



**Political Science  
Doctoral Program**

## **SUMMARY**

**Papp Zsófia**

**Legislators' constituency orientation under party-centred electoral rules  
Evidence from Hungary**

Ph.D. dissertation

**Supervisor:**

**Ilonszki Gabriella, DSc**

Budapest, 2013

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## **I. Research question, main hypothesis and sub-hypotheses**

### *1.1. Background*

During the past ten years, the research on representational roles seems to regain its position among the most studied political phenomena within the international scholarly literature. This new wave of political science literature revolves around the connection between electoral rules and personal representation. The re-emergence of the idea that the individual plays an important role in establishing the link between citizens and politics builds on the worldwide weakening of political parties. Opinion polls suggest that there is a growing amount of voters who are indecisive about their preferences, and cannot identify themselves with either of the parties. This, and the declining turnout, the rise of volatility in party preferences and shrinking party membership are signs that the parties failed “in their capacity to engage ordinary citizens” (Mair, 2005, p. 7). As a result of the disillusionment with parties, personal representation is likely to receive increased attention both among voters and representatives. The measurably greater emphasis on individual politicians challenges the responsible party model, which considers parties as the vehicles of representation.

Oddly, however, voting behaviour in parliament does not seem to support the decline of the party as such. On the “normal course” of legislation, party discipline prevails: Members of Parliament (MPs) still vote in line with the Parliamentary Party Group (PPG) in the majority of the instances. According to Dalton and his colleagues, “the evidence of decline is too selective, emphasizes changes in the mass public rather than in party performance, and is arguably too focused on the mass party ideal” (Dalton et al., 2011, p. 14), therefore it is too early to bury the political party for good. Parties have the capacity to renew by adopting new strategies to re-earn voters’ trust. Adapting to their decreasing popularity within the electorate, parties engage in behaviour that appear irrational at first sight, and that supposedly undermines party representation. Parties put a greater emphasis on the person than it is expected in the responsible party framework.

The parties’ appearance through their politicians and the selection of reliable candidates who are able to fulfil promises and respond to voters’ demands is called personal representation. In this sense, personal representation enhances the quality of representation, and improves “legislative and policy performance” (Colomer, 2011a, p. 7). To achieve this, candidates have to make themselves visible to the voters, and establish the connection between citizens and parliament. The best way to do this is to obtain a certain level of

constituency orientation, to demonstrate sensitivity to issues of direct concern to their voters. This way constituency focus becomes an inseparable part of personal representation. Constituency focus, however, leads to “pursuing the interests of particular groups and individuals in society” (Norton, 2002, p. 3). This particularism serves the basis of the debate surrounding constituency representation, and its effect on the quality of democracy. Representing one particular district might disadvantage citizens living in other constituencies. If, for instance, the MP of constituency A has greater bargaining power against the government than the representative of constituency B, then constituency A gets a larger amount of pork, even at the expense of constituency B. Thus, a conflict will appear between districts A and B, which would have never surfaced without the particularistic behaviour of their MPs. Depending on the positions of their representatives, the quality and efficiency of representation will not be the same throughout the constituencies. The districts of opposition MPs, for example, will always be disadvantaged against the ones of government MPs. The uneven representation corrodes the foundations of democracy, its legitimacy. Furthermore, constituency service and work in parliament cannot be improved unless at the expense of the other. Thus, heightened level of constituency orientation easily leads to declining quality of legislation. Last but not least, district focus defies the idea of general representation, which leads us back to the first point.

However, there are a couple of reasons why constituency orientation is desirable to maintain people’s trust in democracy. Norton summarizes the possible reasons as follows (Norton, 2002). First, it enables interests closest to the people appear in national politics. Second, it legitimizes the political system in the eyes of the voters. Norton and Wood claim that neglecting the district interests would undermine the legitimacy of the legislature (Norton & Wood, 1990)<sup>1</sup>. Third, constituency orientation brings parliament closer to the voters. Fourth, it makes the MPs more visible in their constituencies. Furthermore, constituency representation also serves the interests of the MPs and their parties. Parties can obtain information that would be costly to collect otherwise. As a consequence to that, constituency orientation provides the party with an advantage at the polls. It increases the members’ satisfaction with their jobs, which could enhance member performance in other fields of the representatives’ work. Last but not least, information associated with constituency focus

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<sup>1</sup> This argument is weakened by the fact that – Europe-wide - only a fraction of the voters are able to name their representatives. See the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), <http://www.cses.org/>

might reveal problems the government needs to address, before they become acute (Norton, 2002). There is an increasing interest in how personal representation relates to the trust in legislative institutions (Leston-Bandeira, 2012). If a tighter electoral connection between the representative and represented leads to a greater level of trust in the institutions of representation, then it is also possible to enhance the public perception of democracy. As the input can easily be controlled by decision makers, the quality of democracy might eventually be positively adjusted.

