



**Doctoral School of
Applied Political Science**

THESIS SUMMARY

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Content and End-State-based Alteration in the Practice of Political Violence since the End of the Cold War:

the difference between the terrorism of the Cold War and
the terrorism of al Qaeda: the rise of the “transcendental
terrorist”

Ph.D. dissertation

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Contents

Justification, Research Precursors	4
Hypothesis and Methods Applied	6
Results: Managing the Disjunction: SuperPurple	17
Appendix I: Lethality of Terrorist Attacks, 1993-2003	23
Appendix II: Governmental Definitions of Terrorism	24
Key References	25
List of Author's Publications	28
External Reviews	32

JUSTIFICATION, RESEARCH PRECURSORS

Since the end of the Cold War the geopolitical environment has altered so radically the political scientist is justified in asking: what exactly does “national security” mean today and what are the new threats nation-states face? We know that the threat of a politically driven WWII-type conflict is no longer the driving issue. For several years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the practitioners of national security suffered a malaise of competing and often less than fully credible theories being foisted upon them by the academic world. Whilst some of these attempts to explain the post-Cold War system made their authors very rich and famous¹, none of them enjoyed unequivocal and unanimous recognition on a scale comparable to the universally accepted description of the previous four decades as a bipolar system of competing ideological blocs. There is one important reason for this: there was no overarching threat as there had been under the Cold War. That is not to say that there was an absence of threats to national security. There were many such perceived challenges.

¹ The most influential attempts to make the world more understandable after the loss of the ‘Red Menace’ were Francis Fukuyama’s concept of ‘The End of History’, which posited the glorious victory of “market-democracy” over all and Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ argument that future conflict would be religiously or culturally defined. See Francis Fukuyama: “*The End of History*”, *The National Interest*, Summer 1989 and Samuel Huntington: “*The Clash of Civilizations*”, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, vol.72, no.3, or the two books that grew from each essay.

For the sake of accuracy it should be noted, however, that the modern, post Cold War theory of civilisational clash did not begin with Huntington. It was first internationally coined by the leading western scholar of matters Muslim, Bernard Lewis. A controversial figure, who will be discussed later in this study, Lewis wrote at length on the concept in a piece entitled “*Roots of Muslim Rage*” in the September 1990 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*. The article was reprinted in the Summer 2001-2002 issue of *Policy* and can be accessed at <http://www.cis.org.au/policy/summer01-02/polsumm01-3.pdf>. (All footnoted internet references are correct as of September 2007)

The problem with the list of threats (from ethnic-cleaning to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - WMD) was firstly its length in comparison to the far simpler and coherent threat perception and mission statement of the Cold War environment, and secondly, that until recently (11th September 2001) there was heated debate as to how one should prioritise its elements. What should nations focus their attention on more, ethnic cleansing or organised crime, WMD or environmental catastrophe? There was no clear sense of whether one threat was more overarching than all the others.

Since September 11th 2001, however, there seems to have been a change in threat perceptions, at least from the point of view of the United States, NATO's leading member and the only post-Cold War superpower. After the coordinated attacks that left almost 3,000 innocents dead, this most influential of nations has decided that the geostrategic environment has a new order to it, that a new form of globalised, "hyper-terrorism"² fuelled by Islamic extremism is the new overarching threat to the security of the western world, and that from now on a country must be judged as good or evil based solely on its stance with regard to the new "*Global War on Terrorism*" (GWOT). September 11th was said by many to provide the clarity with which the new geostrategic environment can be described and understood. To quote Charles Krauthammer, transnational terrorist groups³ such as al Qaeda are now the overarching concern of national security and pose "an existential threat"⁴ to the United States and its allies⁵.

² A term first coined by the French security analyst François Heisbourg. The term Hyper-terrorism is meant to communicate the assessment that groups such as Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda are radically more capable and therefore more of a threat to democratic governments than previous "more classic" terrorist groups, that they are interested in mass casualty attacks. See Heisbourg's influential yet rather apocalyptic work: *La fin de l'Occident? L'Amérique, l'Europe et le Moyen-Orient*, [The End of the West? America, Europe, and the Middle East], Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005 and Sebestyén L. v. Gorka: "*Hyper-Terrorism*": *the Globalisation of Terror*" JANES Terrorism and Security Monitor, Special Report, JANES, April 2003.

³ Unfortunately the adjectives most often used to pin-point the existential threat so cited are Muslim, Islamic or Islamist terrorism, with Global Jihadism becoming more and more popular as well. All of these descriptions do a great disservice to law-abiding Muslims everywhere and also add an undeserved sense of quasi religious legitimacy to murderous terrorists that have little in

HYPOTHESIS AND METHODS APPLIED

The primary supposition of my dissertation is that the United States of America's current threat perception is valid. It is not my purpose here to judge the veracity of this assessment, whether or not hyper-terrorism is or is not the most important post-Cold War threat. Central to this paper is the question of what exactly is this new threat and how new is it really. In order to answer these questions it is first necessary to grasp the key term and to come to terms with it. The word *terrorism* seems so familiar. We see it every day in the news, during discussions, but do we really know what it means?

