BUDAPEST CORVINUS UNIVERSITY

GLOBALIZING GOVERNANCE
IN A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER WORLD:

The Global Prince, Merchant and Citizen

Ph.D. Dissertation

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. *Fin-de-siecle, Fin-de-millennium*

The period we live in has been characterized as the end of history, empire, the nation state, neo-liberalism, and the end of the world system. Endings necessitate new beginnings. The purpose of this study is to illuminate what directions we may expect our world to be moving in considering the complexity, increasing interdependence and rapid change that has become part of our lives.

KARL POLÁNYI (2001) delineated the "double movement" of history in his masterwork, *The Great Transformation.* He described the social forces that helped to create and extend *laissez-faire*, market economies first in England and then to the rest of Europe, and the countervailing forces that were opposed to the commodification of land and labor (trade unions and protectionist, national business interests). **Since the 1990s, I argue, the contradictions in terms of justice and democracy in contemporary globalization have also given rise to countermovements that attempt to reassert control over economic forces.** The questions that are being clearly articulated by these multifarious and increasingly vocal counterforces are: **Who is globalization benefiting? What should be the purposes/aims/goals of globalization today?**

The period has also been described as "civilizational crisis," "consumer civilization," "business civilization" which underscores the emergence of new perceptions regarding the human condition (and the corresponding rights and responsibilities), development and "accumulation" as such, which has become more knowledge-based, dematerialized and deterritorialized. Some have described the economy as becoming increasingly "weightless," as more and more of it becomes knowledge- and creativity-based.

The global population boom (from 6.5 billion today to over 9 billion in the next 45 years) alone assures that more people in more places will be positively and/or negatively effected by what we are experiencing today as globalization. And while there is an "apparent powerlessness among the powerful (e.g., the inability of the G7 to sustain domestic legitimacy and effective management of the global economy), there has been growth in the power of the apparently powerless." (SAKAMOTO: 1994, quoted in GILL: 2000, p. 217.)

According to STEPHEN GILL (2000), politicization "from below" may constitute a major, if not revolutionary, change in the emerging world order, which could perhaps be more democratic.

> We do indeed stand at a moment of transformation. But this is not that of an already established, newly globalized world with clear rules. Rather we are located in an age of transition, transition not merely of a few backward countries who need to catch up with the spirit of globalization, but a transition in which the entire capitalist world system will be transformed into something else. (MITTLEMAN: 2000, p. 262.)

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, a confessed student of POLÁNYI, asserts that we are currently in a period of transition from one world system to another. Once in the lifetime of a world system, he claims, when contradictions, secular trends, and cyclical rhythms combine in such a way that the system can no longer reproduce itself, a world system ends and is replaced by another. According to world systems theory, the modern world system today is in structural crisis and has entered a chaotic, transitional period which will cause a systemic bifurcation and transition to a new structure. The nature of the new structure has not yet been determined and, furthermore, cannot be predetermined. It is only in crisis, however, that actors have the most freedom of action, because when a system operates smoothly behavior is determined by the nature of the structure. At moments of transition, individual and collective action become more meaningful, and the transition period to a new structure is more "open to human intervention and creativity." (WALLERSTEIN: 2000, pp. 251-252.)

Change and innovations are clearly present in the redefinition of social scientific concepts as well as in the recontexualization of global actors and their interfaces as we try to grapple with understanding the processes of globalization. It is my contention that the period in which we live, the *fin-de-millennium* and the beginning of the new era has witnessed the emergence of new, innovative and hybrid forms of the Prince, the Merchant, and the Citizen (the Media [Trickster] as part of each) which will shape and need to shape the architecture of new global structures for governing our increasingly fragile and inter-dependent world.

In this study I want to introduce some of the creative and new constellations that have emerged in response to the impact and challenges of globalization. I contend that whether or not we agree with WALLERSTEIN's formulation, it is clear that the world is experiencing a process or simultaneous processes of transformation on many levels which many say is due to or is termed globalization.

