explorative or confirmative factor analysis.

This sub-chapter is organised as follows. After the introduction, I give an overview on the theoretical background of structural equation modeling. The description of the dataset is followed by the confirmative analysis, which includes the path diagram, the equations of both the measurement and structural models, the parameter estimations and the calculations of the indices of goodness-of-fit. Finally, I discuss the results.

Theoretical overview on structural equation modeling

As I wrote earlier, structural equation modeling is a multivariate technique combining aspects of multiple regression and factor analysis to estimate a series of interrelated dependence relationships simultaneously. In simple terms, SEM estimates a series of separate, but interdependent, multiple regression equations simultaneously by specifying a structural model. The structural model expresses the relationships among independent and dependent variables, even when a dependent variable becomes an independent variable in other relationships. SEM is based on causal relationships, in which the change in one variable is assumed to result in a change in another variable.

SEM is a type of confirmatory analysis, in which the relationships are specified prior to the analysis. Based on theory, experience and research objectives, the researcher preliminarily defines which independent variables predict each dependent variable. Consequently, SEM doesn't help in determining the model, but helps to confirm how much the preliminary set model is justified by the sample data

(Hair et al., 2006); while also estimating its parameters and calculating its goodness-of-fit.

In the social sciences, including political science, it is frequently the case that certain theoretical concepts and notions cannot be directly observed or measured, and therefore, the relevant theory cannot be directly tested. There are two types of variables in the SEM model: the observed variables and the latent variables. A latent variable is a hypothesized and unobserved concept that can only be approximated by observable or measureable variables. (Hair et al., 2006).

With the help of observed variables – know also as indicator variables –, the latent variables can be measured. In SEM, both observed and latent variables can be independent or dependent variables. Independent variables are also called explanatory variables, while dependent variables are also called result variables (Füstös et al., 2004). The former are not influenced by other variables of the model, while the latter are. In the SEM model, the latent variables that are predicted by other latent variables are called latent dependent variables – in other words, latent endogenous variables – while those latent variables, which are not influenced by other latent variables are called latent independent – in other words, latent exogenous – variables. So, in the SEM model, latent independent variables are indicated by the observed independent variables, while latent dependent variables are measured by observed dependent variables (Schumacker and Lomax, 2010).

In the SEM, 'X' represents an independent variable and 'Y' represents a dependent variable. Latent independent variables are marked with ξ, while latent dependent variables are marked with η.

The path diagram is a graphical portrayal of the complete set of relationships among the model's variables. Causal relationships are depicted by straight arrows, with the arrow emanating from the predictor variable and the arrowhead "pointing" to the dependent variable. A straight arrow with two heads indicates a nonrecursive, or reciprocal, relationship between constructs. (Hair et al., 2006).

In the path diagram, there is always an arrow pointing to the latent dependent variables from any of the latent variables. There is also an arrow pointing to the (observed) explanatory variables from the latent variables, expressing that the latent variable is „behind" the observed variables. There can be arrows pointing to the latent depedent variables from the latent explanatory variables. In the path diagram, latent variables are marked with a circle or ellipse, while observed variables are marked with square or rectangle. The measurement error, which can be connected to both observed and latent variables, is also marked with a circle or ellipse, which are, however, smaller than those marking the latent variables. In the first case – that of the measurement error connected to observed variables – it shows that the observed variables also indicate other effects than the related latent variables (Schumacker and Lomax, 2010).

The early development of SEM models was due to Karl Jöreskog (1969, 1973), Ward Keesling (1972), and David Wiley (1973); this approach was initially known as the JKW model, but became known as the linear structural relations model (LISREL) with the development of the first software program implementation, LISREL, in 1973. (Schumacker and Lomax, 2010).

In the general LISREL model, there are two parts: the measurement model and structural model. The structural model depicts the causal relationships of the latent variables, while the measurement model describes which observed variables (and how) measure the latent variables. This is practically the confirmative factor analysis model (Garson, 2011), which analyses the relationships betwen the two types of variables. During the confirmative factor analysis, we set up a preliminary hypothesis regarding the structure of factors, and then we test whether our data confirm this hypothesis or not (Bernschütz, 2011).

In order to measure the fit of the structural equation model, we can calculate a number of indeces for the goodness-of-fit. Among them, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is used (Bentler and Bonett, 1980) most frequently. This index compares to model to a baseline model. The value of this index can be between 0 and 1: the higher the value is, the better the goodness-of-fit of the model is. According to a

common rule of thumb, those models, which have an NFI value lower than 0.9 need to be significantly revised (Arbuckle, 2013). NFI has the advantage that its value can only be between fixed values, so we can get a reliable picture on the model in spite of the extremely large dataset used. Contrary to this, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) index (Browne and Cudeck, 1993) doesn't have an upper limit. In case of a perfect fit, its value is 0. The relevant rule of thumb says that models with RMSEA value higher than 0.1 should be revised (Browne and Cudeck, 1993).

The Relative Fit Index (RFI) has similar features to the NFI, although its value can be negative (Bollen, 1989).

Basically, the SEM – when using an appropriate estimation methodology – is based on the correlation matrix of the observed variables. It enables the inclusion of not only scale or interval variables, but also categorical variables into the model. In this case we assume that "behind" the categorical variable there is a continouos distribution, which can only be observed in a discret way (for example, in case it is above a certain threshold, it is 1, otherwise 0).

This idea is independent from SEM and is basically the statistical concept of polychoric correlation of categorical variables (Kirk, 1973), which assumes that the distributions are normal. The special case of the 2x2 table (with two binary variables) is called tetrachoric correlation.

This chapter analyses the amendments tabled to the legislative proposals of the 2013 CAP reform. As mentioned earlier, the dataset contains more than 8,614 legislatvie amendments.

In order to analyse the impact of explanatory variables connected to MEPs and their Member States, joint EP amendments – amendments tabled by multiple MEPs - have been extracted in the binary coded dataset. Extraction in this context mean that variables have been coded in as many lines of the dataset as the number of the MEPs who tabled the amendment jointly. So, in the dataset one row contains the binary

coded variables of one MEP. After the extraction of joint amendments, the dataset contains 16,637 rows. The use of binary and ordinal dependent variables in structural equation modeling was confirmed by Muthén (1979, 1984). Arbuckle (2013) also analysed binary variables.

The research problem behind this analysis is that we know very little about the factors influencing EU decision-making, including the adoption of EU legislative instruments, the interrelatedness of these factors as well as their impact on the final legislative outcome. The objective of the use of structural equation modeling is to get a better understanding of the decison-making of the EU with focus on the European Parliament as well as to identify the factors that influence political decisions and the political-legislative outcome. The main research question is what factors – or clusters of factors –influence EU decisions and how they do so. In our case this concerns the adoption of EP legislative amendments. Therefore, we apply SEM to analyse the observed and latent explanatory and results variables related to EP amendments and their adoption.

The sub-hypotheses of the research are connected first to the model fit, second, to the latent explanatory variables and their role in influencing decision and third, to the relationships among the latent result variables. The sub-hypotheses are as follows:

The H.2.5. sub-hypothesis states that the fit of the model is according to the preliminary SEM model visualised in the path diagram, and hence the SEM model – drawn up based on preliminary theory and practice – describes the relationships of the observed and latent variables according to their real relationships.

The H.2.6. sub-hypothesis states that legal-institutional factors increase the probability of the adoption of EP amendments in the COMAGRI. This sub-hypothesis is connected to the conclusions of Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999), Tsebelis et al. (2001), Lucic (2004), and Kardasheva (2009). Their conclusion is that the probability of adoption of EP amendments is higher in case of first reading amendmetns (Tsebelis–Kalandrakis (1999) and Lucic (2004)), amendments

supported by the European Commission (Tsebelis et al. (2001)) and amendments tabled in ugent procedure (Kardasheva (2009)) compared to amendments tabled in second reading, amendments not having the backing of the European Commission as well as amendments in non-urgent procedures.

The H.2.7. sub-hypothesis says that factors connected to the characteristics of MEPs who tabled the amendment decrease the probability of the adoption of amendments in the COMAGRI. Sigalas (2010) analysed the impact of the gender and age of MEPs on the legislative procedure (allocation of reports, roll-call votes) as well as on certain elements of MEP's work (parliamentary questions, plenary speeches). He concluded that the age of MEPs has a significant negative correlation with the activity of MEPs in terms of parliamentary questions and plenary speeches. The gender of MEPs does not explain their legislative activity at any significant level.

The H.2.8. sub-hypothesis states that factors connected to the Member States of the MEPs increase the probability of adoption of amendments both at EP plenary and in the Council. Sigalas (2010) concluded that MEPs from the central countries of the EU – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom – are more active during the roll-call votes in the EP plenary compared to MEPs from peripheral countries. Kovács (2014) concluded that the probability of adoption of amendments tabled by MEPs from net contributor Member States is higher.

The H.2.9. sub-hypothesis states that the factors connected to the characteristics of the EP amendments increase the probability of adoption in COMAGRI. This is in line with the conclusions of Schackleton (1999) and Kreppel (1999). They concluded that the probability of adoption is higher in case of compromise amendments (Schackleton, 1999) as well as clarification and recital amendments (Kreppel, 1999).

According to the H.2.10. sub-hypothesis political factors that influence the decision-making procedure of the EP increase the probability of adoption of

amendments at all three levels of decision-making (i.e. COMAGRI, EP plenary, Council). Previous articles confirmed that the probability of adoption of EP amendments is higher in case there is an EP unity behind the amendment (Kreppel, 1999) or the amendment is supported by the European Commission or – in case of the consultation procedure – if the EP manages to link its opinion to co-decision proposals (Kardasheva, 2009).

The H.2.11. sub-hypothesis states that there is a positive relationship between COMAGRI and EP plenary adoption of amendments. When analysing the EP amendments of the 2013 CAP reform, Fertő and Kovács (2014) found that EP plenary adopted practically all – more than 90% – of the amendments supported previously by the COMAGRI.

Accoring to the H.2.12. sub-hypothesis, the adoption of the amendment by the EP plenary has a positive impact on their adoption by the Council, so that they can be more likely to be incorporated into the final regulations. This is in line with the conclusions of Fertő and Kovács (2014) based on an analysis of EP amendments in the 2013 CAP reform.

Analysis

In order to test the above hypotheses, I drew up a structural equation model. The first step of the analysis is to define the variables of the model. The explanatory variables are as follows.

Table 20. – The explanatory variables of the SEM model

Name	Abbreviation	Meaning
X_1	CAP	The amendment was tabled to either the 1st or the 2nd pillar of the CAP. The 1st pillar is: Direct Payment and SCMO. The 2nd pillar is the EAFRD.
X_2	Member	The amendment was tabled by any members or substitute members of the COMAGRI.
X_3	Net contributor MSs	The amendment was tabled by an MEP from a net contributor Member State .
X_4	Agricultural MSs	The amendment was tabled by an MEP from an agricultural Member State.
X_5	EU-15 MSs	The amendment was tabled by an MEP from an EU-15 Member State.
X_6	Constituency	The amendment was tabled by an MEP from a Member State, which delegates its representatives to the European Parliament on a constituency basis.
X_7	Recital	The amendment was tabled to the Recital part of the legislative proposal.
X_8	Draft report	The amendment was tabled by the Rapporteur.
X_9	Joint	The amendment was tabled by multiple MEPs jointly.
X_{10}	Compromise	The amendment was adopted in the form of a compromise amendment.
X_{11}	Multiple terms	The amendment was tabled by an MEP in at least his/her second EP-term.
X_{12}	Male	The amendment was tabled by a male MEP.
X_{13}	Large EP Group	The amendment was tabled by an MEP who is either a member of the EPP or the S&D Group of the EP.
X_{14}	Same government	The amendment was tabled by an MEP whose political affiliation is the same as the government in his/her Member State (the Minister from his Member State in the Council has the same political affiliation).

