COLLECTION OF THE THESSES

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The Rubik’s Cube of Democratic Development

A Normative Model of Statebuilding

Ph.D. dissertation

Advisor:

Dr. Kiss J. László, CSc
university professor

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Introduction to the hypotheses

It is a commonplace today that the actors of international relations had to face a qualitatively new context after the end of Cold War. The events of the last 20 years revealed the fact that the security architecture is out-of-date. The parallelly increasing number of democratizing countries and failing states drew attention to the necessity of rebuilding this architecture. Simultaneously, the state-centered Westphalian system lost its credit, since new non-state actors appeared on the scene of international relations.

Due to the ideological antagonism, the Cold War hindered deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of state failure. After the end of the Cold War, the Third World lost its strategic importance and the weak performing states lost their allies which pumped untied money in the rotten systems. Soon, the more or less stable dictatorships gave place to domestic anarchy in many parts of the world. The Hobbesian vision came true in the weak states. The last twenty years has witnessed two changes of systems, which were also characterized in the development of disciplines of international political theory. First, the events which carried the promise of “democracy’s final victory” at the end of the 1980s and the democratic transition of post-socialist countries after the fall of the Soviet Union had enormous impact on transitology. Second, the intervention in Afghanistan proved a radical shift in the perception of international relations.

Although, there are several ways to address state failure, most of them are ineffective. The conscious passivity and non-engagement with indirect security issues is a false strategy. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argued, the world is interdependent, and the national security can be interpreted only in terms of this characteristic. (Keohane et al 2001: 6) Thus, military power in itself is irrelevant to solve conflicts. The real power lies in the capacity of influencing processes of the international politics. The tactic of the Cold War, namely exerting influence and pressure on a country by assisting local forces, simply does work not under the anarchic conditions of a failed state. Robert Kaplan’s prophecy on “The Coming Anarchy” (1994) from the middle of the 1990s, increasing lawlessness and chaotic conditions in weak states has proved to be true.

Restoration of order in weak states is in the interest of the entire international community. Today, military intervention seems to be a necessary and integral part of complex crisis management, as the military forces of weak states are incapable of managing the anarchic situation and providing security for development; in many cases local military is the source of violence and insecurity. The role of modern armies is “to supply the global public good of peace in territories that otherwise have the potential for nightmare.” (Collier 2007: 125) The consequences of untreated state failure can be more
expensive than the intervention, and the civilian deaths in developed countries can be higher than the lost of troops during the intervention.

Although the problem of state failure is coeval with the first centralized system of polity, the phenomenon we refer to today has rather been present since the appearance of the modern states in the 19th century. After the end of the Cold War, the term state failure clamored for recognition in the political lexicons. Humanitarian claims for intervention in states which fail to perform necessary functions became stronger after the pictures of depressing events from Somalia to Cambodia perambulated the Western media at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, state failure, as a part of new researches with academic exigent, is to be connected with the study of Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner on the pages of Foreign Policy in January 1993, and with the volume edited by William Zartman in 1995.

The shift towards a more (national) security oriented approach was forced by the regrettable events of the simultaneous terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks shocked the world, but more importantly woke up the world’s alone superpower from its strategic slumber. The events finally raised the attention of foreign policy scientists and researchers on the external consequences of state failure. After 2001, several studies addressed the relationship between the accumulated knowledge on failed states and the policy decisions. (see eg. Dorff 2005) Many theorists and policy advisors believed that statebuilding is a general cure. Multiple researches listed several common straits of state failure; however, they fell short in providing coherent definition on state failure.

If we examine state failure in details we have to pose three basic questions: Why is it necessary to deal with failed states?; What should be done with failed states to diminish the negative effects?; How should be done it? Regarding these questions, it is possible to formulate several premises which may not lead to find the perfect answers but at least help understand the complexity of our topic. We have to recognize that the commonly used terminology reflects superficiality of the definition of state failure as it presumes linear development, being the failed state on the negative pole and the Weberian ideal type on the opposite. The term statebuilding, however, is normative, and reflects culturally specific assumptions on a functioning state. The aim of statebuilding is necessarily penetrated by the “Western” norms of democracy.

Today, democracy is the dominant form of government and the only generally acceptable regime. Further confidence comes from recent global trends that democracy as a system is relatively stable in overall numbers, and maybe even in quality. However, at the beginning of the new century few reversals call for caution. The future of democratization depends on the integration capacity of the recent system and the ability of democracies to deepen the cooperation. An effective democracy needs not only institutions but new norms which are generally valued by the people. The new norms are essential principles of democracy: freedom, civil and political rights, rule of law, and accountability of
rulers. Today, the idea of democracy is inseparably connected to liberalism, and it finally lies in the belief that the rights of citizens are best protected by a (constitutional) state whose power is limited. However, the “third wave of democratization” slowed down and the commonly mentioned “fourth wave” may have never begun, furthermore, and the global financial crisis began in 2008 holds the threat of severe reversals in weak democracies. The unfortunate factors give inspiration for the academia to come out with new theories on the process of democratization.

However, it is not possible to write down a general strategy on how to build up a democratic state it is still makes sense to aim at elaborating a model which helps understand, explain and forecast the problems related with statebuilding. The dissertation introduces an alternative model that uses the analogy of the Rubik’s cube solution methodology. Due to the fact that the variables during statebuilding and the beginning situations are countless the creation of a general “master plan” is impossible. However, this fact does not mean that there are no common points where the process has to arrive. During statebuilding, there are general lists of tasks which means that there are shorter sequences which can be followed in general.