This dissertation begins with an examination of globalization processes in the context of global transformations and then moves on to an examination and assessment of global changes in three, traditionally viewed contiguous spheres, but today increasingly overlapping spheres−states, markets and societies. The contradictions and possibilities for global governance are then discussed within a framework that is emerging of multi-stakeholder governance at the global level.[1]

From the International Labor Organization (ILO) to the former chief economist of the World Bank, JOSEPH STIGLITZ, complaints are voiced about the direction of economic globalization, its inherent injustices and lack of transparency, accountability and governing structures. Calls are made for the formulation of an ethical framework for governing global markets and the direction of global processes.

Too often studies of globalization ignore the social dimension of globalization − the socio-economic, health, environmental and educational consequences (both positive and negative) of its effects. Recently, the public debate on globalization has been frozen into ideological camps, for and against, with everyday citizens becoming more and more marginalized not just in the debates, but in the processes governing globalization. In the words of JOSEPH STIGLITZ, we need to bring "choice" back into the global equation, weighing economic efficiency against social costs. (STIGLITZ: 2000.) KARL POLANYI also reminds us that the economy should be re-embedded in society, rather than having society driven by the economy. (BELLO: 2004, p.11.4)

The discordant voices in the globalization debate need to be addressed by a new repositioning of global players representing the Global Princes, Merchants, and

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[1] It is important from the start to distinguish between global governance and global government. I will employ Robert Keohane's definition: global governance "refers to rule making and power exercised at a global scale, but not necessarily by entities authorized by general agreement to act." From KEOHANE: 2003, p.132.

Citizens[2] in the governance of globalization processes. This metaphor of the locally and globally (glocally[3]) self-organizing Citizen *vis-á-vis* the turbo markets of the Merchant, and the states and inter-governmental mechanisms of the Prince, is part of the methodological basis of this dissertation. These global players need to operate more transparently, with more accountablity and in cooperation, consultation and dialogue (trialogue) with each other if the challenges of global governance are to be addressed and a concensus on its governance reached.

The polarizing discourse of anti-globlization protestors and the heads of IMF and the World Bank have lead to the ideological entrenchment of opinions and perspectives. Yet it is the intensity of these globalization battles that has created the environment in which questions about the direction and ethics of globalization have been brought into the public domain for deliberation and debate. "Entrenched geopolitical and economic interests are more likely to respond to a mix of pressure and argument, rather than to argument alone." (HELD: 2003b, p. 320.)

It is exactly the arguments that need to be analyzed in order to turn confrontation into constructive engagement. Globalization has come to mean all things to all people, "a theory of how everything works that can be applied anywhere to anything." (SAUL: 2005, p. 86.) Contemporary globalization is one of those profound contextual changes that requires in its wake the redefinition of other terms, like civil society, social change and governance.

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[2] NERFIN: 1986, pp. 3-29; and NERFIN: 1987, pp. 170-195. This metaphor is extended to include the powerful agents of global media today, in an analysis of their role, impact and potential for contributing to more inclusive global governance structures, especially in terms of information dissemination and public education. Because the media is found in all three realms, i.e., states, markets and societies, it is discussed in the framework of this metaphor. The identification of the Media as "Trickster" is thanks to the suggestion of Elemér Hankiss.

[3] "Glocalization means that from now on nothing which happens on our planet is only a limited local event; all inventions, victories and catastrophes affect the whole world, and we must reorient and reorganize our lives and actions, our organizations and institutions, along a 'local-global' axis." (BECk: 2000, p. 11.)

1.2. *The Debate on Global Inequalities and Social Justice*

It is the publicly expressed consensus of the G8 that globalization should reduce global poverty, but quite the opposite has occurred. A study by MATTIAS LUNDBERG and LYN SQUIRE from the World Bank found that the poor are much more vulnerable to shifts in relative international prices that are magnified by a country's openness to trade. They conclude: "At least in the short term, globalization appears to increase both poverty and inequality." (Quoted in BELLO: 2001, p. 238.)

