



**International Relations  
Doctoral Program**

## **COLLECTION OF THESIS**

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**Foreign aid as a global public good:  
civil society organizations in Afghanistan**

Ph.D. thesis

**Supervisor:**

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associate professor

Budapest, 2013

**Institute of International Studies**

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## **1. Definition and Justification of the Problem**

The dissertation examines whether the deficiencies of the international aid regime – especially the lower than desired level of aid – can be explained by the author's hypothesis stating that international aid can be seen as a global public good.

International aid has become a relevant element of the international regime and an important manifestation of inter-state relations since World War II. International aid means that one actor (the donor) voluntarily transfers resources to another actor (the recipient) (at least partially) with the aim of supporting the development and welfare of the latter one. During the half-century-long history of aid, significant sums have been transferred to developing countries. In the 1990s there was a temporary setback, but since the millennium the volume of aid has grown and international aid as a policy has received more attention than before. In this context, security aspects of aid have become more important and thus the system of motivations of the aid regime has been transformed. The change in donor motivations makes it necessary to use an alternative approach to investigate aid. The dissertation uses a concept from microeconomics, namely the concept of public goods and the factors affecting its demand and supply to describe aid. Public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods. (Stiglitz 2000: 143) This leads to the supply of public goods being insufficient in a free market model and to the consumers being bound to free-riding. The dissertation explains some shortcomings of the aid regime with this model.

## 2. Methodology

The phenomenon of international aid is mostly investigated through a political or international political economics approach. The dissertation opens up another approach in order to identify some shortcomings of the international aid regime and investigate if there are means or actors that can eliminate those deficiencies.

Using this analytical framework we examine whether the distinction of private goods and public goods can be used for international aid. In order to have an accurate picture about the problems of aid, the dissertation first summarizes the literature of international aid, describes its general characteristics, defines the concept of international aid and its role in development. After that it summarizes the history of aid and the trends affecting it. We introduce the forms and actors of aid and then summarize the findings in the literature about the effectiveness of aid, especially in fragile states. We analyse the question most relevant to the subject of the dissertation, namely aid as a political instrument and its motivations. We approach the benefits of donors gained through aid by their motivations.

Those issues lead to one of the main questions of the thesis: can aid really be viewed as a global public good? After clarifying the concepts of public and private goods we extend the analytical framework to the global public goods and distinguish between two groups of consumers: the donors and the recipients. We examine the nature of aid for these two groups and the implications of our findings for the aid regime.

Our model will be examined through a case study of aid in Afghanistan. This country is suitable to test the hypothesis since state building has primarily security motivations for the donors and the stability of Afghanistan is of interest to global security.

Afghanistan has received a significant amount of aid over the last decade. For understanding this, one needs to be aware of the political and military context. Through drafting the problems of the country, we make it possible that our hypothesis can be confirmed. In the light of this we can analyse the phenomena and motivations of aid in Afghanistan, the impacts of aid on the security situation and its role in state-building and peace-building. We investigate the role of aid in Afghanistan's modern history and the contribution of aid to the creation of security. At the end of the chapter, security in Afghanistan can be conceptualized as a global public good and aid as a necessary means to reach security can also be viewed as a global public good.

The main hypothesis of the dissertation – saying that aid is a global public good – explains why the amount of aid is lower than the level deemed necessary by all actors, even

the donors. The second main hypothesis of the dissertation inquires if there are actors who can eliminate this deficiency at a global level. Since there is no global governance which could supply the desired amount of global public goods, the question arises whether a civil society is able to do this. At a sub-state level NGOs can raise the supply of public goods significantly through the voluntary contribution of citizens.

The question is if non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) are able to increase the volume (or the quality) of aid as a global public good. In order to analyse this question we need to go back to non-profit literature, since a part of it explains the formation of NGOs with the need to complement the insufficient supply of public goods. We examine the role of NGOs in international relations and specifically in international aid, and we try to find out how they can become capable of supplying aid as a global public good or increasing its quality and quantity. As a part of the Afghanistan case study we analyse the role of NGOs in the country. Finally, synthesizing the recognitions of the thesis, we examine to what extent international NGOs can help to solve the problems arising from the public-goods-nature of aid. Are NGOs able to provide aid as a public good? As a specific example we analyse aid in the healthcare sector, describe aid provided by Hungary as a donor and the experiences of the Hungarian Baptist Aid, one of the Hungarian NGDOs in Afghanistan that specialises in healthcare sector aid.

