THESIS SUMMARY

János Kemény

doctoral dissertation, titled

The Development of Population Centric Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory in the 20th and 21st Century

Thesis Advisor:

Professor Csaba Békés

Ph.D.

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Institute for International Studies

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1. Importance of the Research

The research of Counterinsurgency Warfare is underappreciated in the context of military interventions in today’s conflicts. The research question of the current thesis is why the Untied States of America and its allies couldn’t defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The conflict in Iraq was very spectacular in the sense, that the quick conventional victory over the armed forces of Iraq was followed by an insurgency only months after the victory, which the Armed Forces of the United States couldn’t control – President George W. Bush announced the end of major combat operations on the 1st of May 2003 and the first spectacular attacks took place in August of the same year. Meanwhile the Taliban movement, which was thought had been defeated in early 2002 was making a comeback a few years later partly thanks to the safe havens on the border Pakistani side of the border, and the US and coalition forces struggled to contain resurgent Taliban.

The situation is paradoxical, because the Untied States has the biggest defence budget in the world, and has unique capabilities in this field. The enemies faced by the United States in both theatres has only minimal technological and fiscal means. There were many explanations over the years about why the US failed: the use and nature of force has changed, the nature of coalition warfare, the restructuration of the international system, the change in linking with use of force, the compensatory nature of globalization etc. were all popular explanations. The other popular explanation was, that the nature of insurgency has
changed, thanks to which insurgencies were able to use the above mentioned trends partially and became hard to handle threats.

The author while researching the question came to the conclusion, that it is insufficient to research the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts by themselves – there are fundamental theoretical questions about the use of force which need to be addressed. And this requires the thorough research of the development of counterinsurgency warfare theory.

The objective of the thesis is to present the development of counterinsurgency warfare, show the weaknesses and problems of the theory and the current threats, to which the theory didn’t have an answer due to its intermittent development. The counterinsurgency theory and practice of non-democratic states doesn’t constitute the focus of this thesis. This is due to the important political-military differences between democracies and non-democratic states, which make comparison difficult.

The thesis researches the British, French and also American routes of population centric counterinsurgency warfare and lays a big emphasis on the American development. The cause of this is, that the US has a dominant position in today’s counterinsurgency theory in the Western world – thanks to NATO and bilateral agreements. The countries participating in the Iraqi and Afghan interventions were also under American command most of times. Because of this it is safe to assume, that the US and NATO doctrine had a great influence on our country’s tactics and procedures. This justifies the research of how the theory developed, and that was a great focus of the author.
2. Methods used in the course of the research

While conducting the research the author used primary sources – the works of theoreticians and military doctrines, which had great influence to the current doctrines – and secondary sources – sources, which described counterinsurgencies from a military or other point of view. The two most important sources were British and French counterinsurgency literature, because these constituted the sources for today’s counterinsurgency theory.

We divide the development of counterinsurgency theory into three phases:

- preclassical period: 1896-1944
- classical period: 1944-1982
- neoclassical period: 1982-today

During the century, which these three periods roughly cover, there were significant advances in counterinsurgency theory and practice, which we will analyse and then review the major theoretical schools.

The hypothesis of the thesis is the following:

- The problems of execution in today’s counterinsurgencies are caused by the division of the political and military spheres on the strategic level.

The thesis will present in detail the major theoretical works which are unavailable in Hungarian. Because the topic isn’t greatly researched in Hungary, there is no Hungarian language literature to speak of. In the course of conducting the research one of the major challenges was to acquire the relevant literature. Thanks to this effort the author has acquired a collection of a few hundred books on the topic of irregular military
conflicts in English and in German. The thesis accomplishes a non-declared objective of calling the attention to these works and in the available space tries to promote them.

The thesis lay great emphasis on post World War 2 period, the pre 1944 period is mentioned only as much as needed to apprehend the major developments in counterinsurgency theory. In the post World War 2 period there were two major periods, in which counterinsurgency became central: the period of decolonization, and the post 9/11 period. During the period of decolonization the conflicts which were carried out with the participation of non-state actors were less visible and intensive, but politically important in reshaping the international system. In the post Cold War era the increasing number of frail states gave a great boost to the spread of irregular groups. In the literature the previous topic has greater emphasis – this is underlined by its importance, because big parts of the world were involved – so thesis has to have great emphasis on this.