According to the World Bank, the number of people living in poverty rose in the 1990s in all the areas that came under structural adjustment programs: Eastern Europe, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. This has pushed further the global public debate about the future direction and progress of economic globalization to increase equitable distribution of wealth and social justice. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN (1998) points to the central problem of "glocalization": that rich and poor no longer sit at the same (distributive) table of the national state.

This discourse and debate is partly the result of the emergence of what is called a global consciousness, of global values and global identity. This has been elaborated in the concepts of cosmopolitan citizenship and democracy. Recent conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism by BEITZ (1994), POGGE (1994), BARRY (1998) and HELD (2003a), articulate the idea of egalitarian individualism. They argue that the transformations taking place require the adoption and implementation of cosmopolitan values in the economic realm, as well as necessitate the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism in a complex structure of multi-level, multi-stakeholder governance. ULRICH BECK (2000, p. 93) stresses that civilization is protected against barbarism only when basic rights are applied globally.

In response to these debates, I contend that we are seeing the emergence of new, hybrid forms of multi-stakeholder (public-private and private-private) governance, i.e., governance without government. Studies of the transforming role and competencies of the state, the development of private governance structures in the regulation of TNCs and corporate behavior, and the potential role of the media and an emerging and growing global civil society through transnational networks of social movements will be used to support this contention.

1.3. *The Globalization Debate*

MANUEL CASTELLS's theory of the network society elaborates the idea that since the 1980s a new economic and technological framework has emerged that is global, informational and networked, marking a transition towards an informational mode of development and the rise of the network society. The diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in business and society affect everything from the development of cities and regions, and politics, to everyday life and the development of new social identities. (CASTELLS: 1995, 1998.)[4]

For DAVID HELD, globalization is the "big idea" of our time and, like all concepts in the social sciences, it is contested as a matter of social debate. But he focuses the causes of the globalization debate around three major issues: first is that globalization is not new when you think of it in the context of the colonization and exploitation by European Empires in the past. This is one reason certain parts of the world are not over-enthusiastic about the increased global inter-connectedness and inter-dependence today.

> So the West has imposed on its former colonies a rigorously moral approach to debt – one it has rarely applied to itself. … The inevitability, the no-going back of Globalization, are part of this redemptive process. People who fail must learn their lesson, be disciplined, be punished. (SAUL: 2005, p. 106-107.)

Second, in recent decades globalization has been associated with the "mean-spirited neoliberal project which is reinforced by the conditionality programmes of the IMF and the World Bank for developing countries" (THORUP and SORENSEN: 2004.) Not surprisingly, developing countries find the double standards in trade rules hypocritical since Western economies developed behind protective barriers that they are now requiring less developed countries and regions to lower. In developing countries economic liberalization often occurs before a social safety net is secured, causing an increase in misery, which I have termed "crucifixenomics," an abbreviated form of JOHN RALSTON SAUL's "crucifixion economics". ERZSÉBET

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[4] For a good discussion of CASTELLS in this context, see, FLEW: 2005, pp.53-60.

SZALAI, in a similar vein, states that new capitalism is the "uncurbed reign of the economic elite over the other spheres of social existence." (SZALAI: 2007.)

> Soon these servants of the public good had memorized the new vocabulary and were calling citizens *clients* or *stakeholders* or *taxpayers*, using the narrow utilitarian word efficient … while losing the more relevant concept of whether a law or program was effective. (SAUL: 2005, pp.111-112.)

The discourse that had been pouring out of the West since the early 1970s was embraced by multi-lateral economic organizations (MEIs) and develpment experts and there was no shortage of Western consultants and academic economists eager to push developing countries into experiments with market purity. Imagine how exciting it was for these theoreticians to find countries prepared not merely to engage in reforms, but to risk the entire well-being of real people – of entire peoples – in order to act as existential case studies. (SAUL: 2005, p. 113.)