### 3. Key Findings

#### 3.1. *The public-goods-nature of aid*

The thesis uses an approach where aid has two groups of consumers: the recipients and the donors who consume the “results” achieved by the aid they provide and pay for this through the material resources they spend on aid. Aid behaves in a completely different way for the two groups of consumers. It is easy to see that aid is private goods for the recipients. The given recipient group, which can either be an individual person, a village or a whole country, competes with other potential recipients. Potential consumers can also be excluded, even if we take the potential positive externalities into account.

For the donors, and in a broader sense the whole international community, aid can be public goods since its aim is per definition to support the economic and social development and welfare of a country. The thesis analyses the three groups of motivations for giving aid according to the public-goods-nature of aid. These three groups of motivations are the following: economic and commercial goals, foreign policy and security policy goals and moral, ideological motivations.

The picture is mixed in the case of economic goals. The donor can use aid as a tool to gain position, to increase exports and this does not benefit other countries. To a smaller extent, they can benefit from the gaining positions of the donor indirectly since if the donor’s income increases, it will also increase its imports according to its income elasticity and this will be an advantage for other countries. (Szentes [2005] p. 304). If the economic performance of the recipient country improves, this can also benefit other countries, for example through the expansion of markets (there are no rivalry and excludability). Avoiding bankruptcy, sustaining the ability to repay loans can also be global public goods.

Security policy interests, both “hard” and “soft” security, make aid even more of a global public good. An important goal of aid is to maintain or establish the political and military stability of a region. This benefits the countries of the region much more than remote countries. The declared goal of aid is to fight some global problems, like environmental degradation, uncontrolled migration, the spread of certain epidemics, organized crime and terrorism. (Jayaraman – Kanbur [1999], Kanbur [2001]). The mitigation of these problems is a common interest of all countries and no-one can be excluded from this.

Contrary to the security interests, foreign policy goals of aid are rather private goods, since other countries can be excluded from these. It is the donor who benefits from gaining political influence in the partner country and it is them that can gain an ally for their strategic

interests (for example gaining supporting votes in international organizations). The donor can also support preferred ethnic, religious or other social groups or political movements in the recipient country. (Smillie – Minear 2003: 6). Another benefit, even though less significant, is the benefit of increase in prestige in the eyes of the international donor community. The international aid regime has its own norms striving to reach a higher level of aid (Millennium Development Goals, the 0.7% target of ODA/GDP, the EU's own targets) and there are statistics and reports investigating the quality of aid (commissioned by the OECD DAC, the UNDP and civil initiatives). These norms make it possible that a donor who provides aid of good quality and significant quantity can benefit from the prestige arising from this. This resembles the term "demonstration effect" from microeconomics. Demonstration effect means that some people consume something, it makes another consumer buy the good. Aid donors can also have an intention to imitate others.

In the case of moral and ideological goals, the results are the least unequivocal. The realist theory suggests that a donor only supplies aid if this will serve their own interests. This can be either economic or political interest, but also the spreading of ideological interests. This is not a public good, at most it can be the club good of a certain group. According to the liberal school of aid literature, aid without selfish interest which is motivated by humanitarian or solidarity considerations must exist (Lumsdaine 1993). This is justified by the fact that the population of donor countries giving large amounts of aid supports aid with humanitarian considerations most. (Smillie – Minear 2003: 12). This is especially true for emergency aid. The achievement of humanitarian goals, the reduction of poverty and human suffering can be regarded as a global public good since this is of common value for all – at least if we share the liberal approach.

This means that aid has several benefits from which the countries who are not providing aid can not be excluded and there is no rivalry in consumption. This has even been more relevant since security motivations came into view. Earlier, particular economic interests and the Cold War logic were more dominant and all this resulted in more private good type benefits. The securitization of aid shifted it even more towards being global public goods. From the benefits of the stability of the international regime, no-one can be excluded. The lack of rivalry is also proved by the fact that donors do not compete to increase their aid volume.

Public goods can be divided in two groups: final global public goods and intermediate global public goods. (Kaul et al 1999: 13) Goals like international peace, security and the



equitable allocation of goods are final global public goods. International aid can be a tool to reach this and thus, it is a form of an intermediate global public good.