### *1.2. Question and scope*


This work aims to contribute to our knowledge about the circumstances under which personal representation prevails. *The main question is whether constituency orientation appears in a country where electoral rules encourage party representation.* Previous research has established that electoral systems and member personalization are closely connected: candidate-centred electoral rules enhance personal-, while party-centred systems support party representation. In this sense, representation is perceived as a one-dimensional scale where personal and party representations indicate the two ends of the continuum. However, due to the party-centeredness of the system, the decisions *are presumed to* come from the party rather than being the result of individual discretion. In this view, party and personal representations are not mutually exclusive ideas (Colomer, 2011b), but personal representation might be considered a form of party representation. In party-centred mixed member systems, the existence of the nominal tier leads parties to pursue more person-oriented party strategies. Thus, the oft-cited causal effect between mixed electoral rules and personalization can be confirmed. However, *to unravel the causal mechanism, we have to perceive the link between electoral rules and personal representation as being mediated by central party strategies.*

In the quest to test the above hypothesis I collect evidence from Hungary in a case study fashion. Hungary will serve as a least likely case (Rohlfing, 2012), where member personalization is not likely to appear. Nevertheless, if motivations can be identified that promote personalization, the idea of a *direct* relationship between electoral rules and personal representation has to be adjusted accordingly. Party strategies will not be investigated directly, but I presume that studying individual member behaviour, these strategies will surface nevertheless. *My main assumption is that under such party-centred electoral rules*

*with practically no space for individual action, constituency orientation prevails with the party's blessing.*

The dissertation follows the neo-institutionalist approach, and establishes the link between electoral rules, member attitudes and behaviour in contemporary Hungary. It recognizes that even under party-centred electoral rules, there are serious motivations to pursue particularistic goals. These motivations can be proxied by different sets of career factors that relate to the past experience as well as the currently held positions of the legislators. The nature of the independent variables will point to three different types of motivations: (i) electoral, (ii) position-related, and (iii) habitual explanations. The limited importance of habitual motivations in explaining member personalization, hint that personal motivations are second to electoral and position related explanations. This finding will underpin the argument that members do not personalize out of internal reasons, but because they are expected to. Attitudes and behaviour are adjusted to match actual positions leaving endogenous personal motivations little space.


As member personalization can be perceived in various ways, conclusions may change depending on which type of measurement we apply. Thus, I define personalization and constituency orientation in three different ways in order to get a more complete picture: (i) attitudes toward representation, (ii) campaign strategies at the 2010 general elections, and (iii) non-legislative behaviour in parliament. Figure 1 introduces the structure of the dissertation. In the first part of the analysis I establish the link between the independent variables introduced in Chapter 2 and member attitudes perceived as the focus and style of representation. Empirically separating roles into attitudes and behaviour makes attitudes both independent and dependent variables (Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2011). In the first case, the effect of electoral rules and other factors on attitudes are investigated, whereas in the second, attitudes structure behaviour – which are also affected by the initial independent variables. As Blomgren and Rozenberg put it, “considering roles as independent variables runs the risk of missing the complex relation between roles and the institutional position of the agent” as well as creating a serious problem of multicollinearity (Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2011, pp. 3–4). Although, both approaches are well justified, namely handling roles (that are measured by attitudes in this context) as both independent and dependent variables, this work explores the potential of what lies in the latter. Dashed lines in Figure 1 represent the relationships that remain unattended in the context of the dissertation: constituency service in parliament and campaign strategies will not be explained by member attitudes.