The third reason HELD outlines for why globalization is contested is that many people associate it with increasing global inequality and global poverty. The subject of a growing amount of literature is that economic growth is not reducing global poverty.[5] It is one of the areas that provokes the greatest global mobilization of civil society as well. The Global Call to Action Against Poverty, for example, claims that it is the largest global civil society movement against poverty in the world.[6]

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[5] See, for example, the discussions of the National Bureau of Economic Research: ‹http://www.nber.org/digest/oct02/w8933.html›.

[6] See, for example, BELLO: 2001, STIGLITZ: 2002, RICE: 2007. For global movements, see, e.g., ‹http://www.makepovertyhistory.org›, the Global Poverty research Group ‹http://www.gprg.org›, and The Global Call to Action Against Poverty ‹http://whiteband.org›.

1.4. *Distinctive Features of Contemporary Globalization:*
Deterritorialization, Extensity, Intensity, Velocity and Impact

One can measure how the world has become increasingly connected in terms of: the *extensity* of these processes which stretch across time and space, the *intensity* of the processes, their *velocity* and the *impact* of their activities. (HELD and MCGREW: 1999.) But many argue that this increased inter-connectedness does not ensure more social organization and justice. More wealth and opportunities have been created for some, but that does not mean the world is more integrated or that wealth is more equally distributed. JOHN RALSTON SAUL puts it even more strongly when he declares that globalization has become an excuse for not dealing with problems and is a betrayal of the idea of public responsibility which is undermining citizens' confidence in democracy. (SAUL: 2005, p. 92.)

For HELD, even if globalization lacks a clear and precise definition, it can be understood best "if it is conceived as a spatial phenomenon, lying on a contiuum with 'the local' at one end and 'the global' at the other. It implies a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power".(HELD: 2003, p. 305.)

HELD continues by describing four distinct types of change:

> First, it involves a stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers, regions and continents … second, globalization is marked by the growing magnitude of networks and flows of trade, investment, finance, culture and so on. Third, globalization can be linked to the speeding up of global interactions and processes, as the evolution of worldwide systems of transport and communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people. And fourth, it involves the deepening impact of global interactions and processes such that the effects of distant events can be highly significant elsewhere and even the most local developments can come to have enormous global consequences. (HELD: 2003, p. 306.)

ROBERT KEOHANE, another prominent expert in the field, states that: "Broadly speaking, globalization means the shrinking of distance on a world scale through the

emergence and thickening of networks of connections – environmental and social as well as economic." (KEOHANE: 2003, p. 325.)

Deterritorialization, in particular, is a distinctive feature of globalization. Deterritorialization means that territorial locations, distance, borders, etc., no longer have a determining influence. JAN AARTE SCHOLTE describes it as follows:

> In global space, "place" is not territorially fixed, territorial distance is covered in effectively no time, and territorial frontiers present no particular impediment. Thus global relations have what could be called a "supraterritorial", "transborder" or "transworld" character. (SCHOLTE: 1999, p. 7.)

Deterritorialization does not mean, however, that territorial geography has lost all of its relevance because we inhabit a globalizing rather than a completely globalized world. (SCHOLTE: 1999, p. 9.)

1.5. *Structural Hybridization*

Globalization is viewed in this study as hybridization "in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices." (ROWE and SCHELLING: 1991.) Discussions and analysis of cultural hybridization dominate the hybridization discourse; but hybridization theory can also extend beyond the cultural field to states, markets, media and civil society because globalization generates forces of both fragmentation and integration termed "fragmegration" that effect all of these fields. (ROSENAU: 2000.)