The first fundamental problem with any study of the phenomenon of terrorism is the inadequacy of the label and the lack of a long-established school of study of terrorism. To begin with it must be recognised that the word terrorism is in no way a value-free and scientifically discrete term. When used it bears with it a subjective loading which means that the person who calls someone else a terrorist is making a moral judgement, not just a description. Secondly, as a field of scientific study, research into terrorism has been an orphan child for too long. Surprisingly the systematic study of the phenomenon did not begin in earnest until approximately 35 years ago. Only recently has the field been truly adopted and made a sub-set of political science. In doing so it was recognised that the term terrorism was not scientific enough, or neutral enough and therefore today we speak rather of the study of *political violence*.

common with the teachings of the Koran or Mohammed. As a result I will shy away from using such popular yet inflammatory phrases and will employ what I believe to be more accurate labels, such as *transcendentally informed terrorists*.

⁴ See the various pieces by Krauthammer in the National Interest, such as: "*Neoconservatism and Foreign Policy*", The National Interest, Fall 2004. Excerpt available at www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/October2004/October2004Krauthammer.html.

⁵ For statistics on the increased lethality of terrorist attacks in the post-Cold War world see Appendix I.

But still the question remains, what do political scientists understand today by the term political violence, or terrorism? Unfortunately, in part as a result of the messy history of the study of the phenomenon and other more political factors, today there are a multitude, scores of definitions of what terrorism is and there is no universal agreement at all on the subject.⁶

This dissertation deals in some detail with the struggle to arrive at a definition for terrorism and will provide its own recommendation. At this preliminary stage I wish to simply list several characteristics or elements I believe to be essential components. Subsequently I am of the opinion that modern terrorism, or political violence, must demonstrate some or all of the following elements:

- there must be a political or religious goal or end-state in the minds of the group perpetrating a terrorist act
- terrorism must involve the use or the threat of the use of violence
- terrorists do not follow the recognised laws of war
- one can only speak of terrorism if it is being executed by a minority in opposition to a legitimate government, or majority
- the inculcation of fear in a populace is a core element of terrorism. As a result the media, electronic and otherwise, is of great use to the terrorist in spreading his message of intimidation.⁷

⁶ For example, the FBI has one definition, so does the PENTAGON, as does the British Criminal Code, or the French Criminal Code, just to name a few existing definitions. See Appendix II for examples.

⁷ Brian Jenkins the leading terrorism expert is famous for stating that the modern terrorist is not interested in having as many people as possible die as a result of his acts, but is interested far more in having as many people as possible watching his actions (via the media) in order to have his message be communicated as wide as possible. Discussions with Dr. Jenkins, Orlando, Florida, November 2nd-5th 2005.

In studying the phenomenon of political violence for well over a decade now, I have come to the conclusion that existing classifications of terrorism are inadequate. The variety demonstrated by various groups and actors has led me to the conclusion that one must employ a new additional categorisation when discussing groups that employ methods of political violence in the post-Cold War environment. I have labelled the two sub-divisions of terrorist, the Rational and Pragmatic and the Irrational, or Transcendental Terrorist and define them as follows:

RATIONAL, PRAGMATIC TERRORIST

The rational terrorist organisation has as its ultimate goal the realisation of a state of affairs that is fundamentally feasible and realistic. As a result there is the possibility for a political or diplomatic solution to the root grievance. The opposing government can – should it so wish – choose to negotiate with such a group. (Examples include the Provisional IRA, ETA and the PLO).

IRRATIONAL, TRANSCENDENTAL TERRORIST

The irrational terrorist has as his end goal the realisation of a state-of-affairs that is not obviously feasible or realistic and which is completely antithetic to the opposing government. There is no possibility for a political resolution or even negotiations. (Example: the Aum Shinrykio destructive cult of Japan that executed the poison gas attack on the Tokyo metro in 1995⁸).

⁸ The sarin gas attack executed on the Tokyo metro by Aum in 1995 was in fact preceded by several unsuccessful biological agent attacks prepared by the private laboratories the cult had established with millions of dollars of its funds. For a journalistic account of the history of the cult see David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshal: *“The Cult at the End of the World”*, Arrow Books, London, 1996. For a scholarly and detailed analysis see the relevant section in Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer: *“America’s Achilles’ Heel: nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism and covert attack”*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998.

