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TO TRUST OR NOT TO TRUST?

**Trust Towards Democratic Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe after the
Regime Change in 1989-1990 – with a Special Focus on Hungary**

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Ph.D. Dissertation

Eszter Bakonyi

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In memory of Rita, Andris, Gallasz, and Mum

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Before the explanation of this field of research from a theoretical, methodological, and historical point of view, I would like to start with some clarifications. Since trust is a fashionable term in public debates but still a bit neglected by social scientists, especially, in the Eastern and Central part of Europe, I decided to write my Ph.D. dissertation in English, although, my native language is Hungarian, because I thought that it might be interesting and useful for other social scientists with different linguistic backgrounds as well. The term which caused many misunderstandings by the different cultural and historical backgrounds and education traditions during my work is Communism or Post-Communism. There are several terms used to explain the regime ruled by the Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe for 40 years before 1989-1990 but in my opinion, the most appropriate and precise is State Socialism. The problem is that it is usually called Communism in Western countries, especially, in the English-speaking countries. And the situation became more confusing when one using the term State Socialism would like to refer to the period after the regime change, because Western scholars usually do not know or use the term Post-'State Socialism' which is rather confusing for them. Thus, as I chose the English language, I decided to follow the tradition of the English-speaking culture to make my text more understandable for more people. Although, I am aware that the regimes realized in Central and Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the philosophical content of the term Communism.

The topic of trust has become fashionable again by the end of the 1990's in nearly all parts of Europe. It was a time when the new democracies of Europe gained some experiences about independent self-governance in a modern, Post-Nationalistic world. Citizens of the Post-Communist countries could finally get access to consumer goods, they could make decisions about their own lives and could express their feelings and opinions freely. The other side of the coin is that these people also had to learn some dark or shadowed side of a functioning market economy and democratic multiparty system, namely, high rates of unemployment or risk of losing their jobs, a deep poverty that was not known or experienced before, ongoing corruption activities of the political elite despite that these cases were published in the media. As Onora O'Neill explained this mechanism in her lecture on the BBC: "in the very years in which the accountability revolution has made striking advances, in which increased demands for control and performance, scrutiny and audit have been imposed, and in which the

performance of professionals and institutions has been more and more controlled, we find in fact growing reports of mistrust”¹. Although, it is also worth to mention at the beginning that other scholars emphasize that it is exactly the institutionalized distrust that is the main principle of democratic politics. As Piotr Sztompka explains it in one of his essays, institutionalized distrust “paradoxically generates the climate of security and generalized trust among citizens”².

Another phenomenon is that these new democracies entered the European Union which was seen by many of these citizens as a final arrival to the free and rich world where they should have always belonged to, but foreign powers and historical mistakes hindered it. These people had very high expectations again, but they also had to realize that the citizens of the old Member States did not always feel this common European feeling of solidarity on the same level or to the same extent. For example, many countries implemented some limitations against the free movement of citizens of the new Member States. Beyond this asymmetry in thinking of a reunited Europe, the European Union itself has faced the so-called democratic deficit and a significant distrust from the people. One example may be the long-term tension and disputes over the European Constitution which showed that different countries want completely different things from the EU, there is no consensus over institutional matters, and that the political elite was unable to explain the people what are the problems in the present situation and how these could be solved.

A third phenomenon or historical event that turned the attention of social scientists to public trust is the financial crisis at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. The credit crunch which started from the United States caught the attention not only of researchers, experts, and analysts, but also of journalists and ordinary citizens in many parts of the world. This crisis also showed us how easy and fast it can be when trust is distorted, damaged or even destroyed and how much effort is necessary to rebuild it. And although, there are many debates and criticism on the importance of trust, most scholars agree that a certain amount of trust is definitely needed for certain activities, e.g. entering financial relationships or activities. A growing distrust in the field of economy may transfer to other areas or subsystems of the society and it may result a decrease of collective and individual actions. As Dermot Lane

¹ O’Neill, Onora (2002): A Question of Trust, BBC Reith Lectures:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2002/lectures.shtml>

² Sztompka, Piotr (2006): New Perspectives on Trust, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 112, No. 3, p. 913

explains it: “trust is an essential element in the life and activity of hope. Without trust there is no hope; it is the absence of trust that brings about despair”³.

Despite the fact that the issue of trust has been in the limelight again since the end of the 1990’s, social sciences still could not formulate a common, standardized definition of trust that would be understood and accepted in common or mostly shared and which could be analyzed and measured also by our existing analytical tools. This Ph.D. dissertation makes an attempt to give an explanation of trust by looking through the different approaches of the last decades and it aims to explore the trends and structures of institutional trust in Central and Eastern Europe after the regime change in 1989-1990 with a special focus on Hungary.

Chapter 1.1: Arguments about the Choice of the Subject and Problem Formulation

In my doctoral thesis, I would like to analyze institutional trust in the former Communist countries after the regime change in 1989-1990 and to compare these countries for exploring the similarities and differences in the tendencies in this field. The focus of my research will be posed on Hungary, mainly because of practical reasons as there are much more detailed data available for me about this country. The reason why I think this research is relevant and important for the scientific world is that the institutional framework was set up very quickly in the Post-Communist countries, but after two decades, it is not clear what happened to public attitudes toward the new institutions. By this time, we do not have enough detailed analysis to describe the structural differences of institutional trust in the different Central and Eastern European countries; or whether the tendencies of trust moved similarly to each other in the different countries or totally different things happened in each of them. It also implies the question whether the same institutions have similar or different image in the different regions from the point of view of trust and confidence. Another dilemma whether these new democratic institutions have already been strong enough or whether people see them with a high level of suspicion. Regarding the case of Hungary, it would be also fruitful to explore the content of this term and the complex relationship between trust and some other, social and economic factors.

³ Lane, Dermot A. (1996): *Keeping Hope Alive*, Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, p. 60.

Before we go into the details of tendencies and theories about institutional trust, let me start with the question or dilemma whether trust is a necessary characteristic of social life; and if yes, why it is important. On the one hand, we may say that trust is necessary if we take into consideration that human beings are social creatures. If we want to get into an interaction, we need to have a minimum level of trust that the partner does not want anything bad for us, s/he will not harm us or damage our possessions. On the other hand, if we trust people and institutions we do not know, we can save time and energy as we can take a lot of things for granted during the interactions, e.g. rules or behavioural norms. We do not need to find them out once more and we can count on it that the others also know these rules and norms and they do their best to comply with them. That is, if we trust others, we can arrange our social situations and actions more easily. Moreover, we can decrease transaction costs, because we can rely on the institutions dealing with controlling and which make sure that the rules are complied with. Without these institutions, it would be very costly to defend ourselves from the cheaters⁴.

Another argument is what some authors claim in the field of network analysis and typology of capitals (Claire Wallace mentions the writings of Wallace, Schmulyar, Bezir, Wilkinson, Knack, Keefer, Putnam, Coleman, and Lin in a study of hers, see footnote) that the social capital invested into social networks makes a significant profit for the individual in decreasing risk. For example, it improves health care indices, promotes economic growth, decreases crime, improves the outcomes of the educational system, and strengthens the production of trust that leads to political stability⁵. As Onora O'Neill also points out: "some sociologists have suggested that the crisis of trust is real and new because we live in a risk society. We do live among highly complex institutions and practices whose effects we cannot control or understand, and supposedly see ourselves as subject to hidden and incomprehensible sources of risk. It's true that individuals can do little or nothing to avert environmental risks, or nuclear accidents, or terrorist attacks"⁶. In relation to this idea there are scholars who argue that a community can even collapse without social trust. As the Swedish researcher Peter Dahlgren expressed it in a lecture held in August 2006 in Estonia, the lack of trust can paralyze the society⁷. Although, others have softened this idea by arguing that a social order

⁴ Yamagishi, Toshio (1998): Trust and Social Intelligence. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, <http://lynx.let.hokudai.ac.jp/members/yamagishi/english.htm>, pp. 18-22

⁵ Wallace, Claire (2003): 'Social networks and social capital'. In: Torsello, Davide – Pappová, Melinda (eds.) (2003): Social Networks in Movement. Time, interaction and interethnic spaces in Central Eastern Europe, Šamorín, Dunajská Streda, Slovakia: Forum Minority Research Institute, p. 15

⁶ O'Neill, Onora (2002): *op. cit.*

⁷ See the whole lecture more detailed in: Carpentier, Nico – Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, Pille – Nordenstreng, Kaarle – Hartmann, Maren – Vihalemm, Peeter – Cammaerts, Bart (eds.) (2006): Researching media, democracy

can exist and maintained without trust if there are strong institutions which ensure the commitment of the citizens, the sanctioning of cheating, the monitoring whether citizens follow the rules or not, and the enforcement of contracts⁸.

However, there is no consensus among the authors about the question whether social trust is necessary or not. Similarly, empirical studies dealing with trust have not yet proved it clearly that it would be an essential precondition of social coexistence. According to John Locke, citizens as being participants of collective actions have the right to replace their government and set up new institutions if the existing ones do not meet the expectations of the community. From this point of view, distrust is a positive common good in democracies, because it is a kind of consistent or unified scepticism toward the government or other political institutions. Social distrust can also hinder government officials in their so-called authoritarian attempts or aspirations⁹, i.e. distrust is able to prevent the abuse of power deriving from the position of these officials, or the arbitrary and unjust procedures. Russell Hardin uses similar argumentation when he says that modern bureaucracies do not function the way as Max Weber described it. Thus, conscious and self-confident citizens always have to keep some distant from State institutions and have to approach them with suspicion. So, very interestingly, his starting point in the relationship between citizens and the democratic institutional system is not trust but distrust. Hardin calls this disposition Liberal Distrust and he emphasizes that research has to start from this point as it is not worth for citizens to waste their trust¹⁰. In sum, distrust is not simply the opposite of trust and the lack of trust does not immediately translate into distrust if for example, the grounds of distrust are not sufficient¹¹. Distrust supplements trust as Andrain and Smith, and Hardin point out or it is functionally equivalent with trust as Luhmann described it. Luhmann argues that there is only qualitative difference between trust and distrust, thus, individuals simply need to choose between them¹².

On the other hand, Claus Offe argues that high level of trust toward the institutions of Liberal democracy is needed in Post-Communist countries after the transformation of their systems.

and participation. The intellectual work of the 2006 European media and communication doctoral summer school, Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press

⁸ Cook, Karen S. – Cooper, Robin M. (2003): 'Experimental Studies of Cooperation, Trust, and Social Exchange'. In: Ostrom, Elinor – Walker, Jimmy (eds.) (2003): *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, p. 209

⁹ Andrain, Charles F. – Smith, James T. (2006): *Political Democracy, Trust, and Social Justice*, Boston, Massachusetts: Northeastern University Press, p. 20

¹⁰ Kornai, János (2003): *Tisztesség és bizalom a poszt-szocialista átmenet fényében (Honesty and Trust at the Post-Communist Transition, in Hungarian)*, *Beszélő* 2003/6

¹¹ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 911

¹² Luhmann, Niklas (1979): *Trust and Power*, Avon, Great Britain: Pitman Press, p. 71

This high level would be desired because these institutions (e.g. media publicity, general elections in every four years, competition of parties, government responsibility, and independence of the courts) can be understood as preventive measures against institutionalized distrust¹³. These institutions do not deal with the distribution or redistribution of produced goods but with the decreasing of transaction costs for the individuals and for other institutions in their own specific way. By the functioning of these institutions, participants of a democratic system can trust that everybody takes his/ her responsibilities and that institutions do not give unfair advantage to anybody when following the rules. If individuals or institutions do not follow the rules, there is the opportunity to go to the court¹⁴. This type of institutional role is called ‘efficient’ institution and in opposition to ‘redistributive’ institutions, these institutions guarantee that everybody follows of the rules.

Several theories try to explain how could it be that these ‘efficient’ institutions still could not produce enough trust in transitional countries. One of them argues that trust and distrust are not two static and mutually excluding conditions but dynamic and changing phenomena. The mostly constant social trust, constant as it is necessary for social interactions, is distorted and pushed into the background from time to time. Then, distrust strengthens which is also an important dimension of human coexistence and modern societies. According to Saskia Sassen, the culture of distrust “originates basically from the fear of people that they lose their jobs or they are given lower wages, because immigrants are ready to do that job for that price. This fear, the economic dread has shown up in periodic and frequent waves in Europe for a long time”¹⁵.

We also have to add that the new democratic institutions have to make huge efforts to get trust from the people. The main reason may be because people felt in the Communist regime that the State, the Government, and other political and economic institutions are enemies of the citizens and representatives of a foreign power, namely, the Soviet Union. Moreover, the institutions of the Communist regimes did not fulfil the needs of the society and corruption was very widespread. Another factor that may lead to social distrust if the new democratic

¹³ Offe, Claus (2000): Demokrácia és bizalom (Democracy and Trust, in Hungarian), *Beszélő* 2000/3

¹⁴ Rothstein, Bo (2005a): ‘Bevezetés’. In: Kornai, János –Rothstein, Bo –Rose-Ackerman, Susan (eds.) (2005): Tisztség és bizalom a poszt-szocialista átmenet fényében. A társadalmi bizalom megteremtése a poszt-szocialista átmenet időszakában (Honesty and Trust at the Post-Communist Transition. Creation of Social Trust in the Post-Communist Transition, in Hungarian), Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, p. 21

¹⁵ Sassen, Saskia (2005): Elnemzettelenedés. Saskia Sassen a globalizációról (De-Nationalization. Saskia Sassen on Globalisation, in Hungarian), *Figyelő*, 17th November, Vol. 49, No. 46, pp. 30-31

governments are just keeping postponing important social and economic reforms without solving these problems.

Most scholars of different paradigms agree that institutions, social structures, and economic processes can shape the identity of citizens, representation of interests, and selection of values¹⁶. Civil society is a special sphere of the society and it has its own functional logic and system of norms. However, these scholars do not agree where the borders of civil society are exactly, e.g. how to deal with business corporations and political parties¹⁷. Another important point is how people feel and think about the democratic system: how they construct their civic identity and how they see or position themselves in this system. For example, the courts themselves cannot establish justice and the rule of law, just only if citizens recognize them as judicial institutions and as parts of the system. Hence, when citizens become somehow participants of this system, they trust its institutions¹⁸. As Robert Putnam noticed it, there is a strong connection between civil organizations, their activity, and social trust that citizens feel towards each other¹⁹. If there are several people who take part in voluntary organizations, they will interiorize a range of skills with which they can reach their interests more easily, they can get more information about the functioning mechanisms of political, economic, and social institutions. Thus, these scholars say that civil participation may function as a kind of social capital which can be an important factor in the time of Post-Nationalistic identity²⁰. The main point here is that trust on micro-level can be transferred to macro-level. Although, this hypothesis is weakened by the fact that this theory of Putnam was criticized by many people and Putnam himself raised the question in one of his texts in 2002 that the relationship might be rather the opposite. He suggests that it is not participation that produces trust towards the institutional system but specific institutions produce social trust. And if they do it efficiently,

¹⁶ Chambers, Simone (2002): 'A Critical Theory of Civil Society'. In: Chambers, Simone –W. Kymlicka (eds.) (2002): *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society*, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 91

¹⁷ Chambers, Simone – Kymlicka, W. (2002): 'Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society'. In: Chambers, Simone –W. Kymlicka (eds.) (2002): *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society*, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-5

¹⁸ Chambers, Simone (2002): *op. cit.*, p. 102

¹⁹ Putnam, Robert D. – Leonardi, Robert - Nanetti, Raffaella (1993): *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, quoted by: Kornai János (2003): *op. cit.*

²⁰ Niedermüller, Péter (1999): *Etnicitás és politika a későmodern nagyvárosokban (Ethnicity and Politics in Post-Modern Metropolises, in Hungarian)*, *Replika* 1999/38, pp. 105-118

then, civil participation comes into being²¹. But a more detailed explanation of the different approaches on generating and maintaining trust will be presented in the theoretical chapter.

And last but not least, the research of trust or distrust is important because of its up-to-dateness. On the one hand, we do not have trustable data about social trust towards the institutional system from the times before the regime change in 1989-1990. But we may not be wrong when we suppose that social mistrust strengthened during the Communist times, because institutions functioned according to an order forced by a foreign power as it was not chosen by the citizens but brought to them by the Red Army. A so-called 'grey sphere' of life developed: the prohibited 'second economy' and 'second public life'. A lot of people got used to the fact that the norms represented by the official institutions of the Communist regime are false and the society functions according to other principles. If somebody wanted to know the truth, s/he had to turn to institutions outside of the system, for example, to the Western broadcasts and radios, e.g. the Radio Free Europe, the Luxembourg Radio, and the Voice of America.

On the other hand, after the regime change in 1989-1990, the standard of living decreased significantly, social inequalities became more significant and visible, and a new dimension of poverty came into being in the Post-Communist societies: the so-called deep poverty. Meanwhile, several news were published in the press about questionable cases of privatization and the growing level of corruption in the State administration. All these led a lot of people to uncertainty and suspicion towards the new institutions of democracy and market economy. Besides these, the dramatic events on the streets of Budapest, Hungary in September and October 2006 might also prove that the institutions of democracy were established and functioned, but these institutions have not been able to strengthen yet and could not meet the requirements of the society. Regarding these trends, it would be worth to go into deeper by a case-study and to analyze the level of trust of the Hungarian public, the main characteristics of their trust or mistrust, and to describe the structural changes of their institutional trust – if changes occurred. We also attempt to explore the peculiarities of Hungary through a comparative analysis about the societies of Central and Eastern Europe in terms of social and institutional trust.

²¹ Rothstein, Bo (2005b): 'A társadalmi bizalom és a kormány tisztessége: az ok-okozati mechanizmus' (Social Trust and Honesty of the Government: the Causal Mechanism, in Hungarian). In: Kornai, János – Rothstein, Bo – Rose-Ackerman, Susan (eds.) (2005): *Tisztesség és bizalom a poszt-szocialista átmenet fényében. A társadalmi bizalom megteremtése a poszt-szocialista átmenet időszakában* (Honesty and Trust at the Post-Communist Transition. Creation of Social Trust in the Post-Communist Transition, in Hungarian), Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, p. 36

Finally, I would like to define the main terms I want to use in my dissertation. Although, I will use different theoretical explanations parallelly about trust and institutions, I will always focus on the so-called impersonal trust which is also referred to as general trust, social trust, public trust, confidence, and system trust. General trust tends towards the anonymous others, i.e. all other fellows in the society we do not know; and towards the whole democratic institutional system and its participants. We define the term of trust in advance as it follows an adaptation or routine and a decision. It means a preliminary commitment to the system of rules and the functioning mechanism of the system. But it does not need a common basis of value systems or beliefs. So, trusting somebody means that we suppose that we can forecast the reaction of others or the coming events and that we can rely on it. In terms of institutional trust as it is our focus, it incorporates the aspects of the perceived legitimacy, the technical competence, and the ability of the institutions to perform their duties efficiently²². In contrast to this, we do not want to deal in details with interpersonal trust used mostly in psychology and social psychology, because on the one hand, our research focus will be on impersonal trust. As Anthony Giddens highlights the difference between the two: trusting people “is built upon mutuality of response and involvement: faith in the integrity of another is a prime source of feeling of integrity and authenticity of the self. Trust in abstract systems provides for the security of day-to-day reliability, but by its very nature cannot supply either the mutuality or intimacy which personal trust relations offer”²³. So, the difference between personal and impersonal trust can be simplified as personal trust needs face-to-face commitments, while impersonal trust needs faceless commitments²⁴. On the other hand, the analysis of the two types of trust would go beyond the possibilities of this dissertation regarding time and space. We also support the idea that institutional trust may be more important in modern democracies as institutions can provide more resources to the people than their fellow citizens could²⁵, especially, when people do not live in small communities any more but in complex societies in which they have to deal and cooperate with the anonymous others.

When we use the term of institution, we refer to institutions of the democratic institutional system and free-market economy which are described and defined by the rules of the law. Thus, when analyzing data, we will not interpret this term on an abstract but rather on a more

²² Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): Trust as a Process: A Three-Dimensional Approach, *Sociology* 2007/41., p. 123

²³ Giddens, Anthony (1990): *The Consequences of Modernity*, Palo Alto, USA: Stanford University Press, p. 114

²⁴ Yang, Kaifeng (2006): Trust and Citizen Involvement Decisions: Trust in Citizens, Trust in Institutions, and Propensity to Trust, *Administration & Society*, Vol. 38., No. 5., p. 578

²⁵ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 123

concrete level. It means that we will not deal with institutions in a broader sense or used in other fields, e.g. marriage or uniforms. When we use the term of institution, we will interpret it on the one hand, as it carries the behavioural norms and system of rules of the community. On the other hand, we will handle it as a kind of founder and collector of the community knowledge, so an institution contains information about how to behave and what to do in several situations in a given society. Besides, when using the term of institution, we want to keep in mind a constructivist concept, i.e. institutions are those things that people recognize as institutions in the system. For example, the institution of the president of the State will not be the guard of functioning of democratic institutions just because the law states it, but because the citizens recognize the head of State as watchdog of democratic functioning.

Chapter 1.2: Structure of the Dissertation

Firstly, I will present the most important theories I would like to use or refer to in this research. I start with the theories dealing with social trust and I try to summarize the main conceptions of definition, emergence, and maintenance of trust. Then, I describe some institutional theories: first, the economic and rational choice theories about institutions and secondly, the cultural and historical theories of institutions. During the analysis of institutional trust, I will follow the concept of institutions formulated by the Sociological Neoinstitutionalism and the concept of trust-as-a-process. Besides, after summarizing the theories of trust and institutions in this first theoretical chapter, we will deal briefly with the historical background of institutional trust in Central and Eastern Europe after the second world war.

Secondly, after looking through the main concepts I plan to use for the research, I set up and describe some hypotheses I would like to test in the analysis. For setting up these hypotheses, I will follow the findings of the theories and previous studies.

Thirdly, I describe the methodology and data I will use for the analysis and I will argue why I chose that methodology and those data and why not other ones. I do also here the operationalization of the important terms of the analyses.

Fourthly, I make a comparative analysis of survey data from several Central and Eastern European countries after the regime change in the beginning of the 1990's. I aim at exploring what happened in those countries after setting up the new, democratic institutional system. I compare the different countries and the different parts of the region according to the level of institutional trust. I want also to highlight the differences and similarities between these countries according to institutional trust and what image these institutions gained in the views of the citizens. I would like to explore what happened in these countries in the first decade of democracy and market economy in the field of trust; and whether similar or different trends can be found in public attitudes towards the new institutional framework. I would like to focus on the peculiarities of Hungary as well, whether the trends of institutional trust and the images of the different types of institutions developed the same way or differently compared to the other countries of the Central and Eastern European region.

Fifthly, after analyzing institutional trust and the specialities of Hungary in this respect in the region, I would like to make a more precise analysis about social trust in Hungary. I will test the models set up along with the hypotheses to find out the main social and economic factors that are in relation to the level and volume of institutional trust. I will analyze also how the trends of institutional trust shaped in general and in case of the different types of institutions. I will generate different social groups according to their level and structure of institutional trust, and I will try to highlight how these trust-groups changed in Hungary during the years after the regime change.

Lastly, I will summarize the main findings of the research and show what is the outcome of the test of hypotheses. I will try to make a conclusion about the main developments of institutional trust in the Central and Eastern European region after the regime change in 1989-1990, with a special focus on the Hungarian trends as a case study. I will describe also the possible ways of future research in this field of study by pointing out the weaknesses of my analyses and the missing points I could not touch.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Historical Background

In this chapter, I will go through the main theories I find worth to keep in mind when conducting a research on trust and institutions. As I agree with those scholars who emphasize the historical characteristics of the concept of trust, I am convinced that before any analysis is done on this topic, the main social and economic characteristics of the Communist regimes and societies should be summarized first in a descriptive way. As trust is highly dependent on time and place, it is very difficult to compare trust between different cultures or to understand trust in a society without knowing the origins of some basic public attitudes and dispositions. It can be also argued to be important from the point of view of the theory of path-dependency.

This chapter will consist of three subchapters. The first one summarizes the different aspects and characteristics of trust. It will point out the problems and difficulties of defining this term and what kind of solutions were born to explore the different faces of trust by developing typologies about it. Then, the theories on the emergence of trust will be explored: in what kind of communities or relationships it is likely to be developed and in what circumstances it is less likely. I will show also how different approaches explain the maintenance or disappearance of trust.

The second subchapter deals with the theories on institutions. This literature is more elaborated and rich in social sciences as political and economic studies made a huge part to develop the concept of social institutions in sociology. If it is possible to make it this way and simplify the difference between the approaches to these two notions, the theories on trust are more complex and problematic, but the theories on institutions are more significant in quantity. That is why I will explain the most important aspects of institutions by following two very different approaches about it: the rational choice theory and economic concepts on the one hand, and the cultural and historical theories on the other. I will try to highlight the basic conceptions of these theories about the definition of institution, the explanation of the emergence and change of institutions, and in what conditions institutions are more or less likely to evolve.

In the third subchapter we will look through the historical background of institutional trust in Post-Communist countries very briefly as our space is limited, but we find it non-negligible. The reason why I make a subchapter about it is that I agree with those approaches and scholars who argue that trust and especially, impersonal trust is a “here and now” phenomenon. As the institutions of these countries are not emerged in long and elaborated social processes like for example, in the United Kingdom but have been set up suddenly, they needed to deal with a significant lack of democratic tradition. Also, from a structuralist point of view, it is worth to take into consideration the historical characteristics of the institutional processes as the structure of the past and present has an important effect on the behaviours of the people. And this explanation may be true for both the people who have interaction with the institutions, i.e. the citizens, and the people who maintain and function these institutions directly and actively, i.e. the bureaucrats and representatives of the State and the civil society. Although, as space is limited and as it is not an historical study, I will focus on the modern, latest history of the Central and Eastern European States.

Chapter 2.1: Theories on Trust

The term of trust is often used as synonym of reliance, confidence, solidarity, reliability, and faith. I would like to separate interpersonal trust from impersonal trust and to focus on the latter term. This type of trust is also often mentioned as social trust, general trust, political trust, institutional trust, and system trust. I do not wish to take the ambitious aim to provide a term which is acceptable for everybody. I just would like to highlight the different debates, approaches, and the confusion existing around this term, and then, I will decide to use a definition by arguing for this choice.

Chapter 2.1.1: Defining the Term of Trust

Although, the term of trust has been used in social sciences for a long time and has become very popular in social science discourses in the 1990's²⁶, it still does not have a clear definition or concept which would be used commonly and would be appropriate for empirical measuring. As Dmitry Khodyakov summarizes it, it is not just a common understanding of trust that social sciences still miss. His analysis on the literature of trust showed that there was

²⁶ Cook, Karen S. – Cooper, Robin M. (2003): *op. cit.*, p. 209

a disagreement between scholars of this field about the definition, the concept, and the nature of trust as trust, confidence, reliability, and faith usually used as synonyms. Similarly, there is a conceptual confusion about the object of trust, namely if it is possible at all to make a distinction between personal and impersonal trust²⁷. We do not want to argue that social sciences need one voice, but it is worth to state in advance that the realm of researching trust is very confused, very much discussed and offers numerous ways for understanding trust. However, many social theorists have tried to make a synthesis or give a better concept of trust to solve the problem of confusing interpretations of a term. Two decades ago, Niklas Luhmann was complaining about the indifference of authors towards the definition of this term while it was used. As he points out, the mainstream of sociological theory never paid too much attention on trust, neither the classical, nor the modern authors. Thus, the theoretical framework of the term of trust is rather incomplete. Empirical research dealing with trust analyzed rather general, not too detailed opinions, e.g. positive and negative attitudes towards political leadership and political institutions, and also hopes and worries. Shmuel Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger used the concept of trust in a monograph in 1984 as if it was consistent with the term of solidarity, meaning, and participation. By using this concept, it can be argued that unconditional trust emerging in families and small communities cannot be transferred and applied automatically as a term to the complex societies based on the division of labour. Thus, special social institutions are needed for the construction of trust, e.g. friendship networks and patron-client relationships. But it is still not the theory of trust, only some findings resulting from the division of labour and the emergence of solidarity²⁸.

Although, as Lynne G. Zucker pointed out when quoting Garfinkel, the term of trust remains invisible and not only in the scientific discourse but also in the everyday life. The reason for this is that it relates very strongly to the basic norms and customs of behaviour, thus, all actors take it for granted until somebody infringes it. In this moment, the community become aware of the notion of trust and when trust-producing mechanisms are formulated, i.e. these mechanisms become formal and institutionalized, then, trust turns into a product which can be sold. The size of the market of trust will depend on the volume of the produced trust²⁹. But I will come back to this idea more detailed in the subchapter dealing with sustaining trust.

²⁷ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 116

²⁸ Luhmann, Niklas (1988): 'Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives'. In: Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988): *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, p. 94

²⁹ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920*, *Research in Organizational Behavior* 1986/8., pp. 54-55

John Dunn separates two meanings of the term of trust. These two meanings do not exclude each other mutually but they are complementers of each other and strengthen each other. In the concept of Dunn, trust means a human feeling on the one hand, and a mode of action on the other hand. Trust as a human feeling is the original form, it exists beforehand and it evolves spontaneously. This concept that goes back to the ideas of David Hume argues that trust as a human feeling can develop from close family ties or big social distances, e.g. the relationship of the leader of the country and the subject. The main point of this idea is that the person trusts that s/he can forecast well the intentions of the other free actor. When the person gains direct experiences whether s/he could predict well the intentions of the other, it may turn out that s/he has to be disappointed. And at this moment, as Dunn argues, the doubt toward the other person is the distrust itself. The original trust of the person is not a disposition chosen by him-/herself, thus, it cannot be strategic. In contrast to this, trust as a human action relates to the fight with long-lasting uncertainty and it refers to the situation how someone can battle with this uncertainty. Thus, this latter meaning of trust is strategic and it depends very much on how this trust has developed³⁰. Besides, Dunn gives more nuances to this concept when he separates two kinds of trust towards politicians and political actors. According to the first meaning of this kind of trust, when we trust them, we trust in the goodwill of the given person, body or institution, i.e. they try to do their best when dealing with political, economic or social affairs, no matter if they are good at it or not. The other meaning of this type of trust refers to the situation when we trust their competence and expertise, but we are not completely sure whether they are good people from a moral point of view or not³¹.

Bernard Barber suggests in a monograph in 1983 to separate three dimensions of trust and trust expectations³². These phenomena basically differ from each other in the way how trust comes into being, i.e. what produces trust. The first dimension of trust is produced by the continuity of natural and moral order, hence, trust relates to the fact that people get used to the way of order in the community and they know what should be done in different situations. Thus, they trust because they have the impression that they know the system and they know what they can expect. The second dimension of trust is produced by the technical competence of the actors regarding their roles. It refers to the idea that we trust that both parties know their roles and the rules of their roles. When we go into an interaction with another person or

³⁰ Dunn, John (1988): 'Trust and Political Agency'. In: Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988): *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 73-74

³¹ Dunn, John (1988): *ibid.*, pp. 89-90

³² Luhmann, Niklas (1988): *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95

organization, we expect that s/he knows how s/he should behave in that given situation according to his/her role in the society. For example, when we have to deal with official administration, we expect that the administrator knows how to behave in that situation and that the administrator also has expectations towards us how to talk to him/her and how to behave.

These two types of trust based on the idea that people feel familiarity towards things, situations, and behaviours they have already known for a long time. Thus, they will not be very careful or suspicious when they get into an interaction with a person or an institution, because they can rely on the familiar systems of roles and behaviours. These two types or dimensions of trust are very close to the term confidence in the typology of Luhmann and also to the distinction of Ferdinand Toennies between community and society which says that basic trust is stucked to personalized trust relations in the community, kinship ties, and friendships, but with the development of abstract systems, trust in impersonal principles or in anonymous others becomes indispensable to social existence. But I will deal with that more detailed shortly.

The third dimension of trust in the theory of Barber is a bit different from the first two dimensions as it is not based on the phenomenon that people get used to things through interactions in a society. This third type of trust is produced by the expectations of the actors that other people or actors are trustworthy which means that we do expect that other people and institutions are trustworthy. This trustworthiness is an obligation or willingness to put and prefer the interests of others before and against their own interest.

In his typology, Luhmann separates first the term of trust from the term of familiarity, i.e. when we are loyal to something which is familiar to us, hence, we are used to it. Familiarity is related to the family and the small community with strong ties between the members. As Luhmann argues, familiarity is an unavoidable phenomenon of life, but in contrast to this, trust is a solution, an answer to the special problems of risk. The second step is that he divides trust into two concepts: trust and confidence. Both refer to expectations, presuppositions, and can end in disappointment. Confidence is the original or basic form when a person trusts that s/he is not wrong about his/her presuppositions. For example, s/he goes for a walk on every Sunday afternoon and does not think about it or does not afraid of that s/he will be run over by a car. According to Luhmann, it is not possible to live without creating expectations and

presuppositions which are adapted to the continuous, repeating events. And more or less, we do not have to keep in mind that we may be disappointed, because on the one hand, it happens very rarely that we are disappointed about our expectations. And on the other hand, we would not know what to do without expectations and presuppositions, and we would live in a world of continuous uncertainty. We would drop out our expectations and presuppositions without replacing them with something else. In contrast to confidence, trust requires a preliminary commitment from the actor. There is a given risky situation, e.g. if the person should buy or not a used car about which it can turn out later that it is a lemon or a dud. It is the decision of the person whether s/he takes the risk or not. But in the latter case, s/he also gives up the advantages s/he could reach in that risky situation which is here to buy a cheap car. In case of trust, the person is not that dependent as in the case of confidence, although, trust can also become a routine, normal, unconscious behaviour³³.

In sum, I comprehend that this trust-confidence distinction makes a difference between the two terms in the perception and in the logic of attribution, i.e. finding reasons why given things happen. I explain first the difference between trust and confidence according to the perception of the actors. For example, if somebody does not take into consideration that there are other possibilities and options, let's say, s/he leaves his/her house every day without taking a gun with him/her, then, this is the situation of confidence. The person simply does not think about it that s/he can be attacked, s/he relies on the system and the anonymous others. It is not a conscious decision, instead, s/he just does it like this every day, because this is the way how people live in that society. In opposition to this, if the person prefers a given action in contrast to others despite the possibility of being disappointed, e.g. others behave differently than we expected, then, this is the situation of trust.

Regarding the logic of attribution, in case of confidence people use outside causes to explain the situation when they are disappointed. It means that they explain the failure by saying that the world is like this, things sometimes happen like this. In opposition, in case of trust, people use inside causes, i.e. they explain the situation when they are disappointed that it happened because of the personality or character of the partner. The cause of the failure does not come from the outside world but from the characteristics of the partner, from the inner attributes of the other person or organization. And another difference is that in case of trust, after a disappointment the person feels sorry about his/her previous trust decision.

³³ Luhmann, Niklas (1988): *ibid.*, pp. 95-97

Besides these, Luhmann quotes Deutsch who argues that trust realizes only in those situations when the possible damage is bigger or seems to be bigger than the possible benefit. Otherwise, it would be only rational calculation how the person decides in the given situation and risk would remain between acceptable limits³⁴. Thus, trust relates rather to danger and unpredictable uncertainty than to risk.

The distinction of the concepts of trust and confidence refers to our competence that we are able to make difference between danger and risk, but this distinction of Luhmann does not refer to probability and improbability. It refers only to the fact that the possibility of disappointment is in relation or not to the previous behaviour of the actor. A confidence relation may become a trust relation as well. For example, taking part in economic and business life represents confidence towards money, but the way how we invest or spend this money is already trust. However, the relationship of the two terms is not a zero-sum game, i.e. the more confidence does not mean less trust. In societies with a complex structure, we can interpret it as confidence is always the precondition of participation and trust is the condition of the best use of chances and possibilities. In sum, confidence expresses the reliance on the system and trust expresses the reliance on the fellows³⁵. Although, not all sociologists who deal with trust accept that these two dimensions of reliance (the trust and confidence distinction) are so important. For example, according to the scholars of the theory of 'efficient' institutions, these two terms are basically the same and this is the institutional trust itself.

Luhmann pays less attention to familiarity of the three types of trust. This type is a bit less important to us as it relates to the private sphere³⁶ and it is closer to the interpersonal, not to the institutional trust. But regarding the other two types, Luhmann draws our attention to the fact that the relationship between the two, trust and confidence, has been changing as the world has changed. According to Luhmann, in modern societies, social differences are related much more to functional manners instead of relating to social stratification. The rules of living together in a society have been changed, e.g. the legal framework or the economy is not only a matter of the prices any more but goes beyond the borders and a huge fluctuation takes place. Nowadays, scientific inventions get into the ordinary life of citizens much faster. Our life is not determined any more by structures and cultures defined in space but by processes

³⁴ Luhmann, Niklas (1988): *ibid.*, p. 98

³⁵ Luhmann, Niklas (1988): *ibid.*, pp. 98-99

³⁶ Luhmann, Niklas (1988): *ibid.*, p. 102

existing temporarily and not limited in space, e.g. fashion. And these new circumstances, Internet access, constraints, possibilities and dependencies, openness, and the lack of integration have changed the relationship between trust and confidence. Trust has remained the most important in interpersonal relations, but participation in functional systems, e.g. the economy, is not a matter of interpersonal relations any more. Thus, in these situations, this is confidence and not trust what is needed. It also implies that citizens decide less strategically and they rely more on the applied rules and norms of behaviour.

In contrast to this, Slavoj Žižek criticizes the unavoidableness of constraints determining our life. He calls this phenomenon the “«reflexivization» of our everyday life”. Žižek argues that according to the theory of Giddens and Beck about risk society, our life has not been driven by previous ideals and tradition any more. Instead, the different ways of living exist together in the same time, next to each other and the individual can always decide, moreover, s/he has to decide whether s/he chooses the fashionable, up-to date one or not. Thus, all of his/her life is pervaded by reflexivity and s/he does not follow the ideas or ways of life accepted by a lot of people just because of outside constraints. As Žižek explains it, “we experience more and more in relation to all our motivations from the sexual focus to national affiliation that these are all matters of choice. The areas once taken for granted [...] have been already colonized by reflexivity by now. And now, we experience them as something we have to acquire and have to make decision on”³⁷. But ironically, this reflexivity can be also a kind of constraint when a person follows the mainstream, although, s/he is aware of it, s/he chose it him-/herself, and s/he can look at it from a distance.

But going back again to Luhmann, he argues that in sociological sense, there are constant structures and changing conditions in the modern world. There is no choice between opting in or opting out as participation in the structure cannot be avoided. The bases of creating social trust (in the terminology of Luhmann, it is simply trust) have disappeared, because there is not any rational reason to accept something which is unavoidable. The result is that it is not necessary and there is not any chance to choose confidence, i.e. trust in the system; we can feel dissatisfaction at most and that is all we can do³⁸. Taking all these into consideration, it implies that nowadays, there is not too much sense to separate trust from confidence as it is in the terminology of Luhmann when researching social trust toward institutions.

³⁷ Žižek, Slavoj (2006): “Megteheted!” (You can do it!, in Hungarian), *2000* 2006/7-8, p. 3

³⁸ Luhmann, Niklas (1988): *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103

Besides, it is also worth to focus on the lack of reliance towards other people, institutions or the whole system. The lack of confidence means that people turn away from public life and withdraw to their private sphere. They deal with their private matters only and represent a fatalist attitude towards the world. In contrast to this, the lack of trust simply means a decrease of actions or more precisely, the interval of the opportunities of rational actions. But by doing so, the size of the system may be decreased, because there is not enough source for self-reproduction on a given level of development. But the lack of confidence does not result necessarily the lack of trust. And the system is often saved from this pessimistic scenario by the fact that we transfer our life experiences on the system. For example, we suppose that our family doctor is a cautious and good specialist and our bank handle our money well. It means that we take part in the functioning of the social and economic system and this participation presupposes a given amount of reliance. Thus, trust built up on micro level defends the system of loss of confidence on macro level³⁹.

Lynne G. Zucker interprets trust differently than Luhmann does it. She puts emphasis rather on the level and possibilities of measurement, not on the way of functioning. According to the approaches of economic and organizational theory, e.g. in the studies of Arrow and Ouchi, trust can be interpreted as a product, a raw material or an implicit contract. But they agree that trust is the most efficient mechanism to direct and complete a transaction. As Seligman puts it: “the existence of trust is an essential component of all enduring social relationships”⁴⁰. Among other sociological approaches, in the theory of Blau, trust is an essential element of stable social relationships and Parsons says it is necessary to sustain and operate social cooperation. According to Garfinkel, trust is a necessary basis which is needed even to the most routine, everyday interactions. For Evan, Geertz, and Macaulay, trust is an informal, interactive process which is based on internalization and moral commitment, and it functions through these two⁴¹. As Zucker summarizes all these, there are two major trends in sociology about interpreting trust: one is focusing on the individual and the other one concentrates on the community. In the former case, trust characterizes the expectations of the individual, e.g. s/he ignores his/her own interest with respect to the others, thus, s/he puts an emphasis on collective orientation. For example, in the concept of Parsons, trust relates to the micro level. According to the community-centred trust concept, all expectations and actions of the actor is characterized by the fact that s/he takes the phenomena and the way of functioning of the

³⁹ Luhmann, Niklas (1988): *ibid.*, p. 104

⁴⁰ Seligman, Adam B. (1997): *The problem of trust*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 13

⁴¹ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *op. cit.*, p. 56

social order for granted. And that is why the person trusts them. One of the representatives of this concept of trust is Garfinkel⁴² and it suggests that the person takes the existing rules, functioning, and behavioural manner for granted. This concept is different from the individual-centred approach because it focuses on the community.

Zucker's own definition of trust which is based on the approach of Garfinkel also separates two types of trust. The first type of trust means common presuppositions and already existing expectations and it is very similar to the concept of Durkheim about mechanical solidarity. This type has two elements: one is the common system of symbols and the other one is the common basis of interpretation. In sum, this definition of trust attaches attitudes of everyday life and the reciprocity of future prospects and expectations to the term of trust, hence, it means a socially valid knowledge. The other type of trust is represented by constitutive presuppositions and it is close to organic solidarity of Durkheim. Although, these two types of trust are not inverses of each other but complementers, therefore, they exist together and complete each other. The second type of trust, i.e. the constitutive presupposition has also two elements. The first one is independence from self-interest and it means that besides the one opportunity which would be the most favourable to the actor, there is another alternative action which is independent of the desires and wishes of the person or the organization. And this latter phenomenon, the opportunity of the alternative action is what differentiates this second type of trust from the first type which is, besides this, quite similar to this second one. The second element of constitutive presupposition, i.e. the second type of trust is intersubjective meaning. Intersubjective meanings imply that the actor knows the social expectations and demands, s/he knows that the other person or organization also knows them, and moreover, the actor knows that the other person or organization also knows that s/he him-/herself knows them⁴³. This latter idea is a bit complicated, but an example to this can be the use of money when all members of a community trust a piece of paper. Moreover, they are willing to make efforts and give goods for it, however, it is just a piece of coloured paper certified by the signature of the head of the central bank of the country.

Zucker completes her definition of trust with some dilemmas of measuring trust. The main point is the fact that the size of trust cannot be seized and cannot be measured in itself. Scholars mostly agree that the possibility of measuring trust can be interpreted only as measuring whether trust is present or not. But also in this case, trust can be defined by notions

⁴² Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, p. 57

⁴³ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, pp. 57-59

and conditions which also cannot be measured in itself, e.g. internalized rules, moral codes, and the norms of applied reciprocity. As some researchers and Zucker argue, if these latter indicators are present, we can say that trust exists and presents in a community, but we cannot study trust itself directly⁴⁴.

Another viewpoint that I think to be important to keep in mind when doing this research is the theory of diffuseness of trust. According to the typology of the research Critical Citizens, social trust has five components. These components can be divided into two groups, one is the more diffuse area of social trust and the other one is the more specific area of trust. Two components belong to the diffuse group: trust towards the community and trust towards the principles of the system. This latter means that respondents prefer the basic ideas of democracy and market economy and they favour these ideas in contrast to other types of systems, for example, totalitarian or authoritarian systems. These two components are diffuse in the sense that these are rather difficult to define and apprehend, especially, in a survey. The other three types of social trust are much easier to understand and evaluate by the citizens. These three are trust toward the performance of the regime, the institutions, and the political actors. This theory which is also called as a fivefold conceptual framework distinguishes between the five types of social trust according to the levels or objects of support⁴⁵. The scholars of this research argue also that nowadays, the more diffuse types of trust remained rather high. But the more specific three other types showed complex trends in the last couple of years. In case of trust toward regime performance, it has had very changing trends, while trust toward regime institutions has been decreasing, especially, in the younger democracies. In case of trust toward political leaders, the trend has been totally confused and complex⁴⁶.

The last concept I found worth to keep in mind when analyzing institutional trust in Central and Eastern Europe emphasizes the crucial role of time when trust is analyzed. This approach handles the term of trust as a process by using the notion of agency to highlight its “temporal-relational context of action”⁴⁷. Khodyakov also supports this idea and suggests to use a three-dimensional concept. We will see that the three types of trust are very similar to the scheme of Luhmann, although, the two scholars put the emphasis on different aspects. Khodyakov starts his model from the distinction of Granovetter between strong and weak ties and follows this

⁴⁴ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, pp. 59-61

⁴⁵ Norris, Pippa (2005): ‘Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?’ In: Norris, Pippa (ed.) (2005): *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 9-12

⁴⁶ Norris, Pippa (2005): *ibid.*, p. 10

⁴⁷ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 116

idea when separating the first two types of trust. First, he defines thick interpersonal trust as the first type of trust people develop in their lives and it is strongly connected to family members, close friends, and small communities. This is the basis for orientation of the citizens to the social world, but minor changes always shape it a bit as a child gains experiences from interactions with others⁴⁸. At this point, I would like to draw the attention that in contrast to the concepts of trust mentioned so far, there is a developmental characteristic between the three types in the approach of Khodyakov. The basis for thick interpersonal trust is familiarity, reciprocity, and similarity and it becomes automatic very easily, thus, people usually do not perceive its present or do not perceive it as trust. The second type of trust in the concept of Khodyakov is thin interpersonal trust which functions when we enter interactions with people whom we do not know well. In these situations, people cannot rely on preliminary knowledge about people, they have to comply with expectations based on a supposed morality and that a cooperation will meet the interests of both parties. As Hardin puts this latter idea: trust is an “encapsulated interest”. In parallel with this, distrust may be interpreted, then, as an encapsulated conviction about cheating and betrayal of the partner⁴⁹.

Of course, thin interpersonal trust is much riskier than thick interpersonal trust. Although, there are two factors that may help people to make a trust-decision regarding anonymous others or people providing weak ties. Trustworthiness of others can be strengthened by a trusted intermediary, e.g. a friend of us recommends us a good doctor to visit. The other one is when the institutional background assists us to build up thick interpersonal trust. An example of Khodyakov is when we take a flight without knowing if the pilot is a good expert or a dangerous person, but the reputation of the flight company may help us to trust the pilot and travel by that aircraft. The third type is institutional trust which contains trust towards not only real institutions but toward abstract principles of the system and anonymous others. It also implies that this type is the most difficult to be measured and analyzed. Trustworthy institutions are legitimate for the people and have technical competence, and by these two, they can meet the needs of the citizens⁵⁰.

We can see that although, we went through the concepts very briefly, the typology of Luhmann and of Khodyakov is very similar. The types of ‘familiarity-trust-confidence’ and ‘thick interpersonal trust-thin interpersonal trust-trust in institutions’ are parallel, although,

⁴⁸ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 120

⁴⁹ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 910

⁵⁰ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, pp. 120-123

the starting points are different, thus, the emphases are put on different parts of the two typologies. Luhmann separates familiarity first from the two other types as those are connected more strongly and argues that trust is basically interpersonal, but it can function, similarly to confidence, as impersonal trust or reliance. In contrast to this, Khodyakov interprets the two first types for being mostly similar as their objects are persons and separates them from the third one which is the impersonal type. Although, we will use the concept of trust-as-a-process, we also have to add that the differences between the typology of Luhmann and of Khodyakov are basically rather just nuances. Lastly, the definition of trust as a process that we would like to use in this research is the following: “trust is a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party’s actions based on (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor, (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about the partner’s actions, and (4) the belief in the honesty and morality of the other side”⁵¹.

Chapter 2.1.2: Emergence of Trust

When Zucker explains the emergence of trust, she talks about the production of trust and separates three modes of it. The first one is the process-based method of producing trust. In this case, trust relates to exchanges and acts of exchange of the past and the future. Some examples for this are fame, brand name, reputation, and presenting a gift. In this case, trust does not have an established, ruled market, there are not investments into trust. Instead, trust relates to the experiences of the individual gained through the exchanges. This is similar to thin interpersonal trust of Khodyakov. By the way, the theory of Zucker can be criticized at this point, because in case of brand name, producer and seller companies try hard to influence customer habits by different PR and marketing techniques.

The second type of producing trust is the characteristic-based method. In this case, trust relates to a certain person who is determined and characterized by something, for example, his/her family background or ethnic origin. Basically, this type corresponds with the theory of Social Psychology which explains that social and demographic similarity can be an important factor between two persons for the functioning of trust in interpersonal relations. Here again, production of trust relates to a peculiarity of the person which usually means a visible and easily describable characteristic, e.g. family background, ethnicity or gender. In this case,

⁵¹ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 126

trust does not have an established market, i.e. it is sold and bought completely freely. This is again similar to thick interpersonal trust of Khodyakov and familiarity of Luhmann.

Finally, the third type is the institutional-based method. In this case, trust relates to formal social structures which can be characterized by individual or corporational-like attributes, e.g. it relates to the university by the degree. Or it can prevail through mediator mechanisms, e.g. this type of trust relates to the bank by the bank account⁵². It means that the production of trust is identified only with formal social structures to which the individual is integrated either through some kind of organisational membership in a broad sense, for example, the university student relates to the university; or through contracts, for example, the relation of the clients to the bank. In this case, the source of trust is generated by written documents as signs of something else, e.g. school certificates, rules of the banks, own prescriptions of chambers, and organisational regulations. At this third case, we can talk about a dynamic market functioning actively where individuals try to buy and accumulate trust and to invest into trust, e.g. by higher education⁵³.

Let's see an example to the differences between these types of producing trust. According to Zucker, the first type of producing trust was replaced by the third one in the United States in the 1800's and the beginning of 1900's. One reason for this is that geographic and social distances were stepped over in the American society because of the immigrants and the high internal migration. Besides these, industrialization developed certain institutional changes. All these phenomena resulted in the spread of rational bureaucratic organizations in the United States and school certificates necessary for getting a job gained a more important role as these referred to the reputation and capacity of the individual. Another result was the spread of service economy in which financial mediators and the government gained a more important role, both because of regulation and legislation. Because, both played an important role in the setting up of an environment in which there are general expectations on the rules which define transactions⁵⁴.

Regarding our topic, only this third type of trust-producing mechanism is interesting now which is the institutional-based method. The main point here is that certain companies, bureaucracies, and people specialize themselves to the production of trust. Some examples

⁵² Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *op. cit.*, p. 53

⁵³ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, p. 60

⁵⁴ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, pp. 53-55

can be the chambers and stock exchange which register and review firms. In the concept of Zucker, there are ‘three plus one’ conditions of trust produced by institutions and of the emergence of the market of this kind of trust. The first one is that there has to be a social distance between the participants of the transaction, i.e. they belong to different social groups. The second condition is that there has to be a geographic distance between the participants, because the formal indicators of trust can bridge easier the physical distance. The third condition says that there are numerous interdependent transactions in a social system especially, when big networks of independent transactions evolve. The number of these interdependent transactions decides the size of the market of institutional trust. And the ‘plus one’, supplementary condition is the one that helps institutional trust to take the positions of process-based trust, because economic transactions are embedded into the interdependent transactions and thus, if trust is damaged in one transaction, it damages trust in other transactions, too. Basically, there are two possibilities for damaging trust: the one is cultural heterogeneity because of the immigrants and the internal migration; and the other possibility is the instability of companies and corporations⁵⁵. We can also add that according to our presuppositions, trust towards the democratic institutional system can change in the same way, namely, because of the instability of governments and central administrative institutions, thus, not only because of the low intensity of functioning of trust-producing institutions but also because of the poor performance of democratic institutions.

As the production of institutional trust linked up to formalization and standardization, the role of regulations and contracts has become more important. Zucker reminds to the work of Stanley H. Udy who argues that characteristics of the Weberian bureaucracy emerge in situations when first, other social relations broke down, for example, the old systems of distribution and stratification. And second, where the use of new things makes similarities in the organizations of the population and similarities make trust. The third element is that innovation has a legitimating role, for example, power hierarchy and the system of promotion at a modern company seem to be necessary. Although, the transposition of formal bureaucratic structure itself will not result a higher productivity. But Zucker also adds that production of trust can evolve by the existence of a common knowledge which is often specialized and react in a special, flexible way to changes, therefore, this knowledge is idiosyncratic⁵⁶.

⁵⁵ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, pp. 65-89

⁵⁶ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, pp. 90-93

The analysis of Zucker shows that trust between people and companies broke down in the United States during the period of 1840 to 1920. As a result, new companies and sectors which had an intermediary function came into being, e.g. banks, insurance, governance, real estate agencies, and legal services. These new intermediators provided social and public services and through this activity, they improved the emergence of other economic activities. As trust-producing formal mechanisms come into being, i.e. as these are institutionalized, trust becomes a product which can be sold and can be exchanged. Then, some persons and companies specialize themselves in participating in the production and marketing of trust. These firms and bureaucracies are mostly evolve and spread when trust is damaged, breaks down, hence, these firms and bureaucracies start to function as social networks, usually, as weak ties between companies, bureaucracies, and individuals. Legislation and regulations set up an institutional environment which is the development of institutional-based trust, thus, stable expectations emerge during the transactions while formal guarantees and certificates help to strengthen trust⁵⁷.

Another approach about the emergence of trust is the one of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. They analyze a hypothetical case when a certain A and B persons are from two different worlds, but both have some kind of cultural background. They get in touch with each other and the question is how cooperation comes into being between them, with other words, how trust is institutionalized. Berger and Luckmann suppose that interaction takes place between A and B if they reflect to each other by their behaviours, i.e. according to the Weberian term, when social action takes place⁵⁸. For the emergence of trust, i.e. institutionalization of the interaction, Berger and Luckmann describe three necessary conditions. The first one is the repeating of actions by which these actions become routine and a common basis of knowledge evolves. It means that a certain action will not make a surprise or fear for the partner any more, and thus, institutions will have a history. The second condition is that this certain, new action has to be relevant for both A and B in that certain situation. And the third condition is that communication has to take place between A and B, so that they understand what is going on and they can change if something goes into a wrong direction. For the common child of A and B, the interactional institution evolved like this will be an already given, outside, and constraining circumstance. The basis of trust for this common child will not be any more that “We do things like this”, instead, that “These things

⁵⁷ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *ibid.*, pp. 94-100

⁵⁸ Weber, Max (1987): *Gazdaság és társadalom. A megértő szociológia alapvonalai 1. (Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, in Hungarian)*, Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, p. 38

has to be done like this”⁵⁹. In sum, the emergence of trust in the theory of Berger and Luckmann happens through institutionalization.