**FIGURE 1. The relationships between the different components of the electoral connection**



In the second part of the analysis, the effects of the independent variables on campaign strategies will be investigated. As it will be laid down in detail in Chapter 4, personalization is measured by four different dimensions of campaigning: norms, means, organization and agenda. The four components will capture both attitudes and self-reported behaviour. The third part will be focusing directly on constituency service. It examines how explanatory factors influence MPs’ non-legislative work in parliament in terms of addressing issues of their electors’ concerns. The sequence of the empirical chapters is defined by the level of abstraction the different measures represent. Representational roles in attitudes and partly campaign strategies (norms) operate with abstract ideas of representation and campaigning, while campaign means, organization, agenda and constituency service in parliament capture actual behaviour. This behaviour, however, is approached differently by the two groups of dependent variables. Whereas campaign strategies provide us with indirect measures of behaviour, questioning data directly reflects MPs’ actions. In the former case, the indirectness is the consequence of responding members having to report on their own behaviour. Figure 2 shows the order of the various aspects with regards to their relative abstraction.



**FIGURE 2. The hierarchy of the different measures of member personalization in terms of abstraction**

A great bulk of literature examines whether personal traits and actions contribute to electoral success. There are several reasons why students of voting behaviour started to explain voters’

choices with factors beyond party preferences: the worldwide weakening of party affiliations, the increase in volatility of votes and the changes in the nature of the campaigns (Cain et al., 1987, p. 12). The international literature provides an answer with the concept of *personal vote*. In the 1970s research on personal vote was motivated by the increasing proportion of re-elections among representatives in the USA and the UK although the mentioned trends would have implied the opposite. Students of personal vote (Cain et al., 1987; Canache et al., 2000; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Gaines, 1998; Herrera & Yawn, 1999; Marsh, 2007; Mondak & Huckfeldt, 2006; Mondak, 1995; Morgenstern & Swindle, 2005; Norris et al., 1992; Norton & Wood, 1990; Shugart et al., 2005; Swindle, 2002; Tavits, 2010) assume that a certain proportion of votes cast for the candidates can be explained with variables beyond party affiliation, fixed characteristics of the voters and the trends in economics as well. These factors are derived from the qualifications, abilities, personal characteristics and the record of the candidate (Cain et al., 1987, p. 9), which can be enhanced by active constituency-oriented behaviour.

Recognizing that constituency-oriented behaviour does not only depend on the institutional and career factors, but on the demand of favouring the districts, the electoral connection is to view as a cycle of constituents' wishes and representatives' behaviour. It is difficult to establish a one-directional link between the two: the question is whether citizens react to the supply, or the supply increases as the demand is enhanced by external factors? The answer is probably, both. This work begins the research of this cycle by taking a closer look at the representatives' point of view, excluding – both external and internal - demand from the equation. It is probably more exact to say that real demand is unexploited, perceived demand is taken into account at some point of the research, as it is assumed that representatives step up for their constituencies because they aim for re-election. This entails that Members of Parliament and their parties think that there is a certain kind of demand to an active constituency representation. Meeting the “real” demand in the voters' eyes serves the basis of personal vote. To put it simple, if voters think that the MP has done his or her job well they will vote for him or her, but if they think he or she has not worked hard enough, they will vote for whom they expect to do so. Hence, “*Electoral consequences*” on Figure 1 refers to the effects of constituency-oriented behaviour (personal vote-seeking), which is most likely to reflect in votes. Uncovering the complexity of this electoral connection is a two-pillar project: one has to examine member perceptions and behaviour as well as their translation into votes

(voting behaviour). It is beyond the scope of this work to cover both aspects hence it will only investigate member perceptions and behaviour.

### *1.3. Explanatory factors*

The main hypothesis of the dissertation is that - despite the institutional disincentives - there is a relevant level of constituency orientation in the case of Hungary. The fact that the formation of constituency focus is not random, in other words, its level is structured by pre-defined independent factors, should prove that district orientation is a valid concern in Hungary. Thus it is not its level but its structure that leads to the conclusion that constituency orientation is something that prevails even under party-centred electoral rules. In case it would be random, it would require an absolute measure to determine whether the phenomenon is strong enough to be considered relevant. But if its degree changes under different conditions, which conditions have strong hypotheses attached to them, constituency orientation might be considered as the result of established decisions, especially as they are most commonly tied to electoral or position related motivations. Therefore, the degree of constituency orientation is no longer the issue here, but the factors influencing its occurrence. As long as there are rational decisions behind constituency orientation, it remains a factor that has to be taken into account.