The question of international military interventions is continually present because of fragile and failed stats, and the problems surrounding them. The question of the use of force is intimately interlocked with this in the international system. The rules of the use of force have greatly changed after World War 2, and after the Cold War new uses have been found, such as peace keeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention etc.

For the irregular militant groups World War 2 was a breakthrough on many grounds. In the Western world such groups weren’t recognized as legitimate combatants and international law reflected this view. During World War 2 externally supported resistance and guerrilla groups got a great role in the fight against the German and Japanese forces. Due to this
fact after World War 2 the irregular militant ‘earned’ the combatant status with the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1949.

The relevant counterinsurgency practice of World War 2 accumulated on the Japanese and German sides – the Allied forces (with the exception of the Soviets, who fought insurgents in the Ukraine) weren’t forced to engage in large scale counterinsurgency operations. The early American counterinsurgency doctrine was nevertheless influenced by Axis practice, but with the beginning of the Cold War they quickly became less relevant. This was in great part due to the aforementioned fact, that international law changed in favour of irregular forces. The relevant practice of colonial powers became more relevant.

It is questionable, if the armies of the United States and Western European countries focused enough attention to the problem of this kind of conflict and the adaptation process it takes to succeed in them. While great changes were occurring in the emphasis compared to conventional interstate war. However counterinsurgency operations are by nature unloved military operations in the European and American political and military mind set.

Important definitions. The author places great emphasis on delimitating important concepts, because many publications are using concepts in wrong or misleading ways. Such concepts, as resistance, terrorism and insurgency are put under a thorough review. The author defines operational concepts, such as anti-terrorism, counterterrorism, nonconventional warfare, foreign internal defence and stabilization operations.

- Irregular activity: ‘The use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or
criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.’ (AAP-6 [2013] p. 2-I-9.)

- Counterinsurgency: ‘Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.’ (AAP-6 [2013] p. 2-C-16.)

- Population centric counterinsurgency: population security is central. Attacking insurgent groups is secondary, because to succeed, the counterinsurgent needs the cooperation of the population. This school of thought lays great emphasis on development and rebuilding, securing the political legitimacy, providing security for the population etc. In colonial times the resettlement of the population could be counted as a population centric approach. In today’s world the policing and strategic communications approaches as well as cultural sensitivity could be counted as population centric counterinsurgency approaches.

- Enemy centric counterinsurgency: the main emphasis is on attacking insurgent groups. Actions taken at killing and capturing the leadership of insurgent organizations, strengthening boarders to counter infiltration, organizing amnesty etc. can be counted as parts of this approach. In colonial times collective responsibility and punishment were part of this approach. Nowadays counter-network operations can be counted to the enemy centric approach.
Jihadi movement: ‘It comprises organizations, groups, assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, symbolic figures, and the individuals who have adopted the ideology of armed jihad against the existing regimes in the Arab-Islamic world on the basis that these are apostate regimes ruling by not what Allah said (…), by legislating without Allah, and by giving their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel enemies of the Islamic Nation. The jihadi current has also adopted the program of armed jihad against the colonialist forces which attack Muslim lands on the basis that those regimes are allies fighting Islam and Muslims.’ (quoted by Lia [2010] p. 103.)

3. Results of the Research

3.1 Development of British Counterinsurgency Theory

The British Army accumulated one of the greatest experience in conducting counterinsurgencies in the 20th century. The first notable work on this subject emerged in 1896 by then Col. Charles E. Callwell. bearing the title Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. This work emerged in the context of what was then known as imperial policing, and Callwell’s work became a classic. He cites many conflicts and suggests appropriate tactical approaches for success. (Jones [2007] p. 5.) A great strength of Callwell’s work is how it addresses many problems which are also problems today, such as gathering accurate intelligence, developing strategy and using it on the operational and tactical levels, what kind of logistical
and security problems exist etc. He gives advice on how to secure the population to isolate the insurgent. He concluded, that irregular conflicts cannot be won by applying schemes previously decided and cannot be won by applying conventional warfare. (Alderson [2010] p. 32.)

The British counterinsurgency doctrine developed four great principles, three of which only came into existence only after World War 2:

1. the use of minimum force (1923)
2. considering insurgency as a political act (1949)
3. the need to cut the connections between the insurgent and the population (1963)

The development of British doctrine showed a progressive adaptation to the international realities after World War 2. Thanks to great practical experience emanating from the conflicts in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus the population centric approach became the main focus of doctrine. The doctrines attributed great importance in achieving success to factors such as destroying insurgent infrastructure, subversive forces etc. (Alderson [2009] 111-112. o.)

