



**Sociology Ph.D.  
Program**

## **THESES**

For the Ph. D. dissertation

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**Personal Characteristics and Earning Inequalities**

**Supervisor**

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**Institute for Sociology and Social Policy**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

There is considerable consensus among scholars of inequalities in wages that the main determinant of the earning distribution is human capital (Mincer: 1974). However, using human capital variables such as education, cognitive performance and job specific training and skills, a surprisingly large portion of the variance in earnings is not explained (Kertesi – Köllő). Recently a new paradigm has emerged in the social sciences where personal characteristics are thought to account for differences in economic success (Bowles et al.: 2001a, Bowles et al.: 2001b). In this paper, I examine the wage impact and return of personal traits using multivariable statistical models.

## II. PREVIOUS RESEARCHES

According to (Bowles et al., 2001a) we can suppose that the amount of labour services an employee supplies to a firm is the product of two terms: number of hours and level of effort. Employers can prescribe the number of working hours in a contract, but the level of effort cannot be contracted. Employers only can assume that higher wage may induce more effort. Personal characteristics which lead an employee to work harder, keeping everything else constant may have an impact on wages. It is easy to see that highly fatalistic, low-efficiency persons believe that their actions determine the outcome by little. Because greater fatalism lowers an employee's desired effort level, it may result in lower wages, while the anti-fatalistic attitude translates into more effective work that in turn may be rewarded with a higher salary.

One of the most widely used personality variables in sociological and economic research is the Rotter *locus of control scale* (Rotter: 1966). People having *external control* believe that hard work and effort are not rewarded, while individuals with *internal control* believe that future success is mostly shaped by their own efforts. Another frequently used measure of personal traits is the *self-esteem scale* developed by Rosenberg (1965), which is measured with 10 questions (each have four response choice) ranging from low to high self-worth statements.

There are a considerable numbers of researches outlined correlations between economic success and personality variables. In Table 1. I summarized the main findings of previous researches. According to the results the wage impact of personal characteristics are low or moderate, but still they have a significant impact on earning controlling a wide range variables. Previous researches mostly used data set from the Anglo-Saxon world, but the research technique was not implemented in European data. This lack of results encourages further researches.

TABLE 1.: CORRELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND PERSONALITY VARIABLES ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS RESEARCHES

Author	Dependent variable	Personality variable	Control variables	Size of effect in standardized regression parameter	R <sup>2</sup> change compared to the control variables	Data
Andrisani and Nestel (1976)	Log wages (yearly, 1970)	Rotter scale (1969)	Education, training, health, tenure with current employer, age, marital status, region of residence, city size, and race.	-0,10 <sup>1</sup>		NLS (men born 1907-1921)
Andrisani (1977)	Log wages (yearly, 1970; 1971)	Rotter scale (1968; 1969)	Education, training, health, tenure with current employer, age, marital status, region of residence, city size, and race.	Between - 0,03 and 0,01 <sup>2</sup>		NLS (men)
Goldsmith et al. (1997)	Log wage (hourly wage, 1980 and 1987)	Predicted Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1980)	Education, experience, tenure, cognitive skills, occupation, industry of employment, unemployment rate, gender, age, race, marital status, number of children, wealth	0,16; 0,15 <sup>3</sup>		NLSY (men and woman born 1957-1965)
Dunifon and Duncan (1998)	Log wage (hourly wage, average between 1973 and 1977; hourly wage, average between 1988 and 1992)	Personal control scale (1968-1972). It is very similar to the Rotter scale	Age, education, cognitive performance, race, parent's socioeconomic status, region, number of siblings, job related variables.	0,09; 0,13		PSID (men born 1943-1951)
Murnane et al. (2001)	Log wage (hourly wage, 1990/1991)	Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1980)	Race and ethnicity, calendar year, academic skills, skill in performing mental tasks rapidly and accurately	0,08 <sup>4</sup>	4% <sup>5</sup>	NLSY (27/28 years old man)
Osborne Groves (2005a)	Log wage (hourly wage, average between 1990 and 1993)	Rotter scale (1970)	Parent's socioeconomic status, number of respondent's children, highest grade, work experience, cognitive performance IQ	-0,103; -0,129 <sup>6</sup>	1,10%	NLSY (women born 1946-1954)
Osborne Groves (2005b)	Log wages (yearly, between 1980 and 1981)	Rotter scale (1968)	Schooling, tenure, IQ, fathers earning (between 1966-1968)	-0,200	3,5%	NLS (men born 1942-1952)

<sup>1</sup> Internal control is measured with lower values.

<sup>2</sup> Own calculation from the information provided by author using the following equation:  $B_i = \beta_i \times (s_i/s_y)$  see: Bring, 1994: 210.

<sup>3</sup> Own calculation from the information provided by author

<sup>4</sup> Own calculation from the information provided by author

<sup>5</sup> Compared to models without academic skills

<sup>6</sup> Own calculation from the information provided by author

### III. DATA, MEASUREMENT AND METHODS

In my paper I will use data from the Hungarian Household Panel Survey (HHP), a longitudinal survey on income and labour market dynamics that also contains attitude variables. The dataset covers the period from 1992 to 2007, but from 1998 till 2006 the data collection had been paused. Another restriction of the samples is that people under 16 years could not participate in the research, since the samples include only people who are older than this age.

Analysing wages requires investigating people on the labour market (1) with available data of earning (2). All respondents who were employees, self-employed, or were employed beside pension, maternity leave or compulsory military service were regarded as active and their missing earning data had been imputed according to employment status. The sample selection bias was treated with Heckman (1979) two step procedures. Heckman's lambda is estimated from the logit equation where selection criterion was explained with age, gender, region, education, *control of future scale*, a dummy variable whether the respondent is unemployed, and an other dummy variable showing whether the respondent is retired.

Because the *Rotter scale* is not available on this survey, I created an index (*control of future scale*<sup>7</sup>) – which is theoretically and empirically<sup>8</sup> – very similar to the Rotter scale. In order to examine the highest income period I used the attitude question from 1993, when they had been asked at the first time.