As to the independent variables, their presumed effects are formulated as sub-hypotheses. (1) First, due to a more direct accountability linkage, single member district (SMD) representatives are expected to be more constituency-oriented in attitudes and behaviour than list MPs (Curtice & Shively, 2000; Gallagher & Holliday, 2003; Lancaster & Patterson, 1990; Lancaster, 1986; Mitchell, 2000; Norris, 2000, 2004; Scholl, 1986). (2) Second, according to the “shadowing hypothesis”, MPs running in SMDs focus on the constituency with a larger probability than members who did not ambition nominal level positions (Ingall & Crisp, 2001; Kumbhat & Marcian, 1976; Lundberg, 2006; Norris, 2004; Norris et al., 1992; Soroka et al., 2009; Zittel, 2012). (3) Third, elected local office holders are more likely to become constituency oriented than members who are not holding multiple mandates (Dewogheraele et al., 2008; Navarro, 2009; Putnam, 1976; Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010). (4) Fourth, constituency orientation appears in the case of MPs running at the local elections in October 2010. (5) Fifth, previous nominal level experience affects constituency orientation positively. Its effect is expected to be larger in the case of representatives who had just held the position. (6) Sixth, newcomers (Heitshusen et al., 2005), and (7) party leaders (Wahlke et al., 1962;

Zittel, 2012) are less concerned about their districts than senior and backbench members. (8) Eighth, MPs farther away from their parties on the left-right scale are expected to be more focused on their constituencies than members in close ideological proximity to the party centre (Zittel & Gschwend, 2008). (9) Last, but not least, the effect of party affiliation is expected to influence constituency orientation and member personalization in two ways. First, a gap is hypothesized between new and more established parties. Members of parties with a history of constituency representation will focus more on the districts irrespective of their actual positions and chance of winning on the nominal level. Second, MSZP<sup>2</sup> members were especially motivated to pursue personal representation as a result of voter disillusionment with the Socialist party label. Thus, based on their actual positions a significant difference between Fidesz<sup>3</sup> and MSZP is hypothesized.

## **II. Methods and data**

### *2.1. Case selection*

The most common criticism of cross-country research is that it is difficult to identify the casual effects independently from other cross-country factors (Jun & Hix, 2010). Hence, it might be more useful to focus on a single country, and thereby hold cultural and historical aspects constant. Accepting these claims as starting point, the dissertation is built up in a case study fashion. The main goal is to modify the literature's hypothesis associated with party-centred electoral rules, and show that even under such extremely party-centred circumstances, the prevalence of constituency orientation can be detected. In the quest to answer the research question, Hungary qualifies as the least likely case (Gerring, 2007; Rohlfing, 2012). Based on the extensive literature on case study research, a single case is sufficient to hypothesis modification, or even rejection.

There is no doubt with regards to whether the Hungarian electoral system is to be classified as mixed-member. Using the classification of Shugart and Wattenberg (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001), the Hungarian electoral system falls into the category of mixed-member majoritarian with partial compensation. A country having a mixed electoral system often leaves scholars with the conclusion that the country is half-way between being candidate- and party-centred.

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<sup>2</sup> Hungarian Socialist Party

<sup>3</sup> Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union

Although, the SMD tier brings a certain degree of candidate-centeredness into the system, its effect is far from obvious. I argue that due to closed party lists and centralized candidate selection the Hungarian electoral system has to be considered party-centred, therefore it is a critical case to test whether party centred electoral systems truly suppress personal representation. Mechanical effects leave limited space for members to act on behalf of their constituencies, still, a certain degree of personal representation appears.

As the main focus of the study is restricted to the 2010-2014 electoral term, a few words on the problems of the country year are in order. In the 2010 elections Fidesz-KDNP<sup>4</sup> won a majority that post-transition Hungary has rarely<sup>5</sup> seen before. With an overall 52.7 % of the votes they secured 2/3 (68.1 %) of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament. Furthermore, Fidesz and KDNP won 98.2 % of the 176 constituency seats, and 59.5 % of the seats available at the regional party lists<sup>6</sup>. One could possibly argue that the case selection may distort the results because of the imbalance of parties at the 1<sup>st</sup> tier of the electoral system. The dominance of Fidesz-KDNP on the first two tiers makes this case too peculiar to draw conclusions about the whole system based only on 2010. However, I argue that this situation gives even more power to the findings. Candidate selection in Fidesz-KDNP is regarded as the most centralized with the most exclusive selectorate. Thus, the electoral system must have stronger party-centred effects on member attitudes and behaviour than in the case of a more balanced partisan set-up with the selection strategies being less centralized in general. Therefore, if different forms of personal representation are found under such circumstances, then it is logical to expect that it prevails under less extreme conditions as well. Also, if it appears, then it is very likely that party-centeredness does not rule out other forms of representation.