My Hypothesis is fourfold:

1. *Irrational terrorist actors have become more numerous since the cessation of the Cold War*
2. *Governments are sorely limited in the selection of tools that can be used in the face of such actors*
3. *The Irrational or Transcendentally informed terrorist represents a wholly different category of threat, since due to the fact that he is completely uninterested in political resolution, he can justify the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.*
4. *Osama bin Laden typifies the new threat and poses a challenge which we cannot adequately deal with given existing Westphalian state structures and national security divisions of labour.*

My dissertation validates these hypotheses by demonstrating:

- a) **How national security has evolved as a function of the modern nation-state.**
- b) **What the difference is between the geostrategic environments of the Cold War and the post-September 11th 2001 state-of-affairs.**
- c) **Who Osama bin Laden is and how novel an organisation al Qaeda is and,**
- d) **What should be done to reform Westphalian security architectures so as to make them applicable to the new threat environment that has been shaped by the rise of the Irrational/Transcendental Actor and the globalisation of security.**

My conclusion is that the existing hierarchical nation-state structures which were created as a by-product of the establishment of the modern nation-state must be flattened and made interdepartmental. I call this being “*SuperPurple*”, a phrase I derive from the inter-armed forces integration mandate upon US forces under the Goldwater Nichols Act (which was called ‘*Purple*’ integration).

THE WESTPHALIAN INHERITANCE

My dissertation discusses at some length the national security system that has evolved globally in the last 4 centuries. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is taken by most commentators as introducing the foundations for the creation in the West of a system in which the objects were states, bodies that were independent of each others – although which could ally with one another – and into whose internal affairs it was not allowed to become involved, a system in which sovereignty would eventually become paramount⁹. Later, as this concept evolved and as the individual allegiances of the people would shift from local landowner or royal house, to a professional political elite defined around a national identity, the state would evolve further into the nation-state, with its fundamental aspects of citizenship and nationality.

For our purposes, the most important side-effect of the founding and development of the nation state as a way to run and define a country, are the ramifications of this new locus of sovereignty on the practice of providing for the security of the new construct. Whilst man has been waging war for as long as territory and other forms of expropriable wealth have existed, the modern method of securing the nation state resulted in a new and fascinatingly almost universal division of labour being established in practically every nation of the

⁹ In fact it was the sacrosanct nature of sovereignty that would later lie behind the creation of the ‘balance-of-power’ system that would be so important to Europe in following centuries.

world¹⁰. The national security systems thus created were quite simply formed around a categorisation of threats as being either external, internal, civilian, or military in nature. Of course, there developed particular variants, nations that combined civilian and military counter-intelligence into one body, for example, but on the whole the majority of modern nations-states established a division of labour as described in *Table One*.

Type of Threat	Nation State Institutional Response
External Military (Invasion)	Standing Professional Army
Internal Constitutional, Legal Disorder	Police Force
Theft of Military Secrets	Military Counter-Intelligence
Theft of Political, Economic Secrets	Civilian Counter-Intelligence
Enemy Military Intention/Capability	Military Intelligence
Enemy Intention by External Political Elite	Civilian Intelligence (Espionage)

Table One: The Inherited Architecture of Westphalian National Security

It should be remembered, that whilst we take for granted today the existence for example, of police forces and professional armies, these are all recent inventions in historical terms, with village militias and temporarily hired mercenaries having been the rule for centuries before the permanent elements of the Westphalian national security structure were fully established.

¹⁰ There are of course rare exceptions to the rule, such a countries such as Andorra or Costa Rica, but these all have in common either the fact that they are too small to have their own armies or security services, or that they rely upon external and comprehensive guarantees of safety, as in the case of the latter and its relationship with the USA.

In each case, as the nation state evolved and solidified its structures, the internal architecture of national security was reinforced by the laws and constitutional measures which defined the responsibilities and specific missions of the given organs. As a means to preserve efficiency and to ensure against abuses of power and information, practically every state of the developed West would severely demarcate the spheres of authority of each body. Matters of military intelligence, for example, were to be the sole purview of the body (-ies) expressly mandated to respond to this threat, and so on. In fact any intentional or even inadvertent flouting of this strict division of labour could, if found out, generally cause scandal and/or investigation¹¹. The strict interpretation of missions and the resultant mirror-image response whereby the threat would be matched by a domestic body focused on that threat, would simply be further reinforced by the cut and dry, unequivocal threat environment presented by the Cold War, within which the threat was posed by a group of nation-states.

I argue that this Westphalian system for the provision of national security – whilst very logical and successful in the past – is greatly limited in applicability when faced with threats that are not linked to the nation state. One such threat is transnational terrorism. But before I can examine exactly how limited the system is, I must further refine my definition of terrorism.

Having established core definitional elements and avoiding semantic traps, (see Appendix II for official definitions) we arrive at a workable definition, such that:

¹¹ For example when the CIA was accused during the Vietnam War of collecting information on Americans nationals in the USA, an activity which was outside of its mandate.