This idea about the emergence of trust is also supported by the Gradualists who criticize the concepts of Neoclassical economists. The concept of the Neoclassical and Neoliberal economists about the emergence of trust is that the ‘invisible hand’ creates trust-producing institutions, i.e. these institutions are created by the inner logic and hidden mechanisms of the system. According to these scholars, it happens because the participants of the system see the reason that this is the interest of the market to have functionable, honest, and trustable institutions. In this case, public trust emerges first, and then, institutions evolve, hence, public trust is institutionalized. In contrast to this, Gradualists and Neoinstitutionalists argue that it is unquestionable that the institutional background has to be developed or set up first. This institutional background is, for example, the institution of legal certainty of ownership and the institution of democratic freedoms and these have to exist first to avoid that the processes take an unfavourable direction by which these institutions lose public trust. According to the arguments of Gradualists and Neoinstitutionalists, there is not any guarantee that institutionalization happens automatically and the institutions which came into being will function honestly⁶⁰.

One important function of institutions is socialization, i.e. to learn how to behave and which are the rules of the game. Therefore, trust as an institution, on the one hand, is a founder of the knowledge of the community: how to solve certain things and how to act in certain situations. The other important function of institutions is the exercise of control, i.e. the reinforcement of the rules⁶¹. Summarizing the concept of Berger and Luckmann, trust towards institutions is determined by and depend very much on the culture, but it emerges doubtlessly through learning and constant feedbacks, i.e. the break of the rules is followed by a penalty. Also in this concept, interpersonal trust is replaced by institutionalized trust and it gains social legitimacy because this type of trust is able to give authentic replies to the needs of the community.

Berger and Luckmann touch also the question of distrust. They argue that as the institutions of trust evolve, at the same moment, distrust evolves also. As a knowledge mediated by an

⁵⁹ Berger, Peter – Luckmann, Thomas (1967): *The Social Construction of Reality*, New York: Anchor Books, pp. 56-59

⁶⁰ Rothstein, Bo (2005a): *op. cit.*, p. 22

⁶¹ Berger, Peter – Luckmann, Thomas (1967): *op. cit.*, pp. 62-65

institutions is socially objectivated – for example, the way how to behave in a certain interaction is interpreted as a kind of knowledge –, it becomes a generally valid and accepted truth in the given community. Derivation from the institutionalized norms and knowledge, i.e. distrust, will be taken as derivation from reality and as deviance⁶².

There is a more popular approach to the development of trust which was shared by many social scientists in the 1990's, but it is still very popular. This approach makes a strong relation between trust and social capital, and between institutional trust and civil society. The most prominent authors of this approach in the field of sociology are Robert Putnam, Francis Fukuyama, and Reginald Rose. They argue that trust cannot function on societal level if it does not exist on personal and community levels. The role of social capital and civil society is crucial according to their approach, because on the one hand, trust on micro level can be transferred to macro level. Although, it has been criticized by many authors who conducted research in Central and Eastern European countries (see the case of Russia in Khodyakov, 2007, or the case of Romania where institutional trust was rather high despite the high level of corruption, see: Kornai, 2005). Of course, it does not mean that this concept about the emergence of trust cannot be valid in other parts of Europe or in the United States. These authors emphasize also the importance of social capital and civil society that on the other hand, citizens gain important skills and knowledge about the norms and rules of cooperative and collective actions in their own community and they can use this knowledge while participating in the democratic system. Thus, according to this, social capital and civil society help people to learn the production and maintenance of trust on State level.

Although, this approach has been very popular in social sciences, some critiques can be formulated about it as well. It does not really make a difference between personal and impersonal trust, instead, it just handles the two types as if these were functioning the same way according to the same logic. I would like to argue against it as I understand that these are two different things: when people trust people who they know well or at least a bit; and the situation when people trust institutions or the anonymous others with whom they need institutionalized trust to enter an interaction or collective action. I would like to approach the emergence of trust from the opposite direction than the supporters of the concept of social capital and civil society in relation to trust. This concept focuses on the level of the individual, how s/he learns the norms and rules of collective actions and personal interactions, and then,

⁶² Berger, Peter – Luckmann, Thomas (1967): *ibid.*, p. 66

how s/he uses this knowledge when having contact with institutions and the social system itself. I would suggest to see the other side of the coin and approaching the emergence of trust from the characteristics of the institutions. Following the concept of Parry, quoted by Khodyakov, these are the institutions that have to develop trustworthiness in order to have citizens trust in them. In other words, the focus of this approach is the ability or inability of institutions to provide people with goods and services they need, rather than the existence or absence of social networks, norms, and interpersonal trust⁶³. Moreover, the approach of social capital has not been criticized only from a theoretical basis but also by some empirical evidences. According to the research of Yang about employees of public institutions, “propensity to trust has a positive impact on trust in citizens, but not on trust in participation institutions. The result challenges the social capital view that interpersonal trust and trusting leads to better administrative and political performance”⁶⁴.

Although, supporters of the social capital and civil society approach to trust also tried to make some nuances about institutional trust to make this part of the concept more elaborated. Many authors relate institutional trust to democratic systems where similarly to the functioning of civil society, people can fully participate in the functioning of the system and they can also control their institutions to some extent⁶⁵. According to Fukuyama, if a society have a narrow radius of trust and develop trust only in the private sphere, then, it is a ‘low-trust’ society and people trust only those who are similar to them. In contrast, in ‘high-trust’ societies, people possess large amounts of social capital and they learn in the civil society how to engage in the social and political life, as it is explained also by Newton and Putnam⁶⁶.

However, we do not want to question the validity of this approach to institutional trust in certain societies in certain historical situations, we think that in case of the Central and Eastern European region, this concept can be criticized for being inappropriate. As Khodyakov summarizes the weaknesses of the approach of social capital and civil society to trust in institutions, we may mention that it uses a too broad definition about the emergence of institutional trust. Putnam explains in his work that social capitals are “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”⁶⁷. But this definition seems to be too broad for using it on

⁶³ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 116

⁶⁴ Yang, Kaifeng (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 591

⁶⁵ See the works of R. Dahl, B. Misztal, K. Newton, R. Putnam, A. J. Secor and J. O’Loughlin, mentioned by Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 117

⁶⁶ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 117

⁶⁷ Putnam, Robert D. (1993): *op. cit.*, p. 167

macro-level, especially, for empirical research. It may be useful to use the original term of social capital as Bourdieu and later Coleman does it as resources people can obtain through personal networks. This exchange through networks can provide people with access to important resources such as social support and financial assistance⁶⁸.

A second argument against the approach of social capital and civil society of institutional trust can be that this approach makes a hierarchy between personal and impersonal trust by making the latter somehow more important or superior compared to the former. By doing this, the authors of this concept usually handle institutional trust as a way of measuring the modernization of a society. Although, one may argue that for the citizens, personal trust represents a higher value than impersonal trust as the former makes their life more secure and as the latter often remains invisible for them while it is functioning. Many citizens prefer to have a gentlemen's agreement about a business than to make formal contracts. An even more problematic issue is the emergence of trust towards institutions. Fukuyama, Almond and Verba, and others emphasize also the development of trust towards persons to gain trust later towards institutions. But one can also argue for the opposite way of developing trust. As Hardin puts it, as we have to interact with people we do not know at all, we need to rely on institutionalized norms and rules to have social exchanges with them and these institutionalized norms and rules are completely independent from the characteristics of the individuals with whom we want to have an interaction. It supports the approach Parry who argues that institutional trust is more likely to be rooted in the effective performance of institutions than in the overall level of social trust or participation of citizens in the civil society⁶⁹.

And finally, Khodyakov also points out the weakness of this social capital and civil society approach to institutional trust as being too simplified by using only one dimension of measuring trust. This approach cannot characterize a society with high levels of interpersonal trust and low levels of institutional trust as it cannot be placed in one dimension between 'high' and 'low' trust in the society. As Koldyakov argues, this approach violates the rule of mutual exclusiveness, i.e. categories should not overlap, and the rule of exhaustiveness of social classification, i.e. it is possible to position all possible cases into the existing categories⁷⁰.

⁶⁸ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, 118

⁶⁹ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 118

⁷⁰ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 118

In a later study of Putnam, he even excludes institutional trust from his analysis because there was not any correlation between personal and impersonal trust. Khodyakov also supports the idea to analyze these two separately. He suggests to deal with personal trust in the form of thick and thin interpersonal trust, i.e. trust in people relating to us with strong and weak-ties, and he separates these two former types from trust in institutions. He suggests to use these three forms of trust as ideal types in the Weberian term and not as well-crystallized notions of life. If we try to use the term of trust-as-a-process of creating, developing, and maintaining it, we can incorporate the temporal characteristic of this term into the analysis⁷¹. In contrast, the social capital and civil society approach deals with trust rather just as a variable that can be measured and then, people or societies can be grouped as high- or low-trusters. The same is true for the definition of Gambetta: trust is “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or a group of agents will perform a particular action, both *before* he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) *and* in a context in which it affects *his own* action”⁷² (author’s italics). It may be useful to distinguish between high- and low-trusting people, but it does not help to understand how trustworthy relationships created and maintained⁷³. By the way, the point that Gambetta highlights, the idea of temporality and rationality of trust has some implications I would like to use in this research. The idea of trust-as-a-process of ‘imaginative anticipation’ as Khodyakov puts it, goes beyond the rational choice approach, because it stresses the role of imagination which points to the fact that people are not able to predict the future, but they are able to form hypotheses about it⁷⁴. The limited rationality of people as an important element in developing trust is also emphasized in the studies of Luhmann and Giddens. They both agree that people are not able to make completely rational decisions, because they have to act in an environment of everlasting uncertainty, fast changes, and risks. That is why, according to Messick, Kramer, and Uslaner, rationality is often replaced with morality. It is the unpredictability of long-term future which makes people rely more on honesty and morality than on the possibility of acting rationally⁷⁵. As Virginia Held summarizes it: “we speak of trusting a person’s *opinion* (which may be uncertain), not of trusting his *knowledge* (which can only be what it is); we claim to trust a person’s *choice* (which may go either way), not to trust such fully determined behaviour (in principle thoroughly predictable) as his reflexes or

⁷¹ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, pp. 120-124

⁷² Gambetta, Diego (1988b): ‘Can We Trust Trust?’ In: Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988): *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, p. 217

⁷³ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 125

⁷⁴ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 126

⁷⁵ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 127

heartbeat. In short it seems to be that trust is more required exactly when we least know whether a person will or will not do any action⁷⁶ (author's italics).

Chapter 2.1.3: Maintaining Trust

Partha Dasgupta emphasizes the connection between trust, credibility, and commitment and according to his arguments, these two latter are the basic elements of the maintenance of trust. Dasgupta also adds that an important condition for maintaining trust is punishment, or more precisely, the unavailability of the possibility of being punished if we break the rules. If there is not appropriate punishment for the case if somebody breaks the rules or the contracts, people will not make efforts to follow these rules and contracts. If cheating can be perceived in the community in general, people will not want to enter interactions with others and there will not be mutually beneficial relationships. Although, Dasgupta also adds that punishment itself is not enough to prevent the violation of trust. It is also important that on the one hand, the punishment of a negative behaviour is credible and believable, otherwise, it will not be a deterrent. On the other hand, the coercive organizations have to be trustworthy, i.e. it has to be clear what the coercive organization will do in a certain situation and it really has to do it. A coercive organization can be the society itself and the punishment can be discrimination, shame, or the negative opinion of the society. A special case is when it is the society who is the sufferer or victim. According to game theory, a response can be in this situation the reciprocal altruism when the actor hinders the other partner to enter an interaction with him/her again.

Dasgupta argues also that there is a connection between personal and impersonal trust, i.e. between the trust in people and the trust in institutions or organizations. If trust is violated in one part, for example, it turns out that somebody has a criminal record, trust will be violated in other fields, for example, this person will not be hired for an important position. Moreover, distrust can go further to another level when we do not trust the government that it does what is expected and we do not trust also that this government can be made step down by general elections or by an uprising as it does not do what people expect from it to do. According to Dasgupta, this is why trust is a very fragile product, because if a piece of the mosaic is damaged somewhere, the whole picture will be destroyed. Following this explanation, we may argue why some sectors, e.g. the banking sector, are so conservative and close the doors

⁷⁶ Held, Virginia (1968): On the Meaning of Trust, *Ethics* 1968/78., p. 157

if any example of inconvenience for clients is discussed publicly. Dasgupta also emphasizes that this is the reason why there is a strict selection method at the educational system of medical and law professions, because there is a strong connection between the use and prestige of the health care system and legal protection as services, and trust towards the members of these professions. This is why it is worth to invest time and money into this kind of trust. Following the concept of Dasgupta, we do not trust a person, a company or an institutions, because s/he/it states that s/he/it will do something, but because we know what options s/he/it has, what s/he/it is able to do in the given circumstances, and we expect or rather we hope that s/he/it will decide as we expect. It is important here to make a distinction between trust and blind trust, because this latter is usually seen as a bad decision.

Dasgupta gives also an important role to empathy, because when we decide to make an agreement with somebody else, then, we have to examine the situation from his/her point of view to see how probable it is that s/he will do or keep up his/her part of the agreement. Dasgupta accepts also that there are not clear and unambiguous measuring units to measure the seize of trust, but he argues that it is possible to evaluate in a certain context whether it is worth to trust or not. In this sense, trust does not differ from other products such as information or knowledge. Thus, he uses the term of trust with the meaning that somebody has appropriate ideas and expectations about the behaviour of others and s/he keeps in mind them when s/he chooses a certain action without the opportunity to see in advance the actions and reaction of the others to his/her action. The maintenance of trust has a crucial role in the concept of Dasgupta as the existence or non-existence of trust influences our actions. For example, when we lend a book, it is very important that we do not know in advance what the other person will do⁷⁷ and whether trust will be maintained or not.

Dasgupta makes more nuances into his concept about the damage of trust when he deals with the question whether the person who breaks the rules knew that s/he caused damage to the other person or not. For example, it is the situation when a merchant of cars already owned before sells a car to somebody, but later it turns out that the car has serious problems. People differ from each other in the way how they evaluate something to be honest or ethical and people also think differently about the reputation of the same thing. Although, the reputation

⁷⁷ Dasgupta, Partha (1988): 'Trust as a Commodity'. In: Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988): *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 50-51

could increase trust, but these are exactly the different evaluations and interpretations of trust what make this term, according to Dasgupta, a scientific and research problem⁷⁸.

In relation to the maintenance of trust, Dasgupta quotes also Albert Hirschmann who argues that trust, similarly to other moral resources, is growing by usage, but it becomes insignificant by being out of usage and negligence and the next step is the decline of trust⁷⁹. Besides the usage of trust, it is also important for the maintenance that certain modes of action, certain elements of action are repeated continuously more or less in the same way without changes. Because, if an interaction is repeated from time to time, then, according to Dasgupta, the risk that the parties cheat each other decreases, e.g. this is the case between the seller and the buyer in the shop⁸⁰. Many economists emphasize also the continuity for maintaining trust when they argue that trust is a public good, a social mode of solution to make production and exchange possible. It is also worth to mention here that there is a significant asymmetry in the functioning of trust and reputation which implies that it is usually a long process to build up trust, but it can be ruined very quickly⁸¹.

These approaches that I summarized by this point state that the key points for maintaining trust are to have a stable, functioning democracy, the rule of law, and the institutional system of free-market economy. But there is another strong approach in the literature of sociology that does not accept this idea and emphasizes that trust can be maintained only by anarchy, social crises, and chaos. The argument states that when there is an established, well-functioning institutional framework, we do not need trust, because everything is going according to the rules and cheating is followed by punishments. Then, we do not need trust when we enter an interaction. But in case of anarchy or chaos, people cannot rely on the system and this is the situation when they really need trust to meet their basic needs and take part in collective actions with other people to do it. Many scholars argue that trust from the level of the people do not spill over to the level of the political arena to become institutional trust and they also reject the idea that social trust is the essence of democracy⁸². The supporters of a third approach argue that when we speak about trust towards institutions in case of a stable, well-set up, well-functioning, and efficient institutional system, this trust does not express the commitment, human reliance, and solidarity towards our fellow citizens.

⁷⁸ Dasgupta, Partha (1988): *ibid.*, pp. 52-53

⁷⁹ Dasgupta, Partha (1988): *ibid.*, p. 56

⁸⁰ Dasgupta, Partha (1988): *ibid.*, p. 66

⁸¹ Dasgupta, Partha (1988): *ibid.*, pp. 62-66

⁸² Yang, Kaifeng (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 580

Rather, it expresses trust in the effectiveness of punishments of the institutions that can be used against those who break the rules. Thus, we do not trust our group, community, society, and the order or the rules of the game of this group but instead, the punishments. The unavoidableness and effectiveness of punishments we trust.

Ernest Gellner takes the sociological analysis of the traditional Muslim society by Ibn Khaldun as a starting point for explaining the maintenance of trust. Khaldun presents a paradox in his analysis and the main idea is that it is anarchy which develops trust and social cohesion. Gellner supplements this with the analogue that it is the government which destroy trust and according to him, there are empirical data to prove it, but it is also possible to prove it on a theoretical level. According to the Functionalist explanation of Gellner, if there is not any central authority and governance, then, social groups have to look after themselves to ensure their existence and security. And also for example, they have to control their members not to make tensions toward strangers. In this case, members of the group have to trust each other mutually. However, Gellner himself also admits that if social cohesion is needed in a group, it does not mean that it will develop⁸³.

Another important point that Ibn Khaldun made is that urban life was incompatible with trust and cohesion, because urban life makes them impossible. The reason why is because, although, there are common interests in urban groups, they will not behave similarly to a corporative group, e.g. to fight together and to defend themselves, because the relationships of an urban group are too weak ties for this. 'Urban' in this context means that these people accept the governmental power, but in reality, they are atomized because of their economic specialization, the way of living and making earnings, their political preference or rather of their one-sided dependency⁸⁴. In contrast to this, political relations in the countryside and in rural areas are often symmetrical and based on participation, although, personal or personalized political power is fragile and limited in time in these communities⁸⁵.

Diego Gambetta adds another interesting presumption to this concept that in reality, trust can function well in anarchic and chaotic circumstances and it is the culture of uncertainty which gives a sense to trust towards the single, given institutions. For proving this, he mentions the Italian Mafia whose functioning and success was possible mostly because people did not trust

⁸³ Gellner, Ernest (1988): 'Trust, Cohesion, and Social Order'. In: Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988): *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 143-145

⁸⁴ Gellner, Ernest (1988): *ibid.*, pp. 147-148

⁸⁵ Gellner, Ernest (1988): *ibid.*, p. 153

the central authority. Before the unification in 1861, people in South Italy and especially, in Sicily did not trust the legislation and the law and this distrust sustained later on as well. Using the concept of game theory, trust towards the competence of the Mafia and the central authority, in other words, trust towards the capacity of the Mafia and of the central authority to make an order, defence, and organize resources is a zero-sum game. And this trust, as Gambetta points out, does not increase just because things are going and functioning well, thus, it is distrust which is taking the main role. Maybe, trust does not exist at all, it is rather about the special, better or poorer organized exploitation of distrust⁸⁶.

Bernard William says in relation to the question of maintaining trust that there are four basic elements of those mechanisms which force people to cooperate. The first element is the fear of punishment. The second one is that the functioning of trust and the coming into being of cooperation makes it possible that economic interests of the participants are mutually satisfied. The third element is that people have a general drive or motivation which can be based on cultural, moral or religious foundations, but regardless to reward and punishment, cooperation is a good thing. And the fourth element is that it helps trust to be maintained and cooperation to be realized if the individuals are tied to each other by familial or friendship relationships. Following this concept, Gambetta argues that the Mafia followed this lesson and uses all four elements together in the same time⁸⁷. In sum, it was distrust which made it possible for the Mafia to survive⁸⁸. If we take the famous sentence of the Hungarian philosopher György Lukács, saying that the natural has ontological priority to the social, and we paraphrase this sentence now to the concept of Gambetta, we may say that uncertainty and distrust have methodological priority to trust.

Evan, Geertz and Macaulay also argue in their studies on trust that coercive social institutions are needed exactly when trust is violated and not for its maintenance. Trust in this concept is an informal and interactive process and only internalization and moral commitment are needed for its functioning and sustainment. Formalization, e.g. contracts, are usually needed when trust is violated or does not prevail⁸⁹. This approach can be related a bit to the philosophy of the Empiricist philosophers of the Enlightenment as these scholars regard trust

⁸⁶ Gambetta, Diego (1988a): 'Mafia: the Price of Distrust'. In: Gambetta, Diego (ed.) (1988): *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 158-166

⁸⁷ Gambetta, Diego (1988a): *ibid.*, p. 168

⁸⁸ Gambetta, Diego (1988a): *ibid.*, p. 173

⁸⁹ Zucker, Lynne G. (1986): *op. cit.*, p. 56

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as being maintained successfully by education through the internalization of values and punishments for deviance.

Chapter 2.1.4: A Summary of the Concepts of Trust

Niklas Luhmann in a study from the end of the 1980's was complaining that social scientists had never paid much attention on the term of trust regarding its content and theoretical characteristics. In the next two decades, many social scientists have come to realize the importance and centrality of trust in social organization⁹⁰. Although, we also have to add that there are many debates among social scientists if trust exists in stable, democratic regimes or if it disappears when institutions take the role of ensuring that rules and law prevail. It is also debated if anarchy helps or hinders to develop trust and if trust can be measured at all and if yes, whether it is a binary variable, a continuum variable or something else. As Khodyakov explains it, most contemporary social scientists do not view trust as a process, as he would like to do it, because, of course, trust is traditionally measured by surveys and experiments, but it is difficult to handle a process with these research methods. Usually, scholars use trust in an analysis as independent or dependent variable. Those scholars who use trust as an independent variable are primarily concerned with the benefits of trust, e.g. Gambetta, Putnam, and Luhmann. They focus on the potential of trust to reduce transaction costs, facilitate cooperation, create social capital, and reduce the risks of uncertainty. In contrast, those scholars who use trust as a dependent variable, concentrate on factors which have an impact on trust, e.g. Yamagishi, Coleman, O'Neill, and Zucker. They investigate the characteristics of trustees as a criterion of building trust, the role of the reputation of trust intermediaries, and the characteristics of organizations to develop trustworthy relationships. Khodyakov admits that this latter group focuses on factors that develop and maintain trust, but he also criticizes this approach for using trust as a simple variable. Instead, he suggests a new usage for this term by focusing on the dynamic aspect of trust. If we do not view trust as a glue that holds society together but as a social practice or process, then, we incorporate responsibility, commitment of both parties, and the chance for social changes into the term. Thus, trust means to anticipate that the other party will show benevolence supported by moral competence in the form of loyalty, generosity, and honesty⁹¹.

As many authors dealing with trust do it, I also would like to stress the temporary aspect of trust, i.e. while examining trust, we have to keep in mind the importance of past and future, and the cultural-historical context. As Solomon and Flores puts it: "trust is historical, but it is

⁹⁰ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 115

⁹¹ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 125

not so much tied to the past as it is pregnant with the future”⁹². It also means that the maintenance of trust depends highly on previous experiences and reputations of the parties who enter interactions and who also have some future expectations to have material or non-material rewards from this interaction. Khodyakov suggests to incorporate the three temporal aspects into the term of trust by viewing trust as a form of agency. It refers to the fact that actors reproduce and transform structures in an interactive way to solve problems posed by changing historical situations. Agency has three elements in this concept: iteration, i.e. routines and traditions and it refers to social practices of the past; projectivity, i.e. anticipation of the future based on the actor’s hopes, fears, anxieties, desires, and calculations; and the third one is practical evaluation, i.e. the capacity of actors to decide about the applicability of alternative actions according to the existing information, behavioural norms, and moral standards⁹³.

Besides these debates, it is also worth to mention that some researchers do not agree on the question whether trust in institutions can be also conceptualized and measured or only interpersonal trust can be. For example, Margaret Levi insists that trust exists only between individuals, but trustworthiness can be attached both to individuals and institutions. She argues that citizens do not trust the State itself but “they are declaring a belief that, on average, its agents will prove to be trustworthy”⁹⁴. Russell Hardin gives similar explanation when he urges that researchers should not focus on trust in the State and State institutions but instead, they should concentrate on trustworthiness⁹⁵. I accept these arguments, but I think that trust in institutions can exist in the way as I interpret institutional trust that it is a social process in which two partners have a relationship, thus, both have some kind of responsibility and commitment in the situation. In other words, I would regard institutions much more as agents and actors of the system than Levi or Hardin do it. Besides, I suppose also that institutional trust can be more important in modern societies than interpersonal trust as people can get more appropriate resources faster and easier from institutions than from their fellow citizens. The major difference between interpersonal and impersonal trust is that some types of social exchange involved. Interpersonal trust depends more on social interactions, but these are usually more reciprocal and less risky interactions. In sum, trust in our conceptual framework is highly related both to rational decision-making and to ideas about honesty and

⁹² Quoted by Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 125

⁹³ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, pp. 125-126

⁹⁴ Quoted by Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 123

⁹⁵ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 123

morality, and it also incorporates the influence of past, present, and future on the decision whether to trust or not⁹⁶.

Chapter 2.2: Theories on Institutions

In this research, I will analyze trust toward institutions of the democratic system and free-market economy. In the analytical chapter, I will not use data directly from the Communist regimes as these data are sometimes missing, sometimes manipulated. Thus, when I summarize the most important approaches to institutions that I would like to keep in mind during this research, I will not deal with autocratic regimes and dictatorships as this is not my main focus. The most important issues to discuss in this chapter are about the definition of institution, the explanations how institutions emerge or produced, in what circumstances it is more likely or less likely, how institutions are maintained, and why institutions change. Looking through the literature on institutions, it seems to be self-evident that social actors do not exist without institutions. Although, I try to describe how institutions evolve and how social life is different by them, it implies the fact that we know something about a social world *before* institutions and that we can imagine a pre-institutional situation. But the situation is that authors of institutional theories usually emphasize that there is not any social world without institutions as we, the people create them by living and working together with others. As Jack Knight puts it: “from the simplest to the most complex, we produce them while conducting all aspects of our social life”⁹⁷. He also points out the importance of separating institution from organization⁹⁸, because these two terms are used very often as synonyms. But institutions rather tend to be rules of the game, while organizations are players of the game with some institutional framework governing the people who constitute the organization.

Although, it is still very difficult to give a summary of the different approaches of democratic systems and democratic frameworks as this topic has been discussed for a long time and by many authors in social sciences. Mikhail Beliaev suggests a typology for these concepts to make three groups of theories on democracy. The first group can be the type of system theories which interpret democratic consolidation as the well-functioning of institutions.

⁹⁶ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 128

⁹⁷ Knight, Jack (1992): *Institutions and Social Conflict*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 1

⁹⁸ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, p. 3

Many scholars of this approach mention the concept of democracy of Robert Dahl which he calls poliarchy. The main point is that in poliarchy, the democratic political system is inclusive from the point of view of public opinion and public participation, but it is exclusive from the point of view of representation and decision-making. The second group of democracy theories contains the elitist approaches which pay the most attention on the actions of the most important political elite and actors. Another important characteristic of the elitist approaches that they often use the paradigm of game theory.

The third type of democracy theories is the cultural approach which bases its assumptions on opinion polls about the attitudes and expectations of the public. Besides, the cultural approach differs from the first two in another thing that it examines usually three aspects of democratic attitudes. First, they investigate how the public evaluate the functioning of democracy. Second, they focus on the personal, individual commitment to democracy as a normative value. And the third aspect is what this approach examines is the acceptance of democratic values together with personal psychological dispositions. Linz, Stepan, and Gunther use the same typology of theories on democracies in a study in 1995 that Beliaev uses, just they call these three types as structural, behavioural, and attitudinal dimensions⁹⁹.

As Beliaev points out, the literature on new democracies suggests the following relationship between political attitudes in case of the Post-Communist regimes. The constant satisfaction with the functioning of democratic institutions increases the normative support of citizens towards these institutions on the one hand. But on the other, as Claus Offe also mentions it in one of his texts in 1997, public participation in and involvement into the networks of democratic institutions may lead to the distortion and fragmentation of democratic values in the population¹⁰⁰. Although, there are many debates among scholars about the relationship between satisfaction with the institutional system and civil participation. For example, Putnam and many supporters of their ideas emphasized in the 1990's the trust-developing role of participation, but at the beginning of the decade started with 2000, Putnam himself also thought to be important to give more nuances to this concept or to think it over and go on with it¹⁰¹. Besides this, many scholars put often much more emphasis on economic inequalities, e.g.

⁹⁹ Beliaev, Mikhail (2002): 'Institutional Design and Consolidation of New Democracies'. In: Kapralski, Sławomir – Smith, Paul Vincent (eds.) (2002): *Democracies, Markets, Institutions: Global Tendencies in Local Contexts*, Warsaw: IFIS Publishers, pp. 20-23

¹⁰⁰ Beliaev, Mikhail (2002): *ibid.*, p. 25

¹⁰¹ Rothstein, Bo (2005b): *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36

in the results of longitudinal analyses conducted in the U.S.¹⁰²; or on personal experiences gained in public administration offices¹⁰³; or on the level and volume of corruption experienced in the everyday life¹⁰⁴ than on participation when talking about trust toward democracy and the democratic institutional system.

Regarding the case of Post-Communist societies, or in other words, new democracies, many authors point out that feedbacks between leaders and citizens are necessary in modern societies. But during the Communist times, dictatorship repressed these feedbacks, statistics were manipulated, because it was not important or interesting what needs citizens have, the objectives were set and decided on higher levels of the society and the Communist parties. This is what Deutsch calls while quoting Kornai to be the competence of making efforts for non-understanding. With this strategy, the Communist parties systematically ruined the institutions of civil society, and by this, distrust gained legitimacy in society¹⁰⁵. While according to Rose and Munro, the very essence of democratic governance is the institutions. An important aspect of stabilizing democratic governance is the institutionalization of party systems which can be a state of equilibrium, a dynamic equilibrium or a structural inequilibrium according to the relationship between demand of citizens and supply of the parties. This institutionalization is the result of a trial-and-error process between the elite and the voters¹⁰⁶. In the following chapters, some important theories will be presented about these issues: the role of institutions in democratic regimes and free-market economies and also the main aspects of the historical background in these Post-Communist States. As this field of study is very rich in concepts, approaches, and debates, it is unavoidable that all of them cannot be discussed here in details. It seemed to be rational to make two groups of these approaches in advance to highlight the main differences between them, but still to have a handleable amount of theories. First, I will focus on economic approaches and the theory of rational choice on institutions, and then, on cultural and historical approaches.

¹⁰² Uslaner, Eric M. – Badescu, Gabriel (2005): 'Tisztesség, bizalom és jogi normák a demokratikus átalakulásban: miért tudja Bo Rothstein jobban megmagyarázni Svédországot, mint Romániát' (Honesty, Trust, and legal norms in the Democratic Transition: why can Bo Rothstein explain Sweden better than Romania, in Hungarian). In: Kornai, János – Rothstein, Bo – Rose-Ackerman, Susan (eds) (2005): Tisztesség és bizalom a poszt-szocialista átmenet fényében. A társadalmi bizalom megteremtése a poszt-szocialista átmenet időszakában (Honesty and Trust at the Post-Communist Transition. Creation of Social Trust in the Post-Communist Transition, in Hungarian), Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, p. 66

¹⁰³ Rothstein, Bo (2005b): *op. cit.*, p. 47

¹⁰⁴ Uslaner, Eric M. – Badescu, Gabriel (2005): *op. cit.*, p. 55

¹⁰⁵ Rose, Richard – Haerpfer, Christian (1996): *New Democracies Barometer IV.: A 10-Nation Survey*, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, p. 5

¹⁰⁶ Rose, Richard – Munro, Neil (2003): *Elections and Parties in New European Democracies*, Washington: CQ Press – Congressional Quarterly Inc., pp. 71-73

Chapter 2.2.1: Economic Conceptions and Theories of Rational Choice

According to Kenneth Shepsle, the term of institutions was neglected in economics for a long time. Although, it was present in the Neoclassical paradigm, but as a fixed, external factor, and already given in advance. Only later, as an impact of the equilibrium concept of Coase, economists started to pay more attention on this term¹⁰⁷. However, it has to be added that there can be found some reference to institutions and institutional change in the classical literature of social sciences. Two schools of thoughts can be distinguished, one emphasizes the collective benefits of institutions and the other one explains the discriminatory and conflictual manner of it. The main difference between the two approaches whether they understand institutions as source of coordination or as source of conflict: does it coordinate of interests of the people or does it make conflict among their interests? The first school of the classical theories referring to institutions can be characterized by four main ideas explaining the emergence of institutions. One is social contract of, among many others, Thomas Hobbes. The other three are similar in a way that they do not describe the emergence of institutions as a conscious act of people but as an evolutionary process when institutions are not produced but selected by the community. For example, in the explanation of David Hume, institutions evolve spontaneously as norms of justice or property. For Adam Smith, it is the exchange coordinating the market which develops institutions. In both cases, institutions are artificial and external for the people, but they learn how to behave by a trial-and-error process to avoid both internal and external sanctions. In the latter case, the market prevents individual actors from bargaining as the rules, norms, and values are given; and the market makes life more efficient by competition between organizations and institutions. Thus, in both cases, a socially beneficial outcome is developed either accidentally, or through the market. The fourth theory is different from these, because it argues that institutions are results of social selection. Institutions evolve to meet the needs of the community and if they cannot meet these necessities, they will disappear and others will come to be. Societies are changing and becoming more and more structured in modern times, hence, only those institutions can survive which can adapt to the changing conditions and which can fulfil the needs of the society the most effectively. According to Spencer, as populations are growing, there is an intensifying war for resources among the societies. And in this war, institutions have a crucial role in making societies more competitive than others. In this respect, the theory of Smith and

¹⁰⁷ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): Studying institutions: some lessons from rational choice, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1989/1., p. 131

Spencer are similar that competition is beneficial for the society and that it creates institutions to improve this competition¹⁰⁸.

In contrast, the other classical tradition emphasize the discriminatory role of social institutions which are beneficial only for certain segments of the society. This approach is represented by, for example, Karl Marx and Max Weber and it views institutions as parts of social conflicts over distribution of resources in the society. According to the theories of Marx about historical materialism and class conflict, there is a strong connection between the political, social, and economic regime, i.e. the institutional framework and the forces of production. When forces of production are growing and the present system cannot fulfil the necessities of the society any more, the relationship between production and forces of production is changed by a revolution and another basis of production is developed. The history of institutions can be explained by the change of the basis of production and the struggle between the different social groups. According to Weber, all institutions have benefits for some groups in a society, but not all institutions survive. As he describes it about the emerging institutions of Capitalism in relation to the Protestant value system, some social groups develop more advantageous behaviours in adapting to economic conditions and other groups of the society will learn it to be also advantageous. After some time, this new behaviour and strategy become a necessity, not a choice for members of the society¹⁰⁹.

As Shepsle argues, before economists turned to the term of institutions in the mid-20th century, mostly political science paid attention on it. But this approach was cumulative and regarded institutions as the sum of actions of many individuals. Until the behavioural revolution in the mid-20th century, political science did not have a disciplinary theory and this science was rather only about the history of political thoughts and philosophy. Then, it became an empirical science with testing hypotheses and measuring quantitative data, instead of literal work of cataloguing political institutions. The theories based on rationality and rational behaviour concentrate on individual-level phenomena and do not deal with the community and belongingness of individuals to each other. It was the case until the theory of rational choice in which the institutions play the role of holding the community together. Behaviourism in sociology and psychology regards institutions as empty shells that have to be filled up by individual values, roles, and statuses¹¹⁰. According to this, we just have to put

¹⁰⁸ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, pp. 4-8

¹⁰⁹ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, pp. 8-9

¹¹⁰ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *op. cit.*, pp. 132-133

together these elements and we get the institutional characteristics. As a result of this thought, practically, institutions do not have to be studied.

The rational choice revolution came in the 1960's and 1970's in economics. It refused the deterministic approach of behaviourism that roles and socialization determine individual actions. Instead, the rational choice approach sees men as rational agents who wants to maximize their profit by calculating with different possible outcomes and choosing between them by their benefits. The focus of the study was the individual again, but this individual is not determined by roles and procedures, instead, s/he is able to make choices according to his/her own private values and preferences. But as Granovetter points out, in both theories, individuals are not connected to the social structure and the society itself is simply missing from the theory. Then, in the 1980's, behaviourists and sociologists turned to the relationships between people while rational choice authors turned to the institutions as these embed people into the social structure¹¹¹. The older institutionalism did not try to develop a general picture of institutions by arguing that these are bounded to time and place, hence, it is impossible to speak about institutions in general. According to the school based on rational choice of New Institutionalism, the equilibrium of the institutional framework is based on the structure, formal procedures, and preferences of the actors. And as Shepsle argues, institutional frameworks endeavour to reach equilibrium, because the main aim of institutions is not efficiency but calculability gained through stability¹¹². Institutional stability helps also the actors to rely on information used for formulating expectations about the future behaviours of others¹¹³.

But this equilibrium that Shepsle also refers to has been debated for a long time among rational choice scholars. There was a consensus at the beginning that equilibrium occurs in the system because it works in the rational way. As everybody follows his/her interests, the system will find its equilibrium position as it fits best to the preferences and the roles of the individuals carrying these preferences. In this approach, an institutional system exists and functions in its way as it is the most rational and efficient in that society. If it is not the case, an institutional change takes place and the system reaches its optimum position. The basis of equilibrium is the preferences of individuals. Others also pointed out to the role of the structure, e.g. that people with agenda-setting role in a structure can emphasize their

¹¹¹ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *ibid.*, pp. 132-134

¹¹² North, Douglass C. (1990): *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5-12

¹¹³ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, p. 38

preferences more successfully than ordinary people. Moreover, structure-induced equilibrium has been also developed in the rational choice theory and it criticized the former, preference-induced equilibrium. Both approaches, the preference-induced and the structure-induced equilibrium approaches accept that an institutional framework exists, because there is not any alternative of it that people with veto power or decision power would prefer more. But the structure-induced approach goes a bit further and gives an important role to the way how the community deal with things in determining the institutional system. Although, this approach still regards institutions as exogenous, external, and given somehow and does not explain why the community go about its businesses as it does¹¹⁴. The reason is that in contrast to sociologists, the rational choice authors do not deal with the sources of social life but the outcomes of it, e.g. developing institutions.

In modern economic conceptions, institutions are defined as strategies to solve problems of collective action. Some of them follow the tradition of Hume and Smith that institutions evolve spontaneously and/ or selected by the market, thus, the present institutions are always socially beneficial for the community or at least, for the dominant social groups. Other authors emphasize the intentions of some social groups to make an impact on the distribution or exchange of resources and on political power. In this approach, institutions are intentional products of some social groups or actors. As Knight summarizes it, a number of recent economic theories of institutions combine the two views as there is an intentional process on micro level and then, a competitive selection on macro level¹¹⁵. Besides, the two-folded characteristic of institutions is also of high importance, namely, that institutions are actions, choices, and decisions on the one hand, while institutions consist of people on the other¹¹⁶.

In the definition of institutions in the rational choice theory, information and knowledge have a central role. To solve coordination problems of collective actions, the system needs information about the agents and the possible alternatives that may occur while agents need information about the rules and punishments in case of breaking the rules. Institutions are needed and their role is to make and distribute information among the participants of the system to make collective actions possible. Although as Hayek points out, people will always lack some information to design the socially most beneficial institutions, but the process of

¹¹⁴ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *op. cit.*, pp. 135-137

¹¹⁵ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11

¹¹⁶ Elster, Jon (2001): *A társadalom fogaskerekei. Magyarázó mechanizmusok a társadalomtudományokban* [Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, in Hungarian], Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, p. 152

social selection may solve this problem¹¹⁷. Some authors argue that agents will act on the basis of the information they get from the institutions about other partners. But other authors put more emphasis on the knowledge one knows about him-/herself¹¹⁸. If for example, somebody does not pay taxes, drives faster than the speed limit and breaks the rules in general to have own advantages, s/he will suppose or predict the same attitude and behaviour about others which will help to develop mistrust in the society. The theory of the firm, the principal-agent theory, the transaction costs economics argue that institutions have the function of enforcing the rules or the law, decreasing transaction costs, giving information about the other parties, and dealing with opportunistic behaviours.

There is another factor which plays an important role in economic conceptions and it is the demand of citizens for force and constrain people or groups. In other words, people claim, especially, if it is a rule coming from outside, to have forcing tools as games always incorporate cheating as well¹¹⁹. People are interested in free-riding¹²⁰, thus, institutions have to show them that it is costly to break the rules and also to show how diverse the punishments are¹²¹. Some scholars argue that certain institutions may be specialized only to this one role and following the proposal of Tsebelis, they make a distinction between efficient and redistributive institutions¹²². But in general, it can be summarized that institutions emerge to solve the problems of collective actions¹²³, but it is possible to make a distinction whether it is about a dilemma of self-regulated or externally regulated collective actions¹²⁴. According to the authors of rational choice theory, an institution generates expectations: it gives information what is the punishment and what to expect from the other partner with whom we enter an interaction¹²⁵. In sum, common knowledge, force, and repetition are important elements of the definition of institution¹²⁶.

Although, some critiques can be also added to the rational choice theory about the definition of institutions. Basically, institutions are seen as negotiated solutions of a community for

¹¹⁷ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, p. 11

¹¹⁸ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *ibid.*, p. 139

¹¹⁹ Ostrom, Elinor (1990): *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 16-18

¹²⁰ Nee, Victor – Ingram, Paul (1998): 'Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure'. In: Brinton, Mary C. – Nee, Victor (eds) (1998): *The New Institutionalism in Sociology*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 3

¹²¹ North, Douglass C. (1990): *op. cit.*, p. 4

¹²² Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, p. 41

¹²³ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, pp. 9-10

¹²⁴ Ostrom, Elinor (1990): *op. cit.*, pp. 40-57

¹²⁵ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, p. 17

¹²⁶ Ostrom, Elinor (1990): *op. cit.*, p. 51

collective action problems, hence, it implies as if these were always the best outcomes and accepted and preferred by all individuals of the system. But the theory does not explain how this common decision on institutions was made in the community and how it was decided by the individuals that this certain institution is the best and most rational solution for a given cooperation problem. Sometimes it can be noticed that the social aim that institutions facilitate is not the objective set in advance but a by-product of what the founders wished to aim at. A similar aspect can be mentioned as a critique to rational choice theory and it is the argument about the rules which are fixed in advance¹²⁷. Not all rules can be fixed in advance, because some problems can always turn up which were impossible to see in advance. On the other hand, rules which are fixed in advance to solve certain anomalies or problems of opportunistic behaviours can have by-effects which are not preferred by the community.

Following the ideas of rational choice theory, it is difficult to think about the emergence and change of institutions as institutions have already existed and given in advance¹²⁸. We cannot think about what could have been before them¹²⁹. Economic concepts and the theory of rational choice explain the emergence of institutions usually in two ways. According to the first explanation, institutions are developed by the logic of the invisible hand. The second explanation which is supported by the theory of solidarity says that institutions emerge by force or mostly in small communities: through a contractual process¹³⁰. Although, most contemporary authors of this economic approach agree that some kind of rationality always can be found in the emergence of the institutions as these institutions are developed and changed by interests and as the supporters of rational choice theory argue, these are individual and not community interests¹³¹. But there are other authors who phrase it a bit softer and emphasize that institutions can also be by-products themselves of certain rational, economic or social processes¹³². According to this paradigm, institutions must not change as it is more cost-effective if they do not change¹³³, although, path-dependency may create a sub-optimal situation¹³⁴ inside the institutional framework. But the reality is that institutions do change and one reason for this can be that prices or taste¹³⁵, i.e. preferences of the people change. Thus,

¹²⁷ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140

¹²⁸ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *ibid.*, p. 139

¹²⁹ Hechter, Michael (1990): 'The Emergence of Cooperative Social Institutions'. In: Hechter, Michael – Opp, Dieter – Wippler, Reinhard (eds) (1990): *Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects*, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, pp. 13-15

¹³⁰ Hechter, Michael (1990): *ibid.*, pp. 13-15

¹³¹ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, p. 38

¹³² Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *op. cit.*, p. 140

¹³³ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *ibid.*, p. 144

¹³⁴ Nee, Victor – Ingram, Paul (1998): *op. cit.*, p. 30

¹³⁵ North, Douglass C. (1990): *op. cit.*, p. 18

institutions can be changed both endogenously and exogenously. Rules and contracts can be renegotiated if some important and key players of the system are not satisfied with the present situation and force the others to have renegotiations. Besides, outside shocks can also hit or tackle the institutional system.

Institutions in the rational choice and economic theories are chosen by individuals rationally and intelligently by using data and information about others and about the possible alternatives and outcomes. Although, these authors do not agree if an institution remains the same after renegotiations or not. Some argue that after any transformation for inside or outside reasons, an institution is never the same again. But others add that if the agents agreed in advance that they would change the rules during the games as it turns out to be necessary, because new conditions occur or they could not see all possibilities in advance, then, values and preferences do not change and original institutions remain intact as the way of change was part of the original institution set up in advance. The main point is when institutions probable to occur in rational choice and economic theories is to reach Nash equilibrium when no player desires to change his/her strategy to alter the strategic choices of all the others. But the number of Nash equilibriums may make a threat to the system as this situation may be subperfect for the system, although, nobody wishes to alter his/her intentions. The robustness of institutions, i.e. when it does not have any history of experience when a decisive group wanted to alter the institutional arrangements, has been started to be discussed by rational choice theorists only in the last times¹³⁶.

Another reason can be that in contrast to the concept of Neoclassical economists, institutions definitely do not realize equilibrium and are not chosen consciously by participants of the system¹³⁷. However, these authors also add that changes have to adapt to the existing basis of interpretation, because if there is no appropriate logic to describe new inventions and new ideas, then, the totally new actions and concepts will remain unnoticed in the system. Thus, a new invention or idea is successful only when it can be described and evaluated in the language of the existing institutions¹³⁸. This is the so-called institutional isomorphism.

Besides, institutions in rational choice theory and in economic considerations are viewed either as a game or as a choice, in both cases there is another reason why it is rare, slow or

¹³⁶ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *op. cit.*, pp. 141-143

¹³⁷ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *ibid.*, p. 145

¹³⁸ Hargadon, Andrew B. – Douglas, Yellowlees (2001): When Innovations Meet Institutions: Edison and the Design of the Electric Light. In: *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2001/46., p. 478

difficult to change an institution substantially and this is the factor of time. The players of the game or the rational actors making a choice endeavour to avoid wasting time as it would be irrational for the system. In sum, rational actors are impatient about long-lasting renegotiation processes and they are afraid of the break-down of these processes. But these considerations can be also the critiques of this approach as institutions can be maintained not because they solve well the dilemma of collective actions or because they are chosen rationally by intelligent agents having enough data. Instead, they exist in the system because it is more cost-efficient to maintain them than to change them. As Shepsle puts it, “as a consequence, institutions may be robust, not because they are optimally suited to the tastes of participants and the present environment, but rather because transaction costs price alternative arrangements too high”¹³⁹. Thus, some authors of rational choice and economics turned to the consideration that institutions are not chosen by rational individuals at all, but instead, institutions evolve somehow through evolutionary processes to be the glue that holds atomistic and self-interested individuals to form an organized society¹⁴⁰.

In contrast to this, other rationality authors emphasize that self-interested individuals develop institutions to establish efficiency in the system. Some theorists, for example Coleman, argue in favour of social efficiency which is the efficiency of allocating social resources and self-interested individuals are interested in developing these to maximize social welfare and utility. Although, the utility function seems to be a very subjective term and besides, it may vary if the resources at disposal change. The other approach about efficiency focuses on individual efficiency and argue that the most efficient institutions are those minimizing transactional costs. Thus, the explanation of developing institutions for social efficiency is about the measuring how well institutions allow us to gain more from collective actions, while individual efficiency is about that institutions are created to minimize costs of individuals. Although, it seems to be a weak point of this approach that self-interested actors prefer institutional rules which produce social utility¹⁴¹. Rational actors will not support any institutional arrangements which endanger their own utilities. As Knight puts it, “rational-choice explanations of social institutions based on gains in social efficiency fail as long as they are grounded in the intentions of social actors”¹⁴².

¹³⁹ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *op. cit.*, p. 144

¹⁴⁰ Shepsle, Kenneth (1989): *ibid.*, pp. 143-145

¹⁴¹ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, pp. 28-34

¹⁴² Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, p. 34

To solve these dilemmas and controversies among rational theory approaches, the Paretian criteria have been developed and used to understand institutional changes. According to this idea, a Pareto optimal situation is when any other change of allocation or distribution of resources would harm significantly an actor while another gains. Socially beneficial institutions are Pareto optimal, but Pareto optimal institutions are not necessarily socially efficient or serving justice in the community. A Pareto inferior situation is when there is another alternative which improve the welfare of an actor without harming the benefits of others. And Pareto superior means that a step back to the previous conditions would mean that one actor gains more welfare while others do not lose. In the rational choice approach, self-interested rational actors will follow a strategy of meeting Pareto superior situation for themselves until they achieve a Pareto optimal situation together¹⁴³. As Knight describes it by explaining the ideas of Schotter, “institutions will be created only if they produce outcomes Pareto superior to those that would be achieved in a world without institutions. Otherwise, they serve no beneficial purpose”¹⁴⁴. It also means that rational actors do not search for institutional solutions creating social benefits but institutional outcomes that fit best to their own interests. It does not mean that institutions do not have social utilities, but as Knight argues, these are by-products of the process and not the original purpose of the rational actors. Moreover, social institutions may fulfil needs of a group or society that needs were not in the minds of those rational actors who created the institutions¹⁴⁵.

However, institutional change in the rational choice approaches is complicated by two factors: the costs of collective actions and uncertainty. The first factor makes the explanation of institutional change weak as by definition, rational actors will not change the institutional framework if the change makes more costs for them than the benefit they would gain. Moreover, a distributional bias in the system increases significantly the costs for actors who endeavour to bring about collective change in institutions. The second factor, i.e. uncertainty highlights that actors may not be able to act for a change in distribution of resources if they do not understand how the institutional system works. Or, if they understand how it works, but they are uncertain about the future effects, they will not be able to design strategies to change the institutions to reach long-term benefits. Thus, institutional change always incorporate visions about future utilities and benefits for rational actors and it results that institutional change is very much path-dependent¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴³ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, pp. 34-35

¹⁴⁴ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, p. 35

¹⁴⁵ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, pp. 38-40

¹⁴⁶ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, pp. 42-47

Chapter 2.2.2: Cultural and Historical Approaches

According to the New Institutionalism in economics, one of the main role of institutions is to decrease uncertainty, however, as Akerlof also points out, institutions can sustain even if they do not represent the interest of anybody, i.e. they are completely good-for-nothing¹⁴⁷. In sociology, the process of institutionalization means to become regularity¹⁴⁸ regardless whether it is useful or not; whether it is a formal or informal rule; and what kind of costs it causes. Moreover, some argue that it is not the institutionalization but the common ideology that makes the rules and the following of the rules cheaper¹⁴⁹. As the mainstream turned from the Old Institutionalism to the New one, the cognitive approach came into the limelight instead of the normative approach. It has also meant that routine actions got more importance than commitment, premisses gained more attention than values, and the logic of following the rules instead of motivations¹⁵⁰. According to the authors of ethnomethodology, institutionalism can be characterized by routine actions and the rules of it become visible just only when they are broken. The supporters of phenomenology see it different when they argue that it is the common sense and the cognitive constructions that are in the centre of institutionalization. Although, these two approaches do not explain why individuals take part and why they follow the logic of the institutional system. These are the questions that the theory of practical action tried to answer¹⁵¹. As Giddens argues, the aim of individuals is to be able to control certain concerns of them in the institutional framework, while Goffman emphasizes that instead of commitment to values, individuals are driven by interactional commitment. Collins adds that there is not any kind of moral consensus in society, instead, the feeling of belonging together or of separation arises during interactions that creates affective solidarity and cultural resources in the community or in the society¹⁵². The research interest of this approach turned from internalization to imitation, from commitment to ethnomethodological trust, from sanctioning to ad hoc solutions, from norms to descriptions and schemas, from roles to routine¹⁵³. According to the theory of practical action, actors and their interests are

¹⁴⁷ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): ‘Introduction’. In: DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (eds.) (1991): *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 4

¹⁴⁸ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, p. 9

¹⁴⁹ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, p. 5

¹⁵⁰ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, p. 19

¹⁵¹ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, pp. 20-22

¹⁵² DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, pp. 23-24

¹⁵³ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, pp. 26-27

institutionally constructed and the origin of conflict is that there are contradictions in the system¹⁵⁴. Supporters of the cultural approach argue that the effectiveness of institutions can be suboptimal and they do not express anything about the economic or political order and forces of the given society. Instead, the rules and the structural logic of the institutional framework refer to the historical experiences¹⁵⁵. The scholars supporting the approach of Historical Institutionalism regard institutions similarly to this when they state that the different States use different methods and conceptions of meaning and these have impacts on the behaviour of all social groups, because institutions shape the political culture¹⁵⁶. Following this line, they define all formal organizations, informal rules, and procedures as institution that shape and structure behaviour¹⁵⁷.

According to DiMaggio and Powell, the motivators of bureaucratization have been changed since the bureaucracy theory of Weber, but they also admit that the trends of nowadays are still similar to that. They point out two factors to be the origin of this process. One is structuration that was described by Giddens and its result is that all social institutions homogenized; the second factor is isomorphism that we have already mentioned. These processes do not shape according to economic utility or profit but on the basis of political preferences and value systems¹⁵⁸.

The three branches of New Institutionalism are also examining the relationship between institutions and behaviour. These three approaches developed independently from each other, but all of these were reactions to the behavioural school which became influential in the 1960's and 1970's. Although, these three analytical approaches were originally four: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, new institutionalism in sociology, and new institutionalism in economics. But authors usually synthesize rational choice and economic institutionalism as they are overlapping so much and there is only a difference between them in the emphasis they place: economic institutionalism focuses more one

¹⁵⁴ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, pp. 28-29

¹⁵⁵ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991a): *ibid.*, p. 33

¹⁵⁶ Skocpol, Theda (1985): 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research'. In: Evans, Peter B. – Rueschemeyer, Dietrich – Skocpol, Theda (eds.) (1985): *Bringing the State Back In*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 21

¹⁵⁷ Thelen, Kathleen – Steinmo, Sven (1992): 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'. In: Steinmo, Sven – Thelen, Kathleen – Longstreth, Frank (eds.) (1992): *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 2

¹⁵⁸ DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (1991b): 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields'. In: DiMaggio, Paul J. – Powell, Walter W. (eds.) (1991): *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 64-80

property rights, rents, and competitive selection, while rational choice institutionalism stresses more the role of strategic interaction. But in sum, all these types of institutionalism called themselves with this name of new institutionalism¹⁵⁹.

We have already discussed the rational choice theory in economics. Similarly to that, the rational choice institutionalism starts from the idea that the decisive participants have fixed set of taste or preference and they aspire to maximize their profit through an extensive calculation. Although, the outcome of individual actions can be suboptimal, the role of institutions is important in the formulation of strategic interactions. The existence of institutions can be defined or explained by their functions, retrospectively. Institutions decrease transaction costs, thus, collective actions are less expensive than without these institutions. Participants of the institutional system associate and take part in the process voluntarily. If institutions are established in a competitive process, those will survive that provide more benefits for the relevant actors. As new topics, rational choice institutionalists also turned their attention to the intensity of ethnic conflicts, the cross national coalition behaviour, and the development of political institutions¹⁶⁰.

The second type of new institutionalism is the historical or as also called, interpretational institutionalism and it developed as response to group theories in politics and structural-functionalism in the 1960's and 1970's. It states that the main player that shapes collective behaviours and determines certain outcomes is the political or economic unit, e.g. the State. Although, historical institutionalism agrees with structural-functionalist scholars that institutional organization of the polity and the economy shape the behaviour of individuals, it is closer to structuralism regarding the role of institutions in generating and structuring collective behaviours than to functionalism that views institutional outcomes as response to specific needs of the community¹⁶¹. As Hall and Taylor put it, many authors of historical institutionalism started to "look more closely at the state, seen no longer as a neutral broker among competing interests but as a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict"¹⁶². These studies are often cross-cultural comparisons showing the differences between the various outcomes and behaviours generated

¹⁵⁹ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, *Political Studies*, 1996/44., p. 936

¹⁶⁰ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, pp. 943-945

¹⁶¹ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, p. 937

¹⁶² Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, p. 938

by the different national health care systems¹⁶³, labour markets or financial systems. This theoretical approach has four main elements that will be summarized here briefly.