Hypotheses and methodology

The dissertation follows deductive formal logic because it aims at rethinking and reconstructing existing theories and models on state failure and statebuilding. It also intends to present an alternative model of statebuilding. The complexity demands the deductive logic, because a comprehensive inductive research on state failure and statebuilding would lead to the recognition that all variables are connected to each other. For this reason, the only effective way to conduct the research is using presumptions and hypotheses. The previously stated goals help avoid redundant information. Consequently, of course, some information and results will stay latent, but we have to make this sacrifice to achieve the final goal.

The present work is similar to the eclectic constructivist researches and studies because it intends to point out that each of the existing models and theories on state failure and statebuilding contain elements which can be used in an alternative model. However, in our opinion, all the existing models comprise logical traps or deficiencies, which demand the revision of them. Our work is determined to collect verified theorems of the relevant theories and to give new meaning by re-aggregate them. The
most important added value of this work is the creation of a new theoretic outcome by reorganizing existing knowledge in a new model on statebuilding. The applied method is also appropriate to expand the theoretic frames of certain sub-disciplines of international relations, and to use the democratization discourse or the achievements of development economics in the state failure literature.

Comparing the outcome with the existing literature, the real novelty of the present work is that it helps understand, explain and forecast the challenges coming from failed states and propose alternative solution techniques. Consequently, the third hypothesis enjoys more attention. On the other hand, the first two hypotheses are not less important either because their verification is the proof why we need a new and alternative statebuilding model.

The empiric verification of the alternative model cannot be the goal of the present work, because due to the complexity of the model, the number of variables, factors and dimensions are higher than the number of present and past statebuilding exercises. Undeniably, there are formidable methodological reasons behind the fact that synthetic attempts and comprehensive comparisons of different statebuilding exercises have not led towards a unified model and definitions. The universe of tractable cases of successful statebuilding experiences is in the inconvenient “small-N” range. The solution which has been used in other normative attempts to model statebuilding has been either the serious delimitation of the analysis to particular institutions, policy areas or other attributes of governance, or a restriction of the geographic scope. Advocates of large-N quantitative methodologies have proposed various strategies to increase the number of the units of analysis, sometimes also by restricting the scope to various policy domains. Ultimately the problem for the analysts is both the number of cases and the complexity of plausible causal chains in any rendering of the statebuilding process.

The anticipated outcome of the present work and the introduced alternative model of statebuilding is a “theoretic crutch” for handling the interconnected dimensions and stages during the statebuilding process. The model is a good basis for further researches by serving as a method for analyzing the success or failure of statebuilding processes and by estimating the influence of different dimensions in certain situations.

The dissertation aims at addressing three comprehensive and complex questions and approaching the answers through three hypotheses. Even if the problem of state failure is not a new phenomenon, there are no clear and comprehensive frameworks which could help analyze, explain and forecast the events and phenomena associated with it. Consequently, there is not a coherent model which could serve as clear advising schema for decisionmakers. Analyzing the ever growing literature of state failure, post-conflict development, democratization and development politics, three obvious questions can be separated which eventually come from each other. The nexus among them is even deeper because the second question gains substance only by answering the first; and accordingly, the
substance of the third question follow from the second’s answer. First, before we could reach a comprehensive and final conclusion, we have to understand and explain why failed states are necessary to be dealt with. Second, after it becomes obvious that ignoring state failure is not an option in the 21st century, another question emerges, namely, what can the international community do with failed states? Third, no matter what solution is planned in theory as a cure for state failure, the reality is different and the actors which are involved need to have a clear vision on how the proposed solution should be implemented.

The goal of the present work is to contribute to the international literature by re-conceptualizing definitions and examining the three above mentioned questions. In order to achieve this, we intend to construct a new theoretic framework by reconstruction of the achievements of respective sub-disciplines. The present work fits in the state failure discourse but it intends to expand the theoretic borders and to include arguments from transitology and development economics. However, the present work tries to avoid remaining a simple study on the quality of system transformations and it is not an economic evaluation of development opportunities for poor countries or of aid policies, either. We have to keep in mind that there is no absolute or dogmatic truth, id est our goal should be reshaping the frames of thinking on state failure rather than finding answers for specific questions.

1st hypothesis

State failure means per definition a trap of humanitarian and security threats. Failed states are unable to escape by themselves from this trap.

Several lists of causes and consequences of state failure prove that neither humanitarian nor security challenges must be neglected. Due to domestic characteristics and inconvenient external pressures, failed states are unable to develop and elude from more severe consequences. In the 21st century, the consequences directly and indirectly affect the entire international community, which is why the problem cannot be handled as secondary.

Thus, it is easy to find answer for the first question. Per definition, failed states are not able to escape the trap of humanitarian and security threats by themselves, and the consequences of neglected state failure are clear. The humanitarian and security problems are not only the challenge of the given state but of the entire international community. In order to answer the fist hypothesis, the dissertation aims at formulating a complex definition to state failure.
2nd hypothesis

Statebuilding is the logical answer for state failure.