Source: own composition

Based on the above explanatory variables I defined five latent variables. One of the objectives of the confirmatory analysis is to see whether explanatory variables are clustering along these latent variables in the SEM model. Regarding the legal-institutional latent variable, it incorporates the explanatory variables connected to the CAP legislative proposals as well as the to the COMAGRI membership. There is a separate latent variable for the explanatory variables connected to Member States, to the type of the amendment, to the personal characteristics of the MEP as well as to the political affiliation of the MEP.

In the internal EP decision-making there are three levels at which the institution either adopts or rejects EP amendments. Decision on the legislative amendment – including draft report, open, OGC and compromise amendments – is first made in the COMAGRI. In the second phase, the EP plenary votes on the COMAGRI adopted amendments. Finally, a decision is made on those amendments adopted by the EP plenary by the Council (following the trialogue negotiations). The dependent (result) variables of this research reflect these three decision-making phases:

Table 21. – The dependent variables of the model

Code	Abbreviation	Meaning
Y_1	η_1	The amendment was adopted by COMAGRI
Y_2	η_2	The amendment was adopted by the EP plenary
Y_3	η_3	The amendment was adopted by the Council

Source: own composition

The relationships among the latent variables as well as their connections with the result variables are defined in Table 22.

Table 22. – The connections of the latent variables of the model

Parameter	Description of the connection
γ_{11}	Regarding the COMAGRI vote on amendments, it is an important factor if the MEP is either the Member of the Substitute Member of the COMAGRI, and also, the amendment was tabled to which CAP legislative proposal concretely. (At the EP plenary stage, the legislative proposals are treated – therefore voted – more like a package.)
γ_{22}	National delegations in the EP usually form their positions before the EP plenary vote (it less frequently happens before the vote in the Committee)
γ_{23}	In the Council, national interests play the biggest role.
γ_{31}	The type of the amendment – especially in case of draft report and compromise amendments – is important before the COMAGRI vote. In the EP plenary, these amendments are only considered as COMAGRI supported amendments.
γ_{41}	Personal characteristics – especially the number of EP terms – are important at the level of the most personal decision-making, i.e. at the level of COMAGRI, where personal prestige can also influence the adoption of legislative amendments (and very often, the voting results are also close). In the plenary vote, with mroe than 750 MEPs, personal characteristics play much less significant role.
γ_{51}	Party affiliation largely determines the outcome of the voting at COMAGRI level: before the vote, working groups of EP Groups decide on the voting list, i.e. which amendments they adopt and which ones they reject.
γ_{52}	Party affiliation also determines the voting on EP plenary: before the plenary vote, EP Groups decide on the voting list, i.e. which amendments they adopt and which ones they reject.
γ_{53}	The same political affiliation of the MEP and the Minister of the MEP's Member State – who participates in the Council – makes the cooperation between the MEP and the Minister easier.

Source: own composition

In the model both observed explanatory variables as well as latent and observed results variables can have standard error. Regarding the relationships among the result variables, we can assume a one-directed relationship from the COMAGRI to the EP Plenary and also from the EP Plenary to the Council.

Figure 3. – The path diagram of the SEM model



Note. In the path diagram X represents the observed independent variable, Y is the observed dependent variable, ξ is the latent independent variable, η is the latent dependent variable, β marks the relationships between the result variables, δ is the residual term of the exogenous latent variable, γ means the relationship between the latent explanatory variables and the latent result variables, ζ is the stochastic residual term of the latent endogenous variable, ε is the measurement error of the endogenous manifest variables.

It can be seen in the path diagram that latent explanatory variables form three separate spheres: 1.) the 'Sphere of the MEP', which contains the latent variables connected to the MEPs and their Member States; 2.) the 'Sphere of content' contains the latent variable of the characteristics of the amendment, while 3.) the 'Institutional-political sphere', which contains the legal, institutional and political factors.

Based on the path diagram, the relationships between the latent result variables and the latent explanatory variables, and hence the structural equations are as follows:

$$\eta_1 = \gamma_{11}\xi_1 + \gamma_{31}\xi_3 + \gamma_{41}\xi_4 + \gamma_{51}\xi_5 + \zeta_1,$$
$$\eta_2 = \gamma_{22}\xi_2 + \gamma_{52}\xi_5 + \zeta_2 + \beta_1\eta_1 ,$$
$$\eta_3 = \gamma_{23}\xi_2 + \gamma_{53}\xi_5 + \zeta_3 + \beta_2\eta_2$$

where ξ denotes the latent independent variable, η denotes the latent dependent variable, β denotes the relationship between the result variables, γ denotes the relationship between the latent explanatory and latent result variables and ε denotes the measurement error of the endogenous manifest variables.

The relationships between the observed and the latent explanatory variables, and hence the measurement model is as follows:

$$X_1 = \lambda_1^X\xi_1 + \delta_1, \quad X_2 = \lambda_2^X\xi_1 + \delta_2, \quad X_3 = \lambda_3^X\xi_2 + \delta_3, \quad X_4 = \lambda_4^X\xi_2 + \delta_4,$$
$$X_5 = \lambda_5^X\xi_2 + \delta_5, \quad X_6 = \lambda_6^X\xi_2 + \delta_6, \quad X_7 = \lambda_7^X\xi_3 + \delta_7, \quad X_8 = \lambda_8^X\xi_3 + \delta_8,$$
$$X_9 = \lambda_9^X\xi_3 + \delta_9, \quad X_{10} = \lambda_{10}^X\xi_3 + \delta_{10}, \quad X_{11} = \lambda_{11}^X\xi_4 + \delta_{11}, \quad X_{12} = \lambda_{12}^X\xi_4 + \delta_{12},$$
$$X_{13} = \lambda_{13}^X\xi_5 + \delta_{13}, \quad X_{14} = \lambda_{14}^X\xi_5 + \delta_{14}$$

where X denotes the independent variables, δ denotes the residual term of the exogenous latent variable and λ denotes the factor weight of the endogenous manifest variables.

The observed result variables are as follows:

$$Y_1 = \lambda_1^Y \eta_1 + \varepsilon_1, \quad Y_2 = \lambda_2^Y \eta_2 + \varepsilon_2, \quad Y_3 = \lambda_3^Y \eta_3 + \varepsilon_3,$$

where Y is the observed dependent variable and ε is the measurement error of the endogenous manifest variables.

Results, discussion

In the correlation matrix below, I calculated and visualised the polychoric correlations of variables pairwise.

Figure 4. - The polychoric correlation matrix of the variables of the model



The analysis of the structural equation model was conducted with SPSS AMOS version 22.0.0 (Arbuckle, 2013). The SEM model with the parameter estimates can be seen in Figure 5.

Figure 5. – The SEM model of the 2013 CAP reform in the European Parliament



Note: Legal: Legal-institutional factors; Member State: Factors connected to the Member States; Amendment: Factors connected to the amendments; MEP: Member of the EP proposing the amendment; Politics: Political factors; COMAGRI: Adoption by COMAGRI; EP Plenary: Adoption by the EP Plenary; Council: Adoption by the Council of Agriculture Ministers.

Figure 5. contains the standardized parameter estimates. Based on the results we can discuss the hypotheses.

H.2.5. sub-hypothesis: The model fit is very weak. The value of the NFI is only 0.007, the value of RMSEA is 0.706, while the value of RFI is -0.047. It means that in reality, the relationships and clustering of the observed and latent variables as well as the latent explanatory and result variables are not in line with the preliminary model which was drawn up based on previous experiences and relevant theory. Therefore, we reject the H.2.5. sub-hypothesis of this research.

Before the analysis of the next hypotheses it is important to note that because of the weak fit of the model – the rejection of the H.2.5. sub-hypothesis –, the conclusions regarding the hypotheses on the relationships of variables in the model shall be treated with caution and reserve. In a model with a low value of goodness-of-fit, conclusions on the strength of relationships among the variables can only be treated with reservations.[9]

When we estimate the model, we also estimate the standard errors of the parameters, so we could also test their significance. Nevertheless, in practice, it does not make too much sense because given the large sample used in the analysis, the tests are so powerful that practically all of the hypotheses would be significant.

According to the H.2.6. sub-hypothesis, legal and institutional factors increase the probability of the adoption of EP amendments in COMAGRI. The results of the model show that the value of the parameter between the legal-institutional latent explanatory variable and the COMAGRI latent result variable is 0.06. The positive value of this parameter – although to very minimal extent – confirms the H.2.6. sub-hypothesis, which is therefore adopted. This result confirms the findings of Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999), Tsebelis et al. (2001), Lucic (2004) and Kardasheva (2009), namely that legal-institutional factors increase the probability of adoption of EP legislative amendments.

[9] The p-value of the model is 0 to three decimal places, in spite of the weak model-fit. Nevertheless, with this sample size, the sampling variation is so small and the tests are so powerful that even the smallest difference could be significant.

The H.2.7. sub-hypothesis stated that those factors which are connected to the MEP who tabled the amendment decrease the probability of adoption in COMAGRI. According to the results of the SEM, the parameter value of the relationship between the Member and the EP Committee latent variables is 0, which means that there is no explanatory power in this relationship, so we reject the H.2.7. sub-hypothesis. Naturally, this result does not confirm the findings of Sigalas (2010), namely, that the personal characteristics of MEPs have an influence on their legislative and parliamentary activity.

According to the H.2.8. sub-hypothesis, factors connected to the Member State of the MEP increase the probability of the adoption of EP amendments both at EP plenary and in the Council. The results of the model show that the parameter of the relationship between the „Member State" and „EP plenary adoption" latent variables is 0.01, while the „Member State" and „Council adoption" is 0.11. Though to a very limited extent, these results confirm the H.2.8. sub-hypothesis at both level of decision-making (EP plenary and the Council). Additionally, they confirm the results of Sigalas (2010) and Kovács (2014). We can also conclude that Member State related factors have higher impact on the adoption of amendments in the Council.

The H.2.9. sub-hypothesis states that amendment-related factors have a positive impact on the adoption of the amendments in the COMAGRI. Given that the parameter value of the relationship between the „Amendment" and „COMAGRI adopted" latent variables is 0.56, we confirm the H.2.9. sub-hypothesis. This result confirms the conclusions of Schackleton (1999) and Kreppel (1999) articles.

The H.2.10. sub-hypothesis states that political factors increase the probability of adoption of EP amendments at all three levels of the decision-making. The results of the structural equation model show that the parameter value of the relationships of the 'Political factors' latent variable with the 'COMAGRI adopted' latent variable is 0.12, -0.15 with the 'EP plenary' latent variable and 0.61 with the 'Council adoption' latent variable. Because of the latter result, i.e. the positive

relationship with the final adoption, we confirm the H.2.10. sub-hypothesis. It is important to note that political factors have the highest impact on the decison-making in the Council, which shows the significant influence of MEPs whose political affilition is the same with that of their respective national governments. These results confirm the conclusions of Kreppel (1999) and Kardasheva (2009).

According to the H.2.11. sub-hypothesis, the adoption of EP amendments by COMAGRI has a positive impact on their adoption in the EP plenary. The parameter value of the relationship between these two latent result variables – in line with the conclusions of Fertő and Kovács (2014) – is 0.68, therefore, we adopt the H.2.11. sub-hypothesis.

Finally, H.2.12. sub-hypothesis states that the adoption of amendments by the EP plenary has a positive impact on its adoption by the Council. The parameter value of the relationship between these two latent result variables is 0.55, which confirms the findings of Fertő and Kovács (2014). Also, based on this, we confirm the H.2.12. sub-hypothesis.

The objective of this sub-chapter was to analyse the decision-making procedure of the European Parliament and its internal relationships via a confirmative model using the 2013 CAP reform as a case study. The relationships between the observed and latent explanatory variables at various levels of decision-making have been defined based on relevant literature and personal experience.