The most notable official doctrine during the Cold War was the 1969 Counter-Revolutionary Operations. This was the most complete doctrine to that date. It used a comprehensive definition of insurgency and tried hard to integrate the notion to other concepts in use at the time. It set up five main priorities, which were to be achieved in order to be successful:

1. developing a national plan (political and economic reforms, coordination among security services etc.)
2. good governance
3. popular support
4. creating an unbiased law enforcement
5. creating an effective security structure

The development of British theory also gave to important authors to the discussion about counterinsurgency: Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson. Thompson developed in his 1966 work, Defeating Communist insurgency his own formula for defeating an insurgent movement, which was an important starting point for Counter-Revolutionary Operations (1969). Kitson developed important ideas about how the Army can and should support civil authority in case of insurgencies.

3.2 Development of French Theory

The French experience rested in great part on the colonization of Algeria and Indochina. Though in the end both were lost causes from the French point of view, they contributed greatly to the development of the Revolutionary Warfare Doctrine (Doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire, DGR).

Charles Lacheroy is considered the first major contributor. He developed important ideas about what was then called revolutionary war. His main aim was to explain how seemingly stronger power were defeated by seemingly weak actors in the course of revolutionary wars. In his view revolutionary wars were the real total wars, and the real aim is not the battlefield but the rear are of the enemy and getting control over the population. Although there were later many disagreements between those
who contributed to the DGR and it wasn’t a lasting force in France itself, it is one of the main sources of inspiration for the theory of today. The DGR had two outstanding authors, whose work is relevant today: Roger Trinquier and David Galula.

Trinquier’s Modern Warfare had many insight on population control, tactics against enemy civil-military organizations etc. He described in detail how it is suitable to pacify areas controlled by the enemy.

Galula was not the typical representative of DGR, however during his time as an officer in Algeria, he came to know intimately the DGR. After the war he has written his main work Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, which was published in English. This way Galula’s effect on the English speaking world was reinforced. Galula developed for ‘laws’ and six ‘steps’ for defeating an insurgency. These were aimed at securing the support of the population and more than any other author who emphasized the primary role of politics in securing the population (among others, he suggested in the liberated areas the emerging pro counterinsurgent leaders should be organized into a party for the national political stage). Galula’s legacy is still relevant today.

3.3 The Development of Counterinsurgency Theory in the United States

The preclassical era of counterinsurgency was markedly different affair compared to the British and French experience, because of the absence of colonialism. However as part of defending the interest of the United States, many non-colonial interventions were conducted by the US before World War 2. This required a different kind of use of force. The
interventions in this era were typified by the limited manner in which they were conducted, their main aim being the restoration or empowering of a pro-US political leadership. For this purpose they intended to create a government which had legitimacy.

Although the British experience had some influence on the American thinking, there was a distinct American way of handling these conflicts. The Americans recognized that conventional warfare is of little use in these situations. At the same time they were convinced of the usefulness of the organization and equipment of modern armies and methods which proved successful. However the American preclassical concept lacked some of the political dimension compared to the British. The expeditionary nature of American counterinsurgencies in this era generated some useful experience, but these were largely forgotten after World War 2.

After World War 2 revolutionary warfare became the main threat and doctrine writers tried to use German experiences in new doctrines. These were of temporary nature, and the growing American experiences in the Cold War gave new focus. The election of President Jon F. Kennedy brought new urgency to the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, because Kennedy was convinced, that the Soviet Union and its allies are conducting an offensive in the form of revolutionary wars against the Western world. During his lifetime a many new doctrines were written and after his death, with the increasing commitment of American ground forces to the Vietnamese theatre, the conduct of counterinsurgency operations became a day to day task. There are conflicting views regarding the effectiveness of these, however, because the war was seen as lost, it became quickly not fashionable to talk about counterinsurgency.
The Vietnam war had a dampening effect on the further development of counterinsurgency doctrine. President Richard M. Nixon sought to reduce commitments of this kind and in the Nixon doctrine he declared, that the US would provide help for other countries, but would not send actual military forces to help fight in these conflicts. This approach proved popular among later administrations. Counterinsurgency doctrine became irrelevant for a long time.

