



**International Relations  
Ph.D. Programme**

**Thesis Summary  
to**

**Kéglér Ádám**

**INTEREST ENFORCING OF THE MEMBER STATES  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Ph.D. dissertation

**Tutor:**

**Péter BALÁZS, Ph.D.**  
University Professor

Budapest, 2008

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                       |    |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| I. Introduction .....                 | 4  |
| II. The Influence Index.....          | 5  |
| III. Summary .....                    | 10 |
| IV. Bibliography and references ..... | 13 |
| V. List of Publications .....         | 16 |

## ***I. Introduction***

The purpose of my dissertation is to map the possibilities of interest representation of member states in the institutions of the European Union (EU) above all in the Council of the European Union.

The dissertation is divided into three major parts. The first chapter gives a summary of the theoretical background of the interest representation.

In the second chapter the decision making processes, and the institutions responsible for decision making are analyzed. The chapter includes the analysis of the Council presidencies as an example of soft power techniques used by the member states. This issue has a special importance since Hungary will hold the presidency in the first half of 2011.

In the third chapter I introduce a new model which measures and simulates the capacity of each member state to influence decisions. When preparing the model I collect all the inputs and factors that could affect the interest representing power of a member state. In order to show how the model works I present three case studies.


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## ***II. The Influence Index***

This model shows the main criteria of a powerful member state. The pyramid contains 6 factors where the basic stage shows the most important criterium that makes a member state influential and the highest stage shows the least important criterium. The most important factor is the payer status that is not automatically in line with economic power. The population of a state is also an important factor because the number of votes are divided along this factor. But these factors are not enough to make a country influential for example a country won't be too powerful only because of its population (for example Poland). The factor of political power shows the strengths of political positions in EU institutions and includes governments' political party affiliation. If the majority of the governments are in the same political family it helps making coalitions and interest groups. The date of accession is also an important factor since the, since the EU is about information and contacts, the older member states must have better networks and more experienced civil servants working in the institutions. The presidency is also a decisive factor, because the state which holds the presidency has more impact on the preparatory and negotiation phases and also the right to set and influence the political agenda. When preparing a model I used the theoretic frame of a very famous game theory the "*n+1 multiplayer*" game theory of John F. Nash, because in comparison original models of the game theory it works with players of different power. The Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf and the Deagen-Packel index models are also contain very interesting elements for such decision situations. Finally, I have chosen the factors that characterize the best way the influence power of a member state country. These categories are the following:

- Net payer position – the bill-payer's position
- Economic index – shows the power of a state and it's interest in the economic questions
- Population of the member state – determine the member of the votes and seats
- Political index – strong positions means strong informational power
- Date of accession – better knowledge of the networks and more experience of the system
- Presidency – a half year long position of coordinating the political agenda

## INFLUENCE INDEX



### I. Net payer status (Σ: 6 points)

A, EU's budget contributor (net contribution – gross share):

| Net contributions  | Gross share              |
|--------------------|--------------------------|
| VAT percentage     | Agricultural subsidy     |
| GNP/GNI percentage | Structural politics      |
| General expenses   | Operational expenses     |
|                    | <b><i>Difference</i></b> |

| net account (Billion €) | points |
|-------------------------|--------|
| 0 (equilibrium)         | 1      |
| 0,1 – 0,9               | 2      |
| 1,0 – 1,9               | 3      |
| 2,0 – 3,5               | 4      |
| 3,6 – 4,9               | 5      |
| 5,0 –                   | 6      |

|    |                | (bln €) | points |
|----|----------------|---------|--------|
| 1. | Germany        | 6,3     | 6      |
| 2. | France         | 3,0     | 5      |
| 3. | Netherlands    | 2,6     | 4      |
| 4. | United Kingdom | 2,2     | 4      |
| 5. | Italy          | 1,7     | 3      |
| 6. | Sweden         | 0,9     | 3      |
| 7. | Austria        | 0,3     | 2      |
| 8. | Denmark        | 0,5     | 2      |
| 9. | Finland        | 0,2     | 1      |