Chance of winning is another interesting issue that is influenced by the election year in the context of the dissertation. Many (Curtice & Shively, 2000; Heitshusen et al., 2005; Herron, 2002; Jun & Hix, 2010; Lundberg, 2006; Sieberer, 2010) argue that the candidates' chances of winning affects their behaviour. 2010 was a special year from this aspect as well, because based on opinion polls prior to the election (which were supported by the election results), virtually no SMD candidates were expected to defeat nominees of Fidesz and KDNP. They were not expected to finish even close to them. Thus, chance of winning did probably not play

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<sup>4</sup> Christian Democratic People's Party

<sup>5</sup> The winning coalition in 1994 (MSZP and SZDSZ) won 71.77 % of the mandates.

<sup>6</sup> The relative „unsuccessfulness” of Fidesz-KDNP on the national level is the product of the compensatory nature of the 3<sup>rd</sup> tier.

a substantial role in 2010, at least not on the most personalized level of the electoral system. Nevertheless, it can be argued that safe seats make the system more party centred, as the decision of who gets elected is now truly in the hands of selectors. Therefore, the choice of 2010 to conduct research results in a more extreme case of party centeredness, which again, is less likely to show signs of personal representation and constituency orientation.

## *2.2. Data and techniques*

The main hypothesis of the dissertation is that despite the institutional disincentives, constituency orientation is a relevant option in the case of Hungary. Furthermore, its appearance is rather systematic, as it shows considerable variation in terms of the independent variables under investigation. The empirical chapters of this work are based on three datasets. First, the MP survey<sup>7</sup> of the Hungarian Election Study was used to measure representational roles (Chapter 3) and campaign strategies (Chapter 4). The data was collected in June 2010, right after the new parliament was elected. 232 face-to-face interviews were carried out based in a standard questionnaire among the Hungarian representatives. The questions resemble the research goals of the Comparative Candidates Survey<sup>8</sup> enabling to put the findings into a comparative perspective on a later stage of the research.

Second, during the spring of 2013, parliamentary questions were coded by the researchers of the Centre for Elite Research at the Corvinus University of Budapest<sup>9</sup>. The dataset contains oral and written questions from May 2010 to January 2013, to map constituency orientation in non-legislative parliamentary behaviour (Chapter 5). Although the dataset builds upon the whole set of Hungarian MPs elected in 2010, to maintain relative comparability between chapters, the random sample of the MP survey was used in Chapter 5 as well.

Third, while the above data sources provide the dependent variables of this work, some of the independents were obtained from the Hungarian Representatives Dataset maintained by the Centre of Elite Research<sup>10</sup>. However, the majority of the IVs were coded by the author

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.valasztaskutatas.hu/eredmenyek-en/adatbazisok/magyar-adatok>.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.comparativecandidates.org/>

<sup>9</sup> I am immensely grateful to Adrienn Tóth and Rudolf Tamás Metz, who worked tirelessly to code individual questions. I am also grateful to Gabriella Ilonszki and Réka Várnagy for their valuable insights to the initial research design.

<sup>10</sup> It would be impossible to account for all the researchers who helped create the dataset throughout the years. However, I must acknowledge the help of Adrienn Tóth, who made important

using official sources like the websites of the Hungarian Parliament<sup>11</sup> and the National Election Office<sup>12</sup>.

As to the applied techniques, various regression methods were used to estimate the dependent variables which showed a considerable variation in terms of distribution. Besides the standard bivariate analyses, linear, bi- and multinomial logit, Poisson, negative binomial and zero-inflated beta regressions were built to explain constituency orientation and member personalization in Hungary.