The first one is the way how historical institutionalists view the relationship of institutions and individual behaviour. For this explanation, they developed the cultural approach in contrast to the calculus approach of economics and rational choice theories. According to the cultural approach, individuals are not profit maximizers but satisfiers. Behaviour is not dependent on strategy but on the worldview of the person. People are more likely to choose routines and familiar behaviours to reach their goals than to follow strategic calculations about the intentions of others. As worldview and routine behaviour have an important role in the cultural approach, it is crucial how the individual interprets the situation regarding the action s/he will make. And as individuals are embedded into institutional networks, institutions form the interpretational basis, the norms and values, the identities and self-images, the symbols, scripts, and preferences of the individuals. It is also a reason why institutions change very slowly and they maintained although sometimes they are suboptimal. The reason is because some institutions provide important elements of identity and values for the individuals. These are conventional institutions and taken for granted, thus, they can avoid a thorough scrutiny and transformation. On the other hand, institutions shape the worldviews of the individuals, thus, existing institutions have a strong impact on the reforms that individuals propose¹⁶⁴.

The second important element of historical institutionalism is the asymmetry of power in the developing and functioning of institutions. They do not view the development of institutions as designed by free individuals through a community contract, for example, but as a situation in which some groups have or have more access to decision-making tools. These authors do not pay much attention whether institutional outcomes make a better-off for the participants of the institutional framework but they rather focus on how some groups lose while others gain from the disproportionate resources in the system. The third element is that historical institutionalists view the institutional framework as determined by path-dependency and unintended consequences. It means that the same structure does not result the same outcomes everywhere and the paths that institutions follow are defined by the responses of the different societies to the new challenges. As the history of institutions has an effect on the present

¹⁶³ Immergut, Ellen M. (1992): 'The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy-Making in France, Switzerland, and Sweden'. In: Steinmo, Sven – Thelen, Kathleen – Longstreth, Frank (eds.) (1992): *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-89

¹⁶⁴ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *op. cit.*, pp. 938-940

functioning of institutions, unintended consequences and inefficiencies always occur. Institutions of a country usually follow a path, but historical events, e.g. economic crises or military actions can make a turning point and a new path for the institutions. The fourth element of this approach is that other factors, e.g. ideas play a crucial role in shaping institutions and institutional interactions. This element is a response to rational choice institutionalism emphasizing the role of tastes and preferences of the individuals, but historical institutionalists argue that ideas and beliefs of people are more related to the institutional system¹⁶⁵.

Independently from the above mentioned types, another new institutionalism developed in the field of sociology in the 1970's. It originated in organization theory and the starting point was when some sociologists started to criticize and overcome the traditional distinction of rationality in modern organizations, bureaucracies and cultural practices of the social environment. In contrast to the two first types of institutionalism, the third one, i.e. the sociological institutionalism emphasizes that institutions do not emerge and are maintained because of their usefulness, rationality, and effectiveness but because they contain culturally specific practices, similarly to myths. Sociologists started to deal with the questions: what kind of institutional forms and practices are developed in different cultures and how these practices diverge from each other in different countries. The sociological institutionalism can be characterized by three main features¹⁶⁶ that will be summarized here briefly.

The first one is that they widen the term of institution by arguing that it does not contain only formal rules, procedures, and norms but also the systems of symbols, the cognitive descriptions, moral fundamentals, thus, everything that shapes human behaviour in interactions. It means that these authors do not separate institutions as organizational structures from culture as shared attitude and values but combine the two concepts. Moreover, this approach does not view institutions only as cultural phenomena but they also handle culture as an institution, instead of the traditional way of defining culture as a network of symbols, scripts, and routines for everyday behaviours¹⁶⁷.

The second element is that sociological institutionalists put the emphasis on the cognitive dimension instead of the normative dimension when examining institutions. The normative

¹⁶⁵ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, pp. 938-942

¹⁶⁶ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, pp. 946-947

¹⁶⁷ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, pp. 947-948

dimension in sociology stressed the importance of institutions in presenting roles with norms of behaviours for individuals. People internalized these norms and act according to their roles, thus, institutions affect individual practices and actions. But in contrast to this, new institutionalists in sociology argue that institutions do not provide only explanations how to behave in a situation but also interpretation bases on how to understand the situation and the action of the others. This is the way how social constructivists, e.g. Berger and Luckmann and many others view the social world. Institutions in the cognitive dimension provide people with cognitive scripts, categories, and models that are indispensable for actions¹⁶⁸. As Hall and Taylor explain it, institutions in sociological institutionalism “do not simply affect the strategic calculations of individuals, as rational choice institutionalists contend, but also their most basic preferences and very identity. The self-images and identities of social actors are said to be continued from the institutional forms, images, and signs provided by social life”¹⁶⁹. When an individual enters an interaction with an institution, s/he has to recognise first the institution as institution and then, the individual works and reworks the existing institutional templates during the interaction. It does not mean that it is not rational and useful for the individual, but the emphasis is on the point that this rationality and usefulness is constituted by the individual. Sociological institutionalists argue that individuals and institutions are seeking to define and express their identities in the interactions¹⁷⁰.

The explanation of this approach about institutional change is also different from the other types of new institutionalism. This is the third element of this theory that makes it different from the other two. Authors of sociological institutionalism argue that organization often does not transmit new institutional practices because their effectiveness is useful but instead, because the given institution or the people working there gain social legitimacy by this. It implies that institutional practices can be inefficient or even dysfunctional, because the aim is social appropriateness in a given cultural environment in contrast to instrumentality¹⁷¹. It also implies the difference between the three types of new institutionalism that in sociology, there is a kind of intentionality in institutional changes as new types have to be appropriate, but historical and rational choice institutionalists rather emphasize instrumentality of institutional changes as being more neutral from interpretations and identities of the people. It is because the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour is not that well developed in historical institutionalism which uses both the cultural and calculus approach, but it does not

¹⁶⁸ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, p. 948

¹⁶⁹ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, p. 948

¹⁷⁰ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, pp. 948-949

¹⁷¹ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, p. 949

explain the logic how institutions affect exactly human behaviour. And rational choice institutionalism is also less developed than sociological institutionalism in this respect as the type of rational choice uses a rather simplified explanation about this relationship by the utility maximization as human motivation in relation to interactions with institutions. Institutional change is less intentional in rational choice institutionalism, but the way how institutional systems are functioning is highly intentional¹⁷².

Chapter 2.2.3: A Summary of Institutional Theories

Economic concepts about institutions mostly handle them as external, spontaneously emerging actors of economic life or developed by the invisible hand, but not made by the people. They are strongly connected to competition in the market. Institutions are developed and maintained because they are beneficial for the society or at least, for the dominant group. Institutions fulfil necessities, provide information, punish cheaters and by this, make an optimal situation in the economy. Thus, according to the economic and rational conceptions, existing institutions have to be beneficial and efficient in terms of the interests of the actors and any inefficiency and suboptimality are products of some kind of State intervention¹⁷³.

In economic concepts, institutions emerge, selected, and maintained, because they have social benefits. They set the scene, the rules, the standards, and the dispute resolutions in many different areas when people interact on individual level. Institutions help modern trade and exchange by defining the measurement of time and space; they promote exchange by defining the bases of property rights; they help to develop social standards about responsibilities and roles by defining rules of marriage and other rules governing the family; they structure bargaining over resources by organizing economic production and distribution; and they make decision-making less difficult and costly by setting the framework of political and State institutions in which representatives can conduct law-making. But according to the rational choice theory, individuals do not give priority to social and collective benefits, they will always follow the strategy of narrow rationality, i.e. the preference of individual self-interest. Practically, individuals accept and take part in institutions, because they can gain more and follow their interests easier and less costly in these institutions than doing it alone.

¹⁷² Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, pp. 950-953

¹⁷³ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, p. 13

Institutional rules are products of conflicts between different interests of various social actors¹⁷⁴.

The rational choice approach has been criticized by many other schools of social sciences. Although, usually all authors agree that institutions are products of social actions and maintained because they are useful for the community, the rational choice approach is mostly criticized to be weak regarding its only focus: the rationality of these processes. As Yang puts it in his study about trust of public administrators in citizens: “when markets replace governments, negotiation and bargaining replace government-citizen interaction, why would administrators trust the integrity and honesty of self-interested customers?”¹⁷⁵. Sociologists usually criticize this approach for neglecting norm-driven behaviours and the little interest that rational choice authors show to explaining the emergence of values, preferences, and institutions. It is also worth to mention that rational choice authors base their theories on the present situation and explain the emergence and maintaining of institutions retrospectively and with a functionalist approach: institutions exist, because they provide useful outcomes in an efficient way. Thus, existing institutions are functionally useful, efficient, stable, and realizing an equilibrium in the system. Although, the works of Shepsle were also criticized for failing to clarify institutional changes¹⁷⁶.

Basically, following the explanations of Knight, there are four types of critiques that is worth to mention here as a summary. The first one argues that the rational choice approach fails to take into consideration the changing nature of preferences. The second criticism is that this approach views institutions as actors of a world dominated by autonomous individuals following their self-interest and it fails to explain two important social characteristics. The one is that institutions themselves reflect and cumulate the common historical experiences of a community; and the other one is that institutions provide a feeling of cohesion for the members of the community based on common experiences and representations. The third critique is that the rational choice school does not explain the existence of suboptimality and inefficiency in individual and social interactions. And the fourth one complains about the fact that rational choice theorists neglect power relationships which affect the emergence and maintenance of institutions very often¹⁷⁷.

¹⁷⁴ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, pp. 22-28

¹⁷⁵ Yang, Kaifeng (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 590

¹⁷⁶ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *op. cit.*, pp. 952-953

¹⁷⁷ Knight, Jack (1992): *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18

Although, about the third main criticism of the rational choice theory about not exploring suboptimality and inefficiency, North in his later works tried to develop a theory about inefficient institutions. He explains three main causes for inefficiency. The first one is that actors lack information and knowledge to produce efficient institutions. The second argument is that the costs of producing efficient institutions may hinder to do it as the costs of establishing and maintaining institutions maximizing collective welfare may be higher than the benefit of their functioning later on. The third argument of North is the introduction of additional actors, e.g. State representatives to enforce the roles and laws. These actors may choose rules that maximize their own interests and utilities and not that of the community¹⁷⁸. An example of this latter is corruption in State bureaucracy.

The cultural approach starts to explain the emergence of institutions by insisting that institutions are created in a world where institutions have been already existed. Sociological institutionalists argue that institutions are not only chosen because of their utility for the community but because they provide collective processes of interpretation and social legitimacy for the actors. By doing this, institutions offer important elements of social identity for the actors of the institutional framework. People choose and maintain institutions, because they appreciate the social and cultural role they play in these processes. It also helps to understand apparent inefficiencies in the social and political system. When institutions are developed, they always borrow from the existing world of institutional templates as reforms are defined by cognitive systems of the community, thus, institutions are at least partly affected by the past. But it is also a phenomenon that makes so much criticism about sociological institutionalism arguing that it focuses on macro-level processes too much and forgets about individual considerations. A world explained by sociological institutionalists is often said to be ‘actions without agents’. It is also suggested by critics to pay more attention on meanings, scripts, and symbols emerged from debates and not only from interpretations¹⁷⁹.

Historical institutionalists also insist that institutions are always already-existing phenomena of the social world, therefore, new institutions are always affected by the past. This approach is unique as it does not use a deductive method about institutions as for example, the rational choice theory does but an inductive one. When these authors analyze why certain actors behaved as they did, these scholars use the historical records and evidences to explain it. It is also called a neo-Weberian focus in historical analyses of actors and it makes possible to

¹⁷⁸ Knight, Jack (1992): *ibid.*, pp. 32-33

¹⁷⁹ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *op. cit.*, pp. 953-954

explain why a certain institutional framework occurs when there are more possible outcomes of equilibrium according to the calculus approach. But this inductive method of historical institutionalism has also a weakness comparing to the deductive approaches, because it makes historical institutionalist analyses slower to develop the findings into a systematic theory about the general processes of institutional development and change in the different cultures and regions of the world¹⁸⁰.

Chapter 2.3: Historical Background

There are many scientific considerations that suggest to pay attention to the structures and processes of the past to understand the present situation, behaviours, and attitudes of the people. According to the cultural approach, the existing institutional framework and procedures are very much depending on the past. Structural-functionalism and structuralism argue that behaviours of people are shaped by the existing institutional structures and systems. Sociological institutionalism stresses that institutions and individuals always make and remake the present rules, procedures, and scripts of the institutional environment in interactions. Rational choice and economic scholars emphasize the future expectations about possible gains and actions of the others based on past experiences. Historical Institutionalists view institutions and institutional processes as certain realizations of an ideal type of a regime with specific characteristics affected by the culture and social history of the given country or region. The crucial role of past events and procedures is also in the centre of the path-dependency theory.

The list could be enlarged. I agree with these concepts that it is worth to summarize briefly the main consequences of the past in Central and Eastern Europe from the point of view of institutional trust. But I would like to emphasize as well that historical analysis and comparisons out of our present research focus as time and space is limited here. Therefore, I will not present a coherent explanation about the several narrations, point of views, and approaches of historical sciences towards the history of the Central and Eastern European region. Instead, I will present just a very short and sometimes maybe subjective description of the main historical trends and peculiarities that may have a strong effect on the attitudes, behaviours, and way of thinking of people living there; and mainly for those readers who are not familiar with the history of the Post-Communist region and Hungary.

¹⁸⁰ Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): *ibid.*, pp. 954-955

The vast majority of people in this region did not have any personal experience about living in democracy and free-market economy, hence, after 1989-1990, they had to learn how to behave and how to build up new identities through interactions in the new institutional framework. People wanted the same human and political rights, economic standards, and social developments that they know or imagined about the Western world. People had high expectations about the new institutional system that might have made it more difficult for these institutions to fulfil these expectations. But the time of the regime change was a very special, joyful, and optimistic moment in Central and Eastern Europe when people expressed their choice in favour of the new regime of democracy and free-market economy, and a willingness to learn its procedures and rules of behaviour. Although, these people had to develop and maintain these institutions, rules, and procedures themselves when they had own experiences only about the processes, norms, and roles of dictatorship and a centrally-planned economy. In sum, it is worth for the empirical analysis as well to go through briefly on the historical experiences of people in the Central and Eastern European region. As only transitional countries will be dealt with in the analytical chapter, neither Germany and Austria from Central Europe, nor several Eastern European States will be paid attention to regarding their historical characteristics as an East-West comparison would go beyond the limits of this dissertation. Therefore, an appropriate comparison between all Central and Eastern European countries cannot be made here. Besides, we do not have trustable data about this region in many fields before the regime change in 1989-1990, e.g. about social trust.

Chapter 2.3.1: The Problem of Institutional Trust in Central and Eastern Europe

History is often taught in schools of Central and Eastern Europe – and maybe in other countries as well – as a history of conflicts and wars. These small Central and Eastern European nations lived often under foreign powers when they were not allowed even to use their national language and follow their traditions. There are many ways and angles how the history of Europe can be framed, phrased, and told. The way how we teach our children in schools about our culture is very much affected how we think about ourselves. The way how we interpret our history, the way how we choose certain events from history, certain writers

from literature is a mirror of our self-definition, self-interpretation, and self-identity. Let us take the example of Hungary.

During the Communist times and until now, this small country had the highest rate of suicide in Europe (in the time this dissertation was written, in 2008, Latvia and Slovenia came first, and then, Hungary) and even nowadays, in the European Union, Hungary is always the first one among the 27 countries in pessimism about the present situation and about future prospects. There can be many explanations of these negative tendencies in the basic psychological disposition and attitudes of the people, but it may play an important role that the history taught in school is very much focused mostly on negative events with pessimistic interpretations. According to this, Hungary was always occupied and invaded by foreign powers: Tatars/Mongols, Ottoman Turks, Austrians, Germans, and Russians, thus, Hungarians always had to cope with institutions of foreign powers, had to accommodate to foreign cultures and procedures while their own social, political, and economic development was always interrupted. Institutions were always seen as enemies of the citizens as these were not developed inside the society but posed onto them by outside forces. Many Hungarians got used to the habit that it is not a shame to cheat institutions, e.g. not to pay taxes or paying less, instead, it is a symbol of resistance. And they also developed the idea that next to the ‘big, official door’ there can be found always a ‘small, unofficial door or a backdoor’ to deal with matters. And besides the way Hungarian history is taught in schools, tragedies are not interpreted as ‘sad but people and the culture survived and could benefit from other events’ but that ‘and it again ruined the country and took back the Hungarian development with hundreds of years’. Similarly, most of the Hungarian writers whose life and oeuvres are taught in schools had a very tragic life because of personal or historical causes. Some of them committed suicide, died in fights or concentration camps. Also many of them in the 19th and 20th centuries could not publish their texts because of political reasons. In Hungary, funny poems and poets are usually not taught as many literature theorists and politicians of culture think that if something is not serious, it cannot be valuable aesthetically. These practices are changing nowadays, of course, but this negative way of telling the story of Hungarian history and culture still has a strong impact on the society and the education system. Besides or as a result of these, Hungarians have a well-developed ‘culture of complaining’, too. In sport championships they are happy only with the golden medal and if the Hungarian team receives the silver medal, everybody is upset and disappointed about it. Moreover, state funeral is given only for the Olympic winners of golden medal automatically, in case of winners of

silver medals it is a matter of subjective decision of the Hungarian Olympic Committee. Of course, it can be also a function of self-defence. If we are pessimistic and tell in advance that it will not succeed, then, loss or defeat is not that bad and the gain of the other partner is not that appreciated. Blaming foreign powers who once occupied the country may be always useful to avoid cognitive dissonance for cheating, breaking the rules, and not behaving appropriately. In sum, the negative way of thinking, distrust, and scepticism is deeply rooted in the history of small nations of the Central and Eastern European region (even Poland which is not small, but laying just in between two big powers: Germany and Russia).

As there is not much time and space here to look through thoroughly the history of the Central and Eastern European region and it is not the aim of this dissertation, I will summarize briefly what institutional and social characters may affect trust nowadays in the Central and Eastern European region. People have direct experiences by themselves or from family relatives about the difficulties and tragedies of the 20th century. Many social, economic, and political crises hit Eastern and Central Europe and two world wars started and took place in these areas. During these, two modern dictatorships hit these societies: the Nazi and the Communist regime. Although, many people died before as well in wars and diseases, these were the State institutions and the modern bureaucracy in these times that repressed the human and political rights of people, that executed many citizens, and that intruded violently into all spheres of public and private life. This happened indirectly as well, for example, through the presence of secret spies everywhere, even among family members reporting about each others. These circumstances and because of the absence of realistic hope of changing this had a ruining effect on trust in general. People living in the countries which will be analyzed here shortly, i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are socialized in a system of State-controlled and centrally-planned economy that shaped the lives and way of thinking of people very much. As Khodyakov explains it, “trust in the state was significantly undermined by a poorly managed socio-economic system and repression, as well as assassination of millions of people by the state and its leaders”¹⁸¹. Other scholars also interpreted it as the Communist system was not based on trust but fear, control, power, and corruption while these were the functional substitutes of trust¹⁸².

After the second World War, Central and Eastern Europe was occupied by the Red Army and they “forgot” to withdraw back to the Soviet Union. Although, they left Austria in 1955, but

¹⁸¹ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 117

¹⁸² Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 117

the Iron Curtain was built up at the border of Hungary and Austria and the Central and Eastern European countries were declared to be Soviet sphere of interest. In all countries, Communist parties controlled by Moscow took the power a few years after the end of WW II. People had to get used to dictatorship and centrally-planned economy. There was a lack of commodities, there was no market economy, there was censorship and people did not get passport. Or if somebody got the permission to travel abroad, his/her family members did not get passport to avoid emigration or defecting as it was called at that time. On the one hand, the State could intrude into the private sphere of people by the secret spy network, but on the other hand, people could get information from democratic sources through the Western radio stations, e.g. the Luxembourg Radio, the Radio of Free Europe, the BBC, and the Voice of America. Institutions of the State were seen by the society as not their own institutions selected and developed by themselves but as something coming from outside, controlled by a foreign power, and representing repression. People did not trust the institutions of the Communist regime and however, civil society did not exist in Western terms but it does not mean that trust did not exist in these societies at all. This is what Khodyakov calls “the weakness of the strong state”¹⁸³. Trust can be said to be low in the Central and Eastern European societies as people did not trust State institutions. But as political relations were decisive in getting permission to have a flat, to get admission to the university or to get a job, a huge network of mutual help developed. When there were not or not enough commodities in the shops, people needed personal contacts and some extra money for the shop-keepers to be able to buy goods “from under the table”. And it was the same in hospitals, universities or at the housing offices that personal networks and some extra money was needed for doctors, professors, and State officials to get special services, although, in a democracy we would call these normal services. From this respect, Central and Eastern European societies were high-trust societies in the Communist regime as there were extensive networks of interpersonal trust, although, the State was not included into these trust-relationships. As Khodyakov puts it, these networks “were the basis of survival under conditions of permanent shortages of consumer goods and services”¹⁸⁴.

Although, Central European people had already had some experiences about extended bureaucracy that covers every part of public and private life, about secret spying, and censorship from the times of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Hapsburg Empire. It was also a very hierarchical society with many privileges of certain people and with

¹⁸³ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 119

¹⁸⁴ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 119

institutions that did not handle all citizens as equals. Formal and official businesses and matters were very bureaucratic, slow, and sometimes negligent or dowdy. People had the experience that knowing important people and offering some extra money to bureaucrats or State officials make life easier and official businesses faster. Peoples of the monarchy learned that there was always a small gate or backdoor next to the big, official gate or frontdoor and that it is easier and faster to use the small, informal gate, instead of the official one. Between the two World Wars, these countries became mostly independent and usually formed their first republic in the 20th century with their own, national, and free institutions. Although, these institutions should have solved very serious social, economic, and political problems that they failed to do so. There were huge gaps between the different groups of the societies and the majority of the populations lived on a very low level of civilization and modernization. Also, the rate of illiteracy was very high and only 1 percent or less of the population could afford or was allowed to study at universities.

In the post-war period, many basic structural changes took place in the Central and Eastern European societies. The majority of the people moved or were forced to move into big cities to work in factories and the heavy industry. Also, new cities developed where factories were built up and operated. As industry needed skilled workers and also because of the egalitarian ideology of the Communist regime, an huge educational expansion took place. Although, these courses at the beginning were rather fast and quality was not an important aim, but it opened the window of mobility and structural mobility for many people in the society who could not study in the previous regimes before WW II. And as illiteracy decreased and more people could study in the higher education, political rights, political and social thinking became more important and the techniques of resistance became more sophisticated. People of this region knew more about the world outside of the Communist bloc, films, poems, and beat songs became tools of expressing freedom and resistance while people learned to read between the lines. A second economy and a “second public sphere” emerged in which market activities, e.g. “zimmer frei” businesses on the one hand, and freedom of thought on the other hand could gain space and became reality. The “second public life” made it possible through the samizdat literature to talk about poverty as according to the Communist ideology, poverty did not exist in Socialism, thus, it was impossible to talk about it publicly. Although, poverty, homelessness, and unemployment also existed in these regimes, just the State tried to hide it, e.g. by creating “unemployment inside the gates” when people had a job but did not have any meaningful work to do. But the second economy and second public sphere also meant that

people had to rely on each other so much to avoid to be caught by the State as these activities were illegal. Strong ties helped people to have the feeling of safety and security, while weak ties helped them to find the knowledge and “the right people” to get access to scarce resources. And that is why Khodyakov criticizes the social capital theory on institutional trust and suggests to separate interpersonal and institutional trust by their objects, because these societies in Central and Eastern Europe had a low level of institutional trust during the Communist regime but with a high level of interpersonal trust¹⁸⁵. It was simply needed then to survive and make individual progress in the system.

But it has been also a hurdle for the new institutions of democracy and market economy. State institutions had a bad reputation in Central and Eastern Europe, but trustworthy institutions may be necessary for a functioning democracy, free-market economy, and for citizen participation in public debates and activities. According to the structuralist and structuralist-functional approaches, at the beginning of the transformation, citizens are sceptical with the new institutions as they have attitudes and behaviours affected mostly by the previous regime. They will mostly rely on their strong and weak ties instead of trusting the State institutions. And from a historical institutionalist point of view, it can be also said that people may extrapolated their distrust developed in the old regime to the new institutions. But after some time, people will learn how to trust the new democratic institutions which were also “foreign” for them at the beginning of the transition process. Moreover, the new situation came into being after the fall of the Iron Curtain did not bring only uncertainty and growing inequalities into the life of the citizens but the new institutions and processes were often designed and executed by the elite while citizens were not involved and sometimes the new reforms were against their interests¹⁸⁶.

On the other hand, these are not only the citizens who have to learn institutional trust in the new regime but also the institutions have to learn to have and show trustworthiness to the people. It may also take some time, but the situation is new not only for the citizens but also for the institutions and State officials. The new institutions are accountable for creating and enforcing the rules of the game, exercising legal control, and protecting individual rights and freedoms¹⁸⁷. Moreover, the role of State officials, bureaucrats, and public administrators is also crucial in developing trust of citizens towards the State or civic institutions. These

¹⁸⁵ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *ibid.*, p. 120

¹⁸⁶ Utasi, Ágnes (2006a): Társadalmi tőke és bizalom [Social Capital and Trust, in Hungarian], *Kritika*, 2006/6, http://www.kritikaonline.hu/kritika_06junius_cikkek_utasi.html

¹⁸⁷ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124

officials, administrators, and bureaucrats also have to learn the new rules, values, and behaviours of democracy, but citizens often gain experiences about the whole system through interactions with administrators and officials. Many scholars argue that negative attitudes of administrators toward ordinary citizens make an obstacle to citizen participation in collective actions. Surveys have also showed that officials think about citizens as incompetent and selfish. They think that citizens do not know enough or sometimes anything about government decisions and public debates around social and economic issues. And when citizens have to make decisions, they follow their own, often material interests instead of the community ethos and interests. And it may cause a distrust in citizens and unwillingness to involve them into collective actions, debates, and decision-making from the part of State officials and public administrators¹⁸⁸. As King and Stivers put it, “for every citizen cry against the bureaucracy, there is a matching response that disparages a lazy, apathetic, and uncommitted citizenry”¹⁸⁹. This approach emphasizes the role of institutions in developing and cultivating trust which is more important than the behaviour of administrators in the institutions, because citizens cannot magically invent trust¹⁹⁰.

Chapter 2.3.2: A Summary of the Historical Background of Institutional Trust

Institutions in the Central and Eastern countries during the Communist regime were seen as enemies of the citizens and representing foreign occupation and dictatorship. Thus, distrust was very strong towards these institutions. From the social capital point of view, it can be seen as a problem of the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust. As people could not take part in voluntary organizations, they could not learn on micro level how to cooperate and trust other people. Thus, trust was not developed on individual level because of the lack of a strong civil society, hence, trust could not be generalized and transformed into trust towards institutions of the State. If there is not civil society, there is not trust in institutions.

According to another tradition, there is an alternative explanation for the low institutional trust in Communist countries. This approach supports the idea that institutional trust is created

¹⁸⁸ Yang, Kaifeng (2006): *op. cit.*, pp. 573-577

¹⁸⁹ King, C. S. – Stivers, C. (1998): ‘Citizens and administrators: Roles and relationships’. In: King, C. S. – Stivers, C. (eds.) (1998): *Government is us*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, p. 49

¹⁹⁰ Yang, Kaifeng (2006): *op. cit.*, pp. 590-591

by the extent to which State institutions are able to meet the needs of the society. The lack of civil society and the low level of interpersonal trust could be a reason for low institutional trust, but it is much more important in the explanation that the Communist governments and States failed to provide their citizens with the goods and services they needed. And as institutions could not perform their functions, Central and Eastern European citizens living in Communist regimes learned quickly that waiting for the help of the State is less efficient than turning to personal networks and sometimes, using illegal methods. Khodyakov also explains it about the case of the Soviet Union: “factory managers had to exchange state-owned raw materials with other factory managers, bribe public officials, and produce goods of unacceptable quality just to reach the goals of central plans. Yet they also had to develop trustworthy relationships with other managers because their actions were illegal, and managers risked punishment if caught by the state (Anderson, 1995; Kapustkina, 2004). The social and economic hardship that people had experienced at that time taught them how to rely on interpersonal networks with their relatives, friends, and even friends of their friends rather than on the state in obtaining scarce consumer goods and services”¹⁹¹.

Besides the dysfunctional problems of institutions of the Communist regime, some scholars emphasize the role of the moral aspect in low institutional trust before the regime change in 1989-1990. If moral judgements play an important role in the attitude formulation of citizens about institutions, the problems with social ethics in a society will have a negative impact on institutional trust. As Yang formulates it: “trust is foremost an attitude with affective components and a form of moral affirmation indispensable to moral self-definition, good character, and moral judgement (J. P. Miller, 1994; Weinstock, 1999). However, in a diverse society with a distrustful political culture, ideological clashes, racial conflicts, income gaps, and geographic differences, widespread affect-based trust is difficult to achieve”¹⁹².

¹⁹¹ Khodyakov, Dmitry (2007): *op. cit.*, p. 119

¹⁹² Yang, Kaifeng (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 590

Chapter 3: Hypotheses

As the empirical research part of the dissertation is basically an explorative research, the main focus is not verification or falsification of hypotheses, although, I do not want to miss this important aspect from this research. As I have comparable and more detailed data with social and economic backgrounds of the respondents only from Hungary, I will formulate and test hypotheses on these data to use it as a case study. In the following, three different hypotheses will be presented on the possible relationships between public trust and social-economic situation.

1st Hypothesis

In the first hypothesis I would like to describe the relationship between participation and institutional trust with a few other background variables that may influence this relationship. There are different theories and interpretations how participation and social embeddedness influence social trust. Some scholars argue that more participation in the system through information, expressing opinions, civil activities, and social capital generate distrust in the citizens toward the authorities¹⁹³. Thus, there is an opposing relationship between participation and social trust. In contrast, others argue that embeddedness in the civil society¹⁹⁴, social and cultural capital strengthen trust in the system¹⁹⁵. On the one hand, if people are more informed and familiar with the partners and the procedures, they will be more positive about it which is a similar mechanism to the operation and nature of prejudice. On the other hand, people with higher social status, more information, and opportunities or potential for participation can benefit more from the system¹⁹⁶. In this first hypothesis, we assume that information and participation strengthen trust in institutions while the level of urbanization and education together with the economic situation affect positively the level of information of the citizens.


¹⁹³ See for example: Norris, Pippa (2005): *op. cit.*, p. 27, or: Hardin, Russell (2004): 'Distrust: Manifestations and Management'. In: Hardin, Russell (ed.) (2004): *Distrust*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 23-24, or: Kornai, János (2003): *op. cit.*

¹⁹⁴ See for example: Putnam, Robert D. – Leonardi, Robert – Nanetti, Raffaella (1993): *op. cit.*

¹⁹⁵ See for example: Coleman, James S. (1988): *Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital*, *American Journal of Sociology*, 1988/94

¹⁹⁶ See for example: Inglehart, Ronald (1977): *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 315


Model 1



2nd Hypothesis

According to the theory of path-dependency¹⁹⁷, historical experiences can be as stable, influential, and fixed that the same public attitudes are maintained and prolong in a changing institutional environment as well¹⁹⁸. Besides, several authors¹⁹⁹ described about the trends of the 1990's that cynicism toward political governance is usually strongly embedded in the political culture. According to these concepts, there is a significant difference between public trust of the generations who grew up before and after the regime change as they have absolutely different historical experiences, norms, habits, and daily routines. Younger generations may be more open to the new political culture that Tony Blair and Bill Clinton represented²⁰⁰, to Post-Materialist values, and also to the values of self-representation, ecology, and social solidarity than older people²⁰¹. In contrast, older generations grew up in a world of “second” or “black” economy and “second” public sphere, in an era of fear, distrust, and dysfunctional operation of the whole institutional system. I assume in our second hypothesis that age and age-cycle have a strong influence on public trust and that new generations who grew up after the regime change trust the democratic institutional framework more than those who grew up in the Communist regime.

Model 2



¹⁹⁷ Bourdieu, Pierre (1977): *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 159-197

¹⁹⁸ Norris, Pippa (2005): *op. cit.*, p. 8

¹⁹⁹ For example: Leonardo Morlino, Jose R. Montero, Marco Tarchi, and Susan J. Pharr, see: Norris, Pippa (2005): *ibid.*, p. 6


²⁰⁰ Clark, Terry Nichols (1998): 'Overview of the book'. In: Clark, Terry Nichols – Hoffmann-Martinot, Vincent (eds.) (1998): *The New Political Culture*, Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, p. 3

²⁰¹ Clark, Terry Nichols – Inglehart, Ronald (1998): 'The New Political Culture: Changing Dynamics of Support for the Welfare State and other Policies in Postindustrial Societies'. In: Clark, Terry Nichols – Hoffmann-Martinot, Vincent (eds.) (1998): *The New Political Culture*, Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 10-13

3rd Hypothesis

Several authors²⁰² describe that opinions about democratic institutions are strongly linked to economic performance or rather to the public perceptions of economic trends and processes. According to McAllister, if the effects of the political culture and the historical situation are under control, economic factors have a much stronger influence on institutional trust than social factors²⁰³. Although, McAllister found that the objective economic situation does not have any influence on institutional trust, only the subjective economic situation affects institutional trust²⁰⁴, I assume in the third hypothesis that both the objective and the subjective economic situation have an influence on institutional trust and the better situation results more positive assessments. Besides, I assume that subjective assumptions play a more significant role in institutional trust than social factors.

Model 3



²⁰² For example: Lewis-Beck, Fiorina, see: McAllister, Ian (2005): 'The Economic Performance of Governments'. In: Norris, Pippa (ed.) (2005): Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 189

²⁰³ McAllister, Ian (2005): *ibid.*, p. 201

²⁰⁴ Norris, Pippa (2005): *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23

Chapter 4: Methodology and Data

In my PhD dissertation, I will follow a deductive method as it is often applied in social sciences, hence, the focus of my research is going from the level of theories toward the empirical level. When exploring the term and functioning of trust, I will start from a general level and then, go in-depth into a more detailed analysis. This research will consist of three different analyses to complement each other, although, they will not follow each other in a linear order throughout the chapters of the dissertation. By these three types of analysis, I will try to incorporate and use in parallel three analytical elements to explore trust: the content of the term, temporality, and the social context.

The first analysis explores the content of trust and it shows how citizens construct the notion of social trust and how they apply it in terms of the new democratic institutions. We expect that the definition of trust of the average citizens differ from that we have been using in surveys for several decades. Of course, the concept is more complicated than just asking “do you trust the president?” or “how much confidence do you have in the press?”, but maybe these standard questions with the standard answers measure something that is not the same or it cannot express the changes of the term of trust during the last decades as we always use this concept in surveys without any changes on it. Therefore, it may turn out that we should use new concepts and new questions when asking the citizens about their confidence in democratic institutions. Thus, in the first analysis, I will explore the content of trust and the different characteristics it has from the Communist (or as it is also called in Central Europe, the State-Socialist) and the democratic regime. For this aim, I will highlight the main patterns and characteristics of social and institutional trust or let us say public trust, from different angles and both from a present and a retrospective point of view.

In the second analysis, I will try to show the main tendencies and dynamics in the Central and Eastern European region after the regime change in 1989-1990. The reason why I will not compare data about trust from earlier times is that on the one hand, we do not have trustable data before this period. On the other hand, my main focus in the dissertation is what happened after the transformation and set-up of a democratic institutional framework, how the citizens of this region thought about their institutions. I would like to show the differences and similarities in the region in terms of institutional trust and whether the concepts and

tendencies were similar from the beginning and became later more different between the countries or whether these were originally different and became more different or similar. Or another scenario can be if everything remained stable regarding the trends of the different countries, i.e. trust toward democratic institutions moved together in the region and so we can find similar tendencies in the new Post-Communist States. In sum, the aim of this second analysis is to show the trends of institutional trust in the Central and Eastern European region in the first decade of democracy and market economy and to place Hungary in this picture by showing the similarities and/or the uniqueness of this case compared to other regions and other countries from the same region.

In the third type of analysis I will go in-depth into the Hungarian case and after describing what is special in Hungary regarding the whole region, I will explore what social and economic factors may play a crucial role in it. Moreover, we will try to explore how the society is structured according to institutional trust. While the first two types of analysis are rather explorative and descriptive, this third type will be more explanatory. Of course, we will apply an explorative method when forming trust-groups in the society and try to describe the Hungarian society and some changes if any change occurred in the society according to the trust-structures of the citizens. But in contrast to the first two types of analysis, I will try to explain the different trust-decisions of the citizens with some background information, namely, their social and economic characteristics. Before starting the analyses, I would like to present briefly the details of the methodology and data to be used in the analytical chapters. And besides these, I would like to also argue briefly why I decided to use these methods and these data for the dissertation.

Chapter 4.1: Methodology

In this section, I design the methodology I will use when analyzing both the Hungarian and the international survey data. For the former, I will use a longitudinal dataset of the Hungarian Medián Opinion and Market research, and a cross-sectional survey I designed and conducted for this dissertation. For the latter, I use the second and the third wave of the European Value Study (EVS), but only the second and the third waves as the countries I would like to analyze and compare did not take part earlier, only from these waves. And I will use only those

variables and country data which are incorporated into both data sets, otherwise, it would not be possible to compare them.

For both the comparative and the Hungarian analyses, I use the question “how much confidence you have in...” measuring the answers on a 4-point scale. The answers are “a great deal”, “quite a lot”, “not very much” and “not at all”. Although, the direction of the scales was different in the comparative and the Hungarian questionnaires, I transformed the scale of the comparative data for the analysis to have the same logic. In case of the scales, I have to add that there is a debate between scholars about the scaling and which scales are the most applicable for representing attitudes and intentions for actions. There are, for example, some empirical findings that people tend to place themselves on the negative side if there are few points on the scale. But on the other hand, if the scale have too much points, it confuses respondents as it is more difficult for them to choose a point on it²⁰⁵. One of the reasons why I decided to use the EVS instead of other comparative European surveys is that it uses the same 4-point scale that the Hungarian Medián institute use whose data I will use for the in-depth analysis. And although, this scale has its disadvantages as well and it also distorts the reality of attitudes a bit, but if I use it for all my analyses, it will result always the same kind of distortion, hence, the tendencies of the data may remain the same. Regarding the statistical analyses, I would like to deal only with the valid answers and leave out those who said they did not know the institutions or could not decide or when the interviewers simply did not pose the question. In case I use the invalid answers, too, I will always emphasize it in the text. I transformed this 4-point scale to a 0-100 scale but just for practical reasons: to make the numbers of the tables more reader-friendly and to make the whole analysis more understandable.

I will use both univariate and multivariate methods for the survey analyses to compare the tendencies and trends of institutional trust of the different social groups. I will do both cross-sectional analysis to highlight the institutional design according to trust of the citizens at given time points and I will also make trend analyses – as we do not have panel data, so a “real” longitudinal analysis is not possible in itself. I plan to use factor analysis or if the model does not fit, I will use separated principal component analysis. Besides, I will run hierarchical cluster analyses to explore whether different groups of institutions exist or not according to their trustworthiness. I will also use variance analysis to compare the levels of

²⁰⁵See for example: Alwin, Duane F. (1997): Feeling Thermometers Versus 7-Point Scales. Which Are Better?, *Sociological Methods & Research*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 318-340

trust toward the same institutions in different time points or between different regions and countries. I plan to use path analysis, regression analysis, and chi2 statistics to examine the social factors influencing institutional trust. And finally, I will use K-means cluster analysis to formulate or create social groups according to their type or structure of institutional trust. The variables for the cluster analysis will be the factors or separated principal components (the latter is a more explorative method, while factor analysis is rather confirmatory²⁰⁶). Thus, this model of clusters will be designed by the different types of institutions in groups, because it would be nearly impossible with 15-20 institutions to follow, interpret, and label the generated trust-groups according to 15-20 cluster centres per group. Cluster analysis is chosen because it creates groups according to the attitudes of the respondents without any preconception of the researcher. And it generates homogeneous groups as the members of each group are as similar to each other as possible, while the groups are as different from each other as possible²⁰⁷. But a disadvantage of this method is that it does not ensure that the variance, i.e. the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the groups reaches the same minimum level²⁰⁸.

In sum, the strategy of the research will be as follows. I will explore first the bigger picture and then, going in-depth into the details of the data. First of all, I will conduct an explorative research on the levels, trends, and institutional designs of the new Central and Eastern European democracies according to trustworthiness of their institutional framework. Secondly, a longitudinal data analysis will be done to explore the levels and changes in social trust toward the different institutions and types of institutions of the new Hungarian democratic system. I will also apply explorative methods to highlight the structure and the changes of the structures of institutional trust in the two decades after the regime change in Hungary. Besides, explanatory models will be also used here to identify and interpret the social and economic factors which influence institutional trust. And finally, an explorative research will be done to highlight the content of trust in Hungary as a case study.

²⁰⁶ Mochmann, Ingvill Constanze (2002): Lifestyles, social milieus and voting behaviour in Germany. A comparative analysis of the developments in eastern and western Germany, <http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2003/1278/pdf/MochmannIngvillC-2003-10-10.pdf>

²⁰⁷ Székelyi, Mária – Barna, Ildikó (2002): Túlélőkészlet az SPSS-hez. Többváltozós elemzési technikákról társadalomkutatók számára (Toolkit for the SPSS. On multivariate analysis techniques for Social Scientists, in Hungarian), Budapest: Typotex Publisher

²⁰⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cluster_analysis#External_links

Chapter 4.2: Data

For the comparative part of my research, I use the second and the third wave of the European Value Study (EVS). It is an international comparative research conducted in Europe from 1981. The Eastern countries were incorporated only in 1990, except the Baltic countries that took part first in 1999/2000. The reason why I chose this dataset is that it has data about Central and Eastern Europe from just after the regime change and from a decade later, thus, I can compare what happened in this region after the transformation into democracy. Another reason is that the questionnaire contained a lot of different institutions and the answers were coded on a 4-point scale that I feel to be more applicable in this case than other scales.

There are some other surveys that I could have used but I decided not to, because some did not have data from the first half of the 1990's, for example the Eurobarometer, although, there are much more institutions in that survey. There are surveys that used only a few institutions, for example the ISSP, in their questionnaires that would not have been rather worthy to analyze. And also some surveys used the question of institutional trust just in the last few years or did not have data about Central and Eastern Europe. Another reason why I chose the EVS instead of others is that it uses the 4-point scale to measure institutional trust. Some surveys used only a 2-point scale, for example the Eurobarometer at the beginning, which is a bit too simplistic. Sometimes an 11-point (0-10) scale is used, but sometimes it is difficult for the respondents to choose if there are too many answers, like here, to place their answers on an 11-point scale. It is especially true when people are asked about topics about which they do not have very sophisticated views about or if the issue is too abstract as it might have been the case for some respondents with the new institutional framework at the time of the regime transformation.

Both waves of the EVS were done by personal interviews using standardized questionnaires. The second wave of EVS used a multi-staged random sampling procedure representing the 18 and older population of each country. All countries were weighted by gender and age and there was a special weighting variable for handling East and West Germany separately, hence, I used this one for my analysis. The questionnaire did not contain the standard type of education, thus, it was not possible to weight with the level of education. The third wave of EVS was conducted differently in the countries regarding the sampling and weighting methods in the various countries. Some countries used quotas, some used random samples

with maximum and minimum levels of age, while some used random samples with only a minimum age level. Another problem is the difference of weighting variables. It was not unified now, thus, some countries made very precise and sophisticated weights, for example the Czechs who introduced 5 or 6 variables into the weighting variable, some applied more simple weighting variables using just gender and age again, while others did not create any weighting variable at all, like the Romanians.

These basic differences made it clear that I cannot deal with multivariate models or explanatory models using social and economic explanatory variables for my analysis. Another reason why I cannot do this is that in 1990, the questionnaire asked only how old the respondent was when finished school, but we do not have information about the level of education. In my opinion, it was a very problematic decision by the designers of the questionnaire as a lot of things happened in the history of the 20th century that forced people to interrupt their studies. Thus, some of the citizens could finish school much later or some people had to start a school when they had already been adults for achieving a higher standard of living. And there are also people with learning difficulties who need more time to finish a school than the average. Thus, the age of finishing school hides all these nuances and does not say anything about the achieved skills and competences of the respondents. I could not use also the variable of the economic situation of respondents, however, it was asked in a very good way regarding the comparison between countries. Respondents had to place themselves on a 0-10 scale regarding their economic circumstances compared to the others in their society, but the Czechs and the Slovaks used a 1-20 and a 1-24/25 scale that I recoded into a 0-10 scale. Although, I was afraid of losing too much information, therefore, I decided not to use this variable at all. Thus, as I could not use the two most important background variables, i.e. education level and economic situation, I decided not to use explanatory models to deal with social factors affecting trust in the Central and Eastern European region.

A reason for these national differences of the third wave of the EVS is that some institutions did not exist any more, especially, in the new democracies, therefore, the survey could not be conducted by the same researchers and same institutions as in the previous wave. Another problem comes from financial resources, because EVS is financed by the participants and if somebody cannot afford it or do not get enough funding, they have to do the research in a more cost-efficient way which means automatically that they need to make some compromises about the quality. There were some countries as it always happens accidentally

or because of personal reasons whose fieldwork and dataset is more problematic from the point of view of a comparison, but fortunately from my point of view, these were rather Western or Southern countries, not the Central and Eastern European countries. As national partners changed, so did the questionnaire. It was the case with Hungary, too, that the translation was not the same in the two waves. Of course, the two questions were very similar, but not the same that may also generate differences between the answers. For example, the institution of civil service was translated at the second wave as “State offices and municipalities”. The choice of “State” from the part of the translator was, in my opinion, a bad decision as this word is very strong and implies the State authorities so strongly. And it is especially problematic in a society that had been living in State Socialism for 40-50 years when the State dominated even the private life of the people and the society. At the next wave, it was translated as “administration” which is a better solution, but the problem is that it was not the same with the previous one, hence, the comparison between the two waves of the survey is a bit problematic again.

The reason why I decided to use this dataset despite some of its weaknesses is because I will compare the trends and tendencies of the different Central and Eastern European countries in terms of institutional trust, but I will not deal with the demographic variables. The sampling methods were not the same in these countries, but all of them used random samples. The Czechs used a maximum level of age (75), but it does not distort too much the comparison as people do not live much longer in these countries. And besides, the sampling methods were more similar to each other in these countries than in other parts of Europe. I also checked the answers of the weighted and the unweighted data file and it did not make a difference at the comparison of the countries or between the two time points. And another reason why I used this dataset is that we do not have better data for this period. These data cannot be corrected and sampling differently now, thus, we have to deal with this or at least, to keep it in mind during the analysis.

Regarding the Hungarian data that I use for the longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses in Chapter 6, these are all nationally representative surveys conducted by the Hungarian Medián Institute. These were all face-to-face interviews with standardized questionnaires and samples were chosen always by multi-staged random sampling procedure with random walking. In case of the longitudinal analysis, we used already existed data sets about institutional trust in Hungary. Medián have monthly surveys with 1200 respondents per month from each year,

except between 1991 and 1994 when a few surveys were conducted per year. There are 15-20 institutions on the list in the questionnaires and respondents had to assess how much they trust them on a 4-point scale. The scale is a continuous variable with answers “trust completely”, “very much”, “a little”, and “not at all”. Thus, the scale does not have a middle as in case of a 4-point scale like “trust very much”, “rather”, “rather not”, and “not at all”. I think the continuous variable is more appropriate than the quasi-binary 4-point scale and besides, it follows the same logic that the EVS does.

I tried to incorporate as many institutions into the longitudinal analysis as possible, but I decided to use only those about which there are at least 15 years of data. That is why the Hungarian Central Bank, the public prosecutors, and some other institutions are missing from the longitudinal analysis. However, at the cluster analysis of the longitudinal data I am less strict with the list of institutions, because I conduct this analysis on four pieces of 5-year data to cover the two decades after the regime change, thus, an institution do not need to have 15 years long dataset to be worth to analyze and incorporate into the model. The reason behind it is that I would like to explore the trends and structures of social trust in the new Hungarian democracy, therefore, I try to take as many factors into consideration as possible. Although, some data cleaning and recoding was necessary to do for merging the data of the 20 years which took a few weeks, but it was important to have comparable data both about institutional trust and about the social and demographic background of respondents.

In case of the cross-sectional analysis, I had the chance to design a short questionnaire about the content and the different types of trust. The fieldwork was again done by Medián on a nationally representative sample with 1200 respondents in April 2009. Data of both the longitudinal and this cross-sectional analyses are weighted according to the official statistics about distribution of the Hungarian adult population according to gender, age, education level, and type of settlement.

There is another important issue about analyzing these data and it is the handling of missing cases. Of course, fieldwork and weighting procedures are not the same in case of all countries and waves of the EVSs, as we have mentioned already, but it was also important throughout the whole dissertation to use these already existing data sets in a way that distort the so-called reality to the least extent possible. In case of the comparative analysis of international data, I use only the valid answers about institutional trust.

Regarding the longitudinal dataset, I decided to use only the valid answers in case of institutional trust, because at the beginning of the first decade, there were less surveys per year and less data about the institutions and later on, there were institutions which showed up later in the questionnaires, hence, there were years in which there was not data about trust toward them. I decided not to replace missing cases with the means of the sample as there might be significant changes and differences between the assessment of institutions, or between the assessment of the same institution but in different years. These are really big data sets with more than 10 thousand responses per year, therefore, one does not have to be anxious about the strengths of the methods and the statistical tests when using the valid responses only. Thus, I decided to keep and use the valid answers only to distort the data just as little as possible.

In case of the cross-sectional analysis, I take into consideration only the valid answers when it is about the descriptive part of the analysis. For the purpose of data reduction, I compute different types of scales from the same types of institutions. For this latter analysis, I replace missing cases with the mean of the whole sample not to lose data on other institutional variables and the final scale if there are some missing cases on one variable. I find it a good decision because my survey contains only 1200 responses, hence, I do not want to lose data unnecessarily, especially, in case of the multivariate statistical models. On the other hand, I think that it does not hurt my data that much as these are from the same time or moment and I suppose that those who give the answer 'do not know' are not that different from the average of the whole sample.

In sum, it is always a problem with low-budget research such as a Ph.D. dissertation that we have to use already existing data sets, therefore, we do not have the chance to design a questionnaire with questions and answers we would like to explore exactly, we cannot decide about the sampling procedures, the timing of the fieldwork or the weighting and data cleaning methods. But I am convinced that these three datasets: the two waves of EVS, the 20-year longitudinal monthly data about Hungary, and the survey I designed and conducted in 2009 are the most appropriate and best quality data available for the longest period.

Chapter 5: Comparison of Central and Eastern Europe with Hungary

In this chapter, I would like to explore what are the special Central European (CE) characteristics of institutional trust: whether there are any similarities between the Post-Communist (or more precisely, the Post-”State Socialist”) countries or they are very different from each other in this respect. As my research focus is the case of Hungary and keeping in mind the limitations of space, I will not examine the main factors or causes that generated different results in institutional trust in the individual countries of this region. I will also not deal with the different cultural and historical backgrounds of the countries in-depth as my main aim is not to show that these countries are different or similar in terms of trust toward democratic institutions or to explain why they are different from each other, instead, I just would like to show whether Hungary is similar or different from the other countries in the region and whether the differences or the similarities became dominant as time has gone by. Of course, I will point out the differences and similarities between the regions and the countries to show the main characteristics of institutional trust after these countries became free and independent. But in this research, I would like to say something about Hungary and I think it is worth to step back a bit from the case and try to place it into the present, actual political, social situation and then, it may be found that some great changes that took place in Hungary are just normal and usual tendencies regarding the whole region. Thus, I will not use explanatory models that I also mentioned in the methodology chapter to be very problematic regarding the different demographic variables of the countries and the sampling and weighting methods of the two waves of EVS, therefore, I will use here only explorative methods.

Although, there are some differences between the national samples (and translations) and some weaknesses of this international comparison that I have already mentioned in the methodology chapter, and moreover, I had to leave out some institutions and countries from the analysis as those were not incorporated in one of the two EVSs I used. Thus, in this comparison, I will analyze trust toward the church, the armed forces, the educational system, the legal or justice system, the press, the trade unions, the police, the parliament, the civil service, the social security system, and the European Community/Union (EC/EU). And I will use data of East Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia (I will call them the Central

European region without Hungary), Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia (I will call them the Eastern and Southern part of Europe), and Hungary. It means also that I cannot analyze data of the Baltic countries as they still belonged to the Soviet Union in 1990.

For this analysis, I used the question “how much confidence you have in...” measuring on a 4-point scale. Then, I followed the same method that I will do with the Hungarian survey analysis in Chapter 7, namely, I transfer them into a 0-100 scale (after I reversed it, hence, high scores mean here also a higher level of trust) to make the findings more visible and the tables understandable more easily.

Chapter 5.1: Comparing the Different Types of Institutions

In this section, I will examine how the different institutions that have similar roles form a group or not and how the different types of institutions gained or lost trust in the different regions of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

First, I run some factor analyses, but none of the models was acceptable because of the statistical conditions: low communalities, non-significance at the goodness-of-fit tables or some variables were sitting on both factors, and seemed to be impossible to interpret. Basically, the church and the EU did not fit into the factor analyses, but after I dropped them out, the institutions still did not form a structure through this statistical procedure. Thus, I decided to develop separated principal components and I made three groups of the institutions. First, I tested my group structure on the data of the whole CEE region from 1990 and found that the church did not match to any group, therefore, I had to leave it out from the whole analysis. Then, the EU did not fit into the group of decision-makers and representatives of power, but it went well with the neutral, social/civic institutions. The reason can be that as these countries were not members of the EC at that time, the EU was somehow an outsider, more neutral institution for the Central and Eastern European citizens. But at the end, I had all institutions belonging to a group (except the church) and all principal components had an eigenvalue higher than 50 percent. Then, I could generate the same structure on the data of 1999/2000 and these were also statistically acceptable. In the first group that I call the State services, I put together the education system, the civil service, and the social security system. For the second group, I added together the armed forces, the legal system, the police, and the

parliament, and I called this group the decision-makers and power representatives. The third one, the group of neutral, social/civil institutions consists of the press, the trade unions, and the EC/EU.

From the table below, it can be seen that there are some differences between Hungary, the CE and South Eastern European (SEE) countries in trust toward State services and decisions maker, power representative institutions in 1990. State services got higher public support in Hungary than in the two regions of Europe, especially, in the SEE countries. Also decision-maker, power representative institutions enjoyed a much higher trust in Hungary than in the other countries together in the two regions and the difference was significantly huge between Hungary and the other Central European countries. It is also a reason why the neutral and social/civil institutions got a lower level of trust in Hungary than all the other institutions that is interesting regarding that it was the time of setting up and consolidating democratic institutions. These institutions, the third group got low scores in the other regions, too, the lowest was in the SEE countries, although, these differences are not significant in statistical terms. But these may also imply that Hungarians had rather high expectations about their institutions and these institutions enjoyed a higher level of trust, especially, the new institutions of democratic decision-making. Moreover, the high support in society toward the new, democratic representatives of power was a unique phenomenon in Hungary in 1990 regarding the average of the Central European region.