Without systematic statebuilding the promise of future development in a failed state will not be seen and the international community will suffer the consequences. The second hypothesis practically follows from the first one, namely, the fact that failed states are not able to develop by themselves does not necessarily mean that external actors cannot strengthen the basis of development. The international community has to intervene in the failed states in order to diminish the severity of the negative spillover effects.

Although, it is obvious that reaction is needed, the form of intervention is disputed. The debate is not completely settled whether the responsibility of the international community includes real actions or the provision of international development aid is a sufficient response. Of course, taking over all the responsibilities from the local actors in form of some kind of trusteeship does not seem to be appropriate, either. It has become more and more accepted by the scholars and decisionmakers that the “aurea mediocritas” is statebuilding. Statebuilding is inherently complex and multidimensional, such as it would be impossible to limit the causes of state failure to one dimension. The process of statebuilding includes simultaneously the strengthening of state institutions, the reconstruction and development of economy and the reform of society, which together allow opportunity for a sound environment which can be the basis of future sustainable development. However, we have to keep in mind that statebuilding is contradictory even in theory and there are no perfect experiences with it in practice, either.

Due to the fact that there is no widely accepted definition, the scholars on the field cannot agree even in the final aim of statebuilding, whether it is democracy, or it is simply a certain institutional structure. The reason is the high number of different suggestions which build on one aspect or dimension of state failure. The presumption of this work is that the final goal of the complex process is both. Namely, the outcome necessarily needs to be an institutional structure which is democratic. Eventually, we aim at drawing a comprehensive and comparative picture of different statebuilding models, and suggest an alternative way of thinking in which all the dimensions and steps, as well as the logical connections among them are taken into account.
3rd hypothesis

Despite of skepticism in the literature and in practice, statebuilding has to be complex and sequenced. The alternative model helps understand, explain and forecast the success of statebuilding through six dimensions and four steps which are interconnected during the process.

A necessary question comes from the second hypothesis: if we know that statebuilding is answer to state failure why is it possible that each statebuilding exercise had different outcome? The ultimate challenge in interpreting such a complex model is the enormous number of variables that influence each other and consequently change the final outcome of statebuilding. Accordingly, the goal of the present work cannot be the presentation of a blueprint for statebuilding, the aim is rather the introduction of a new and alternative schema of thinking which helps understand, explain and forecast the development of the state during the process. The model is necessarily normative and builds on the existing knowledge on the field in a constructivist manner. To overcome the danger of being lost in the complexity of the matrix of six dimensions and four steps, the present work uses the analogy of the solution methodology of the Rubik’s cube. The four sequences are: satisfying the basic needs; creating an interim authority; enhancing local ownership and reaching national level development. Whilst the dimensions are: security-military; institutional; economic; societal; external and domestic. The cube can be solved despite of the fact that the six faces and the “cubelets” can be oriented independently while each move affects all the faces and “cubelets” at the same time. Contrarily to most of other statebuilding models which evaluate specific cases and try to extrapolate the findings to other cases, the Rubik’s cube analogy is a schema for thinking about different cases at the same time.

The Hungarian scientist, Ernő Rubik’s invention from 1974 has conquered the world in the last three decades. At the beginning, the puzzle he introduced was held impossible to solve, but today the Internet is full with the algorithms of the solution. The solution methodology, or at least the way which leads to the solution, shows striking similarity with the interconnected system of development in a state where several dimensions and different steps jointly determine the outcome while they are mutually influencing each other.

The original cube, as well as the different variations, consists of small cubes (cubelets) which can rotate around. Among the small cubelets there are special ones. First, the edge cubelets are in the intersection of two faces (dimensions) and these always represent determined places between the two dimensions. Second, the corner pieces are in the intersection of three dimensions.
The cube has eight corners and twelve edges, which means that the permutations of different orientations depend on that. For instance, from the eight corners, seven can be oriented independently and the position of the last one depends on the orientation of the preceding seven. Accordingly, the odd permutation of the corners implies the permutation of the edges, too. Explicitly, eleven edges can be moved independently with the move of the last one depending on the previous ones. Stemming from this, there are 43 quintillion different options of moves during the solution. This number is incomprehensible even in mathematics. Consequently, the question emerges: how can we use the analogy in social sciences? The answer is surprisingly simple. The number of permutations resonates with the number of different options during statebuilding; however, the solution methodology also shows that the outcome is always the same despite of the number of different variations. It is a commonplace in social sciences, that there are no identical development paths, which eventually questions the validity of comparisons of different models. With the use of the Rubik’s cube analogy there is a possibility to incorporate the high number of variables and different “take off situations”.


Source: Hardwick n.d.
The solution methodology of the cube has a basic rule: the center cubelets have a fixed position, which means that they have to be solved first. This fact is similar in the statebuilding process and shows the sequence which has to be followed during the development. Statebuilding can be successful only if the basic requirements are met. Also in compliance with the solution methodology of the cube, the next sequences of statebuilding are similar in all cases despite of the different moves during a sequence. The alternative model of statebuilding proposed by the present work is a frame for thinking and the substance always depends on the real situation such as the permutation of the cubelets’ orientation between two sequences of the solution.