### **III. Main findings**

Table 1 summarizes the effects of the different independent factors on the various aspects of constituency orientation. Variables that have no role in explaining the extent to which Members of Parliament seek to represent their districts include 1<sup>st</sup> tier legislative experience before 2006 and perceived ideological distance from the party. These results substantially weaken the importance of habitual motivations the way they are defined in this work. Former SMD experience does not appear to make members more focused in their districts: habits of the past will not translate into attitudes or behaviour in the present. Additionally, the driving force behind focusing on the constituency does not feed upon the desire to distance themselves from their parties, or ideological disagreements between parties and their MPs. Parties and representatives are in perfect correspondence in terms of how members perceive their positions on the left-right scale.

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improvements to the data with regards to the term 2010-2014. An earlier version of the data is available at <http://elitkutatas.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=adatok> .

<sup>11</sup> <http://parlament.hu/>

<sup>12</sup> <http://valasztas.hu/>

**TABLE 1. The role of the various independent factors in explaining the different aspects of constituency orientation**

	Perceptions of representation			Campaigning					Parliamentary questioning			
	Focus	Style	Norms	Means	Organization	Agenda	Nr. of questions	Nr. of local questions	Proportion of local questions			
<b>Electoral</b>												
Local candidacy	++		++	++	+	++	+	+	+	+	+	+
<b>Position</b>												
Mandate type (2010)	++	++										
Local position		+	+	++	+	++	+	+	+	++	++	++
SMD (2006-2010)												
Newcomer	++	+	+		++		+	+	+	+	+	+
Party leader	++	+										
Party	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++
SMD (2006-2010)												
SMD before 2006												+
Ideological distance												

++ The variable has a stable, established effect on the given dependent variable in all model specifications.

+ The variable has a stable, established effect on the given dependent variable under some of the model specifications.

Blank cells represent variables without any empirical effect on the given dependent variable. In the case of patterned cells the effects of the variables were theoretically not plausible.



Variables with a moderate overall effect on personalization and constituency orientation are local candidacy, party leadership positions and local political positions. First, running for local positions in October 2010 sets focus of representation to the district as opposed to foci like the party, a specific group in the society or all the citizens in the country. Prospective local politicians appear to be concerned for the well-being of their closer surroundings. Their focus also manifests in campaign personalization on the level of the usage of personalized campaign tools. Thus, future electoral considerations form the way members think about their jobs as representatives as well as how they structure their campaigns for national office. Second, rather surprisingly, taking party leadership positions only affects how MPs engage in representation, and leaves campaign aspects and parliamentary behaviour unchanged. Regarding job perceptions, party leaders prefer the generalist approach of representation over district orientation. Additionally, taking style of representation into account, they do not identify with the role of the constituency delegate. At the same time, they are not more likely to take a party delegate or trustee position. Thus, representing the party is not the main concern either, and surely, party leaders think bigger than standing out for the interests of a restricted local area. What was, however, even more interesting is the limited role of the party leadership in questioning. As argued in Chapter 5, leaders distribute time between members, but do not take the lead in pleading the party's case. The main difference between the effects of local candidacy and party leadership is that while the former influences dependent variables over two distinct aspects of personalization and constituency orientation, the latter only counts as far as representation attitudes go. Therefore, one could say that the effect of running for local political positions is oddly more substantial in explaining personalization. Third, the role of local positions was not straightforward either. On the one hand, in terms of role perceptions, multiple office holding does not influence constituency orientation. However, in a few instances its effect appeared to be significant. Nevertheless, these examples did not verify the hypothesis of local office holders being more constituency-oriented with regards to their ideas of representation. On the other hand, as to campaign strategies, local positions seemed to make a difference. Their campaigns were more person-oriented (norms), they applied significantly more personalized campaign tools (means) and they raised issues that were not touched upon by the party campaign (agenda). What does not appear in their attitudes toward their jobs as national representatives, surfaces in campaign strategies. Furthermore, their hypothesized preferences toward their constituencies did not influence actual behaviour. It was concluded that members who had the chance to conduct

services on the spot, did not exploit the potential what lies in parliamentary questioning as constituency work. These results suggest that local office holders compartmentalize: their work as local officials does rarely influence how they think and act as national representatives. Due to the effect detected in campaigning, however, the analysis is regarded inconclusive in terms of the decision on the hypothesis.