**II. Economic index (Σ: 5 points)**

- A, GDP/capita rate: max. 2 points
- B, Balance of Foreign Trade: max 2 points
- C, Unemployment rate: max. 1 point

**III. Measurement of the member state (Σ: 4 points)**

| Population (million person) | Point(s) |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| 0 – 5                       | 1        |
| 5 – 10                      | 2        |
| 10 – 25                     | 3        |
| 25 -                        | 4        |

**IV. Political index (Σ: 3 points)**

- A. Majority of the member state govns. are in the same political family: 1 point
- B. Strong position in the Commission: 1 point
- C. Influential EU leader: 1 point  
/the President of: an EP faction, the Commission, the EP, the Court, etc./

**V. Membership time (Σ: 2 points)**

- A. From 1951: 2 points
- B. From 1973 or 1992: 1 point

**VI. Presidency (Σ: 1,5 points)**

Presidency troika membership: 0,5 point

*The main data of the Influence Index (research closed on March 2008)*

|                       | population<br>(1000 pers.) | GDP<br>(Bln €) | GDP/capita<br>(EU average<br>100%) | GDP groth.<br>(%) | Balance of<br>trade (%) | EU budget<br>contr.<br>(€) | EU budget<br>(%) | EU budget<br>(per capita €) | unemployment<br>(%) | Council<br>mandates | EP<br>mandates |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| France                | 61427                      | 1710           | 109                                | 2,1               | -0,4                    | 18 338 461 530             | 17,37            | 298,54                      | 8,5                 | 29                  | 78             |
| Italy                 | 57936                      | 1417           | 102,8                              | 2,8               | -0,9                    | 14 603 278 351             | 13,38            | 252,05                      | 6,1                 | 29                  | 78             |
| Germany               | 82501                      | 2247           | 109,8                              | 3,9               | 3,7                     | 22 461 580 633             | 19,89            | 272,26                      | 6,4                 | 29                  | 99             |
| Belgium               | 10395                      | 298            | 117,7                              | 3                 | 3,4                     | 4 498 323 986              | 3                | 432,74                      | 7,5                 | 12                  | 24             |
| Luxemburg             | 454                        | 29             | 247,8                              | 6,1               | 10,5                    | 258 243 690                | 0,25             | 568,82                      | 4,9                 | 4                   | 6              |
| Netherlands           | 16289                      | 502            | 123,5                              | 2,7               | 8,9                     | 6 378 649 329              | 4,69             | 391,59                      | 3,4                 | 13                  | 27             |
| United Kingdom        | 60024                      | 1791           | 116,8                              | 3,1               | -1,7                    | 14 270 042 046             | 11,54            | 237,74                      | 5,3                 | 29                  | 78             |
| Ireland               | 4056                       | 160            | 137,1                              | 4,8               | -0,6                    | 1 676 005 781              | 1,48             | 413,22                      | 4,7                 | 7                   | 13             |
| Denmark               | 5396                       | 208            | 124,2                              | 3,7               | 2,3                     | 2 344 743 747              | 2,06             | 434,53                      | 3,2                 | 7                   | 14             |
| Greece                | 11040                      | 181            | 82,2                               | 4,4               | -6,2                    | 2 104 756 564              | 1,93             | 190,65                      | 8,6                 | 12                  | 24             |
| Spain                 | 41051                      | 904            | 98,7                               | 4                 | -5,3                    | 10 828 853 860             | 9,55             | 263,79                      | 8,0                 | 27                  | 54             |
| Portugal              | 10506                      | 147            | 71,4                               | 1,6               | -7,3                    | 1 552 361 077              | 1,46             | 147,76                      | 8,2                 | 12                  | 24             |
| Austria               | 8129                       | 245            | 122,7                              | 3,2               | 0,2                     | 2 390 769 963              | 2,26             | 294,1                       | 4,3                 | 10                  | 18             |