Hybridization can be observed in the political economy, in the interpenetration of modes of production and hybrid economic formations. Hybridity in space and time can be observed in the coexistence of the premodern, modern and post-modern. Structural hybridization can also be observed in the transformation of states, in business regulation, and in the public-private and private-private partnerships between business and society. "Structural hybridization and the mélange of diverse modes of organization give rise to a pluralization of forms of cooperation and competition as well as to novel mixed forms of cooperation." (PIETERSE: 1995, p. 452.) **The state, market, citizen and media hybrids that have evolved in**

**response to the democratic challenges of globalization are the major themes of
this dissertation.**

1.6. *The Metamorphosis of the Nation State*

Since the mid-1990s, it has been argued by KENICHI OHMAE (1995) and others
that nation states have become dysfunctional actors in the global economy. While
others like BOYER and DRACHE (1996) and SCOTT (1997) argue that the state has the
capacity to transform and adapt to changing economic circumstances. TAMÁS
SZENTES emphasizes the crucial role states can and do play, for example, in
attracting foreign direct investment and TNCs. (SZENTES: 2003, especially pp. 333-
354.)

Many of these discussions crystallized in the aftermath of 9/11 and emphasized
the hollowing out of state authority by globalization, "empowering individuals and
groups to play roles in world politics – including wreaking massive destruction –
that were once reserved for governments of states." (WOODWARD: 2003, p. 310.)
Other reactions included those who saw that "the terrorist attacks and their aftermath
have served to vindicate more traditional state-centred understandings of world
politics." (WOODWARD: 2003, p. 310.)

In a recent paper SASKIA SASSEN discusses how the global is partly constituted
inside and embedded in the national – in a geographic space that is encased by an
elaborate set of national laws and administrative capacities, "thereby blurring the
distinction global/national and signalling that the national state participates in the
implementation of globalization." (SASSEN: 2006a, SASSEN: 2006b.) In other words,
as SZENTES has stated, globalization paradoxically while it may reduce state
competencies in the economic sphere, increases the necessity and importance of the
role of the state in the economy. (SZENTES: 2003.)[7] SASSEN concludes that the
global is partly constituted inside the national while, at the same time, there is partial
denationalization of specific components of nation states and not just in the area of
economics.

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[7] See especially the discussion on the controversial effects of economic globalization, SZENTES:
2003, pp. 301-323.

I agree with SASSEN and SZENTES and contend in the area of state analysis (and later in the areas of markets and societies), we are witnessing the constitution of a **hybrid state** with **hybrid competencies and scope**, i.e., the formation of a type of authority and state practice that entails the partial denationalizing of what has traditionally constituted the nation state.

1.7. *The Emergence of Multi-Stakeholder, Co-Regulation of Global Markets*

Besides international and intergovernmental treaties, there are increasing numbers of new types and loci of business regulation. Sources of regulation are varied and range from individual firms, and business associations to NGOs and public agencies. Those that have attracted scholarly interest are particularly global policy networks (RUGGIE: 2001; WITTE, REINICKE and BENNER: 2000) and private inter-firm regimes, (CUTLER and HAUFLER: 1999; and HAUFLER: 2000) but there are many others that have not been sufficiently addressed or analyzed. There is a growing institutionalization of standard setting between profit-making and not-for-profit actors which needs more attention. Private actors are beginning to establish, maintain, verify, and monitor their own private regulations and these new rule systems are becoming the constitutive tools of global governance today in economic relations.

Whereas traditional forms of regulation emanated from national governments, and later also from intergovernmental agencies, we now see **hybrid** forms of regulation emerging in public-private and private-private governance structures. These include multi-stakeholder approaches to co-regulation.[8] These relationships are arguably different from the historical alliances of NGOs and the private sector because, in contrast to the past where these different actors met as adversaries, today there is the emergence of shared norms and principles. This new and innovative development emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s.

Setting standards (both product and production standards) that are ethical, environmentally sound and socially sensitive are increasingly becoming the area within which hybrid partnerships are emerging. Verification, certification and reporting are also moving from self-regulation to co-regulation.

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[8] Co-regulation is defined in regulatory arrangements where at least one actor is not a profit-making entity; self-regulation is the arrangement where individual firms set their own norms of conduct.