More stable effects are associated with the remaining factors: seniority, SMD candidacy, mandate type, SMD career, and party<sup>13</sup>. With the exception of party affiliation, all the listed variables have prevailing effects in two out of three dimensions of constituency orientation and personalization. Being a newcomer influences how Members of Parliament think about their roles as representatives on the one hand, and questioning behaviour on the other. Junior MPs prefer the generalist approach of representation instead of promoting the interests of the constituencies. In this sense, new members fit the hypothesis of them being less constituency oriented than more experienced MPs. However, in terms of non-legislative behaviour in parliament, the results were not so straightforward. Regarding written questions, the hypothesis could be confirmed in some of the model specifications: newcomers tended to submit a smaller quantity of local questions. Nevertheless, with regards to oral questions, an opposing tendency stands out. This result diminishes when party affiliation was controlled for, thus, this contradiction was extenuated as opposed to tendencies pointing to the other direction.

It is hardly a surprise that variables directly connected to the nominal level of the electoral system pose a strong effect on the dependent variables. Candidacy on the nominal level naturally affects campaign features. SMD candidates pursued more person-oriented campaigns (norms), applied personalized campaign tools in larger numbers (means), and dealt with issues of local concern (agenda). They even had personal campaign teams with a greater probability (organization); however, no difference was detected between them and list candidates in terms of the party support in setting up their staffs. There was nothing unexpected about these results: electoral motivations outperform other explanations when it comes to campaigning, which is based mostly on rational calculus. More interestingly, candidacy on the 1<sup>st</sup> tier affects the local aspect of questioning in parliament. Moderate evidence was found in terms of the shadowing hypothesis as far as constituency service goes. SMD candidates might not be more constituency-oriented in attitudes, but they still address local issues in parliament both orally and in written formats. Moving further, the overall

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<sup>13</sup> Explanatory factors are reported in the order of their significance in explaining personalization.

effects of mandate type and holding an SMD position between 2006 and 2010 are hardly separable. With regards to campaign strategies, former SMD positions captured the effect of type, whereas in the case of perceptions of roles and parliamentary questioning they accounted for two different processes. As for the effect of mandate type it clearly structures how Members of Parliament think about representation. List members are more party oriented than nominal level MPs, who prefer to represent the wants and needs of their constituencies. This distinction appears with regards to style of representation as well. SMD members are more of constituency delegates, while list MPs would act on behalf of the party. Additionally, 1<sup>st</sup> tier members are substantially more local-oriented when it comes to submitting written questions. In terms of campaigning, mandate type<sup>14</sup> had a moderate effect on norms. With regards to organization, SMD members hired a larger proportion of their teams themselves enhancing the personalization aspect of their campaign strategies. After election, previous incumbencies switched from being classified as position related to habitually driven motivations<sup>15</sup>. In this quality, previous nominal level experience did not play any role in explaining member perceptions of their roles. However, it proved to be more useful in determining MPs' behaviour in parliament. Former SMD members were more active in furthering local interests in most of the aspects of questioning. In fact, aside party affiliation, the strongest effect is associated with this variable when seeking for the determinants of the overall local focus of questions, which is argued to be the strongest predictor of local orientation.

Last, but not least, the effect of party affiliation overwhelmingly dominated the chapters. Members of virtually every party think and behave different than MPs of Fidesz. The only exception to this rule is KDNP as its members act in the same way as Fidesz MPs<sup>16</sup>. The largest differences were established between new parties (Jobbik and LMP) and Fidesz-KDNP. Interpreting the results regarding LMP requires great caution because of sample bias. However, similar tendencies were followed by Jobbik MPs, which points to general trends in the attitudes and behaviour of new parties. First, as far as focus of representation is concerned, members of these parties are significantly less constituency oriented than their peers in

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<sup>14</sup> On Table 1, this effect is listed in the row of "SMD (2006-2010)" among position related factors, because during the 2010 campaigns they served as SMD incumbents.

<sup>15</sup> Effects are listed in the row of „SMD (2006-2010)” among habitual explanations.

<sup>16</sup> However, in the case of the proportion of local questions, Fidesz members appeared to be more locally oriented than KDNP MPs.