Aid being a private good for recipients and a public good for donors has several implications. For the recipients this means that demand will adjust to price zero. Still, demand will not be infinite for several reasons: aid does not only consist of grants, but of preferential loans; aid is allocated in many cases on certain conditions; and aid poses a significant administrative burden on the recipients. Yet, we can see that the demand for aid is much bigger than its supply.

Another problem is that the consumers (the recipients) do not pay the price of aid, so they do not express their exact preferences. They do not show their reservation price, i.e. the highest price a buyer is willing to pay for a certain product. Thus, no market mechanisms, but political–bureaucratic decisions allocate aid. This concerns the allocation among states, but also among sub-state target groups, regions, communities and households.

The distorting effect of aid being a free of charge good is exactly, that recipients will not consume it through purchasing, but through persuading the donor to support him. The recipient can appeal to the interest of donors or make political and economic deals to acquire aid. Demonstrating being in need is also a method for appealing for aid. This way it is not efficiency but the interests of donors, the deals of the actors and the bargaining power of the recipient which determine allocation.

Aid being a public good for donors also has important implications, since the problems of public goods show clearly in their case. Mainstream economics describes free riding and sub-optimal supply as a market failure. For global public goods sub-optimal supply is even more of a serious problem. Since groups of consumers are numerous and complex, coordination problems are very significant. At a national level, the state can substitute the market and produce public goods, but at international levels there is no possibility like that because there is no global government. International regimes (financial, commercial, aid regimes, etc.) are trying to fill this gap. The international aid regime strives to improve coordination and eliminate the disadvantages of sub-optimal supply. The Millennium Development Goals, the various ODA/GDP targets, the peer reviews of the OECD DAC all serve this goal.

The public-good-nature of aid also implies that the supply is not coordinated by market mechanisms like in the case of private goods. Since the international development regime is explicitly decentralized and the number of actors is large, the political–bureaucratic coordination mechanisms are not sufficient. Lack of coordination is described by several

authors as an obstacle to efficiency (e.g. van de Walle 2001, Smillie – Minear 2003). There are intentions to strengthen political–bureaucratic coordination in order to reduce the decentralization of the system. Actually, this is what OECD DAC and, in the field of humanitarian aid, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative strive for. Other concepts would enhance market coordination through further decentralization and the introduction of more market mechanisms. (Easterly 2002).

The public-good-nature of aid has become of great significance since the security motivations of donors came into view. In parallel, the amount of aid has risen (see chapter 1.3.2. of the dissertation). There are three ways to explain this. Either, the donors recognized aid as being a public good and voluntarily reduced their free-riding. This would contradict our previous experience and the theory of public goods. Or, the individual benefit, which can be internalized by the donors, has grown, and this has made them increase their supply. Or, the alternative mechanisms which strived to decrease free-riding were successful. The growth in the volume of multilateral aid can be an example for the latter one. If aid is given based on multilateral interests, not bilateral ones, a kind of international supplying authority can come into being. This resembles the state providing public goods instead of the market at domestic levels.

To sum up, aid has two different faces for recipients and donors: for the former it is private goods, for the latter it approaches the concept of global public goods. The problems of public goods, sub-optimal supply and free-riding, are intensified by the unrealistically high demand for aid due to the preferential conditions of allocating them.

### *3.2. The contribution of NGOs to the supply of aid as a global public goods*

The rise of NGOs can be observed not only generally at the international level, but specifically in the field of aid. The aid regime is a product of the post-World War II period and civil society organizations were embedded quite early in this regime. Humanitarian and development NGOs work in implementation and fundraising. They play an important role in the mobilization of the public and thus political advocacy also became a part of their activities.

There are two factors which explicitly helped the rise of NGDOs (non-governmental development organizations) First, they filled a market niche: the big donor countries were tired of supporting recipient governments of questionable efficiency, they did not want to expand the operative capacities of the UN family and they neither wanted to increase their own apparatus, so they found the implementers of aid projects in the NGOs. Actually, this means that they found a supplier of public goods outside the state. The other reason is the

intention to involve local target groups. Since NGOs mostly have a close relationship with local organizations and the target groups themselves, they can be useful in achieving this goal. In the 1970s there was a change of orientation in the aid regime: basic necessities came into view instead of big infrastructural investments. This meant that peripheral groups were targeted with small-scale projects. The aid agencies of donor countries did not have the capacity to work in a decentralized manner, or cooperate with the recipients in several small projects in remote areas. NGOs were a solution to this problem. Later, there was another shift towards NGOs: the conservative turn in the Thatcher and Reagan era did not only imply the shift of social services towards the private sector domestically, but internationally too. (Ahmed – Potter 2006)