Table 5.1, Trust towards different types of institutions in 1990 (means on the principal components)

	Hungary	Other CE countries	South Eastern countries
State services	0,076188	0,020243	-0,0588*
decision-makers, power representatives	0,105114	-0,06092*	0,07281
neutral, social/civil institutions	-0,00787	0,023773	-0,03911

*significant difference from Hungary according to Anova statistics

A decade later, Hungary was still similar to Central Europe and was still different from the SEE countries in terms of trust towards State services. But a new characteristic is that institutional trust towards the new decision-makers and power representatives in Hungary decreased to the level of the two other regions. If we compare the institutional design of the two regions, we can notice that the South Eastern part of Europe is dominated by decision-

makers and power representatives, while others have to face with distrust. A totally opposite picture can be seen in Central Europe (now without Hungary), i.e. the only group that is distrusted is the one of decision-makers and power representatives, but the other groups gained some trust during the first decade of democracy. The Hungarian case is different as only the State services got more trust than the average, hence, others seem to be untrustworthy.

Table 5.2, Trust towards the different types of institutions in 1999/2000 (means on the principal components)

	Hungary	Other CE countries	South Eastern countries
State services	0,049079	0,021506	-0,05508*
decision-makers, power representatives	-0,01277	-0,01449	0,028775
neutral, social/civil institutions	-0,1684	0,03817*	-0,01047*

*significant difference from Hungary according to Anova statistics

When comparing the different regions and Hungary according to the changes took place in the institutional design of trust during the first decade of democracy, it can be seen that institutional trust toward the different groups mostly remained stable in the regions of CEE. In SEE, there are not significant differences between the scores of the groups in 1990 and 1999/2000. It might be because the institutions could gain more credibility than in other places, but as two groups had lower scores than the average of the whole CEE region, it rather means that the SEE citizens had more modest expectations toward the new democratic institutional system than the citizens had in other countries. In CE, State services and the neutral, social/civil institutions enjoyed higher level of trust than the decision-makers, although, this level was not too high, but it remained stable until the end of the decade. When focusing on Hungary, it can be noticed that this country has a different institutional typology as State services always enjoyed a high level of social trust during the first decade. In contrast, decision-makers and power representatives had high support at the beginning, but then, it diminished by the end of the first decade. And although, the neutral, social/civil institutions suffered from distrust at the beginning, they even lost more during their first ten years.

Table 5.3, Comparison of trust towards the different types of institutions in time in Central and Eastern Europe (means on the principal components)

	Hungary		Other CE countries		South Eastern countries	
	1990	1999/2000	1990	1999/2000	1990	1999/2000
State services	0,076188	0,049079	0,020243	0,021506	-0,0588	-0,05508
decision-makers, power representatives	0,105114	-0,01277*	-0,06092	-0,01449*	0,07281	0,028775
neutral, social/civil institutions	-0,00787	-0,1684*	0,023773	0,03817	-0,03911	-0,01047

*significant difference from 1990 according to Anova statistics

As it can be seen from the principal component analyses and the comparison of trust toward institutions by time, it can be noticed that citizens of the different regions and countries of Central and Eastern Europe had very different expectations and opinions about the new, democratic institutional framework. They are different not only in their attitudes about the new institutions at the beginning of the democratic regime, but they might be different also in their perceptions about the functioning and effectiveness of these new institutions after the first decade of democracy. These different perceptions may be a result of different expectations, different functioning of institutions, and different civic culture. After exploring the big trends in institutional trust toward different groups of institutions, it is also worth to explore how the different institutional frameworks were structured in the minds of the citizens according to trustworthiness; and how these trust-designs changed or remained stable in the Post-Communist states during the first decade of democracy.


Chapter 5.2: Comparing the Different Institutional Designs

In this section, I would like to explore whether there are differences or similarities between the institutional frameworks of the Central and South Eastern region of Europe in terms of their representation in the minds of the citizens. Here, I would like to highlight how institutions are connected to each other according to the trust-decisions of the people; if these organizations form groups, how diverse these groups are; whether there are institutions that lay out and do not match to the whole framework; how the different institutional designs of the regions differ from each other; and how they changed (if any change occurred) during the first decade after their set-up. In order to show the distance of institutions by their trustworthiness represented in the minds of the citizens, I use hierarchical cluster analysis on

every data files of the regions at the two points in time. The dendograms below show how close these institutions are to each other and how diverse the groups are.

Let us start with the institutional design of the whole CEE region. It can be seen that there are three “real” groups. The parliament and the civil service are the closest to each other and also the justice system and the police linked together very quickly. These four institutions can be found in the first group that seems to be logical as being the basic political, state-dominated institutions which are familiar to the citizens. The second group consists of two important democratic institutions: the press and the trade unions, and also the social security system joined them as its trustworthiness is similar to the former two institutions. The third group is much more heterogeneous: there is a pair of the armed forces and the education system and a bit later, the European Community entered the group structure. And lastly, there is a real outlier: the church which was totally different in the minds of the citizens in the CEE and did not match to the new institutional framework (or not to any of these institutions).

Figure 5.1, Institutional design by trust in the CEE countries in 1990 (dendogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)




The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the legal system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Community

The next step is to take a closer look inside the region. It can be seen that the Central and the South Eastern parts of Europe are totally different from each other in this respect. As the institutional design of CE with and without Hungary was exactly the same, we deal only with CE without Hungary, also to compare it with Hungary. If we first have a look at on the South

Eastern countries, we can see that the structure of institutional trust is much simpler than that of the whole region of CEECs or the Central European region. There is only a huge group of institutions, then, a rather small one and this is all. The first, huge group consists of the parliament, the civil service, the social security system, the justice, the police, the press, and the trade unions. Hence, most of the democratic and political institutions can be found here that shows that the citizens of the SEE region did not have a very sophisticated and structured view about the members of the new democratic institutional framework. The next institutions which joined this group later are the EC with the pair of the army and the education system which is similar to the structure shown above. And again, the church is an outlier: in the minds of the citizens, it is very far from other institutions of the system.

Figure 5.2, Institutional design by trust in the SEE countries in 1990 (dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)




The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the legal system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Community

The institutional design of the CE region shows a different structure. There are three smaller groups, thus, it is a bit more heterogeneous and structured. The first group consists of most of the political institutions: the parliament, the civil service, the police, and also as members of the political scene: the press and the trade unions. The second group shows a difference from the other region that education is very far from the army but close to the legal and the social security system. The third group is not a real group, they both, the army and the EC joined the two former groups a bit later. And here again, the church is a real outlier and joined the other institutions only much later, at a greater distance.

Figure 5.3, Institutional design by trust in the other CE countries (without Hungary) in 1990 (dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)

Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine




*The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the legal system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Community

Regarding now the institutional design of Hungary, it can be seen that it is very different from the CE region as it has smaller but more homogeneous groups which are more distant from each other. Thus, these groups in Hungary differ from each other much more than in the other countries of the region. In the first group, we can find the parliament, the civil service, and the social security system which is an interesting composition of institutions. In the second one, there are the institutions that represent hierarchy, require obedience from the citizens, and which are very formal organizations: the education and the legal system, the army, and the police. The third group incorporates institutions which are more neutral or independent from Hungarian politics and the State: the EC, the press, and the trade unions. It is also interesting that these last two institutions have a very different role in Hungary than in the CE region as these two institutions are much distant from the State in the minds of citizens of Hungary than in other CE countries. But similarly to the CE countries and the whole CEE region, the church does not fit into the framework according to institutional trust.

Figure 5.4, Institutional design by trust in Hungary in 1990 (dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)


Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



*The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the legal system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Community

The next step of the analysis is to examine the change of institutional designs in the region. It can be noticed that the structure of institutions according to social trust did not change too much in the CEE region, only one, the social security system came closer to the first group of basic political institutions mostly dominated by the State (the parliament, the civil service, the legal system, and the police). But an important difference can be found here, i.e. that the institutions are further from each other after one decade of independence and democracy, therefore, the groups needed more distance to be formed. It implies that the new institutions became more different from each other in the minds of the citizens and these institutions could represent their own image to the public during the first decade of democracy.


Figure 5.5, Institutional design by trust in the CEE countries in 1999/2000 (dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)



*The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the justice system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Union

In case of the SEE countries, two important changes took place during the 1990’s in the field of institutional trust. The first is similar to what I have already mentioned about the whole CEE region, i.e. that the institutions became more different from each other, thus, there are more small groups (as the reader may remember, there was only one huge group in the SEE countries and then, only a small one, thus, it was not a complicated structure of institutions). For example, there is a group consisting of the parliament, the civil service, and the trade unions; another one of the justice, the social security system, and the police; a third one of the press and the EU; and the last one of the army, the education system, and the church. And besides, there are bigger distances inside the groups. It shows that the whole structure became more heterogeneous or complicated, detailed and also the groups inside are more heterogeneous. Another difference compared to the institutional framework of the beginning of the decade is that the church is not an outlier any more. It connected to two other formal and hierarchical institutions that also ask for obedience from the people: the armed forces and the schools. But this trend that the church is not an outlier but an organic part of the institutional framework is absolutely unique among all regions analyzed in this research.

Figure 5.6, Institutional design by trust in the SEE countries in 1999/2000 (dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)




*The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the justice system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Union

In case of Central Europe (without Hungary), very different tendencies can be seen from the SEE region. There are only two real groups: one of the parliament, the civil service, and the social security system; and another one of the army and the education system. But all other institutions stepped separately or individually into the structure. It shows that institutions are not only more different but have their own faces or images in the minds of the citizens. And it is also an interesting finding that the EU, and especially the church, are still outliers in the system and do not really match to it.

Figure 5.7, Institutional design by trust in the other CE countries (without Hungary) in 1999/2000 (dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)

Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



*The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the justice system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Union


The Hungarian case is entirely different again from the CE region, moreover, the tendency we can find here is the opposite again. It can be seen, for example, that it is difficult to cluster the institutions into groups according to their distance from each other. Therefore, there are less groups and the groups are not real, separated groups which is a difference from the previous point in time. For example, there is a big group from the parliament to the education system (with seven institutions), inside which there is a smaller, more homogeneous one consisting of the parliament, the civil services, the justice, and the police. And there is another one out of this consisting of the press, the trade unions which together with the EU belong to the big group.

The church is still outlier, similarly to the other CE countries and in contrast to the SEE countries. It can be also noticed that between the beginning and the end of the decade, institutions became closer to each other according to the trust towards them, except the church which is still left out. This tendency of coming closer in Hungary is absolutely unique in terms of institutional design in the region. Another thing that makes Hungary different from the remaining part of the CE region is that the press and the trade unions are still further from other institutions in Hungary compared to other CE countries.

Figure 5.8, Institutional design by trust in Hungary in 1999/2000 (dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis)

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)

Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



*The institutions of the figure are the following: chur: the church, arme: the armed forces, educ: the education system, just: the justice system, pres: the press, trad: the trade unions, poli: the police, parl: parliament, civi: civil service, soci: the social security system, euro: the European Union

In sum, I found both some similar and unique tendencies in the Hungarian case of institutional design according to the trust-decisions or perceptions of the citizens. By the end of the first decade of democracy, Hungary became more similar in this respect to the average of the CEE region, but it is because the two subregions, i.e. the SEE and the CE experienced the opposite tendencies and Hungary is different from both, although, in different ways. However, in both subregions, the perception of trustworthiness of the institutions became more complex, the citizens thought about them differently, thus, they seem to have gained their own image in the system. In contrast, Hungary is an exception as her institutions became closer to each other and a less complex structure can be seen with fewer nuances in it. It may imply the conclusion that Hungarians had very high expectations about the democratic institutional system that the young institutions could not meet or fulfil, hence, a strong scepticism, some mistrust, and apathy started to evolve that made the institutional design more reduced and simple in the perceptions of the citizens. It may be in parallel later to the events of Budapest in autumn 2006 when people demonstrated on the streets after the PM admitted lying to gain the elections. But another scenario can be that Hungarians simply started to think about the institutional framework less sophisticatedly, because politics became more boring than in the years of the regime change in 1989-1990.

Hungary (and the whole CE region) was different from the SEE region in terms of the position of the church in the whole institutional framework. In the CE countries, the church has remained an outlier of the new institutional system by the end of the first decade, while in the SEE countries, it matches well to the others. Another difference is that in Hungary, the trade unions and the press are very close to each other (as in the whole CE) compared to the SEE countries and these two institutions are much further from the others, while in other parts of the CE, these are closer to the political, mostly State-dominated institutions. It implies that the press and the trade unions could strengthen more their democratic credibility in Hungary and citizens think about them as real counter-balances of the political authorities and powers, regardless if they do a good job in this role or not.

Chapter 5.3: Comparing the Levels, Tendencies, and Trends of Trust

For this analysis, I used the 0-100 scale again and I compared the means of the different regions with the means of Hungary in case of the various institutions. Our data from 1990 show that Hungary was a bit different from the region in terms of trust towards institutions. Although, this difference was not too huge as Hungarians trusted differently approximately the half of the institutions listed in the questionnaire. Hence, I found statistically different means in case of six institutions out of the eleven and except one (the education system), Hungarians expressed more reliance in these institutions (namely, the church, the legal system, the police, the civil service, and the European Community) than the other Central and Eastern European citizens together.

When taking a closer look into the data, much more differences can be found inside the region. And in case of the comparison of Hungary to the South Eastern European (SEE) countries, more significant differences can be noticed. Only the press and the police enjoyed the same level of trust, but all other institutions got very different judgements. In most of the cases, Hungarians trusted much more the institutions (the church, the legal system, the parliament, and the social security system), especially, the civil services and the EC. In contrast, the SEE countries expressed more confidence than Hungarians did in the trade unions and the education system, and especially, in the armed forces. When taking into consideration the other Central European countries, it can be seen that Hungary is a bit more

similar to them as there are three institutions that they trust at the same level (the press, the trade unions, and the EC) and only two got very different scores. Hungarians trusted more the church, the legal system, the police, and especially, the armed forces and the civil services compared to other CE citizens. Although, other CE citizens expressed more confidence than Hungarians did in the parliament, the social security system, and the education system.

In sum, there were two institutions that had a very different image in Hungary compared to the other parts of the Central and Eastern European region: the armed forces that the SEE citizens trusted much more and the Central Europeans trusted much less than Hungarians did; and the civil services that Hungarians appreciated much more than citizens of all other regions.

Table 5.4, Comparison of trust towards institutions in the Central and Eastern European region, 1990 (means on a 0-100 scale)

	Hungary	other Central European countries	South Eastern Europe	other CEECs together (without H)
church	54	48*	49*	48*
armed forces	51	44*	60*	50
education system	56	59*	62*	60*
legal system	55	49*	50*	49*
the press	43	43	43	43
trade unions	35	36	37*	37
the police	50	45*	49	46*
parliament	42	45*	40*	44
civil service	48	40*	40*	40*
social security system	47	50*	43*	47
European Community	56	55	48*	53*

*significant difference from Hungary according to Anova statistics

The data which were collected one decade later show that attitudes of the Central and Eastern European citizens changed a lot and their trust toward the democratic institutions became more different from each other. When comparing Hungary again to the remaining countries of the region, a much more differentiated picture can be seen as people have more different ideas about the institutions than 10 years earlier. There are only two institutions now that got the same amount of trust both in Hungary and in the region: the social security system, hence, it has not changed since the regime change and the other one is the church (but this latter is just because of the average of the higher and lower means in the CE and SEE countries).

When taking a closer look again inside the CEE region, it can be seen that there is only one institution: the social security system which was seen similarly in Hungary and in the SEE countries. Another finding is that at the beginning of the decade, Hungarians trusted more the institutions and these are the SEE citizens now who expressed more trust towards their institutions. For example, the latter group trusted more the church, the trade unions, the police, and especially, the armed forces, the press, and the education system. While Hungarians had more confidence in the justice system, in the parliament and the difference is even bigger in case of the civil services and the European Union. When comparing Hungary with the other CE countries, we can see that although, these were more similar to each other than the SEE countries and Hungary in 1990, now, Hungary and the CE countries are absolutely different from each other and in contrast to the SEE region, there is not any institution that had got the same level of trust in Hungary and in the CE region. But similarly to what happened in the comparison of Hungary and the SEE countries, the same can be seen in the comparison of Hungary to the CE region that Hungarians became more sceptical and dissatisfied with the democratic institutions than their CE fellow citizens. It can be noticed that the public of the other CE countries trusted more the armed forces, the police, the social security system, and the education system than Hungarians did and the difference was especially huge in case of the press and the trade unions. On the other hand, Hungarians still trusted more the church, the justice system, and trusted more also the parliament than the other CE citizens and the difference was rather big in case of the civil services and the EU.

Thus, firstly, summarizing the data of the years 1999/2000, it can be assumed that there are three institutions that showed huge differences in the levels of social trust in Hungary compared to the CE and the SEE regions. In case of the press, Hungarians expressed much higher dissatisfaction than in the other two regions, but the civil services and the EU still enjoyed a much higher level of trust in Hungary than in the two regions. Although, we do not have data about the operation of the institutions in the different countries and regions, hence, we do not know whether these institutions played different roles in Hungary than in the other two regions or Hungarians just had much higher expectations at the regime change. And even if the Hungarian institutions did not function much worse than in the other countries, Hungarians might become more distrustful compared to citizens of the other regions, because of their higher expectations. For example, in case of the press, Hungarians might have higher expectations about its role in the democratic system that the press simply could not meet. And that may be why it got lower scores than in the other two regions and not because the

Hungarian press was much worse than the press of the other Post-Communist countries. The same could happen to the civil services that Hungarians had a better service than in the other two regions or they just did not have high expectations about it regarding the future, thus, it could not lose too much confidence in Hungary compared to the other regions. But in case of the European Community and later Union, it can be seen that Hungarians do have higher expectations about the European integration than the citizens of the other CEE countries, maybe because they felt some disillusionment about their own democratic institutional framework.

And secondly, when comparing how the Hungarian institutional trust changed in comparison to the two regions, four groups of the institutions can be created. The first one is the group of institutions that suffered a great loss of trust (but again, not comparing Hungary to Hungary in time but comparing Hungary and the two CEE regions in time) and interestingly, this is the biggest group consisting of the press, the police, the trade unions, the army (lost compared to SEE, but remained stable to CE countries), and the church (lost to SEE, but stable to CE countries). The second group of institutions which got stable distrust in Hungary in comparison to the two other regions are the education system and the social security system. The third group gained trust in Hungary compared to the two other regions and these are the parliament and the EU (gained to CE, but stable to SEE countries). And the last group consists of the institutions that enjoyed stable trust in Hungary compared to the SEE and CE regions which means that these were always trusted more in Hungary than in the two other regions. These two institutions are the justice system and the civil services. It also shows something about the institutional design of Hungary that compared to the two other regions, some authoritative institutions lost trust: the church, the police, and the armed forces, while some democratic institutions gained trust: the parliament and the EU as a representative of the democratic community to which, as Hungarians might feel, Hungary can rejoin after a long period of foreign occupation. Although, the case of the press is interesting as being a democratic institution but losing trust in Hungary compared to the two regions of CEE.

Table 5.5, Comparison of trust towards institutions in the Central and Eastern European region, 1999/2000 (means on a 0-100 scale)

	Hungary	other Central European countries	South Eastern Europe	other CEECs together (without H)
church	47	44*	53*	48
armed forces	46	50*	58*	53*
education system	56	61*	65*	63*
justice system	45	41*	42*	42*
the press	37	45*	46*	46*
trade unions	30	38*	35*	37*
the police	45	48*	48*	48*
parliament	39	36*	33*	35*
civil service	47	40*	35*	38*
social security system	42	43*	41	42
European Union	51	44*	43*	44*

*significant difference from Hungary according to Anova statistics

After taking a look at inside the regions to explore what happened there during the first decade after the regime change and the set-up of the democratic system regarding trust toward the new institutions, it can be seen that the picture is rather complex and this period was not just about the disillusionment of the post-honeymoon term. Because nearly half of the democratic institutions lost trust in the CEE region, but the other half could reserve their trustworthiness and most could even gain more confidence. The main losers of this decade are the justice systems, the national parliaments, and the EU. When going closer into the subregions, it can be noticed that in South and Eastern Europe, more institutions (7 out of the 11) could not meet the expectations of the citizens compared to Central Europe (where this number was just 5). The region of SEE is the only one where the church could gain more confidence among the citizens and the main losers here are the legal system and the parliament. In Central Europe, the picture is a bit different as the church suffered a significant loss in its trust-capital, but the main losers are again the legal system and the parliament and besides, also the social security system. This latter finding is interesting on the one hand, because East Germany became a member of the EU and also after the reunification, a great amount of Western mark flowed into the country to advance the standard of living. But in sum, these data imply that in contrast to the SEE citizens, Central Europeans were very dissatisfied with the economic and social consequences of the first decade of democracy and market economy.

The institutions that enjoyed the same level of trust at the beginning and the end of the decade in the whole Central and Eastern European region are the trade unions, in South Eastern

Europe it was the police and in Central Europe: the civil services. The Hungarian case is a bit different from the other CE countries, because the education system could also reserve the same level of trust and although, it was the most trusted institution in 2000, the level of trust was much lower than in other CE countries. Another difference between Hungary and the other regions that except those two that we have already mentioned, all institutions suffered a significant loss of confidence in Hungary, especially, the church and the legal system. While in the other CE countries only five institutions lost of their trustworthiness and the number of losers is also lower as I have mentioned above. In contrast to Hungary, some institutions could even gain more confidence in the other CE countries and the big losers are also different here, namely, the justice system (it is the same as in Hungary), the parliament, and the EU.

In sum, it shows that Hungary is unique in the region in the sense that besides that the democratic institutions also suffered some loss of social trust, these are definitely the authoritative institutions (legal system, church, and partly the army) that lost really a great amount of trust, while for example, the army gained a very significant amount in other parts of CE. And although, the EU also lost some reliance in Hungary, it was still much more appreciated than in other countries of the CE region.

Table 5.6, Comparison of trust towards institutions in time in the different regions and Hungary (means on a 0-100 scale)

	All CEECs		SEECs		CECs		Hungary		Other CEECs	
	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
church	49	48*	49	53*	49	45*	54	47*	48	44*
armed forces	50	52*	60	58*	45	49*	51	46*	44	50*
education system	60	62*	62	65*	58	60*	56	56	59	61*
legal/justice system	50	42*	50	42*	50	42*	55	45*	49	41*
the press	43	45*	43	46*	43	44*	43	37*	43	45*
trade unions	36	36	37	35*	36	37*	35	30*	36	38*
the police	47	47*	49	48	46	47*	50	45*	45	48*
parliament	43	35*	40	33*	45	36*	42	39*	45	36*
civil service	41	39*	40	35*	41	41	48	47	40	40
social security system	47	42*	43	41*	50	43*	47	42*	50	43*
European Community/Union	53	45*	48	43*	55	45*	56	51*	55	44*

*significant difference from 1990 according to Anova statistics

When taking a look inside the CE region, it can be noticed that these countries are extremely different from each other in the tendencies of the first decade of their free and independent

period. Maybe Hungarians and Czechs are a bit more similar to each other, but the other three countries have very different images about their institutional framework in the minds of the citizens. Let us start with the two similar countries. Hungary and the Czech Republic are similar in the sense that big changes occurred in institutional trust during this first decade of democracy and nearly all institutions lost significantly of their trustworthiness. In Hungary, as I have already mentioned, all institutions lost trust except the education system and the civil service that remained stable, while the main losers are the church and the legal system. In the Czech Republic, also all institutions lost confidence, except the press that could gain some trust during this period. And another difference is that in this latter country, there are more main losers, namely, the armed forces, the legal system, the parliament, the social security system, and the EU. With these results, the Czech Republic is the country in the region that have the most “big losers” and whose institutional framework suffered the most regarding social trust besides the press that could gain some confidence.

In case of of East Germany, it can be seen that the tendency of institutional trust is very similar to the Czech and the Hungarian cases in the sense that it is rather simple, but a difference is that the direction of the tendency is the opposite compared to the above mentioned two countries. Thus, most of the institutions of East Germany gained trust among the population, moreover, some gained a very huge amount of trust-capital. The German case is unique in the sense that the biggest changes in institutional trust took place in this country (in case of 7 institutions out of the 11) and it is also the only one where the parliament remained on the same level, although, it is under the midpoint of the trust-scale. The institutions that gained more trust in East Germany are the legal system which is also unique in the region, the press, the trade unions, and especially, the army, the education system, the police, and the civil service. Three institutions lost of their trustworthiness and it is a really huge amount of loss in trust: the church, the social security service, and the EU. At the end of the decade, trust towards the EU became the lowest in East Germany that shows that the idea of rejoining Europe, the Western democratic culture, and reaching the Western standard of living is a tempting idea rather from outside, but from inside, it seems to be less satisfying.

The Polish and the Slovakian trends are more complex in the field of institutional trust than in the above mentioned countries. In Poland, two institutions could reserve a very high level of trust: the armed forces and the education system. And the image in the public also did not change during the time in case of a third institution: it is the social security system. The other

institutions mostly lost confidence, but these are “only” the half of them. The losers are the press, the civil service, and especially, the church while it still enjoys the highest level of trust in the region, the justice system, the parliament, and the EU. But on the other hand, there were two institutions which gained trust and it was a significantly big amount of trust: the police and the trade unions.

Similarly, the Slovakian trends are rather complex: less changes took place and the changes were not only losses in institutional trust. There were four institutions whose image did not change in Slovakia: the education system, the press, the police, and the civil service. Slovakia is unique in the sense that the most stability in public trust can be found here. And it is also surprising if we take into consideration that at the time of the first wave of the survey, Slovakia was democratic but not independent as it was part of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the new centre of power was outside of the Slovakian territory, namely, on the Czech side. In contrast, later, a lot of Czechs were happy about the separation of the two countries to lose the “poor neighbour”. However, the Czech national institutions and the EU suffered much more loss in trust, while in Slovakia, they rather gained or remained stable in terms of trustworthiness. Going back to Slovakia and comparing it to Poland, it is a difference that those institutions that experienced a change in Slovakia mostly gained and not lost of their trustworthiness. These are the parliament and it is the only one in the region that gained confidence, the EU which is also unique in the region, although, the level of trust is still lower than in the Hungarian case, and especially, the church and the army. By the way, the institutions that lost trust in Slovakia all faced with a huge loss: the justice system, the trade unions, and the social security system. The case of the church is very interesting in these two countries: Poland and Slovakia. Institutional trust towards the church is the highest in these two countries in the region, but the Polish church lost a lot and the Slovakian gained a lot, although, both are mostly Catholic countries²⁰⁹ (while the other countries are more secularized or less religious²¹⁰). It shows that as the majority of the population is Catholic in Slovakia but they were repressed in the Communist era, nowadays, social involvement and interest is higher toward the church and it might give the church a more significant role publicly in the minds of the citizens. In contrast, the Polish Catholic church played a very important role in the Communist period as one of the leading institutions of the opposition and the democratic transformation in Poland. But it seems that it was also a disadvantage of the church that it lost

²⁰⁹ BBC and <http://www.kinseyinstitute.org/ccies/pl.php>

²¹⁰ <http://www.indiana.edu/~kinsey/ccies/cz.php> and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Germany

of its significance in the free regime and became less important without the “big common enemy”.

In sum, the Hungarian case is unique and different from the other countries of the CE region as there is not any institution in Hungary that could gain some trust in the first decade of democracy and market economy and most of them could not become stable in trustworthiness. Thus, the great majority of the institutions lost confidence, but in contrast to the other countries, the changes are rather modest in Hungary. The Hungarian case is more similar to the so-called Visegrad countries, especially, to the Czech Republic and except Slovakia, but it Slovakia a special case, maybe, because this country became free, independent, and democratic in 1993 for the first time in history. And the most different case from Hungary is the East German, but it is also a special case, because of historical reasons, i.e. the German reunification and the EU-accession. It can be also added that it seems to be a regional phenomenon that authoritative institutions lost their confidence among citizens, while democratic institutions could gain or at least suffered just minor losses. It implies that although, authoritative institutions, i.e. the army, the police, and the legal system became formally independent, national, and democratic, but they need more time and maybe better performance to reach credibility compared to the institutions of democratic representation. By the way, the authoritative institutions might have a more difficult task than the institutions of democratic representation to gain the confidence of citizens as the memories might be still too close in time about the police and the legal system as tools against the democratic opposition, ordinary citizens, and great artists who saw the world differently than the official ideology was. And maybe, citizens need more time to believe that those people wearing the same or very similar uniforms now behave and act for the interests of the citizens. And also, it may be easier to change the composition of the parliament and the journalists at the press than to change a huge hierarchical apparatus.

Table 5.7, Comparison of trust towards institutions in time in Central Europe (means on a 0-100 scale)

	East-Germany		Poland		Czech Republic		Slovakia		Hungary	
	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
church	47	30*	76	65*	34	28*	51	62*	54	47*
armed forces	24	47*	61	61	45	38*	52	62*	51	46*
education system	47	62*	72	71	60	55*	61	62	56	56
legal/justice system	46	49*	54	45*	50	36*	49	40*	55	45*
the press	35	41*	52	49*	42	44*	46	47	43	37*
trade unions	37	41*	32	40*	35	33*	39	44*	35	30*
the police	45	55*	42	54*	46	42*	45	45	50	45*
parliament	43	42	60	39*	45	27*	37	42*	42	39*
civil service	32	41*	43	41*	43	37*	43	42	48	47
social security system	55	48*	44	43	50	43*	49	41*	47	42*
European Community/Union	59	40*	54	44*	58	44*	45	48*	56	51*

*significant difference from 1990 according to Anova statistics

Although, I do not want to make a comparison between the concrete levels of trust by institutions in the single countries as there are some differences in the national sampling and weighting methods, and also because it is not the aim of this research to explore why there are differences between the countries. Therefore, I will focus rather on the tendencies of the different countries. However, it may be worth to look through in which countries these institutions enjoyed the highest and in which countries the lowest level of trust and how it changed from the beginning by the end of the first decade of democracy. When taking a look at on the column of the highest trust in 1990 in the table below, it can be seen that it is mostly dominated by Poland and for some extent, Hungary. Regarding the column of the lowest level of trust in 1990, it is mostly dominated by East Germany and for some extent, Poland. It implies that the Polish population was very polarized about their new democratic institutions. Moving forward to the columns of 1999/2000, it can be noticed that the column of the lowest trust is dominated almost only by the Czech Republic and for some extent, by Hungary, while the column of the highest trust is more heterogeneous as it is dominated nearly equally by three countries: Poland, East Germany, and Slovakia.

This shows that the Poles were originally much more in favour of their new institutions and it remained the case by the end of the century, hence, in a regional comparison, Polish institutions could save their trustworthiness rather well. Different tendencies can be seen in the two parts of the former Czechoslovakia. Institutions were not extremely trusted or

mistrusted in any of the two countries, but then, at the end of the decade, most of the Czech institutions became the least trusted in the region, while in Slovakia, some institutions became the most trusted. East German institutions suffered from the greatest mistrust at the beginning of the 1990's, but then, they jumped on the top and gained a significant public reliance, except the European Union that really lost a lot from being on the top in this country and then, in the bottom. The opposite trend can be found in Hungary which was mostly on the top in terms of social trust and by the end of the first decade, some of the Hungarian institutions experienced the lowest level of trust in the whole CE region.

It is also interesting to see which institutions remained stable regarding their positions according to institutional trust in the region. The church was originally and remained the least trusted among the Czechs, but it was the most trusted and still it is in Poland. It is true in the latter country in case of the armed forces as well which played an important role in advancing the reforms and the transformation, the education system, and the press, too. The trade unions got the highest trust in Slovakia in 1990 and it was still the case at the end of the decade. East Germans had the most confidence in the social security system in the region at both points of time. In Hungary, it is the civil service that enjoyed the greatest reliance throughout this period.

Table 5.8, The highest and the lowest level of trust towards institutions in Central Europe, 1990-1999/2000 (means on a 0-100 scale)

	highest trust		lowest trust	
	1990	1999/2000	1990	1999/2000
church	PL	PL	CZ	CZ
armed forces	PL	SK (PL)	E-D	CZ
education system	PL	PL	E-D	CZ (H)
legal/justice system	H (PL)	E-D	E-D	CZ
the press	PL	PL	E-D	H
trade unions	SK	SK	PL	H
the police	H	E-D (PL)	PL	CZ
parliament	PL	E-D, SK	SK	CZ
civil service	H	H	E-D	CZ
social security system	E-D	E-D	PL	SK (H)
European Community/Union	E-D (CZ)	H	SK	E-D

Finally, it is also worth to mention what Jon Elster points out that although, the same systems and motivations exist in different countries, but several points of equilibrium can be found

always. Thus, country differences can be mostly explained by the historical backgrounds and peculiarities, and by accidental events²¹¹.

Chapter 5.4: A Summary of the International Comparison

In the first decade of democracy, different trends can be noticed in the Central and Eastern European region regarding the trustworthiness of the new institutional framework. It seems that citizens had rather high expectations about the new institutions of democracy and free-market economy in the Central European region, while the expectations of the citizens in the South East European Post-Communist countries were rather unstructured as a whole. It may be a necessary result that many people became disappointed by the functioning of the new democratic institutions in Central Europe, while the citizens of Southern Europe had a more heterogeneous picture about their institutions by the end of the first decade of democracy.

Some institutions suffered big losses in public trust, while others could gain or remained stable. The variety of trends and institutional designs in respect of trust-capital is also rather high in the Central and Eastern European region. The church is among the big losers in many countries of Central Europe, while it gained public trust in the South East European countries. The armed forces faced with the opposite trend: they gained more trust in Central Europe, while lost of their trustworthiness in the South Eastern European countries. The parliaments and the European Union became much less trusted in the whole region. Of course, as one goes closer to the country-level, more nuances and differences can be noticed, even inside one geopolitical, historical, and cultural region of Europe. For example, in case of the Central European countries, the Polish institutions enjoyed the highest level of public trust in the region, while East Germans were the most distrustful about their institutions. One decade later, the Czechs became the most disappointed about the new democratic institutions in the region, while Poles and East Germans assessed their institutions the most trustworthy. In general, it can be assumed that usually, the authoritative institutions could reserve their trust-capital less successfully during the first decade after the regime change in 1989-1990, while the democratic institutions which make counter-balance to the State and the Government, namely, the parliament and the press, could reserve public trust more successfully.

²¹¹ Elster, Jon (2001): *op. cit.*, p. 163

Regarding the case and the uniqueness of the case of Hungary, nearly all institutions of the new democratic system lost of their public trust and could not remain stable in trustworthiness. Besides, while some of the new institutions could represent a more trustworthy image during the first decade, no institutions in Hungary could increase its trust-capital. The authoritative institutions lost definitely from their trustworthiness while some of them, for example, the armed forces could gain some trust in other countries of the region. Hungary is also special that it is the only country of the Central European region where citizens trust the European Union after one decade of democracy. Although, the level of trust in the EU was about in the middle or neutral point of the trust-scale in Hungary.

It seems that Hungarians had rather high expectations about the new institutions of democracy and free-market economy at the times of the regime change that the newly established institutional framework could not really meet. After a fast disappointment, Hungarian citizens turned to the values, lifestyle, and standard of living of Western Europe in terms of social trust. Although, the East German case showed that after the EU accession, a slight but significant disappointment took place regarding trust in the European Union. It may also imply some similar trends in Hungary after the EU accession of the country, but besides a closer analysis in time, it is also worth to explore the content and social background of social trust.

Chapter 6: Analysis of Hungarian Data on Trust Toward Institutions

After this detailed analysis of the levels, trends, and designs of institutional trust in the Central and Eastern European region, I go in-depth into the Hungarian case. I think that it is worth to explore the functioning of public trust more detailed on a concrete example or case study. Of course, it was also a question of accessibility of datasets, but it may also make my analysis a bit more socially and historically robust if I integrate more different data, analyses, and angles into my research on a changing and abstract social phenomenon in societies that had to learn the norms and procedures of a completely new institutional framework after the regime change in 1989-1990.

This chapter consists of two big parts and both are dealing with the peculiarities and special patterns of public trust. In the first part, I make a historical analysis to show how the different institutions and types of institutions gained trust or distrust from the society; and how this trust changed or remained stable during the two decades of democracy and free-market Capitalism. Besides the simple descriptive analysis of the longitudinal data, I try to characterize the Hungarian population and the history of attitudes by creating trust-groups according to the levels and structure of institutional trust of the citizens.

In the second part, I go into details of some important theoretical assumptions about public trust. I analyze some well-known data and theories of this field of study. I try to highlight the consequences of trends, peculiarities, and patterns of institutional trust from the viewpoints of the different theories on public trust. In this part, I analyze both trust in the anonymous others and trust in the institutions and besides, I try to explore also the retrospective dimension of public trust. Finally, I test here the three hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3.

Chapter 6.1: Longitudinal Data on Trust in Hungary

Long-term data sets always give researchers the chance to make much more trustworthy pictures about latent social phenomena by decreasing the role of random, exceptional or accidental events and data. Besides, it makes possible to understand these phenomena deeper

by understanding the evolution, change or in contrast, the stability or stagnation of these phenomena. I think that in case of a subject like institutional trust in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, it is indispensable to study longitudinal data for a better understanding of the topic itself.

Although, there are some weak points in a longitudinal analysis of a latent social dimension as well. For this analysis of longitudinal data on institutional trust, I used nationally representative surveys conducted in every month during two decades. The questions about institutional trust were always the same in a standardized questionnaire with always the same 4-point scale answers to the question: How much do you trust...? The list of institutions that the Hungarian Medián institute used every month consisted only of 14 institutions at the beginning of the 1990's with just a few thousand respondents per year. While by the end of the 2000's, there were much more than ten thousand respondents per year who assessed the trustworthiness of about 20 institutions of the new democracy. It is a huge dataset, but its richness is also its weakness at the same time.

In this dataset, there are nearly a quarter million answers about democratic institutions from the first two decades of democracy in Hungary, but I have only these standardized, close-ended questions that cover this long period. I do not have any qualitative data or reference about the content of trust, nor any argument behind the numbers and the changes in the levels of trust toward a given institution. When a significant change occurs in a longitudinal dataset about public opinions, it seems to be easy to look up the calendar and explain the changes according to the events of that particular period of time. But the danger of this explanation is that it becomes easily a so-called hunt-for-significance, when the researcher chooses events which fit to his/her model about the change, for example here, in public trust toward institutions, while s/he leaves out all those which do not fit in. This is one reason why I try to avoid to make thorough comparisons between the statistical results and the political history of the democratic Hungary. Another reason is that as time and space is limited here, I try to focus on my primary interest here, namely, to highlight the main trends and the changing profiles of institutions and of the different types of institutions in the eyes of the Hungarian public between 1991 and 2010.

Longitudinal datasets may be also risky, because it is not possible to follow the changing nature or content of a given phenomenon or term. It may happen that a change can be noticed

in institutional trust during several years, but as I have now the same standardized questions and answers, I do not know whether it is really institutional trust itself which is changed or it is the respondent who changed his/her expectations about the trustworthiness of institutions as a result of his/her experiences or social interactions.

All in all, I would not like to state here, in this small introduction before the longitudinal analysis, that longitudinal data is useless to explore social phenomena throughout decades, especially, when these are latent phenomena which often operate without consciousness and intention by the actors. In contrast, these longitudinal data are very important to show the functioning of social trust toward the new institutions of democracy in Hungary. It also has many advantages compared to the comparative regional analysis in Chapter 5 and also to the cross-sectional analysis of Chapter 6.2. These data were collected by the same methodology, the nationally representative random samples were designed and selected always with the same methodology, the age and the weighting methods were also always the same – not like in case of the regional data of the European Value Study that I analyzed in Chapter 5. It means that although, it is just about a small territory, namely, about one country, but as these data were collected, recorded, and weighted by the same procedures, these are much more trustworthy about the levels of trust and the social dimensions of the nature of trust. Compared to the cross-sectional analysis that I will explain shortly in Chapter 6.2, these longitudinal data help to avoid that special cases or exceptions affect or distort the analysis about social trends of institutional trust. Besides, the long time-period, the representativity of the samples, and the huge number of respondents ensure that these data and results are socially much more robust compared to a cross-sectional analysis.

Chapter 6.1.1: The Trends of Institutional Trust in Hungary

In the first two decades of democracy in Hungary, the different types of institutions showed quite a few changes and moves in the levels and trends of trustworthiness. According to the availability of data, three different types of institutions seem to be rational to generate from the datasets. Sometimes their trends move together and sometimes differ from each other. The three types are the following: political institutions consisting of the government, the parliament, the political parties, the president of the state, and the local municipalities. Law enforcement institutions that ensure that the law prevails are the courts, the Constitutional Court, the police, and the army. Finally, the social and economic institutions are the church,

the trade unions, the Hungarian public TV, the Hungarian public radio, the newspapers, the commercial banks, and the insurance companies. Other institutions, such as the public prosecutors, the Hungarian Central Bank or international institutions like the European Commission are not incorporated into these analyses as there is not any available longitudinal data about their trustworthiness, except in the last few years of the 2000's. Thus, I decided not to use them to avoid changes in the trends from the fact that their high or low level of trust suddenly modifies the average of a given group of institutions.

Some interesting trends can be perceived in this longitudinal data on institutional trust. Just after the regime change in 1989-1990, all types of institutions enjoyed a very high level of trust by the Hungarian public which was followed, maybe necessarily, by a sharp decrease. On the one hand, the new institutions could not fulfil all expectations of the public immediately, especially, because the change of the political regime resulted crucial structural changes in the society and the economy, thus, many people had to face with deprivation or even marginalization. On the other hand, the time might be also short for the people who operated the institutions and who interacted with the institutions to learn and use properly the new rules of behaviours, procedures, briefly, the new institutional culture of democracy. But it has been already discussed in Chapter 5 about the Central and Eastern European region.

When having a look at on the data of the different types of institutions, it can be seen that the levels and trends of institutional trust changed a lot between the two decades after the regime change. Taking the levels of trust first, it can be perceived that the means of the three types moved rather together in the first decade, namely, at the end of the 1990's. Of course, there were differences between them, but at the beginning and at the end of this decade, the levels of trust towards political, law enforcing, and socio-economic institutions were rather close to each other with similar results. In this decade, it is always the law-enforcing type which gained the highest level of social trust in the society, but usually, the political institutions and sometimes the socio-economic institutions are rather close the legal group. By the middle of the second decade after the regime change, it has become clear that Hungarians trust the new institutions of law enforcement much more than the other two types. While the level of trust in those which enforce the law move around 60 or 50 points on the 100-point scale, the levels of institutional trust toward the political and the socio-economic group sink to 40-50 points which means that they have been positioned onto the negative side of the trust-scale.

These changes in the level of trust in institutions show that the Hungarian population have become more sceptical or more realistic with the new institutions of democracy. And while people have been disappointed by the way how legislation is conducted, how the political actors behave, and how the social and economic institutions fulfil their roles, they have still hoped that those institutions who ensure that rules will not be broken and that cheaters will be punished do their job with competence and/or goodwill. Of course, the media also affects public opinion through exaggerating corruption and moral scandals that may emphasize or strengthen the perception of these anomalies in the society. But besides this, it is still visible that all types of institutions lost trust and became distrustful in the Hungarian public, except the punishing institutions.

When focusing on the trends of institutional trust which is more important from the point of view of our topic, it can be noticed that although, the levels of trust towards the three different types of institutions are or have become rather different from each other, the trends of these data have been more similar during the two decades. From this point of view, political institutions have a strong effect on the other types of institutions, thus, political institutions which were much more in the limelight during the transformation of the regime pulled the other institutions with themselves. Although, this influence have become weaker and weaker throughout the years. The index of institutional trust in the political sphere always makes small circles between two national elections. Trustworthiness of political institutions is always very high when a new government come into office and this capital of trust erodes during the following years, then, exactly four years later, when the old government step down and a new come into power, hope seems to come back and trust in political institutions emerges again.

This trend can be noticed during the two decades after the regime change, with only one exception, and the same happened to the other types of institutions. Especially, with the institutions of law enforcement which show the same trend, while the socio-economic institutions diverged earlier from the political institutions. There was a significant fall in trust towards socio-economic institutions in the middle of the 1990's when a serious austerity package was introduced and the next elections could raise the level of trust in these institutions, but they could never benefit again from the small circles around the social expectations towards changes in governments. These data also show that economic institutions could not show or prove to the society that besides the difficulties, society as a


whole can benefit from the new Capitalist regime, while social institutions also could not show or prove that they can secure the victims of the structural changes and could not soften the negative effects of the austerity measures.

The one exception in the trends of institutional trust was the year of 2006 when for the first time in the new democratic system in Hungary, the same government stayed in office after the general elections. This year, the same small circles cannot be perceived in the trends of institutional trust, although, it is also true that the circles of the previous years had also become smaller during the years. However, I do not incline to compare or verify trends in institutional trust with the daily political events, it seems to be rational that there is a slight turning point in the trends of institutional trust in 2006. It was also the year when the Hungarian Prime Minister admitted that he and his team lied to gain the general elections. It was followed by violent demonstrations on the streets. In these days, people could follow live on TV how hooligans attacked the building of the Hungarian public TV and that the police could not handle the situation at all, nor could secure people and goods there. And people could also see in these days that some peaceful demonstrators or people walking there were attacked violently by the police and that the authorities could not handle these situations. And besides, that even the parliament did not function properly as the opposition parties left the auditorium and the discussion in the parliament, they went out to the square in front of the building and had talks there for several weeks. It also meant that the president of the State could not ensure the proper functioning and operation of the democratic institutions of the republic for some time. Not only the violent and peaceful demonstrators but also the opposition parties and the Hungarian president expressed their disappointment with the PM in office at that time. After these events, all types of institutions lost trust gradually in the public until the next general elections when a new political party gained power. By the last elections of the second decade after the regime change, the trends of institutional trust towards all types of institutions increased sharply, except the socio-economic institutions whose level of trust increased also but rather moderately. This latter difference may be a result of the world economic crisis that arrived to Hungary at the end of 2008 and affected its economy very seriously in 2009.

These trends in institutional trust show that the role of political actors have been very strong in influencing trust decisions of the population while this role has become weaker and weaker during the years and the different types of institutions gained a stronger image in the public.

Of course, the trends based on institutional trust are just the means of different single institutions which are very different from each other and which may be assessed very differently regarding their competence and goodwill even in the same type or same group of institutions. That is why it is worth to explore the trends of institutional trust in the two decades of democracy in case of all single institutions.

Figure 6.1, Trust towards different types of institutions in Hungary, 1991-2010 (means of valid answers on a 0-100 scale)



I think that it is worth to explore the trends in public trust in case of every institution separately to design a better and more detailed picture about institutional trust in a new democracy. As it could be noticed from the above analysis, people had different trust-decisions on the basis of the function or role of the different types of institutions and the longitudinal data also implies that the history of the institutions might also have a strong effect on public trust towards the institutional framework. When taking a look at the single institutions which consisted the different institutional groups in the previous part of this chapter, it can be noticed that even the similar institutions have different history and generated different trust-decisions during their lifetime according to the assessments of the public.

Going through the institutions one by one, it can be perceived that there are some big losers, some benefited and could remain on a relatively high level of trustworthiness, while others remained neutral or neglected, and also others eroded slowly in terms of their trust-capital.

After the general elections, governments lost their trustworthiness very quickly, but after four years, by the next general elections, another political coalition could always persuade the general public about its competence and trustworthiness. Governments enjoyed public trust only in the year they came into office, but in the other years, distrust was stronger than the trustful attitudes. The only exception was the year 2006 that has been already mentioned and by the end of the 2000's, the government had to face a very strong distrust from the society: the mean of public trust in 2009 reached the lowest level with 24 points on the 100-point scale. And this index remained in the negative side of the scale also in the next year when another national election took place.

The parliament had followed the same trend as the government for one and a half decade and usually it reached the same level of public trust. It is interesting to see that although, the government is represented as a much more active actor of the political scene, the trends of trust towards the parliament do not always followed the trends of trust towards the government and sometimes, the parliament showed a bit different picture. Just after the regime change, when the new political framework had to be designed and introduced, the Hungarian parliament enjoyed a very high level of public trust. In the following years, the trend of institutional trust toward the parliament moved together with the trend of trust toward the government, although, the parliament could never generate as high expectations in the citizens as the government could and the level of trust toward the parliament remained on the neutral part of the trust-scale. The trends in trust toward the parliament and the government diverged from 2006, because although, similarly to other political institutions, the parliament also lost of its trustworthiness, but remained on a significantly higher level than the government. It seems that institutional trust towards the parliament was very high when the new legislative system was set up, but it became a less popular institution when the effects of the first years of the new legislation were experienced in the public and when the first parliament of the new democracy could not represent itself as a competent and cooperative collective body. After many years of medium level of institutional trust, the parliament also lost of its capital of trustworthiness.

A very different trend can be perceived in case of the courts. Around the regime change, the courts enjoyed an enormously high level of public trust: 72 points on the 100-point scale and only the head of the State got a higher level of trust at that time. This very high level might show only the very significant expectations of the population that life in Hungary would

change immediately thanks to the new regime, the new rules, and the new institutional framework. Some people might hope that merit would govern many segments of the society and especially, the labour market, instead of party membership and social networks as it was the case in the Communist era. Although, in the second half of the 1990's and at the end of the 2000's, institutional trust toward the courts decreased by the neutral point of the scale for a short time, public trust in the courts always remained on a rather high level while many other institutions suffered significant losses in trustworthiness. It seems that people have had a strong demand for fines and penalties and that cheaters should always be penalized when they break the rules. It seems to be rational that rules are very important in a region where a completely new system was set up with new institutions following new procedures and new institutional culture. On the other hand, these trend data also imply that courts could present themselves successfully as holders of law and justice in the society.

The Constitutional Court may also represent the guard of law and justice to the citizens, but trust towards this institutions show a very different trend from the one of the courts. In the years of the regime change, this institution was less well-known and it may be a reason that it started from a bit lower level of public trust compared to the courts. By the middle of the 1990's when the Constitutional Court insisted on opposing some major elements of a significant austerity package of the government, this institution suddenly became a very trustworthy actor in the eyes of the Hungarian public. From this time to the middle of the 2000's, the trend of institutional trust toward the Constitutional Court moved together with trust toward the courts, although, the former was always on a much higher level. By the beginning of the second decade after the regime change, the Constitutional Court became the most trustworthy institution together with the president. But in contrast to the courts, the Constitutional Court could not save this positive trend and after 2006, it lost a lot of its trust-capital. In 2005, the average level of institutional trust toward the Constitutional Court was 66 and four years later it reached 56 points on the 100-point scale. It seems that compared to the courts, the Constitutional Court became a much more politicized institution than a guard of the law and the democratic balance. The courts were much more successful to approach the view that courts represent justice, while the Constitutional Court is much more attached to the political arena and political conflicts. Thus, when a serious occasion takes place in internal politics, the Constitutional Court which moves together with other political actors loses more from its trust-capital, while the courts could be more independent and save some integrity regarding their image and institutional trust.

The president of the republic is a bit special among the institutions of the new democracy in Hungary as it is not a collective actor but one single individual. It means that it would be easier for the citizens to assess his knowledge, competence, and goodwill as Dunn refers to it that is presented in Chapter 2, but on the other hand, the role of the president is rather weak and symbolic, thus, he does not have too much opportunities to influence the life of the citizens, the social framework, or his own image. But still, the president is a very interesting example of trust-decisions by the citizens and the trends of trust toward him show that it is not just an abstract institution or a political actor who symbolizes abstract values but that the public follow and react his public activity and gestures to the society very sensitively according to trust in the president²¹². At the time of the regime change, the first Hungarian president was a writer who spent many years in prison after the 1956 uprising, a good friend of the Czech president Vaclav Havel, another writer and symbolic figure of the resistance against the Soviet Communist repression. The first Hungarian president, Árpád Göncz was a very popular and neutral actor of the Hungarian political life in an era when many people were optimistic and had high expectations about the political and social changes of the country. At that time, the president was the most trustworthy institution in the eyes of the Hungarian public: he got about 80 points on the 0-100 scale. Also later, his index was always the highest among all institutions with an average about 70 points. In the first half of the 2000's, his successor got a bit lower level of public trust, but it still remained a trustworthy institution and together with the Constitutional Court, it led the ranking of trustworthiness of the institutions. Another slight decrease occurred in the trend of trust toward the president in the second half of the 2000's when, as it has been already mentioned above, a more decisive person came into office. He had many statements and gestures that the public assessed controversially. And this president became particularly critical and morally sensitive after the leaking of the speech of the PM in 2006 in which he admitted that he lied to gain the elections. The head of State remained a trustworthy institution, but it has lost a lot from its trust-capital during the two decades and the level of trust toward him stabilised close to the neutral point of the scale.

After the introduction of the multi-party system based on the competition of different parties and ideologies in a short time period of optimism and high expectations in Hungary, it is a

²¹² See for example an analysis about public opinion on the first year of president László Sólyom: Bakonyi, Eszter (2006): Vegyes érzelmek (Ambivalent feelings, in Hungarian), In: *World Economy Weekly – HVG News Magazine*, No. 31

rather striking result that political parties gained the lowest level of public trust in the new institutional framework. The parties got only 36 points on the 100-point trust-scale and immediately lost 10 points by the following year. The trend of trust toward political parties followed thoroughly the election cycles: the index increased a bit when a new government was likely to come into office, but the trustworthiness of the parties disappeared immediately after the election year. An interesting result is that although, the parliament consists of the political parties and those parties who are outside of it are rather neglected in the public sphere and do not get media coverage, but still political parties gained much lower trust than the parliament. Practically, the parties always seemed to be rather mistrustful while the parliament, time after time, could gain some public trust. The trend of trust toward the political parties moved together with the trust toward the government instead of the parliament. Especially, after 2006, the political parties were on a very low level of public trust and could gain just a few more points on the trust-scale, while the parliament could diminish a lot of its mistrustworthiness. Even it could gain a slight mistrust by the next election year, while the parties remained strongly mistrusted.

A very different trend can be perceived from the above mentioned in case of institutional trust towards the Church. Similarly to many other institutions, the Church also enjoyed a rather high level of trust at the regime change when after many decades, people could visit religious services freely again. The level of trust towards this institution remained about neutral in the first half of the 1990's, but then, a slow decrease started in the next years and until 2008, trust towards the Church was weak and the index did not really change as if nothing happened to this institution in the eyes of the public. This constant modest distrust in the Church may be a result that after some time, it turned out that quite a lot of priests worked for the secret police of the Communist dictatorship. But later on, the trends of public trust towards the Church show that stagnation of this index does not mean necessarily a negligence from the public. The Church lost the most of its trust-capital in 2008 and 2009 when the economic and financial crisis affected Hungary very seriously, possibly the most seriously in the continental Europe at that time. These data show a serious criticism for the Church that an institution which deals with the assistance of the less successful social groups and people who are in need could not meet the demand of the society. The index of institutional trust reached its lowest point in case of the Church: 40 points out of the 100. This trend is a bit similar to the middle of the 1990's, when a serious austerity package was introduced in Hungary that affected many people with lower status, for example, the unemployed. And in this time, trust

towards the Church decreased again, but the loss did not take very long. It implies that the Church may build up the so-called goodwill-based trust, but it was definitely less successful in building up the competence-based trust.