A variety of transformations set the stage for new multi-stakeholder initiatives and co-regulation in the early 1990s. "These changes include a transformation of the discursive field, a restructuring of the political environment and the correlation of social forces therein as well as a growing criticism against forms of corporate self-regulation." (PATTBERG: 2006, p. 11.) Already in 1994, STUART HOLLAND outlined particular spheres (a power matrix) within which different combinations of efficient and effective public-private mechanisms operate. These include: planning, spending, enterprise and regulation. (HOLLAND: 1994, p. 176.)

I will examine recent trends particularly in enterprise and regulation, as part of the original research on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and social entreprenuers to document and support the hypotheses above. This is done to highlight the emergence of **hybrid** forms of market mechanisms and a redefinition of profit to include social capital accumulation and socially and environmentally conscious, long-term investments. New examples of "profitable" and efficient strategic partnerships between business and society and between multilateral economic institutions and society will be given to support this line of argumentation.

It is my assertion that these innovations and initiatives constitute an important field of economic hybridization in the discourse of corporate social responsibility, in the redefinition of profit, and in business regulation. This expands the potential participation of new actors in regulating and directing global business.

1.8. *The Tricksters of Globalization*

The Media has always been central to globalization. Through the new technologies it globally contextualizes and gives meaning to information, images and events that take place across vast reaches of time and space. TERRY FLEW (2005: pp. 178-179) outlines three dimensions to the centrality of the media in globalization:

First, media constitutes the technologies and service delivery platforms through which international flows are transacted. Second, the media industries are leaders in the push towards global expansion and integration. Finally, the media provides informational content and images of the world through which people seek to make sense of events in distant places. Media is central to globalization partly

because of its role as communications technologies that enable the international distribution of messages; but global media also derives a particular importance from its perceived role in weakening the cultural bonds that tie people to nation states and national communities.

The study of media and globalization becomes, however, problematic when globalization is divided into categories like politics, economics, culture and society. There is little theoretical interaction between globalization and media scholars. Globalization theorists come from the outside of media and communication studies; and most media scholars are concerned with the media economy and power inequalities. Usually media study becomes marginalized in a subgroup of cultural studies, when in fact it encompasses economics, politics and polities. TERHI RANTANEN insists that the media plays a more central role today and should be a constituting part of the mediation process, rather than being viewed as an intermediary between two parties like the state and society or economics and society. The idea she develops "is that individuals, through their individual media activities, which become social practices, contribute to globalization." (RANTANEN: 2005, p. 18.)

The Janus-face of the media in an age of globalization is one of the least understood and analyzed in the social sciences, yet it is an integral part to globalization of economies, politics and civil societies. Positions range from that of American communications experts who argue that the concentration and privatization of mass media ownership and its commercialization leads to its alliance with and propagation of regressive political forces, to those who herald the new digital age as the age of participatory democracy on a global scale. There are also complete rejectionists, like KAI HAFEZ (2007), who writes that media globalization is a myth (albeit necessary myth) and argues instead that what we are witnessing are rather forms of media regionalization at best. Yet most experts agree that the media is important and does have the potential to significantly change systems.

Part of the reluctance to address the role of the media today and its intersection with globalization lies in the media's increasingly complex nature and structure. Sometimes referred to as the "New Media" to distinguish it from traditional medium, today's communication networks including the internet, the world wide web, computers and email are all *vehicles* for conveying information within a new *medium* that is entirely dependent on technology.

I argue that the bifurcation of the global media into what RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ (2005) terms economics-oriented and political-oriented actors is one form of media hybridization. LIPSCHUTZ delineates two types of contemporary communications media: 1) the powerful private media conglomerates who produce one-way news and entertainment in response to consumer demand, and 2) the less powerful media, which includes the internet, that provides two-way communications and permits the "creation of a global epistemic context within which virtually simultaneous political activism and action can take place in widely separate locations." (LIPSCHUTZ: 2005, p. 18.)

He emphasizes that whether the flow of information is one-way or two-way makes a difference in terms of who is effected by the news and in terms of the responses by those effected. The two-way global communications media not only provides for the rapid transmission of information, but allows scattered groups around the globe to learn about what others are doing, "to observe and validate each other's actions and to disseminate the ethical bases for those actions. These ethical principles become integral to a globalized episteme, a political network that spans societies and cultures." (LIPSCHUTZ: 2005, p. 31.)