Out of the sub-hypotheses regarding the impact of each of the factors of SEM on the adoption of EP amendments – taking into account the weak model-fit –, I rejected only one sub-hypothesis and accepted six of them. With regards to the fact that I adopted all four sub-hypotheses connected to the logistic regression, I also accept the H2. hypothesis. Based on this we can conclude that although to a varied extent and with diverse impact the variables of the analysis – including variables connected to MEPs, their Member States, amendment-related variables – and the factors of the SEM have an impact on the adoption of EP amendments at each level of the decision-making.

Chapter 8 THE NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM

This chapter aims to give an insight into the networks of the Member States and EP Groups in the European Parliament based on the jointly tabled amendments of the MEPs in the 2013 CAP reform. The analysis provided in this chapter will test the H3. hypothesis of this dissertation:

> ***H3. hypothesis: When tabling amendments to CAP legislative instruments, the characteristics of MEPs and their Member States influence the cooperation and networks among them in the European Parliament.***

Besides testing the H3. hypothesis, I also test a number of sub-hypotheses which are based on the relevant literature, and which help form a comprehensive view on the analysed networks.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I gave a short overview on social network analysis and the networks of Member States and EP Groups in the process of the 2013 CAP reform. Then, I define the sub-hypotheses based on the relevant existing literature. This is followed by the methodological overview with focus on the metrics and indices that are used in this research. The brief introduction of the dataset is followed by the presentation of the results. Finally, I draw conclusions from the analysis.

Prior to and during the political debate on CAP, several EU Member States tried to establish a common position. These common positions are also indicative of the relationships and networks between the Member States, so it is worthwhile to consider a brief overview on their relations.

In December 2009, 22 EU Member States adopted the so-called Paris Declaration. In this case, the group of non-signing countries (Denmark, Malta, Sweden, The Netherlands and the United Kindom) is more interesting because, with the exception of Malta, all four countries are net contributor Member States which play

a key role in financing the CAP. In September 2010, the two largest net contributing Member States of the EU, France and Germany published a joint position in which they committed themselves to maintaining CAP as a key policy area for the EU also after 2013.

The Agricultural Ministers of the new, predominantly Central and Eastern European Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) signed the so-called Warsaw Declaration in February 2010 in which they called for the elimination of the inequalities of direct payments between the Member States. In December 2010, the MEP's of Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Slovakia signed a joint declaration about the CAP reform in which they urged a fairer distribution of direct payments between the Member States and the strengthening of the rural development pillar of CAP.

The three Baltic States also called for a more equitable distribution of direct payments between the Member States in a joint position adopted in 2012. In 2012 the Visegrád countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) as well as Bulgaria and Romania also signed a joint declaration in which they advocated a fairer and more market oriented Common Agricultural Policy. Then in 2013 Slovenia also joined the above countries to adopt the Budapest Declaration in which they called for the simplification of CAP procedures and for the European Parliament to play a greater role in the elaboration of the CAP (based on Zahrnt, 2011).

With regards to the coalitions between the various Groups of the European Parliament based on the positions published prior to the CAP reform, we can draw the following conclusions.

The EP Group of the European People's Party published its position about the forthcoming reform in 2010. In this position they called for maintaining the level of the CAP budget and argued that the EU should finance 100 percent of the direct payments.

The Socialist Group of the EP published a surprisingly reformist position concerning the future of the CAP in 2010, in which they stressed the need to improve the environmental performance of the CAP (framed as the production of environmental public goods) as well as the importance of the convergence of rural areas. They claimed it was necessary to redistribute agricultural aid from the most competitive to the most disadvantaged farms. In the Socialists' opinion, job creation in rural areas should be enhanced by strengthening the rural development pillar of the CAP.

The Liberal Group did not adopt a firm and common position about the future of the CAP in advance. In their statement published about the future of the EU's budget they pointed out that the CAP should also contribute to achieving the EU2020 targets, however, they also found it feasible to reduce the total budget of the CAP. The Liberal Group made it clear that they were not in favour of the introduction of any new rules that were detrimental to large farms.

The Green Group of the EP that normally prioritises the interests of small farmers and bioproducers once again placed the environmental performance of the CAP at the heart of its program, also expressing its concerns about the market orientation of the CAP. They also questioned whether the proposed structural changes were realistic (based on Zahrnt, 2011).

It is apparent from the above that an EPP-S&D-Greens coalition was formed during the CAP reform for improving the environmental performance of the CAP. Besides, one may also identify a Liberal-EPP coalition in defence of large farms as well as a Socialist-Greens coalition to increase the aid provided to the most disadvantaged small farmers.

8.1. The sub-hypotheses

The main research question is what patterns influence the formation of coalitions of MEPs when they table EP amendments. I concentrate on both country and

political party characteristics. Based on earlier research, I test the following sub-hypotheses.

In an agricultural context, Moschitz and Stolze (2009) stated that 'old' Member States are more active than 'new' ones. The reason behind this may be that accumulated experience in EU decision-making and membership in an older social network make it possible to table more legislative amendments. Based on this, H.3.1. sub-hypothesis is as follows:

H. 3.1. MEPs from EU-15 Member States are the most active ones.

In a similar analysis focusing on a network of intergovernmental relations, Thurner and Binder (2009) concluded that dominantly Nordic, net contributor Member States formed a network, and that relationships between actors from these MSs were the most frequent. This may be explained by the fact that net contributor Member States (as they finance the EU's common policies) may generally be considered more influential in EU decision-making and, therefore, the MEP's of these Member States may increase the probability of the adoption of their amendments if they table them jointly with other MEPs from similar states. Based on this, H.3.2. sub-hypothesis is as follows:

H.3.2. MEPs from net contributor Member States form relationships with each other most frequently and more often with each other than with MEPs from non-net contributor Member States in the analysed network.

As for the EU-15 Member States, in line with the concept of 'Core Europe' or the 'Europe of Concentring Circles' (Stubb, 1996), one should expect that MEPs from either founding Member States or MSs which joined the EU before 2004 (EU-15 countries) would be engaged in closer network compared to MEPs from late entry states (EU-12 countries). Based on this, H.3.3. hypothesis is the following:

H.3.3. MEPs from EU-15 Member States form relationships with each other more frequently in the network than with EU-12 Member States.

According to the analysis of Thurner and Binder (2009:89), 'the higher the bilateral economic interdependence between two Member States, the higher … the propensity to form … ties'. Based on this it can be expected that MEPs from those Member States which have closer economic ties formulate relationships more frequently in the legislative process in the EP as well as in tabling joint amendments. Therefore, the H.3.4. sub-hypothesis is as follows:

> *H.3.4. MEPs from Member States with higher bilateral economic interdependency tie with each other more frequently.*

Votewatch (2014) defines many types of activity rates for EP Groups. The EPP and S&D Groups are the most active ones based on their legislative performance (Votewatch, 2014:12). Based on this it can be expected that these two EP Groups are the most actives ones in the legislative process as well. Therefore, we define the H.3.5. sub-hypothesis as follows:

> *H.3.5. MEPs from the large EP Groups (S&D and EPP) are the most active in the legislative process of the EP: MEPs from these two groups table joint amendments most frequently.*

Based on CEPS-Votewatch (2012:10) the EPP and S&D Groups of the EP vote together in more than 70% of all legislative cases. Therefore, it can be expected that MEPs from these two EP Groups tie with each other most frequently when tabling joint amendments. Patz (2011b) suggests that EP Groups – MEPs – from the same political side cluster together: EPP with EFD and non-affiliated members on the right-wing political side, while Socialists and Democrats with the Greens and the United Left on the left-wing political side. Based on these results, the following two sub-hypotheses can be defined:

> *H.3.6. (1) The relationship between the S&D and the EPP EP Group is the most frequent relationship. (2) EP Groups on the same political side – in a*

left-right division of the political scene – tie with each other more frequently.

The intermediary role in the context of network analysis means that an actor of the network is on a path between two nodes not directly linked in the network. These intermediaries practically form a "bridge" between the other two actors. Somewhat related to the conclusions of Thurner and Binder (2009), one can expect that the Greens-EFA EP Group plays the most important role as an intermediary. On the other hand, based on CEPS-Votewatch (2012), ALDE plays the intermediary role in the European Parliament, being the most frequent voting partner of the EPP and S&D groups in the legislation. It is also confirmed by Votewatch (2014), showing that ALDE is the EP Group being most frequently in winning coalitions in the EP. I define the following two sub-hypotheses based on these results as follows:

H.3.7. It is the (1) Greens-EFA or the (2) ALDE EP group, which plays the most important role as an intermediary.

In spite of ideological differences – which in this context are embodied in their affiliations with the various EP Groups – MEPs are keener to cooperate with each other. This is confirmed by CEPS-Votewatch (2012). National differences are more a barrier to the cooperation between MEPs. One of the outcomes of Mérand et al. (2011) is that EU-level structures – in this case EP Groups – have a more central role in a network – expressed in the number of ties – than national level structures. Also, according to the expections of Roederer-Rynning (2015), ideological cleavages might become more salient as the legislative power of EP increases. Based on this, the H.3.8. sub-hypothesis is as follows:

H.3.8. Ideological differences are less a fragmenting factor between MEPs than different nationalities. In other words, the different EP Group affiliations are less an obstacle to cooperation within the network and to tabling joint amendments than differences in nationality and the resulting differences in the interests of the Member States.

The conclusions of the article by Thurner and Binder (2009) confirm the expectation that the MEPs of geographically close (often neighbouring) EU Member States will more often table joint amendments. One of the potential explanations for this is that EU Member States geographically close to each other are often tied by common linguistic and cultural characteristics that facilitate the cooperation between their MEPs. Furthermore, in the case of countries close to (neighbouring) each other there is a greater chance that they have similar natural and agricultural characteristics which also justifies joint action in the CAP reform. Based on this, the H.3.9. sub-hypothesis is as follows:

> *H.3.9. The MEPs of EU Member States that are geographically close to each other form ties with each other more often in the network.*

8.2. Methodological overview

Social Network Analysis (SNA), its methodology and its application potential have attracted significant scientific attention in the last decades. In SNA, the relations between the social actors are at the centre of the analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

A social network consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined between them. The presence of relational information is a critical and defining feature of a social network. Relation in this context means the collection of ties of a specific kind among the members of a group. In SNA, a relation can be any type of connection among the actors or units. Nodes and arcs are the basic building blocks for social networks. In graph theory, the nodes are also referred to as vertices or points, and the lines are also known as edges or arcs. Visual displays including sociograms and two or higher dimensional representations continue to be widely used by network analysts. The visual representation of data that a graph or sociogram offers often allows the researchers to uncover patterns that might otherwise go undetected (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

The undirected graph is one of the models of SNA, in which the relations among the actors are undirected, i.e. the direction of lines is not specified. To the contrary, in a directed graph – digraph in short – the direction of the lines is specified. In a digraph, a node can be either adjacent to, or adjacent from another node, depending on the ’direction’ of the arc (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

8.3. Indicators of Social Network Analysis

The most frequently used indicators, metrics and definitions of the social networks are as follows:

- Degree: the degree of a node is the number of edges it is connected to. Equivalently, the degree of a node is the number of nodes adjacent to it. A node with degree equal to 0 is called an isolate (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). When determining the weighted degree, the frequency of connections serves as the weight. Degrees and weighted degrees are used to test the H.3.1., H.3.5. and H.3.6.(1) sub-hypotheses.
- Density: the density of a graph is the proportion of existing to possible lines in the graph. Put another way it is the ratio of the number of lines present to the maximum possible (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:101). The density of a node is the proportion of possible lines to those that are actually connected to the node. Density indices are used to test the H.3.2., H.3.3. and H.3.6(2) sub-hypotheses.
- Betweenness centrality: interactions between two nonadjacent across might depend on the other actors in the set of actors, especially the actors who lie on the paths between the two. These „other actors” potentially might have some control over the interaction between the two nonadjacent actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:189). Betweenness centrality describes the potential of a network actor to act as information broker and provides information about its overall activity level in the network (Moschitz, 2009). In this chapter, betweenness centrality is used to test the H.3.7. sub-hypothesis.