TABLE 2.: ITEMS IN THE CONTROL OF FUTURE SCALE

	Fully true (3)	Partly true (2)	Rather true (1)	Not true at all (0)	N
a1.) I cannot solve my problems	24,47%	23,82%	42,13%	9,58%	4103
a2.) I accomplish all my purposes	3,51%	9,85%	52,61%	34,03%	4099
b1.) I can hardly effect the turns my life takes	18,20%	24,49%	40,75%	16,57%	4076
b2.) The shaping of my future depends primarily on me	12,51%	20,81%	40,70%	25,98%	4075
c1.) I can hardly relieve most of my troubles	22,28%	26,46%	35,64%	15,62%	4078
c2.) I trust my future	12,25%	14,88%	36,33%	36,54%	4077

<sup>7</sup> The index was created from six items. The six questions contain three oppositions, between the opposition pairs the correlation is at least -0.3. The following points were matched to answer-categories: fully true: 3; partly true: 2; rather true: 1; not true at all: 0. I used the following equation to calculate the index: control of future scale = (a2-a1)+(b2-b1)+(c2-c1) .

<sup>8</sup> I could test the correlation between *control of future scale* and *Rotter locus of control scale* on the data of 1000 respondents from a national representative sample from Hungary in the spring 2009. The Pearson-correlation coefficient is 0,38, which is different from 0 on the significance level 0,01.

When using personality variables in any wage equation a very serious problem should be solved: personal traits should be endogenous to wages. Personality namely may be shaped by success or failure on the labour market. The crucial criterion is to use panel data where we have many observations about one individual. Beside that, I used three estimation techniques to avoid the reverse causation. The simplest and easiest way is when the wage in time  $t$  is explained with personality variable measured  $t-1$ . The model is called *detained impact model*.

$$\log_{10}W_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times Z_{i,t} + \beta_2 \times C_{i,t} + \beta_3 \times H_{i,t} + \beta_4 \times P_{i,93} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1.)$$

where  $W$  is the net salary or wage measured in the last month,  $Z$  is a vector of demographic variables (gender, age, age square, region, marital status),  $C$  is a vector containing some corrections variables (Heckman sample selection bias, a dummy variable showing whether the wage was imputed, and an other dummy variable showing whether the personality variable was imputed),  $H$  is a vector of human capital variables (education, tenure, tenure square, a dummy variable for working in part-time), and in vector  $P$  is the *control of future scale*.  $P$  is measured in 1993, and the other variables are from a later wave of the survey, so  $t > 1993$ .

Very similar to the detained impact model is the *earning change* model, where among the control variables the wage of previous year is included. In this equation it is assumed that the most important factor explaining the earning in time  $t$  is the earning in time  $t-1$ , but we are looking for any other significant impact.

$$\log_{10}W_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times Z_{i,t} + \beta_2 \times C_{i,t} + \beta_3 \times H_{i,t} + \beta_4 \times \log_{10}W_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \times P_{i,93} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (2.)$$

The third estimation techniques is called *two staged least squares model* (2SLS). In a first equation *control of future scale* is explained, and the residual of this equation is substituted in the original equation (equation #1).

$$P_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times Z_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \times \hat{H}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \times \log_{10}W_{i,t-1} + \bar{P}_{i,t-1}, \quad (3.)$$

where the formalizations are the same, but the vector  $\hat{H}$  contains education, tenure, tenure square, a dummy variable for working in part-time and job specific experience and its square) and  $\bar{P}$  is the residual of the equation. Equation #1 is rewritten in the form:



$$\log_{10} W_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times Z_{i,t} + \beta_2 \times C_{i,t} + \beta_3 \times H_{i,t} + \beta_4 \times \bar{P}_{i,93} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (4.)$$

I investigated five models: from 1994 to 1997 there were four models, and one for the year 2007. In this former year the numbers of missing cases were high due to *control of future scale*<sup>9</sup>, so I imputed the missing cases from the later year of survey (1996 or 1997)

#### IV. RESULTS

The results are presented in tables A1. to A4. We can conclude that personal characteristics such as *control of future scale* has a positive significant impact on wages using multivariable statistical models. It means that people being optimistic and being able to control their future earn *ceteris paribus* more. The t-statistics show that the regression parameters of *control of future scale* are different from zero at significance level of 1% in case of sixteen models out of the examined eighteen models<sup>10</sup>.


The size of effect can be read out from the unstandardized regression parameters ( $\beta$ ). In log-level models (where the dependent variable is in logarithmic form and the independent variables are not legitimized)  $\beta$  means the percentage change in the dependent variable when one of the independent variables changes one unit, holding any other differences constant ( $\% \Delta y = (100 \times \beta) \times \Delta x$ ). On Figure 1. the unstandardized regression parameters are expressed in the three models with one standard deviation confidence intervals. Since the confidence intervals are very close to each other and would be more closer if I had been used two standard deviation (95% confidence interval), I concluded that there are no significant differences between the parameters estimated with different technique.

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<sup>9</sup> In the previous models I took into consideration only those people who were older than 16 years in 1993 and were on the labour market. This very strict restriction made a large number of missing cases in year 2007.


<sup>10</sup> The numbers of cases were limited in the two models where the examined impact was not significant at the 10% level.

**Figure 1.: The size of effect of one unit change in control of future scale calculating with three different model**



In case of control of future scale it is fairly difficult to interpret what the *one unit change* means, because one cannot be sure whether it is a large or a small change. However, we can regard one standard deviation change in the *control of future scale* large enough. On Figure 2. instead of  $\beta$  coefficients I represented  $\bar{\beta}_x$  which is  $\beta_x \times \sigma_x$  where  $\sigma_x$  is the standard deviation belonging the *control of future scale*. One standard deviation in the examined index means 3% to 1,5% change in earring holding other differences constant. The size of effect seems to be small but we should remark that a very broad number of control variables were included in the estimations and in case of larger income the impact of personal characteristics are larger expressing it in money.

**Figure 2.: The size of effect of one standard deviation change in control of future scale calculating with three different models**




On Figure 3. I expressed the size of effect of one standard deviation change in *control of future scale* in money. I inflated all prices on 2008 level<sup>11</sup> and I calculated with the average net salary<sup>12</sup>. The results show that impact of one standard deviation change in *control of future scale* holding other differences constant means approximately 3000 and 800 HUF change in the average salary depending on the estimation technique.

<sup>11</sup> Source of CPI: [http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat\\_eves/tab13\\_06\\_01i.html](http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/tab13_06_01i.html) (downloaded 26. May. 2009)

<sup>12</sup> Source: [http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat\\_eves/tab12\\_01\\_41i.html](http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/tab12_01_41i.html) (downloaded 26. May. 2009)


**Figure 3.: The size of effect in 2008 prices (calculating with one standard deviation change in control of future scale)**



In order to properly examine the return of the *control of future scale* within the path of life, the analysis had to cover a larger income period. People who permanently participated on the labour market should differ from the average person in the sample, since being able to exist permanently on the labour market requires higher education and perhaps more optimistic attitude. So I expect the return of personal characteristic higher than it is impact on a certain point of time, and I expect that the larger the examined income period, the larger is the return of personality.