| Sweden                | 8997                       | 288            | 114,7                              | 4,3               | 6,8                     | 3 022 806 250              | 2,68             | 335,98                      | 5,2                 | 10                  | 19             |
| Finland               | 5222                       | 155            | 112,1                              | 6,8               | 5                       | 1 659 737 105              | 1,56             | 317,84                      | 6,8                 | 7                   | 14             |
| <i>Hungary</i>        | <i>10099</i>               | <i>88</i>      | <i>60,9</i>                        | <i>1,4</i>        | <i>-8,6</i>             | <i>928 912 076</i>         | <i>0,81</i>      | <i>91,98</i>                | <i>7,7</i>          | <i>12</i>           | <i>24</i>      |
| <i>Poland</i>         | <i>38166</i>               | <i>243</i>     | <i>49,9</i>                        | <i>6,9</i>        | <i>-4,2</i>             | <i>2 747 200 785</i>       | <i>2,49</i>      | <i>71,98</i>                | <i>9,7</i>          | <i>27</i>           | <i>54</i>      |
| <i>Czech Republic</i> | <i>10197</i>               | <i>98</i>      | <i>73</i>                          | <i>6,1</i>        | <i>-6,1</i>             | <i>1 216 863 719</i>       | <i>1,04</i>      | <i>119,34</i>               | <i>5,5</i>          | <i>12</i>           | <i>24</i>      |
| <i>Slovakia</i>       | <i>5380</i>                | <i>38</i>      | <i>55,1</i>                        | <i>9,6</i>        | <i>-3,4</i>             | <i>461 026 947</i>         | <i>0,41</i>      | <i>85,69</i>                | <i>10,6</i>         | <i>7</i>            | <i>14</i>      |
| Slovenia              | 1997                       | 27             | 80                                 | 6                 | -2,1                    | 321 017 791                | 0,29             | 160,75                      | 5,1                 | 4                   | 7              |
| Estonia               | 1351                       | 11             | 57,4                               | 11,2              | -12,7                   | 138 567 103                | 0,12             | 102,57                      | 5,4                 | 4                   | 6              |
| Latvia                | 2315                       | 13             | 47,1                               | 11,7              | -13                     | 188 436 582                | 0,16             | 81,39                       | 4,7                 | 4                   | 9              |
| Lithuania             | 3451                       | 21             | 42,1                               | 7                 | -7,7                    | 270 700 006                | 0,22             | 78,44                       | 5,6                 | 7                   | 13             |
| Malta                 | 400                        | 4              | 69,3                               | 3,3               | -9,5                    | 57 460 366                 | 0,05             | 143,65                      | 6,3                 | 3                   | 5              |
| Cyprus                | 737                        | 13             | 83,5                               | 3,7               | -5,7                    | 178 627 328                | 0,14             | 242,37                      | 4,1                 | 4                   | 6              |
| Romania               | 21700                      | 79             | 34,8                               | 7,7               | -8,4                    | 1 067 905 902              | 0,93             | 49,21                       | 6,9                 | 14                  | 35             |
| Bulgaria              | 7700                       | 21             | 32,1                               | 5,7               | -5,8                    | 322 612 813                | 0,24             | 41,90                       | 6,6                 | 10                  | 18             |
|                       |                            |                |                                    |                   |                         |                            |                  |                             |                     |                     |                |
| EU 15                 | 383759                     | 10264          | 108,9                              | 3,4               | 0,4                     | 106 402 076 850            | 93,1             | 277,26                      | 6,4                 | 237                 | 570            |
| EU 27                 | 487440                     | 10917          | 90                                 | 3,5               | -0,18                   | 114 287 945 060            | 100              | 234,46                      | 6,8                 | 345                 | 785            |

|     |        |       |       |     |      |   |   |   |     |   |   |
|-----|--------|-------|-------|-----|------|---|---|---|-----|---|---|
| USA | 293951 | 10037 | 149,5 | 2,6 | -4,9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4,5 | 0 | 0 |
|-----|--------|-------|-------|-----|------|---|---|---|-----|---|---|

Source Eurostat, 2007.