- QAP (*Quadratic Assignment Procedure*) correlation: it is used to measure the extent of the similarity or difference between two matrices and to test the significance of the correlation between the two matrices. QAP correlation is a non-parametric method of analysis that, as a first step, defines the Pearson correlation between the two matrices (containing the same actors and of the same size) and then uses a permutation procedure to test whether or not the resulting correlation is significant (based on Borgatti, 2002). QAP correlation normally defines whether the similarity between the actors along a certain variable (characteristic) correlates with the strength of the tie between them (Borgatti et al., 2003). QAP correlation is used, on the one hand, to test the H.3.4. sub-hypothesis (the correlation between the ties of MEPs in the legislative process and the economic ties between their countries) and, on the other hand, to test the H.3.9. hypothesis (the correlation between the ties of MEPs in the legislative process and the geographic closeness of their Member States).
- *Homophily*: according to the principle of homophily the similarity of actors along a certain characteristic will result in the formation of a tie between them. In other words, individuals linked to each other are similar to each other in some characteristics, or individuals similar to each other will form ties with each other. Accordingly, people's personal networks are homogeneous with regard to many sociodemographic, behavioural and intrapersonal characteristics. Homophily suggests that the number of connections between individuals (actors) similar to each other is greater than the number of connections between individuals (actors) different from each other (based on McPherson et al., 2001). The concept of homophily was first used by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954). Golub et al. (2011) pointed out in their analysis that homophily can significantly influence the flow of information in the network. According to Newman[10], in social network analysis measures of modularity or clustering are the same as measures of homophily. Modularity measures the strength of the individual communities or clusters of the network. Modularity is based on the general feature of networks that the actors of networks group into community structures within

[10] http://lists.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=SOCNET;sF9sSQ;20090520150621-0600

which the ties between the actors are dense and frequent whereas the number of ties between the various communities or clusters is low (Newman et al., 2004). In this chapter, the modularity index is used to test the H.3.8. sub-hypothesis.

8.4. Dataset

Again, the database of this research was expanded using EP amendments that were proposed by more than one Member of the European Parliament in the legislative proposals of the 2013 CAP reform. As for the EP's internal procedure, there is a phase when all the Members of the EP – either alone or jointly with other MEPs – can make amendments. As I wrote before, this is the so-called open amendment phase, and amendments tabled here can be called open amendments. This analysis is based on these open amendments tabled to the above four CAP legislative instruments. It is also important to note that unlike open amendments, other types of EP amendments – amendments tabled by the EP rapporteurs, amendments of opinion-giving committees as well as plenary amendments – can't form the basis of a network analysis, as no embedded MEP coalitions can be found in these types of amendments. The database contains almost 7.000 European parliamentary open amendments related to the four legislative proposals of the 2013 CAP reform.

Table 23. – The dataset broken down by EP Groups

EP Group	Number of amendments tabled by one MEP	Number of amendments jointly tabled by MEPs belonging to the same EP Group	Number of amendments jointly tabled by MEPs belonging to different EP Groups
ALDE	478	257	
ECR	289	375	
EFD	39	0	
EPP	1,458	939	
Greens-EFA	469	3	
GUE-NGL	115	180	
S&D	674	652	
NI	134	0	
Total	3,656	2,406	687
		Grand Total	6,749

Source: own calculation

In the database, the names of MEPs have been converted into their EP group affiliation and nationality. This makes it possible to analyse the networks among EP Groups and Member States.

MEPs from the following EP Groups tabled amendments:

- ALDE – Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe;
- EPP – European People's Party;
- ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists;
- Greens-EFA – Greens – European Free Alliance;
- GUE-NGL – European United Left - Nordic Green Left;
- EFD – Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy;
- S&D – Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats;

MEPs from the following Member States tabled amendments: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Table 24. – The dataset broken down by Member States

Member State	Number of amendments tabled by one MEP	Number of amendments jointly tabled by MEPs representing the same Member State	Number of amendments jointly tabled by MEPs representing different Member States
Austria	113	0	
Belgium	103	2	
Bulgaria	150	0	
Czech Republic	168	0	
Denmark	88	26	
Estonia	9	0	
Finland	14	53	
France	352	118	
Germany	538	110	
Greece	538	110	
Hungary	66	0	
Ireland	116	68	
Italy	312	213	
Latvia	49	0	
Lithuania	63	1	
Luxemburg	42	0	
Netherlands	140	2	
Poland	81	143	
Portugal	246	22	
Romania	157	49	
Slovakia	8	0	
Slovenia	5	0	
Spain	327	707	
Sweden	31	29	
United Kingdom	464	492	
Total	4,180	2,145	424
		Grand Total	6,749

Source: own calculation

For the purposes of this study, "activity" always means the activity embodied in tabling joint amendments included in the above databases, i.e. only activity resulting from cooperation between MEPs.

8.5. Results

I tested the sub-hypotheses by calculating the follow social network analytic statistics:

- degree
- weighted degree
- betweenness centrality
- density of the graph and the nodes
- QAP correlation
- homophily indices, modularity.

Even though networks based on degrees represent a simplified approach, it is justified to apply them from a content perspective, since not only the number of connections between the various actors bears an important message in the decision-making process of the EP but also the mere number of actors with which the other actors (MEPs, Member States, EP Groups) form ties within the network.

In the dataset of this research, the relationship among the EP Groups as well as the Member States is undirected as there is no influence from one actor – node – to another: they are just 'simply' paired. In the context of this research, 'node' means the EP Groups or Member States, while 'edges' means the relationships among them. For the purposes of this analysis, nodes represent the EP Groups or Member States while the ties between them are the amendments tabled by them jointly.

It is important to note that in social network analysis, the meaning of 'power' or 'influence' is at least twofold. A central actor is powerful if it has a large number of social ties in the network, while a broker is powerful if it connects different parts or non-connected actors of the network (Mérand et al., 2011).

The network analysis presented in this study was primarily prepared with the Gephi software[11]. The QAP correlation was calculated with the UCINET 6 software[12], while modularity indices were calculated with the Python 2.7 program[13].

There are eight nodes in the graph of the EP Groups. This is the number of EP Groups – including the Non-Inscrits MEPs whom I treat as one group in this research – whose MEPs tabled amendments together with the MEPs of any other EP Groups. In the network, the number of edges is 13. The 13 edges represent a total of 1,086 connections.

For the network of EP Groups, the average degree value is 3.25, which means that an EP Group has a relationship on average with 3.25 EP Groups. The average weighted degree value is 271.5, which expresses that an EP Group has on average 271.5 connections with other EP Groups.

As for the Member States, the number of nodes is 26, while the number of edges is 73. This means that MEPs from 26 Member States tabled amendments together with an MEP from another Member State, and also that there are 73 links between the 26 Member States. The 73 edges represent a total of 2,169 connections.

For the network of Member States, the average degree is 5.62, expressing that a Member State has relationships on average with 5.62 other Member States. The average Weighted Degree is 166.85, which shows that on average, there is 166.85 connections between any of the two Member States.

The H.3.1. sub-hypothesis claims that MEPs from EU-15 Member States are the most active ones. Activity of an MEP in this context can be expressed by the degree and weighted degree indices. For Member States, France and Germany tops the ranking in terms of weighted degree, while Ireland and Germany are the most active ones in terms of degree. For weighted degree, in the top 12 places there are only EU-15 Member States. These results have also been visualised in Graph 1.

[11] http://gephi.github.io/
[12] https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home
[13] https://www.python.org/download/releases/2.7/

Graph 1. – The activity of MEPs by Member States



The descriptive statistics related to the Member States of MEPs tabling amendments also confirm that MEPs from the EU-15 Member States were more active in the network. Based on the above, the H.3.1. sub-hypothesis is confirmed.

Table 25. – Descriptive statistics of EU-15 and EU-12 Member States

Country group	Number of Member States tabling amendments	Relationships				
		Number	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Variance
EU-15 MS	15	3,847	256.5	43	518	171.2
EU-12 MS	9	491	54.6	6	84	28.3
Total	24	4,338	180.75	6	518	167.6

Source: own calculation

According to the H.3.2. sub-hypothesis, MEPs from net contributor Member States form relationships with each other more frequently than with net beneficiary Member States. This therefore means that the MEPs of net contributor Member States more often cooperate with each other when tabling amendments.

Table 26. – Descriptive statistics of the relationships between net contributor Member States

Category	Relationships				
	Number	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Variance
Relationships with net contributor Member States	2,247	187.3	16	435	133.4
Relationships with net beneficiary Member States	772	64.3	0	288	80.7
Total	3,019	251.6	0	435	124.7

Source: own calculation

The descriptive statistics suggest that MEPs from net contributor Member States form the majority of their relationships with other MEPs from net contributor Member States. In addition, I test the sub-hypothesis by determining the density indices within and between the Groups.

Table 27. – Density indices of Member States in net contributor and net beneficiary breakdown

Indicator	Relationships between net contributor Member States	Relationships between net contributor and net beneficiary Member States	Relationships between net beneficiary Member States	Total network
Number of maximum/potential relationships	66	168	91	325
Number of actually formed relationships	31	26	16	73
Density within the Group	0.47	0.15	0.18	0.22

Source: own calculation

As the density index between net contributor Member States is the highest in the network, we accept the H.3.2. sub-hypothesis.

The H.3.3. sub-hypothesis claims that MEPs from EU-15 Member States form relationships with each other more frequently than with EU-12 Member States. In practice, this means that the MEPs of EU-15 Member States more often table joint amendments with each other.

Table 28. – Descriptive statistics of the relationship of EU-15 Member States

Category	Relationships				
	Number	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Variance
Relationships formed with EU-15 Member States	3,459	230.6	43	486	148.0
Relationships formed with EU-12 Member States	388	25.9	0	104	37.4
Total	3,847	256.5	0	486	148.6

Source: own calculation

The descriptive statistics suggest that on average, EU-15 Member States tabled ten times more amendments with each other than with the EU-12 Member States. In

addition, this sub-hypothesis can also be confirmed by calculating the density indices within and between the EP Groups.

Table 29. – Density indices of Member States broken down by EU-15 and EU-12 Member States

Indicator	Relationships between EU-15 Member States	Relationships between EU-15 and EU-12 Member States	Relationships between EU-12 Member States	Total network
Number of maximum/potential relationships	105	165	55	325
Number of actually formed relationships	51	17	5	73
Density within the Group	0.49	0.1	0.09	0.22

Source: own calculation

As the intra-group density index is highest in the case of relationships between the EU-15 Member States, the H.3.3. sub-hypothesis is confirmed.

The H.3.4. sub-hypothesis states that MEPs from Member States with higher bilateral economic interdependency tie with each other more frequently: cooperate with each other more frequently when tabling legislative amendments. For a country, the share of the value of total trade in a bidirectional relationship compared to the value of the gross total trade of the country best expresses the bilateral economic interdependency. The determination of the closeness of economic relations (i.e. economic interdependency) is based on the UN's international trade statistics.[14] As a first test the subhypothesis, I analysed the statistical relationship between two attributes of the actors (MEPs), irrespective of the actor's role and position in the network. To this end I calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient between the weighted degree of the relationship between the EU Member States and the closeness of economic relations. The results suggest that we cannot reject the chance of a positive relationship between the weighted degree and the closeness of economic relations even at 1%. The results of the regression model naturally also

[14] United Nations (UN) International Trade Statistics UN Comtrade database (UNSD 2013).

confirm the above results. The results suggest that in the case of two Member States an increase of 1 percentage point in exports from the Member State that has great economic dependence on another will result in a 1.79 increase in the number of amendments tabled jointly by the two Member States.