In the post Cold War era the need for reintroducing counterinsurgency soon emerged. But politically it was inconceivable to conduct such operations. A notable attempt, which tried to incorporate counterinsurgency in the US perspective was the Fourth Generation Warfare ‘school’, which was not really significant before 9/11. During the nineties the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was the accepted notion on how the future capabilities should be built. RMA envisaged a technology centred war, in which the side, which can achieve information domination (meaning real time access to the situation from the tactical to the strategic levels, based on a really expensive and complicated sensor network). The 1991 Gulf War seemed to vindicate this point of view, but after the 2003 invasion of Iraq it proved it had its limitations.

3.4 The modern problems of insurgencies

The conflicts currently in progress against what is usually called a jihadi movement (consisting of many groups, representing diverging ideologies) is one of the main factors. Although the perception is, that these groups function effectively in military matters, this is not true: there are
many factors that are working against the military and political effectiveness of these groups. The thesis lays great emphasis on the theoretical development of insurgency in the last decades as developed by members of the jihadi movement. There are some important lessons on how the jihadi thinkers are using the classical insurgent literature and how they deviate from it. There is also major structural differences between the classical insurgencies that effect their development. For the sake of shortness, we will concentrate in this summary on the structural problems in the following.

The jihadi groups usually depend on charismatic leadership, ideology and other factors play a more minor role compared to this. The formal decision making bodies are less relevant because of this and some groups don’t create institutional bodies at all, which would be able to balance the power of the charismatic leader. Because ideologically the jihadi movement can only count on a minority of the population in their (usually fundamentalist) reformist agenda, and there’s usually no real prospect to widen this audience in the absence of radical change to the core values.

Jihadi groups have an elitist altitude usually, and want to bring their agenda from the top down to the society they want to transform. They don’t usually have a big supporting network or underground, which could engage in subversion in the classical sense. Jihadi mentality usually prevents this, because non-violent approaches are believed to be unworkable and jihadis usually refuse to participate in legal political processes, believing they are corrupt. Through active communication however, once violent means are introduced, such movements are capable of gathering some following.
The most visible difference compared to the classical era of insurgency is the multitude of actors on the insurgent side. The classical centralized party or political movement is no more. The only thing uniting insurgents groups usually involves some negative approach, meaning that the foundation of cooperation is not a common goal but a common enemy (such as foreign military presence).

The economic model of insurgency has also changed greatly: earlier the population proved to be the main source of food, medical supplies, clothing etc. for the insurgents, and it was of primary importance for the counterinsurgent to disrupt the flow of goods by isolating the insurgent from the population in order to defeat the insurgency. Today the insurgents don’t need control of the population to secure their supplies, and jihadi groups usually cannot (and need not) exert effective population control on territories under their control, which is partially due to their organizational weakness.

The smaller organization, which is a hallmark of current insurgent groups, needs less supplies and it needs other kinds of supplies compared to the classical era. New ways of financial models have emerged since the classical era, such as drug production and trafficking, participating in organized crime, collecting civilian donations, winning over rich individuals for support etc. The role of cities as the main venues of insurgent violence also brought a new quality to the conflict and stands in strong contrast to the rural based insurgencies of the classical era.
3.5 Third Party Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgencies conducted along the lines of the third party counterinsurgency model are seen by the author as the alternative to the colonial political system, which can provide a stable political background for these operations. In the course of classical insurgencies usually two sides were present: the insurgent and the counterinsurgent (the latter meaning often the colonial power). In the current setting this model is no longer useful. In Iraq as well as in Afghanistan a third party approach was dominating since 2004 and 2003 respectively: the operations were conducted in concert with the newly formed security forces of these countries. These third party counterinsurgencies deviate in many respects form those in the preclassical and classical era. On the one hand in both countries the international forces had to support an extremely weak government, which was newly established. In both cases the use of military force was at first not intended to include counterinsurgency warfare. This is a major difference compared to the classical where the defence of the colonial system was the main task.

We define third party counterinsurgency the following way: ‘the third party counterinsurgent is a political and military actor, which arrives to the conflict zone from a third country, uses large conventional military force to support the legitimate and internationally recognized government of the country, with which it operates in concert to defeat the insurgency’. (For comparison Erin Simpson defines large as more than 1000 soldiers from general purpose forces (Simpson [2010]). Sending advisers or special forces is not considered to be third party counterinsurgency, because this kind of
support is in the category of Foreign Internal Defence, constituting a qualitatively different kind of help. Also the third party counterinsurgent has different strategic options compared to the two actor modell:

- tries to halt the advance of the insurgency militarily while helping to build up (or when necessary create) capable state institutions to handle the threat by themselves
- tries to create a political settlement between the government and the reconcilable insurgent forces
- leaves militarily and lets the conflict develop its own way (although this doesn’t necessarily mean an end to political or economic support).