The general rule is that there are general algorithms, i.e. a list of well defined instructions for implementing the process from a given initial state, through well defined successive states to a desired outcome. Each of the algorithms takes into account the beginning situation and describes the effect of the steps and forecast the success of the way applied to bring the cube closer to the desired outcome. The originality of the algorithms is the fact that they are strategies for transforming only the necessary parts without scrambling the already solved parts. These strategies can be applied several times even in case of different parts during a sequence. However, and it is a warning sign for using the methodology in social sciences, the algorithms have certain side effects, namely in certain situations the orientation of cubelets may change other parts of the cube. It means that the analogy has to focus on the corrective mechanisms, too, which reorganize the changed parts in the wished manner.

**Results**

After the end of the bipolar world system, the weak performing states lost their donors. Anarchy, which was envisaged by Thomas Hobbes, became the rule in the weak states. Simultaneously, the scholars celebrated the victory of democracy in the post-modern world. The gap between the pre-modern states and post-modern democracies has grown constantly. The manifestation of the latent challenges coming from the weak states was only matter of time. After the simultaneous terrorist attacks and the intervention in Afghanistan, the international politics witnessed a new system change, because there occurred a radical shift in the perception of the problems stemming from weak statehood.
Although, there were several techniques to address state failure most of them were ineffective. The restoration of order in weak states became the self-interest of the entire international community. Today, it is clear that the consequences of state failure are more expensive than the costs of an intervention. However, there remained a serious problem. The theory and practice of interventions fought against the challenge of ineffectiveness. The main feature of state failure studies has been the unclear definitions and vague policy recommendations. Consequently, there is no single prescription for the problem of failed states.

In order to understand the complexity of state failure and the necessary response to it, we only need to try to answer three questions. Why is it necessary to deal with failed states? What should be done with failed states to diminish the negative effects? How should be done it? The dissertation’s main aim was to address the above mentioned questioned and to find answers through the hypotheses. We are aware that the problem of state failure is not a new phenomenon, but the events after the Cold War called the attention to the fact that there are no functioning and comprehensive frameworks which could help understand, explain and forecast events associated with it. Similarly, the decisionmakers cannot use a coherent model. The dissertation aimed at contributing the international literature by re-conceptualizing existing definitions and at constructing a new theoretic framework using the achievements of former models of statebuilding.

It is not complicated to formulate an appropriate answer for the first question because failed states are not able to manage the humanitarian and security challenges and the consequences of neglected state failure are unpredictable. Although, the problem affects the entire international community, and it is clear that a reaction is needed, the debate is not settled whether the reaction should be real intervention or the international community has to find new techniques. However, it is accepted in the literature that statebuilding is some sort of “aurea mediocritas”. Thus, the answer for the second question is that statebuilding is the appropriate answer, which is complex and multidimensional because it includes simultaneously the strengthening of state institutions, the reconstruction and development of the economy and the reform of the society. The third question refers to the implementation of the statebuilding. It is a highly disputed issue in the literature. Due to the ambiguous definitions and the high number of different suggestions, there is no agreement on the final goal of statebuilding. The basic presumption of this work is that the aim of statebuilding should be to build up both a functioning institutional structure and a democratic environment. The dissertation aimed at elaborating a comprehensive and comparative picture on the different practical and normative statebuilding models and at creating an alternative schema of thinking in which all the different sequences and dimension of statebuilding are taken into account.
The first hypothesis

The first hypothesis stated that state failure is a trap of humanitarian and security threats from which these states are unable to escape by themselves. Here, the main task was to find the appropriate definition by re-organizing the existing knowledge in the literature.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the worrisome events, manifested in form of violent civil conflicts, famines or human rights abuses, appeared on the headlines of the World’s (Western) media causing increased attention to state failure events. As the people in developed countries did not have to fear of the global contestant’s attack, their awareness to “third world events” became more intensive. Politicians, experts and scholars shortly had to experience that neither the international organizations, nor any existing political instruments are prepared to respond sufficiently the problem of state failure. It is true that on systemic level democracy became “the only game in town” defeating, or losing its counter-alternative organizing principle. But the anarchy of the international system, which penetrated in several weak performing states, encumbered the realization of the “end of history”.

All the relevant international organization, leading think tanks and research groups and many scholars devoted energy and effort to find the definition of state failure, but the result was the birth of many competing views rather than a comprehensive terminology. The complexity of the phenomenon and the abundance of factors, conditions made the generalization almost impossible. Although, there are useful guides on how to conceptualize the phenomenon, such as elaborated by the State Failure Task Force, the Fund for Peace or Robert Rotberg’s research group, there is still space for “definition-seekers”. The studies and researches on state failure and statebuilding still begin without exception with categorization and conceptualization what state failure really means. The competing views, however, show obviously that there is no final truth.

However, the early works on state failure already called the attention to the uncontrollable consequences that are dangerous for the whole international community, the primary motivation for seeking the definition remained humanitarian until 2001. The simultaneous terrorist attacks fundamentally changed the motivation of analysis which aimed at explaining the causes behind and the consequences of weak state performances. National security became the new motivation. The definition that the present work endeavored to formulate is also based on this recognition, namely, that the activity of the relevant international actors is enhanced by events which challenge security, id est a “selfish definition” is more appropriate. The re-conceptualization of state failure builds basis for further researches.