[http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?\\_pageid=1996\\_39140985&\\_dad=portal&\\_schema=PORTAL&screen=detailref&language=en&product=EU\\_strind&root=EU\\_strind/strind/ecobac/eb011](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996_39140985&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=detailref&language=en&product=EU_strind&root=EU_strind/strind/ecobac/eb011)



## Influence indexes

|                | Net payer | Economic power | Population | Political power | Membership time | Presidency | $\Sigma$    |
|----------------|-----------|----------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------|-------------|
| Germany        | 6         | 5              | 4          | 3               | 2               | 0          | <b>21</b>   |
| United Kingdom | 5         | 4              | 4          | 2               | 2               | 1,5        | <b>18,5</b> |
| France         | 4         | 4              | 4          | 2               | 1               | 0          | <b>15</b>   |
| Italy          | 3         | 3              | 4          | 2               | 2               | 0          | <b>14</b>   |
| Sweden         | 3         | 4              | 2          | 2               | 1               | 0,5        | <b>12,5</b> |
| Netherlands    | 4         | 2              | 2          | 2               | 2               | 0          | <b>11</b>   |
| Denmark        | 1         | 4              | 1          | 2               | 1               | 0          | <b>9</b>    |
| Belgium        | 2         | 3              | 1          | 2               | 1               | 0          | <b>9</b>    |
| Spain          | 0         | 2              | 2          | 3               | 2               | 0          | <b>9</b>    |
| Finland        | 0         | 2              | 4          | 2               | 1               | 0          | <b>9</b>    |
| Ireland        | 0         | 4              | 1          | 2               | 1               | 0          | <b>8</b>    |
| Austria        | 2         | 2              | 2          | 1               | 1               | 0          | <b>8</b>    |
| Portugal       | 0         | 1              | 4          | 1               | 0               | 0          | <b>6</b>    |
| Poland         | 0         | 1              | 2          | 3               | 1               | 0          | <b>7</b>    |
| Greece         | 0         | 1              | 2          | 1               | 1               | 0          | <b>5</b>    |
| Luxemburg      | 0         | 0              | 1          | 2               | 2               | 0          | <b>5</b>    |
| Hungary        | 0         | 1              | 2          | 1               | 0               | 0          | <b>4</b>    |
| Czech Republic | 0         | 1              | 2          | 0               | 0               | 0,5        | <b>3,5</b>  |
| Romania        | 0         | 1              | 2          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>3</b>    |
| Slovakia       | 0         | 1              | 1          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>2</b>    |
| Slovenia       | 0         | 1              | 1          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>2</b>    |
| Estonia        | 0         | 1              | 1          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>2</b>    |
| Bulgaria       | 0         | 1              | 1          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>2</b>    |
| Latvia         | 0         | 1              | 1          | 1               | 0               | 0          | <b>2</b>    |
| Lithuania      | 0         | 1              | 1          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>2</b>    |
| Malta          | 0         | 0              | 1          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>1</b>    |
| Cyprus         | 0         | 0              | 1          | 0               | 0               | 0          | <b>1</b>    |

The factors in itself are not measured with the demand of providing an exact proportion of the member state but overall they represent well the differences in decision influencing power.

Since not all member states interesting in all topics, it's important to note how neutral players behave in these situations. This "lack of interest" is what makes package deals possible and this is that offers the possibility to create coalitions.

\* \* \*

### ***III. Summary***

My research hypothesis is that the Council-centered decision model and the inability to follow political agenda are the main reasons why citizens of the European Union do not understand and thus do not trust the steps towards enhancing the role of the Union. The democratic deficit and the struggle over competencies between different institutions brought about this state of mistrust. At the level of the European Union one element of the democracy assumption of Weber is particularly true: namely that it is not the will of the people that is realized, but its deformed version pronounced by the political elite (Weber, 1995). In the council-centered model this is even further concentrated towards states with more influence or towards coalitions providing greater ability of bringing decisions.