Answering the question about the return of personality requires a small modification in the measurement of the dependent variable. Instead of the last monthly earning I will explain all received benefits from the first job during the examined income period. I took into consideration the sum of yearly income(s), paid overtime(s) and contribution(s) to meal, car, travel and rent. With this modification in the dependent variable I used the Equation 1 to determined the return of personality variable. I plotted my results on Figures 4. We can see that one standard deviation change in the *control of future scale* means ceteris paribus above 8% change in wages. The result strengthens the hypothesis that those people’s personalities who are able to exist on the labour market enduringly have larger wage return than the wage impact of an average person in the sample.

**Figure 4.: The wage impact and return of one standard deviation change in control of future scale**



## CONCLUSION

In my paper I made evident the impact of personal characteristics on wages using multivariate statistical models and working with Hungarian panel data. The results are partly an implementation of previous research techniques and from this perspective my results strengthen those researches' findings. On an other perspective I made some steps forward, since I tried to make difference between wage impact and wage return, and I pointed out that the return of personality variables during an income period (analysing those people data who are permanently visible on the labour market) is larger than its impact on a certain point of time.

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# ANNEX

TABLE A1.: REGRESSION RESULTS WITH THE DETAINED IMPACT MODEL

	Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1993)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1994)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1995)		
Constant	3,73 () ***	3,58 () ***	3,542 () ***	3,715 () ***	3,53 () ***	3,51 () ***	3,902 () ***	3,676 () ***	3,658 () ***
Male	0,099 (0,239) ***	0,093 (0,223) ***	0,091 (0,218) ***	0,091 (0,214) ***	0,082 (0,193) ***	0,08 (0,189) ***	0,093 (0,223) ***	0,084 (0,2) ***	0,082 (0,196) ***
Age	0,017 (0,921) ***	0,005 (0,245)	0,006 (0,322)	0,023 (1,167) ***	0,012 (0,593) ***	0,012 (0,628) ***	0,016 (0,813) ***	0,008 (0,411) *	0,009 (0,448) **
Age square	0 (-0,851) ***	0 (-0,056)	0 (-0,115)	0 (-1,103) ***	0 (-0,465) **	0 (-0,478) **	0 (-0,736) ***	0 (-0,267)	0 (-0,284)
Unmarried/single	-0,027 (-0,047) *	-0,03 (-0,053) **	-0,024 (-0,042) *	-0,015 (-0,026)	-0,022 (-0,04) *	-0,018 (-0,032)	-0,016 (-0,03)	-0,026 (-0,049) **	-0,023 (-0,043) *
Divorced	-0,025 (-0,031)	-0,009 (-0,011)	-0,007 (-0,008)	-0,018 (-0,022)	-0,002 (-0,003)	-0,001 (-0,001)	-0,005 (-0,007)	0,002 (0,003)	0,003 (0,003)
Widow	-0,047 (-0,043) *	-0,011 (-0,01)	-0,013 (-0,012)	-0,023 (-0,02)	0,024 (0,021)	0,027 (0,023)	-0,022 (-0,019)	0,009 (0,008)	0,007 (0,006)
Town	0,036 (0,079) ***	0,014 (0,031)	0,012 (0,026)	0,04 (0,087) ***	0,01 (0,022)	0,01 (0,02)	0,029 (0,064) **	0,001 (0,003)	0,002 (0,004)
Country seat	0,057 (0,099) ***	0,028 (0,049) **	0,025 (0,043) **	0,046 (0,078) ***	0,012 (0,021)	0,009 (0,015)	0,068 (0,116) ***	0,036 (0,061) ***	0,033 (0,057) ***
Budapest	0,158 (0,297) ***	0,103 (0,194) ***	0,097 (0,183) ***	0,147 (0,284) ***	0,092 (0,177) ***	0,087 (0,169) ***	0,14 (0,279) ***	0,086 (0,171) ***	0,083 (0,164) ***
Wage had been imputed	0,052 (0,072) ***	0,063 (0,087) ***	0,073 (0,101) ***	0,02 (0,03)	0,035 (0,051) **	0,038 (0,056) ***	0,024 (0,037)	0,03 (0,046) **	0,031 (0,048) **
Heckman's lambda	-0,128 (-0,135) ***	-0,062 (-0,065) ***	-0,037 (-0,04) *	-0,156 (-0,127) ***	-0,061 (-0,049) **	-0,055 (-0,045) **	-0,162 (-0,135) ***	-0,083 (-0,069) ***	-0,082 (-0,068) ***
Tenure		0,005 (0,254)	0,005 (0,253)		0,002 (0,123)	0,002 (0,131)		0 (0,017)	0 (0,022)
Tenure square		0 (-0,365) **	0 (-0,365) **		0 (-0,192)	0 (-0,21) *		0 (-0,079)	0 (-0,091)
Working part-time		-0,131 (-0,108) ***	-0,129 (-0,107) ***		-0,141 (-0,118) ***	-0,134 (-0,112) ***		-0,222 (-0,195) ***	-0,219 (-0,192) ***
Years of education		0,03 (0,37) ***	0,028 (0,347) ***		0,034 (0,4) ***	0,032 (0,38) ***		0,034 (0,4) ***	0,032 (0,382) ***
Control of future scale			0,009 (0,153) ***			0,008 (0,13) ***			0,006 (0,1) ***
Control of future scale had been imputed									
R <sup>2</sup>	0,189	0,327	0,348	0,165	0,325	0,341	0,160	0,351	0,361
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,189***	0,138***	0,021***	0,165***	0,161***	0,016***	0,160***	0,191***	0,009***
Weighted N	1745			1826			1757		
$\bar{\beta}$	3,171%			2,775%			2,092%		