There were two significant increases in the finance of NGDOs in the 1980s and 1990s. The reason for this on the one hand is that they had a close relationship with the local society and thus could increase the effectiveness of aid. On the other hand, it is their ability to strengthen local civil society and thus their contribution to the spread of democratic norms. The amount of NGO aid (coming from both private and public sources) grew from one billion USD in 1970 to seven billion in 1990. (Ahmed – Potter 2006: 104)

We can draw a parallel between the global engagement of NGOs and their domestic role. In general, we may suppose that a state provides aid in the quantity desired by its citizens. Public choice theory states that a democratic political community will supply public goods in a quantity fitting the preferences of the median voter. (Stiglitz 2000). The result of this is that if someone desires a higher amount of public goods than the median voter, he will try to find alternative methods to increase the supply. Generally, this is the reason for the creation of NGOs. (Weisbrod 1977)

As far as aid is concerned, this means that individuals who are not satisfied with the aid granted by their countries will finance aid through additional resources, i.e. donations. These donations will mostly be channelled through NGOs to the recipients. NGDOs come into being because the volume of aid provided by institutional donors is insufficient and a part of the population expects a higher level of aid (more public goods). They can buy a higher amount of aid through their donations given to NGOs. In the framework of the model, this reduces the problems arising from sub-optimal supply.

There are three ways NGOs can contribute to international aid: fundraising, advocacy and improving the quality of aid through the comparative advantages of NGOs.

Practically all NGOs work on fundraising since the collection of donations is a central question to most of them. If we regard aid as a public good, we can see that through raising

the funds for their activities, NGOs contribute to the increase of the global public good represented by aid. The motivation of private donors can be the feeling of doing something good, the joy of helping others. Many people feel that it is their duty to help people in need. If NGOs collect and channel these funds to the recipients, they increase the supply of aid as a public good.

The Hudson Institute Center for Global Prosperity (CGP) attempts to size up private donations from the big donor countries. According to the research conducted by CGP, the amount of private donations was 56 billion USD in 2011. This is more than a third of the official development assistance. (Hudson Institute 2012: 8-13) Although the overall amount of private donations shows an increasing tendency, the ratio of official grants in the turnover of NGOs is also growing. This means on the one hand that NGOs have become more important for official donors than aid implementers. On the other hand, it is a sign of the limits NGOs face when they try to raise funds from the private sector. Private donors are only willing to pay in a higher level of aid to a limited extent and humanitarian emergencies often induce them to do so.

We do not have unequivocal data about the amount of private donations going to NGOs, but we can suppose that it is a large part. So, it can be said that the fundraising activities of NGOs are relevant. This means that they can increase the amount of public goods and thus decrease the problems arising from the sub-optimal supply.

Another significant role of NGOs is advocacy and keeping certain crises and issues on the agenda. In our analytical framework this means that NGOs attempt to reduce free riding of donors, they try to make donors provide more and better aid. Only few NGOs are influential enough to be efficient in advocacy independently. The NGO platforms introduced in the dissertation in short do not only play a role in coordination, but also in advocacy. Besides local platforms, the international networks also play a key role in representing the interests they experience in the field towards their own governments.

Summarizing the advocacy role of NGOs, we can see that NGOs have reached good results in improving the quality of aid, but not in the reduction of free-riding. At global levels, there are examples of issues and forgotten crises put on the agenda by NGOs.

Besides fundraising and advocacy, there are other characteristics of NGO activities that have a positive impact on the amount and the quality of aid. The question arises if NGO aid is more efficient than official aid.

In the case of complex humanitarian emergencies, like the Afghan crisis, NGOs have several responsibilities. They are primarily implementers but they also act as a source of

information (because they often arrive earlier and stay longer in the field than other international actors). They also participate in peace building. Building a peaceful society requires, besides mere peacekeeping, activities which armed forces are not able to perform. These are, for instance, the supervision of elections, the resolution of conflicts, mediation, strengthening the civil society and the support of civil initiatives. Since NGOs are more neutral, they are suitable for this job. (Ahmed – Potter 2006: 170-173)

There are some other advantages of NGO aid. Civil solidarity has historic traditions. Through micro-level aid implemented by NGOs, the project can have a direct connection with target groups, thus aid can be more targeted and more efficient. A direct relationship with target groups means that the NGO can conduct a more reliable needs assessment and the final beneficiaries can participate in the planning, implementation and evaluation phases of the project.