The role of the hybrid media is fundamental to discussions of global markets, politics and civil societies, and their respective roles and impacts on global governance. The better civil society is able to access and influence the international media, on the one hand, the more it will increase its influence in international debates. On the other hand, a fantastic explosion of citizen-led news forums, mailists, chatrooms, blogs, etc., has changed the way news is made and reported and business has also joined this global conversation. Users have become producers and producers users. **Because of the Media-Tricksters multifunctional character, I will weave analysis of its role into the larger framework of discussions on the hybridization of states, markets and societies**.

1.9. *The Challenge and Potential of an Emerging Global Civil Society*

Global civil society surfaced with many related terms, like international non-governmental organizations, transnational advocacy networks, global social movements, new multilateralism, deterritorialization, etc. The need for civil society stems from democracy's deficiencies, but civil society at the global level remains amorphous and incomplete without some kind of articulation of citizenship that can be applied globally. In the field of international law, great strides have been made which include, importantly, the recognition of the individual as a legal subject. But moving towards a more developed **cosmopolitan citizenship** is supported by HELD and others. (For example, HEATER: 2002.) Cosmopolitan or world citizenship entails rights but also responsibilities. In the context of global governance, global citizens organized in networks of social movements, become part of a growing global civil society.

Many authors like MARY KALDOR (2003, 2007) and JAN AART SCHOLTE (1999) speak of globalizing civil society's potential:

1) to give voice to stakeholders and even empower them, thereby enhancing participation at the global level;

2) to contribute to the quality and scope of public education by disseminating information about complex and rapid changes;

3) to foster discussions about the actual challenges of global governance – locally as well as on the supranational level;

4) to contribute to enhancing the transparency of global governance; and

5) to increase accountability.

In the area of state and market transparency and accountability, we will look at the potential of a globalized civil society to address these claims.

It is important to keep in mind the limits of global civil society as elaborated by CHANDHOKE (2002), CHAMBERS and KOPSTEIN (2001), and PHILLIPS: (1999), which underscores the question as to whether global civil society is able to provide an alternative, or is simply bound, like markets and states, by the same logic. DAVID RIEFF, a sceptic of the term, suggests that civil society is simply a projection of our desires and he states that civil society's function is to make the world safe for global capitalism. He believes that it is a mistake to assume that networks of associations

can replace state functions and warns that "advocates of civil society are the useful idiots of globalization." (RIEFF: 1999.)

The leverage of civil society may be limited and it is argued that only in partnership with states and market actors, can responsibility be shared. In the end, of course, social values and norms will have to change if the world is to become safer, healthier and more just, and it is here that civil society organizations can play an important role; but if the public does not care, neither multinational corporations nor governments will institute change.

An important part of the debate that has been neglected, except for a few authors like DAVID BONBRIGHT (2006) and TIMOTHY D. SISK (1999), is the potential of globalization to actually empower local communities, which at the same time has consequences for enhancing state power to manage global economic integration and sustainable development. There will be a discussion of the potential empowerment of local communities by the enhancement of democratic capacity-building at the sub-national and national levels. This is supported by the elaboration of global initiatives and programs and their potential impact at the local level. The challenge is whether local democracy-building can enhance the globalization of local issues and discussions, while localizing discussions of global concern.

Because of my extensive work in the field of social entrepreneurship, I endeavored to present the social entrepreneur as a new **hybrid** form in civil society, combining business sense and strategies with ethical and social purposes. In this part of the discussion, I will conclude with an elaboration of best practices and successful strategies that have developed in the field of social entrepreneurship for changing societies and the way people do business.