Victory in the classical sense in a third party counterinsurgency – meaning military success, which has the effect that the insurgents are pushed back and the legitimacy of the government is restored – is the task of the host nation government. The third party can only help by giving aid in restoring the monopoly of violence and playing a constructive political role (helping negotiating or other specific help) ensuring that the host nation prevails over the insurgent.

The key to a successful third party approach is ensuring the legitimacy on three fronts: on the domestic political side of the third party counterinsurgent, in the domestic political side of the host nation and in the wider international community. The role of the latter is important, because the effective conduct of operations is depending on the support of many international organizations and building multinational partnerships and coalitions. The legitimacy of the operation has to be achieved also in order to grant the support of non governmental actors, which also provide
necessary capabilities for the counterinsurgency effort. This has to be achieved in a media environment, which is much more balanced compared to the classical era: the internet and developing technology provide useful tools for insurgents to conduct effective strategic communications campaigns. (Mackinlay [2005] pp. 59-61.)

It is also important to note, that the host nation is not only a partner in this efforts, but also a hindering factor sometimes. For example:

- the political leadership of the host nation can restrict the cooperation in critical areas, it can deviate in its strategic communication contradicting the third party counterinsurgent etc. which decreases the effectiveness of the cooperation
- the host nation can have structural problems, which make successful cooperation more difficult, but are difficult to overcome because of political barriers (such as corruption)
- it is possible, that the host nation cannot effectively function but because of prestige or other concerns refuses to accept help, which by decreasing the effectiveness of the host nation government decreases the effectiveness of the cooperation.

The third party counterinsurgent also has to invest a lot of effort into not becoming the main focus of the insurgency, thereby providing a unifying target around which various insurgent groups can rally. On the other side, the presence of a strong military actor or coalition can lead to the unwanted consequence, that in the absence of a political solution the host nation government can become dependent on outside help for stabilizing
their position, which has to be avoided (also in economic, security or other fields), because this hinders the development of the host nation capacities.

Simpson cites numerous fields, where third party counterinsurgent have significant handicaps compared to the two actor model, which decreases their chances of success, despite the fact, that third party counterinsurgent are militarily usually strong actor. Simpson cites the following reasons:

- Information deficit: the third party doesn’t poses accurate information about the battlefield to form a realistic picture about the situation
- Military deficit: although the third party counterinsurgent is a dominant military power, it is only able to generate military effectiveness in a conventional sense, it is usually unsuited for counterinsurgency warfare
- Political deficit: the outcome of the intervention usually doesn’t threaten the security or existence of the third party counterinsurgent, but the handling of the war becomes increasingly difficult with the passing of time
- Strategic deficit: the success hangs in large part on the achievements and capability of the host nation government. If it fails expectations, it loses its legitimacy and the situation of the third party counterinsurgent becomes untenable. It would be almost impossible to disengage and present the result as a win for the dominant military power. (Simpson [2010] pp. 35-37.)
There is a strong relationship between the political and the strategic deficit, because the third party isn’t physically threatened and so it has a difficult case to move against the insurgents with full force. To add to that, the third party usually has different military commitments which it has to honour, and also, the seemingly excessive use of force can bring about domestic political problems. The moral judgement of the domestic public opinion of the third party is also an important measure (for example it was accepted in World War 2, that strategic bombing was used in large part against the enemy civilian population, which was labelled as unethical in Vietnam).

One can add to the difficulties the problem of the ‘unforeseen’. The most visible of which is that the appearance of the third party in a counterinsurgency can provide a unifying effect on the competing insurgent forces (in strong contrast to the domestic public opinion of the third party, where such actions can be divisive). Mack called this phenomenon indirect cohesion. (Mack [1975] pp. 182-183.)

Beneath the military deficit lies a complex phenomenon. There is an easily comprehensible part regarding the language and cultural dimensions. But this is intertwined with a structural capability loss, which occurred in Western militaries after World War 2. Many units, which were established to handle civil infrastructure for the war effort in occupied territories were disbanded, which were capabilities of great importance for counterinsurgencies. (Kitson [1991] p. 187.) This trend is alive today.