The second step of the testing of the sub-hypothesis is the calculation of the QAP correlation. For this purpose I determined the non-symmetric matrix of the relationships between the 24 Member States[15] both in terms of economic interdependency (the ratio of export to the total export volume) and in terms of amendments tabled jointly (the ratio of joint amendments to the total amendments tabled by the given Member State). The result of the QAP correlation performed with the UCINET 6 program after 5,000 permutations is the following: Pearson-correlation 0.3502, p-value 0.0002, therefore significant at 1%. The low significance suggests that there is a low probability that the two matrices are independent from each other. The positive correlation means that the two variables are directly (although not strongly) proportional.

These results confirm the H.3.4. sub-hypothesis, namely that MEPs from Member States with higher bilateral economic interdependency tie with each other more frequently in the network: they cooperate more often with each other in tabling amendments.

The H.3.5. sub-hypothesis states that MEPs from the large EP Groups – EPP and S&D – are the most active ones in the network.

[15] The number of Member States from which MEPs tabled amendments to the analysed legislative proposals jointly with the MEPs of other Member States.

Graph 2. – The activity of MEPs by EP Group



Graph 2. summarises the 'degree' – number of connected EP Groups – and 'weighted degree' – number of connections – values for all EP Groups. From the results it can be seen that the EPP group is the most active in terms of weighted degree (number of connections with other groups) followed by S&D. In terms of 'degree' S&D tops the ranking with 5 degrees, followed by the EPP Group– in tie with ALDE and ECR – with 4 connections.

Table 30. – Descriptive statistics of the relationships of EP Groups

Category	Relationships				
	Number	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Variance
All EP Groups	2,172	271.5	13	850	289.7
Large EP Groups (EPP+S&D)	1,302	651	452	850	281.4
Other Groups	870	145	13	396	157.7
Groups on the same political side	638	91.1	4	299	119.6
Groups on different political sides	448	74.7	5	290	110.9

Source: own calculation

The descriptive statistics of the connections of EP Groups also suggest that the average of the number of amendments tabled by the members of the EPP and the S&D Groups is more than four times higher than the average of the number of amendments tabled by all other Groups. Based on this, we accept the H.3.5. sub-hypothesis.

The H.3.6.(1) subhypothesis states that the relationship between the S&D and the EPP Group is the most frequent relationship. I test this sub-hypothesis by calculating the number of edges (relationship) between the nodes (EP Groups).

Graph 3. – The number of edges between EP Groups



Source: own calculation

The results on Graph 3. show the EPP-EFD relationship is the most frequent one in this network. The EPP-S&D relationship takes the second place in the ranking. Therefore, we can't confirm the H.3.6. (1) sub-hypothesis.

According to the H.3.6.(2) sub-hypothesis, EP Groups on the same political side tie with each other more frequently.

The descriptive statistics of EP Groups suggest that both the number of relationships and its average are higher between Groups on the same political side. In addition,

this sub-hypothesis could also be tested by determining the density indices within and between Groups.

Table 31. – Density indices of EP Groups by political side

Indicator	Relationships within the same political side	Relationships between opposite political sides	Total network
Number of maximum/potential relationships	13	15	28
Number of actually formed connections	7	6	13
Density within the Group	0.54	0.4	0.46

Source: own calculation

According to the results almost 54% of the potential relationships were formed in the network between EP Groups on the same political side. Therefore, we accept the H.3.6(2). sub-hypothesis.

Figure 6. – Network of EP Groups and Member States by weighted degree



The H.3.7. hypothesis suggests that either the Greens-EFA or the ALDE EP group play the most important role as an intermediary in the network. This sub-hypothesis can be checked by calculating the betweenness centrality index for each of the EP Groups. The results are summarised in Graph 4. below.

Graph 4. – The role of EP Groups as intermediaries



Source: own calculation

Based on the above results we reject the H.3.7. sub-hypothesis, both H.3.7.(1) and H.3.7.(2). It is neither the ALDE nor the Greens-EFA, but the ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists – Group which plays the key intermediary or bridging role among the EP Groups. The results mean that the ECR Group is most frequently on the possible shortest path between two nodes. However, it shall be noted that the ECR owes this key position primarily to the fact that it helps independent MEPs participate in the process of tabling amendments, i.e. it connects independent MEPs to the EP Groups otherwise not in direct contact with them.

As low betweenness centrality in this context can be interpreted as being peripheral, it can also be concluded that GUE-NGL, Non-Inscrits and EFD MEPs play a peripheral role. The above results are visualised on Figure 7. below.[16] In the graph, the size of the nodes is proportionate to the number of directly not connected EP Groups between

[16] In Figure 6. and 7. PES refers to the EP Group of the Party of European Socialist, i.e. the S&D Group.

which the given node (EP Group) plays an intermediary role. The thickness of the edges represents the intensity of the relationship (by weighted degree).

Figure 7. – The relationship among EP Groups by betweenness centrality



The H.3.8. sub-hypothesis states that ideological differences (different party affiliations) are less an obstacle to forming relationships in the network (i.e. cooperation in the tabling of amendments) than the different nationalities, i.e. different Member State interests. In other words, differences between the interests of Member States appear to be a factor that poses a greater obstacle to forming relationships and cooperation between MEPs.

In terms of network analysis, this sub-hypothesis can be best tested with homophily indices, such as modularity. In the modularity analysis I classified MEPs into two types of categories (division into modules and clusters) based on the MEP-level dataset and the network: in the first part of the analysis I allocated MEPs to EP Groups

(categories 1-8) and in the second part to Member States (categories 1-25). Thereafter, I tested their existing relationships: to what extent MEPs' party affiliation and Member State determines the forming of relationship compared to the random rewiring of MEPs in the analysed network. The calculations were performed by the Python 2.7 software using Networkx 1.9[17]. As a result of the calculations, the modularity of the analysed network partitioned by EP Groups was 0.613 while the modularity of the network partitioned by Member State was 0.581. The modularity of both networks was significant at 5% (as opposed to the random rewiring of the actors) and the difference between the two modularities was also significant at 5%. As it is clear from the results, the modularity and homophily of the network partitioned by EP Groups was the higher. Accordingly, MEPs will cooperate with each other with greater probability along political and ideological lines and thus the H.3.8. sub-hypothesis is confirmed.

The H.3.9. sub-hypothesis states that MEPs of EU Member States that are geographically close to each other form ties with each other more often in the network. I used the QAP correlation to test this hypothesis. For this I determined the matrix of the relationships between the 24 Member States both in respect of the geographical distance between their capital cities and the jointly tabled amendments (the ratio of joint amendments to the total number of amendments tabled by the given Member State). The result of the QAP correlation performed with the UCINET 6 program after 5,000 permutations is the following: Pearson correlation -0.151, p-value 0.001, therefore significant at 1%. The negative correlation means that the two variables are inversely (although not strongly) proportional. Based on this, we reject the H.3.9. sub-hypothesis.

8.6. Conclusions, summary

This chapter investigates the decision-making of the European Parliament in the new CAP regulation using social network analysis. The main conclusions of the analysis are as follows.

[17] http://networkx.github.io/documentation/networkx-1.9/

Regarding the networks of Member States, this analysis confirms the preliminary sub-hypothesis that MEPs from EU-15 Member States are the most active ones – expressed in the number of degrees and weighted degrees – in the network. These results confirm the findings of Moschitz and Stolze (2009).

The results also confirm that net contributor Member States establish relationship with each other more frequently. Out of the 15 most frequent relationship between MSs, 10 relationships were formed exclusively by net beneficiary Member States. These results confirm the conclusions of Thurner and Binder (2009). The results of this analysis show that MEPs from EU-15 Member States form relationships with each other more frequently than with their counterparts from EU-12 Member States. This supports the concept of Stubb (1996) and Thurner and Binder (2009).

Finally, for the network of Member States, the results are in line with the conclusions of Thurner and Binder (2009) as MEPs from Member States with higher bilateral economic interdependency tie with each other more frequently. This is confirmed by the indices reflected in bilateral economic relationships (interdependencies) between the Member States and the results of the regression model of the weighted degree characterising bilateral relationships in the network (the frequency of bilateral relations) as well as the results of the QAP correlation. However, contrary to the sub-hypothesis, the research outcomes did not confirm that MEPs from EU Member States closer to each other geographically would cooperate with each other more frequently when tabling amendments.

Regarding the networks of EP Groups, the research outcomes didn't confirm the conclusions of Votewatch (2014), concretely that MEPs from the large EP Groups – EPP and S&D – are the most active ones in the network. To the contrary, the research outcomes supports Patz's (2011b) findings that EP groups from the same political side cluster together. The results of the research do not confirm the conclusions of Thurner and Binder (2009) and also contradicts with the previous analysis CEPS-Votewatch (2012) and Votewatch (2014), because neither ALDE nor the Greens EP Group played

the most important role as an intermediary among the EP Groups. Instead we find that the ECR EP Group plays this role.

Finally, the results confirm that ideological differences between MEPs – more precisely between EP Groups – are less a fragmenting factor which may impede cooperation, than different nationalities and national interests. MEPs tie with each other more likely along political, ideological lines. It supports the conclusions of CEPS-Votewatch (2012) and is also partly in line with the statements of Mérand et al. (2011).

The analysis presented in this chapter studies the relationships in the legislative amendments tabled in the European Parliament during the 2013 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the network created by those relationships with both network analysis and statistical methods. Even though in recent years some research analysed the EU decision-making process and the role of the EP from the perspective and with the toolkit of network analysis, network analysis based on EP amendments is a new field of research.

In sum, we can conclude that the social network analysis highlighted a number of factors, which influence the cooperation and network of MEPs in the European Parliament. Particularly, the results regarding sub-hypotheses 3.2., 3.3., 3.4., 3.6(2), 3.8., contain information regarding the characteristics of MEPs – including their party affiliation and nationality – that has an impact on their cooperation in the network. Based on this, we confirm the H.3. hypothesis.

Chapter 9 SUMMARY

The main objective of the research that I present in this dissertation is to examine the role and influence of the European Parliament in the legislative procedure of the 2013 CAP reform. The analyses of the reforms of the CAP has always attracted significant scientific attention (see Swinnen, 2008), however, to date, the investigation of the decision-making process of the CAP has recieved much less attention.

The objective of the research was to come up with a much detailed and fine-tuned picture on the role of the European Parliament in the decision-making process. While previous research analysing the inter-institutional relationships of the European Union viewed the position of the Parliament as an entity in light of the role of the Commission and the Council (Scully, 1997b; Pech, 2011; Christiansen and Dobbels, 2013), this research covers all the phases of the decision-making process, which makes it possible to analyse the roles of the COMAGRI, the opinion-giving committees as well as the EP plenary session.

The real novelty of the research is that it analyses the role of the Members of the European Parliament in the legislative process by categorising them as rapporteurs, members or substitute members of the COMAGRI.

This analysis is also relevant because the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, making the European Parliament a co-legislator in the domain of the Common Agricultural Policy. Although previous analyses reached different, sometimes conflicting conclusions regarding the changing influence of the EP under co-decision, preliminary expectations and the experiences of the legislation of other EU policy domains projected that the introduction and the extension of the co-decision procedure increased the legislative influence of the European Parliament (Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Swinnen and Knops, 2012).

In this dissertation, the role of the EP in the 2013 CAP reform is analysed in comparison with the CAP legislation in the previous EU programming period. Given that in the previous EU programming period the EP took part in the legislative process

under the consultation procedure, this makes it possible to compare the influence of the EP under two different EU legislative procedures.