A completely different trend can be noticed in case of the trade unions. It seems that the public was rather neglecting and, in the same time, strongly distrustful with this institution. At the regime change, trade unions got their highest average points on the trust-scale in the last two decades which was 38 points on the 100-point scale. But it lost a significant amount by the next year. And although, in 1994, the index was on 36 points, a strong distrust stabilized in the Hungarian public toward the trade unions with an average level about 30 points. It seems that nothing could really change the trust decisions of the people during these two decades of democracy which is again a very sad result for an institution that is set up to represent the interests of those who are too weak usually to express themselves and communicate efficiently. By 2010, the level of trust increased a bit, by 35 points, but it is still a very significant distrust from the society as a whole.

The army of the Communist Hungary was known as a non-efficient and irrational organisation where some or most of the officers are simple alcoholics or sadist. It is interesting to see that at the regime change, the army enjoyed a very high level of public trust, it was one of the highest at that time: 66 points on the 100-point scale. Although, there was a significant loss in the following year, but the level of institutional trust toward the army remained relatively high during the first decade of democracy. In the first half of the 2000's, the public became rather neutral with the army and its index was about the middle of the trust-scale, while in the second half of the 2000's, trust-capital of the army eroded slowly and remained constantly in the negative side expressing a slight distrust by the society.

Another interesting trend in institutional trust can be noticed in case of the police. The police was a very strong and visible symbol of the dictatorship, it was an institution that nearly all citizen had interaction with, they had uniforms and used threatening and even violence against the citizens, especially, against the opposition movements. In spite of this history, the police was a very trustworthy institution just after the regime change, it got 63 points on the 100-point scale. Although, it suffered a major loss by the next year, it remained one of the most trusted institution in the following years. Institutional trust in the police followed the very same trend as trust in the army for about 15 years after the regime change. Also the level of

trust toward the police was nearly the same as toward the army. In the middle of the 2000's, a major difference occurred in the trends toward the two institutions. In 2004, when the country joined the European Union, the level of trust toward the army started to decrease slightly, while the level of trust in the police increased for a few years. Although, trust in the police also stayed close to the neutral point of the scale, the index of the police was on the positive side while the army stayed on the negative side. It may strengthen my previous explanation that Hungarians prefer fines and penalties against cheaters very much and as citizens meet and interact the police more often than the army, it may be the reason for the trustworthiness of the police on the one hand, and for the difference between trust toward the army and the police on the other.

Trust in the local municipalities has had a similar trend to the other political institutions, but it is not exactly the same trend. On the one hand, the index followed the changes of the election circles, but the moves or deviations were not that big as in case of the parties, the parliament or the government. On the other hand, the trend of institutional trust toward the local municipalities was always a bit late compared to the other political institutions. It means that public trust in the municipalities also increased around the years of the elections, but the index was still high or even higher in the year following the elections. It seems to be a rational explanation for these late trends of trust in municipalities compared to the other political actors that usually, the general elections take place in Spring while the local elections in Autumn, thus, local decision-makers may have some more time to preserve their capital of trust than the national politicians and institutions. Although, municipalities are different and unique to the other political institutions, because the level of public trust has been always much higher than in case of the other political institutions and because losses were never too serious. In 2006 which seems to be a turning point in the history of the new political institutions, local authorities could not strengthen their trustworthiness like in other election years. However, the level of trust remained still high, a bit above the neutral point of the scale. The reason for this modest but rather stable institutional trust toward the municipalities may be that although, there is corruption, incompetence, and sometimes lack of goodwill in local politics, but still these institutions are much closer to the citizens, they have more personal contacts, interaction, and mutual information in general which may be eligible to generate social trust.

As the news and the media were manipulated in the Communist times, a high level of institutional trust may be expected toward the free press in the new democratic framework. A few years after the regime change, the Hungarian television, radio, and the printed press were not specially trustworthy, but they could gain a rather significant level of public trust. The Hungarian public TV was criticized often to be biased towards the government and the political parties, but its trustworthiness did not follow the changing public image and trustworthiness of the government or the parties. The public TV was assessed to be neutral on the trust-scale a few years after the regime change, then, it became a rather trustworthy institution with 60 points on the 100-point scale by the end of the 1990's. By the end of the 2000's, social trust in the public TV approached again the neutral point of the scale, but it has still remained on the positive side.

A similar but a bit different trend can be noticed in institutional trust in case of the Hungarian radio. It was a very trustworthy institution a few years after the regime change, but then, it lost of its trust-capital. The level of public trust increased again towards the public radio by the end of the 1990's when a slow decrease has started. By the end of the 2000's, the Hungarian public radio became a rather neutral institution in terms of public trust.

The trend of institutional trust toward the newspapers seems to be much simple. It implies that the printed press could not really change its trustworthiness or strengthen public trust significantly. The index of the daily papers did not change as much as of the TV or the radio. Although, similarly to the TV and the radio, the printed press could also strengthen its trustworthiness in the second half of the 1990's, the index of the newspapers usually remained about the neutral point of the trust-scale and never really approached the 60 points on the 0-100 scale, for example. However, we talk about the daily papers only which usually said to be very politicized and biased toward one of the political sides and parties, trends of institutional trust toward the daily papers do not follow the trends of the major political actors. By the end of the second decade after the regime change, the daily newspapers became a slightly mistrustful institution of the new democracy, although, the economic crisis which affected the printed press seriously and the strengthening role of the online media might result that daily papers become less significant in the life of the society.

The Hungarian population was always a bit careful with the new institutions of Capitalism which was a system that they welcomed with high expectations but with low skills and

knowledge about the functioning of these institutions. The trends of institutional trust followed mostly the general trend of the election circles until the beginning of the 2000's. Commercial banks were trusted to some extent or rather the public was neutral to them, but insurance companies had to face with serious distrust from the citizens. In the following years, trust toward these new institutions eroded slowly, but a real change came when the world economic crisis hit Hungary at the end of 2008 and it was also very serious in 2009. Especially, the banks suffered a lot from the crisis, they fell from the neutral level into the distrusted area of the scale while the insurance companies only became more distrusted again. During the financial and economic crisis, much more people might follow the news than before which may emphasized the negative effects on the image of the banks. A very significant loss can be noticed in the level of trust and a real change in the trend of institutional trust in case of the commercial banks in 2008. The level of institutional trust in banks was 45 on the 100-point scale in 2007 and it fell down by 35 points in 2009.

Table 6.1, Trust toward institutions in Hungary between 1991 and 2010 (means on a 0-100 scale)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
government	56	32	33	55	37	37	39	53	46	43	45	54	48	42	42	39	32	28	24	41
courts	72	54	54	58	51	49	50	55	54	54	54	56	54	56	56	55	53	50	49	53
parliament	56	32	33	51	39	36	38	50	46	44	45	52	47	44	43	43	38	35	32	42
churches	58	48	49	48	47	45	46	44	45	45	47	46	44	46	45	44	42	40	40	43
political parties	36	26	28	39	32	30	32	40	37	35	37	42	37	36	35	36	31	30	28	34
Constitutional Court	67	48	57	64	62	63	65	69	69	67	67	68	65	65	66	64	61	58	56	59
army	66	48	57	59	56	53	52	55	54	45	48	51	49	49	49	50	46	44	42	46
trade unions	38	27	32	36	34	29	28	30	31	28	30	31	31	32	32	34	33	33	32	35
president	79	56	64	76	70	69	68	73	75	74	67	66	63	65	68	64	56	56	53	55
police	63	42	53	58	55	52	53	54	50	45	48	49	51	55	55	56	50	50	49	53
local municipality		52	51	54	56	52	54	58	57	54	56	59	58	57	56	57	57	54	53	56
Hungarian Television		48	45	52	52	52	54	60	59	58	56	55	55	55	56	54	53	52	51	53
Hungarian Radio		61	51	56	56	55	57	62	61	60	58	56	56	55	55	53	52	51	49	51
daily papers						51	52	57	56	55	53	53	50	48	47	46	46	45	43	45
insurance companies						29	32	37	33	35	36	39	37	37	36	35	36	35	31	34
commercial banks						41	45	47	39	45	47	51	46	43	44	43	45	42	35	36
mean	59	45	47	54	50	47	48	53	51	49	50	52	49	49	49	48	46	44	42	46

Number of all cases: 1991: 1192, 1992: 2186, 1993: 6844, 1994: 4797, 1995: 14,157, 1996: 15,532, 1997: 14,389, 1998: 14,368, 1999: 13,139, 2000: 14,365, 2001: 14,400, 2002: 14,399, 2003: 15,197, 2004: 14,396, 2005: 15,597, 2006: 13,187, 2007: 15,596, 2008: 13,201, 2009: 12,000, 2010: 14,400

There is much shorter longitudinal data about trust toward the Hungarian Central Bank and toward the public prosecutors, thus, I do not analyze these results here. But I will use their data as well in the next chapter when I form social groups according to their level and structure of institutional trust.

Chapter 6.1.2: Changing Types of Trust-Groups

As it can be seen in the previous chapter, institutional trust changed a lot in Hungary in the two decades after the regime change in 1989-1990. There are institutions which could gain significant trust immediately and could save their trust-capital more or less in the eyes of the public. This trend can be noticed, for example, in case of those institutions that ensure that the law prevails. In contrast to this, there are other institutions which could never really build up a trustworthy image to the public, for example the press, although, free press was one of the most important developments of the transformation into democracy. As there are different trends in public trust toward institutions, it might be expected that similar changes could occur in the society according to the trust-decisions of the citizens. In this chapter, I will analyze the same longitudinal data from a different point of view and with different tools. I will explore the image and structure which exist in the society about the levels and structure of institutional trust and besides, how these images and structures has changed throughout the two decades of democracy. I think that analyzing not only the trustworthiness of the institutions and the different types of institutions but also the trends of social groups which can be formed according to their institutional trust will be also very worthwhile to extend the analysis.

For this analysis, I merged every five years to have enough data about all institutions. I used only the relevant and valid answers for the statistical analysis, because, especially at the beginning of the longitudinal data set, there was not much data about institutional trust and later, some institutions had data only from the last years of the two decades. I used multi-variate analysis to create groups according to their level and structure of trust toward the different institutions. For making the statistical results more robust on the one hand, and more easy to interpret on the other, first, I always made a scale of the different types of institutions

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and then, I run a cluster analysis with these scales. I used F-statistics to decide whether a model of clusters can be accepted or should be refused.

In case of the first half of the first decade, six groups came into being. People who belong to the first group refuse all types of institutions of the new democracy, they are very sceptical and distrustful with the whole new institutional framework. I call this group “disappointed” as the results imply that these citizens are not content at all with the developments of the regime change. The second group is very happy about the political changes of 1989-1990, but they express serious criticism as well toward the social and the law enforcement institutions. I call them “new democrats” in which term I try to express that a main characteristic of this group is that they are supporters of the change of the political regime. Members of the third group also trust the political institutions, but in contrast to the former group, they trust very much the law enforcing and the social institutions. I call them the “trusters of civil society and the rule of law”, because it is what leads their trust-decisions. The fourth group is completely the opposite of the first one. They trust enormously the law enforcing institutions, but besides, they trust all types of institutions on a very high level, close to the maximum point of the scale. I call this group “blind trust” as their attitudes to the new institutional framework seem to be without any criticism. The fifth cluster is rather refusal with the new institutions of the democratic regime, they trust somehow those institutions which ensure that everybody follows the rules. They do not really trust social institutions, but their distrust is the strongest toward the new political elite and institutions. I call them “order-loving suspicious” as besides the law enforcing institutions, they are very negative with the other institutions. Finally, the members of the sixth group are very satisfied with the law enforcing institutions and rather trustful with the new political institutions, but they are strongly critical with the social institutions. I call this group “law prevails in a weak civil society”, because data show that these citizens are rather satisfied with the new institutions, but they do not appreciate the functioning of the new civil society in representing the interest of the citizens.


Table, 6.2, Final cluster centres of trust-groups, 1991-1995

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Political institutions	14.54	52.52	54.68	75.75	26.26	55.87
Law enforcement institutions	16.68	36.58	63.42	85.46	48.23	72.02
Social institutions	17.02	39.08	63.99	72.83	40.83	36.57

Political institutions: Government, Parliament, political parties, president of the state, local municipality. Law enforcement institutions: courts, Constitutional Court, army, police. Social institutions: the Church, trade unions, Hungarian TV, Hungarian Radio, daily papers.

When comparing these groups, it can be noticed that the completely disappointed group was rather big at the time or just after the regime change: they make one tenth of the population. Also the proportion of the order-loving suspicious citizens is rather high, approximately, one fifth of the citizens. But besides these two groups, all in all, seven people out of ten trusted the new institutional framework, at least to some extent, just after the transformation into democracy. Regarding the details, it is also interesting that the proportion of the group representing blind trust is also rather high at that time: about one out of six citizens belongs to this group. New democrats who are mostly satisfied with the political transformation are a rather small community: only one out of eight citizens based their trust on the political changes. The relatively biggest group to which one-fourth of the adult population belonged is the one that trust the civil society and the rule of law.

Figure 6.2, Trust-groups, 1991-1995 (percentage)



In the second half of the first decade after the regime change, six groups formed again according to their level and structure of institutional trust. Members of the first group trust

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political and law-enforcement institutions very much while they are a bit disappointed about the social institutions. I call them the group of “strong State” as they trust strongly the institutions of State authorities and State power. The second group is slightly disappointed or neutral with the political institutions while they trust law enforcing and social institutions. I call them the “trusters of civil society and the rule of law” as these two play the main role in their trust-decisions. The third group is very distrustful both with the political and the social actors of the new institutional framework and they are much more in favour of the law-enforcing institutions. I call this group the “order-loving suspicious” as they trust only those institutions which ensure that the rules are not broken and cheaters are punished. The fourth group express an extremely high level of institutional trust, the indices of all types of institutions are over 70 points on the 0-100 scale. These citizens represent “blind trust” as their trust decisions seem to be unstructured and uncritical in a time when some controversies of the new regime emerged. The fifth group distrust strongly the law-enforcing institutions and they are also disappointed with the new political actors. Compared to these two, they have much more trust in the social institutions, but the average of this index is in the middle of the trust-scale. That is why I call them the group of “modest trust in civil society” as it seems that they are disappointed by both the political and the law enforcement institutions while they still have some trust in the counter-balance of the State. The sixth group is the complete opposite of the fourth one, although, it is similar that they also have rather unstructured trust-patterns toward the new institutional framework. Members of this group refuse all types of institutions and all three indices are extremely low in this group. That is why I call them “disappointed” as it seems that any institution could not prove its trustworthiness in the eyes of these citizens.

Table 6.3, Final cluster centres of trust-groups, 1996-2000


	1	2	3	4	5	6
Political institutions	65.22	47.55	37.30	74.31	41.55	15.19
Law enforcement institutions	67.11	63.01	50.43	81.90	34.46	17.01
Social institutions	45.66	61.57	29.35	73.33	50.01	19.17

Political institutions: Government, Parliament, political parties, president of the state, local municipality. Law enforcement institutions: courts, Constitutional Court, army, police. Social institutions: the Church, trade unions, Hungarian TV, Hungarian Radio, daily papers.

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Although, many research results show that disappointment and pessimism are very important elements of the self-representation and disposition of Hungarians²¹³, it is interesting to see that regarding the two extremes of the trust-groups, the positive approach has two times as much representatives as the negative approach: one out of ten people belongs to the disappointed group while approximately one out of five people is in the group of blind trust. Also about one fifth of the population are order-loving suspicious citizens while the relatively biggest trust group, the supporters of the strong State make a bit more than one fifth. The main characteristic of one third of the population is that their trust-decisions are governed by some kind of trust in the civil society. One out of seven people belongs to the group of modest trust in civil society while nearly one fifth of the population are trusters of civil society and the rule of law.

Figure 6.3, Trust-groups, 1996-2000 (percentage)



By the first half of the second decade after the regime transformation, there were enough data to integrate trust in economic institutions as well into the previous model with political, law-enforcing, and social institutions. These clusters show that economic trust was a very important factor at that time, a few years after the first serious austerity measures in the new democracy, because it can be noticed that some trust-groups can be characterized mainly by their assessment about the new institutions of free-market Capitalism.

Members of the first group created by trust in the different types of institutions are very sceptical about all institutions of the new democratic system, especially, the economic

²¹³ See for example: European Commission (2009): Monitoring the social impact of the crisis: public perceptions in the European Union. Analytical Report, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_276_en.pdf, or: Pew Research Center (2009): Two Decades after the Wall's Fall: End of Communism Cheered but not with more Reservations: <http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/267.pdf>

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institutions. I call them the “anti-capitalist suspicious” group as their trust-decisions are led by mistrust and their assessment about trustworthiness of economic institutions is very hostile. The second group is more or less the opposite of the first one. Members of this group trust all institutions to some extent, but these feelings remain rather on the neutral part of the trust-scale. They trust more the economic institutions, thus, I call this group “market supporter truster”. The third group is extremely negative with all institutions of the new democracy, the average trust-indices of all types of institutions are about 10 points on the 0-100 scale. I call them the “disappointed” group as they do not only formulate very strong criticism about trustworthiness of the new institutions but rather refuse all types of institutions. The fourth group is again the opposite of the former group, members of this group trust all types of institutions to a very high extent. Although, they trust political institutions a bit less than law enforcement institutions, it follows the trends of trust in the whole society, thus, trust of this group in political institutions is still on a very high level. That is why I call this group “blind trust” as they insist in a position that seems to be unflinching. The trust-structure of the fifth cluster is a bit more complex than in case of the third and fourth groups. Members of this group trust political and even more the law enforcement institutions while they slightly distrust social institutions and they are very distrustful about economic institutions. I call this group “strong State with anti-capitalism” as this group trust strongly the central authorities and the rules in an abstract manner, but they are suspicious with the market and the market forces. It implies that these people are disappointed with the new economic model of the country and they might feel some kind of nostalgia toward the Communist regime or at least, toward a life in which the State governed the most dimensions of social and public life. The sixth group has also an interesting structure in institutional trust. Members of this group trust all types of institutions on a rather high level while law enforcement institutions are the most trustworthy for them and social and economic institutions are a bit less trustworthy. This group will be called “law-conscious truster” as their disposition is positive about all institutions and their trust-decisions seem to be governed by the certainty, conviction or belief that law always prevails.


Table 6.4, Final cluster centres of trust-groups, 2001-2005

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Political institutions	34.66	47.57	12.26	77.40	56.31	66.70
Law enforcement institutions	37.51	51.67	12.52	90.02	64.45	73.34
Social institutions	31.51	51.18	12.11	82.60	40.03	60.10
Economic institutions	26.75	55.28	6.39	84.57	29.07	59.92

Political institutions: Government, Parliament, political parties, president of the state, European Commission, local municipality. Law enforcement institutions: courts, Constitutional Court, public prosecutors, army, police. Social institutions: the Church, trade unions, Hungarian TV, Hungarian Radio, daily papers. Economic institutions: Hungarian Central Bank, commercial banks, insurance companies.

Regarding the size of these clusters of institutional trust, it can be noticed first that the two ends or the two extremes make very small part of the society. Only one out of twelve or thirteen citizens belongs to the disappointed group and the same proportion is true for the group of blind trust. A second thing that can be remarked that the society seem to be very polarized according to the trust-decisions. About in the same proportion of people belong to rather trusting and rather mistrusting social clusters. One fifth of the society is anti-capitalist suspicious and another one fifth is in favour of the strong State with anti-capitalist feelings. Although, there are a bit more citizens who have mostly positive attitudes toward the new institutional framework. One fifth of the population are market supporter trusters while another one fourth of the citizens belong to the group of law-conscious trusters.

Figure 6.4, Trust-groups, 2001-2005 (percentage)



For the second half of the second decade after the regime change, six groups can be created again according to their level and structure of institutional trust. Members of the first group

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trust only the institutions which ensure that law prevails and cheaters are punished, but they distrust all other types of institutions, especially, the economic institutions. I call them “order-loving suspicious” as they seem to believe only in the institutions of order and punishments. The second group trust all institutions very much and although, they trust the law enforcement institutions a bit more, their trust-structure is not really complex. This is the group of “blind trust”, because it seems that this group accepts all types of institutions without criticism. The third group is the other extreme, its members refuse all institutions of the new democracy and all indices of institutional trust are about 10 points or even lower on the 100-point scale. I call this group “disappointed” as its members seem not to believe in any institution of the system any more. The fourth group expressed a rather strong trust in the different institutions, especially, in the law-enforcing institutions. The only type of institution that this group rather distrust is the type of economic institutions, although, this distrust is rather modest, only 40 points on the 100-point scale. I call this group “law-conscious truster with weak economy” as their strong institutional trust seem to be led by those institutions which ensure that law prevails, but they assessed economic institutions to be the weak point of the whole framework. The fifth group is very mistrustful with all institutions, especially, with the political institutions, although, there are not a big difference between the indices. I call this group “politically disappointed suspicious” as their distrustful disposition seems to be influenced by a disappointment in the political actors. Finally, the sixth group have also an interesting and rather structured pattern in institutional trust. Members slightly distrust the political institutions, but it is still very close to the neutral standpoint and they trust very much the law enforcement institutions. They moderately trust the social institutions and express the highest level of trust toward the economic institutions. I call this group “market-friendly truster” as besides the group of blind trust, they are the only true supporters of the new Capitalist institutions while they trust the other democratic institutions as well.


Table 6.5, Final cluster centres of trust-groups, 2006-2010

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Political institutions	43.98	71.09	11.45	61.97	30.32	48.16
Law enforcement institutions	55.47	80.74	11.75	70.33	32.04	56.87
Social institutions	34.84	72.01	9.71	57.35	34.23	51.26
Economic institutions	25.06	73.39	4.82	40.08	34.06	61.39

Political institutions: Government, Parliament, political parties, president of the state, European Commission, local municipality. Law enforcement institutions: courts, Constitutional Court, public prosecutors, army, police. Social institutions: the Church, trade unions, Hungarian TV, Hungarian Radio, daily papers. Economic institutions: Hungarian Central Bank, commercial banks, insurance companies.

Regarding the two extremes of the trust-groups, the positive disposition has a bit more supporter: one out of ten people belongs to the disappointed group while one out of seven citizens represents blind trust. The suspicious approach to institutions seems to have a rather significant popularity by the end of the second decade of democracy: about four out of ten people belong to a somehow suspicious cluster. One fifth of the population belong to the order-loving suspicious group while another one fifth is in the politically disappointed suspicious group. There is another significant group: the market-friendly trusters who make a bit more than one fifth of the population, thus, relatively, it has the highest proportion in the society. And finally, one out of six citizens is law-conscious trusters who perceive a weak economy.

Figure 6.5, Trust-groups, 2006-2010 (percentage)



Finally, as a summary, it is worth to explore the trends of institutional trust-structure in the Hungarian society in the two decades after the regime change in 1989-1990. When comparing the different trust-groups of the different times, it can be noticed that the proportion of

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sceptical, mistrustful or refusing citizens have become significantly higher in this period. In the first half of the first decade, these rather distrustful groups made 30 percent of the society and in the end of this decade it was still 28 percent. By the first half of the second decade, when the Hungarian society had gone through some serious austerity measures and the economy started to strengthen while the EU accession of the country generated some high and positive expectations, the level of suspicion and distrust increased. The proportion of those groups who have a negative image about the trustworthiness of the new democratic institutions was 47 percent and remained on this level also in the second half of the last decade when it was 48 percent. It seems that on the one hand, the new democratic institutions were not efficient in building up a trustful image and on the other hand, neither the citizens, nor the institutions could learn efficiently how the new democratic procedures, rules, and norms function. These data may also imply that it is not only about a difficulty that maybe all new systems have to face with but that the new democratic institutions could not meet the expectations of the citizens. Therefore, the inappropriate functioning of the new institutional framework may be the reason why the suspicious and disappointed groups represented 30 percent in the first decade and became 50 percent by the second decade.

When taking a look at now on the other end of the scale of trust-groups, it can be noticed that the proportion of blind trusters also changed throughout the two decades, but in a much smaller extent. In the first phase, blind trusters made one fifth, one sixth of the society and it remained the same in the second half of the first decade. But in the third phase, i.e. in the first half of the second decade, the proportion of blind trusters decreased significantly in parallel with the increase or emergence of the groups of institutional distrust. At this time, the proportion of the group of blind trusters sank from 17 to 8 percent and it increased slightly again to 14 percent after the EU accession of the country in the second half of the 2000's.

Another interesting trend in the structure of institutional trust of the society is the relationship to or assessment of the new civil society and its institutions. In the first phase, i.e. between 1991 and 1995, there were two trust-groups whose trust-decisions were dominated by their relationship to the civil society institutions. There was one which trusted the new institutions of the social segment and it made 24 percent of the society while there was another group, 17 percent of the population which perceived the weakness of these institutions. In the next phase of the analysis, the group of strong trust in the civil society decreased to 18 percent while a

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new group emerged who trusted these institutions modestly and 14 percent of the citizens belonged to this cluster. In the third and fourth phase, these groups disappeared completely and no trust-groups can be characterized by its trust-decision about social institutions. It implies that social institutions and their representation in the society became less important or noticeable for the citizens in the second decade of the new democracy.

An opposite trend can be perceived in case of the relationship toward the trustworthiness of the new institutions of the free-market economy. Of course, there is not data about trust in the economic institutions from the first decade, but as they entered into the model, these institutions seem to dominate the trust-decisions of some trust-groups. In the first half of the 2000's, there were three groups in the society which were created on the basis of their strong dispositions toward economic institutions. One fifth of the citizens were supporters of the new institutions of Capitalism while another one fifth were suspicious with them and another one fifth were simply anti-Capitalist in this respect. By the second half of the second decade after the regime change, distrust toward economic institutions was not a main factor in trust-decisions. A reason for this may be that people started to get used to the new economic regime, and another reason may be that a general scepticism started to emerge in the society which was not a special characteristic of any single group any more. All in all, the group of strong trust in the economic institutions remained relatively big in the society and moreover, it slightly increased from 19 to 22 percent of the society.

Another interesting trend can be noticed in case of the law enforcement institutions and those groups whose trust structure is dominated by these institutions. Of course, as it can be seen in case of the social and economic institutions, these trust groups did not remain always the same during the two decades and their trust structure slightly changed, but the main characteristic remained their trust toward the rule of law. In the first phase, there were two groups whose trust-decisions were dominated by their attitudes toward the institutions of justice and they made together 40 percent in the society. In the second phase, there was only one group whose trust structure was influenced by trust in law enforcing institutions and it made 18 percent of the citizens. In the third and fourth phase, there was still just one group whose trust decisions were structured by the belief in the rule of law, but while in the former period it became a significantly bigger group with 26 percent, it decreased significantly to 16 percent in the last period.

Finally, it is also worth to mention how political institutions structured the different trust-groups during these two decades after the regime change. Just after the regime transformation, there was a group which supported the new political institutions of the democratic system and 12 percent of the society belonged to this group at that time. This group of supporters of the new political institutions which I called new democrats disappeared immediately after a few years and a new group emerged. Political institutions also played an important role in the trust decisions of a new group in the end of the first decade, but it was dominated by a wish for a strong State. It is a not very surprising result, although, that after the first disappointments and the austerity measures, some citizens felt a kind of nostalgia toward the strong State similarly to the one they had experience of from the Communist times. This new group made 22 percent of the society in the second phase of this analysis. In the third phase, there was one group again whose trust-structure was influenced by trust in political institutions and it was again the group of supporters of the strong State. Although, the proportion of this group slightly decreased to 19 percent. In the fourth phase, an interesting change can be noticed in the trends of trust-groups in case of the role of political institutions. After new democrats and supporters of the strong State, a new group replaces all these previous ones whose trust decisions were influenced by institutional trust toward the political institutions. And this new group feel disappointment and suspicion toward these institutions, and in general, toward the whole system which is a very radical change in the structure of these trust-groups. The proportion of this group is 19 percent of the society which also means that the group whose trust-structure is sensitive to the functioning of the political institutions did not really change in the last ten-fifteen years in Hungary.

Table 6.6, Change of trust-groups between 1991 and 2010

1991-1995	%	1996-2000	%
Blind trust	17.3	Blind trust	17.6
New democrats	12.4	Trusters of civil society and the rule of law	18.2
Trusters of civil society and the rule of law	23.7	Modest trust in civil society	14.3
Law prevails in a weak civil society	17.1	Strong state	21.7
Order-loving suspicious	18.3	Order-loving suspicious	17.8
Disappointed	11.2	Disappointed	10.4
2001-2005	%	2006-2010	%
Blind trust	8.3	Blind trust	14.1
Market supporter trusteer	18.9	Market-friendly trusteer	22.2
Law-conscious trusteer	26.1	Law-conscious trusteer with weak economy	15.5
Strong State with anti-capitalism	18.8	Order-loving suspicious	18.1
Anti-capitalist suspicious	20	Politically disappointed suspicious	19.1
Disappointed	7.8	Disappointed	11

As it can be seen in this chapter, there were some important changes in the levels, trends, and structures of institutional trust during the first two decades of democracy in Hungary. Some interesting patterns can be noticed of both the public image of new democratic institutions and the structure of trust of the citizens influenced by the new institutions. After exploring the historical trends of institutional trust in Hungary, I think that it would be also worth to explore the content of this notion and concept of public trust more deeply. I will analyze the content and functioning of trust in institutions and other people and I will try to match these two under the umbrella of the trust-as-a-process approach. In this way, I supplement the linear, time-focused perspective with a temporary terminological and functional analysis of a term which is always strongly connected to a historical time and a geographical, cultural region.

Chapter 6.2: The Content of Trust in Hungary

As it could be seen in the previous chapters, simple big surveys may be very useful to explore the structure of social trust: how the institutional design looks like according to the trust decisions or trust evaluations of the citizens; and how the society is structured according to the level and type of trust of the people. This big survey data sets are also very useful to make longitudinal and cross-country evaluations and comparisons, although, there are always some limits of these kind of assessments. On the one hand, it is difficult to control the factor of time and cultural background in the statistical analysis and on the other hand, there is not any chance – at least, in case of these surveys I used here – to explore and elaborate what people think about the term of trust: how they formulate it, how they understand it, and how they look at it from different aspects.

In this chapter, I would like to go deeper into the meaning of social trust by following the different framing, interpretation, and typology of the theories presented earlier in Chapter 2. Fortunately, I had the chance to design a short questionnaire to do this research on a nationally representative sample of the Hungarian adult population. For more details of the methodology and description of data, please, see Chapter 4.

In the following subchapters, I try to explore first the notion and content of institutional trust – or confidence as Luhmann calls it. Then, I would like to deal with social trust in different ways but following the theories explained in Chapter 2. I approach it both as trust towards the anonymous others that Luhmann calls trust and also as thick and thin interpersonal trust developed by Khodyakov. In the third subchapter, I try to use and test the trust-as-a-process approach on the Hungarian case and I summarize the main empirical evidences of my analysis about the content of trust.

Chapter 6.2.1: Trust in Different Institutions

As it was mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, I try to elaborate the term of social or general trust a bit more in the following subchapters. I will start with the term of

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institutional trust: which institutions, which types of institutions are more trustworthy for Hungarians and what the content of this term might be for them when they make trust-decisions. Thus, this subchapter will deal with the term confidence of Niklas Luhmann and the concept of trust of John Dunn that were presented in Chapter 2.

First, I use the same standard question of Medián to characterize general trust in the Hungarian democratic institutional system. The results show that the Hungarian population is sceptical with the institutional framework, but the whole picture is not that dark as it seems to be at first sight. Although, none of the institutions got really high ranking in trustworthiness, there are some institutions which got higher average means and there are some which got a result close to the middle of the scale which is still not that negative. The top institutions are mostly those which enforce the rule of law and which are not related closely to politics: the Constitutional Court, public prosecutors, the head of State, and the local municipality. Although, this latter consists of elected politicians as well, but it seems that people feel it closer to their lives and themselves and they perceive it to be more transparent than State-level politics and policy-making. The reason why the European Commission may be also rather trustworthy for the citizens is that although, it consists of politicians and it is less transparent for the citizens who do not know more about it, it may symbolize the Western European countries for many people where Hungarians always wanted to belong to during their history.

There are some institutions in the middle of the list of general trust decisions, these are mostly social and economic institutions. And there are some institutions which got a worse result, these are mostly political institutions and those which might be blamed for the financial crisis as data were collected a few months after the crisis affected Hungary very seriously.

A more detailed, elaborated, and nuanced picture may be drawn up, if these results are completed by the goodwill and competence approach of institutional trust. When taking a look on the results of institutional trust based on goodwill of the institutions and the people working there, it may be noted that the two opposite ends of the scale are rather smaller than in case of the scale of general trust while the vast majority of the institutions are around the neutral point of this second scale. Although, it shows that opinions are not that polarized about the goodwill of institutions and the people working there than in case of general trust, it

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can be also seen from the following table that trust in goodwill is not that different from general trust. There are many institutions about which general trust got the same score on the scale as according to goodwill-based trust. In case of some institutions, the score about goodwill-based trust is a bit higher than the general assessment of trustworthiness, but the difference is not so big. There are only two exceptions, the churches and the trade unions, but I will come back to them later in this subchapter. All in all, it can be assumed that goodwill-based institutional trust is not very different from general public trust, although, the former is a bit higher.

In case of institutional trust based on the competence of the institution and the people working there, the difference is much more visible. It shows that in general, the Hungarian public trust the democratic institutional system on a moderate level (the average score is 58 on the 0-100 scale while 48 for goodwill-based and 46 for general trust). The list of the institutions by their trust scores is very similar to the previous list of the goodwill-based trust, but the scores are much higher in case of competence-based trust. There are two small groups at the end of the scale: the most and least trusted institutions according to their competence, but most institutions are again somewhere around the mean of the sample. There are only three institutions in case of this trust-scale which are in the “negative” side, i.e. their competence is strongly questioned by the general public and these are the parliament, the political parties, and the government. But besides these, most institutions got a rather high score on the scale of competence-based trust, the most trustworthy are the Constitutional Court, public prosecutors, the European Commission, the courts, and the Hungarian Central Bank.

Table 6.7, Comparison of trust towards institutions in Hungary in 2009 (means on a 0-100 scale)

	General trust	Trust in goodwill	Trust in competence
government	23	26	27
courts	54	54	65
parliament	31	34	36
churches	45	55	60
political parties	30	31	35
Constitutional Court	61	62	69
public prosecutors	57	58	67
army	48	53	60
trade unions	39	51	50
president of the state	56	59	63
European Commission	55	56	66
the police	51	53	56
local municipality	56	58	60
Hungarian National Television	54	55	62
Hungarian National Radio	53	54	61
daily papers	47	49	56
Hungarian Central Bank	52	49	64
commercial banks	37	36	55
insurance companies	32	33	50
International Monetary Fund, IMF	46	46	62
World Bank	46	45	62

When making a quick, rather qualitative summary of the profile of the institutions according to their positions among other institutions in the dimensions of goodwill-based and competence-based trust, five groups can be formed. A short summary can be found under this paragraph. There are some institutions which have a consistent positive image among Hungarian citizens: the average scores of these institutions are always higher than the average of all institutions. On the contrary, there are some institutions whose trust scores are always below the average in both the goodwill-based and the competence-based dimension, these have a consistent negative profile. There are two other groups which are also – or a bit more

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interesting: the two inconsistent groups which are trustworthy in one dimension but not in the other. There are two institutions in the inconsistent group which gained trust from the public because of their goodwill: the head of State and the municipality. These two seem to be less politicized and closer to the citizens or representing better the interests of lay people. Although, it is also some criticism for these institutions as not being competent enough and being more civil than professional. The other inconsistent group represents those who got higher scores for their competence than the average but lower level in the dimension of goodwill-based trust. It may be an experience of the financial crisis that hit Hungary a few months before the fieldwork and which might be the most serious at that time in the European Union. Because the group with more competence and less goodwill-based trust consists of the following institutions: the courts, the Hungarian Central Bank, commercial banks, the IMF, and the World Bank. The fifth group is the consistent neutral group which got similar scores in both dimensions of goodwill- and competence-based trust and these scores were not very different compared to the average of all institutions.

Finally, as I mentioned earlier, I would like to make a short note on two institutions which belong to this latter group: the churches and the trade unions. Both institutions got much higher scores on the goodwill-based and competence-based trust-scale than on the general trust scale. These two institutions are the only ones which have this special trust-profile among the general public. These results of the two institutions may be interpreted as a strong critical viewpoint to these institutions: churches and the trade unions. It may imply that people appreciate their goodwill that they work in favour of the people and they also appreciate the competence of these two institutions, but as general trust is still much lower towards them, it also shows that the society is unsatisfied with the outcome or the work these two institutions have done in practice. And regarding that these two institutions would have an important role in strengthening social solidarity and assisting those who are in trouble, it shows a strong criticism and demand from the people to the churches and the trade unions in the times of the financial and economic crisis to operate much more efficiently.

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Summary of the goodwill- and competence-based trust:

- Consistent positive: Constitutional Court, public prosecutors, and the European Commission
- Consistent negative: parliament, insurance companies, political parties, and the government
- Inconsistent – more goodwill: head of State and the local municipality
- Inconsistent – more competence: courts, Hungarian Central Bank, commercial banks, IMF, and the World Bank
- Consistent neutral: churches, Hungarian National Television, Hungarian National Radio, army, police, trade unions, and the newspapers

For elaborating more the term and the content of trust, it may be worth to analyze how people trust the different types of institutions. First, I replaced all missing data with the average score of the given institutions, hence, the final score of a type of institutions does not contain the answers of only those who gave a valid answer in case of all institutions constituting a certain type. Then, I made four groups out of the 21 institutions: political institutions are the government, the parliament, political parties, the president, and the European Commission; law enforcement institutions are the courts, the Constitutional Court, public prosecutors, the army, and the police; social institutions are the churches, the trade unions, the Hungarian National Television, the Hungarian National Radio, and the newspapers; and economic institutions are the Hungarian Central Bank, commercial banks, insurance companies, the IMF, and the World Bank. I tried to make consistent groups on the one hand, and similar groups in size on the other. The results of these types of institutions on the trust-scales are not very different from the previous results of the institutions themselves, it just makes it a bit more plausible and tangible how people trust and approach the democratic institutional system.

It is not very surprising at first sight that people trust only those institutions which try to enforce the rule of law and give penalties to those who break the rules. People are rather neutral about social institutions but distrustful a bit towards economic and political institutions. It implies that two decades after the regime change in 1989-1990, Hungarians are not satisfied with the way how institutions of the multi-party political system and free-market

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economy function on the one hand, and they are also dissatisfied with the way how anonymous others follow or break the social rules and morals, on the other hand.

But this picture becomes a bit more sophisticated when comparing trust in goodwill and trust in competence of the different types of institutions. Taking the dimension of goodwill first, it can be seen that both law enforcement and social institutions are trusted in this respect, but political and economic institutions are regarded in general as working in favour of other interests than of the society and those whom they represent. Regarding the dimension of competence, it seems that all types of institutions gained a rather strong position, even the political institutions got a neutral result. Of course, law enforcement institutions are the most trusted again, but all other types could prove to the citizens to have enough competence in their field.

And besides, it can be seen as well that citizens trust the competence much more of all types of institutions in the democratic system than their goodwill to work in favour of the people. Of course, it can be interpreted in different ways, for example, people trust the competence of institutions more because they function rather well or they just express their criticism towards the goodwill of these institutions and the people working there. Anyway, the one thing which can be noticed or observed here is that even general trust is lower towards some institutions but trust in competence is higher in case of all types of institutions than trust in their goodwill.

Table 6.8, Comparison of trust towards different types of institutions in Hungary in 2009 (means on a 0-100 scale)

	General trust	Trust in goodwill	Trust in competence
political institutions	42	44	48
law enforcement institutions	54	56	63
social institutions	48	53	58
economic institutions	43	42	59

After these observations, it is also worth to pay attention on what people say to be more important for them when making trust-decisions. The results show that competence is basically much more important for the people than goodwill when it is about functioning and operating the democratic institutional system. Two out of three people consider competence to

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be necessary more than goodwill of the institutions and the people working there. While one out of four respondents regards goodwill to be a more important aspect about institutions than their competence.

Table 6.9, Regarding these institutions and the people who are working there, in your opinion, which one is more important: ...? (percentage)

they should rather have less competence but should have goodwill	24
they should rather have less goodwill but should have competence	67
do not know	10

In sum, two decades after the regime change in 1989-1990, Hungarian citizens make their trust-decisions and base their trust attitudes according to their trust in the competence of institutions and pay less attention on goodwill-based trust. Their answers are consistent with the general disposition that they not only make trust-decisions on the basis of trust in their competence but they use this explanation to describe the situation as well. Although, another question may be posed then: why general trust is rather low towards institutions in Hungary if citizens trust their competence and focus more on the dimension of competence? I will try to answer this question in the following subchapters.

Chapter 6.2.2: Trust in Other People

Trust in other people is very often measured by a binary opposition: whether respondents trust or distrust other people. I do not support binary oppositions in surveys as it reduces the world into two-dimensional views, although, it makes the analysis simpler to handle and it is also important to add that it is not a bad approach to tackle social trust. There is another binary opposition which is also very popular among researchers and used for example, in the American General Social Survey, the European Value Study, and the World Value Survey. It asks respondents to choose whether most people can be trusted or one cannot be careful enough when dealing with others. The problem here, as Miller and Mitamura also points out that trust here is not in opposition with distrust but with caution²¹⁴. Besides, comparative international studies using this question can be also criticized for not paying attention on the

²¹⁴ Miller, Alan S. – Mitamura, Tomoko (2003): Are Surveys on Trust Trustworthy?, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 66., No. 1., pp. 62-63

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historical and cultural backgrounds in which trust and caution is measured, in other words, these studies forget about the “culture of trust” and “the culture of cynicism”²¹⁵. Although, I also understand and accept the rationale behind the decision not to change this survey question as being part of a longitudinal analysis.

These longitudinal surveys using the simple two- or three-dimensional scale (some use a third category like “it depends” or something neutral compared to the two ends of the opposition) are also problematic, because it is not clear whether the levels of trust or caution are changed because life has changed, because criminal levels have changed or because of the demographic shifts that may occur. For example, as Miller and Mitamura argue, if there are more women than before, then, there are more people in the society who are more risk-averse, thus, trust will have a lower level than before²¹⁶. As a starting point, I will analyze here trust towards other people both with the Likert scale and the simpler way by three dimensions.

When using the 1-7 scale to measure how much people agree that other people can be trusted, it can be seen that the answers are rather diverse and not very polarized that strengthens the methodological standpoint of Miller and Mitamura. Most people chose the middle of the scale or tended to the centre of the scale, although, also many people preferred the negative end of the scale. In sum, people rather do not agree with the statement that most people can be trusted: the mean of valid answers is 3.75.

Table 6.10, How much do you agree with the following opinion: most people can be trusted? (percentage)

7 – completely agree	3
6	9
5	20
4	27
3	19
2	12
1 – do not agree at all	9

²¹⁵ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 907

²¹⁶ Miller, Alan S. – Mitamura, Tomoko (2003): *ibid.*, p. 64

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Similarly to the findings of Paul R. Brewer²¹⁷, it seems that young people trust anonymous others more. Although, young Hungarians are much more distrustful than some others, e.g. according to the survey of Miller and Mitamura, young American university students express a rather low level of mistrust on the same scale. Although, it is also important to add that these surveys were not conducted by the same methodology, therefore, the exact numbers should not be compared, instead, only the tendencies of the data. It can be also seen that distrust is stronger than trust in the Hungarian public when it is about anonymous others.

Table 6.11, Most people can be trusted (percentage)

	U.S., university students*	Japan, university students*	Hungary, aged 18-29	Hungary, whole population
agree (scores 5-7)	53	38	37	32
neutral (score 4)	36	29	24	27
do not agree (scores 1-3)	11	33	38	41

*Source of data: Miller, Alan S. – Mitamura, Tomoko (2003): *ibid.*, p. 66.

The following survey question is based on the binary opposition about trust, but a central answer is also added. The results show that less than one third of Hungarians think that most people can be trusted, half of the population trust a few people while one out of four people says: it is very difficult to find someone who is trustworthy. It shows that trust in anonymous others is rather low in Hungary and the situation has worsened in the last years. Significantly more people think that hardly any people can be trusted while there is a significant decrease among those feeling that most people are worth to trust.

When comparing this survey question with the previous one as a tool to measure generalized trust towards anonymous others, both some similarities and differences can be noticed. In both cases, the majority of citizens tended to choose somewhere the middle of the scale (in case of the 1-7 scale most people choose the scores 3, 4, and 5). On the other hand, in case of the 3-point scale, a bit more people chose the positive end than the negative one (28 and 24 percent), while it was the opposite with the 7-point scale (12 percent chose the negative ends, scores 1-2 and 21 percent the positive ends, scores 6-7). Although, the middle point of the 3-

²¹⁷ Brewer, Paul R. (2004): Public Trust in (Or Cynicism about) Other Nations across Time, *Political Behavior*, Vol. 26., No. 4., pp. 321-322

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point scale is closer to caution than to trust and the tendency in time also shows a decreasing level in trust towards anonymous others in the society.

Table 6.12, Another way of measuring trust towards anonymous others (percentage)

	2005*	2009
most people can be trusted	39	28
less people can be trusted	45	48
hardly any people can be trusted	16	24
do not know	1	

*Source of data: Bakonyi, Eszter (2007): *Bizalom és előítélet* (Trust and Prejudice, only in Hungarian): <http://www.median.hu/object.183d2b97-e83d-4d4a-8c6a-3f97fb5dac1c.ivy>

Besides trust towards other people in general, I would like to explore it a bit more as well. It is difficult to operationalize and to measure both with qualitative and quantitative methods, but I tried to use the typology of Niklas Luhmann in this survey as well to go a bit deeper into trust in other people. I presented one of the classical dilemmas of Luhmann as a question for respondents about buying an already-used car from someone they do not know at all. According to Luhmann, trust is different from confidence as the former takes places in interactions between persons and not between a person or persons and an institution. Trust is a decisions and not just relying on somebody or something and besides, it uses inside causes in contrast to confidence which is related to outside causes referring to the system. In case of the already-owned car, I decided to use the same logic and situation that Luhmann explains. Although, not all people have a car in Hungary, only half of the population have a car in the household, I thought that respondents would be able to understand and imagine the situation and the main point of the dilemma. And besides, I wanted to keep this situation of the decision when the product to buy is socially important and economically expensive enough that the situation is risky enough, thus, I can test whether trust in the sense of Luhmann works or not.

The survey results show that trust as a term of Luhmann is very low in Hungary. When Hungarians imagine that they would like to buy a car and go to a salon that they have not known before and the dealer offers them a car already-owned before but only for half price of a new one, two times as much people would not buy it than those who would choose trust. Six out of ten people think that they would not buy this car, because if it turns out later that it has

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a serious problem, they will be worse off than if they had bought a new one. Thus, they would not trust the dealer and would not take the risk. Only three out of the ten would make a positive trust-decision and would not suppose that the dealer would sell them a lemon or a dud. They think they would buy the already-owned car, because if there is not any serious problem with it, they get a car for half price which means that they make a good business.

Table 6.13, Let's imagine that you would like to buy a new car, so you go to a salon of already-owned cars where you have not been to before. The dealer offers you a car that costs half price compared to a new one. What would you do? (percentage)

I would buy the car, because if it is good, I get a car for half price, so I make a good business	32
I would not buy it, because if it turns out later that it has a serious problem, it is worse than if I had bought a new car	60
do not know	8

The decision of taking the risk or not is just one important element of trust in the interpretation of Luhmann, another aspect which I think to be worth to explore is how participants of the interaction interpret and explain the situation, especially, when something inappropriate occurs. According to Luhmann, as trust is present in human interactions, it implies that when trust is broken, people tend to say that it happened because of the personality of the other person and not because of external causes. These results show that the theoretical situation of buying an already-owned car could represent well the trust-dimension of Niklas Luhmann: the vast majority of people used inside causes when they had to explain the failure of trust. When respondents imagined that they bought the car, but it turned out that it was a lemon or a dud, seven out of ten people would think that it was the fault of the dealer who wanted to cheat them. And only one out of four people would think that they were unlucky, it was part of a risky business and nobody is responsible for this personally.

However, it is also important to add that this kind of trust-decision and the retrospective explanation of the situation may strengthen distrust and suspicion among people. And these feelings may be only results of previous experiences and not rational decisions and explanations of trust towards other people.

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Table 6.14, Let's imagine that you bought the car, but it turns out that it has a serious problem. What would you think mostly, what would be your main feeling about it? (percentage)

that you were defrauded, so it was the fault of the dealer	70
that you were unlucky and nobody is responsible for this	24
do not know	6

In sum, it could be noticed here that trust towards anonymous others is rather low and people try to be cautious and they are a bit suspicious about interactions with other people. Although, it does not mean that they react always in parallel with their basic attitudes in the given situation. And on the other hand, these findings do not explain what may be behind these attitudes and how trust towards other people and trust in institutions, or in another way, trust and confidence may interact or not. I will try to elaborate these questions a bit more in the next subchapter.

Chapter 6.2.3: Trust as a Process in Hungary

In this subchapter, I would like to examine some other approaches about social trust or generalized trust, among others the trust-as-a-process approach which consists of three main elements: thick trust, thin trust, and institutional trust. Besides this, before explaining the details of my analysis, I would like to mention an important aspect here: the relationship between trust and group membership. As Michele Williams argues, trust depends on the trustworthiness of others and on the affective response of the person to the others. It is called the affective-cognitive model and emphasizes the relationship how group membership influences trust and also how trust influences group membership. It also means that social categorization has a crucial role in the development of trust. According to Williams, ingroup members appear to be more honest and trustworthy than others which shows that identification has an important role²¹⁸. Although, she also adds that the factor which is most likely to influence social trust is demographic difference between people, not group membership²¹⁹.

²¹⁸ Williams, Michele (2001): Group Membership as an Affective Context for Trust Development, *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 378-382

²¹⁹ Williams, Michele (2001): *ibid.*, p. 392

In the following table, I tried to separate three different types or fields of social trust. The first one that I call the group of “common fate” consists of three different groups: colleagues, friends, and family members. This one is the closest to thick trust which is based on familiarity and similarity. People have common experiences, they enjoy the same advantages and suffer from the same difficulties and besides, what is the most important is that they know that they share these experiences and “fate”, they reflect on it, thus, it is a social relationship in the Weberian term. The second type or field of social trust tries to refer to thin trust and it also consists of three groups. The first one is the neighbour which category is very close to the previous one as the results also show it, but nowadays, neighbours usually do not have as strong social relationship as, for example, co-workers have. Anyway, in this case, I made this group on the basis of locality. These are the anonymous or nearly anonymous others, the people who live together but do not have necessarily personal connections to, e.g. neighbours, people from the same settlement, and from the same country. In terms of thin trust, it is the reputation that makes these people and social relationships trustworthy. And finally, I made a type of three groups again with which people usually meet in institutional circumstances: shop assistants, school teachers, and medical staff. In case of this latter type, trustworthiness is based on or dominated by the perceived legitimacy of the institution.

Although, it is a kind of artificial set-up of groups made by the researcher, but it is just an attempt to elaborate trust in anonymous others and to make some kind of relation between institutional and social trust. It was important in designing these groups that the basis of group membership, relationships, and trustworthiness are different, but people can position themselves in these situation and can answer simple survey questions.

These results show that thick trust is very high among Hungarians: family members and relatives got more than 90 points on the 0-100 scale while friends and close acquaintances got more than 80, co-workers and colleagues more than 70 points. Thin trust towards anonymous others with whom people live together in smaller or bigger circles is also relatively high. Neighbours who live the closest to the respondents got nearly 70 points, but trust towards people who live in the same settlement or the same country also got more than 50 points which is still in the positive side of the scale. Last but not least, social trust on institutional level is also rather high: shop assistants got more than 60 points, school teachers, doctors, and

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nurses got about 70 points. A reason for these high levels of trust may be what the network literature emphasizes that trust as a capital provides access not only to resources but to social networks. And as institutions in the Communist times usually failed to offer the demanded goods and resources, many secret networks ensured these resources. And as these scholars argue, these networks of strong trust might remain still important under the highly risky and uncertain conditions after the regime change²²⁰.

The results show that perceived legitimacy of these groups with whom respondents interact on institutional level is higher than the reputation of those anonymous others with whom they live at the same place and in the same country. All in all, these levels of social trust are surprisingly high to the previous results about institutional trust. Now, I try to build in the historical dimension and the trust-as-a-process approach into the analysis of institutional trust.

Table 6.15, Trust as a process: social trust (means on a 0-100 scale)

“common fate”	
your co-workers and colleagues	72
your friends and close acquaintances	86
your family members and relatives	92
“local community”, anonymous others	
your neighbours	68
people who are living in the same settlement with you	58
other Hungarian people in general	54
social relations on institutional level	
shop assistants	62
school teachers	69
doctors, nurses	70

In the following table, I tried to incorporate some elements of the trust-as-a-process approach and some reference to the historical background and changes. The results show that trustworthiness of both institutions and social relationships decreased significantly in the last two decades according to the subjective assessment of the citizens. The statement that “in general, people could be trusted more before the regime change than nowadays” got 73 points

²²⁰ Cook, Karen Schweers (2005): Networks, Norms, and Trust: The Social Psychology of Social Capital. 2004 Cooley Mead Award Address, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 8-10

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on the 0-100 scale which is a rather high level of agreement. Family cohesion also seems to be weakened as agreement with lowering of trust in family members also got a high score. Neighbours, colleagues, and shop keepers of the local grocery store also enjoyed a higher level of trust before the regime change in 1989-1990. Institutional trust also lost so much during the last two decades in respect of their functioning and how they fulfil and fulfilled their tasks for the society. The statement that got the higher level of agreement among these is about the respect and attention that employers pay on their employees and workers which was higher in the old regime than nowadays: people evaluated it by 81 points on the 0-100 scale. Another dimension of the functioning of institutions and the system itself is honesty and goodwill to work for the benefit of the whole society. Although, it got the lowest score among these statements, it still got about 70 points that corruption was on a lower level before the regime change than nowadays.

These results imply that the three elements of the trust-as-a-process approach move together. Thick and thin trust both decreased after the regime change according to the respondents while institutional trust also seems to lost significantly of its credibility. These results also show that Hungarians are not very satisfied with free-market Capitalism on the one hand. On the other hand, it may be also seen that trust relations between employers and employees suffered the most significantly by the regime change and later on. Institutions are more criticized for the way how they do their jobs than for their honesty. People think that corruption is higher in the new democracy than before, but this opinion is a bit less supported than the previous ones.

Table 6.16, Trust as a process: retrospective dimension (means on a 0-100 scale)

In general, people could be trusted more before the regime change than nowadays.	73
Family cohesion was stronger and family members could trust or count on each other more before the regime change than nowadays.	70
One could trust his/her neighbours, colleagues, and the shop keeper of the local grocery store more before the regime change than nowadays.	71
In general, all institutions, let's say schools, hospitals, and the Parliament did a better job before the regime change than nowadays.	74
Employers respected their employees and workers more before the regime change than nowadays.	81
Corruption was less before the regime change than nowadays.	67

In relation to social and institutional trust, I tried to explore another aspect of this issue, namely, what the main factor is that helps someone to step ahead in the social structure and the mobility channel. People explain that personal efforts and influential people were the most important factors: four out of ten people say that diligence and hard work, one out of three thinks that good relationships and contact to influential people were the most important for admission to a good school, for a good job or getting a flat in the Communist regime. Knowledge and talent also had some role in social mobility: one out of six people thinks it was the most important factor before 1989-1990. Bribe was not that important according to the respondents: one out of twenty people says that bribe to the person who decided about it played the most important role to getting ahead. It seems that luck did not have an important role in the old regime.