The definition used in the dissertation re-conceptualizes state failure on the basis of security and in theory justifies international interventions. Because of the fact that per definition state failure is an international phenomenon which does not know borders and spills over neighboring countries, creating
regional and in the worst case scenarios international instability. In the world of sovereign states, sovereignty protects all states from intervention under the aegis of the international law, but “cooperative sovereignty” means that sovereignty is not evidently attached to the state. The territory of the world is the common good of the world’s population and the states have the duty to protect the population living on the given territory. Territoriality in this sense is not a right but a duty to control the sovereign portion of the world’s territory. The definition of state failure is the failure of the control of this territory which puts the population of the country and the population of other countries in danger.

The second hypothesis

The second hypothesis stated that the logical answer for state failure is statebuilding. In order to verify this statement, the dissertation examined the different possible solutions. The fact that failed states are not able to develop by themselves does not necessarily mean that external actors cannot give useful assistance. In line with “cooperative sovereignty”, the external actors become responsible for the reinstallation and maintenance of the control over the territory. Statebuilding means the rebuilding of the state’s capacity of control the sovereign share. Although, the different tasks during statebuilding process are not clear and they seem to differ case by case, there are common straits along which the complex process can be characterized. It is generally recognized that alternative opportunities, such as redrawing state borders, or letting territories develop without governments, are not viable under the conditions of the recent international system. Per definition, failed states are not able to step on the road of sustainable development by themselves, that is why the active participation of the international community is needed. Cases which would prove that a country with weak state performances can carry out an internally driven development are rather exceptions than the rule. Due to the effects of globalization, the countries are highly interconnected in every aspect, and weak states are not exceptions, either. Assuming that a weak or failed state is unable to cope with internal pressures, it is improbable that it becomes able to handle the even bigger external forces. Summing up, it means that some form of international intervention is inevitable, and considering that weak statehood is connected with the lost of the monopoly on violence on the territory of the state, this intervention has to have a military dimension, too. Supposing that the international community is ready to intervene in all cases that constitute humanitarian danger for the people living on the territory of a country is too idealistic. However, it is probable that all the countries that perceive security interests in the intervention will act.
The complexity of challenges and the obscure conditions for statebuilding led to different definitions of the process, which is reflected in the ambiguous terminology. The process is labeled with several different expressions: peacebuilding, nation-building, post-conflict reconstruction or statebuilding. It is beyond doubt that the terms are synonyms, but as they unavoidably refer to a different focus, there is a need for clarification. In our definition, peacebuilding refers to the foundation of conditions of sustainable peace by creating several institutions and helping avoid the renewal of conflict. Whilst, nation-building refers to building a common identity. It is generally true, that foreign powers are unable to build nations, and the process would not happen in a fortnight, either. In our point of view, the most appropriate expression to apostrophe the complex process is statebuilding. It is adequate, because the problems stem from the failure of the state. However, the practice of statebuilding, namely the question of how to implement it, gives floor to fierce debates in the literature.

Several studies were born on the analogies between statebuilding experiences in the past and present. The historical examples help understand the complexity of the process but are unable to provide clear and copyable blueprints. On the other hand, it is evident that normative models and logical frameworks of statebuilding draw conclusions from the historical examples. Thus, these examples are indeed necessary because they lead us to deeper understanding that statebuilding is influenced by the complex constellation of different latent and manifested factors, dimensions and sequences. Analyzing different factors which made statebuilding projects successful can give advice regarding the recent theoretical debates on statebuilding. It is true that after the Cold War modern statehood experienced recession but the state is still the central unit of international politics even if we recognize that several other actors, such as international organizations, NGOs, or even certain personalities can influence international political events. States are still the eventual frames for providing the institutional structures for development in several dimensions of life. However, there are some comments according to which the decline in statehood is the normal evolution of politics and the international community should accept that certain territories will live without states the reality is different. As long as states have sovereignty over certain territories the failure poses significant security threat.

On the other hand, the question was still open, what kind of state the international community should build? The ideal case, of course, would be the modern nation-state that was born after long wars in Europe. Today it is hard to imagine that the “Westphalian creation” can be remade as neither the birth of new nation that can seize a state, nor a state that gives birth to a nation are real opportunities. Colonization of stateless territories by European powers showed that artificial creations will conserve latent conflicts of weak statehood and never existed nationhood. The decolonization only gave floor to permanent crises that were swept under the rug during the Cold War. The destroying
events in the 1990s proved that these conflicts were not solved, as the new problems of state failure are natural continuums of conflicts of decolonization. Soviet style statebuilding resembles with colonization as it forced artificial identities on the states and nations that could not take roots giving place for violent secessionism in several parts of the post-socialist world. Commonly cited successful statebuilding projects were the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. However, the two cases have some useful advice on the favorable factors of statebuilding but cannot serve as a model for recent projects. Germany and Japan had been functioning states with homogenous society; the failure of statehood was only the result of the destroying and decisive defeat in the war.

After the experiences in Afghanistan and more importantly in Iraq, there were born several theoretical contributions to the literature of statebuilding. Furthermore, the relevant international organizations and research groups created their own comprehensive checklists of the necessary tasks during statebuilding. Consequently, the large number of different models called the attention to the necessity of a comprehensive, complex but new schema which incorporates in a single framework all dimensions and steps which are present in the different models.