Fidesz-KDNP and MSZP. The fact that MSZP is on the latter side of the relationship suggests that there is indeed a substantial difference between parties having a considerable history in constituency representation and those who were newly formed and had not have the chance to prevail in the SMDs. Thus, party culture might be a decisive factor in terms of how representatives perceive their roles. Parties that have experience in constituency representation will continue to motivate their members to pursue constituency orientation even if they stand only a small chance to actually filling in SMD positions. Consequently, small and new parties that had not been successful in harvesting the single member districts will not show indications of constituency focus. Second, the very same tendencies appear in the campaign behaviour of Jobbik and LMP. The campaigns of these parties are less personalized in terms of norms, means and organization than the campaigns of either Fidesz-KDNP or the Socialists. Third, considerable differences were found between parties in terms of questioning behaviour as well. Oddly, however, the results do not reflect the tendencies uncovered in the cases of role perceptions and campaign behaviour. On the contrary, not only were members of Jobbik and LMP more active in parliamentary questioning, but the number of locally oriented inquiries were larger in their case as well. Nevertheless, as the proportion of local questions is not higher in their case, it would be an overstatement to argue that they are more concerned about local issues than MPs of larger parties. The larger number of local inquiries is the consequence of the role of questions in the representatives' work. They are less of a tool for constituency service than government control, making opposition parties more active relative to their size. As a consequence, other behaviour traits have to be examined to conclude on what MPs do to further the interests of the local areas.

Among the main predictors, electoral and position related factors seemed to be the better estimators of role perception, campaign dimensions and non-legislative behaviour in parliament. In the group of habitual variables, only former SMD background was found important in explaining constituency orientation and personalization. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that these conclusions largely depend on the concrete definitions applied throughout the dissertation. The way the group of the various factors is established greatly influences the results attributed to the different types of explanations. There are several additional variables that might count as habitual, but were not controlled for on the course of this analysis (i.e. number of years spent in a local position, more detailed election history). Furthermore, the way how IVs are categorized into the three groups of factors is also a manner in dispute. One could rightfully argue that, for instance, candidacy is a rather weak

proxy of future electoral intentions, thus it might not be considered as an electoral factor in the case of representational roles (Chapter 3) and behaviour in parliament (Chapter 5). Thus, the conclusions drawn from the analyses are only valid in the context of this work. Also, conclusions were made based on statistical significance, and coefficient signs were rarely taken into account when a variable was not proven significant. Again, one could argue that by the reason of the fact that the sample accounts for a large proportion of the population (64 %), sample results are conclusive to the whole parliament.

To summarize the findings of the different chapters, it appears that Hungarian Members of Parliament are rational actors. Their attitudes and behaviour is mostly structured by electoral calculus and the possibilities (and constraints) their positions offer. Nevertheless, not only electoral rules and positions pose constraints on member behaviour, but the overall party centeredness of the system. Thus, the effects revealed by the analysis are the effects that have already undergone the thorough monitoring of the party. After this filter, several individual variables remained significant indicating that pursuing constituency orientation and personalization is not something that defies party interests. On the contrary, in certain cases, it is the party's strategic interest to encourage district-centred behaviour. For example, in instances where the party vote might be increased through individual behaviour both at the national and the local elections, parties are likely to motivate their members to more constituency-centred actions. Although we have no direct evidence for this, the level of party centeredness in the political system suggests that prevailing personalization are not likely to be the consequence of personal representation, but the extension of the party will. Thus, the two concepts are hardly the two ends of a continuum. Party centeredness does not rule out constituency focus, and district promoters can also be faithful to the party.

Taking a closer look at the effects of the various independent factors on constituency orientation and personalization it becomes clear that the majority of variables with strong effects are characteristics connected to electoral rules. The existence of the SMD tier leads the way in explaining why Members of Parliament and parties think that district focus is something to encourage. Thus, there is an established relationship between electoral rules and member attitudes and behaviour. The nominal level indeed causes a steady increase in the level of constituency orientation. Strict party control over candidate selection, however, ensures that these effects appear in synch with party interests. Parties recognize that district focus and personalization might be an asset in the quest for maximizing votes. Bringing politics closer to the people is a way to renew. Putting the popular faces into the front lines,

and showing how concerned members are for their constituencies, might balance the negative associations in connection with parties. This pursuit is in fact not alien to Hungarian politics. In the previous regime, electoral rules were changed to enhance the legitimacy of the whole political system: in 1966, a single national level party list was replaced by single member districts. At the time, of course, this did not involve true democratization, as the circle of nominating bodies was extremely restricted until 1970, when legal burdens were lifted only to be replaced by administrative thresholds. However, it is rather an example that Hungarian parties have a history to prefer SMDs and still maintain full control over candidate behaviour.

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## V. The Author's publications

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#### 5.1.1. Book chapters

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