In the case of the third party the political and military deficits are also intertwined in the domestic discourse about the use of force. Counterinsurgencies and conventional wars have different needs, and in
most cases there is a bias on part of the officer corps in favour of conventional war. (Kitson [1991] pp. 199-201.) Galula argues, that there are other factors complicating the relationship in the minds of soldiers between conventional wars an counterinsurgencies. He argues, that counterinsurgencies are much harder to train for, and also the politisation of the armed forces goes against entrenched values, but is needed for a successful counterinsurgency operation. Adding to the military deficit is the fact, that weapons developed for conventional war, are mostly unsuited for counterinsurgency operations. (Thompson [1966] p. 62.)

Today there is a clear trend of building coalitions to overcome some of these problems, which have a significant civilian contribution. There are many difficulties in creating a viable coordinating mechanism between these various actors. The thesis analyses AJP-3.4.4 along the lines of the third party counterinsurgency theory.

3.6 Conclusions

On the tactical and operational levels the development of population centric counterinsurgency wasn’t straight forward. Considering the British examples, almost in every conflict the Army had to face serious tactical difficulties, which it handled sometimes in a wrong way (making the conflict longer). The British theory development with the political interests and legal framework of the colonial background in mind, taking into account the colonial bureaucracy, which provided important administrative tools for the counterinsurgency. In the French case the colonial framework had a very different meaning, the Army had a much greater say in what to
do compared to the British. After World War 2 the French had a radically
different view of the threat they were facing in the form of revolutionary
war. The legal framework had a much smaller role in the approach of the
developing DRG school, and the extra-legal approach was powerful. The
French example however was useful in giving an example on how to
combine the military and administrative matters. The American experience
in the preclassical era could have provided important lessons for future
expeditionary counterinsurgencies, but because of political limitations and
institutional distinctiveness they were put aside. The need for political
support was however well underlined by these operation. The American
experience is also important, because it is a great example on how a
democratic system with enough care on the tactical level can incorporate
(enemy centric) tactics from a non-democratic country.

In sum we can say, that population centric counterinsurgency theory
provides the only available alternative with which (under the current
political framework) it is possible to counter insurgencies effectively to a
certain degree.

The historical examples make it clear, that in the course of a conflict
it is of utmost importance to provide a stable political background at home.
The disintegration of the colonial framework (or in the case of the US the
great power ambitions) and the strengthening of the legal status of the
irregular groups in armed conflict resulted in the viability of insurgency as a
strategic concept. Thanks to the same factors the context of
counterinsurgency changed greatly: it became expeditionary and supporting
and outside government in its nature. With the change of political objectives
the situation became more complicated: compared to the classical era, when
the support of the status quo was the main objective, in the neoclassical
period counterinsurgencies were conducted in a situation, where changing
the status quo was the main objective. Adding to the problems was the fact,
that with the dissolution of the colonial framework there was a halt in the
comprehensive development of counterinsurgency theory (which doesn’t
mean of course, that tactical innovation and adaptation wasn’t conducted).
Only in the last few years with the emergence of the third party
counterinsurgency theory was there a theory which promised to be a
framework, which is able to take into account the changed political realities
and provide a comprehensive approach ranging from the tactical to the
strategic level.

FM 3-24 was in small part and AJP-3.4.4 greater part able adapt to
these realities by integrating elements of the third party approach. But the
limitations of these doctrines is significant, because they are only intended
for the operational military approach and aren’t intended to provide
guidance for the strategic level, they can only absorb strategic realities.

In light of this we can say, that the hypothesis is validated. Although
the separation of political and military factors is due to historical reasons,
and due to the fact that the tasks of the military became manifold, the
change in civil-military cooperation needed for the successful conduct of
counterinsurgency operations is at best only partially possible (and in a
conventional conflict it could be disadvantageous), but the possibility needs
to remain.

Counterinsurgency can be an important tool to counter emerging
transnational threats emanating from weak states in the future, so the
institutional learning process and the preservation of institutional
knowledge is very important to cut the learning process in future conflict environments and the enhancing of the political-military effectiveness in solving the conflict.

The further avenues of research regarding the third party counterinsurgency model are numerous. On the one hand there is a possibility to conduct research on how different political systems are able to adopt this framework in practice. On the other hand there is a great opportunity to research the background on the coalition nature of current counterinsurgency warfare, because the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided numerous cases which are worth studying.

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