The results show that the regime change caused a significant change also in this respect. Now, there is only one factor which plays a really important role in getting ahead in one's career and it is relations to influential people: six out of ten people say it to be the most important. Diligence, efforts, and hard work which was the most important reason before seem to have no role any more. Only 7 percent chose it as the most important factor, while this proportion was about 40 percent before. Knowledge and talent also became less important in social mobility according to the assessment of the citizens: one out of six says it was the most important factor before the regime change in 1988-1989, while only one out of twenty thinks it is still the most important factor in the new democratic system. In contrast, bribe gained much more importance than before: one out of four says that it is essential for a good school, a better position or to have a flat.

All these data show that the characteristic of blindness for success²²¹ is rather strong in the Hungarian society. People do not trust that successful people are rich, well-educated, wealthy or famous because of their own talent and efforts but because of external causes. Instead of inside causes, Hungarians use mostly outside causes to describe the situation when someone reaches a beneficial situation: they refuse that it was the diligence, hard work or knowledge

²²¹ Csepli, György – Örkény, Antal – Székelyi, Mária – Barna, Ildikó (2004): Bizalom és gyanakvás. Szociálpszichológiai akadályok a piacgazdasághoz vezető úton Kelet-Európában (Trust and Suspicion. Social psychological hurdles on the way to market economy in Eastern Europe, in Hungarian), *Szociológiai Szemle*, 2004/1, pp. 7-11

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions and talent of the person which helped him or her. They insist that external factors which are independent from the personal efforts play the most important role in social advancement: relationships with influential people and bribe. It implies that Hungarians do not trust that the democratic institutional system functions in an appropriate way; that competition in the society is free and fair; and that institutions operate in the name or spirit of goodwill.


Figure 6.6, The most important factor of mobility, e.g. admission to a good school, to a good job or getting a flat (percentage)



Chapter 6.2.4: Test of the Hypotheses

After this major explorative part of my research on social trust, I will analyze my hypotheses that I formulated in Chapter 3. I used the same data file as in the cross-sectional analysis, a nationally representative survey conducted by the Medián Institute with 1200 respondents from April 2009. As the reader may remember, the model of the 1st hypothesis is the following:

1st Hypothesis




In case of the first hypothesis, I will use path analysis, because I assume that trust is a so complex term which is difficult to explore or measure directly. On the other hand, I would like to highlight how different social phenomena influence trust but at the same time, I do not want to exclude that these different phenomena also influence each other. I used the following variables for the analysis: education (the highest level of education), economic situation: income groups (according to the monthly household income per capita), material goods (having material goods in the household), urbanization (type of settlement according to the number of inhabitants), information (frequency of watching TV, listening to the radio, and reading newspapers), participation (interest in politics, participation at the last and plans about the next general elections; unfortunately, other variables about participation in the civil society were not available), and public trust (toward institutions). I have created principal components about the variable of information, material goods, and participation. And I have made both interval and ordinal level variables of income, material goods, information, and participation to make it possible to use them both as dependent and independent variables at the regression analyses. Institutional trust is also a principal component of general trust toward political, law enforcement, social, and economic institutions.

To save time and space, I will not present here all tables of the statistical analyses. All tables that I used here can be found in the Annex. In sum, I had to run several models and most of them were not significant. The findings are interesting and sometimes surprising, but finally, the model was too weak as I formulated it originally. First, I run a regression model with all explanatory variables with general trust to see whether more variables play important roles in the model than how I expected and also to see whether some variables have significant influence on trust but I left them out originally. This model was not significant and only the education variable have a significant influence on general trust, other variables do not play a

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role in this model. Then, I started to test the 1st hypothesis as I explained it before. I tested the model about the relationship between institutional trust, information, and participation, but the model was not significant and the variable of information did not have a significant influence on trust. Hence, I have to modify this model and leave out the effect of information. The model also does not work with the two remaining variables of trust and participation, thus, I have to modify the model significantly. I assume that education has a strong effect on how people think about the institutional framework and how they assess the performance of the institutions. The other variable that I entered into the new model is the material goods, because I assume that those people who are successful and this success can be expressed and easy to understand by goods are stronger supporters of the existing institutional regime than the less successful people. I also tried it with the income variable, but that model was also not acceptable. Anyway, this new model is significant as a whole, but regarding the variables, only participation has a significant influence on trust, while material goods and education did not have which is a rather interesting result.

Regarding the path to participation, my model also failed about the influence of information on participation, thus, I modified my model again and I entered the variable of education, material goods, and household income into the model. The path analysis to information was acceptable, although, two out of the four variables are not significant. Finally, as a last step, I tested the influence of education on the two economic variables. Only one out of these two models was significant, the relationship between education and material goods is not proved. These modifications were necessary for my path modeling not to lose a step on the path. Although, this model explains only 1 percent of the heterogeneity of general institutional trust. For a better understanding, the original (black), the new (red), and the refused relationships (green) are presented on the figure below.



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
Finally, there are interesting parts and details on this model, although, the whole model is proved to be weak. First, it is a striking result that information does not play any role in the level of institutional trust. I expected that the media have a strong influence on institutional trust: if people know more about what and how the institutions do, people will have more firm decisions on their operation and image, especially, if they do not have regular and direct contact with them. Participation has a not very strong but significant effect on trust which is also interesting from the point of view that people trust the institutions more if they are more active in the political life, although, they are not necessarily well-informed about it. It may be a reason why blind trust as a trust-group was always represented throughout the two decades of democracy. In contrast, it is also interesting that education and material goods do not have any influence on institutional trust in the model.

Regarding the next point of my path analysis, and it is very interesting again that information does not have a role in the interest to politics and participation in past and future elections. Nor the household income and material goods influence the participation in political life. However, there is one variable that has a strong influence on participation and it is the level of education. People with higher educational level are more likely to participate in the political life.

The educational level does not have a significant effect on the level of information which also seems to be a bit strange result. Nor had the household income. The level of urbanization had a significant but very low influence on information and as the estimations for the regression Betas are rather weak in path analyses, I rather do not accept this (-0.137). Only material goods have a significant effect on the level of information of the citizens.

Finally, education does not have any influence on material goods, but it affects strongly the income level. It shows that people with higher educational degrees do not necessarily consume material products on a higher level, but more time spent on studying mostly means higher income. As a result, I have the following path modelling which is rather weak and different from the original model.

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
In sum, many paths and relations cannot be accepted from the original model, for example, the information variable simply remained alone and there is not way that leads to trust toward institutions. Also urbanization has a very low influence that I rather leave out from the model. Material goods influence the level of information as people living in better conditions consume more news. But the problem that the level of education does not affect material goods, therefore, it is just one way and it does not lead to institutional trust. Education has an influence on the household income per capita, but it is also the end of the path, there is not any way further from here. It seems that the variables of income, information, and urbanization can be simply dropped out as there is not ways from these parts of the model. There is only one “real” path in my model which goes from education to institutional trust through participation. There is not direct effect between education and institutional trust, only indirect effect. My original hypothesis is not proved, although, this new model explains less than 1 percent of the heterogeneity of institutional trust. This new model shows that the level of education has a strong effect on citizen participation in public life and it influences institutional trust positively. It implies that participation in the system strengthens confidence in it and well-educated people follow and use the system better which is represented in their higher level of trust in contrast to the concept of Liberal distrust.

2nd Hypothesis


It may be a bit confusing, but I will use “age” in a different meaning here at the 2nd hypothesis than in case of the 1st and 3rd hypotheses. Age will mean whether the citizens grew up in the Communist regime, got used to the norms, procedures, and institutional framework of the dictatorship and centrally planned economy or the citizens were children at the time of the regime change. I will also explore the effect of age-cycle which refers to the influence of the paradigm that the way of thinking becomes more closed during the lifetime. I will run

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regression analyses with age as a dummy variable and age-cycle as an interval variable. As the reader may remember, the model of the 2nd hypothesis is as follows:




I tested this model about age-cycle both as an interval and as an ordinal variable. The difference is not very important from my point of view, but I present it also in the model below. These independent variables reserve only between half and one and a half percent of the heterogeneity of institutional trust. The three regression models show that my original hypothesis is partly correct and partly has to be refused. On the one hand, both age and age-cycle have an influence on institutional trust toward the new regime. But it has to be refused that age has a stronger effect on institutional trust than age-cycle and that the relationship is the opposite. Thus, these are the older generations who trust the democratic institutional framework more, not the younger citizens which is also a very interesting result. Although, there is a difference between those young adults who were still children and those who were adults at the time of the regime change.




These results show that it has a strong influence on trust in the new democratic system whether someone grew up in the Communist regime or became adult in the democratic regime. Besides, it is much more important where a citizen is positioned in the age-cycle: whether s/he is a young adult, close to the teenagers, in his/her 30's, 40's, 50's or already enjoys retirement. My presupposition seems to be correct that the new generations who became adult in democracy and free-market economy trust the new institutional framework more than those who grew up in the Communist regime. Although, it is much more important whether a citizen is younger or older in the dimension of age-cycle. It shows that older generations who know dictatorship better appreciate the new democratic system more than those young people who can take the democratic norms and procedures for granted. It implies that institutional trust depends basically on the age of Hungarian citizens, but this relationship interferes by the fact that the regime change happened in the near past and historical experiences modify a bit the effects of the age-cycle.

3rd Hypothesis

In the last hypothesis, I assume that several social and economic factors influence institutional trust among which the subjective economic situation plays a key role. I will test it with path analysis again. My third hypothesis follows the model below:



First, I run a simple regression analysis with all variables of the model as independent variables to test all direct effects. It shows that only the household income per capita has a direct effect on institutional trust if all variables step into the model. Then, I tested my original model, again, from the end of the path. From the analysis of the influence of the subjective economic situation, the future economic prospective, and the social factors as age, gender, education, and urbanization, it can be noticed that although, the whole model significant, but only one variable affects institutional trust significantly. This one variable is the age of respondents. It implies that this path modelling is even worse than the previous one (i.e. Model 1), because on the one hand, the strength of influence of the social and economic factors cannot be compared. And on the other hand, a path model cannot be built up as there is only one way to institutional trust but from a variable that no way goes to. Thus, it is necessary again to modify my original model. I added the direct effect of household income per capita on institutional trust.




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But as it can be seen, it does not solve the problem of the model. Besides, the other stages of the path modelling also do not really work. Only one variable out of the social background variables influences the future perspectives and this is the gender of the respondents. But it is true that the subjective economic situation also has an effect on the future perspectives. The subjective economic situation is influenced by the household income per capita, but it is not affected by the material goods of the household.

I also run my model to test the influence of the different variables on institutional trust without the education and urbanization as these have effect neither on future perspectives, nor on institutional trust, but although, the model was significant, only the age of the respondents had a significant influence on institutional trust. Therefore, I refused this model, too. The subjective economic situation and the future prospects also did not have a significant effect on institutional trust, if only these two independent variables entered the model, although, the model itself was significant.

My original model (only the black arrows) explained only 2 percent of the heterogeneity of institutional trust. If the household income per capita also enters the model, it decreases to 1 percent. Finally, in my new model, there is not any indirect relation, only direct relations between household income per capita and age to institutional trust; between household income and the subjective economic situation; and between gender, the subjective economic situation and the future prospective. For a better understanding, please, have a look at on the final scheme of my path analysis below.



Although, I have to refuse this 3rd hypothesis as well, this model, or rather the failures of this model also have some interesting lessons to be learned. First, a not very surprising result is

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that higher income means more satisfaction with the present economic situation, although, it is interesting that material goods does not have this affect. It implies that Hungarian households perceive economic success rather in terms of money and cash, while they incline to underestimate the importance of material goods in the household. The present assessments have very strong effects on the perception of the future. People who are more satisfied with the economic performance are much more optimistic about their future economic improvements, while people who are dissatisfied with their present situation are pessimistic about their future. Also women expect more development in the economic situation of their household than men.

Finally, household income and age both have direct effects on institutional trust, older people trust the institutions a bit more than younger people and people with higher income also trust institutions a bit more. It shows a bit practical image about the Hungarian public that institutional trust mostly depends on age and money which implies that both the effectiveness and the historical experiences may play a role in institutional trust. Although, we could not really test our hypothesis on the difference between social and economic factors, age has a bit stronger effect than household income, but it is a rather weak result that should be explored more.

Chapter 6.3: A Summary of the Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Analyses

Similarly to the comparative international analysis in Chapter 5, the longitudinal data from the first two decade following the regime change also show that Hungarians had very high expectations about the newly established institutional framework of democracy and free-market economy. Public trust toward the different types of institutions moved together in the first decade, the indices of law-enforcing, political, and socio-economic institutions mostly moved together. High expectations usually result in big losses of hope, faith, and trust, but it is not necessarily the case. It always takes time for a community to learn the new institutional norms and procedures while institutions also need time to learn how to interact with the citizens and how to meet their expectations. The longitudinal data show that some types of institutions were more successful than others in creating and maintaining a trustworthy image

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in the general public. By the middle of the second decade, public trust toward the different types of institutions have diverged. In the first decade of democracy, people trusted the law-enforcing institutions most, but they also trusted the political and socio-economic institutions. By the middle of the 2000's, citizens became very disappointed about the legislators and mostly all actors of the political scene, and the same happened to the social and economic institutions. People trusted neither those who created the new rules of the game, nor those who represented the new economic system and who are the counter-balance of the State (e.g. the press). Instead, after some corruption cases discussed in the media and the disappointment about the results of the regime transformation, the only type of institution that Hungarian citizens trusted are those who punish the cheaters in the game.

The trends of institutional trust of the two decades from 1991 to 2010 show that political institutions always had a strong influence on the public image of other institutions. Citizens became very optimistic about the political institutions around every general elections, but these positive assessments diminished by the end of the government period. Trust emerged again by the next general election. Other types of institutions mostly followed the trend of the political institutions but usually with more moderate changes. The influence of the political institutions became weaker and weaker on the assessment of other types of institutions during the two decades. It may mean that people became more realistic about the new institutional framework and that the institutions had difficulties in meeting the expectations of the citizens. Social and economic institutions lost more public trust in the middle of the 1990's when serious austerity measures were implemented in Hungary and the same happened after the economic crisis affected Hungary very seriously at the end of the second decade. The new economic institutions could not prove to the public that free-market economy and the Capitalist regime is appropriate or functions appropriately. While social institutions could not persuade the citizens that they could remedy the negative effects of the economic transformation or that they function as a good tool against the breach or trespass of State power. The year of 2006 was a turning point for the political institutions and for many other institutions as well. In this year, the same government stayed in office after the elections which never happened before in the democratic system. A few months after the election, a speech of the PM was leaked in which he admitted lying to gain the elections. Citizens perceived and experienced many peaceful and violent demonstrations on the streets and the dysfunctional operation of some of the new democratic institutions. These results show that

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the newly set up institutions did not remain abstract members of the system but people assessed them firmly according to the functioning, the role, and the history of the new institutions. Another important lesson learned is that rules and punishments seem to play a very important role in the strengthening of the newly established system.

The same lesson can be noticed from the longitudinal analysis of trust toward not only the different types of institutions but also toward the single institutions of the new regime. Of course, I do not have the time and space here to go into details about the changes of institutional trust toward every single institution during the two decades of democracy and I also do not want to repeat the analysis I have done and described above, thus, I will just summarize here briefly the main findings. There were big losers of this period who enjoyed a rather high level of public trust just after the regime transformation and became the most distrusted institutions of the new system. For example, it happened to the parliament and the government. It implies that people hoped much from the new political actors who could not represent their competence and goodwill well enough for the society. The Constitutional Court and the Hungarian national TV could mostly benefit of social trust during the two decades of democracy. Many other institutions could preserve a rather stable image in the public, for example, the police, the courts, the president, and the municipalities. Political parties and trade unions could not move toward the positive side of the trust-scale, they remained distrustful during the two decades. The church and the public radio also remained stable after some loss of trust-capital. A fourth type of trend (after the big losers, those who benefited, and those who reserved a stable level) is the slow erosion of trust-capital which can be noticed in case of the army and the press. Commercial banks and insurance companies could also belong to this latter group, but at the end of the 2000's, they suffered a significant decrease that place them rather into the group of big losers.

These longitudinal data also made it possible to explore the structure of the society and the changes of this structure according to trust toward the different institutions of the new democracy. The most striking result of the creation and analysis of trust-groups is that the proportion of suspicious, disappointed, and distrustful groups increased significantly from about 30 to 50 percent of the society during these two decades. Blind trust also decreased, but it strengthened again in the end of the 2000's. Another interesting finding is that social institutions and the civil society played an important role in forming the trust-decisions of the

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people at the time of the regime change, but they became neglected very quickly and later on, they never played a noticeable role again in the trust-structure of the society. In contrast, economic institutions, although, stepped in later into the model, but they started to dominate the trust-decisions of many citizens immediately. The institutions of law enforcement also played an important role in the trust-structure of many citizens in the early times, but later, there was only one group whose trust design was influenced by the institutions of law enforcement and moreover, later this group became smaller than before. Another astonishing result is how the new political institutions influenced the trust-structure of the society. At the beginning of the 1990's, there was a group which was dominated by positive assessments about the new political actors and I call this group the new democrats. This group disappeared immediately after a few years and a new group came into being according to trust in political institutions which can be characterized by a nostalgia toward the strong State. By the end of the second decade, a third group replaced it and this new group was suspicious with the political institutions and in general, with the whole system. All in all, the analysis of trust-groups according to the changing design of their trust-structure showed a more detailed, complex, and more dramatic picture about institutional trust than at the simple, descriptive part of the longitudinal analysis. It implies that there are many different factors, trends, and peculiarities deeply in the trust-decisions and trust-capitals or in the process of trust how it functions in the society than as it would be noticed by the surface.

Summarizing very briefly the cross-sectional analysis, it shows that trust is rather low in the Hungarian society by the end of the 2000's while there is a moderate level of confidence, especially, towards those institutions which ensure the functioning of the rule of law. As the relationship between trust and confidence is not a zero-sum game, it can be also seen from the data that when it is about breaking or distorting trust, people use inside causes as arguments to explain the situation which is a major characteristic of trust in Luhmann's term. Regarding the basis of confidence, i.e. the absence of uncertainty²²² or in other term: institutional trust, the analysis shows that trust in the competence of institutions is much higher while trust in their goodwill is not that strong among the citizens.

The cross-sectional analysis also shows that the trust-as-a-process approach can be a very useful tool to explore the content and the main elements of trust in a Post-Communist society.

²²² Cook, Karen S. – Cooper, Robin M. (2003): *op. cit.*, p. 213

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As all three types of trust or all three folds of trust got rather good results, although, thick trust seems to be much higher than thin and institutional trust, it may strengthen the idea that trust and trust decisions also express a desire of belonging to somewhere²²³. Although, other scholars emphasize that if trust networks become closed networks, it may restrict the scope of exchange in the society²²⁴. These findings are also supported by the results of other studies on this field that as competition and fluctuation have become present at the workplaces and growing income inequalities can be found in the neighbourhoods, trust has withdrawn into the strong, familial relations²²⁵ and all these processes may strengthen a “defensive civic community”²²⁶. But it is also true that the different faces of trust, i.e. thick, thin, and institutional trust are interconnected as citizens of a society do not live side by side, instead, they read newspapers or blogs and opinion polls, quarrel and discuss, talk and watch TV which all influence their decisions and readiness about trust and distrust towards others, be it an institution or another person²²⁷. Going back to my results, thick trust, thin trust, and institutional trust could be separated and analyzed mostly well. The results show that thick and thin trust became lower after the regime change in 1989-1990 and the same happened to institutional trust. Although, it is important to mention that these are retrospective perceptions where past events are assessed from the present.

Besides, Hungarians became the most suspicious about the economic system and its operation or functioning. On the one hand, one of the main losers in confidence or social trust is the free-market Capitalism based on free and fair competition. According to the Hungarian public, the level of corruption has also increased since 1989 and 1990 which may be both a cause and an effect of growing distrust²²⁸ as one may not trust others because s/he thinks that they are corrupt or s/he will give bribes and uses his/her “connections” because s/he does not trust their goodwill and/ or competence. On the other hand, economic enviousness also seems to be rather strong among the Hungarian population. People think that successful people have good relations to influential people and pay bribe when necessary while diligence, effort, hard work, and talent have hardly any role in social mobility. These data show a rather strong blindness for success among Hungarians.

²²³ McEvily, Bill – Perrone, Vincenzo – Zaheer, Akbar (2003): Trust as an Organizing Principle, *Organization Science*, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 92

²²⁴ Cook, Karen Schweers (2005): *op. cit.*, p. 12

²²⁵ Utasi, Ágnes (2006a): *op. cit.*

²²⁶ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 908

²²⁷ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *ibid.*, p. 907

²²⁸ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 908

In sum, my data from the cross-sectional analysis show that trustworthiness of the institutions is not very high as trust in their goodwill is rather weak, but people appreciate their competence which make them more trustable. Suspicion, disappointment, and economic envy are rather significant elements of the public opinion about the democratic institutional system of Hungary. All in all, institutions do not have a very negative image regarding social trust towards them. These are rather the institutional procedures which make Hungarians sceptical or suspicious towards the institutional framework. The way how institutions operate seems to be rather questionable for the citizens and this is why they do not trust them enough or express their complains through very critical views about these democratic institutions.

Finally, after the test of my three hypotheses, it can be assumed that institutional trust is a rather complex and complicated social phenomenon which is difficult to explore by multivariate explanatory methods. Two out of the three hypotheses have to be refused and the remaining third hypothesis could be only partly accepted.

In case of the first hypothesis, one of the most striking results is that the level of information does not have an influence on institutional trust. Out of the original factors of education, economic situation, urbanization, information, and participation, only participation has a significant direct effect and education has an indirect effect in this model. And this is the only “real” path in the model. It shows that people with higher education are more likely to participate in the political life which results a higher level of trust in the new institutions of democracy.

In case of my second hypothesis, I can partly accept it, but the original assumption was partly wrong as well. I was right that it has a strong effect where somebody is in his/ her lifespan and whether s/he grew up and socialized before or after the regime change. But the direction and the intensity of these impacts was not exactly correct. It seems to be true that historical experiences have a long-term effect on political behaviour of the citizens. People who grew up before the regime change and who have experiences about a completely different institutional framework of dictatorship and centrally-planned economy trust the new institutions of democracy and Capitalism more than those who do not have these same experiences. But the effect of age-cycle is much more important and the direction is the

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opposite than I expected. It seems that older people trust the institutions more than youngsters who may be characterized by Liberal Distrust of Hardin. Although, the effect of experiences from Communism cross the impact of age.

And lastly, I refused my third hypothesis as well which was the weakest from the three hypotheses. It tried to combine the different social and economic background variables while I do not exclude their relationship and I tried also to compare the influence of social and economic factors on institutional trust. Unfortunately, this model did not work at all, only age and the income level had an influence on institutional trust. According to the model, young and materially less successful citizens are more critical, sceptical, and suspicious with the new democratic regime. It shows that trust in the new regime is strongly dependent on historical experiences and personal success in the material dimension.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Final Remarks

In this final chapter, I would like to summarize briefly the process of the dissertation: how I got through the different theories of trust, social trust, institutional designs, and institutional changes; what are the main characteristics of institutional trust in Central and Eastern Europe; and lastly, how Hungary is different or not from the other countries; and what are the empirical evidences supported or not supported by the summarized theoretical concepts.

I think that the most important characteristic of this work is that I tried to operationalize and empirically measure some concepts of trust, the integration of tick, thin, and institutional trust, and that I attempted to make a step further throughout my research not to study and analyze only the attitudinal but also the behavioural segment of trust. But of course, there are many new ways to explore more not only how citizens think and decide or would decide in different situations but also how they are involved in different actions or abstain from actions²²⁹. For example, it would be worth to explore how low- and high-trustors invest their money, vote at the elections, choose a career for their children, whom they avoid as business partner, and when they decide to emigrate from a country²³⁰.

Chapter 7.1: Theoretical Considerations

There are three big traditions in the conceptualization of trust which I touched in my theoretical explanation. Two of these big theoretical approaches are influenced by and rooted in the Western, Neoliberal political thinking. The third one is mostly influenced by the experiences of Eastern Europe during the so-called Soviet times. These three big traditions in the research on trust may be simplified to three keywords: the first can be characterized by the civil society, the second one with social capital, and the third one with temporality or time-dependence. Let me go through these approaches very briefly again.

The theoretical tradition explaining the main mechanisms of trust with the logic of civil society argues that there is a strong connection between the two: civil society and social trust.

²²⁹ Sztompka, Piotr (1999): *Trust: A Sociological Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-29

²³⁰ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, pp. 909-910

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These scholars explain that trust towards the State and the democratic institutions depend on the existence and functioning of civil society. Some empirical evidences also supported this concept, while, interestingly, not in the case of Hungary²³¹. According to this school, trust on the level of the institutions and State bureaucracy is built upon trust in the small circles of the society. Thus, a strong and well-functioning civil society with trustful participants goes hand in hand with trust towards democratic institutions and actors of the system. This approach argues by emphasizing the importance of learning-by-doing, i.e. in this case that people learn how to generate, deal, and maintain trust in interpersonal social relationships and contexts and later on, they are able to use this knowledge on the State and institutional level when they have to communicate, interact with, and interpret the formal procedures of the democratic system.

The second big school of explaining trust interpret this term by approaching it with the social capital theory. These authors emphasize the importance of social networks as tools for integration into the society and for resources and services. People in a big, heterogeneous, and complex society where they get into interactions with others whom they do not know and do not have the chance or time to get knew well, then, they need mediating institutions or assistance for beneficial cooperation and problem solutions. Trust in this concept is one of the social capitals which makes interactions and fruitful interactions possible without wasting money, costs, time, and energy. Trust is also necessary for other capitals to operate well and those people who have more capital, they will be able to get more resources. This theoretical approach also explains that people with more social capital, e.g. living in big cities, having higher level of education, higher social and economic status, better access to information and interest groups will trust the democratic institutions more as the system is more transparent and understandable for them on the one hand, and as they get to more resources on the other hand.

This approach uses some concepts of the rational choice theory as the main motivation of individuals here is to get more access to resources as efficiently as possible. Some authors argue for and explain the market of trust, the production of trust, and trust as a product in the society. In case of the previous approach which focused on the civil society and participation in the civil society as a logic of developing and maintaining trust sees imitation as a

²³¹ Utasi, Ágnes (2006b): Társadalmi tőke és bizalom 2. [Social Capital and Trust, Part 2], *Kritika*, http://www.kritikaonline.hu/kritika_06juli-aug_cikkek_utasi.html

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motivation for social and institutional trust as these are just analogues of trust, procedures, and habits learned and developed in interpersonal relations in the civil society.

The third theory regards trust as a dynamic, always changing phenomenon stuck to a concrete time and place. The explanation also implies that it is nearly impossible to explore this social characteristic in general. This concept is called the trust-as-a-process approach and focuses on the temporal dimension: what happened in the past; how the present situation can be characterized; and what are the future prospects of the actors. The other very strong dimension of this approach is the Functionalist interpretation: trust decisions and the interpretation of the whole situation depend on whether the requirements are met or not. If an institutional system does not provide the citizens with the necessary goods, services, and feelings, e.g. the feeling of security, safety or cohesion, then, people will not assess these institutions as trustworthy. And finally, these elements of the concept are strongly embedded into the idea of cultural and historical dependency which means that trust has different logic of operation and different characteristics in the different countries, cultures, and historical times.

Trust itself has three types in the trust-as-a-process theory. There is thick trust which means and provides safety and security. It is produced through strong ties. The second type is thin trust and it means to know the “right” people to get easy access to goods and services. This one is produced through weak social ties. The third one is institutional trust which depends on the functioning of the institutions whether they are able to meet the requirements of the society or not.

Institutional trust itself can be also characterized by its nature. Many authors separate trust based on competence from trust based on goodwill of the institutions or the anonymous others as well. The difference between these approaches is whether the emphasis is put upon rationality, functionality, and performance or upon honesty, morals, and ethics.

A special approach that I do not plan to discuss here in details is about chaos and anarchy as basic preconditions of social trust. These authors argue that in a stable institutional system, trust is unnecessary as all procedures and roles are given and function well. Instead, trust is really needs to develop and operate in chaotic situations when the State or another central

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authority cannot do his job. It uses again the logic of Functionalism as an operational principle of social and institutional trust.

In case of the institutional theories, I presented two big approaches about the emergence, maintenance, and change of institutions. To put it in a simple way, these two are the calculus approach and the cultural approach. The former says that agents are profit maximisers while the latter regards them as satisfiers. In case of the calculus approach, I described the most important economic and rational choice concepts of institutions that I planned to use as basic ideas for the dissertation and the analyses. In case of the cultural approach, I mentioned some important considerations of cultural and historical theories about the same topic. The keyword for institutions of the calculus approach is benefits while in case of the cultural approach, these are history and identity.

Economic theories explain the emergence of institutions by the invisible hand, the process of social selection, and by conflict resolution and structuration. The process of institutionalisation is a trial-and-error way for both sides: for the citizens and for the institutions as well. Institutions have two aims in the economic concepts: efficiency and calculability. Both are important for the agents of the system to operate and rationalize benefit and profit. Institutions in the calculus approach also solve possible conflicts of collective actions by providing the necessary information about the future behaviour of the partners. Institutions always exist because they can provide something useful for the citizens or at least, for the influential social groups. But usefulness is just one thing, they also have to be competitive with other organisations offering something similar in their field. Thus, the economic concepts explain the emergence of institutions as an intentional process on micro level and as a competitive process on macro level. In the rational choice theory, information and knowledge have a central role in the definition of institutions. These are the two important goods or services that institutions provide for the social and economic agents of the system. According to these scholars, institutional changes take place because prices or costs and tastes of the consumers change or outside shocks occur. But institutional and regime changes are never ad-hoc, they are dependent on the events of the near past.

Among the cultural and historical approaches, I discussed the three New Institutionalisms more detailed: the historical institutionalism, the rational choice or economic institutionalism,

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and the sociological institutionalism. These concepts agree that the present rules and structural logic of the institutional framework refer to the historical experiences. Different States use different methods and concepts of meaning and it has an impact on the behaviour of all social groups. As a result, institutions shape the political culture and behaviours. As Structuralists argue, institutions structure the collective behaviours while citizens maintain and redo the institutions and the whole system every day. According to the Functionalists, institutions have a significant utility for the community as they provide responses to specific needs of this community. Phenomenologists say that institutions give a common sense and a cognitive construction of the world for the citizens.

According to historical institutionalism, common ideas and beliefs shape the institutions, while sociological institutionalism argue that these are the tastes and preferences of the individuals that affect institutions. Supporters of sociological institutionalism differentiate between the normative and the cultural dimension of institutions. The normative dimension means that institutions provide roles and norms for the individuals and other organisations, while the cultural dimension means that institutions inform the others how to behave and how to interpret a situation. Rational choice institutionalists focus more on the normative dimension while they do not really take into consideration the changing nature of preferences. Sociological institutionalism also makes a step further than rational choice and economic authors in terms of explaining the maintenance and development of inefficient and dysfunctional institutions in the system. The main point or difference here is that sociological institutionalists argue that social appropriateness makes the basis of maintaining and developing an institution and that socially appropriateness may be at the same time inefficient or even dysfunctional in the system in economic terms.

Chapter 7.2: Interpretation of Empirical Evidences

The regional comparison of trust toward the new institutions in the Post-Communist countries shows that in some countries, it may be a long way that these institutions gain significant social trust while in others, this progress may take less time. Although, in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the new institutions of democracy and free-market economy

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faced with very positive attitudes and expectations from the part of the citizens at the times of the regime change in 1989-1990.

The analyses show also that the Central and Eastern European countries were rather similar to each other, there were mainly just some regional differences whether they belonged to the Central, the Eastern, the Southern part – and it might have been the case with the Baltic States as well. As time went on and citizens gained more experience from the functioning of the new democratic institutional framework and from the individual institutions, these countries gained or strengthened also their own image in terms of public trust. They have become more peculiar, different, and special inside the Eastern and Central European region.

The new democratic institutions of these Post-Communist States were rather trustworthy in the first few years after the regime change in 1989-1990. It shows that these institutions were not only an external framework far from the citizens but they were rather strong mediators or representatives of identity and social cohesion. In accordance with the economic and rational choice theoretical assumptions, they could set the democratic scene, the rules, the standards, and the dispute resolutions well for the citizens of the new regime. As democracy, free-market economy, and most importantly, the Western lifestyle had been waited for long in the Hungarian society, it may not be surprising that the new regime and its institutions were rather popular at the beginning and that many citizens could accept and support the new rules and norms of behaviour, and principles of the system. As authors of the cultural and historical approaches explain, the new democratic institutions could provide collective processes of interpretation in the new circumstances and important elements of social identity. Besides, it was all new for the citizens and also for the new players of the democratic games, e.g. for the organisations and institutions as well, the new procedures and behaviours were not extremely new and difficult to cope with as these were all strongly affected by the past and behaviours of the past.

My empirical evidences show that the trends of institutional trust in the first decade of democracy and market economy in Central and Eastern Europe can be well described by both the calculus and the cultural approach, especially by the latter. In case of Hungary, the picture is a bit different as the logic of behaviours and procedures of Hungary seem to diverge from the cultural explanations and approached closer to the calculus concept. According to my

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data, the Central European region could be characterized in the first decade of democracy by a rather high, although, modest level of trust toward the civil and social institutions. And this trust toward the new civil and social institutions remained stable during the first decade of democracy, thus, these new institutions could provide important elements of social identity for the citizens in the new circumstances.

In contrast to this, Hungary had a different way in the new democracy as a significant disappointment followed the first period of democracy. Not only the new civil and social institutions but practically, all institutions of the new regime lost of their trustworthiness in the first decade of democracy, except the State services. It shows what both my comparative and longitudinal analyses confirmed also that the strong State has become an important need and wish for Hungarian citizens. It implies that the controlling-punishing function of institutions were stronger for Hungarians than the identifying function. In the Southern Eastern States, institutions needed more time to make a difference and have a structured image about their trustworthiness in the public opinions: there were not many changes in the first decade after the Communist regime collapsed.

Regarding the inner structure of the institutional frameworks in the different regions of Central and Eastern Europe, there are also some interesting and very different trends in public assessments. During the first decade of democracy, the new institutions became more individual and unique, they developed their own image in the society, thus, the whole system became more structured, complex, and specialised by the end of the first decade. In Hungary, I found different trends. The public image of institutions became closer to each other inside the institutional framework; there were less nuances and differences in the system than before. Only the trade unions and the press did not follow this trend which may show that these institutions were a bit further from the State which also means that they were a bit neglected by the citizens as their demand for a strong State became more important and more significant. Finally, institutions in the whole Central European region had to face with very high expectations from the citizens just after the regime change in 1989-1990 in terms of competence, efficiency, and trustworthiness but it was followed by a significant disappointment in general. The South and East European countries experienced different trends: institutions here composed at the beginning a rather unstructured framework inside the new political system, but this picture became more heterogeneous as time went on. It implies

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that institutions of democracy and free-market economy were identification and reference points for citizens to a rather small extent in the new system in Central and Eastern Europe while people learned to live with them after some time but in different ways and by different strategies.

In case of the single countries of the Central European region which might be more similar to each other because of the historical, regional, and cultural experiences and similarities, different trends and tendencies of institutional trust can be seen in the new system. Of course, East Germany is a special case because of the reunification with West Germany and the automatic EU accession of the country, but East Germans also show some trends which can be found in Hungary and in the Czech Republic as well. The main finding in case of Hungary but which also true for the Czech case and partly for East Germany is that citizens had very high expectations towards the new democratic institutions which were simply unable to fulfil them. And then, it was followed by a strong disappointment and lower trust in the new institutions. The same happened to the institutions of the European Communities/ Union. In case of Hungary, strengthening mistrust has gone hand in hand with a higher level of trust toward the coercive institutions which are specialized in surveillance and control of citizens, in following the rules of the game, and in giving penalties to cheaters. In contrast to Hungary and the Czech Republic, the new institutions enjoyed a higher level of public trust and lost less of their trustworthiness in Slovakia and Poland. The regime change in 1989-1990 was a real success for the new Slovakian and Polish institutions after they became independent from the Soviet regime, and in case of Slovakia, from the Czechs as well. These results strengthen the concept of the cultural approach and more precisely, the historical institutionalism that the different States use different methods and concepts of meaning to provide the citizens. These differences have an impact on the behaviour of the citizens in these States and thus, the institutional frameworks shape the political culture of these countries and the political behaviour of their citizens.

My analyses about the Central and Eastern European region and about Hungary in itself proved the experiences of Western democracies that although, the institutional system, the functioning of the institutions, and the State bureaucrats are transparent, much more transparent than before, thus, these institutions, bureaucrats, and elite groups are much more accountable than before, but still they get less trust from the public. Most institutions can

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reach only a moderate, rather neutral level on the trust-scale while many of them distrusted by the citizens. Only a very few institutions enjoy really high level of trust. However, these results may also prove that citizens do not think of the institutions as just abstract phenomena and principles but they also assess the performance and image of the institutions when they make their trust decisions.

The changes of trust-groups in the Hungarian society show that more and more people would like to see some kind of order in the social and economic system. The free competition of ideas and interests in politics, of workers and professionals on the labour market, of different values and habits in the society might be too fast and shocking for many people that they could not adapt or adapted only with difficulties to the new situations and requirements. Besides, more transparency and information or better access to these showed also the dark side of the new regime such as cheating, free-riding, corruption, and sometimes, the incompetence of these institutions and bureaucrats. But it does not mean that Hungarians are completely disappointed about democracy and free-market economy, there is still strong support towards them, although, civil society and the counter-balances of the State have become less important and less trusted during the two decades after the regime change in 1989-1990.

My empirical analysis about trust-as-a-process in Hungary shows that in contrast to the concept of globalization about turning thick into thin trust²³², thick trust has strengthened compared to thin trust and institutional trust which have weakened during the two decades of democracy and free-market economy. It shows again a disappointment in the Hungarian public that trust towards the new institutional framework and towards the anonymous others could not gain a significant and stable trust yet. After some experiences about democracy and Capitalism, people rely mostly on their strong ties while perceive weak ties and institutions with some more suspicion. These results are supported by some other studies that the level of institutional trust is decreased, the circle of social trust is narrowed while family ties became more concentrated and gained a more important role in trust decisions²³³.

My analyses show also that institutions are mostly trusted for their competence than their goodwill in their operation. These results imply that there has been a moral crisis in the

²³² Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 917

²³³ Utasi, Ágnes (2006a): *op. cit.*

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institutional framework and the public life in Hungary. As a result and also as a parallel tendency, personal networks have become denser in the society, the civil society has become more important for the people when it is about trust-decisions. It shows that the performance of the State and State institutions is not enough or rather weak for the citizens. Another implication of the refusal of weak ties and institutions in contrast to strong ties is that self-confidence is rather low in the Hungarian society and in parallel with this, trust towards a system which is based on competition is also very stressful and weak. As a result of all these trends and tendencies, the Hungarian public have expressed a strong demand for coercive institutions. Even if they are not successful or do not behave comfortably in the new system, but at least, cheaters and possibly more successful cheaters and actors of the game should be given penalties. These imply that some dangerous attitudinal tendencies start to develop or maintain in the Hungarian population.

I found similar results at the test of my hypotheses. As other surveys and research have also showed, material success is the most important index of social success in the Hungarian society while people tend not to accept personal skills and talent of the successful fellows. This blindness for success can be also a result of difficulties with adapting to the new competitive regime of democracy and Capitalism as it can be a self-securing function for less successful citizens. Thus, my analyses show that material success is the most important index of social success, integration, and trustworthiness. Besides, the test of my hypotheses have another interesting but also surprising result that information and knowledge seem not to have a real impact on public trust. In contrast to the calculus approach and the rational choice theories, citizens who trust institutions do not need more information than others to have a demand for institutions which would provide it. Nor are they more informed than others which could be a result of interaction and more interest to institutions.

My empirical analyses show also that in Luhmann's terms, confidence, i.e. reliability on the system has been seriously distorted during the two decades of democracy in Hungary. According to Luhmann, it results that citizens lose their interest towards public life and issues and they withdraw into their private life. It does not mean necessarily that trust strengthens by this as the relationship between trust and confidence is not a zero-sum game. In fact, trust as a strategic decision in social situations with anonymous others is also weak by the end of the second decade after the regime change. The consequences of these trends are that the level of

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social activism is lower, there are less social contacts, people withdraw into their private life, they deal rather with personal issues while they are not interested and do not participate in public life, public debates, and the elections. These trends can mean a danger to the functioning and operation of the democratic system, because not only the number of interactions decrease but also the feedbacks of citizens can diminish without which institutions will not have any information what and how should be changed or confirmed.

The lesson learned for institutions from these trends and tendencies is that they should focus more on their citizens, their trust-decisions, and the logic of these trust-decisions of the citizens to reach a higher level of trustworthiness. In addition to this, my findings show also that citizens appreciate competence more than goodwill from the part of the institutions when it is about trust-decisions. It shows also that functionality and performance are more important for the citizens than honesty and morals in case of the institutional framework. These results strengthen the idea that in contrast to the cultural approach, in many Central and Eastern European countries and as my case study shows it, definitely in Hungary, the new institutions of democracy and free-market economy are failed to give a basis for identification for the citizens in Western democratic terms. As several studies and surveys have already showed, material issues have a strong impact on the attitudes, choices, and political behaviour of Hungarian citizens, my analyses also prove that in parallel to the calculus approach and the rational choice theories, utility, benefits, calculability, and efficiency are those characteristics that citizens demand and appreciate about institutions.

Chapter 7.3: Possible Ways of Future Research

Although, a doctoral dissertation has its limitations in time and space, this issue and the analysis of this topic cannot be finished here. There are several possible ways to go on with the analysis of social, general, and institutional trust. It is possible to go on with the same theories and methodology in time and in geographical areas, but it is also possible to make deeper analyses on the same time period and geographical samples.

It would be worth to do the same analysis on the next wave(s) of the European Value Study to see what trends and institutional designs take place in the second decade of democracy in the

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Central and Eastern European region and in its countries. Do the same trends survive or other trends can be found? Do the differences on country level remain, diminished or sharpened by time? Are there special strategies of institutional trustworthiness in some countries which are more successful or institutional designs become simply less structured and complex as more and more citizens are dissatisfied, uninterested, and passive in democracies? It would be also worth to involve the three Baltic states, i.e. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into the analysis as a European region which is historically and culturally different from other Post-Communist countries.

It would be also worth to go on with the longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses in Hungary. Besides, other countries could take part also if there are available data similarly to Hungary from every month in the two decades of the period after the regime change in 1989-1990. But of course, it is not only an issue of human resources but also of funds. What would be easier and methodologically more appropriate and stronger is to conduct a cross-sectional analysis in Post-Communist European countries to make a similar analysis that I have done here to explore the content and specialities of social trust, i.e. the cultural or country differences in familiarity, trust, confidence, thin trust, thick trust, and institutional trust.

It would be also useful to make more confirmative analyses about social and institutional trust to highlight the different factors, directions, and intensity of social and economic backgrounds, and also their inter-connectedness in terms of elements and effects of trust. It could be done both on country level as case studies and on regional level as a comparative study.

The use of other methods would also give an important support to the research of social and institutional trust. Qualitative methods could help to explore and understand better the content, the changing nature, and the mechanisms of social and institutional trust. I fully agree with Piotr Sztompka who also emphasizes it: “when it comes to research we mostly direct questions to individuals and then count the answers. [...] I believe that the future challenge in the research on trust is to develop new, original qualitative techniques and procedures, rather than relying on multiplying surveys and artificial experiments that most often take artefacts for realities”²³⁴. Thus, it would be worth to make focus group interviews and in-depth

²³⁴ Sztompka, Piotr (2006): *op. cit.*, p. 918

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sociological interviews with lay citizens, experts, and members of the institutional framework. Other, more complex research methods, e.g. citizen meetings, deliberative conferences, citizen jury or the Open Space Technology could also add important new knowledge and insights for combining quantitative and qualitative research methods on the one hand, and for finding new evidences and relationships between social and economic dimensions with social and institutional trust on the other.

Besides widening the research of social and institutional trust in time, geographically, thematically, and methodologically, it would be also worth to change the focus or the viewpoint of the research and the researchers. As I have already mentioned it in the theoretical chapters and in my analyses here as well, the issue of trustworthiness is also an important, maybe or according to many scholars, the most important issue here. Thus, it would be very fruitful both for future research in social sciences and for the operation of democracies with democratic citizens if more attention was paid on the content, the elements, the mechanisms, and the social perception of trustworthiness of democratic institutions.

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Annex

In the following chapter, the reader can find the questionnaire of the cross-sectional analysis which was designed by the author. The questionnaires of the comparative and the longitudinal data are public and can be found on the Internet and in printed format, thus, I will not incorporate it into the Annex. After the questionnaire, I present the program files and the tables of the statistical analyses of the comparative, the longitudinal, and the cross-sectional research.

Questionnaire for the cross-sectional analysis

The code 0 always stands for “do not know” while X stands for “no answer”.

ANSWER SHEET!

1. How much do you agree with the following opinion: most people can be trusted? You can see a 7-point scale on this answer sheet, 1 stands for not at all and 7 means you completely agree with the opinion that most people can be trusted. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

DO NOT AGREE

AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 COMPLETELY AGREE
0 - X -

2. And in your opinion:

- 3 - most people can be trusted,
- 2 - less people can be trusted or
- 1 - hardly any people can be trusted?
- 0 - X -

3. Let's imagine that you would like to buy a new car, so you go to a salon of already-owned cars where you have not been to before. The dealer offers you a car that costs half price compared to a new one. What would you do:

- 2 - you would buy the car, because if it is good, you get a car for half price, so you make a good business or
- 1 - you would not buy it, because if it turns out later that it has a serious problem, it is worse than if you had bought a new car?
- 0 - X -

4. Let's imagine that you bought the car, but it turns out that it has a serious problem. What would you think mostly, what would be your main feeling about it:

- 1 - that you were defrauded, so it was the fault of the dealer or
- 2 - that you were unlucky and nobody is responsible for this?
- 0 - X -

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5. Now, I would like to ask you about some institutions and organisations and I would like to know how much confidence you have in them. How much confidence do you have, for example, in the Government? A great deal, quite a lot, not very much or you do not have confidence in the Government at all? And in the...?

	A GREAT DEAL	QUITE A LOT	NOT VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	0 X
<i>government</i>	4	3	2	1	0 X
courts	4	3	2	1	0 X
parliament	4	3	2	1	0 X
churches	4	3	2	1	0 X
political parties	4	3	2	1	0 X
Constitutional Court	4	3	2	1	0 X
public prosecutors	4	3	2	1	0 X
army	4	3	2	1	0 X
trade unions	4	3	2	1	0 X
president of the state	4	3	2	1	0 X
European Commission	4	3	2	1	0 X
the police	4	3	2	1	0 X
local municipality	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian National Television	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian National Radio	4	3	2	1	0 X
daily papers	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian Central Bank	4	3	2	1	0 X
commercial banks	4	3	2	1	0 X
insurance companies	4	3	2	1	0 X
International Monetary Fund, IMF	4	3	2	1	0 X
World Bank	4	3	2	1	0 X

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6. Now, I will list them once more and please, tell me about each of them how much you think they do their job with goodwill and in favour of the people. How much confidence you have, for example, in the Government about doing its job with goodwill and in favour of the citizens: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or you do not have confidence about doing his job with goodwill and in favour of the people at all? And in the...?

	A GREAT DEAL	QUITE A LOT	NOT VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	0 X
<i>government</i>	4	3	2	1	0 X
courts	4	3	2	1	0 X
parliament	4	3	2	1	0 X
churches	4	3	2	1	0 X
political parties	4	3	2	1	0 X
Constitutional Court	4	3	2	1	0 X
public prosecutors	4	3	2	1	0 X
army	4	3	2	1	0 X
trade unions	4	3	2	1	0 X
president of the state	4	3	2	1	0 X
European Commission	4	3	2	1	0 X
the police	4	3	2	1	0 X
local municipality	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian National Television	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian National Radio	4	3	2	1	0 X
daily papers	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian Central Bank	4	3	2	1	0 X
commercial banks	4	3	2	1	0 X
insurance companies	4	3	2	1	0 X
International Monetary Fund, IMF	4	3	2	1	0 X
World Bank	4	3	2	1	0 X

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7. Let's go through the list once more and please, tell me how much you think they do their job with competence. For example, how much confidence you have in the Government about doing its job with competence: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or you do not have competence about doing his job with competence at all. And the...?

	A GREAT DEAL	QUITE A LOT	NOT VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	0 X
<i>government</i>	4	3	2	1	0 X
courts	4	3	2	1	0 X
parliament	4	3	2	1	0 X
churches	4	3	2	1	0 X
political parties	4	3	2	1	0 X
Constitutional Court	4	3	2	1	0 X
public prosecutors	4	3	2	1	0 X
army	4	3	2	1	0 X
trade unions	4	3	2	1	0 X
president of the state	4	3	2	1	0 X
European Commission	4	3	2	1	0 X
the police	4	3	2	1	0 X
local municipality	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian National Television	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian National Radio	4	3	2	1	0 X
daily papers	4	3	2	1	0 X
Hungarian Central Bank	4	3	2	1	0 X
commercial banks	4	3	2	1	0 X
insurance companies	4	3	2	1	0 X
International Monetary Fund, IMF	4	3	2	1	0 X
World Bank	4	3	2	1	0 X

8. Regarding these institutions and the people who are working there, in your opinion, which one is more important:

2 - they should rather have less competence but should have goodwill or

1 - they should rather have less goodwill but should have competence?

0 - X -

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9. How much confidence do you have in your neighbours: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or you do not have confidence in them at all? And in the...?

	A GREAT DEAL	QUITE A LOT	NOT VERY MUCH	NOT AT ALL	0 X
<i>your neighbours</i>	4	3	2	1	0 X
shop assistants	4	3	2	1	0 X
school teachers	4	3	2	1	0 X
doctors, nurses	4	3	2	1	0 X
your co-workers and colleagues	4	3	2	1	0 X
your friends and close acquaintances	4	3	2	1	0 X
your family members and relatives	4	3	2	1	0 X
people who are living in the same settlement with you	4	3	2	1	0 X
other Hungarian people in general	4	3	2	1	0 X

10. Now, I read out some opinions and I would like to ask you to tell me about each of them how much you agree on it: completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree or completely disagree with it.

	COMPLETELY AGREE	RATHER AGREE	RATHER DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	0 X
In general, people could be trusted more before the regime change than nowadays.	4	3	2	1	0 X
In general, all institutions, let's say schools, hospitals, and the Parliament did a better job before the regime change than nowadays.	4	3	2	1	0 X
One could trust his/her neighbours, colleagues, and the shop keeper of the local grocery store more before the regime change than nowadays.	4	3	2	1	0 X
Corruption was less before the regime change than nowadays.	4	3	2	1	0 X
Employers respected their employees and workers more before the regime change than nowadays.	4	3	2	1	0 X
Family cohesion was stronger and family members could trust or count on each other more before the regime change than nowadays.	4	3	2	1	0 X

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11. In your opinion, what was the most important to get ahead, for example, admission to a good school, to a good job or getting a flat in the old regime, before the regime change:

- 5 - diligence/effort and hard work,
 - 4 - good relationships and contact to influential people,
 - 3 - knowledge and talent,
 - 2 - bribe to the person who decides about it or
 - 1 - luck?
-
- 0 - X -

12. And what do you think what is the most important now to get ahead, for example, admission to a good school, to a good job or getting a flat:

- 5 - diligence/effort and hard work,
 - 4 - good relationships and contact to influential people,
 - 3 - knowledge and talent,
 - 2 - bribe to the person who decides about it or
 - 1 - luck?
-
- 0 - X -

Program files for the statistical analyses

The comparative analysis

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*****1999/2000*****.
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fre country.
fre weost_de.
weight by weight.
fre v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212 v213.
recode v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212
(1=100) (2=67) (3=33) (4=0) (else=copy).
mis val v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212 (-
1, -2).
execute.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211
v212
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
***Another weighting variable for Germany!****.
***ZA: Variable weight1 : weight (Germany West and East)
Literal Question
Weight - Germany West and East
Note:
Germany: Weight to correct for the lower probability of getting respondents
from more person households (to deal with West and East Germany
separately).***.
```

```
weight by wogew_de.
temporary.
select if weost_de=1.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211
v212
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
MEANS
  TABLES=v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212
BY weost_de
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

fre o26 o27 wave.
recode o26 o27 (1=100) (2=67) (3=33) (4=0) (else=copy).
mis val o26 o27 (-1, -2).
execute.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=o26 o27
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

weight by wogew_de.
temporary.
select if weost_de=2.
  DESCRIPTIVES
    VARIABLES=o26 o27
    /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
MEANS
  TABLES=o26 o27 BY weost_de
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

recode nato (1=100) (2=67) (3=33) (4=0) (else=copy).
mis val nato (-1, -2).
execute.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=nato
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

*****1990*****.

fre country country1.
select if country1=3 or country1=11 or country1=24.
execute.
fre weight weight1.
fre q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k q556l
q557m.
recode q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k
q556l q557m (1=100) (2=67) (3=33) (4=0) (else=copy).
mis val q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k
q556l q557m (-2).
execute.

weight by weight1.
temporary.
select if country1=11.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j
q555k q556l q557m
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

***Another weighting variable for Germany!****.
***ZA: Variable weight : weight factor
Literal Question
Weight factor
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

This variable contains weights that adjust the weighted samples to make them representative for the countries from which they were drawn (to deal with Germany

West and Germany East separately).***.

****So it's the opposite than in 1999/2000!!!!****.

weight by weight.

temporary.

select if country=3.

DESCRIPTIVES

VARIABLES=q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j
q555k q556l q557m

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

temporary.

select if country1=3.

MEANS

TABLES=q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k
q556l q557m BY country

/CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV

/STATISTICS ANOVA .

*****1981*****.

weight by weight.

fre country.

select if country=8112 or country=8103.

fre country.

fre v538 v539 v540 v541 v542 v543 v544 v545 v546 v547.

recode v538 v539 v540 v541 v542 v543 v544 v545 v546 v547 (1=100) (2=67)
(3=33) (4=0) (else=copy).

mis val v538 v539 v540 v541 v542 v543 v544 v545 v546 v547 (-2).

execute.

temporary.

select if country=8103.

DESCRIPTIVES

VARIABLES=v538 v539 v540 v541 v542 v543 v544 v545 v546 v547

/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

*****Merge*****.

compute wave=2.

val lab wave 2 '1990'.

fre wave.

select if country=11.

fre country.

compute wave=1.

val lab wave 1 '1981' 2 '1990' 99 '1999'.

fre wave.

select if country=8103.

fre country.

fre id_cocas.

weight by weight.

fre chur arme educ pres trad poli parl civi soci euro just.

temporary.

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```
select if wave=1 or wave=2.
MEANS
  TABLES=chur arme educ pres trad poli parl civi soci euro just BY wave
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

fre country1 country.
***weight1: dealing with E-W Germany, country1: also***.

select if country1=3.
fre country.