TERRORISM is the use of violence (or threat thereof) to inculcate fear so as to pressure the broader population - or its legitimate representatives - into a political or religious end-state that is not of their choosing.

There are, of course, many other additional ways to approach the question of a workable definition of terrorism. One more avenue that takes us out of the abstraction of mere words is a pictographic representation of the mechanics of terrorism. By resorting to a Venn diagram-like approach, it may be easier to understand the dynamics at work between the various subjects and objects of political violence:




Diagram One: The Mechanics of Terrorism

Here the mechanics of terror are more transparent. Terrorist group **A** wishes to induce an effect upon a target audience, **C**, primarily the political elite of the nation which is not acting in accordance with its own desires. To coerce change, fear is employed either directly onto members of this elite (this would be

assassination) or pressure is exerted upon this groups through the induction of fear in the general public of the nation concerned, or through the reaction of international opinion. This fear is induced through the act of attacking a given target, **B**, thus channelling the message to the indirect, yet ultimate target, **C**. The intermediate target of violence can be a member or members of the public, or the government, or its authorities. Alex Schmid, formerly of the UN, puts it in a far more graphic fashion: “The particular effect of the terrorist message results from the fact that it is written, as it were, with the blood of people who matter to the addressee, but not to the sender.”¹² R. D. Crelinsten likewise talks of the “double victimisation method”, wherein there are targets of violence and targets of demands, through which the allegiances of the targets of terror and targets of attention and the targets of attention and the terrorists themselves¹³. Or there is Jenkins who sees Terrorism as “violence aimed at the people watching”, i.e., not the people directly under attack¹⁴.

Yet, as I point out in my dissertation, the post-Cold War world redefined terrorism in a way that emphasised a resurgence in religiously motivated violence, or the “**transcendentally informed**” terrorist. This (re-)evolution is examined in the light of work by leading terrorism scholar David Rapoport and his theory of wave-based progression. Below you will see my attempt to put the most recent of his observations in the form of a table depicting the four periods or waves Rapoport has examined¹⁵.

¹² A. Schmid: “*Political Terrorism*” *ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ B. Jenkins: “*International Terrorism*”, *ibid.*

¹⁵ D. C. Rapoport, “*The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism*”, *op. cit.*.

	Trigger(s)	Targets	Methods	End-State ¹⁶
Anarchist 1880s-1890s (Russia, Balkans, Italy)	Unsatisfactory governmental reform efforts	The guilt-inducing, stultifying national order	Assassination, typically with a Bomb and ideally via martyrdom	Revolution
Anti-Colonial 1920s-1960s (Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, and Algeria)	World War I (reinforced by WWII)	Imperial Order	Bomb and Gun, but often also guerrilla-type ‘hit and run’ against police and armed forces. Diaspora and ideologically similar nation-states provided support, USSR included. Anti-colonial attitude of UN a factor	Self-Determination (secular state)
New Left 1960-1980s (Palestine, Northern Ireland, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Turkey and Japan)	The Vietnam War	The Undemocratic, Political and Economic Elite	“Theatrical” targets. Hijacking, hostage-taking, embassy attacks and assassinations. USSR, Cuba, and mutual assistance arrangements of logistical import. American interests become the preferred target	Self-Determination (secular state) or Radicalist, Marxist (or both)
The Religious Wave 1979- 2025(?) (Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, India, Philippines, Indonesia and Japan)	Start of new Islamic century ¹⁷ Iranian Revolution Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan	The Secular National Political Elites and The USA	Suicide-bombing	Creation of a Theocratic State, or proto-Caliphate

Table Two: *The Waves of Modern Terrorism according to Rapoport*, (author’s own tabular representation)

¹⁶ Whilst on the surface one can identify different self-professed goals for the terrorists in each phase or wave, it is worthy noting something Rapoport himself states before he discusses each period individually: “‘Revolution’ is the overriding aim in every wave, but revolution is understood in different ways.” See “*The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism*”, *ibid.*

Yet I am not satisfied with how Rapoport combines in his last wave actors that are religiously motivation, such as Osama bin Laden with others whose motives are predominantly – if not solely – political (such as Yasser Arafat) subsequently I propose a Fifth Wave – the **Transcendental - Apocalyptic**:

	Triggers	Targets	Method	End-State
Transcendental – Apocalyptic Terror 1995- (USA, Japan East Africa, Thailand, UK)	Mujahed Victory over the Superpower USSR			
	End of the Cold War			
	The Gulf War (and bin Laden’s rejection by the Saudi government)	Apostate Arab / Muslim Leaders	Mass Casualty Means, Synchronised (Suicide) Bombers (al Q)	Global Caliphate / Theocracy (al Q)
	Creation of Muslim successor states to the USSR in Central Asia	The USA ‘The West’	BioChem Weapons (Aum)	Global Cult Empire (Aum)
	Plight of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kosovo			