The third hypothesis

Statebuilding is necessarily sequenced process but the gradual development of the different dimensions at the same time. The third hypothesis stated that the alternative normative model of statebuilding explains the steps and factors in six dimensions and four sequences which mutually influence each other. The greatest challenge in verifying the hypothesis was the high number of independent variables and the difficulty of incorporating them in a single and coherent model even if the goal of the model was not the introduction of a dogmatic blueprint of development. The proposed model is necessarily normative because the definitions unavoidably build on the existing knowledge on this field. The model did not intend to criticize the existing models. It rather aimed at constructing a new schema of thinking by using the existing knowledge and experiences. The analogy of the Rubik’s cube’s solution methodology helps understand and explain the interconnections of the dimensions and the sequences.

Statebuilding is complex and gradual development through different sequences. Thus, the possible interim setbacks cannot indicate the failure of the dynamic process. The Rubik’s cube analogy is a proof that neither the followers of the “sequencing” school nor those who believe that the development of the state is gradual are right. In the reality, statebuilding is dynamic but the wished outcome can be reached only through certain sequences. The analogy with the Rubik’s cube solution methodology is a
new schema of thinking about the complexity in which the sequences interpret the timely dynamic of statebuilding and all six dimensions develop simultaneously and gradually during the sequences. At the same time, the dynamics of statebuilding are reflected in the gradual transition of power from the external actors to the local stakeholders.

**Assessing the centerpieces**

The first sequence of statebuilding has to satisfy the basic needs of the country and the people. There is a need for at least a minimal state that is able to maintain the achievements for the next sequence. Simultaneously, the necessity of external presence is high, because the state is definitely not able to develop by itself. During the first sequence, the real stakeholder is the international community and the external actors that are present in the given country. From the point of view of the external actors, the goal of this stage is to create an environment in which the exit strategy is a viable option in the future.

![The Centerpieces of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.](image)

The nexus among the security-military, the external and the domestic dimensions is more direct whilst we have to keep in mind that the sound constellation of all factors is needed in order to say that the first stage was successful. The security is a prerequisite of future development, but contradicting to the existing normative models, it does not mean the absolute primacy of the security dimension. On the other hand, the Rubik’s cube analogy helps understand that the importance of other dimensions should not be exaggerated, either. The development of the dimensions simultaneously influences each other. A positive change in a dimension contributes to a similar transformation in another dimension, whilst any deterioration in one dimension negatively affects the others.

The security can be created and maintained only if the domestic capacities are present, or the external involvement is complete the missing domestic factors. Furthermore, the domestic factors depend also on the institutional, societal and economic dimensions. These dimensions influence the success of the external involvement by indicating the opportunities for external actors.
The first stage of statebuilding is only the first step and its measurable indicator of success is not necessarily the lasting peace or the functioning state. The goal of the first stage is to lay down the basis for future development. The six dimensions have to develop gradually and simultaneously. The external involvement may be higher than the domestic efforts. Although, as it was mentioned several times, the fact, that the stakeholder of the first stage’s development is the international community and the external actors, does not mean that the domestic actors do not have a role here. The first stage is only a sequence and the goal is to move forward to the other sequences of development. In this sense, the domestic actors have to become able to accept the stakes and the ownership of the process of statebuilding has to be transplanted from the external actors to the domestic ones. We can say that the first stage was successful if the basis of future development is visible.

Assessing interim authority

According to the logic of the sequences, the second stage of statebuilding has to contribute to the achievements of the first sequence. After securing the basis of development in all dimensions, the statebuilders have to prepare the local actors for the transition. As it can be seen, the external actors still have the final authority, however, this power should not be permanent, and the local actors should not be socialized for the trusteeship. The goal of this sequence is to identify the right directions of future development. Using the Rubik’s cube analogy, it means that the statebuilders have to identify the right “edge groups” of development in each dimension.


It is still less important to force the local actors to have a perfect performance, but it is crucial that they become slowly part of the process. It means that the external actors have to find the appropriate stakeholders of development, who will be the basis of power transition. The local stakeholders, “the edge pieces”, who worked separately, have to be made be interested in the joint effort, id est to form the “edge groups”. During this process, the most important goals are avoiding renewed fighting,
strengthening the rule of law through a strong transitional authority, providing the key public goods and services, and beginning reconciliation. Furthermore, all of these goals have to be achieved through a mixture of external, in the form of a (neo)trusteeship, and internal, in the form of an interim government, efforts. The external actors have to pay attention to the importance of the local efforts, because the interim authority should not be based on a state which is only a collection of externally run institutions.

Similarly to the first sequence of statebuilding, certain dimensions have closer relation even if we still have in mind that the dimensions can be separated only in theory. The security-military, the external and the institutional dimensions necessitate more synchronized development. Accordingly, the economic, societal and domestic dimensions are in closer relation. These groupings are easily acceptable if we think about the most important goal of this stage, which is avoiding renewed fighting whilst the domestic actors become able to be the real engine of development. However, in this stage, the presence of the foreign actors is still the key for development, because they can maintain security, and they shape the frames of the future institutions. The locals can have an organic role in the statebuilding process when the economy and the societal situation create a situation where the opportunity costs of development are higher than the motivation for renewed fighting or simply remaining free rider in the process.

Winning the war does not lead automatically to sustainable peace. The appropriate interim solutions need the joint effort of the external and the local actors even if it slows down the process for a while. This stage can be only successful if the root causes of the former conflict are not present or they are weaker than the attractiveness of development. This is the key of the future because external actors cannot be present indefinitely. Consequently, the final indicator of success of this stage is the increased ability of the local actors to bear the responsibility of development in the future.