***changing them!***.

recode country1 (3=1) (4=2).
val lab country1 1 'west' 2 'east'.
fre country1.

if (wave=1) country1=1.
fre country1.

fre weight weight1.
if (wave=1) weight1=weight.
fre weight weight1.

weight by weight1.
fre chur arme educ pres trad poli parl civi soci euro just nato majo.

temporary.
select if country1=2 and (wave=2 or wave=99).
MEANS
  TABLES=chur arme educ pres trad poli parl civi soci euro just BY wave
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

*****1990/2000*****.

fre country1.
select if country1=4 or country1=18 or country1=19 or country1=20 or
country1=21 or country1=22 or country1=23 or country1=24 or country1=25 or
country1=26 or
country1=27 or country1=29 or country1=34 or country1=35 or country1=36.
fre country1.

recode country1 (4=1) (18 thr 20=3) (21 thr 24=1) (25 thr 27=2) (29=3)
(34=2) (35 thr 36=3) into region1.
val lab region1 1 'central europe' 2 'eastern, south europe' 3 'former
soviet union'.
fre region1.

compute region2=region1.
if (country1=24) region2=0.
val lab region2 0 'hungary' 1 ' other central european' 2 'eastern, south
europe' 3 'former soviet union'.
fre region1 region2.

***the weight for Germany separately***.

weight by weight1.
```

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```
fre v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212 v213
o26 o27.
fre c08.
```

```
recode v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212 o26
o27 (1=100) (2=67) (3=33) (4=0) (else=copy).
```

```
mis val v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212
o26 o27 (-1, -2, -4).
```

```
execute.
```

```
temporary.
```

```
select if region1=2.
```

```
DESCRIPTIVES
```

```
VARIABLES=v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211
v212 o26 o27
```

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
MEANS
```

```
TABLES=v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212
o26 o27 BY region1
```

```
/CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
```

```
/STATISTICS ANOVA .
```

```
temporary.
```

```
select if region2=1.
```

```
DESCRIPTIVES
```

```
VARIABLES=v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211
v212 o26 o27
```

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
CROSSTABS
```

```
/TABLES=country1 BY o26 o27
```

```
/FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES
```

```
/CELLS= COUNT ROW
```

```
/COUNT ROUND CELL .
```

```
temporary.
```

```
select if region1=1.
```

```
MEANS
```

```
TABLES=v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209 v210 v211 v212
o26 o27 BY region2
```

```
/CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
```

```
/STATISTICS ANOVA .
```

```
CROSSTABS
```

```
/TABLES=country1 BY v200 v201 v202 v203 v204 v205 v206 v207 v208 v209
v210 v211 v212 o26 o27
```

```
/FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES
```

```
/CELLS= COUNT ROW
```

```
/COUNT ROUND CELL .
```

```
*****1990*****.
```

```
fre country.
```

```
select if country=4 or country=18 or country=19 or country=20 or country=21
or country=22 or country=23 or country=24 or country=25 or country=26 or
country=34.
```

```
fre country.
```

```
recode country (4=1) (18 thr 20=3) (21 thr 24=1) (25 thr 34=2) into
region11.
```

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```
val lab region11 1 'central europe' 2 'eastern, south europe' 3 'former
soviet union'.
fre region11.

compute region22=region11.
if (country=24) region22=0.
val lab region22 0 'hungary' 1 ' other central european' 2 'eastern, south
europe' 3 'former soviet union'.
fre region11 region22.

weight by weight1.
weight off.
temporary.
select if country=4.
fre weight weight1.

***the weight for Germany separately***.

weight by weight.
fre q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k q556l
q557m.
recode q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k
q556l q557m (1=100) (2=67) (3=33) (4=0) (else=copy).
mis val q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k
q556l q557m (-2, -1, -4).
execute.
temporary.
select if region11=3.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j
q555k q556l q557m
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

CROSSTABS
  /TABLES=country BY q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i
q554j q555k q556l q557m
  /FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES
  /CELLS= COUNT ROW
  /COUNT ROUND CELL .

MEANS
  TABLES=q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k
q556l q557m BY region11
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

temporary.
select if region22=3.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j
q555k q556l q557m
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

temporary.
select if region22=0 or region22=3.
MEANS
  TABLES=q545a q546b q547c q548d q549e q550f q551g q552h q553i q554j q555k
q556l q557m BY region22
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .
```


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```
*****merge*****.
```

```
***changing the two weights and country codes in 1999/2000 to the same with  
the 1990***.
```

```
fre country.  
select if country=4 or country=21 or country=22 or country=23 or country=24  
or country=25 or country=26 or country=34.  
fre country.  
fre sex birth.  
fre year.
```

```
CROSSTABS  
  /TABLES=country BY year  
  /FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES  
  /CELLS= COUNT row  
  /COUNT ROUND CELL .
```

```
fre scho.  
  ses v320 v320_cs v322 v323.  
fre incom town.  
fre q721.  
recode q731 (401=1) (402=2) (403=3) (404=4) (405=5) (406=6) (407=7) (408=8)  
(409=9) (410=10) (2101=1) (2102=2) (2103=3) (2104=4) (2105=5) (2106=6)  
(2107=7)  
(2108=8) (2109=9) (2110=10) (2201 thr 2203=1) (2204 thr 2205=2) (2206 thr  
2207=3) (2208 thr 2209=4) (2210 thr 2211=5) (2212 thr 2213=6) (2214 thr  
2215=7)  
(2216 thr 2217=8) (2218 thr 2219=9) (2220 thr 2224=10) (2302 thr 2303=1)  
(2304 thr 2305=2) (2306 thr 2307=3) (2308 thr 2309=4) (2310 thr 2311=5)  
(2312 thr 2313=6)  
(2314 thr 2315=7) (2316 thr 2317=8) (2318 thr 2319=9) (2320 thr 2324=10)  
(2401=1) (2402=2) (2403=3) (2404=4) (2405=5) (2406=6) (2407=7) (2408=8)  
(2409=9)  
(2410=10) (2501=1) (2502=2) (2503=3) (2504=4) (2505=5) (2506=6) (2507=7)  
(2508=8) (2509=9) (2510=10) (2601=1) (2602=2) (2603=3) (2604=4) (2605=5)  
(2607=7) (2608=8) (2609=9) (3401=1) (3402=2) (3403=3) (3404=4) (3405=5)  
(3406=6) (3407=7) (3408=8) (3409=9) (3410=10) into incom.  
val lab incom 1 'lowest' 10 'highest'.  
var lab incom ' household income'.  
fre incom.
```

```
recode incom (sysmis=-2).  
execute.  
temporary.  
select if incom=-2.  
fre q731.
```

```
if (q731=2606) incom=6.  
recode incom (-2=sysmis) (else=copy).  
fre incom.
```

```
fre year country.  
weight by weight.  
recode year (1990 thr 1993=1) (1999=2) into evs.  
val lab evs 1 '1990' 2 '1999'.  
fre evs.
```

```
recode country (4 thr 24=1) (else=2) into region1.  
val lab region1 1 'central eu' 2 'east, south eu'.
```

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```
fre region1.

compute region2=region1.
if (country=24) region2=0.
val lab region2 0 'hungary' 1 'other central' 2 'east, south'.
fre region2.
recode region2 (1 thr 2=1) (else=copy) into region3.
val lab region3 0 'hungary' 1 'other cee'.
fre region3.
fre chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro.

temporary.
select if evs=1 and region1=2.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

temporary.
select if evs=1.
MEANS
  TABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro BY region1
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

temporary.
select if evs=1 and region2=1.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

temporary.
select if evs=1 and region1=1.
MEANS
  TABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro BY region2
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

temporary.
select if evs=1 and region3=1.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

temporary.
select if evs=1.
MEANS
  TABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro BY region3
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .

temporary.
select if evs=2.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

temporary.
select if region2=1.
MEANS
  TABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro BY evs
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
/CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV  
/STATISTICS ANOVA .
```

temporary.

```
select if evs=2 and country=23.
```

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro  
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

temporary.

```
select if country=21.
```

MEANS

```
TABLES=chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro BY evs  
/CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV  
/STATISTICS ANOVA .
```

*****clusters of variables*****.

temporary.

```
select if evs=2.
```

```
PROXIMITIES chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro  
/MATRIX OUT ('C:\DOCUME~1\el3\LOCALS~1\Temp\spss4040\spssclus.tmp')  
/VIEW= VARIABLE  
/MEASURE= SEUCLID  
/PRINT NONE  
/STANDARDIZE= NONE .
```

CLUSTER

```
/MATRIX IN ('C:\DOCUME~1\el3\LOCALS~1\Temp\spss4040\spssclus.tmp')  
/METHOD BAVERAGE  
/PRINT SCHEDULE  
/PLOT DENDROGRAM VICICLE.
```

```
ERASE FILE= 'C:\DOCUME~1\el3\LOCALS~1\Temp\spss4040\spssclus.tmp'.
```

temporary.

```
select if evs=2 and region2=1.
```

```
PROXIMITIES chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro  
/MATRIX OUT ('C:\DOCUME~1\el3\LOCALS~1\Temp\spss4040\spssclus.tmp')  
/VIEW= VARIABLE  
/MEASURE= SEUCLID  
/PRINT NONE  
/STANDARDIZE= NONE .
```

CLUSTER

```
/MATRIX IN ('C:\DOCUME~1\el3\LOCALS~1\Temp\spss4040\spssclus.tmp')  
/METHOD BAVERAGE  
/PRINT SCHEDULE  
/PLOT DENDROGRAM VICICLE.
```

```
ERASE FILE= 'C:\DOCUME~1\el3\LOCALS~1\Temp\spss4040\spssclus.tmp'.
```

temporary.

```
select if evs=2.
```

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro  
/MISSING  
LISTWISE /ANALYSIS chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro  
/PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION  
/PLOT EIGEN  
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION ML  
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25)  
/ROTATION VARIMAX .
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
temporary.  
select if evs=2.  
FACTOR  
  /VARIABLES arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci /MISSING  
  LISTWISE /ANALYSIS arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci  
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION  
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(2) ITERATE(25)  
  /EXTRACTION ML  
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25)  
  /ROTATION VARIMAX .
```

***az egyhaz nelkul jo, csak a goodness of fit szign., es több változó rajta ul ket faktoron. ezert most 2-vel probaljuk, amugy is gyanus volt az abra szerint a 3.

2-nel elromlik az EU es az armed f., de a futtatás után se jo a goodness of fit, raadasul az egyik fakroton van ket változó, a masikon pedig az osszes tobbi. ugyhogy

szeparalt fokomponenssel fogjuk, de elobb megnezzuk az 1999-eset. 99-ben se jo az egyhaz es az EU, se a goodness of fit. Es több is mindketton rajta ul.

most regionkent, hatha a sokfeleseg a baj***

```
temporary.  
select if evs=2 and region1=1.  
FACTOR  
  /VARIABLES chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro  
/MISSING  
  LISTWISE /ANALYSIS chur arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci euro  
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION  
  /PLOT EIGEN  
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)  
  /EXTRACTION ML  
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25)  
  /ROTATION VARIMAX .
```

```
temporary.  
select if evs=2 and region1=1.  
FACTOR  
  /VARIABLES arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci /MISSING  
  LISTWISE /ANALYSIS arme educ just pres trad poli parl civi soci  
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION  
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(2) ITERATE(25)  
  /EXTRACTION ML  
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25)  
  /ROTATION VARIMAX .
```

CECs, 1990: egyhaz es EU nem jo, armed f. epp hogy+rajta mindketton, több rajta mindketton. 1999: egyhaz es EU most se jo, goodness of fit sem, több rajta mindketton. Akkor szeparalunk!

```
temporary.  
select if evs=2.  
FACTOR  
  /VARIABLES pres trad euro /MISSING  
  LISTWISE /ANALYSIS pres trad euro  
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION  
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)  
  /EXTRACTION PC
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
/ROTATION NOROTATE  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

***1990: nem illeszkedik az EU, de jo a semleges tars. intezmenyekhez, a donteshozokhoz nem jo, az egyhaz meg sehova. Es mind a harom 50% felett van!*

```
educ civi soci  
arme just poli parl  
pres trad euro
```

```
temporary.  
select if evs=1.
```

```
FACTOR  
  /VARIABLES pres trad euro /MISSING  
  LISTWISE /ANALYSIS pres trad euro  
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION  
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)  
  /EXTRACTION PC  
  /ROTATION NOROTATE  
  /SAVE REG(ALL)  
  /METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

***1999: az EU itt illeszkedik a hatalomhoz, de az osszevetes miatt inkabb most is a semlegesekhez tesszuk. Az egyhaz itt se jo sehova. Es ezek is 50% felett!*

```
temporary.  
select if evs=2.
```

```
FACTOR  
  /VARIABLES pres trad euro /MISSING  
  LISTWISE /ANALYSIS pres trad euro  
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION  
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)  
  /EXTRACTION PC  
  /ROTATION NOROTATE  
  /SAVE REG(ALL)  
  /METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

```
fre fokomp11 fokomp12 fokomp13 fokomp21 fokomp22 fokomp23.  
compute fokomp1=fokomp11.  
if (evs=2) fokomp1=fokomp21.  
compute fokomp2=fokomp12.  
if (evs=2) fokomp2=fokomp22.  
compute fokomp3=fokomp13.  
if (evs=2) fokomp3=fokomp23.  
var lab fokomp1 'state services'.  
var lab fokomp2 'decision makers, power repr'.  
var lab fokomp3 'neutral, social/civil inst'.  
fre fokomp1 fokomp2 fokomp3.
```

```
temporary.  
select if region2=2.  
MEANS  
  TABLES=fokomp1 fokomp2 fokomp3 BY evs  
  /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV  
  /STATISTICS ANOVA .
```

```
temporary.  
select if evs=2 and region1=1.  
MEANS
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
TABLES=fokomp1 fokomp2 fokomp3 BY region2
/CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
/STATISTICS ANOVA .
```

```
temporary.
select if evs=2 and (region2=0 or region2=2).
MEANS
TABLES=fokomp1 fokomp2 fokomp3 BY region2
/CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV
/STATISTICS ANOVA .
```

The longitudinal analysis

```
fre kerdiv.
fre havisuly.
weight by havisuly.
```

****ellenőrizni, hogy jól vannak-e kódolva a bizalom változók, az iskolát, a kort és a súlyt, eurégiót, legyártani az évet, kbankbizt átírni bankbizre a mördzsöléshez**

```
*****
*****.
*****1991-
1995*****
*****.
*****
*****.
```

****1991 (1990-ben nincs), csak jan. adat! 100-fokú**

```
fre egyhbiz szaksbiz partbiz parlbiz alkbiz elnbiz kormbiz hadsbiz rendbiz
onkorbiz birobiz sajtobiz.
```

```
temporary.
select if egyhbiz=100.
fre kerdiv.
```

```
select if kerdiv=1991101.
fre kerdiv.
```

****1992, csak két hónap, nem ua. itemekkel és mintanagysággal, 100-fokú**

```
fre kormbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz lapokbiz mrbiz parlbiz egyhbiz hadsbiz birobiz
sajtobiz szaksbiz partbiz rendbiz.
```

```
temporary.
select if kormbiz=100.
fre kerdiv.
```

```
select if kerdiv=1992011 or kerdiv=1992121.
fre kerdiv.
```

****1993, 4 hónap, eltérő mintanagyságok, mindenféle 100-fokú, 3:sima 100, 9: 5-fokú, 10: sima 100, sajtó helyett MR, MTV, lapok, 12: sima 100, megint sajtó**

```
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz sajtobiz lapokbiz mtvbiz mrbiz.
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
temporary.
select if kormbiz=100.
fre kerdiv.

select if kerdiv=1993031 or kerdiv=1993091 or kerdiv=1993101 or
kerdiv=1993122.
fre kerdiv.

temporary.
select if kerdiv=1993122.
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz sajtobiz lapokbiz mtvbiz mrbiz.

***1994, 4 hó, kül. 100-fokú, 7, 9, 10: sima 100, 12: 5-fokú

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz sajtobiz.

temporary.
select if kormbiz=100.
fre kerdiv.

select if kerdiv=1994071 or kerdiv=1994091 or kerdiv=1994101 or
kerdiv=1994121.
fre kerdiv.

temporary.
select if kerdiv=1994121.
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz sajtobiz.

recode onkorbiz (9=sysmis) (else=copy).
fre onkorbiz.

***1995: bizalom összevissza, jan: 100-fokú+egy érték (means?), feb-júl,
nov-dec: 4-fokú, isk4-en nincs sehol label, aug-okt: régi isk4

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbibiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz napibiz.

temporary.
select if kormbiz=100 or kormbiz=1.
fre kerdiv.

***jan, okt

recode kormbiz to napibiz (0=0) (33.3=33) (66.7=67) (100=100) (else=-1).
fre kormbiz to napibiz.

compute kerdiv=199501.
fre kerdiv.

***feb, márc, ápr, jún-dec

compute kerdiv=199512.
fre kerdiv.
fre isk4.

fre jov4.
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

***eredeti 1995-ös: nincs kerdiv! datumok es honapok se mindig

fre datum datum2 honap.

fre kormbiz.

temporary.
select if kormbiz=100 or kormbiz=1.
fre honap.
fre felvetel.

compute ev=1995.
fre ev.

weight by suly.
fre ev.

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz.

temporary.
select if mrbiz=4.
fre kormbiz kerdiv.

select if kerdiv=199502 or kerdiv=199503 or kerdiv=199504 or kerdiv=199506
or kerdiv=199507 or kerdiv=199508 or kerdiv=199509 or kerdiv=199511
or kerdiv=199512.
fre kerdiv.

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz.
recode kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz (0=-1) (1=0) (2=33) (3=67)
(4=100).
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz.

select if kerdiv=199501 or kerdiv=199510.
fre kerdiv.
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz.

select if ev=1991 or ev=1992 or ev=1993 or ev=1994.
fre ev.

recode kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz (33.3=33)
(66.67 thr 66.7=67) (else=copy).
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz.

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz.
mis val kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz (-2, -1).
execute.

DESCRIPTIVES

VARIABLES=kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

compute polbiz=(kormbiz+parlbiz+partbiz+elnbiz+onkorbiz)/5.
fre polbiz.

temporary.
select if kormbiz=-1 or kormbiz=-2.
fre polbiz.

compute enforc=(birobiz+alkbiz+hadsbiz+rendbiz)/4.
fre enforc.

compute tarsbiz=(egyhbiz+szaksbiz+mtvbiz+mrbiz+lapokbiz)/5.
fre tarsbiz.

QUICK CLUSTER
  polbiz enforc tarsbiz
  /MISSING=LISTWISE
  /CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(80) CONVERGE(0)
  /METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)
  /PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.

QUICK CLUSTER
  polbiz enforc tarsbiz
  /MISSING=LISTWISE
  /CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(30) CONVERGE(0)
  /METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)
  /SAVE CLUSTER
  /PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.

val lab klaszt4 1 'kiábrándult' 2 'bízó, főleg jogiban' 3 'pol-iból
kiábrándult' 4 'társ-iból kiábrándult'.
fre klaszt4.

val lab klaszt6 1 'disappointed' 2 'new democrats/pol regime change' 3
'trust civil soc+rule of law' 4 'blind trust' 5 'order-loving suspicious'
6 'law prevails+weak civil soc'.
fre klaszt6.

*****
*****
*****1996-
2000*****
*****
*****
*****

***1996, 1997, 1999: 1-1 hóban nincs

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz.

temporary.
select if kormbiz=100.
fre kerdiv.

recode kerdiv (1996011 thr 1996061=1) (1996072 thr hi=1) (else=2) into sel.
fre kerdiv sel.

select if sel=1.
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
fre kerdiv.
```

```
recode kerdiv (1997012 thr hi=1) (else=2) into sel.  
fre kerdiv sel.
```

```
recode kerdiv (lo thr 1999031=1) (1999042 thr hi=1) (else=2) into sel.  
fre kerdiv sel.
```

```
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz  
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz.  
mis val kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz  
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz (-1, -2).  
execute.
```

```
DESCRIPTIVES
```

```
VARIABLES=kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz  
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz  
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
recode kerdiv (98011 thr 98121=1998) (1996011 thr 1996121=1996) (1997011  
thr 1997121=1997) (1999011 thr 1999121=1999) (2000011 thr 2000121=2000)  
into ev.  
fre ev.
```

```
***73 főnek nincs kora vagy kiskorú
```

```
select if kor5=1 or kor5=2 or kor5=3 or kor5=4 or kor5=5.  
fre kor5.
```

```
weight by havisuly.  
fre ev.
```

```
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz  
onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz.  
mis val kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz  
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz (-1, -2).  
execute.
```

```
DESCRIPTIVES
```

```
VARIABLES=kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz  
elnbiz onkorbiz rendbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz  
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
compute polbiz=(kormbiz+parlbiz+partbiz+elnbiz+onkorbiz)/5.  
fre polbiz.
```

```
compute enforc=(birobiz+alkbiz+hadsbiz+rendbiz)/4.  
fre enforc.
```

```
compute tarsbiz=(egyhbiz+szaksbiz+mtvbiz+mrbiz+lapokbiz)/5.  
fre tarsbiz.
```

```
compute gazdbiz=(bankbiz+biztbiz)/2.  
fre gazdbiz.
```

```
QUICK CLUSTER
```

```
polbiz enforc tarsbiz gazdbiz  
/MISSING=LISTWISE  
/CRITERIA= CLUSTER(3) MXITER(80) CONVERGE(0)  
/METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)  
/PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
***QUICK CLUSTER
```

```
  polbiz enforc tarsbiz gazdbiz  
  /MISSING=LISTWISE  
  /CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(80) CONVERGE(0)  
  /METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)  
  /SAVE CLUSTER  
  /PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.
```

```
val lab klaszt6 1 'teljesen kiábrándult' 2 'gazd-iakból kiábrándult' 3  
'gazd, jogiban bízó' 4 'gazd-iból kiábrándult bízó' 5 'nagy bizalom minden'  
6 'bizalmatlan'.
```

```
fre klaszt6.***.
```

```
***kidobjuk a gazdbizt a modellből, mert mindig rossz miatta az F-  
statisztika, 3-6 klaszterre
```

```
QUICK CLUSTER
```

```
  polbiz enforc tarsbiz  
  /MISSING=LISTWISE  
  /CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(80) CONVERGE(0)  
  /METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)  
  /PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.
```

```
QUICK CLUSTER
```

```
  polbiz enforc tarsbiz  
  /MISSING=LISTWISE  
  /CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(80) CONVERGE(0)  
  /METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)  
  /SAVE CLUSTER  
  /PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.
```

```
val lab klaszt6 1 'strong state' 2 'trust civil soc+rule of law' 3 'order-  
loving suspicious' 4 'blind trust' 5 'civil soc modestly' 6 'disappointed'.  
fre klaszt6.
```

```
*****  
*****.  
*****2001-  
2005*****  
*****.  
*****  
*****.
```

```
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz hadsbiz szaksbiz elnbiz  
rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz.  
fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz ugybiz hadsbiz szaksbiz  
elnbiz rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz mnbbiz lapokbiz kbankbiz biztbiz  
eubizbiz.
```

```
temporary.
```

```
select if kormbiz=4.
```

```
fre kerdiv.
```

```
recode kerdiv (200501 thr 20050301=1) (20051001 thr 20051002=1)
```

```
(20051202=1) (else=2) into sel.
```

```
fre sel.
```

```
select if sel=1.
```

```
fre kerdiv.
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

***iskola változó nem stimmel! 2000: régi isk4, 2001: régi isk4 isko4 néven, csak 2 óra, 2002: isk5 más kódokkal isk4 néven, isk5 1 óra, 2003: isk5,

2004: isk5, isk4 csak pár hónapra

temporary.

select if ev=2001.

fre isk4 kor5 isko4 isko5 isk5.

if (ev=2001) isk4=isko4.

fre isk4.

fre isko4.

fre isko5.

fre isk5.

fre kor5.

fre kor.

fre szulev.

recode isk5 (1 thr 2=1) (3=2) (4=3) (5=4) into isk4.

val lab isk4 1 'max 8 oszt' 2 'szakm' 3 'éretts' 4 'diploma'.

fre isk4 isk5.

compute euregio=0.

if (megye=1) euregio=1.

if (megye=13) euregio=1.

if (megye=7) euregio=2.

if (megye=11) euregio=2.

if (megye=19) euregio=2.

if (megye=8) euregio=3.

if (megye=18) euregio=3.

if (megye=20) euregio=3.

if (megye=2) euregio=4.

if (megye=14) euregio=4.

if (megye=17) euregio=4.

if (megye=5) euregio=5.

if (megye=10) euregio=5.

if (megye=12) euregio=5.

if (megye=9) euregio=6.

if (megye=15) euregio=6.

if (megye=16) euregio=6.

if (megye=3) euregio=7.

if (megye=4) euregio=7.

if (megye=6) euregio=7.

exec.

value label euregio

1 "Közép-Magyarország"

2 "Közép-Dunántúl"

3 "Nyugat-Dunántúl"

4 "Dél-Dunántúl"

5 "Észak-Magyarország"

6 "Észak-Alföld"

7 "Dél-Alföld"/.

fre euregio.

***2001

compute isk4r=isko4.

if (isko5=1) isk4r=1.

if (isko5=2 or isko5=3) isk4r=2.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
if (isko5=4) isk4r=3.
if (isko5=5) isk4r=4.
fre isko4 isko5 isk4r.
recode isk4r (-2=sysmis) (else=copy).
val lab isk4r 1 '0-7 oszt' 2 '8 oszt+szakm' 3 'éretts' 4 'diploma'.
fre isk4r.

***2002

recode isk4e (1 thr 2=1) (3=2) (4=3) (5=4) into isk4.
val lab isk4 1 'max 8 oszt' 2 'szakm' 3 'éretts' 4 'diploma'.
fre isk4 isk4e.

compute ev=2001.
fre ev.

*ügyészség csak 2002-től

temporary.
select if ev=2003.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=ugybiz mnbbiz
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

***2003: van bankbiz és kbankbiz is

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz ugybiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz lapokbiz bankbiz
  biztbiz mnbbiz kbankbiz.

temporary.
select if kbankbiz=4.
fre kerdiv.

if (kerdiv=200312) bankbiz=kbankbiz.
fre bankbiz.

***2004

compute kor=104-szulev.
fre kor.
recode kor (18 thr 29=1) (30 thr 39=2) (40 thr 49=3) (50 thr 59=4) (60 thr
hi=5) into kor5.
val lab kor5 1 '18-29 éves' 2 '30-39 éves' 3 '40-49 éves' 4 '50-59 éves' 5
'60+'.
fre kor5.
fre megye euregio.

*pár hónapban nincs euregio, ezért újra legyártottam

select if ev=2001 or ev=2002 or ev=2003 or ev=2005.
fre ev.

weight by suly.
fre ev.

fre kormbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz ugybiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz eubizbiz rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz mnbbiz
  lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz.
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
recode korbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz ugybiz hadsbiz
szaksbiz elnbiz eubizbiz rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz mnbbiz
  lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz (-2 thr 0=-4) (1=0) (2=33) (3=67) (4=100).
mis val korbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz ugybiz hadsbiz
szaksbiz elnbiz eubizbiz rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz mnbbiz
  lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz (-4).
fre korbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz ugybiz hadsbiz szaksbiz
elnbiz eubizbiz rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz mnbbiz
  lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz.
```

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=korbiz birobiz parlbiz egyhbiz partbiz alkbiz ugybiz hadsbiz
szaksbiz elnbiz eubizbiz rendbiz onkorbiz mtvbiz mrbiz mnbbiz
  lapokbiz bankbiz biztbiz
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
compute polbiz=(korbiz+parlbiz+partbiz+elnbiz+eubizbiz+onkorbiz)/6.
fre polbiz.
```

```
compute enforc=(birobiz+alkbiz+ugybiz+hadsbiz+rendbiz)/5.
fre enforc.
```

```
compute tarsbiz=(egyhbiz+szaksbiz+mtvbiz+mrbiz+lapokbiz)/5.
fre tarsbiz.
```

```
compute gazdbiz=(mnbbiz+bankbiz+biztbiz)/3.
fre gazdbiz.
```

QUICK CLUSTER

```
polbiz enforc tarsbiz gazdbiz
/MISSING=LISTWISE
/CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(100) CONVERGE(0)
/METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)
/PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.
```

QUICK CLUSTER

```
polbiz enforc tarsbiz gazdbiz
/MISSING=LISTWISE
/CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(100) CONVERGE(0)
/METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)
/SAVE CLUSTER
/PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.
```

```
val lab klaszt6 1 'anti-capitalist suspicious' 2 'market-supporter trust' 3
'disappointed' 4 'blind trust' 5 'strong state, suspicious with the market'
6 'law prevails, trust'.
fre klaszt6.
```

```
*****
*****
*****2006-
2010*****
*****
*****
*****.
```

```
fre KORBIZ BIROBIZ PARLBIZ EGYHBIZ PARTBIZ ALKBIZ UGYBIZ HADSBIZ SZAKSBIZ
ELNBIZ EUBIZBIZ RENDBIZ ONKORBIZ MTVBIZ MRBIZ MNBBIZ
  LAPOKBIZ KBANKBIZ BIZTBIZ.
```

temporary.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
select if korbiz=4.  
fre kerdiv.
```

```
recode kerdiv (lo thr 200603=1) (200605 thr 20060101=1) (else=2) into sel.  
fre sel.
```

```
select if sel=1.  
fre kerdiv.
```

```
recode kerdiv (200802=1) (200804 thr 200805=1) (200808=1) (200810=1)  
(200812=1) (20080101=1) (20080301=1) (20080601=1) (20080701=1) (20080901=1)  
(else=2)  
into sel.  
fre sel.
```

```
select if sel=1.  
fre kerdiv.
```

```
recode kerdiv (200902=1) (200904=1) (200906 thr 200907=1) (200909 thr  
200912=1) (20090501=1) (20090801=1) (else=2) into sel.  
fre sel.
```

```
recode kerdiv (lo thr 20100201=1) (else=2) into sel.  
fre sel.
```

```
select if sel=1.  
fre kerdiv.
```

```
fre kor5.  
fre isk4 isk5.  
fre euregio.
```

```
compute ev=2006.  
fre kerdiv ev.
```

```
weight by suly.  
fre ev.
```

***2008

```
recode isk5 (8=sysmis) (else=copy).  
fre isk5.
```

***2009

```
recode UGYBIZ KBANKBIZ (100=4) (67=3) (33=2) (0=1) (-4=0).  
fre UGYBIZ KBANKBIZ.
```

***2010

```
fre KORBIZ BIROBIZ PARLBIZ EGYHBIZ PARTBIZ ALKBIZ UGYBIZ HADSBIZ SZAKSBIZ  
ELNBIZ EUBIZBIZ RENDBIZ ONKORBIZ ANTSZBIZ MTVBIZ MRBIZ  
LAPOKBIZ MNBBIZ KBANKBIZ BIZTBIZ.
```

```
recode isk5 (8=sysmis) (else=copy).  
fre isk5.
```

```
temporary.  
select if ev=2006.  
DESCRIPTIVES
```

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
VARIABLES=ugybiz mnbbiz
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

fre KORMBIZ BIROBIZ PARLBIZ EGYHBIZ PARTBIZ ALKBIZ UGYBIZ HADSBIZ SZAKSBIZ
ELNBIZ EUBIZBIZ RENDBIZ ONKORBIZ MTVBIZ MRBIZ MNBBIZ
LAPOKBIZ KBANKBIZ BIZTBIZ.
recode KORMBIZ BIROBIZ PARLBIZ EGYHBIZ PARTBIZ ALKBIZ UGYBIZ HADSBIZ
SZAKSBIZ ELNBIZ EUBIZBIZ RENDBIZ ONKORBIZ MTVBIZ MRBIZ MNBBIZ
LAPOKBIZ KBANKBIZ BIZTBIZ (0=-4) (1=0) (2=33) (3=67) (4=100).
mis val KORMBIZ BIROBIZ PARLBIZ EGYHBIZ PARTBIZ ALKBIZ UGYBIZ HADSBIZ
SZAKSBIZ ELNBIZ EUBIZBIZ RENDBIZ ONKORBIZ MTVBIZ MRBIZ MNBBIZ
LAPOKBIZ KBANKBIZ BIZTBIZ (-4).
fre KORMBIZ BIROBIZ PARLBIZ EGYHBIZ PARTBIZ ALKBIZ UGYBIZ HADSBIZ SZAKSBIZ
ELNBIZ EUBIZBIZ RENDBIZ ONKORBIZ MTVBIZ MRBIZ MNBBIZ
LAPOKBIZ KBANKBIZ BIZTBIZ.
DESCRIPTIVES
VARIABLES=KORMBIZ BIROBIZ PARLBIZ EGYHBIZ PARTBIZ ALKBIZ UGYBIZ HADSBIZ
SZAKSBIZ ELNBIZ EUBIZBIZ RENDBIZ ONKORBIZ MTVBIZ MRBIZ MNBBIZ
LAPOKBIZ KBANKBIZ BIZTBIZ
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

compute polbiz=(kormbiz+parlbiz+partbiz+elnbiz+eubizbiz+onkorbiz)/6.
fre polbiz.

compute enforc=(birobiz+alkbiz+ugybiz+hadsbiz+rendbiz)/5.
fre enforc.

compute tarsbiz=(egyhbiz+szaksbiz+mtvbiz+mrbiz+lapokbiz)/5.
fre tarsbiz.

compute gazdbiz=(mnbbiz+kbankbiz+biztbiz)/3.
fre gazdbiz.

QUICK CLUSTER
polbiz enforc tarsbiz gazdbiz
/MISSING=LISTWISE
/CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(100) CONVERGE(0)
/METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)
/PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.

QUICK CLUSTER
polbiz enforc tarsbiz gazdbiz
/MISSING=LISTWISE
/CRITERIA= CLUSTER(6) MXITER(100) CONVERGE(0)
/METHOD=KMEANS(NOUPDATE)
/SAVE CLUSTER
/PRINT INITIAL ANOVA.

val lab klaszt6 1 'order-loving suspicious' 2 'blind trust' 3
'disappointed' 4 'law prevails+weak econ' 5 'pol disappointed suspicious' 6
'market-friendly trustful'.
fre klaszt6.
```

The cross-sectional analysis

```
*****
*****Cross-sectional analysis*****
*****
```


E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

```
fre biz01 biz02 biz03 biz04 biz08 biz0901 biz0902 biz0903 biz0904 biz0905
biz1001 biz1002 biz1003 biz1004 biz1005 biz1006 biz1007 biz1008 biz1009
biz1101
  biz1102 biz1103 biz1104 biz1105 biz1106 biz12 biz13.
recode biz01 (0=-4) (1=0) (2=16.7) (3=33.4) (4=50.1) (5=66.8) (6=83.5)
(7=100) into rebiz01.
fre biz01 rebiz01.
mis val rebiz01 (-4).
execute.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=rebiz01
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

temporary.
select if kor5=1.
fre biz01.

mis val biz01 (0).
execute.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=biz01
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
mis val biz01 ().
execute.

recode biz1001 biz1002 biz1003 biz1004 biz1005 biz1006 biz1007 biz1008
biz1009 biz1101 biz1102 biz1103 biz1104 biz1105 biz1106 (0=-4) (1=0) (2=33)
(3=67) (4=100).
fre biz1001 biz1002 biz1003 biz1004 biz1005 biz1006 biz1007 biz1008 biz1009
biz1101 biz1102 biz1103 biz1104 biz1105 biz1106.
mis val biz1001 biz1002 biz1003 biz1004 biz1005 biz1006 biz1007 biz1008
biz1009 biz1101 biz1102 biz1103 biz1104 biz1105 biz1106 (-4).
execute.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=biz1001 biz1002 biz1003 biz1004 biz1005 biz1006 biz1007 biz1008
biz1009 biz1101 biz1102 biz1103 biz1104 biz1105 biz1106
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

fre korm1 biro1 parl1 egyhaz1 part1 alkb1 ugyesz1 hads1 szaksz1 elnok1
eubiz1 rend1 onkorm1 teve1 radio1 lapok1 mnb1 bank1 bizt1
  egbizt1 asz1 antsz1 oep1 imf1 vbank1 korm2 biro2 parl2 egyhaz2 part2
alkb2 ugyesz2 hads2 szaksz2 elnok2 eubiz2 rend2 onkorm2
  teve2 radio2 lapok2 mnb2 bank2 bizt2 egbizt2 asz2 antsz2 oep2 imf2 vbank2
korm3 biro3 parl3 egyhaz3 part3 alkb3 ugyesz3 hads3 szaksz3 elnok3 eubiz3
rend3 onkorm3
  teve3 radio3 lapok3 mnb3 bank3 bizt3 egbizt3 asz3 antsz3 oep3 imf3 vbank3
korm1 biro1 parl1 egyhaz1 part1 alkb1
  ugyesz1 hads1 szaksz1 elnok1 eubiz1 rend1 onkorm1 teve1 radio1
lapok1 mnb1 bank1 bizt1 egbizt1 asz1 antsz1 oep1 imf1 vbank1
polint jogint
  tarsint gazdint.

DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES= korm1 biro1 parl1 egyhaz1 part1 alkb1 ugyesz1 hads1 szaksz1
elnok1 eubiz1 rend1 onkorm1 teve1 radio1 lapok1 mnb1 bank1 bizt1 imf1
vbank1
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

recode korm1 (-4=23.22) (sysmis=23.22) (else=copy) into korm111.
```

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```
fre korm1 korm111.
recode biro1 (-4=53.85) (sysmis=53.85) (else=copy) into biro111.
recode parl1 (-4=31.43) (sysmis=31.43) (else=copy) into parl111.
recode egyhaz1 (-4=45.11) (sysmis=45.11) (else=copy) into egyhaz111.
recode part1 (-4=29.68) (sysmis=29.68) (else=copy) into part111.
recode alkb1 (-4=61.21) (sysmis=61.21) (else=copy) into alkb111.
recode ugyesz1 (-4=57.31) (sysmis=57.31) (else=copy) into ugyesz111.
recode hads1 (-4=48.22) (sysmis=48.22) (else=copy) into hads111.
recode szaksz1 (-4=38.96) (sysmis=38.96) (else=copy) into szaksz111.
recode elnok1 (-4=56.2) (sysmis=56.2) (else=copy) into elnok111.
recode eubiz1 (-4=55.29) (sysmis=55.29) (else=copy) into eubiz111.
recode rend1 (-4=51) (sysmis=51) (else=copy) into rend111.
recode onkorm1 (-4=55.97) (sysmis=55.97) (else=copy) into onkorm111.
recode teve1 (-4=53.63) (sysmis=53.63) (else=copy) into teve111.
recode radio1 (-4=53.36) (sysmis=53.36) (else=copy) into radio111.
recode lapok1 (-4=46.95) (sysmis=46.95) (else=copy) into lapok111.
recode mnb1 (-4=52.01) (sysmis=52.01) (else=copy) into mnb111.
recode bank1 (-4=36.51) (sysmis=36.51) (else=copy) into bank111.
recode bizt1 (-4=32.12) (sysmis=32.12) (else=copy) into bizt111.
recode imf1 (-4=45.98) (sysmis=45.98) (else=copy) into imf111.
recode vbank1 (-4=46.05) (sysmis=46.05) (else=copy) into vbank111.
fre korm111 biro111 parl111 egyhaz111 part111 alkb111 ugyesz111 hads111
szaksz111 elnok111 eubiz111 rend111 onkorm111 teve111 radio111 lapok111
mnb111 bank111
bizt111 imf111 vbank111.
```

```
compute polint1=(korm111+parl111+part111+elnok111+eubiz111+onkorm111)/6.
compute jogint1=(biro111+alkb111+ugyesz111+hads111+rend111)/5.
compute tarsint1=(egyhaz111+szaksz111+teve111+radio111+lapok111)/5.
compute gazdint1=(mnb111+bank111+bizt111+imf111+vbank111)/5.
fre polint1 jogint1 tarsint1 gazdint1.
```

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=polint1 jogint1 tarsint1 gazdint1
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=korm2 biro2 parl2 egyhaz2 part2 alkb2 ugyesz2 hads2 szaksz2
elnok2 eubiz2 rend2 onkorm2 teve2 radio2 lapok2 mnb2 bank2 bizt2 imf2
vbank2
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
recode korm2 (-4=26.4) (sysmis=26.4) (else=copy) into korm22.
recode biro2 (-4=54.07) (sysmis=54.07) (else=copy) into biro22.
recode parl2 (-4=33.66) (sysmis=33.66) (else=copy) into parl22.
recode egyhaz2 (-4=55.14) (sysmis=55.14) (else=copy) into egyhaz22.
recode part2 (-4=31.13) (sysmis=31.13) (else=copy) into part22.
recode alkb2 (-4=61.72) (sysmis=61.72) (else=copy) into alkb22.
recode ugyesz2 (-4=57.54) (sysmis=57.54) (else=copy) into ugyesz22.
recode hads2 (-4=52.69) (sysmis=52.69) (else=copy) into hads22.
recode szaksz2 (-4=51.32) (sysmis=51.32) (else=copy) into szaksz22.
recode elnok2 (-4=59.13) (sysmis=59.13) (else=copy) into elnok22.
recode eubiz2 (-4=56.42) (sysmis=56.42) (else=copy) into eubiz22.
recode rend2 (-4=52.54) (sysmis=52.54) (else=copy) into rend22.
recode onkorm2 (-4=58.19) (sysmis=58.19) (else=copy) into onkorm22.
recode teve2 (-4=54.81) (sysmis=54.81) (else=copy) into teve22.
recode radio2 (-4=54.15) (sysmis=54.15) (else=copy) into radio22.
recode lapok2 (-4=49.1) (sysmis=49.1) (else=copy) into lapok22.
recode mnb2 (-4=49) (sysmis=49) (else=copy) into mnb22.
recode bank2 (-4=35.73) (sysmis=35.73) (else=copy) into bank22.
recode bizt2 (-4=33.04) (sysmis=33.04) (else=copy) into bizt22.
```

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```
recode imf2 (-4=45.72) (sysmis=45.72) (else=copy) into imf22.
recode vbank2 (-4=44.89) (sysmis=44.89) (else=copy) into vbank22.
fre korm22 biro22 parl22 egyhaz22 part22 alkb22 ugyesz22 hads22 szaksz22
elnok22 eubiz22 rend22 onkorm22 teve22 radio22 lapok22 mnb22 bank22 bizt22
imf22 vbank22.
```

```
compute polint2=(korm22+parl22+part22+elnok22+eubiz22+onkorm22)/6.
compute jogint2=(biro22+alkb22+ugyesz22+hads22+rend22)/5.
compute tarsint2=(egyhaz22+szaksz22+teve22+radio22+lapok22)/5.
compute gazdint2=(mnb22+bank22+bizt22+imf22+vbank22)/5.
fre polint2 jogint2 tarsint2 gazdint2.
```

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=polint2 jogint2 tarsint2 gazdint2
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=korm3 biro3 parl3 egyhaz3 part3 alkb3 ugyesz3 hads3 szaksz3
elnok3 eubiz3 rend3 onkorm3 teve3 radio3 lapok3 mnb3 bank3 bizt3 imf3
vbank3
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
recode korm3 (-4=27.05) (sysmis=27.05) (else=copy) into korm33.
recode biro3 (-4=64.91) (sysmis=64.91) (else=copy) into biro33.
recode parl3 (-4=35.87) (sysmis=35.87) (else=copy) into parl33.
recode egyhaz3 (-4=60.37) (sysmis=60.37) (else=copy) into egyhaz33.
recode part3 (-4=34.93) (sysmis=34.93) (else=copy) into part33.
recode alkb3 (-4=68.84) (sysmis=68.84) (else=copy) into alkb33.
recode ugyesz3 (-4=66.67) (sysmis=66.67) (else=copy) into ugyesz33.
recode hads3 (-4=60.35) (sysmis=60.35) (else=copy) into hads33.
recode szaksz3 (-4=49.98) (sysmis=49.98) (else=copy) into szaksz33.
recode elnok3 (-4=63.23) (sysmis=63.23) (else=copy) into elnok33.
recode eubiz3 (-4=65.96) (sysmis=65.96) (else=copy) into eubiz33.
recode rend3 (-4=56.38) (sysmis=56.38) (else=copy) into rend33.
recode onkorm3 (-4=60.04) (sysmis=60.04) (else=copy) into onkorm33.
recode teve3 (-4=61.51) (sysmis=61.51) (else=copy) into teve33.
recode radio3 (-4=60.98) (sysmis=60.98) (else=copy) into radio33.
recode lapok3 (-4=55.90) (sysmis=55.90) (else=copy) into lapok33.
recode mnb3 (-4=64.24) (sysmis=64.24) (else=copy) into mnb33.
recode bank3 (-4=55.11) (sysmis=55.11) (else=copy) into bank33.
recode bizt3 (-4=50.08) (sysmis=50.08) (else=copy) into bizt33.
recode imf3 (-4=61.66) (sysmis=61.66) (else=copy) into imf33.
recode vbank3 (-4=62.04) (sysmis=62.04) (else=copy) into vbank33.
fre korm33 biro33 parl33 egyhaz33 part33 alkb33 ugyesz33 hads33 szaksz33
elnok33 eubiz33 rend33 onkorm33 teve33 radio33 lapok33 mnb33 bank33 bizt33
imf33 vbank33.
```

```
compute polint3=(korm33+parl33+part33+elnok33+eubiz33+onkorm33)/6.
compute jogint3=(biro33+alkb33+ugyesz33+hads33+rend33)/5.
compute tarsint3=(egyhaz33+szaksz33+teve33+radio33+lapok33)/5.
compute gazdint3=(mnb33+bank33+bizt33+imf33+vbank33)/5.
fre polint3 jogint3 tarsint3 gazdint3.
```

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=polint3 jogint3 tarsint3 gazdint3
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
*****
*****
*****Test of
hypotheses*****.
```

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*****.

sort cases by sorszam.
execute.
weight by suly.

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES polint1 jogint1 tarsint1 gazdint1 /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS  
polint1 jogint1 tarsint1 gazdint1  
/PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION  
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION PC  
/ROTATION NOROTATE  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES polint1 jogint1 tarsint1 gazdint1 /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS  
polint1 jogint1 tarsint1 gazdint1  
/PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION  
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION PC  
/ROTATION NOROTATE  
/SAVE REG(ALL)  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

fre polint1 jogint1 tarsint1 gazdint1 general.

DESCRIPTIVES

```
VARIABLES=general  
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

***material goods

fre HUTLADA1 AMOSOG1 MIKRO1 VIDEO1 DISHWAS1 LEGKOND1 CD1 DVD1 hmozil
VKAMERA1 RTEL1 SZINTV1 FRITZO1 auto1 fax1 uzen1 hhaz1 fenyg1 digifg1
efurol roral.

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES AMOSOG1 MIKRO1 CD1 DVD1 RTEL1 auto1 digifg1  
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/ANALYSIS AMOSOG1 MIKRO1 CD1 DVD1 RTEL1 auto1 digifg1  
/PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION  
/CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION PC  
/ROTATION NOROTATE  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

AMOSOG1 MIKRO1 VIDEO1 CD1 DVD1 RTEL1 FRITZO1 auto1 digifg1.

FACTOR

```
/VARIABLES AMOSOG1 MIKRO1 CD1 DVD1 RTEL1 auto1 digifg1 /MISSING LISTWISE  
/ANALYSIS AMOSOG1 MIKRO1 CD1 DVD1 RTEL1 auto1 digifg1  
/PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION  
/CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)  
/EXTRACTION PC  
/ROTATION NOROTATE  
/SAVE REG(ALL)  
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

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```
fre goods.
recode goods (low thr -0.62744=1) (-0.62745 thr 0.31157=2) (0.31158 thr
0.81582=3) (0.81583 thr hi=4) into goods4.
val lab goods4 1 'low level' 2 'lower-middle' 3 'upper-middle' 4 'upper
level'.
fre goods4.

***information

fre HIR_NAPK HIR_MOKK HIR_RTL HIR_TV2 HIR_M1 HIR_M1ES HIR_DKRO HIR_ATV
NAPILAP neztv HIRHALLG HETILAP.
recode HIR_NAPK HIR_MOKK HIR_RTL HIR_TV2 HIR_M1 HIR_M1ES HIR_DKRO HIR_ATV
(9=1) (else=copy).
mis val HIR_NAPK HIR_MOKK HIR_RTL HIR_TV2 HIR_M1 HIR_M1ES HIR_DKRO HIR_ATV
NAPILAP neztv HIRHALLG HETILAP (0).
execute.
fre HIR_ATV.
DESCRIPTIVES
  VARIABLES=HIR_NAPK HIR_MOKK HIR_RTL HIR_TV2 HIR_M1 HIR_M1ES HIR_DKRO
HIR_ATV NAPILAP neztv HIRHALLG HETILAP /SAVE
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES ZHIR_NAPK ZHIR_MOKK ZHIR_RTL ZHIR_TV2 ZHIR_M1 ZHIR_M1ES
ZHIR_DKRO ZHIR_ATV ZNAPILAP Zneztv ZHIRHALLG ZHETILAP /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS ZHIR_NAPK ZHIR_MOKK ZHIR_RTL ZHIR_TV2 ZHIR_M1 ZHIR_M1ES
ZHIR_DKRO ZHIR_ATV ZNAPILAP Zneztv ZHIRHALLG ZHETILAP
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /METHOD=CORRELATION .

*napilap nem illeszkedik

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES Zneztv ZHIRHALLG ZHETILAP /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS Zneztv
ZHIRHALLG ZHETILAP
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /METHOD=CORRELATION .

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES Zneztv ZHIRHALLG ZHETILAP /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS Zneztv
ZHIRHALLG ZHETILAP
  /PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION .

fre info.
recode info (low thr -0.74239=1) (-0.45362 thr 0.13572=2) (0.13573 thr
0.73117=3) (0.73118 thr hi=4) into info4.
val lab info4 1 'low level' 2 'lower-middle' 3 'upper-middle' 4 'upper
level'.
fre info4.
```

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```
fre isk4 isk5 joved4 hztava hztiden eletni_j TELEP3 TELEPNAG polerd
szav061 ujjál .
```

```
***political patricipation
```

```
mis val polerd szav061 ujjál (0).
execute.
```

```
DESCRIPTIVES
```

```
VARIABLES=polerd szav061 ujjál /SAVE
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

```
FACTOR
```

```
/VARIABLES Zerd Zszav061 Zval /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS Zerd Zszav061
Zval
/PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION
/CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
/EXTRACTION PC
/ROTATION NOROTATE
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

```
FACTOR
```

```
/VARIABLES Zerd Zszav061 Zval /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS Zerd Zszav061
Zval
/PRINT INITIAL KMO EXTRACTION
/CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
/EXTRACTION PC
/ROTATION NOROTATE
/SAVE REG(ALL)
/METHOD=CORRELATION .
```

```
fre parti.
```

```
recode parti (low thr -0.64298=1) (-0.64298 thr 0.13711=2) (0.13712 thr
0.62627=3) (0.62628 thr hi=4) into parti4.
```

```
val lab parti4 1 'low level' 2 'lower-middle' 3 'upper-middle' 4 'upper
level'.
```

```
fre parti4.
```

```
recode TELEPNAG (1 thr 2=1) (3 thr 5=2) (6 thr 8=3) (9=4) into urban.
```

```
val lab urban 1 'to 2000' 2 '2000-20,000' 3 '20,000-500,000' 4 'Budapest'.
```

```
fre urban.
```

```
*1st
```

```
REGRESSION
```

```
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT general
/METHOD=ENTER isk4 joved4 goods4 info4 parti4 urban
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

```
REGRESSION
```

```
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT general
```

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```
/METHOD=ENTER info4 parti4  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT general  
/METHOD=ENTER parti4  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT general  
/METHOD=ENTER parti4 isk4 goods4  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT parti  
/METHOD=ENTER info4  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT parti  
/METHOD=ENTER isk4 joved4 goods4  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT info  
/METHOD=ENTER isk4 joved4 goods4 urban  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT goods  
/METHOD=ENTER isk4  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
```

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```
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT jovfo
/METHOD=ENTER isk4
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT general
/METHOD=ENTER isk4 parti4
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

*2nd

```
fre kor kor5 szulev.
recode szulev (low thr 72=0) (73 thr hi=1) into kor2.
val lab kor2 0 'adult in 1990' 1 'child in 1990'.
fre kor2.
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT general
/METHOD=ENTER kor
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT general
/METHOD=ENTER kor2
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT general
/METHOD=ENTER kor5
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

*3rd

```
fre nem kor5.
recode hztiden (5=4) (else=copy).
mis val hztiden (0).
fre hztiden.
```

```
recode nem (1=0) (2=1) into dnem.
fre nem dnem.
```

DESCRIPTIVES

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```
VARIABLES=isk4 urban hzttava hztiden /SAVE  
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT general  
/METHOD=ENTER dnem Zisk4 Zurban kor Zhzttava Zhztiden goods jovfo  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT general  
/METHOD=ENTER dnem Zisk4 Zurban kor Zhzttava Zhztiden  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
```

REGRESSION

```
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT Zhztiden  
/METHOD=ENTER dnem Zisk4 Zurban kor Zhzttava  
/RESIDUALS DURBIN .
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REGRESSION

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E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions
 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
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Tables of the analyses

The comparative analysis

EVS 1990

PC of state services (allami szolgaltatasok, ellatasok)

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,634
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	3159,005
	df	3
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
educ how much confidence in: education system	1,000	,496
civi how much confidence in: civil service	1,000	,616
soci how much confidence in: social security system	1,000	,585

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,697	56,570	56,570	1,697	56,570	56,570
2	,715	23,849	80,418			
3	,587	19,582	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix(a)

	Component
	1
educ how much confidence in: education system	,704

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

civi how much confidence in: civil service	,785
soci how much confidence in: social security system	,765

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. 1 components extracted.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

PC of decision makers and power representatives

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,723
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	6193,439
	df	6
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
arme how much confidence in: armed forces	1,000	,343
just how much confidence in: legal/justice system	1,000	,603
poli how much confidence in: the police	1,000	,624
parl how much confidence in: parliament	1,000	,511

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2,080	52,011	52,011	2,080	52,011	52,011
2	,815	20,372	72,384			
3	,573	14,331	86,715			
4	,531	13,285	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix(a)

	Component
	1
arme how much confidence in: armed forces	,586
just how much confidence in: legal/justice system	,776
poli how much confidence in: the police	,790
parl how much confidence in: parliament	,715

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. 1 components extracted.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

PC of neutral and social/civil institutions

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,583
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2129,758
	df	3
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
pres how much confidence in: the press	1,000	,629
trad how much confidence in: trade unions	1,000	,565
euro how much confidence in: European Community	1,000	,366

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,560	51,988	51,988	1,560	51,988	51,988
2	,836	27,881	79,869			
3	,604	20,131	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix(a)

	Component
	1
pres how much confidence in: the press	,793
trad how much confidence in: trade unions	,751
euro how much confidence in: European Community	,605

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. 1 components extracted.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions
EVS 1999/2000

PC of state services

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,617
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	3588,458
	df	3
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
educ how much confidence in: education system	1,000	,434
civi how much confidence in: civil service	1,000	,655
soci how much confidence in: social security system	1,000	,664

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,753	58,426	58,426	1,753	58,426	58,426
2	,752	25,078	83,505			
3	,495	16,495	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix(a)

	Component
	1
educ how much confidence in: education system	,659
civi how much confidence in: civil service	,809
soci how much confidence in: social security system	,815

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a 1 components extracted.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions
 PC of decision makers, power representatives

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,734
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	5997,788
	df	6
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
arme how much confidence in: armed forces	1,000	,358
just how much confidence in: legal/justice system	1,000	,563
poli how much confidence in: the police	1,000	,645
parl how much confidence in: parliament	1,000	,566

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2,132	53,296	53,296	2,132	53,296	53,296
2	,782	19,562	72,858			
3	,582	14,561	87,419			
4	,503	12,581	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix(a)

	Component
	1
arme how much confidence in: armed forces	,598
just how much confidence in: legal/justice system	,750
poli how much confidence in: the police	,803
parl how much confidence in: parliament	,752

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 a 1 components extracted.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions
 PC of neutral, social/civil institutions

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,584
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1732,092
	df	3
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
pres how much confidence in: the press	1,000	,624
trad how much confidence in: trade unions	1,000	,554
euro how much confidence in: European Community	1,000	,375

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,553	51,766	51,766	1,553	51,766	51,766
2	,834	27,787	79,553			
3	,613	20,447	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix(a)

	Component
	1
pres how much confidence in: the press	,790
trad how much confidence in: trade unions	,744
euro how much confidence in: European Community	,613


Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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All CEECs 1990

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
 Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine


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E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions



CE (with H)


Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

SE countries


Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



Other CE (without H)

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)


Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Hungary


Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



Clustering of variables in 1999

Hungary


Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions


All CEECs

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



CE (with H)


Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions


SE countries

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



Other CE (without H)

Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine



The longitudinal analysis

Years 1991-1995

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Initial Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	,00	80,20	13,40	100,00	,00	86,80
enforc	24,75	,00	100,00	100,00	16,75	83,50
tarsbiz	,00	13,40	73,60	100,00	93,40	,00

Iteration History^a

Iteration	Change in Cluster Centers					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	32,901	49,080	47,052	41,317	47,290	47,037
2	3,272	4,844	1,586	2,446	5,282	2,799
3	3,424	2,394	,459	,344	3,809	1,911
4	1,949	1,100	1,130	,201	2,623	1,229
5	1,522	,686	1,710	,191	3,064	1,240
6	1,833	,429	1,701	,488	2,681	1,031
7	1,775	,457	1,574	,507	2,205	,786
8	1,560	,565	1,003	,641	1,561	,379
9	1,030	,630	,678	,274	1,089	,222
10	,794	,472	1,156	1,106	,863	,133
11	,634	,359	1,032	,871	,899	,287
12	,447	,351	,547	,527	,677	,302
13	,308	,310	,371	,331	,664	,343
14	,112	,271	,368	,404	,424	,483
15	,142	,163	,267	,343	,413	,543
16	,261	,401	,333	,161	,516	,510
17	,087	,343	,258	,076	,380	,301
18	,135	,317	,148	,070	,280	,250
19	,177	,330	,062	,051	,226	,044
20	,071	,528	,092	,000	,253	,000
21	,080	,290	,072	,016	,172	,022
22	,024	,183	,088	,039	,118	,000
23	,025	,059	,081	,060	,063	,000
24	,021	,025	,071	,054	,061	,024
25	,000	,037	,030	,029	,011	,010
26	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000

a. Convergence achieved due to no or small change in cluster centers. The maximum absolute coordinate change for any center is ,000. The current iteration is 26. The minimum distance between initial centers is 84,826.