Table Three: A Fifth Phase in Modern Terrorism: The Transcendental

If the above description is correct, if al Qaeda (and Aum Shinrykio) can be considered to be significantly different from the terrorist groups that proceeded them, as I believe this to be the case, then, one can reasonably conclude that the utility of the methods used to combat the previous four types of terrorist groups

¹⁷ 1979 was the year the Muslim calendar moved into 1400 Hijra.

is not assured and as such we must reassess tools and policies. This question's analysis is the goal of the final chapter of my dissertation.

RESULTS : MANAGING THE DISJUNCTION – ‘**SUPERPURPLE**’

I have used my dissertation to demonstrate that today, for many countries, the classic tools of national security are ill-suited to the challenge of defending against transcendentally-informed users of political violence, such as al Qaeda, since al Qaeda and their related threats are not limited by the strictures of the Westphalian system, being globally dispersed, interdisciplinary and hyper-mobile. The urgency for developing new methodologies and frameworks in which to understand and deal with such threats is underlined by the fact that the transcendental actor – since he is not motivated by worldly, political goals and wishes to totally destroy his opponent – can justify within his own ‘logic’ the use of weapons of mass destruction. This is “hyper-terrorism”, the intersection of WMD means and the use of political violence.

Additionally I demonstrate in my dissertation that national legal order is insufficient when addressing crimes that are of such a magnitude that they do harm to humankind en masse, in other words, crimes against humanity. The systematic targeting for extermination by a government of a particular group for reasons of political, ethnic or religious identity is the most obvious such crime against humanity. Such arguments lie in part behind legal actions brought in Nuremberg against the architects of Adolf Hitler's “Final Solution” and the Hague Tribunal that is currently prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic, amongst other, in connection with the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia Muslims and ethnic Albanian Kosovars. But more important than the resultant creation of temporary supranational courts to try such mass-murderers, is the implicit inference that response to such crimes is not simply the responsibility of the legal system of the

country where the atrocities occurred, or the legal system of the nationals who committed them, but is the responsibility of all nations which have the capability and opportunity to take action. The inference being toward universal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of such crimes. With 9/11 one can make the case that terrorism has been elevated (or has sunken) to just such as level of crime.

With the first unsuccessful attack against the World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993¹⁸, Aum's Sarin gas attack of the Tokyo Metro in 1995, Timothy McVeigh massive truck bomb attack in Oklahoma City, the East Africa Embassy bombings of 1998, September 11th and the synchronized Madrid railways bombings, it is easy to demonstrate that we have moved from the age of *mass-audience* (Brian Jenkins) to the age of *mass-casualty* terrorism and the rise of the **transcendentally informed (irrational) terrorist**. If then the aim of actors such as those responsible for the aforementioned attacks is to kill as many people as possible, carnage for the sake of carnage, then one can argue that the mass-casualty terrorism of groups such as al Qaeda is akin to a crime against all humanity that universal jurisdiction applies to such crimes and such actors.

For centuries the tools of national security matched the threat. Today the threats operate in a milieu that is transnational and not limited by the shell of nation-state architecture. The foe moves in a world that is unrestricted by international convention, by physical borders, or the dictates of government. We must admit to ourselves the fact that our old division of labour is out-of-date and that we cannot justify the maintenance of hermetic seals between various agencies and forces. The successful members of the transatlantic community that won the

¹⁸ Unsuccessful because we now know that the intention of the attackers was to detonate their truck bomb next to a structural member within the WTC underground garage so that the building would collapse. Fortunately their bomb was of insufficient force to accomplish what would be accomplished through the use of the suicide jumbo-jet attack in 2001.

Cold War inherited a tool box of means to provide for security that has not changed. Whilst the enemy has moved to a higher operational plain of operational existence we have not and will likely never do so, since world governance is not something that is welcomed either by the majority of citizens who find their identity in the national *métier*, nor by the entrenched stratum of politicians who would have everything to lose should their domestic authority be replaced by a higher transnational one. As a result we must look elsewhere for a solution.