This research is based on a new dataset which was gathered by the author of this disseration and contains thousands of European parliamentary amendments. This new dataset provided the opportunity to analyse the decision-making process with novel methods and to apply new approaches. The analysis of the dataset made it possible not only to present, quantify and measure the influence of the EP as a whole, but also to show the influence of all stages and key players of the decision-making process in a quantified way.

It was also one of the objectives of the dissertation to use novel methods in the domain of EU decision-making, specifically methods that have not yet been applied for the analysis of the role and influence of the EP and its internal structures in the legislative process. In the related literature, success rates of EP amendments (Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis et al.,2001; Kreppel, 2002) as well as the analysis of factors influencing the adoption of EP amendments (Kreppel, 1999; Lucic, 2004; Kardasheva, 2009; Burns et al., 2009) are widely discussed. Based on the new dataset, the application of two new methods became possible.

First I developed a confirmatory factor analysis model, which defines hypotheses based on relevant literature and my personal experiences regarding the interrelatedness of the factors as well as the latent variables influencing the adoption of amendments. Second, it is also a novel methodological approach to apply social network analysis to the investigation of the internal relations of the European Parliament during EU decision-making. Although SNA already been conducted in the context of the European Parliament has (Patz, 2011b; 2012), the networks embodied in the jointly tabled EP amendments have not been analysed yet. Nevertheless, it is a completely new element in the SNA that the networks of MEPs and Member States are analysed in light of the trade and geographical relations among the Member States.

9.1. Reflections on the research questions and hypotheses

Based on relevant literature, preliminary expectations and my own personal experiences, three key research questions and related hypotheses have been defined in this dissertation. In this chapter I present the key results and conclusions of the reseach as regards the three research hypotheses.

The first hypothesis of the dissertation is as follows:

H1. hypothesis: The European Parliament increased its legislative influence in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy with the extension of the co-decision procedure by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Regarding the H1. hypothesis I analysed the increase of the legislative influence of the European Parliament by comparing the adoption rates of EP amendments between the co-decision and the consultation procedures. Unlike previous related research (Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Kreppel, 2002), this research came up with the novelty that the European parliamentary amendments have been categorised according to the characteristics of the amendments as well as the characteristics and decision-making role of the tabling MEPs. This made it possible to calculate the success rates of EP amendments in each of these categories. Additionally, the adoption of amendments has been analysed at all three phases of decision-making, which gives a comprehensive overview on the nuances of the intra-EP decision-making.

The results of the calculations show that the adoption rates of EU amendments of the CAP legislation was higher in all the investigated categories under the co-decision procedure compared to the consultation procedure. Based on this, we can state that after the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament enhanced its role and increased its influence in the legislation of the Common Agricultural Policy. Therefore, we confirm the H1. hypothesis.

In general, these results of the analysis confirm the conclusions of Corbett et al. (1995) and Tsebelis et al. (2001), namely that the adoption rate of European parliamentary amendments is higher under the co-decision procedure. The results also confirm the main finding of Hix (2002), Kreppel (2002), Thomson et al. (2006), and Jupille (2007), that the EP increased its legislative power with the introduction of the co-decision procedure.

The results of this research are also in line with the findings of Crombez and Swinnen (2011) on the CAP reform, namely that the European Parliament gained legislative influence with the change from consultation procedure to co-decision procedure. The results also underpin the conclusions of Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig (2012) that the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon increased the legislative influence of the EP in the CAP legislation.

It is noteworthy to mention that more than half of the agricultural policy amendments that were in the negotiation mandate of the EP towards the Council in the 2013 CAP reform were incorporated into the final regulations. Based on this result we can fairly state that during the trialogue negotiations the EP was an equally influencial partner next to the Council. This result reinforces the positions of Crombez (1997), Tsebelis and Garrett (2001), as well as Selck and Steunenberg (2004) that the EP became a real co-legislator with the Council after the introduction of the co-decision procedure.

Regarding the relationship between the COMAGRI and the EP plenary, we can conclude that the EP plenary largely shared the position taken by the COMAGRI by adopting the COMAGRI-supported amendments almost automatically. It means that the main political and policy direction was not set by the EP plenary but the COMAGRI. It reinforces the conclusions of Neuhold (2001) and Yordanova (2010) that the parliamentary committees and their reports constitute the backbone of parliamentary decision-making.

It is also worth to highlight some of the new findings, results and conclusions of this research regarding the role of MEPs and the legislative influence of opinion-giving committees. Out of all the various types of amendments, compromise amendments have the highest adoption rate. This result – together with the high adoption rates of draft report amendments – shows the imporant role and significant legislative influence of EP rapporteurs. Finally, it is important to note that the role of opinion-giving committees of the EP in the legislation of the 2013 CAP reform was very limited: the adoption rate of their amendments was the lowest among all categories.

Concerning the second hypothesis of the research and its testing, we can draw the following conclusions. The H2. hypothesis is the following:

H2. hypothesis: The characteristics of the amendments and the proposing MEPs and their Member States as well as the factors defined by these characteristics have an impact on the adoption of EP amendments at each of the decision-making levels in the EP in the field of CAP.

As the result of the binary logistic regression I identified a number of significant explanatory variables at all three levels of decision-making under both legislative procedures. These significant variables influence the adoption of the EP amendments, some positively, some negatively. The existance of significant variables confirms the H2. hypothesis, therefore, we accept it. The binary logistic regression identified the following significant variables along the categories connected to the H2. hypothesis.

Regarding the variables connected to the type of the amendment the ‘Compromise amendment’ and the ‘Draft report amendment’ variables were significant at all three decision-making levels under the consultation procedure. In the co-decision procedure, the ‘Recital amendment’ variable was also significant at the intra-EP decision-making levels. Given that the Recital amendments were positively related with the chance of adoption of the amendment, this outcome confirms the conclusions of Kreppel (1999).

As for the variables connected to the characteristics of the MEPs, only some of the EP Group variables – EPP, ALDE – were significant under the consultation procedure. Under the co-decision procedure, the EPP variable was also significant together with the 'COMAGRI Member' and 'Substitute Member' variables. In case of all these three variables, the positive classification increased the chance of adoption of the amendments. The results related to the EP Group variables – EPP, ALDE – confirm the conclusions of Hix et al. (2005) and Yordanova (2009).

Concerning the variables realted to the Member State of the MEP, the 'EU-15 MSs' and the 'Agricultural MSs' variables were significant under the consultation procedure. However, under the co-decision procedure, four Member State-related variables were significant at least at one of the decision-making levels: 'Net contributor MSs', 'EU-15 MSs', 'Cohesion MSs' and 'Constituency'.

Besides analysing the variables of the research with logistic regression, I also applied confirmative factor analysis to investigate the impact of five latent variables – in other words, factors or groups of variables – on the adoption of EP amendments. Because of the weak model fit of the confirmative model, the results of the model should be treated with reservation. With this in mind, we can draw the following conclusions.

According to the results, the legal-institutional factors influence the probability of adoption of EP amendments by the COMAGRI. This result confirms the findings of Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999), Tsebelis et al. (2001), Lucic (2004) and Kardasheva (2009).

Concerning the factors connected to the characteristics of the MEP, I expected that these factors influence the probability of adoption in the COMAGRI. However, the results show that the value of the relevant parameter is 0, therefore, there it has no explanatory power. This result does not confirm the conclusions of Sigalas (2010) that the personal characteristics of MEPs influence their legislative and parliamentary activities.

The results of the model also show that the factors connected to the Member State of the MEPs has an impact on the probability of the adoption of European parliamentary amendments both at the level of EP plenary and the Council. This result confirms the findings of the research of Sigalas (2010) and Kovács (2014). We can also conclude that these factors influence the adoption of amendments by the Council more.

Based on the results, we can also conclude that the factors characterising the type of the amendment also influence the probability of adoption of EP amendments in the COMAGRI. This result is in line with the conclusions of the analysis of Shackleton (1999) and Kreppel (1999).

Finally, based on the results of the SEM we can state that the political factors of decision-making also influence the probability of adoption of EP amendments at all three levels of decision-making. It is also noteworthy that political factors have a larger impact on the decisions taken in the Council, which shows the significant influence of MEPs having the same political affiliation as their respective governments in their Member States. These results confirm the findings of the articles of Kreppel (1999) and Kardasheva (2009).

One of the novelties in the analysis that I used to test the H2. hypothesis is that some of the variables – for example, the Member State-related variables – have not been analysed in any previous papers yet. Additionally, as I wrote earlier, the application of SEM as research methodology in the context of the decision-making of the EU is also a novelty.

Concerning the third hypothesis and its testing of the research, we can come to the following conclusions.

> *H3. hypothesis: When tabling amendments to CAP legislative instruments, the characteristics of MEPs and their Member States influence the cooperation and networks among them in the European Parliament.*

One of the general but very important conclusions of the analysis drawn when testing this hypothesis is that the role of the European Parliament in EU legislation can be analysed with the tools and methods of social network analysis, and that these results can be interpreted in real-life circumstances. The results make it possible to better understand the role of the EP and its political groups in EU decision-making, and also how this role is influenced by the political affiliation and nationality of the MEPs. The analysis identified a number of MEP and Member State-related factors that have an impact on the cooperation among the MEPs, therefore, we confirm the H3. hypothesis.

As for the concrete results of the research, we can make the following statements.

The analysis of the network of Member States confirms that when tabling legislative amendments, MEPs from net contributor Member States join with each other more frequently than with MEPs from net beneficiary MSs. This result confirms the conclusions of Thurner and Binder (2009). The results of the analysis also confirm that EU-15 Member States tie with each other more frequently than with EU-12 MSs, which underpins and confirms the findings of Stubb (1996) and Thurner and Binder (2009).

The results of the analysis of the network of Member States also confirm that MEPs from Member States with closer economic and trade relationships tie with each other more frequently. This outcome also confirms the conclusions of Thurner and Binder (2009). Nevertheless, based on the results of the research we reject the hypothesis that MEPs from Member States which are geographically closer to each other cooperate with each other more frequently when proposing legislative amendments.

Finally, the findings of this research confirm that cooperation among MEPs will take place more frequently along political-ideological line than along national interests. In other words, differences in national interests are more a fragmenting factor regarding the cooperation of MEPs in tabling joint legislative amendments. This is in line with the results and outcomes of CEPS-Votewatch (2012), Mérand et al. (2011) and Roederer-Rynning (2015).

As written above, the social network analysis, its methods and indices that were used for testing the H3. hypothesis have not been applied to the analysis of EP amendments and to the decision-making of the European Parliament previously. Therefore, practically, all the results of the analysis could be considered novel.

9.2. Theoretical and practical relevance of the research

The research presented in this dissertation contributes to the extension of the current theoretical framework several ways by analysing both the decision-making of the European Parliament in general and also in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy. This research mostly contributes to existing research in the field of 1) the analysis of impacts of the extension of the co-decision procedure, 2) the analysis of amendment- and MEP-related explanatory variables, and 3) the application of SNA tools to the investigation of EP decision-making.

As for the practical applicability of this research, it could be primarily of interest to analysts dealing with EU decision-making, as well as to those who want to influence EU decision-making. Among the latter ones could be interest-representing organizations, stakeholders of the agrifood industry or lobbying companies. Broadly, any group that could gain from indentifying the key players of EU decision-making along with their networks could benefit from leveraging and expanding these methods.

9.3. The limitations and the future directions of research

Concerning the limitations of the research presented in this dissertation, I would like to highlight three factors.

First, during the analysis, the European Parliamentary amendments were not categorized or weighted according to their policy importance. It inherently brings some distortions into the research, mostly into the calculation of adoption rates of amendments: it might occur that the adoption of less imporant, even marginal

amendments increase the rate of adoption, although, there is not real policy success behind the adoption of this kind of amendment.