Continued

	Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1996)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1997)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (2007)		
Constant	3,876 () ***	3,74 () ***	3,719 () ***	4,043 () ***	3,816 () ***	3,809 () ***	4,588 () ***	4,028 () ***	3,972 () ***
Male	0,09 (0,211) ***	0,088 (0,206) ***	0,086 (0,2) ***	0,066 (0,168) ***	0,067 (0,168) ***	0,064 (0,162) ***	0,064 (0,146) ***	0,049 (0,113) ***	0,046 (0,106) ***
Age	0,019 (0,953) ***	0,006 (0,297)	0,007 (0,345)	0,015 (0,78) ***	0,008 (0,431)	0,009 (0,454) *	0,01 (0,449)	0,021 (0,959) **	0,023 (1,058) ***
Age square	0 (-0,875) ***	0 (-0,174)	0 (-0,204)	0 (-0,682) ***	0 (-0,347)	0 (-0,352)	0 (-0,303)	0 (-0,762) **	0 (-0,842) **
Unmarried/single	-0,016 (-0,028)	-0,015 (-0,027)	-0,011 (-0,019)	-0,001 (-0,002)	0 (0,001)	0,004 (0,008)	0,007 (0,013)	-0,009 (-0,016)	-0,009 (-0,016)
Divorced	-0,029 (-0,036)	-0,023 (-0,027)	-0,022 (-0,027)	-0,024 (-0,031)	-0,009 (-0,012)	-0,008 (-0,01)	0,005 (0,007)	0,02 (0,028)	0,025 (0,035)
Widow	-0,024 (-0,019)	0,003 (0,003)	0,001 (0,001)	-0,028 (-0,025)	-0,005 (-0,004)	-0,007 (-0,006)	-0,019 (-0,018)	0,013 (0,013)	0,014 (0,014)
Town	0,041 (0,087) ***	0,012 (0,026)	0,012 (0,025)	0,043 (0,101) ***	0,015 (0,035)	0,013 (0,031)	0,033 (0,071) *	0,013 (0,028)	0,013 (0,028)
Country seat	0,055 (0,091) ***	0,025 (0,041) *	0,025 (0,041) *	0,046 (0,082) ***	0,016 (0,028)	0,017 (0,03)	0,045 (0,085) **	0,01 (0,019)	0,008 (0,015)
Budapest	0,13 (0,25) ***	0,08 (0,154) ***	0,075 (0,146) ***	0,155 (0,326) ***	0,098 (0,208) ***	0,094 (0,199) ***	0,12 (0,22) ***	0,056 (0,103) ***	0,056 (0,102) ***
Wage had been imputed	0,032 (0,047) **	0,053 (0,077) ***	0,046 (0,068) ***	0,032 (0,055) **	0,036 (0,062) ***	0,034 (0,059) ***	0,038 (0,05)	0,008 (0,01)	0,008 (0,011)
Heckman's lambda	-0,108 (-0,095) ***	-0,05 (-0,044) **	-0,041 (-0,036) *	-0,143 (-0,139) ***	-0,083 (-0,081) ***	-0,078 (-0,076) ***	-0,317 (-0,204) ***	-0,042 (-0,027)	-0,037 (-0,024)
Tenure		0,005 (0,244) *	0,005 (0,241) *		0,002 (0,134)	0,002 (0,122)		-0,005 (-0,23)	-0,004 (-0,222)
Tenure square		0 (-0,285) **	0 (-0,287) **		0 (-0,122)	0 (-0,119)		0 (0,07)	0 (0,054)
Working part-time		-0,148 (-0,127) ***	-0,141 (-0,121) ***		-0,116 (-0,085) ***	-0,112 (-0,082) ***		-0,195 (-0,239) ***	-0,192 (-0,235) ***
Years of education		0,031 (0,357) ***	0,029 (0,337) ***		0,031 (0,378) ***	0,029 (0,357) ***		0,035 (0,432) ***	0,034 (0,419) ***
Control of future scale			0,007 (0,114) ***			0,006 (0,103) ***			0,005 (0,072) ***
Control of future scale had been imputed									0,02 (0,03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0,136	0,270	0,282	0,158	0,290	0,299	0,103	0,332	0,337
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,136***	0,134***	0,012***	0,158***	0,131***	0,010***	0,103***	0,229***	0,006**
Weighted N	1679			1592			927		
$\bar{\beta}$	2,458%			2,035%			1,574%		

The table contains unstandardized regression coefficient [ $\beta$ ] and in parenthesis: standardized regression coefficients [B].

Coefficients with \*\*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,01, coefficients with \*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,05, coefficients with \* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,1.

All models are significant at 0,001 level.

Omitted categories: female, village, married



TABLE A2.: REGRESSION RESULTS WITH THE 2SLS MODEL

	Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1993)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1994)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1995)		
Constant	3,78 () ***	3,68 () ***	3,657 () ***	3,677 () ***	3,404 () ***	3,399 () ***	3,908 () ***	3,628 () ***	3,622 () ***
Male	0,099 (0,244) ***	0,093 (0,229) ***	0,093 (0,23) ***	0,096 (0,223) ***	0,086 (0,199) ***	0,086 (0,199) ***	0,098 (0,236) ***	0,087 (0,21) ***	0,087 (0,21) ***
Age	0,015 (0,775) ***	-0,003 (-0,13)	-0,001 (-0,067)	0,025 (1,157) ***	0,02 (0,927) ***	0,02 (0,936) ***	0,015 (0,713) ***	0,012 (0,555) *	0,012 (0,567) *
Age square	0 (-0,708) ***	0 (0,234)	0 (0,175)	0 (-1,125) ***	0 (-0,82) ***	0 (-0,828) ***	0 (-0,646) ***	0 (-0,422)	0 (-0,434)
Unmarried/single	-0,028 (-0,048) *	-0,034 (-0,058) **	-0,032 (-0,056) **	-0,011 (-0,017)	-0,022 (-0,036)	-0,021 (-0,034)	-0,009 (-0,015)	-0,023 (-0,038)	-0,023 (-0,038)
Divorced	-0,025 (-0,032)	-0,005 (-0,007)	-0,005 (-0,006)	-0,019 (-0,024)	-0,005 (-0,007)	-0,005 (-0,006)	-0,003 (-0,004)	0,004 (0,006)	0,004 (0,005)
Widow	-0,053 (-0,047) **	-0,006 (-0,006)	-0,006 (-0,005)	-0,035 (-0,031)	0,008 (0,007)	0,011 (0,01)	-0,03 (-0,027)	0,004 (0,003)	0,004 (0,003)
Town	0,031 (0,07) ***	0,008 (0,019)	0,01 (0,022)	0,041 (0,088) ***	0,009 (0,02)	0,011 (0,024)	0,028 (0,062) **	-0,005 (-0,012)	-0,004 (-0,009)
Country seat	0,054 (0,097) ***	0,022 (0,039) *	0,023 (0,04) *	0,057 (0,094) ***	0,02 (0,033)	0,021 (0,034)	0,071 (0,121) ***	0,03 (0,051) **	0,03 (0,052) **
Budapest	0,151 (0,29) ***	0,092 (0,176) ***	0,093 (0,178) ***	0,154 (0,291) ***	0,094 (0,178) ***	0,096 (0,181) ***	0,148 (0,293) ***	0,087 (0,172) ***	0,088 (0,173) ***
Wage had been imputed	0,047 (0,065) ***	0,057 (0,078) ***	0,062 (0,085) ***	0,03 (0,038)	0,037 (0,046) **	0,037 (0,048) **	0,019 (0,028)	0,027 (0,039) *	0,028 (0,04) *
Heckman's lambda	-0,134 (-0,144) ***	-0,063 (-0,068) ***	-0,05 (-0,054) **	-0,152 (-0,124) ***	-0,052 (-0,042) *	-0,05 (-0,041) *	-0,15 (-0,127) ***	-0,082 (-0,069) ***	-0,082 (-0,07) ***
Tenure		0,008 (0,405) **	0,007 (0,371) **		-0,002 (-0,083)	-0,002 (-0,091)		-0,003 (-0,117)	-0,003 (-0,125)
Tenure square		0 (-0,433) ***	0 (-0,404) **		0 (0,012)	0 (0,016)		0 (0,057)	0 (0,064)
Working part-time		-0,121 (-0,09) ***	-0,118 (-0,088) ***		-0,144 (-0,106) ***	-0,139 (-0,103) ***		-0,221 (-0,174) ***	-0,222 (-0,175) ***
Years of education		0,033 (0,41) ***	0,033 (0,412) ***		0,034 (0,406) ***	0,034 (0,407) ***		0,034 (0,408) ***	0,034 (0,409) ***
Control of future scale (instrument)			0,005 (0,088) ***			0,005 (0,081) ***			0,004 (0,057) ***
Control of future scale (instrument) had been imputed									
R <sup>2</sup>	0,178	0,330	0,338	0,159	0,324	0,330	0,163	0,352	0,355
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,178***	0,152***	0,007***	0,159***	0,165***	0,006***	0,163***	0,188***	0,003***
Weighted N	1554			1532			1449		
$\beta$	1,776%			1,739%			1,190%		