Final Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	14,54	52,52	54,68	75,75	26,26	55,87
enforc	16,68	36,58	63,42	85,46	48,23	72,02
tarsbiz	17,02	39,08	63,99	72,83	40,83	36,57

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

ANOVA

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
polbiz	1015571,098	5	139,866	13769	7261,032	,000
enforc	1202630,199	5	140,072	13769	8585,778	,000
tarsbiz	871743,097	5	166,029	13769	5250,557	,000

The F tests should be used only for descriptive purposes because the clusters have been chosen to maximize the differences among cases in different clusters. The observed significance levels are not corrected for this and thus cannot be interpreted as tests of the hypothesis that the cluster means are equal.

Number of Cases in each Cluster

	Unweighted	Weighted
Cluster 1	1497,000	1545,935
2	1755,000	1712,681
3	3258,000	3264,126
4	2449,000	2381,139
5	2476,000	2519,841
6	2400,000	2351,445
Valid	13835,000	13775,167
Missing	15539,000	15400,768

klaszt6 Cluster Number of Case

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 disappointed	1546	5,3	11,2	11,2
	2 new democrats/pol regime change	1713	5,9	12,4	23,7
	3 trust civil soc+rule of law	3264	11,2	23,7	47,4
	4 blind trust	2381	8,2	17,3	64,6
	5 order-loving suspicious	2520	8,6	18,3	82,9
	6 law prevails+weak civil soc	2351	8,1	17,1	100,0
	Total	13775	47,2	100,0	
Missing	System	15401	52,8		
Total		29176	100,0		

Years 1996-2000

Initial Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	93,34	,00	20,00	100,00	73,34	,00
enforc	50,00	58,35	100,00	100,00	,00	,00
tarsbiz	6,66	86,68	,00	100,00	80,00	,00

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Iteration History^a

Iteration	Change in Cluster Centers					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	47,642	47,786	47,887	44,136	47,997	37,380
2	3,036	,688	4,057	2,196	2,640	2,310
3	3,016	1,178	4,119	,302	2,687	,410
4	2,826	2,431	4,302	,613	1,500	,753
5	1,913	1,552	1,830	1,403	1,934	1,597
6	1,196	,823	1,101	1,233	1,247	1,185
7	,319	1,038	,420	,144	,813	,653
8	,482	,468	1,187	,858	,486	1,576
9	,343	1,013	1,389	,668	,591	1,036
10	,196	,459	,684	,204	,871	,689
11	,419	,968	,398	,092	,498	,551
12	,496	,957	,290	,093	,857	,263
13	,238	,506	,215	,052	,514	,581
14	,196	,459	,035	,067	,355	,058
15	,128	,236	,040	,032	,317	,267
16	,020	,025	,079	,000	,341	,357
17	,049	,723	,042	,000	1,090	,187
18	,281	,443	,030	,032	,258	,183
19	,150	,372	,097	,030	,613	,576
20	,184	,468	,332	,201	,493	,171
21	,096	,286	,144	,059	,481	,115
22	,025	,094	,079	,031	,161	,062
23	,204	,387	,064	,000	,107	,000
24	,420	,709	,032	,180	,085	,000
25	,156	,319	,251	,081	,086	,000
26	,041	,107	,025	,000	,109	,000
27	,009	,213	,062	,000	,219	,010
28	,004	,142	,018	,026	,171	,053
29	,190	,218	,030	,004	,021	,053
30	,012	,016	,008	,007	,000	,013
31	,000	,034	,000	,034	,000	,000
32	,000	,074	,000	,076	,000	,000
33	,000	,076	,000	,079	,000	,000
34	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000

a. Convergence achieved due to no or small change in cluster centers. The maximum absolute coordinate change for any center is ,000. The current iteration is 34. The minimum distance between initial centers is 89,012.

Final Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	65,22	47,55	37,30	74,31	41,55	15,19
enforc	67,11	63,01	50,43	81,90	34,46	17,01
tarsbiz	45,66	61,57	29,35	73,33	50,01	19,17

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

ANOVA

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
polbiz	3476124,979	5	129,433	54155	26856,636	,000
enforc	4165654,339	5	133,932	54155	31102,644	,000
tarsbiz	3215320,288	5	124,399	54155	25846,894	,000

The F tests should be used only for descriptive purposes because the clusters have been chosen to maximize the differences among cases in different clusters. The observed significance levels are not corrected for this and thus cannot be interpreted as tests of the hypothesis that the cluster means are equal.

Number of Cases in each Cluster

	Unweighted	Weighted
Cluster 1	11777,000	11737,670
2	9731,000	9847,151
3	9384,000	9627,748
4	9719,000	9545,263
5	7549,000	7745,607
6	5434,000	5658,348
Valid	53594,000	54161,789
Missing	18200,000	17630,830

klaszt6 Cluster Number of Case

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 strong state	11738	16,3	21,7	21,7
	2 trust civil soc+rule of law	9847	13,7	18,2	39,9
	3 order-loving suspicious	9628	13,4	17,8	57,6
	4 blind trust	9545	13,3	17,6	75,3
	5 civil soc modestly	7746	10,8	14,3	89,6
	6 disappointed	5658	7,9	10,4	100,0
	Total	54162	75,4	100,0	
Missing	System	17631	24,6		
Total		71793	100,0		

Years 2001-2005

Initial Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	11,17	27,67	,00	100,00	61,00	61,33
enforc	86,80	60,00	,00	100,00	100,00	13,20
tarsbiz	,00	13,20	40,00	100,00	80,00	80,00
gazdbiz	,00	89,00	,00	100,00	,00	67,00

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Iteration History

Iteration	Change in Cluster Centers					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	47,978	48,638	39,347	41,094	50,929	47,819
2	8,107	3,425	2,184	4,298	2,806	4,446
3	4,817	4,071	1,979	,687	1,512	4,680
4	3,837	4,094	5,547	1,226	1,094	4,077
5	1,829	2,692	4,166	1,970	,648	3,027
6	1,281	1,789	2,472	2,006	,793	2,078
7	,971	1,108	1,407	1,803	,861	1,579
8	,864	,703	,836	1,301	,874	1,156
9	,862	,467	,674	,933	,662	,739
10	,604	,399	,597	,581	,453	,506
11	,454	,309	,407	,574	,339	,426
12	,343	,300	,321	,381	,309	,362
13	,356	,439	,241	,171	,355	,327
14	,333	,559	,237	,254	,368	,359
15	,309	,513	,174	,489	,204	,373
16	,221	,486	,048	,359	,145	,290
17	,193	,579	,000	,232	,223	,355
18	,172	,270	,184	,120	,135	,205
19	,226	,341	,094	,210	,283	,348
20	,162	,250	,097	,206	,302	,325
21	,161	,346	,052	,353	,343	,452
22	,170	,404	,011	,370	,367	,329
23	,154	,462	,028	,310	,258	,402
24	,140	,357	,118	,322	,250	,357
25	,152	,237	,086	,290	,280	,300
26	,088	,198	,000	,342	,268	,256
27	,063	,223	,030	,224	,221	,243
28	,093	,201	,053	,114	,289	,229
29	,108	,151	,048	,176	,242	,187
30	,119	,054	,000	,195	,180	,093
31	,072	,044	,000	,165	,218	,149
32	,158	,217	,078	,190	,197	,174
33	,223	,268	,076	,275	,429	,267
34	,188	,205	,092	,061	,507	,244
35	,200	,260	,135	,067	,363	,258
36	,142	,182	,093	,067	,431	,317
37	,145	,188	,013	,096	,364	,216
38	,087	,204	,025	,151	,357	,248
39	,189	,136	,045	,067	,369	,191
40	,224	,052	,138	,086	,344	,171
41	,303	,037	,266	,089	,336	,140
42	,246	,090	,101	,061	,401	,137
43	,206	,124	,196	,072	,302	,084
44	,118	,113	,077	,052	,251	,091
45	,098	,082	,047	,052	,149	,063
46	,077	,019	,026	,049	,158	,075
47	,117	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Final Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	34,66	47,57	12,26	77,40	56,31	66,70
enforc	37,51	51,67	12,52	90,02	64,45	73,34
tarsbiz	31,51	51,18	12,11	82,60	40,03	60,10
gazdbiz	26,75	55,28	6,39	84,57	29,07	59,92

ANOVA

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
polbiz	816806,241	5	121,116	13595	6744,023	,000
enforc	1105912,838	5	133,567	13595	8279,842	,000
tarsbiz	830820,299	5	140,232	13595	5924,597	,000
gazdbiz	1192625,090	5	149,196	13595	7993,683	,000

The F tests should be used only for descriptive purposes because the clusters have been chosen to maximize the differences among cases in different clusters. The observed significance levels are not corrected for this and thus cannot be interpreted as tests of the hypothesis that the cluster means are equal.

Number of Cases in each Cluster

	Unweighted	Weighted
Cluster 1	2597,000	2717,348
2	2570,000	2577,104
3	958,000	1064,414
4	1205,000	1125,074
5	2544,000	2561,116
6	3629,000	3556,825
Valid	13503,000	13601,881
Missing	59659,000	60386,894

klaszt6 Cluster Number of Case

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 anti-capitalist suspicious	2717	3,7	20,0	20,0
	2 market-supporter trust	2577	3,5	18,9	38,9
	3 disappointed	1064	1,4	7,8	46,7
	4 blind trust	1125	1,5	8,3	55,0
	5 strong state, suspicious with the market	2561	3,5	18,8	73,9
	6 law prevails, trust	3557	4,8	26,1	100,0
	Total	13602	18,4	100,0	
Missing	System	60387	81,6		
Total		73989	100,0		

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions
Years 2006-2010

Initial Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	61,33	83,33	,00	94,50	5,50	33,33
enforc	33,40	100,00	,00	53,20	100,00	,00
tarsbiz	,00	100,00	20,00	73,40	40,00	100,00
gazdbiz	78,00	100,00	,00	,00	33,33	66,67

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Iteration History

Iteration	Change in Cluster Centers					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	50,140	46,243	33,368	49,967	49,961	54,368
2	2,309	4,397	1,851	2,836	4,665	5,790
3	1,446	1,786	,784	2,183	5,809	2,385
4	1,307	,946	1,781	3,057	6,298	1,658
5	1,946	,633	3,730	2,738	6,182	1,329
6	3,313	1,007	3,849	1,369	4,510	1,351
7	1,888	,625	3,108	,686	2,795	,777
8	1,875	,493	2,432	,777	2,249	1,085
9	1,627	,440	1,856	1,092	1,813	,873
10	1,303	,432	1,225	,872	1,244	,695
11	1,084	,264	1,073	,984	,987	,677
12	,760	,229	,498	,798	,671	,494
13	,621	,237	,452	,706	,560	,578
14	,651	,289	,328	,606	,417	,709
15	,944	,208	,384	,610	,422	1,125
16	1,376	,275	,148	,578	,437	1,344
17	1,842	,383	,186	,444	,498	1,393
18	2,527	,434	,160	,369	,507	1,745
19	2,377	,536	,127	,477	,668	1,319
20	2,601	,499	,152	,500	,695	1,300
21	1,984	,368	,177	,552	,540	,887
22	1,975	,268	,123	,608	,637	,686
23	1,727	,331	,267	,654	,597	,553
24	1,746	,364	,167	,675	,725	,443
25	1,777	,529	,154	,846	,803	,390
26	1,738	,501	,182	,863	,926	,364
27	1,616	,333	,197	1,139	,760	,356
28	1,576	,351	,173	1,111	,799	,377
29	1,330	,384	,148	,951	,712	,321
30	1,170	,246	,149	,783	,557	,335
31	,996	,180	,228	,658	,661	,270
32	,658	,171	,190	,509	,451	,262
33	,411	,102	,208	,307	,418	,184
34	,258	,088	,174	,194	,300	,098
35	,218	,076	,144	,130	,242	,081
36	,177	,037	,125	,112	,221	,050
37	,186	,009	,155	,181	,210	,049
38	,146	,047	,097	,166	,150	,030
39	,085	,034	,052	,074	,115	,044
40	,069	,012	,025	,031	,069	,027
41	,062	,010	,038	,031	,054	,015
42	,068	,005	,031	,050	,041	,015
43	,073	,000	,020	,069	,050	,010
44	,067	,006	,050	,035	,082	,019
45	,068	,019	,060	,041	,100	,036
46	,066	,021	,061	,015	,080	,025

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Final Cluster Centers

	Cluster					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
polbiz	43,98	71,09	11,45	61,97	30,32	48,16
enforc	55,47	80,74	11,75	70,33	32,04	56,87
tarsbiz	34,84	72,01	9,71	57,35	34,23	51,26
gazdbiz	25,06	73,39	4,82	40,08	34,06	61,39

ANOVA

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
polbiz	3407718,728	5	131,973	55413	25821,416	,000
enforc	4762205,998	5	134,903	55413	35301,031	,000
tarsbiz	3461144,419	5	151,297	55413	22876,476	,000
gazdbiz	4861973,649	5	137,308	55413	35409,294	,000

The F tests should be used only for descriptive purposes because the clusters have been chosen to maximize the differences among cases in different clusters. The observed significance levels are not corrected for this and thus cannot be interpreted as tests of the hypothesis that the cluster means are equal.

Number of Cases in each Cluster

	Unweighted	Weighted
Cluster 1	9834,000	10044,912
2	8030,000	7801,919
3	5862,000	6084,775
4	8866,000	8604,545
5	10391,000	10562,661
6	12214,000	12320,956
Valid	55197,000	55419,767
Missing	13187,000	12964,210

klaszt6 Cluster Number of Case

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 order-loving suspicious	10045	14,7	18,1	18,1
	2 blind trust	7802	11,4	14,1	32,2
	3 disappointed	6085	8,9	11,0	43,2
	4 law prevails+weak econ	8605	12,6	15,5	58,7
	5 pol disappointed suspicious	10563	15,4	19,1	77,8
	6 market-friendly trustful	12321	18,0	22,2	100,0
	Total	55420	81,0	100,0	
Missing	System	12964	19,0		
Total		68384	100,0		

The cross-sectional analysis

biz01 Ön mennyire ért egyet azzal a véleménnyel, hogy a legtöbb emberben lehet bízni

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 nem tudja	1	,1	,1	,1
1 egyáltalán nem	112	9,2	9,2	9,3
2 2	150	12,4	12,4	21,7
3 3	232	19,1	19,1	40,8
4 4	324	26,8	26,8	67,6
5 5	247	20,4	20,4	88,0
6 6	112	9,2	9,2	97,3
7 teljesen egyetért	33	2,7	2,7	100,0
Total	1210	100,0	100,0	

biz02 Ön szerint az emberek többsége megbízható

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 nem tudja	5	,4	,4	,4
1 szinte alig van megbízható ember	289	23,9	23,9	24,4
2 az emberek kisebb része megbízható	579	47,9	47,9	72,3
3 az emberek többsége megbízható	335	27,7	27,7	100,0
Total	1208	99,9	100,0	
Missing System	2	,1		
Total	1210	100,0		

biz03 A kereskedő ajánl Önnek egy autót, ami feleannyiba kerül, mint egy új autó. Ö ténne

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 nem tudja	97	8,1	8,1	8,1
1 nem venné meg, mert ha később kiderül, hogy valami	720	59,5	60,1	68,2
2 megvenné az autót, mert ha jó, fél áron kap autót	381	31,5	31,8	100,0
Total	1198	99,0	100,0	
Missing System	12	1,0		
Total	1210	100,0		

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

04 Megvásárolta az autót, de arról kiderül, hogy valamilyen komoly baja van. Mire gon elsősorban, melyik érzése lenne erősebb

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	72	5,9	6,0	6,0
	1 az, hogy Önt becsapták, tehát a kereskedő a hibás	837	69,2	70,3	76,3
	2 az, hogy Önnek pechje volt, nem felelős érte senki	282	23,3	23,7	100,0
	Total	1191	98,4	100,0	
Missing	System	19	1,6		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz08 Ön szerint mi a fontosabb, hogy ezek az intézmények és az ott dolgozó embere

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	111	9,2	9,6	9,6
	1 inkább kevésbé legyenek jó szándékúak, de jól értsenek	776	64,1	66,7	76,3
	2 inkább kevésbé értsenek a munkájukhoz, de a jó szándék	275	22,7	23,7	100,0
	Total	1162	96,1	100,0	
Missing	System	48	3,9		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz0901 mennyire bízuk : Becsületesen kezelik az emberek pénzét

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	284	23,4	24,3	24,3
	33	375	31,0	32,1	56,4
	67	433	35,8	37,1	93,5
	100	75	6,2	6,5	100,0
	Total	1166	96,4	100,0	
Missing	-4	42	3,4		
	System	2	,2		
	Total	44	3,6		
Total		1210	100,0		

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biz0902 mennyire bízuk : Okosan fektetik be az emberek pénzét

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	249	20,6	22,0	22,0
	33	390	32,2	34,4	56,4
	67	403	33,3	35,6	92,0
	100	91	7,5	8,0	100,0
	Total	1133	93,6	100,0	
Missing	-4	75	6,2		
	System	2	,2		
	Total	77	6,4		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz0903 mennyire bízuk : Rendesen bánnak az alkalmazottaikkal

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	139	11,5	13,2	13,2
	33	261	21,6	24,8	38,0
	67	505	41,7	48,0	86,0
	100	147	12,1	14,0	100,0
	Total	1051	86,9	100,0	
Missing	-4	156	12,9		
	System	3	,2		
	Total	159	13,1		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz0904 mennyire bízuk : A bevételeik egy részét közösségi célokra, társada felelősségvállalásra fordítják

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	342	28,3	31,7	31,7
	33	405	33,5	37,5	69,2
	67	282	23,3	26,1	95,2
	100	52	4,3	4,8	100,0
	Total	1080	89,3	100,0	
Missing	-4	127	10,5		
	System	2	,2		
	Total	130	10,7		
Total		1210	100,0		

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biz0905 mennyire bízuk : A bankok vezetői nem használják fel a politikai kapcsolataikat arra, hogy tisztességtelen előnyökhöz jussanak

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	565	46,7	50,7	50,7
	33	288	23,8	25,8	76,5
	67	207	17,1	18,6	95,0
	100	55	4,6	5,0	100,0
	Total	1116	92,2	100,0	
Missing	-4	92	7,6		
	System	2	,2		
	Total	94	7,8		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1001 mennyire bízuk : szomszédaiban

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	64	5,3	5,3	5,3
	33	188	15,5	15,6	20,9
	67	588	48,6	48,9	69,8
	100	364	30,1	30,2	100,0
	Total	1204	99,5	100,0	
Missing	-4	6	,5		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1002 mennyire bízuk : bolti eladóknál

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	70	5,8	5,8	5,8
	33	270	22,3	22,3	28,1
	67	649	53,6	53,6	81,7
	100	221	18,3	18,3	100,0
	Total	1209	99,9	100,0	
Missing	-4	1	,1		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1003 mennyire bízuk : iskolai tanároknál

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	52	4,3	4,4	4,4
	33	168	13,9	14,4	18,9
	67	606	50,1	52,1	71,0
	100	338	27,9	29,0	100,0
	Total	1164	96,2	100,0	
Missing	-4	44	3,7		
	System	2	,1		
	Total	46	3,8		
Total		1210	100,0		

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

biz1004 mennyire bízok : orvosokban, ápolókban

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	41	3,4	3,4	3,4
	33	174	14,4	14,5	17,9
	67	602	49,7	49,9	67,7
	100	389	32,2	32,3	100,0
	Total	1206	99,7	100,0	
Missing	-4	4	,3		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1005 mennyire bízok : az Ön munkatársaiban, kollégáiban

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	35	2,9	3,5	3,5
	33	119	9,8	11,8	15,3
	67	515	42,5	51,3	66,7
	100	334	27,6	33,3	100,0
	Total	1002	82,8	100,0	
Missing	-4	94	7,8		
	System	113	9,4		
	Total	208	17,2		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1006 mennyire bízok : barátaiban, közeli ismerőseiben

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	17	1,4	1,4	1,4
	33	59	4,9	4,9	6,3
	67	341	28,2	28,3	34,6
	100	789	65,2	65,4	100,0
	Total	1206	99,7	100,0	
Missing	-4	2	,1		
	System	2	,2		
	Total	4	,3		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1007 mennyire bízok : családtagjaiban, rokonaiban

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	10	,8	,8	,8
	33	27	2,2	2,2	3,0
	67	199	16,4	16,5	19,5
	100	974	80,5	80,5	100,0
	Total	1209	100,0	100,0	
Missing	System	1	,0		
Total		1210	100,0		

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

biz1008 mennyire bízok : az Önnel egy településen élőkben

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	57	4,8	4,8	4,8
	33	313	25,9	26,1	30,9
	67	706	58,3	58,8	89,6
	100	125	10,3	10,4	100,0
	Total	1201	99,3	100,0	
Missing	-4	9	,7		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1009 mennyire bízok : a magyar emberekben általában

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	79	6,5	6,5	6,5
	33	392	32,4	32,5	39,0
	67	653	54,0	54,2	93,2
	100	82	6,8	6,8	100,0
	Total	1206	99,7	100,0	
Missing	-4	4	,3		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1101 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időkben általában jobban meg lehetett bízni az emberekben, mint most.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	70	5,8	6,2	6,2
	33	124	10,3	11,1	17,3
	67	460	38,1	41,2	58,5
	100	464	38,4	41,5	100,0
	Total	1119	92,5	100,0	
Missing	-4	85	7,0		
	System	7	,5		
	Total	91	7,5		
Total		1210	100,0		

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

biz1102 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időkben általában minden intézmény, akár iskola, kórház vagy a parlament, jobban ellátta a feladatát, mint most.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	56	4,7	5,1	5,1
	33	145	12,0	13,1	18,2
	67	393	32,4	35,5	53,7
	100	513	42,4	46,3	100,0
	Total	1107	91,5	100,0	
Missing	-4	97	8,0		
	System	7	,5		
	Total	103	8,5		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1103 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időkben az ember jobban bízhatott a szomszédaiban, a kollégáiban vagy a sarki boltosban, mint most.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	87	7,2	7,7	7,7
	33	163	13,4	14,4	22,1
	67	398	32,9	35,4	57,5
	100	479	39,6	42,5	100,0
	Total	1126	93,1	100,0	
Missing	-4	77	6,4		
	System	7	,5		
	Total	84	6,9		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz1104 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időkben kisebb volt a korrupció, mint most.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	99	8,2	9,0	9,0
	33	208	17,2	18,9	27,9
	67	368	30,4	33,4	61,3
	100	426	35,2	38,7	100,0
	Total	1101	91,0	100,0	
Missing	-4	102	8,4		
	System	7	,5		
	Total	109	9,0		
Total		1210	100,0		

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

qiz1105 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időkben a munkaadók jobban megbecsülték a beosztottaikat, a dolgozókat, mint most.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	33	2,7	3,0	3,0
	33	95	7,9	8,5	11,5
	67	364	30,0	32,5	43,9
	100	628	51,9	56,1	100,0
	Total	1120	92,6	100,0	
Missing	-4	83	6,9		
	System	7	,5		
	Total	90	7,4		
Total		1210	100,0		

qiz1106 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtt nagyobb volt a család összetartás, a családtagok jobban bizhattak egymásban vagy számíthatlak egymásra, mint most.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	109	9,0	9,6	9,6
	33	169	14,0	14,9	24,5
	67	346	28,6	30,5	55,0
	100	512	42,3	45,0	100,0
	Total	1137	93,9	100,0	
Missing	-4	67	5,5		
	System	7	,5		
	Total	73	6,1		
Total		1210	100,0		

biz12 Ön szerint a régi rendszerben, tehát a rendszerváltás előtt mi volt a legfontosabb az ahhoz, hogy valaki előrébb jusson, például felvegyék egy jó iskolába, munkahelyre vagy lakáshoz jusson

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0 nem tudja	67	5,5	5,5	5,5
	1 szerencse	26	2,1	2,1	7,6
	2 csúszópénz annak, aki dönthet a dologról	58	4,8	4,8	12,5
	3 tudás és tehetség	194	16,1	16,1	28,6
	4 kapcsolatok és befolyásos ismerősök	387	32,0	32,0	60,6
	5 szorgalom és kemény munka	475	39,3	39,4	100,0
Total		1208	99,8	100,0	
Missing	System	2	,2		
Total		1210	100,0		

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biz13 mit gondol, most mi a legfontosabb ahhoz, hogy valaki előrébb jusson, például felvegyék egy jó iskolába, munkahelyre vagy lakáshoz jusson

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 nem tudja	13	1,1	1,1	1,1
1 szerencse	48	4,0	4,0	5,0
2 csúszópénz annak, aki dönthet a dolgról	272	22,5	22,5	27,5
3 tudás és tehetség	65	5,4	5,4	32,9
4 kapcsolatok és befolyásos ismerősök	731	60,4	60,4	93,3
5 szorgalom és kemény munka	81	6,7	6,7	100,0
Total	1210	100,0	100,0	

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
biz1001 mennyire bízuk : szomszédaiban	1204	0	100	68,13	27,317
biz1002 mennyire bízuk : bolti eladóknban	1209	0	100	61,59	26,215
biz1003 mennyire bízuk : iskolai tanároknban	1164	0	100	68,71	26,077
biz1004 mennyire bízuk : orvosknban, ápolóknban	1206	0	100	70,45	25,690
biz1005 mennyire bízuk : az Ön munkatársaiban, kollégáiban	1002	0	100	71,64	25,210
biz1006 mennyire bízuk : barátaiban, közeli ismerőseiben	1206	0	100	85,98	21,717
biz1007 mennyire bízuk : családtagjaiban, rokonaiban	1209	0	100	92,27	17,351
biz1008 mennyire bízuk : az Önnel egy településen élőknben	1201	0	100	58,35	23,554
biz1009 mennyire bízuk : a magyar emberekben általában	1206	0	100	53,83	23,877
biz1101 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időknben általában jobban meg lehetett bízni az emberekben, mint most.	1119	0	100	72,74	28,777
biz1102 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időknben általában minden intézmény, akár iskola, kórház vagy a parlament, jobban ellátta a feladatát, mint most.	1107	0	100	74,42	28,812
biz1103 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időknben az ember jobban bízhatott a szomszédaiban, a kollégáiban vagy a sarki boltosban, mint most.	1126	0	100	70,96	30,999
biz1104 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időknben kisebb volt a korupció, mint most.	1101	0	100	67,31	32,324
biz1105 mennyire ért vele egyet: A rendszerváltás előtti időknben a munkaadók jobban megbecsülték a beosztottaikat, a dolgozókat. mint most.	1120	0	100	80,62	25,633

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
korm1 mennyire bízik : a kormányban	1184	0	100	23,22	29,890
biro1 mennyire bízik : a bíróságokban	1175	0	100	53,85	29,021
parl1 mennyire bízik : a parlamentben	1192	0	100	31,43	27,754
egyhaz1 mennyire bízik : az egyházakban	1176	0	100	45,11	32,551
part1 mennyire bízik : a politikai pártokban	1188	0	100	29,68	26,186
alkb1 mennyire bízik : az Alkotmánybíróságban	1162	0	100	61,21	30,159
ugyesz1 mennyire bízik : az ügyészségekben	1156	0	100	57,31	30,469
hads1 mennyire bízik : a hadseregben	1136	0	100	48,22	32,103
szaksz1 mennyire bízik : a szakszervezetekben	1149	0	100	38,96	30,240
elnok1 mennyire bízik : a köztársasági elnökben	1186	0	100	56,20	31,122
eubiz1 mennyire bízik : az Európai Bizottságban	1144	0	100	55,29	29,115
rend1 mennyire bízik : a rendőrségben	1193	0	100	51,00	30,068
onkorm1 mennyire bízik : a helyi önkormányzatban	1190	0	100	55,97	29,466
teve1 mennyire bízik : a Magyar Televízióban	1170	0	100	53,63	27,713
radio1 mennyire bízik : a Magyar Rádióban	1159	0	100	53,36	27,744
lapok1 mennyire bízik : a napilapokban	1141	0	100	46,95	27,284
mnb1 mennyire bízik : a Magyar Nemzeti Bankban	1159	0	100	52,01	28,739
bank1 mennyire bízik : a kereskedelmi bankokban	1176	0	100	36,51	28,635
bizt1 mennyire bízik : a biztosító társaságokban	1181	0	100	32,12	27,242
imf1 mennyire bízik : a Nemzetközi Valutaalapban, az IMF-ben	1041	0	100	45,98	30,245
vbank1 mennyire bízik : a Világbankban	1061	0	100	46,05	30,463
Valid N (listwise)	947				

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
polint1	1210	,00	100,00	41,9670	19,41893
jogint1	1210	,00	100,00	54,3204	22,95923
tarsint1	1210	,00	100,00	47,6019	20,75240
gazdint1	1210	,00	100,00	42,5341	21,90551
Valid N (listwise)	1210				

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
korm2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a kormányban	1187	0	100	26,40	30,498
biro2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a bíróságokban	1179	0	100	54,07	29,412
parl2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a parlamentben	1192	0	100	33,66	28,650
egyhaz2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: az egyházakban	1182	0	100	55,14	32,213
part2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a politikai pártokban	1188	0	100	31,13	26,564
alkb2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: az Alkotmánybíróságban	1172	0	100	61,72	29,422
ugyesz2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: az ügyészségekben	1159	0	100	57,54	29,545
hads2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a hadseregben	1142	0	100	52,69	31,249
szaksz2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a szakszervezetekben	1167	0	100	51,32	30,555
elnok2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a köztársasági elnökben	1186	0	100	59,13	30,325
eubiz2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: az Európai Bizottságban	1129	0	100	56,42	27,844
rend2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a rendőrségben	1188	0	100	52,54	30,405
onkorm2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a helyi önkormányzatban	1190	0	100	58,19	29,649
teve2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a Magyar Televízióban	1168	0	100	54,81	28,259
radio2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a Magyar Rádióban	1160	0	100	54,15	28,211
lapok2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a napilapokban	1151	0	100	49,10	28,874
mnb2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a Magyar Nemzeti Bankban	1160	0	100	49,00	29,659
bank2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a kereskedelmi bankokban	1180	0	100	35,73	28,714
bizt2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a biztosító társaságokban	1181	0	100	33,04	27,755
imf2 mennyire jellemző rájuk: a Nemzetközi					

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
polint2	1210	,00	100,00	44,1563	20,43503
jogint2	1210	,00	100,00	55,7122	23,08244
tarsint2	1210	,00	100,00	52,9064	22,39970
gazdint2	1210	,00	100,00	41,6758	23,12186
Valid N (listwise)	1210				

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
korm3 mennyire jellemző : a kormányban	1173	0	100	27,05	30,704
biro3 mennyire jellemző : a bíróságokban	1175	0	100	64,91	27,804
parl3 mennyire jellemző : a parlamentben	1178	0	100	35,87	28,305
egyhaz3 mennyire jellemző : az egyházakban	1152	0	100	60,37	29,987
part3 mennyire jellemző : a politikai pártokban	1170	0	100	34,93	28,206
alkb3 mennyire jellemző : az Alkotmánybíróságban	1168	0	100	68,84	29,295
ugyesz3 mennyire jellemző : az ügyészségekben	1157	0	100	66,67	27,929
hads3 mennyire jellemző : a hadseregben	1137	0	100	60,35	29,548
szaksz3 mennyire jellemző : a szakszervezetekben	1153	0	100	49,98	28,599
elnok3 mennyire jellemző : a köztársasági elnökben	1175	0	100	63,23	29,268
eubiz3 mennyire jellemző : az Európai Bizottságban	1124	0	100	65,96	26,139
rend3 mennyire jellemző : a rendőrségben	1180	0	100	56,38	28,514
onkorm3 mennyire jellemző : a helyi önkormányzatban	1182	0	100	60,04	27,670
teve3 mennyire jellemző : a Magyar Televízióban	1163	0	100	61,51	27,074
radio3 mennyire jellemző : a Magyar Rádióban	1155	0	100	60,98	27,190
lapok3 mennyire jellemző : a napilapokban	1140	0	100	55,90	27,909
mnb3 mennyire jellemző : a Magyar Nemzeti Bankban	1154	0	100	64,24	27,768
bank3 mennyire jellemző : a kereskedelmi bankokban	1173	0	100	55,11	29,584
bizt3 mennyire jellemző : a biztosító társaságokban	1175	0	100	50,08	29,415
imf3 mennyire jellemző : a Nemzetközi Valutaalapban, az IMF-ben	1056	0	100	61,66	29,406
vbank3 mennyire jellemző : a Világbankban	1066	0	100	62,04	29,551
Valid N (listwise)	982				

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
polint3	1210	,00	100,00	47,8457	19,69479
jogint3	1210	,00	100,00	63,4288	21,71326
tarsint3	1210	,00	100,00	57,7478	20,92607
gazdint3	1210	,00	100,00	58,6284	23,33231
Valid N (listwise)	1210				

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,818
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2457,195
	df	6
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
polint1	1,000	,799
jogint1	1,000	,734
tarsint1	1,000	,704
gazdint1	1,000	,663

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2,901	72,519	72,519	2,901	72,519	72,519
2	,454	11,344	83,863			
3	,393	9,833	93,696			
4	,252	6,304	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix

	Component
	1
polint1	,894
jogint1	,857
tarsint1	,839
gazdint1	,814

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 1 components extracted.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,531
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	18,737
	df	3
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Zneztv Zscore: Szokott-e tévét nézni	1,000	,331
ZHIRHALLG Zscore: Szokott híreket hallgatni a rádióban	1,000	,366
ZHETILAP Zscore: Szokott hetilapokat olvasni	1,000	,449

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,145	38,183	38,183	1,145	38,183	38,183
2	,949	31,623	69,806			
3	,906	30,194	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix^a

	Component
	1
Zneztv Zscore: Szokott-e tévét nézni	,575
ZHIRHALLG Zscore: Szokott híreket hallgatni a rádióban	,605
ZHETILAP Zscore: Szokott hetilapokat olvasni	,670

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 1 components extracted.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,815
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1984,537
	df	21
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
AMOSOG1 Van-e automata mosógépük	1,000	,418
MIKRO1 Van-e mikrohullámú sütőjük	1,000	,335
CD1 Van-e CD lemezzátszójuk	1,000	,460
DVD1 Van-e DVD lemezzátszójuk	1,000	,597
RTEL1 Van-e mobiltelefonjuk	1,000	,435
auto1 Van-e autó	1,000	,419
digifg1 Van-e digitális fényképezőgép	1,000	,420

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3,082	44,032	44,032	3,082	44,032	44,032
2	1,003	14,331	58,363			
3	,791	11,301	69,665			
4	,666	9,518	79,183			
5	,540	7,717	86,900			
6	,508	7,250	94,150			
7	,409	5,850	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Component Matrix

	Component
	1
AMOSOG1 Van-e automata mosógépük	,646
MIKRO1 Van-e mikrohullámú sütőjük	,579
CD1 Van-e CD lemezzátszójuk	,678
DVD1 Van-e DVD lemezzátszójuk	,772
RTEL1 Van-e mobiltelefonjuk	,659
auto1 Van-e autó	,647
digifg1 Van-e digitális fényképezőgép	,648

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 1 components extracted.

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,635
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	575,921
	df	3
	Sig.	,000

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Zerd Zscore(polerd) Mennyire érdeklő a politika	1,000	,550
Zsav061 Zscore: Különböző okokból sokan nem szavaztak április 9-én, a parlamenti választások első fordulójában. Ön elment szavazni	1,000	,571
Zval Zscore(ujval) Ha a közeljövőben új parlamenti választások lennének elmentene szavazni	1,000	,697

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,818	60,589	60,589	1,818	60,589	60,589
2	,692	23,050	83,639			
3	,491	16,361	100,000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix

	Component
	1
Zerd Zscore(polerd) Mennyire érdeklő a politika	,741
Zsav061 Zscore: Különböző okokból sokan nem szavaztak április 9-én, a parlamenti választások első fordulójában. Ön elment szavazni	,756
Zval Zscore(ujval) Ha a közeljövőben új parlamenti választások lennének elmenne szavazni	,835

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 1 components extracted.

Variables Entered/Removed

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	urban, info4, parti4, goods4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő), isk4	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,111 ^a	,012	,005	1,01142165	1,198

a. Predictors: (Constant), urban, info4, parti4, goods4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő), isk4

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	10,921	6	1,820	1,779	,100 ^a
	Residual	880,117	860	1,023		
	Total	891,038	866			

a. Predictors: (Constant), urban, info4, parti4, goods4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő), isk4

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,208	,160		-1,302	,193
	isk4	-,022	,038	-,021	-,587	,558
	joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)	,069	,033	,076	2,107	,035
	goods4	,012	,031	,013	,371	,711
	info4	,021	,031	,023	,670	,503
	parti4	,058	,030	,067	1,920	,055
	urban	-,059	,039	-,055	-1,536	,125

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,3202118	,3122759	-,0050671	,11227280	867
Residual	-2,76274	2,609932	,0000000	1,00791322	867
Std. Predicted Value	-2,807	2,827	,000	1,000	867
Std. Residual	-2,732	2,580	,000	,997	867

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	parti4 info4	.	Enter

- a. All requested variables entered.
 b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,069 ^a	,005	,003	1,01687990	1,160

- a. Predictors: (Constant), parti4, info4
 b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	4,896	2	2,448	2,368	,094 ^a
	Residual	1027,625	994	1,034		
	Total	1032,522	996			

- a. Predictors: (Constant), parti4, info4
 b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,214	,104		-2,060	,040
	info4	,011	,029	,012	,392	,695
	parti4	,059	,027	,067	2,131	,033

- a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,1445865	,0647740	-,0390098	,07012220	997
Residual	-2,63839	2,639508	,00000000	1,01585821	997
Std. Predicted Value	-1,506	1,480	,000	1,000	997
Std. Residual	-2,595	2,596	,000	,999	997

- a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^d

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	parti4 ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^d

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,059 ^a	,004	,003	1,00939395	1,221

a. Predictors: (Constant), parti4

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^d

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3,980	1	3,980	3,906	,048 ^a
	Residual	1126,321	1105	1,019		
	Total	1130,301	1106			

a. Predictors: (Constant), parti4

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Coefficients^d

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,141	,072		-1,954	,051
	parti4	,051	,026	,059	1,976	,048

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^d

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,0893712	,0645930	-,0116083	,05997203	1107
Residual	-2,63821	2,639689	,0000000	1,00893771	1107
Std. Predicted Value	-1,297	1,271	,000	1,000	1107
Std. Residual	-2,614	2,615	,000	1,000	1107

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^d

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	goods4, isk4, parti4 ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,095 ^a	,009	,006	1,01137437	1,200

a. Predictors: (Constant), goods4, isk4, parti4

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^b

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	9,929	3	3,310	3,236	,022 ^a
	Residual	1080,026	1056	1,023		
	Total	1089,955	1059			

a. Predictors: (Constant), goods4, isk4, parti4

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Coefficients^b

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,182	,114		-1,592	,112
	parti4	,061	,027	,071	2,251	,025
	isk4	-,048	,032	-,047	-1,478	,140
	goods4	,050	,028	,056	1,820	,069

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^b

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,2616176	,2177126	-,0107332	,09683567	1060
Residual	-2,69546	2,731280	,00000000	1,00994063	1060
Std. Predicted Value	-2,591	2,359	,000	1,000	1060
Std. Residual	-2,665	2,701	,000	,999	1060

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	info4 ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,011 ^a	,000	-,001	1,00514404	1,885

a. Predictors: (Constant), info4

b. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	,141	1	,141	,139	,709 ^a
	Residual	1090,695	1080	1,010		
	Total	1090,836	1081			

a. Predictors: (Constant), info4

b. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,034	,075		-,448	,654
	info4	,010	,027	,011	,373	,709

a. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

Residuals Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,0234325	,0069051	-,0080318	,01141848	1082
Residual	-2,05813	1,429797	,00000000	1,00467883	1082
Std. Predicted Value	-1,349	1,308	,000	1,000	1082
Std. Residual	-2,048	1,422	,000	1,000	1082

a. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	goods4, isk4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő) ^a	.	Enter

- a. All requested variables entered.
 b. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,251 ^a	,063	,060	,97198381	1,826

- a. Predictors: (Constant), goods4, isk4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)
 b. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	65,632	3	21,877	23,157	,000 ^a
	Residual	978,186	1035	,945		
	Total	1043,818	1038			

- a. Predictors: (Constant), goods4, isk4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)
 b. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,654	,109		-6,012	,000
	isk4	,251	,032	,245	7,738	,000
	joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)	,000	,028	,000	-,014	,989
	goods4	,042	,027	,047	1,573	,116

- a. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,3624438	,5176420	,0208325	,25140697	1039
Residual	-2,56808	1,768023	,00000000	,97057872	1039
Std. Predicted Value	-1,525	1,976	,000	1,000	1039
Std. Residual	-2,642	1,819	,000	,999	1039

a. Dependent Variable: parti political participation PC, +: take part

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	urban, goods4, isk4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: info information PC, +: informed

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,225 ^a	,051	,047	,98794055	1,816

a. Predictors: (Constant), urban, goods4, isk4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)

b. Dependent Variable: info information PC, +: informed

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	54,187	4	13,547	13,880	,000 ^a
	Residual	1012,002	1037	,976		
	Total	1066,189	1041			

a. Predictors: (Constant), urban, goods4, isk4, joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)

b. Dependent Variable: info information PC, +: informed

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,215	,121		-1,773	,077
	isk4	,028	,033	,027	,853	,394
	joved4 családi jövedelmi csoportok (Ft./fő)	,023	,029	,026	,791	,429
	goods4	,179	,027	,200	6,549	,000
	urban	-,146	,034	-,137	-4,282	,000

a. Dependent Variable: info information PC, +: informed

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,5682540	,5628291	-,0048553	,22816698	1042
Residual	-5,08828	1,719554	,00000000	,98604041	1042
Std. Predicted Value	-2,469	2,488	,000	1,000	1042
Std. Residual	-5,150	1,741	,000	,998	1042

a. Dependent Variable: info information PC, +: informed

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	isk4 ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: goods material goods PC, +: do have

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,021 ^a	,000	,000	,99995876	1,712

a. Predictors: (Constant), isk4

b. Dependent Variable: goods material goods PC, +: do have

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	,498	1	,498	,498	,480 ^a
	Residual	1169,466	1170	1,000		
	Total	1169,964	1171			

a. Predictors: (Constant), isk4

b. Dependent Variable: goods material goods PC, +: do have

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,049	,075		-,664	,507
	isk4	,021	,030	,021	,706	,480

a. Dependent Variable: goods material goods PC, +: do have

Residuals Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,0284642	,0346012	-,0010905	,02062696	1172
Residual	-2,34430	1,289050	,00000000	,99953154	1172
Std. Predicted Value	-1,327	1,730	,000	1,000	1172
Std. Residual	-2,344	1,289	,000	1,000	1172

a. Dependent Variable: goods material goods PC, +: do have

Variables Entered/Removed

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	isk4 ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,341 ^a	,116	,115	357,52486	1,644

a. Predictors: (Constant), isk4

b. Dependent Variable: jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	18443325	1	18443324,74	144,287	,000 ^a
	Residual	1E+008	1099	127824,029		
	Total	2E+008	1100			

a. Predictors: (Constant), isk4

b. Dependent Variable: jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	445,276	27,138		16,408	,000
	isk4	131,295	10,930	,341	12,012	,000

a. Dependent Variable: jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	576,5711	970,4566	744,4629	129,49666	1101
Residual	-820,457	3292,134	,00000	357,36229	1101
Std. Predicted Value	-1,296	1,745	,000	1,000	1101
Std. Residual	-2,295	9,208	,000	1,000	1101

a. Dependent Variable: jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	KOR ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,127 ^a	,016	,015	,99272099	1,254

a. Predictors: (Constant), KOR

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	19,495	1	19,495	19,782	,000 ^a
	Residual	1189,476	1207	,985		
	Total	1208,972	1208			

a. Predictors: (Constant), KOR

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,334	,080		-4,156	,000
	KOR	,007	,002	,127	4,448	,000

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,2060000	,3120379	,0001326	,12703877	1209
Residual	-2,71534	2,624822	,00000000	,99231000	1209
Std. Predicted Value	-1,623	2,455	,000	1,000	1209
Std. Residual	-2,735	2,644	,000	1,000	1209

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	kor2 ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,072 ^a	,005	,004	,99819113	1,254

a. Predictors: (Constant), kor2

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6,351	1	6,351	6,374	,012 ^a
	Residual	1202,621	1207	,996		
	Total	1208,972	1208			

a. Predictors: (Constant), kor2

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	,052	,035		1,468	,142
	kor2	-,153	,061	-,072	-2,525	,012

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,1017131	,0517101	,0001326	,07250721	1209
Residual	-2,62533	2,652572	,00000000	,99777788	1209
Std. Predicted Value	-1,405	,711	,000	1,000	1209
Std. Residual	-2,630	2,657	,000	1,000	1209

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Variables Entered/Removed

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	kor5 ^a	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,109 ^a	,012	,011	,99480570	1,253

a. Predictors: (Constant), kor5

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	14,494	1	14,494	14,646	,000 ^a
	Residual	1194,477	1207	,990		
	Total	1208,972	1208			

a. Predictors: (Constant), kor5

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,225	,065		-3,440	,001
	kor5	,073	,019	,109	3,827	,000

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,1523603	,1394378	,0001326	,10953926	1209
Residual	-2,71305	2,599568	,00000000	,99439385	1209
Std. Predicted Value	-1,392	1,272	,000	1,000	1209
Std. Residual	-2,727	2,613	,000	1,000	1209

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban, KOR, goods material goods PC, +: do have, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, dnem, Zurban Zscore(urban), Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete		Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,150 ^a	,022	,015	,98945283	1,275

a. Predictors: (Constant), jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban, KOR, goods material goods PC, +: do have, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, dnem, Zurban Zscore(urban), Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

ANOVA^b

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	23,015	8	2,877	2,939	,003 ^a
	Residual	1003,482	1025	,979		
	Total	1026,497	1033			

a. Predictors: (Constant), jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban, KOR, goods material goods PC, +: do have, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, dnem, Zurban Zscore(urban), Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,466	,114		-4,084	,000
	dnem	,098	,063	,049	1,561	,119
	Zisk4 Zscore(isk4)	,007	,035	,007	,203	,839
	Zurban Zscore(urban)	-,064	,033	-,064	-1,950	,051
	KOR	,005	,002	,091	2,799	,005
	Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	-,032	,036	-,033	-,893	,372
	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	,039	,036	,040	1,095	,274
	goods material goods PC, +: do have	,025	,031	,025	,796	,426
	jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban	,000	,000	,094	2,739	,006

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,4140752	,7208999	,0262943	,14926575	1034
Residual	-2,74335	2,630115	,00000000	,98561397	1034
Std. Predicted Value	-2,950	4,653	,000	1,000	1034
Std. Residual	-2,773	2,658	,000	,996	1034

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zurban Zscore(urban), dnem, KOR, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,147 ^a	,022	,017	,99800516	1,243

a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zurban Zscore(urban), dnem, KOR, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	25,479	6	4,247	4,264	,000 ^a
	Residual	1155,919	1161	,996		
	Total	1181,398	1167			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zurban Zscore(urban), dnem, KOR, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,376	,089		-4,215	,000
	dnem	,060	,059	,030	1,020	,308
	Zisk4 Zscore(isk4)	,019	,031	,019	,595	,552
	Zurban Zscore(urban)	-,055	,030	-,054	-1,810	,070
	KOR	,007	,002	,128	4,201	,000
	Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	-,002	,035	-,002	-,050	,960
	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	,035	,035	,035	1,007	,314

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,3591987	,4063663	-,0033368	,14778980	1168
Residual	-2,75721	2,768519	,00000000	,99543528	1168
Std. Predicted Value	-2,408	2,772	,000	1,000	1168
Std. Residual	-2,763	2,774	,000	,997	1168

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), dnem, Zurban Zscore(urban), KOR	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,548 ^a	,300	,297	,83853359	1,649

- a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), dnem, Zurban Zscore(urban), KOR
- b. Dependent Variable: Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

ANOVA^b

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	350,031	5	70,006	99,562	,000 ^a
	Residual	816,727	1162	,703		
	Total	1166,757	1167			

- a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), dnem, Zurban Zscore(urban), KOR
- b. Dependent Variable: Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

Coefficients^c

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,110	,075		-1,471	,142
	dnem	,098	,049	,049	1,977	,048
	Zisk4 Zscore(isk4)	-,012	,026	-,012	-,446	,656
	Zurban Zscore(urban)	-,012	,026	-,012	-,487	,627
	KOR	,001	,001	,024	,941	,347
	Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	,544	,025	,544	22,128	,000

- a. Dependent Variable: Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

Residuals Statistics^c

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,6224115	1,8559800	,0007712	,54777513	1168
Residual	-2,73606	3,496360	,00000000	,83673462	1168
Std. Predicted Value	-1,138	3,387	,000	1,000	1168
Std. Residual	-3,263	4,170	,000	,998	1168

- a. Dependent Variable: Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, dnem, KOR, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete		Enter

- a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,137 ^a	,019	,015	,99856351	1,243

- a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, dnem, KOR, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete
b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	22,191	4	5,548	5,564	,000 ^a
	Residual	1159,207	1163	,997		
	Total	1181,398	1167			

- a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, dnem, KOR, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete
b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,365	,086		-4,238	,000
	dnem	,058	,059	,029	,989	,323
	KOR	,007	,002	,124	4,258	,000
	Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	-,001	,035	-,001	-,041	,968
	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	,036	,035	,036	1,030	,303

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,2640515	,3891011	-,0033368	,13792470	1168
Residual	-2,75009	2,688266	,00000000	,99685004	1168
Std. Predicted Value	-1,890	2,845	,000	1,000	1168
Std. Residual	-2,754	2,692	,000	,998	1168

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete		Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,043 ^a	,002	,000	1,00584853	1,240

a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

ANOVA^b

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2,191	2	1,096	1,083	,339 ^a
	Residual	1179,232	1166	1,012		
	Total	1181,423	1168			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,003	,029		-,118	,906
	Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	-,001	,035	-,001	-,035	,972
	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	,044	,035	,044	1,253	,211

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,0465000	,1263128	-,0034711	,04332123	1169
Residual	-2,69653	2,745687	,00000000	1,00498666	1169
Std. Predicted Value	-,993	2,996	,000	1,000	1169
Std. Residual	-2,681	2,730	,000	,999	1169

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zurban Zscore(urban), dnem, KOR, jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	.	Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,142 ^a	,020	,014	,98690162	1,297

a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zurban Zscore(urban), dnem, KOR, jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

ANOVA^b

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	21,213	7	3,030	3,111	,003 ^a
	Residual	1025,409	1053	,974		
	Total	1046,622	1060			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete, Zurban Zscore(urban), dnem, KOR, jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban, Zisk4 Zscore(isk4), Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

b. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,451	,112		-4,032	,000
	dnem	,089	,062	,045	1,443	,149
	KOR	,005	,002	,095	2,964	,003
	Zisk4 Zscore(isk4)	,007	,034	,007	,207	,836
	Zurban Zscore(urban)	-,060	,032	-,060	-1,867	,062
	jövő az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban	,000	,000	,084	2,485	,013
	Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	-,027	,036	-,027	-,754	,451
	Zhztiden Zscore: A következő 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete	,032	,036	,033	,907	,365

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,4013521	,6706957	,0251832	,14147668	1061
Residual	-2,71399	2,636167	,00000000	,98363700	1061
Std. Predicted Value	-3,015	4,563	,000	1,000	1061
Std. Residual	-2,750	2,671	,000	,997	1061

a. Dependent Variable: general General trust PC, +: trust

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	goods material goods PC, +: do have, jóvó az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft. ^a -ban	.	Enter

- a. All requested variables entered.
 b. Dependent Variable: Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

Model Summary^a

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,080 ^a	,006	,005	,99892294	1,591

- a. Predictors: (Constant), goods material goods PC, +: do have, jóvó az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban
 b. Dependent Variable: Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6,796	2	3,398	3,405	,034 ^a
	Residual	1059,882	1062	,998		
	Total	1066,679	1064			

- a. Predictors: (Constant), goods material goods PC, +: do have, jóvó az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban
 b. Dependent Variable: Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-,111	,067		-1,653	,099
	jóvó az egy főre jutó családi jöv. 100 Ft.-ban	,000	,000	,067	2,180	,029
	goods material goods PC, +: do have	,041	,031	,041	1,346	,179

- a. Dependent Variable: Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete

E. Bakonyi: Trust towards democratic institutions

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-,1707753	,6239885	,0188757	,07991490	1065
Residual	-1,24914	3,229236	,00000000	,99798381	1065
Std. Predicted Value	-2,373	7,572	,000	1,000	1065
Std. Residual	-1,250	3,233	,000	,999	1065

a. Dependent Variable: Zhztava Zscore: Az elmúlt 12 hónapban az Ön háztartásának anyagi helyzete