Second, as I emphasized in the introduction of this dissertation, the research presented in this dissertation is a case study. This means that at this moment, it is not possible to compare the results of this analysis to those from other EU policy domains.
Therefore, the results of the analysis and their interpretation, especially regarding the changing influence of the EP under the co-decision procedure, should be taken with reservation and due care.

Third, when analysing the explanatory variables, including during the logistic regression and structural equation modeling, joint amendments have been extracted and interpreted multiple times. This necessarily brings distortion to the research, which cannot be eliminated in case we want to test the MEP and Member State related variables.

With regards to the above three factors, I find it important to emphasise the following about the potential future directions of research.

It would be advisable if future research would also concentrate on the analysis of the content of amendments as well as on weighting the amendments according to their importance when analysing the changing influence of the European Parliament after the extension of the co-decision procedure to the CAP. Additionally, in order to get a better understanding on the EP's legislative role, further emphasis should be placed on examining the relationship between the EP and the Council by investigating the factors influencing the adoption of the EP's position (its amendments) during the trialogue negotiations.
It is also important to note that the results of the comparison of the two legislative procedures confirm the increase in the influence of the European Parliament, which is most likely the consequence of the extension of the co-decision procedure. Nevertheless, theoretically it cannot be excluded that the increased legislative influence of the EP was not – or not only – the result of the Treaty of Lisbon, but also other, non-observed factors outside of the scope of the research presented in this

dissertation. These speculations could be justified in further research, in the framework of which the results of this dissertation – namely on the role of the EP in the CAP legislative procedure – can be compared with the policy results that the European Parliament achieved during the legislative procedure of other policy areas under the 2014-2020 EU programming period, for example, Cohesion Policy or the Common Fisheries Policy.

Regarding the analysis of the factors influencing the adoption of EP amendments, future research can cover an extended number of explanatory variables. This is particularly true for the structural equation modeling, where the weak model-fit refers to the fact that the legislation and its outcome is influenced by factors – observed and latent variables – that have not been investigated in this dissertation. Additionally, further exploratory analysis can include setting up and specifying new models via a model selection procedure.

Regarding potential future research connected to network analysis, extending the number of factors influencing the cooperation among MEPs could result in novel and interesting outcomes. In practice it means the calculation of homophily indices for other characteristics of the MEPs beyond the party affiliation and nationality. Also, future research can deal with the relationships embedded in compromise amendments, as well as with the deeper analysis of the network of Member States beyond the factors of geographical proximity and trade dependencies.

Finally, this research can also be extended in the future with the analyis of networks embedded in the adopted EP amendments. This would allow us to analyse and compare the "winning" networks to those of the networks presented in this dissertation. Additionally, network analysis can also be applied in other EU policy areas, providing us with the opportuntiy to compare the EP networks in various policy domains.

8. LITERATURE

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1. ANNEX 1: List of EP documents analysed

The 2013 CAP reform

Direct Payment Regulation

Draft Report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625final/2 – C7-0336/2011 – 2011/0280(COD)), Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, Rapporteur: Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos, PE474.052v01-00, 30.5.2012

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 111 – 282, PE491.238v01-00, 18.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 283 – 611, PE492.791v01-00, 19.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 612 – 939, PE492.792v01-00, 19.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 940 – 1243, PE492.793v01-00, 20.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1244 – 1580, PE494.483v01-00, 23.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1581 – 1883, PE494.487v01-00, 24.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1884 – 2218, PE494.491v01-00, 24.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 2219 – 2292, PE494.604v01-00, 25.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 2293 – 2297, PE497.986v02-00, 18.10.2012

Compromise amendments

COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 – 38, PE500.765v01, 18.12.2012

Opinions

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 – C7 0336/2011 – 2011/0280(COD)); PE491.199v02-00, 16.10.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 – C7 0336/2011 – 2011/0280(COD)); PE480.659v02-00, 10.10.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 – C7 0336/2011 – 2011/0280(COD)); PE485.891v02-00, 25.6.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, (COM(2011)0625 – C7 0336/2011 – 2011/0280(COD)); PE483.719v02-00, 24.9.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy (COM(2011)0625 – C7 0336/2011 – 2011/0280(COD)); PE494.613v02-00, 17.10.2012

Plenary amendments

AMENDMENTS 1, PE519.386, 14.11.2013
AMENDMENTS 2-4, PE519.386v01-00, 13.11.2013
AMENDMENTS 5-13, PE519.386v01-00, 13.11.2013
AMENDMENTS 14-18, PE519.386v01-00, 13.11.2013

EP negotiation mandate

PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, B7-0079/2013, PE503.600v01-00, 4.2.2013

EP Report

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, A7-0362/2013, PE474.052v02-00, 5.11.2013

Final Regulation

REGULATION (EU) No 1307/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, Official Journal of the European Union 20.12.2013

EAFRD Regulation

Draft report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), (COM(2011)0627 – C7-0340/2011 – 2011/0282(COD)), PE474.053v01-00, 24.5.2012

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 74 – 274, PE489.640v01-00, 20.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 275 – 700, PE492.797v01-00, 24.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 701 – 1051, PE492.949v01-00, 24.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1052 – 1396, PE494.479v01-00, 25.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1397 – 1733, PE494.480v01-00, 25.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1734 – 2063, PE494.481v01-00, 26.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 2064 – 2127, PE494.602v01-00, 26.7.2012
AMENDMENT 2128, PE497.987v01, 18.10.2012

Compromise amendments

COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 – 37, PE501.948v01-00, 18.12.2012

Opinions

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); PE491.200v02-00, 17.10.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE489.357v03-00, 21.9.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE485.892v02-00, 21.6.2012

OPINION of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE486.102v02-00, 24.9.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE492.639v02-00, 16.10.2012

Plenary amendments

AMENDMENTS 001, PE519.385/1, 14.11.2013, A7-0361/ 001-001
Amendment 2, PE519.385v01-00, 13.11.2013, A7-0361/2
Amendment 3, PE519.385v01-00, 13.11.2013, A7-0361/3
Amendment 4, PE519.385v01-00, 13.11.2013, A7-0361/4

EP negotiation mandate

PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), B7-0081/2013, PE503.602v01-00, 4.2.2013

EP Report

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), A7-0361/2013, PE474.053v02-00, 5.11.2013

Final Regulation

REGULATION (EU) No 1305/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, Official Journal of the European Union, 20.12.2013

Horizontal Regulation

Draft report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, (COM(2011)0628 – C7-0341/2011 – 2011/0288(COD)), PE483.834v01-00, 30.5.2012

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 103 – 424, PE492.777v02-00, 20.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 425 – 769, PE494.482v02-00, 20.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 770 – 779, PE497.774v01-00, 16.10.2012
AMENDMENTS 780 – 789, PE497.977v01-00, 17.10.2012
AMENDMENTS 790 – 816, PE498.000v01-00, 18.10.2012

Compromise amendments

COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 – 27, PE501.971v01-00, 17.12.2012

Opinions

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE491.202v02-00, 17.10.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE489.355v02-00, 21.9.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE485.889v02-00, 21.6.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, PE494.608v02-00, 17.10.2012

Plenary amendments

AMENDMENTS 001-001, PE519.387/1, A7-0363/ 001-001, 14.11.2013
Amendment 2-5, PE519.987v01-00, A7-0363/2, 13.11.2013

EP negotiation mandate

PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament

and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the CAP, B7-0082/2013, PE503.603v01-00, 4.2.2013

EP Report

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, A7-0363/2013, PE483.834v02-00, 5.11.2013

Final Regulation

REGULATION (EU) No 1306/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, Official Journal of the European Union, 20.12.2013

Single CMO Regulation

Draft report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (COM(2011)0626 – C7-0339/2011 – 2011/0281(COD)), PE485.843v02-00, 5.6.2012

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 435 – 737, PE492.801v01-00, 19.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 738 – 1095, PE494.488v01-00, 20.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1096 – 1415, PE494.486v01-00, 23.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1416 – 1548, PE494.484v01-00, 24.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 1549 – 1848, PE494.588v01-00, 25.7.2012

AMENDMENTS 1849 – 2094, PE492.804v01-00, 25.7.2012
AMENDMENTS 2095 – 2227, PE494.489v01-00, 25.7.2012

Compromise amendments

COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 – 96, PE497.939v01-00, 20.12.2012
COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 97 – 176, PE501.994v01, 20.12.2012

Opinions

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation); PE491.201v02-00, 17.10.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), PE485.893v02-00, 21.6.2012

OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), PE494.633v02-00, 8.11.2012

Plenary amendments

AMENDMENTS 001-001, PE519.388/ 1, A7-0366/ 001-001, 14.11.2013
Amendment 2, PE519.388, A7-0366/2, 13.11.2013
Amendment 8, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/8, 13.11.2013
Amendment 16, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/16, 13.11.2013
Amendment 25, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/25, 13.11.2013
Amendment 30/rev., PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/30/rev., 18.11.2013

Amendment 31, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/31, 13.11.2013
Amendment 35, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/35, 13.11.2013
Amendment 37, PE519.388v01-00, A7-0366/37, 13.11.2013

EP negotiation mandate

PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION ON THE OPENING OF, AND MANDATE FOR, INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS pursuant to Rule 70(2) and Rule 70a of the Rules of Procedure on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), B7-0080/2013, PE503.601v02-00, 11.2.2013

EP Report

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), A7-0366/2013, PE485.843v03-00, 6.11.2013

Final regulation

REGULATION (EU) No 1308/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007, Official Journal of the European Union, 20.12.2013

MINUTES Meeting of 23 January 2013, from 9.00 to 12.30 and from 15.00 to 18.30, and 24 January 2013, from 9.00 to 12.30, BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2013)0123_1, PE502.270v01-00

EP Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, PE 506.441, 13/03/2013

The CAP legislative instruments under the consultation procedure, 2005-2008

Direct Payment Regulation

Draft report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, (COM(2008)0306 – C6-0240/2008 – 2008/0103(CNS)), PE407.775v01-00, 25.6.2008

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 133 – 242, PE407.776v01-00, 1.9.2008
AMENDMENTS 243 – 391, PE412.042v01-00, 2.9.2008
AMENDMENTS 392 – 495, PE412.053v01-00, 3.9.2008
AMENDMENTS 496 – 601, PE412.054v01-00, 3.9.2008
AMENDMENTS 602 – 680, PE412.067v01-00, 3.9.2008
AMENDMENTS 681 – 739, PE412.069v01-00, 3.9.2008
AMENDMENTS 740 – 789, PE412.081v01-00, 4.9.2008

Compromise amendments

COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS 1 – 41, PE413.949v01-00, 2.10.2008

Opinions

OPINION of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE409.570v02-00, 16.9.2008

OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE409.507v02-00, 12.9.2008

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE409.798v02-00, 7.10.2008

COMAGRI documents

Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES, Meeting of 6 October 2008, from 15.00 to 18.30, and 7 October 2008, from 09.00 to 10.45 and from 15.00 to 18.30, BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2008)1006_1, PE414.020v01-00

REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, PE407.775v03-00, 21.10.2008

EP Plenary documents

EP Plenary, Results of the votes, Annex, PE 416.039/1, 19/11/2008

Support schemes for farmers under the CAP, European Parliament legislative resolution of 19 November 2008 on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, P6_TA(2008)0549

Final Regulation

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, Official Journal of the European Union 31.1.2009

EAFRD Regulation

Draft report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, (COM(2004)0490 – C6-0181/2004 – 2004/0161(CNS)), PE 353.498v01-00, 24.2.2005

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 30-342, PE 355.724v01-00, 4.4.2005

Compromise amendments

COMPROMISE PROPOSALS 1-3, PE 357.676v01, 21.4.2005

Opinions

OPINION of the Committee on Budgets for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE 355.400v03-00, 22.4.2005