To introduce an extremity, this means that in theory there might be decisions made in the European Council, which fully ignore the interests of 38% of the population of the Union. This numbers about 185 million people. Naturally this risk is not realistic, since the governments of the countries of the European Union do not make decisions that questions their inland policies. This brings us to an immense contradiction: if in order to reach greater competitiveness the Union will be forced to drastically raze the European model of social economy that would mean the downfall of member state governments. The question is therefore how far the governments are willing to advance on the thin line between rationality and holding on to power. This contradiction also concerns giving over further competencies of the member states. Solution would come as evident, theoretically. All member states should be helped to close up to a nearly similar economical and social level, and from this point common rationalizing can be started, since no member states would give over any competencies when it brought decrease in the living standard of its citizens. To achieve the above would last for 20-30 years the least even according to the most optimistic of estimates, while the demographic indexes of the Union point out that the present social model might collapse in 10-15 years. The aging society and the continual decrease of social resources exclude the scenario described above.

The above mentioned situation will not be eased by such a rivalry between institutions of the Union where the Council will not let go of any more of its competencies, whereas true legitimacy would lie by the European Parliament sessions that are visited by ever less representatives since 1979. In this regard, less than half of the citizens elect the most

legitimate institution of the European Union. At the same time, the “most European” institution is the Commission, which seems to have the most community oriented mentality. The overly bureaucratic, some would say super-bureaucratic nature of the Commission is one of the main reasons for the lack of trust from the citizens of Europe. The Commission is very often and very unjustly considered as an institution of continually growing power and decision making that is totally beyond the citizens of Europe.

In this form this is not true, although it is obvious that the staff of the Commission has grown to huge size, and that such an administration is interested to conserve its own bureaucracy. Nevertheless, during decision making it also seems that the Commission cannot escape from the influence of the Council in everyday cases, not to mention the right of nomination of member states that determine political and human conditions of the institution. By my opinion a possible solution could be a reform of the decision making system that produced significant institutional transformation (ie. Upper House / Senate). This change of course needs political will, which is not present due to the opposing interests described above. When a decision process is examined it can be seen that the effect of the individual Working Groups is much greater than it would be reasonable by their integration. Furthermore, it could be said that somehow even decision preparation – decision sequence is spun around in sense of organization. Sometimes a structure of a Working Group level with more competencies and less interposing forums could work more effectively. In this screenplay the COREPER would have been only the political coordinating body and the Council of Ministers is the final stakeholder level.

On the long term this would also draw out the problem of how logical and effective a structure wherein preparation is carried out in the competency of 27 commissioner’s offices, decision is made in 9 ministerial councils, but none of these reflect the ministerial structures of member states. Effective cooperation would necessitate coordination on the part of member states and community organizations alike. The question above lead us to an another dilemma: how can be logical the present structure of the EU decision making institutions in which the drafting is in the hands of 27 Commissioners, the decision making is in the authority of nine Ministerial Councils but none of these can be compared to the public administration structures being charge in the Member States?

In order of the efficient functioning the public administrative bodies of the EU and the Member States should be harmonized. In the present situation it is very visible that this constitution (Reform Engagement) would be the maximum political compromise of the governments, until the new member states will not have reached the average EU level in the standards of living. Until that moment the well-to-do countries won't give up any of their forthcoming monopolies of their power. The decision making structure of the European Council is a typical mark of the dominancy of big Member States. Until the main criteria of the decision making processes the influence power of the Member States the political integration of this organization will be an idealistic dream. In the present situation the Member States are using the EU institutions only in their behalf.

August 2008, Budapest

Kéglér Ádám

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IN. Európai Tükör (21 pages) – in print
- Kéglér Ádám [2008]: A soros elnökség rendszer és a2011-es magyar EU elnökség.  
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