NGO aid contributes to the strengthening of the local civil society because they work in partnership with local NGOs or community-based organizations. Strengthening civil society and capacity building of NGOs are often a direct objective of NGO projects.

Especially smaller NGOs can work with operational mechanisms which are less bureaucratic. Bigger organizations require more formal elements in operational mechanisms but even so, they are often more flexible than state agencies. As a result of flexibility, they are able to react fast, which is one of the reasons why NGOs are the first to appear in humanitarian emergencies.

An NGO has the possibility, much more than a donor country, to specialize in a geographic region, a sector, or a type of target groups. There are NGOs working only in Afghanistan, or others focusing on healthcare sector aid, or a specific target group like children. Official donors also specialize; Hungary for example designated its international development cooperation partner countries. An NGO which is less bound by political considerations can afford being much more specialized. A higher level of specialization can lead to more field experience and more professionalism, and this can contribute to an increase in aid effectiveness.

NGOs can also afford to work in countries that are not supported by official donors for political reasons. This was also shown in Afghanistan, since during the rule of the Taliban the international community chose the policy of isolation, but still, some NGOs continued to work in the country.

In as far as an NGO can realize the advantages coming from its organizational structure, it can enhance the quality of international aid and thus increase the supply of aid as a global public good.

### *3.3. Testing the model in Afghanistan*

There are three reasons why Afghanistan is a good example for analysing the public-good-nature of aid: first, there has been an armed conflict in the country for several decades, second, the negative externalities of the conflict (the connection with al-Qaeda) make security in Afghanistan a global public good and third, because the country receives a large amount of aid.

The public-good-nature is especially relevant, because state building and peace building, the primary goals of aid, are also global public goods. It is the crucial interest of donors that Afghanistan shall not pose a security threat to other countries, neither through sinking into anarchy, nor through radical groups building a strong central power. This could only be guaranteed through moderate and stable state structures.

After 2001, the donor community turned its interests rapidly to Afghanistan and the country received much more aid than other significant humanitarian emergencies. This proves that it was a priority for donors to participate in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Through our public goods perspective, we can explain this in the following way. The countries of the military coalitions already reached one kind of global public goods through the ousting of the Taliban and the terrorist groups connected to them. Presumably, they decreased the chance of terrorist attacks worldwide and thus contributed to global security. Still, they did not want to pay the price of this public good alone. For decreasing free riding of others, they pressed other countries to contribute either militarily or through aid to the efforts in Afghanistan. Presently, 48 countries are involved in the peacemaking operations and the significant volume of aid proves that the Afghan crisis is different from other humanitarian crises.

The dilemma of the United States and the countries contributing to the ISAF face the dilemma now about the future of Afghanistan: is it possible to prepare a pullout in a way that the insurgents do not take over? We can find an explanation for this dilemma if we resort to the public-goods theory. Political developments have shown that the price of a stable and moderate Afghanistan as a global public good is higher than expected: despite military, political and financial efforts the new Afghan state is not strong enough to function without external support and a final military victory does not seem to be possible. Washington's dilemma is that if they withdraw, they risk losing the public goods reached by the foreign support and control of present-day Afghanistan, i.e. the relative repelling of terrorist groups.

But if they maintain the present state, they will have to finance the military presence and the Afghan state for an unpredictable length of time.

Most big donor countries contribute to the costs in the field of aid, so free riding is not a smaller problem in aid efforts than in military efforts. Taking care of armed forces has a much higher political price (primarily towards domestic constituencies), so states are more inclined to free riding. The concept of free riding can explain the discourse which has arisen in most countries participating in the military intervention. A direct cost-benefit analysis does not justify for countries such as Hungary to send troops to Afghanistan, but NATO membership is a policy priority for the country so the countries having more interest in the Afghanistan operation, especially the United States, can persuade their smaller allies to contribute to the intervention.

Of course, not all problems of the country are due to the deficiencies resulting from the public-good nature of aid. The security situation, the fragmentation of the society and illicit opium production all endanger the stability and development of the country. However, the dissertation uses a public-good approach because this perspective can be used to analyse other crises and securitized aid issues. The problems arising from the public-good nature of aid are not country-specific to Afghanistan, but they are especially relevant there.