Continued

	Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1996)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1997)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (2007)		
Constant	3,892 () ***	3,817 () ***	3,823 () ***	4,079 () ***	3,746 () ***	3,746 () ***	4,523 () ***	4,025 () ***	3,998 () ***
Male	0,095 (0,217) ***	0,091 (0,207) ***	0,09 (0,205) ***	0,076 (0,19) ***	0,075 (0,188) ***	0,075 (0,186) ***	0,071 (0,169) ***	0,055 (0,13) ***	0,055 (0,129) ***
Age	0,018 (0,763) ***	0 (-0,006)	0 (-0,019)	0,013 (0,572) ***	0,015 (0,669) *	0,016 (0,69) *	0,011 (0,451)	0,016 (0,655)	0,016 (0,663)
Age square	0 (-0,705) ***	0 (0,09)	0 (0,099)	0 (-0,507) ***	0 (-0,518)	0 (-0,542)	0 (-0,283)	0 (-0,594)	0 (-0,612)
Unmarried/single	-0,005 (-0,007)	-0,004 (-0,006)	-0,003 (-0,005)	0,001 (0,001)	-0,001 (-0,001)	0 (0,001)	-0,012 (-0,018)	-0,023 (-0,034)	-0,023 (-0,034)
Divorced	-0,032 (-0,04)	-0,023 (-0,029)	-0,023 (-0,028)	-0,024 (-0,032)	-0,013 (-0,017)	-0,012 (-0,016)	0,032 (0,046)	0,035 (0,051)	0,037 (0,053) *
Widow	-0,036 (-0,031)	-0,009 (-0,008)	-0,01 (-0,008)	-0,034 (-0,032)	-0,008 (-0,008)	-0,008 (-0,008)	-0,023 (-0,024)	-0,013 (-0,013)	-0,011 (-0,012)
Town	0,042 (0,087) ***	0,01 (0,022)	0,011 (0,024)	0,045 (0,104) ***	0,012 (0,029)	0,012 (0,029)	0,037 (0,083) *	0,023 (0,05)	0,023 (0,051)
Country seat	0,062 (0,1) ***	0,028 (0,045) *	0,03 (0,049) *	0,051 (0,088) ***	0,017 (0,029)	0,019 (0,033)	0,033 (0,062)	0,022 (0,041)	0,021 (0,041)
Budapest	0,141 (0,263) ***	0,083 (0,155) ***	0,084 (0,156) ***	0,166 (0,343) ***	0,106 (0,218) ***	0,106 (0,219) ***	0,155 (0,283) ***	0,096 (0,176) ***	0,096 (0,176) ***
Wage had been imputed	0,028 (0,039)	0,047 (0,063) ***	0,041 (0,056) **	0,032 (0,052) **	0,029 (0,048) **	0,03 (0,048) **	0,011 (0,014)	0,011 (0,014)	0,01 (0,013)
Heckman's lambda	-0,105 (-0,094) ***	-0,053 (-0,048) **	-0,048 (-0,043) *	-0,146 (-0,141) ***	-0,083 (-0,08) ***	-0,082 (-0,079) ***	-0,483 (-0,301) ***	-0,013 (-0,008)	-0,008 (-0,005)
Tenure		0,008 (0,356) *	0,008 (0,349) *		-0,004 (-0,193)	-0,005 (-0,224)		0,003 (0,119)	0,004 (0,174)
Tenure square		0 (-0,38) *	0 (-0,373) *		0 (0,106)	0 (0,138)		0 (-0,208)	0 (-0,248)
Working part-time		-0,162 (-0,121) ***	-0,159 (-0,119) ***		-0,152 (-0,103) ***	-0,152 (-0,103) ***		-0,195 (-0,256) ***	-0,193 (-0,252) ***
Years of education		0,032 (0,369) ***	0,032 (0,371) ***		0,029 (0,366) ***	0,029 (0,365) ***		0,037 (0,45) ***	0,037 (0,452) ***
Control of future scale (instrument)			0,005 (0,078) ***			0,004 (0,059) **			0,002 (0,025)
Control of future scale (instrument) had been imputed									0,013 (0,021)
R <sup>2</sup>	0,126	0,262	0,267	0,164	0,305	0,309	0,173	0,397	0,398
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,126***	0,135***	0,006***	0,164***	0,141***	0,003**	0,173***	0,224***	0,001
Weighted N	1353			1282			660		
$\bar{\beta}$	1,700%			1,180%			0,518%		

The table contains unstandardized regression coefficient [ $\beta$ ] and in parenthesis: standardized regression coefficients [B].

Coefficients with \*\*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,01, coefficients with \*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,05, coefficients with \* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,1.

All models are significant at 0,001 level.