If we recognize the fact that our internal national security and defense structures were inherited from another age and for another purpose, yet we are unable for various reasons (foremostly political) to create supranational solutions, then the only viable option is to radically reform the instruments at the nation-state level so as to make them more applicable to the new tasks at hand, to closer resemble the enemies of today and to heighten international cooperation in radical ways. If the internal barriers between the police force, the army and various intelligence services could be dismantled in a constitutionally guaranteed fashion, this would facilitate a *modus operandi* that is as flexible and as effective as that of our new enemies. There even exists a precedent for such a unified multi-agency approach¹⁹. Such a reform would result in “*SuperPurple*”²⁰ structures being created that would be as flexible and hyper-

¹⁹ In the bloodiest years of the PIRA’s campaign against the UK government, the decision was taken to create a radically new unit that would take the fight to the most dangerous players. Various names were used, 14 Detachment, or Det., Dragon Company, or 14 Int. and Sy., this formation employed units made up of local police officers, members of the special forces (SAS / SBS) and the intelligence services. 14 Det. was very good at its job, overcoming the old divisions and obstacles to effective interagency cooperation. Whilst information on this part of the PIRA/UK struggle is limited, some works have in recent years shed light on 14 Det. See for example Martin Dillon: *The Dirty War: covert strategies and tactics used in political conflicts*, Routledge, New York, 1990 and James Rennie: “*The Operators – on the streets with 14 Company*”, Century, London, 1996.

²⁰ Purple operations and structures are those that involve all the arms of military service, army, navy, air force and marines, or systems that require their members to be cross-trained and/or experienced in combined arms operations. The US Department of Defense has been emphasizing

mobile as the enemies they need to neutralize. It would not even be too far-fetched to make the argument that in the case of many countries they would be best served in the current geostrategic environment by a unitary body which conglomerated all the skills of the various separate agencies and units into a new structure better suited to facing threats transcendental terrorist threat such as al Qaeda.

Even so, the reality is that such a broad sweeping reform and restructuring of the national security apparatus of the nations of the developed West will inevitably run into heavy resistance from all those who have an interest in maintaining existing structures and who do not see the necessity for change. It is most likely the responsibility therefore of the non-governmental think-tank community to promote the initial discussion on how best to shape old capabilities to meet new threats and to convince as many members of the general public as possible that the topic should be placed on the political agenda of the various nations.

Subsequently it is hoped that the policy elites will recognise the contribution political science categorizations and recommendations can have and will recognize that existing national security architectures must be refocused so as to be made able to function effectively across the international arena with the agencies of other countries. Only in this fashion will we are to be able to manage the transnational threat that is transcendentially-informed political violence.

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the "Purple Mode" for some years now, breaking down the technical as well as mental barriers to interoperability amongst the services, ever since the Goldwater Nichols Act mandated inter-service postings for senior officers. The name purple allegedly comes from the colour arrived at if the four service colours are mixed. My proposal would take this approach and apply it across the whole palate of national security tools, not just the armed forces. I am indebted to my good friend Keith Mines of the US State Department for christening my concept so aptly.

APPENDIX I: LETHALITY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, 1993-2003

YEAR	<i>Number of attacks</i>	<i>Number of victims</i>	<i>Average</i>
1993	431	1510	3.5
1994	322	988	3
1995	440	6445	14.6
1996	296	3224	10.8
1997	304	915	3
1998	274	6694	25.5
1999	395	940	2.3
2000	426	1212	2.8
2001	355	5806	16.3
2002	205	3072	14.9
2003	208	4271	20.5

Sources: *Global Patterns of Terrorism*, United States Department of State www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/33777.htm
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html

APPENDIX II: GOVERNMENTAL DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.

Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974
United Kingdom

Terrorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in Article 129a, Section 1 of the penal Code (above all: murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, explosives detonation) or by means of other acts of violence which serve as preparation of such criminal acts

Bundesamt für Vefassungsschutz,
(Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
Germany

Terrorism is the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a large group wider than the immediate victims.”

Central Intelligence Agency
USA

Terrorism is defined as the unlawful, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Federal Bureau of Investigations
USA

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SCHÖPFLIN GYÖRGY
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Bírálat [Gorka Sebestyén](#) 'Content and End - State-based Alteration in the Practice of Political Violence since the End of the Cold War - The Rise of the "Irrational Actor' cím • PhD dolgozatáról

Az elemzés kiindulópontja a nemzetközi államrendszer 1989 utáni kialakulása és ezen belül a terrorizmus szerepe, amelyet a szerző "irrational actornak" nevez. Az elnevezésen lehet vitatkozni, amennyiben egy mélyebb elméleti megközelítést alkalmazunk: A hagyományos államközpontú elemzési rendszerből kiindulva a terrorizmus valóban irracionálisnak tűnik, mivel a politikai hatalom mozgását magába integrálja az állam és az államok által elfogadott nemzetközi intézmények hálózata. Ez az, ami 1989-ben meglazult, sőt egy sor államot tart számon a világ, amelyek képtelenek fenntartani a hagyományos max weberi kötelezettségeket, illetve képtelen ezen elvárásoknak eleget tenni, elsősorban az erőszak monopóliumával kapcsolatosakat.