One quarter of all aid going to Afghanistan is channelled through NGOs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2005: 13; Waisová 2008: 79) and their fields of activity are manifold. Their role in Afghanistan is of interest in the dissertation, because the Afghan experience and the activities of Hungarian Baptist Aid, the chosen case study, support the statements made above and provide some additional information.

Like in other regions, NGOs can contribute to the supply of aid as a public good through fundraising. After 2001 it was easy to raise funds from the private sector since Afghanistan received a lot of media attention. Several NGOs organized campaigns for this issue. But the crisis is prolonged and there is a need of long-term engagement. Preserving the attention of private donors is very difficult, so it is hard to raise private donations a decade after the fall of the Taliban. This is justified by the experiences of HBAid. They implemented only a smaller part of their Afghan projects from private donations, moreover, these donations were unlabelled donations not dedicated to Afghanistan but to any activity of the NGO. The majority of the projects were financed by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Advocacy is another important task of NGOs. In Afghanistan, this did not mean keeping the crisis on the political agenda because the country received media attention anyway. Lobbying for adequate aid policies and good quality aid was an important issue, so

the success of NGOs can be measured in this field. However, the advocacy role of NGOs in a complex emergency like in Afghanistan can be questioned since there are serious security concerns on the agenda. These belong to the traditional foreign policy, and states are anxious about keeping their privileges in this field.

While the world did not pay too much attention to Afghanistan, that is primarily in the 1990s, NGOs played an important role in keeping the problems of the country on the agenda and raising awareness about the oppressive nature of the Taliban. In this period, NGO advocacy was very important. Still, it was not the humanitarian situation but the terrorist attacks against the Twin Towers which accelerated the decision about intervention. Similarly, after 2001, it was not the NGOs, but the countries sharing the most of the burdens of the intervention that were pressing other donors to avoid free riding. The role of NGOs is rather important in the case of forgotten crises.

The example of Hungarian Baptist Aid shows that an NGO can play an essential role in certain aid issues especially towards its own donors, but NGOs do not have much saying in the strategic decisions of global actors.

Besides that, Afghanistan is also a good example to show that NGO aid can have advantages over official aid and this can mean an increase in quality. Some typical advantages of NGO aid are manifested in the projects of HBAid. In the case of the humanitarian aid projects this was the fast and flexible reaction and the needs-based approach of HBAid based on its previous experience. Later, in the case of the development projects, the advantages of NGO aid were in close relationship with target groups and the participation of the beneficiaries in the needs assessment and the design of projects. Partnership with local NGOs had a beneficial effect on the capacity of partners. These factors show that NGOs can improve the quality of aid as a public good in Afghanistan.



#### 4. Conclusions

Summarizing the conclusions of the dissertation, the hypothesis stating that international aid can be regarded as a public good seems to be verified. Aid appears as public goods for donors in several instances, and this model gives a good explanation for some deficiencies of the aid regime. The insufficient amount of resources can be deducted from the sub-optimal supply of public goods and the free-riding of consumers.

These problems are alleviated by the civil sector trying to fill these gaps at international levels. NGDOs play an important role in fundraising, advocacy against free-riding and through the potentially higher quality of aid. Despite this, they are not able to fill all the gaps of the regime. NGOs are not sufficient alone to produce public goods, even at domestic levels there is the need for the state to play a role. Similarly, at international levels we can see that there are no global actors who could mitigate the shortage of public goods, since there is no global governance.

Further research could elaborate on the applicability of the model in the following fields without claiming completeness:

- To what extent does the model explain the existence and the characteristics of multilateral aid?
- To what extent is it possible to eliminate the deficiencies of the aid regime through the lenses of regime theory and the theory about global governance?
- How much does the role of NGOs differ in producing aid as a public good in other types of crises, for example forgotten crises?
- How can we use the theory of public goods in other fields of international politics and in other international regimes?

Finally, the supply of aid as a public good can be increased if its benefits are more and more internalized by the donors. If in the future the goals of aid shift even more towards security policy considerations, the donors can have more benefits from aid and its stabilizing effect. This can make them less bound to free-riding and more willing to increase their own supply.

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## **6. Publications by the Author**

Etióp külpolitikai fordulat a '70-es években (2005) Kül-Világ, 2005/4  
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A nemzetközi segélyezés mikroökonómiai megközelítésben. Köz- vagy magánjóság-e a segély? (2010) Köz-Gazdaság. 2010/2 189-205. old.

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