Omitted categories: female, village, married

TABLE A3.: REGRESSION RESULTS WITH THE EARNING CHANGE MODEL

	Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1993)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1994)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1995)		
Constant	1,677 () ***	1,958 () ***	1,99 () ***	1,429 () ***	1,685 () ***	1,723 () ***	1,843 () ***	2,131 () ***	2,16 () ***
Male	0,035 (0,086) ***	0,043 (0,106) ***	0,044 (0,107) ***	0,036 (0,085) ***	0,04 (0,094) ***	0,041 (0,094) ***	0,048 (0,114) ***	0,05 (0,12) ***	0,05 (0,12) ***
Age	0,006 (0,323) **	-0,001 (-0,042)	0 (0,022)	0,012 (0,602) ***	0,011 (0,532) ***	0,011 (0,554) ***	0,004 (0,22) *	0,005 (0,237)	0,005 (0,257)
Age square	0 (-0,291) **	0 (0,139)	0 (0,09)	0 (-0,615) ***	0 (-0,541) ***	0 (-0,548) ***	0 (-0,188)	0 (-0,152)	0 (-0,161)
Unmarried/single	-0,003 (-0,005)	-0,01 (-0,017)	-0,008 (-0,013)	0,005 (0,009)	-0,004 (-0,007)	-0,003 (-0,005)	-0,009 (-0,015)	-0,018 (-0,032)	-0,016 (-0,029)
Divorced	-0,008 (-0,011)	-0,001 (-0,001)	0,001 (0,001)	-0,011 (-0,013)	-0,003 (-0,003)	-0,002 (-0,002)	0 (0)	0,001 (0,001)	0,001 (0,001)
Widow	-0,042 (-0,039) **	-0,022 (-0,02)	-0,022 (-0,02)	0,003 (0,002)	0,028 (0,025)	0,029 (0,025)	0,002 (0,002)	0,014 (0,013)	0,014 (0,012)
Town	0,015 (0,033)	0,006 (0,013)	0,005 (0,011)	0,02 (0,042) **	0,004 (0,009)	0,004 (0,008)	0,011 (0,025)	-0,001 (-0,002)	0 (0)
Country seat	0,012 (0,021)	0,003 (0,005)	0,001 (0,002)	0,017 (0,029)	0,001 (0,002)	0 (0)	0,041 (0,072) ***	0,028 (0,049) **	0,027 (0,046) **
Budapest	0,067 (0,13) ***	0,051 (0,098) ***	0,048 (0,094) ***	0,066 (0,127) ***	0,047 (0,09) ***	0,046 (0,089) ***	0,064 (0,128) ***	0,05 (0,101) ***	0,049 (0,099) ***
Wage had been imputed	0,047 (0,066) ***	0,053 (0,074) ***	0,059 (0,082) ***	0,033 (0,045) **	0,034 (0,046) **	0,035 (0,048) ***	0,009 (0,013)	0,012 (0,018)	0,013 (0,02)
Heckman's lambda	-0,049 (-0,052) ***	-0,023 (-0,024)	-0,009 (-0,009)	-0,044 (-0,036) *	-0,006 (-0,005)	-0,005 (-0,004)	-0,116 (-0,099) ***	-0,087 (-0,074) ***	-0,088 (-0,075) ***
The log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (measured in the previous year)	0,568 (0,574) ***	0,473 (0,478) ***	0,456 (0,461) ***	0,613 (0,586) ***	0,504 (0,482) ***	0,49 (0,468) ***	0,551 (0,57) ***	0,435 (0,449) ***	0,424 (0,438) ***
Tenure		0,004 (0,203)	0,004 (0,197)		-0,001 (-0,025)	0 (-0,022)		-0,002 (-0,08)	-0,001 (-0,075)
Tenure square		0 (-0,264) *	0 (-0,263) *		0 (0,038)	0 (0,028)		0 (0,046)	0 (0,036)
Working part-time		-0,059 (-0,048) **	-0,059 (-0,049) ***		-0,11 (-0,084) ***	-0,108 (-0,082) ***		-0,162 (-0,135) ***	-0,161 (-0,134) ***
Years of education		0,017 (0,215) ***	0,017 (0,207) ***		0,02 (0,243) ***	0,02 (0,237) ***		0,018 (0,218) ***	0,018 (0,213) ***
Control of future scale			0,006 (0,094) ***			0,004 (0,066) ***			0,003 (0,055) ***
Control of future scale had been imputed									
R <sup>2</sup>	0,446	0,483	0,491	0,445	0,495	0,499	0,448	0,499	0,502
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,446***	0,037***	0,008***	0,445***	0,050***	0,004***	0,448***	0,052***	0,003***
Weighted N	1607			1685			1611		
$\bar{\beta}$	1,908%			1,406%			1,148%		