Assessing emerging local ownership

The third sequence of the statebuilding process began in a situation where the external actors prepared the environment for power transition and the local stakeholders are identified. This stage is for making these stakeholders feel the responsibility for the statebuilding process. The goal of this stage of statebuilding is to develop an environment in which the local stakeholders are able to continue the development without major interference of external actors. Using again the analogy of the Rubik’s
cube solution method, the stage has to reach a level after which a simple 3x3 cube is present which can be solved more easily.

In all dimensions, the most important goal is to increase the ownership of the local actors. It means that in the security-military dimension, the local participation has to increase the legitimacy of the institutions which eventually will lead to a stronger institutional system. In the institutional dimension, the greatest challenge is to manage “power-sharing” and let more space to the locals. Similarly, in the economic dimension, the local initiatives and investments are more important even if the externally led processes were more effective. In the societal dimension, it is not enough that the hostility is controlled, there is a need of the development of the civil society, because it is the only way that all groups of the society are represented in a certain way. Civil society is a key for democratic development which is eventually the basis of sustainability during the statebuilding process. The relation between external and internal players is still complex. Whilst the external players should rather focus on regional problems, the domestic counterparts have to be responsible for the events in the country. This is extremely important because the local actors will accept the statebuilding process legitimate only if the local factor is significant. The increased local ownership of the statebuilding process also means an opportunity for the external actors for designing an exit strategy. From a more technical point of view, the ownership transfer means also an increase of effectiveness of governance, because the decisions are made on the local level by the locals. The quality of governance will influence the other dimensions because it is the method to pursue the collective interests of the society. Consequently, “good governance” means the intensive participation of locals in the decision-making process. The limits of external political and institutional engineering are clear, but it is also false to leave too much space for the locals as there are fractions inside of the local political forces as well. The key is to find a good constellation of external and local ownership, and during this stage of statebuilding, the locals have to bear greater responsibility. To sum up, the goal of this stage is not to switch off the external influence but to increase the ability of local actors to control the process of statebuilding and to make them able to continue with the next sequence of statebuilding.
Assessing national level development

During the last stage of statebuilding, democratic structures have to become dominant in all dimensions. Democracy is also reflected in the logic of synergies among the dimensions, which means that none of the dimensions has absolute primacy over the others. We would easily think that the institutional dimension is more important because of the institutional nature of the last stage but it would lead to false conclusions. The main problem with most of the international mechanisms is the simplistic conditional nature of such programs. One good example is the logic of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, which presumes that institutional change can reform the whole state. In this sense, the greatest advantage of using the Rubik’s cube analogy is the possibility to analyze the different dimensions in a single model. Accordingly, the analogy helps understand that one dimension in itself is only complex but imperfect slice of the whole and all dimensions influence the others.

The Composition of the Rubik’s Cube Before “the Last Move”. Source: Hardwick n.d.

The main goal of the last stage is to strengthen the state to develop from its own resources. The challenge is the fact that the statebuilding process may seem to be already completed at the beginning of the stage because the conditions are ripe for the external actors to leave the country. Nevertheless, it is important to continue the process because some developments in one dimension may negatively influence the development of another for a certain period of time which necessitates the continuous process in all dimension, i.e. the presence of the external actors, as well. The Rubik’s cube analogy suggests that the development is neither static nor linear. Consequently, the development of the state is dynamic and includes not foreseen setbacks. The goal of the final stage is to create the system of mechanisms which help correct these setbacks. Furthermore, it is only a utopia to have a perfectly working state in the end. In the security-military dimension, the above argument means a consolidated local capacity and an exit point for the foreign military forces. The security apparatus of the state has to be able to cope with most of the challenges which would threaten the basis of the state. The development in the institutional, economic and the societal dimensions all contribute to the sustainability of the process. Participatory democracy, equal economic development and a strong society which allows the people to live together despite of the differences are the key indicators of
success in this stage. The state has to be able to govern the dimensions while the globalized world will permanently create new challenges. To sum up, the goal is to create and strengthen a state which is fed by the domestic resources, uses domestic endowments to participate in the interdependent international networks.

In cases of failed states, the final aim of the statebuilding process is not to build a developed state. The statebuilders can be satisfied if the state serves the security of the given country and thus the international community. Statebuilding obviously cannot aim at building a developed state from a failed state, but we can say that a statebuilding process is successful, when the state is able to maintain its internal and external security, possesses functioning institutions, is able to manage its debt, provides economic growth, manages the societal conflicts in a peaceful way, and balances between external interdependency and its domestic capacities.

Summary of the alternative model

Statebuilding necessarily means more than the simple reconstruction of narrow state functions because the design and the prescriptions for state failure are born in the “North Atlantic design center”. Having said that, it is important to build a state which is legitimate and effective, i.e., a democratic and functioning structure. Statebuilding in this sense rather means shaping the environment which allows and strengthens “good state functions” by maintaining a healthy balance between legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. Furthermore, the state has to become able to influence not only these institutions but the environment, as well.