Ezt a változást a modernség kontra posztmodern kontrasztjával lehet megragadni. Bár a nagyon szilárd alapokon működő, nagyrészt nyugati nemzetállamokat is kikezdte az új folyamatok összessége - ezeket nevezzük globalizációnak - a nyugati állam, az eredeti nemzetállam bölcsője és fenntartója egyelőre elbírja, elviseli a ráhelyezkedő nyomást kisebb-nagyobb kihagyásokkal, amíg a nem nyugati állam, minőségileg más kulturális alapokból felépítve nem képes és valószínűleg soha nem is volt képes a Nyugat által rájuk szabott feladatokat ellátni.

A hidegháború által kiváltott nyomás ezeket a gyengeségeket, elégtelenségeket elrejtette, láthatatlanná tette, de az 1989 óta létrejött változások nemcsak hogy észlelhetővé tették az új világ új politikai tényezőinek kibontakozását, hanem lehetőséget nyújtottak új politikai aktoroknak új szerepek vállalására.

A terrorizmus ebben a képződményben csak egy ilyen szereplő a sok közül, amelyek átalakítják a nemzetköziség rendszerét, az eddiginél jóval összetettebb irányba: Gondoljunk csak a multinacionális vállalatokra, a nemzetközi NGO-kra az internetre és a világot magába foglaló televízió és egyéb médiára, valamint az ezt elősegítő angol nyelv terjedésére.

Ebben a kontextusban a terrorizmus, illetve a terroristák semmiképpen nem irracionálisabbak a többinél, hanem saját felfogásuk után járva, a fővonal, a mainstream által létrehozott szabályrendszert támadják meg, élve a fent említett újonnan kialakult lehetőségekkel, kihasználva az új hatalmi fegyvereket.

12. oldal "political violence". Visszatérve a max weberi megfogalmazásra az erőszak vagy annak rejtett formája mindig is részét képezi a hatalomnak, tehát a kifejezés "political violence" nem magától értetődik: Ebben az elméleti összefüggésben inkább a nem államilag legitimált erőszakról van szó, tehát szerencsésebb lenne "non-state-legitimated violence-ről" írni. Bár elfogadhatjuk az eredeti kifejezést, ha pontosabban van körülírva. Természetesen ennek a folyamatnak jóval tágabb a kontextusa "a nem állami aktorok" szaporodása egy központi fejleménye az 1989 utáni rendszernek.

19. oldal "resurgence in terrorism that is not purely political in nature". Ez az állítás fontos elméleti kérdéseket vet fel, illetve magát a politika fogalmát hagyja meghatározatlanul, arról tanúskodik, hogy az értekezés az állam/nem-állam dichotómiában gondolkodik, a nem-állami aktorok említésének ellenére. Az alapvető probléma a nem-állami aktorok racionalitásának megítélése: Ha elfogadjuk a racionalitás fogalmával járó bonyodalmakat, akkor esetleg egy többszintű és többformájú racionalitás fogalmával közelebb kerülünk a terrorizmus antológiájához.

27. oldal A 17. lábjegyzet nagyon és félrevezetően leegyszerűsíti az Európai Unió és Törökország kapcsolatát.

173-174. oldal A nem európai társadalmi szervezkedés kérdése és a nagycsalád, a klán szerepe messzemenően formálja az említett társadalmak politikai hatalomrendszerét, amelyről a nyugati demokráciaelméletek nemigen akarnak tudomást venni, pedig ennek megvan az antropológiai és szociológiai irodalma, például Edward Schatz "Modern Clan Politics" és az ott idézett írások.

Az eddigieket szem előtt tartva a három kritikai mércének véleményem szerint az értekezés eleget tesz:

1. Az idevágó tudományos irodalom felhasználása széles és meggyőző.
2. A módszertan koherens és logikus, jóllehet - és ezeket próbáltam vizsgálni a fentiekben - mélyebb episztemológiai szinten sok mást is ki lehetett volna hozni az elemzésből.
3. Az értekezés sikeresen rámutatott az új helyzet ismérveire és ezzel eredeti meglátásokat fogalmazott meg.

Minősítési javaslat: **cum laude**

s.k.
PROF. SCHÖPFLIN GYÖRGY

From: Chris Donnelly, Head
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20 April 2006

Re: Sebestyen Gorka, “Content and End-State, based Alteration in the Practice of the Political Violence since the End of the Cold War”

In his Thesis, Mr Gorka has applied rigorous academic research and analysis to a very topical issue. He has, in consequence, produced a work not only of academic excellence, but also of significant current policy relevance.

Throughout the work, Mr Gorka has demonstrated a very thorough knowledge and deep understanding of the issue of terrorism in all its complexity, set within its context of domestic situations and international relations. His thorough and very competent use of the available material – academic research, technical studies, political analysis – coupled with his understanding of the operational sphere, combined to provide a very firm basis for Mr Gorka’s work.