Continued

	Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1996)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (1997)			Dependent variable: the log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (2007)		
Constant	1,449 () ***	1,733 () ***	1,759 () ***	1,659 () ***	1,722 () ***	1,743 () ***	2,196 () ***	2,495 () ***	2,509 () ***
Male	0,035 (0,081) ***	0,039 (0,09) ***	0,038 (0,089) ***	0,019 (0,047) **	0,023 (0,058) ***	0,022 (0,056) ***	0,038 (0,086) **	0,046 (0,104) ***	0,042 (0,094) **
Age	0,008 (0,386) ***	0 (0,008)	0,001 (0,031)	0,005 (0,267) **	0,008 (0,428) **	0,009 (0,432) **	0,017 (0,679)	0,031 (1,251) **	0,03 (1,233) **
Age square	0 (-0,361) ***	0 (0,032)	0 (0,023)	0 (-0,236) **	0 (-0,443) **	0 (-0,436) **	0 (-0,631)	0 (-1,248) **	0 (-1,227) **
Unmarried/single	-0,001 (-0,002)	-0,001 (-0,002)	0,001 (0,002)	0,027 (0,05) **	0,025 (0,047) **	0,027 (0,05) **	0,005 (0,008)	0,014 (0,022)	0,016 (0,025)
Divorced	-0,036 (-0,044) **	-0,033 (-0,041) **	-0,032 (-0,039) **	-0,011 (-0,015)	-0,007 (-0,009)	-0,006 (-0,008)	0,046 (0,065)	0,057 (0,082) **	0,058 (0,082) **
Widow	-0,012 (-0,01)	-0,007 (-0,006)	-0,009 (-0,007)	-0,017 (-0,016)	-0,008 (-0,007)	-0,008 (-0,008)	-0,008 (-0,007)	0,025 (0,024)	0,029 (0,028)
Town	0,018 (0,038) *	0,009 (0,02)	0,009 (0,02)	0,028 (0,067) ***	0,017 (0,04) *	0,017 (0,039) *	0,041 (0,087) *	0,022 (0,047)	0,022 (0,046)
Country seat	0,018 (0,029)	0,01 (0,016)	0,01 (0,017)	0,015 (0,027)	0,004 (0,008)	0,005 (0,01)	0,036 (0,065)	0,03 (0,055)	0,026 (0,048)
Budapest	0,043 (0,084) ***	0,035 (0,067) ***	0,033 (0,065) ***	0,07 (0,149) ***	0,052 (0,111) ***	0,051 (0,109) ***	0,104 (0,18) ***	0,077 (0,133) ***	0,075 (0,131) ***
Wage had been imputed	0,014 (0,02)	0,023 (0,032) *	0,02 (0,028)	0,043 (0,073) ***	0,042 (0,07) ***	0,04 (0,068) ***	0,001 (0,002)	0,003 (0,003)	0,004 (0,004)
Heckman's lambda	-0,029 (-0,026)	-0,016 (-0,014)	-0,012 (-0,011)	-0,064 (-0,063) ***	-0,048 (-0,048) ***	-0,047 (-0,046) **	-0,338 (-0,184) ***	0,144 (0,079)	0,154 (0,084)
The log(10) of monthly salary or wage in the last month (measured in the previous year)	0,628 (0,616) ***	0,556 (0,545) ***	0,546 (0,535) ***	0,606 (0,648) ***	0,545 (0,583) ***	0,539 (0,577) ***	0,516 (0,428) ***	0,289 (0,24) ***	0,286 (0,237) ***
Tenure		0,004 (0,214) *	0,004 (0,213) *		-0,002 (-0,079)	-0,002 (-0,08)		0 (0,005)	0,001 (0,036)
Tenure square		0 (-0,218) *	0 (-0,222) *		0 (0,135)	0 (0,131)		0 (-0,096)	0 (-0,129)
Working part-time		-0,094 (-0,076) ***	-0,093 (-0,075) ***		-0,044 (-0,033) *	-0,043 (-0,032) *		-0,215 (-0,239) ***	-0,214 (-0,238) ***
Years of education		0,012 (0,141) ***	0,012 (0,134) ***		0,014 (0,174) ***	0,013 (0,167) ***		0,036 (0,421) ***	0,035 (0,41) ***
Control of future scale			0,004 (0,059) ***			0,003 (0,046) **			0,004 (0,056)
Control of future scale had been imputed									0,023 (0,025)
R <sup>2</sup>	0,459	0,479	0,482	0,519	0,542	0,544	0,316	0,482	0,486
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,459***	0,020***	0,003***	0,519***	0,023***	0,002**	0,316***	0,166***	0,004
Weighted N	1537			1463			451		
$\bar{\beta}$	1,273%			0,919%			1,252%		

The table contains unstandardized regression coefficient [ $\beta$ ] and in parenthesis: standardized regression coefficients [B].

Coefficients with \*\*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,01, coefficients with \*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,05, coefficients with \* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,1.

All models are significant at 0,001 level.

Omitted categories: female, village, married

TABLE A4.: REGRESSION RESULTS ON EARNING PERIOD

	Dependent variable: log(10) of the sum of all yearly benefits from the first job (1993)			Dependent variable: log(10) of the sum of all yearly benefits from the first job (1993-1994)			Dependent variable: log(10) of the sum of all yearly benefits from the first job (1993-1995)		
Constant	4,734 () ***	4,503 () ***	4,46 () ***	9,794 () ***	9,466 () ***	9,386 () ***	14,901 () ***	14,235 () ***	14,162 () ***
Male	0,136 (0,199) ***	0,123 (0,179) ***	0,12 (0,175) ***	0,23 (0,213) ***	0,206 (0,191) ***	0,201 (0,186) ***	0,37 (0,249) ***	0,329 (0,222) ***	0,322 (0,217) ***
Age	0,053 (1,727) ***	0,043 (1,409) ***	0,045 (1,462) ***	0,09 (1,746) ***	0,058 (1,138) ***	0,061 (1,197) ***	0,121 (1,644) ***	0,086 (1,167) ***	0,088 (1,202) ***
Age square	-0,001 (-1,676) ***	0 (-1,255) ***	0 (-1,295) ***	-0,001 (-1,628) ***	-0,001 (-0,958) ***	-0,001 (-0,99) ***	-0,001 (-1,541) ***	-0,001 (-1,016) ***	-0,001 (-1,029) ***
Unmarried/single	0,023 (0,024)	0,018 (0,019)	0,026 (0,027)	-0,004 (-0,003)	-0,031 (-0,021)	-0,017 (-0,012)	-0,019 (-0,009)	-0,061 (-0,029)	-0,05 (-0,024)
Divorced	-0,045 (-0,033)	-0,028 (-0,021)	-0,025 (-0,018)	-0,019 (-0,009)	0,014 (0,007)	0,021 (0,01)	-0,005 (-0,002)	0,02 (0,007)	0,017 (0,006)
Widow	0,023 (0,012)	0,066 (0,036) *	0,064 (0,035) *	0,027 (0,009)	0,139 (0,048) **	0,143 (0,05) **	0,063 (0,016)	0,168 (0,042) **	0,161 (0,04) **
Town	0,024 (0,032)	-0,002 (-0,002)	-0,004 (-0,005)	0,09 (0,076) ***	0,016 (0,013)	0,011 (0,01)	0,097 (0,06) **	-0,017 (-0,01)	-0,015 (-0,009)
Country seat	0,066 (0,07) ***	0,034 (0,036)	0,03 (0,032)	0,1 (0,065) ***	0,015 (0,01)	0,007 (0,004)	0,136 (0,065) **	-0,002 (-0,001)	-0,01 (-0,005)
Budapest	0,173 (0,197) ***	0,112 (0,128) ***	0,105 (0,12) ***	0,309 (0,236) ***	0,182 (0,138) ***	0,169 (0,129) ***	0,444 (0,25) ***	0,236 (0,133) ***	0,225 (0,126) ***
Wage had been imputed	0,116 (0,086) ***	0,122 (0,09) ***	0,135 (0,1) ***	-0,037 (-0,029)	-0,037 (-0,029)	-0,028 (-0,022)	-0,069 (-0,056) **	-0,079 (-0,064) ***	-0,074 (-0,06) ***
Heckman's lambda	-0,424 (-0,281) ***	-0,354 (-0,234) ***	-0,326 (-0,215) ***	-0,67 (-0,231) ***	-0,47 (-0,162) ***	-0,456 (-0,157) ***	-0,591 (-0,144) ***	-0,351 (-0,085) ***	-0,357 (-0,087) ***
Tenure		0,002 (0,055)	0,002 (0,055)		0,007 (0,133)	0,007 (0,131)		0,006 (0,081)	0,006 (0,082)
Tenure square		0 (-0,14)	0 (-0,141)		0 (-0,2) *	0 (-0,208) *		0 (-0,132)	0 (-0,141)
Working part-time		-0,272 (-0,136) ***	-0,268 (-0,134) ***		-0,493 (-0,149) ***	-0,471 (-0,142) ***		-0,77 (-0,171) ***	-0,755 (-0,168) ***
Years of education		0,035 (0,257) ***	0,033 (0,24) ***		0,079 (0,37) ***	0,073 (0,345) ***		0,119 (0,403) ***	0,113 (0,383) ***
Control of future scale			0,011 (0,112) ***			0,024 (0,152) ***			0,027 (0,12) ***
Control of future scale had been imputed									
R <sup>2</sup>	0,227	0,307	0,319	0,219	0,367	0,389	0,217	0,398	0,412
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,227***	0,081***	0,011***	0,219***	0,148***	0,022***	0,217***	0,181***	0,014***
Weighted N	1764			1704			1516		
$\bar{\beta}$	3,853%			8,149%			8,877%		