Consequently, statebuilding is complex and sequenced. It is a gradual development but through certain stages. The process is dynamic and not linear, that is some setbacks do not always indicate the failure of the process. The literature of democratic development introduced a fierce debate on sequencing a development process and disseminated the ambition to find the necessary prerequisites of final success. The alternative model which uses the analogy of the Rubik’s cube solution methodology contradicts the arguments of both the gradual and sequencing “school”. The reality shows that a statebuilding process is a permanent and dynamic development, but on the other hand the designers of a statebuilding exercise have to follow some steps in a certain order. This is also an answer why different statebuilding exercises showed different outcomes. The steps, the dimensions and the variables which influence the final outcome are different in each situation which posed an enormous challenge in creating a model that could help understand, explain and forecast the outcome of such a
process. Consequently, the Rubik’s cube analogy is not a blueprint but a new schema of thinking about the complexity. It did not intend to criticize existing models or practical experiences. It only aimed at providing a method of thinking about the different dimensions and steps in a single model having in mind that the process is dynamic.

The sequences reflect the timely dynamic of statebuilding and do not prescribe functional priorities among the dimensions. Each dimension develops gradually and simultaneously during the sequences. In this sense, the statebuilding process is a gradual transition through reaching certain sequences from a failed state to a self sustainable and effective and interdependent structure of security, institutions, economy, society, governance and external conditions. The process of transition is a power transfer from the external actors to the local stakeholders. The challenge is to find the balance between legitimate local ownership and effective external actions.

When Ernő Rubik invented his cube it was held impossible to solve. Today, only a few months ago, there was published an algorithm which solves the cube in 20 moves from every possible beginning situation. It is strikingly similar to the general thinking about statebuilding and democratization, according to which it is impossible to describe every statebuilding exercises in a single model which handles all the dimensions and steps together. We are not stating that similar algorithms can work in social sciences, but it is beyond doubt that the Rubik’s cube analogy can be used as schema for thinking. Concluding from the solution methodology of the cube, a basic rule of sequencing can be formulated. The center cubelets have fixed position on each face, that is the basic conditions in each dimensions have to be created and the basic demands have to be satisfied. Statebuilding can be successful only if the basic conditions are ripe for the continuation in each dimension. The algorithms are the general and well defined instruction on the challenges and necessary tasks in each dimension from a given initial situation to the desired outcome. The instructions pay attention to the fact that each move influences the other dimensions, and the strategies do not intend to rewrite the rules of development in the later stages they only try to reform it.

The sequences of statebuilding represent the different stages or better to say the logic of the transformation of authority and power from the external actors to the locals. In the first sequence, the foundation of future lies in the state’s ability to stop fighting and decrease violence. It is only possible if the basic needs are satisfied in each dimension. Creation of an environment which helps future development is a necessary feature of the first sequence. In the second sequence, the external actors need to take a bigger role in development because they can create a certain stability and peace because the greatest challenge in the second phase is the opportunity for renewed hostility. In each interim situations, an “interim recession” may occur, but it has to be kept under control. Furthermore, the locals have to hold bigger stakes. In the third sequence, the external actors still have to be present but the role of the locals is crucial. Without significant local ownership of the statebuilding process, the
development cannot become sustainable and the external actors easily stuck in the quagmire of failed development. Pumping aid in the local economy is not enough, the state has to become able to use its own resources and the external actors have to play rather the supporting agency of development. In the fourth sequence, the goal is to create and maintain a coherent complex structure of the interdependent dimensions. The external actors have to decrease their presence to a minimal level, whilst we have to admit that the external dimension is still important but in a different way. The state has to be able to cope with the challenges of the 21st century which basically stem from globalization and the interdependent world structure.

In addition, the model pays attention to the interaction and development of the different dimensions in each sequence. Differently from other normative models which overemphasize the role of a single dimension, such as security, the Rubik’s cube analogy introduces the dynamic and simultaneous development of six dimensions: security-military; institutional; economic; societal; external and domestic. The connection among the dimensions is different in each sequence and the beginning situation is also not the same in case of different countries. Therefore the complex system can be understood better by using the Rubik’s cube analogy. It is impossible to elaborate a set of needed tasks but it is possible to highlight the important problems in each dimension in each sequence. The dimensions are rather sets of different factors which influence the development of each other and eventually the success of the state. Differentiating among the dimensions is possible only on the theoretic level. This is due to the fact that the factors are overlapping and their relation and interconnected development can be explained as the solution of “edge pieces” and “edge groups” of the Rubik’s cube.

**Afterword**

The dissertation built on the belief that each model and theory on state failure and statebuilding has useful elements which were incorporated in the alternative model after careful revision. Consequently, the real added value of the dissertation was the creation of the new theoretic schema which reorganized the exiting knowledge and obliterated the borders of sub-disciplines such as international political theory, international development, or transitology. The outcome of the schema helps understand, explain and forecast the challenges related to state failure.
On the other hand, the empiric verification of the new model was not the goal of the dissertation. Despite of this fact, the model is a god basis for further researches because it is a method to analyze the success of statebuilding and to estimate the influence of certain factors and dimensions in different situations. The Rubik’s cube analogy is different from other statebuilding models because it does not overemphasize the role of a single dimension. All dimensions are present during each sequence and they are in dynamic relation. The nexus among them is different during each sequence and in different countries but the logic of development is the same.

The model is not a perfect blueprint of development but it is a theoretic crutch for further researches on this field. The aim with the initiation of a new model and with using the analogy was to reconstruct thinking about state failure and statebuilding. The model intended to alleviate the problem of incorporating all factors, dimensions and sequences in a single model.
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