OPINION of the Committee on Regional Development for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation on

support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE 355.448v02-00, 22.4.2005

COMAGRI documents

Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES of the meeting of 26 April 2005, from 9 a.m. to 12.30 a.m. BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2005)0426, PE 357.889v01-00

REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), PE 353.498v02-00, 12.5.2005

EP Plenary documents

AMENDMENTS 1-129 tabled by the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, A6-0145/1-129, PE 357.465, 2.6.2005
AMENDMENT 130, A6-0145/130, PE 357.465, 1.6.2005
AMENDMENT 132/rev, A6-0145/132/rev, PE 357.465v02-00, 2.6.2005

European Parliament Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, ANNEX 1, PE 357.486/1, 07/06/2005

European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, P6_TA(2005)0215

Final Regulation

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), Official Journal of the European Union, 21.10.2005

Horizontal Regulation

Draft report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, (COM(2004) 0489 – C6-0166/2004 – 2004/0164(CNS)), PE 353.479v01-00, 24.2.2005

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 6-21, PE 355.726v01-00,5.4.2005

Opinions

OPINION of the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, PE 357.687v01-00, 21.4.2005

COMAGRI documents

Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES of the meeting of 26 April 2005, from 9 a.m. to 12.30 a.m. BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2005)0426, PE 357.889v01-00,

REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, PE 353.479v02-00, 2.5.2005

EP Plenary documents

EP Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, ANNEX 1, PE 357.436/1, 26/05/2005

European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, P6_TA(2005)0193

Single CMO Regulation

Draft report

DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, (COM(2006)0822 – C6-0045/2007 – 2006/0269(CNS)), PE 384.346v01-00, 19.3.2007

Open amendments

AMENDMENTS 20-96, PE 384.551v01-00, 17.4.2007

COMAGRI documents

Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, MINUTES Meeting of 7 May 2007, from 15.00 to 18.30, and 8 May 2007, from 09.00 to 17.30 BRUSSELS, AGRI_PV(2007)0507, PE 388.534v01-00

REPORT on the proposal for a Council regulation on establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, PE 384.346v02-00, 10.5.2007

EP Plenary documents

EP Plenary Session, RESULTS OF VOTES, ANNEX 1, PE 389.514/1, 24/05/2007

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 May 2007 on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, P6_TA(2007)0207

2. ANNEX 2: Other EU documents used during the analysis

European Commission: Proposal for a Council Regulation on the financing of the common agricultural policy, COM (2004) 489 final, 2004/0164 (CNS), Brussels, 14.7.2004

European Commission: Proposal for a Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), COM (2004) 490 final, 2004/0161 (CNS), Brussels, 14.7.2004

European Commission: Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, COM(2006) 822 final, 2006/0269 (CNS), Brussels, 18.12.2006

European Commission: Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, COM(2008) 306 final, 2008/0103(CNS), Brussels, 20.5.2008

European Commission: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy, COM (2011) 625 final, 2011/0280 (COD) Brussels, 20.10.2011

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European Commission: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), COM (2011) 627 final, 2011/0282 (COD), Brussels, 12.10.2011

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European Commission: One trillion euro to invest in Europe's future – the EU's budget framework 2014-2020, European commission's Press Release; IP/13/1096, 19.11.2013

European Parliament (1999): Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24 and 25 March 1999, Nr: 100/1/99 rev; TABLE B: Financial Framework EU-21,

European Council (2005): Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 15/16 December 2005, 15914/1/05, REV 1, CONCL 3, and 15915/05, CADREFIN 268, Annex I.

Single European Act (SEA, 1987): Official Journal of the European Communities, L 169, Volume 30, 29 June 1987, ISSN 0378-6978

Treaty of Maastricht (TM, 1992) Official Journal of the European Communities, C 224, Volume 35, 31 August 1992, ISSN 0378-6986

Treaty of Amsterdam (TA, 1997): Official Journal of the European Communities, C 340, Volume 40, 10 November 1997, ISSN 0378-6986

Treaty of Nice (TN, 2001): Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001/C 80/1, 10.3.2001

Treaty of Lisbon (TL, 2007): Official Journal of the European Union, C 306, Volume 50, 17 December 2007, ISSN 1725-2423

3. ANNEX 3: Classification of Member States in the Dataset

3.1.Net contributor Member States

2007-2013*	2014-2020**
Austria	Austria
Belgium	Belgium
Denmark	Denmark
Finland	Finland
France	France
Germany	Germany
Italy	Italy
Luxembourg	Luxembourg
Netherlands	Netherlands
Sweden	Sweden
United Kingdom	United Kingdom
	Cyprus

** Source: European Commission, average of 2005-2009, own calculation*

*** Source: European Commission, 2012*

3.2.Cohesion countries

2007-2013	2014-2020
Bulgaria	Bulgaria
Cyprus	Croatia
Estonia	Czech Repbulic
Greece	Estonia
Hungary	Greece
Ireland	Hungary
Latvia	Latvia
Lithuania	Lithuania
Malta	Poland
Poland	Portugal
Portugal	Romaina
Romania	Slovakia
Slovakia	Slovenia
Slovenia	
Spain	

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/

3.3.EU-15 Member States

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

3.4.Agricultural Member States

2007-2013*	2014-2020*
Bulgaria	Bulgaria
Cyprus	Cyprus
Estonia	Denmark
France	France
Greece	Greece
Hungary	Hungary
Ireland	Italy
Italy	Lithuania
Latvia	The Netherlands
Lithuania	Poland
Malta	Romania
The Netherlands	Spain
Poland	
Portugal	
Romania	
Slovenia	
Spain	

** Source: own calculation based on Eurostat data*

3.5.Member States with constituencies in the European Parliament elections

Belgium
France
Ireland
Italy
Poland
United Kingdom

4. ANNEX 4: Relevant publications of the author

4.1.List of publications in Hungarian

Academic volumes, chapters in academic volumes:

Kovács, A. [2015]: Az Európai Parlament mint az Európa-politikát formáló erő, In: Marján Attila (Eds.) Európa-Politológia – Tagállamok Európái, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, ISBN 978-615-5527-17-3, pp.299-330.

Peer-reviewed journals:

Kovács, A. [2014]: Az Európai Parlament szerepe a Közös Agrárpolitika 2007 és 2013 közötti többéves pénzügyi keretre vonatkozó jogszabályainak megalkotásában. Gazdálkodás, 58(5), pp.442-451.
Available:http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/206104/2/GAZDALKODAS_2014_05_Kovacs_442_451.pdf

Kovács, A. [2014]: A konzultációtól az együttdöntésig, Az Európai Parlament megnövekedett szerepe a Közös Agrárpolitika jogalkotásában. Politikatudományi Szemle, 23(4), pp.35-67.
Available: http://www.poltudszemle.hu/szamok/2014_4szam/kovacs.pdf

Kovács, A. [2015]: Politikai hálózatok az Európai Parlamentben. A Közös Agrárpolitika 2013-as reformjának hálózatelemzése. Külgazdaság, approved publication

Kovács, A. [2015]: Strukturális egyenletek modelljének alkalmazása a Közös Agrárpolitika 2013-as reformjának elemzésére. Statisztikai Szemle, 93(8-9). pp.801-822.
Available:http://www.ksh.hu/statszemle_archive/2015/2015_08-09/2015_08-09_801.pdf

Participation in conferences without publication of the full paper:

Kovács, A. [2015]: Politikai hálózatok az Európai Parlamentben: A Közös Agrárpolitika 2013-as reformjának hálózatelemzése. Annual Conference of the Hungarian Association of Agricultural Economics, (Budapest, 12 May 2015)
Available:http://www.makegy.hu/uploads/fe7ef31a06af3700f56b9281c4ee868731af138c/20150512_MAKE_Final_AK.ppt

4.2.List of publications in English

Academic volumes, chapters in academic volumes:

Fertő, I., Kovács, A. [2015]: Parliamentary Amendments to the Legislative Proposals of the 2013 CAP Reform. In: Johan Swinnen (Eds.) The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy, An Imperfect Storm. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brüsszel and Rowman and Littlefield International, London, pp.379-413.
Available:http://aei.pitt.edu/66654/1/Political_Economy_of_the_CAP_Final_small.pdf

Participation in conferences with publication of the full paper submitted:

Kovács, A. [2013]: New Ways for Companies to Develop Effective Lobbying Strategies in the European Parliament, A case study in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy. Proceedings of FIKUSZ ’13 Symposium for Young Researchers, University of Óbuda, ISBN 978-615-5018-91-6, pp.77-96.
Available: http://kgk.uni-obuda.hu/sites/default/files/07_Kovacs_Attila.pdf

Kovács, A. [2014]: The Role of the European Parliament in the Formulation of the Common Agricultural Policy. Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége, Spring Wind Conference, 2014, Debrecen, Hungary, ISBN: 978-963-89560-5-7, pp.301-307.
Available: http://www.dosz.hu/dokumentumfile/TSZ-I-kotet.pdf

Kovács, A. [2014]: The Legislative Influence of the European Parliament in the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy Reform. 7th International Management Conference, Managerial Challenges of contemporary Society, 7(1), Cluj Napoca, Romania, ISSN 2069-4229, pp.191-196.

Kovács, A. [2014]: Political Networks in the European Parliament: Network Analysis of the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy Reform. Proceedings of FIKUSZ '14 Symposium for Young Researchers, 2014, University of Óbuda, ISBN 978-615-5460-28-9, pp.107-122.
Available: http://kgk.uni-obuda.hu/sites/default/files/10-Attila-Kovacs.pdf

Participation in conferences without publication of the full paper:

Kovács, A. [2013]: Round-table: The Political Economy of the 2013 CAP Reform. Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels, Belgium; 28 October 2013)

Kovács, A. [2014]: The role of the European Parliament in the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy reform. 3rd PhD Student Conference, Corvinus University of Budapest (Budapest, 23 June 2014)

Kovács, A. [2014]: The Role of the European Parliament in the Legislation of the Common Agricultural Policy. 142nd EAAE Seminar (Budapest, 28 May 2014)
Available: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/169396/2/paper_Kovacs.pdf

Kovács, A. [2014]: The changing legislative power of the European Parliament: the way from consultation to co-decision – A case study in the Common Agricultural Policy 9th Annual Doctoral Conference, Central European University (Budapest, 24-25 April 2014)

Kovács, A. [2014]: Inter-institutional coalitions and analysis of European Parliamentary amendments in the 2013 CAP reform. XIVth Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists (Ljubljana, Slovenia; 26-29 August 2014)

Kovács, A. [2014]: The role of the European Parliament in the legislation of the Common Agricultural Policy: a comparative analysis of legislative amendments: 2007-2013 versus 2014-2020. XIVth Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists (Ljubljana, Slovenia; 26-29 August 2014)

Kovács, A. [2014]: Is the MEP the Key to Successful European Parliament legislative amendments? AES 88th Annual Conference (Paris, France; 9-11 April 2014)

Kovács, A. [2015]: Political Networks in the European Parliament, Network Analysis of the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy Reform. Agricultural Economics Society, 89th Annual Conference (Warwick, United Kingdom, 13-15 April 2015)

Research Studies:

Fertő, I., Kovács, A. [2014]: Analysis of the European Parliamentary Amendments to the Legislative Proposals of the 2013 CAP Reform. Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium, 102 pages
Available:http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EP_Amendment_Analysis%20Case%20Study.pdf

Kovács, A. [2015]: Social Network Analysis in the European Parliament. Comparative Analysis of the Legislative Instruments of the 2013 Common Agricultural Policy Reform. KKI Studies, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, T-2015/6, ISSN 2064-9460, 24 pages
Available:http://kki.gov.hu/download/9/e6/01000/Social%20Network%20Analysis%20in%20the%20European%20Parliament_Kovacs_Attila.pdf