Continued

	Dependent variable: log(10) of the sum of all yearly benefits from the first job (1993-1996)			Dependent variable: log(10) of the sum of all yearly benefits from the first job (1993-1997)			Dependent variable: log(10) of the sum of all yearly benefits from the first job (1993-2007)		
Constant	19,842 () ***	19,434 () ***	19,37 () ***	25,203 () ***	24,695 () ***	24,678 () ***	28,581 () ***	29,439 () ***	29,611 () ***
Male	0,477 (0,257) ***	0,444 (0,239) ***	0,427 (0,23) ***	0,579 (0,275) ***	0,547 (0,26) ***	0,524 (0,249) ***	0,865 (0,367) ***	0,815 (0,346) ***	0,776 (0,329) ***
Age	0,158 (1,636) ***	0,078 (0,808) ***	0,08 (0,83) ***	0,175 (1,555) ***	0,096 (0,856) ***	0,098 (0,872) ***	0,209 (1,419) ***	0,005 (0,034)	-0,002 (-0,012)
Age square	-0,002 (-1,544) ***	-0,001 (-0,59) **	-0,001 (-0,589) **	-0,002 (-1,466) ***	-0,001 (-0,63) **	-0,001 (-0,625) **	-0,002 (-1,06) **	0,001 (0,338)	0,001 (0,396)
Unmarried/single	0,057 (0,021)	0,026 (0,009)	0,042 (0,016)	0,058 (0,019)	0,014 (0,004)	0,037 (0,012)	0,224 (0,059)	0,231 (0,061)	0,24 (0,063)
Divorced	0,051 (0,015)	0,064 (0,018)	0,071 (0,02)	0,014 (0,003)	0,052 (0,013)	0,05 (0,012)	0,08 (0,021)	0,116 (0,031)	0,129 (0,034)
Widow	0,041 (0,008)	0,132 (0,027)	0,119 (0,024)	0,01 (0,002)	0,104 (0,019)	0,099 (0,018)	-0,116 (-0,024)	-0,027 (-0,006)	0,003 (0,001)
Town	0,142 (0,07) **	0 (0)	-0,004 (-0,002)	0,124 (0,055) *	-0,036 (-0,016)	-0,046 (-0,02)	0,079 (0,031)	-0,032 (-0,013)	-0,042 (-0,016)
Country seat	0,15 (0,057) **	-0,005 (-0,002)	-0,006 (-0,002)	0,141 (0,046)	-0,025 (-0,008)	-0,018 (-0,006)	0,229 (0,079)	0,216 (0,075)	0,186 (0,064)
Budapest	0,58 (0,261) ***	0,313 (0,141) ***	0,293 (0,132) ***	0,744 (0,301) ***	0,442 (0,179) ***	0,423 (0,171) ***	0,896 (0,298) ***	0,654 (0,218) ***	0,643 (0,214) ***
Wage had been imputed	-0,088 (-0,069) ***	-0,09 (-0,07) ***	-0,093 (-0,073) ***	-0,104 (-0,085) ***	-0,117 (-0,095) ***	-0,12 (-0,097) ***	-0,3 (-0,112) **	-0,39 (-0,146) ***	-0,395 (-0,148) ***
Heckman's lambda	-0,582 (-0,115) ***	-0,338 (-0,067) ***	-0,313 (-0,062) ***	-0,944 (-0,16) ***	-0,566 (-0,096) ***	-0,533 (-0,091) ***	-0,986 (-0,137) **	0,451 (0,063)	0,476 (0,066)
Tenure		0,032 (0,344) **	0,031 (0,338) **		0,032 (0,294) **	0,029 (0,269) *		0,169 (1,145) **	0,169 (1,147) **
Tenure square		-0,001 (-0,477) ***	-0,001 (-0,479) ***		-0,001 (-0,452) ***	-0,001 (-0,437) ***		-0,003 (-1,311) **	-0,003 (-1,327) ***
Working part-time		-0,749 (-0,134) ***	-0,722 (-0,13) ***		-0,896 (-0,124) ***	-0,886 (-0,123) ***		-0,379 (-0,089) *	-0,391 (-0,092) **
Years of education		0,147 (0,4) ***	0,139 (0,377) ***		0,155 (0,376) ***	0,145 (0,351) ***		0,155 (0,357) ***	0,148 (0,34) ***
Control of future scale			0,038 (0,135) ***			0,039 (0,123) ***			0,033 (0,086) **
Control of future scale had been imputed									0,076 (0,013)
R <sup>2</sup>	0,210	0,384	0,402	0,254	0,411	0,425	0,392	0,518	0,526
R <sup>2</sup> change	0,210***	0,175***	0,017***	0,254***	0,157***	0,014***	0,392***	0,127***	0,007*
Weighted N	1346			1213			324		
$\bar{\beta}$	12,483%			12,948%			10,118%		

The table contains unstandardized regression coefficient [ $\beta$ ] and in parenthesis: standardized regression coefficients [B].

Coefficients with \*\*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,01, coefficients with \*\* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,05, coefficients with \* are different from zero at the significance-level of 0,1.

All models are significant at 0,001 level.

Omitted categories: female, village, married