On this firm basis of knowledge, Mr Gorka has proceeded to develop his analysis by means of a very innovative use of research methods and techniques. The combination of traditional academic rigour with a very clever use of sources and great insight into national and international processes has enabled Mr Gorka *to go beyond the analysis* normally found in such a thesis into an *assessment* of both the problems and their potential solutions. It is this which gives the Thesis its particular topicality and policy relevance, thereby raising it well above the normal level to be expected of such a work, and insuring that it will make a special and unique contribution not only to a understanding of the issue but also of how and can it should be tackled.

The main issue for modern societies in today's rapidly changing world is how to meet new security challenges in ways which do not compound the problems they bring with them. These efforts are made more difficult by the shortage of academic analysis of current socialite trends; a failure to appreciate the complexities and strength of the driving forces behind the new threats and challenges (such as fundamentalist terrorism); and the lack of operational experience and awareness. In his thesis Mr Gorka successfully addresses all these issues and also helps to point the way for future research work where in-depth academic study can bring real benefit to policy formulation and implementation.

It is for these reasons that I would congratulate Mr Gorka on producing an excellent dissertation. He has demonstrated that the traditional academic virtue can be extremely relevant to the solution of contemporary political and social problems. I have no hesitation in recommending his thesis for acceptance by his peers and the doctoral school. If I were to make one additional remark, it would be to have Mr. Gorka devote a small section of any further version of the text to a discussion of how his final policy recommendation – the use of "Super Purple" could be achieved political, given the various institutional interests it would challenge.

I remain, yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Chris Donnelly". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Chris" and the last name "Donnelly" clearly distinguishable.

Chris Donnelly CMG
Head
Advanced Research and Assessment Group
UK Defence Academy
Joint Services Command & Staff College



To: The Political Science Department
Corvinus University
Budapest

I have read with great interest Sebestyén Gorka’s work, “*Content and End-State-based Alteration in the Practice of Political Violence since the End of the Cold War.*” I found it a very relevant and necessary exploration of the vexing problem now confronting many advanced states: namely how best to organize a nation’s capabilities to effectively protect its citizenry from the “hyper-terrorist.” Understandably, the speed and zeal with which nations combine their various institutions of governance (and their attendant structures) to counter this threat will have regional and global impact.

Mr. Gorka presents a compelling argument for defining the “hyper-terrorist” as an altogether new threat; one that challenges nations to develop innovative approaches to form new (or reform old) structures which will appropriately empower law enforcement, security, and military capacities to successfully counter this worrisome threat. To debate the correct characterization of this threat appears a moot exercise. What is undeniably real, at least from the view of several world capitals, is the absolute requirement to counter something so ominous that it defies traditional thought and approach. The current structures have proven less than effective to this task. To this end, Mr. Gorka’s claim that it is necessary “...to radically reform the nation-state level instruments so as to make them more applicable to...the enemies of today” is most fundamental.

However, care must be exercised here. If done abruptly, undoing traditional structures, processes and procedures may result in a *less* secure environment than had been aimed to achieve. The traditional challenges of law enforcement have not diminished, rather they have transformed as much as modern economies have—becoming more global, connected and

technologically advanced. In a like manner, security services continue their work against long-established foes and with well-established friends as necessary. In the military sphere, troops are now called to answer the immense responsibilities of full spectrum conflict. Radical reform of these and other structures invites risk. Likely new structures come largely at the expense of old ones. In transition from current to future, the assignment of tasks and necessary resources must move in concert. In addition, balance has to be achieved between the limits a citizenry will render its government in the name of protecting them. Being totally secure, at the cost of having far less personal privacy and/or freedom may be too costly a price many citizens are willing to pay for security -- especially in the absence of a clear and definable threat to them. (A key concern, when there may not be universal agreement outside official circles that radical change is needed.)

In general, academically derived solutions are thoughtfully developed and logic based. However, this cannot be interpreted to mean that they are then politically feasible to implement. Often the outcome of a well-intentioned political initiative is quite different than its original design. This is a consequence of democracies—often less efficient and less decisive than other forms of governance. Notwithstanding, progress is achievable. A necessary precursor for meaningful change is for political leaders to articulate compelling arguments for that change, and subsequently to propose solutions that are executable. As Mr. Gorka contends, independent think-tanks have an important role, if not the outright responsibility, to play in this process. The think-tank community can be a significant, but not exclusive, catalyst of change here. The expansive nature of tasks to be addressed to guard against the “hyper-terrorist” must include perspective from a broad field of stakeholders. Much work is needed to adapt current constructs of national security to confront new realities. Without question, Mr. Gorka’s work moves to the discussion forward.

Col. Kevin P. McGrath
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US Embassy
Budapest 7 April 2006