The elaboration and analysis of new global developments will hopefully lead to the conclusion that taking full advantage of the resources of the Prince, the Merchant, the Citizen and the Trickster more participatory and accountable decision-making will emerge and help shape a less fractious and confrontational globalization for the 21st century. **The concurrence of interests in the face of global threats and challenges can be facilitated by the hybridization of traditional players into innovative, flexible, open and inter-dependent stakeholders. By forming a global consensus on values and goals, and by sharing material and intellectual resources, the transformation of traditional players into the hybrid-partners**

may signal a new "Mestizo"-era[9] and new discourse and practice for the globalization of governance where more people in more places will participate and benefit.

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[9] MIKLÓS MÉSZÖLY beautifully writes of the Mestizo as follows: "**He who is Mestizo in blood and spirit will eventually be the survivor.** Justified by history, no matter what is done to him, he remains authentic: authentic, in terms of moral values, philosophiey, imagination and literature. Authentic in beauty. Nevertheless, he will not lose his homeland, culture, language and spirit. There is absolutely nothing contradictory in this. It is only in our modern way of thinking that we regard history as a script for staging mutually-exclusive ideas about identity." (MÉSZÖLY: 1995, p. 325.)

2. DISCONTENTS AND PUNDITS

The struggle over the accountability of the global economic order has become increasingly intense. Violence in Seattle, Prague, Genoa and elsewhere has marked a new level of conflict about globalization, democracy and social justice. The issues which have been raised are clearly fundamental, concerned as they are with the nature of free markets, the relation between corporate and public agendas, and the type and scope of political intervention in economic life. These matters are complex and extremely challenging, although they are not new to political debate and political analysis. What is new is the way the issues are framed, disseminated and fought over – in transnational and global contexts. (HELD: 2003, p. 305.)

I can already dicern the making of the final crisis. It will be political in character. Indigenous political movements are likely to arise that will seek to expropriate the multinational corporations and recapture "national" wealth. Some of them may succeed in the manner of the Boxer Rebellion or the Zapatista Revolution. Their success may then shake the confidence of financial markets, engendering a self-reinforcing process on the downside. Whether it will happen on this occasion or the next one is an open question. (SOROS: 1998, p. 134.)

Dissent, discussions and debates about globalization have become multi-level and multiferious, ranging from street fights and parliamentary debates, to academic and economic symposia. This reflects the pervasive nature of globalization where everyone feels they are stakeholders. It also reflects the impact of globalization on society and politics as much as in the economic sphere where much of the attention has been focussed. This does not mean, however, that there is any agreement or consensus on the definition, role or ethics of globalization. Definitions of globalization differ so profoundly that you wonder if people are actually discussing the same thing. BARBARA PARKER writes: "… because it represents a new stage of world development, globalization is not well defined, and so it is difficult to say with

certainty what globalization means or is likely to mean in the future." She defines globalization as the "increased permeability of traditional boundaries such as nations, time and space." (PARKER: 1998, quoted in SZENTES: 2003, II, pp 264-265.)

Four distinct types of changes have been identified that encompass contemporary globalization: 1) the stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers, 2) the growing magnitude of networks and flows of trade, investment, finance, culture etc., 3) the speeding up of global interactions and processes in transport and communication that increase the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people, and 4) the deepening impact of global interactions so that even the most local events can have enormous global consequences. Often anti-globalization activists have drawn attention to the fact that the neo-liberal vision of globalization is limited to the free movement of capital and commodities, and actually increases the barriers against the free flow of people, information and ideas. (GRAEBER: 2002.)

Some of the main points of contention regarding economic globalization can be summarized as follows:

• Global economic liberalization which promotes market-based policy solutions is not working. It presents problems particularly for developing countries and is increasing global poverty, inequality and injustice. Furthermore, meeting basic human needs should be a non-negotiable principle.

• The balance of power has shifted so that corporations are viewed today as more powerful than states. This results in the disempowerment of states in meeting social needs (e.g., social and environmental protection) and hampers their control over the activities of corporations. It limits states' choices in economic and social policy decision-making, and shifts accountability away from elected officials to the non-elected global bureaucracies of multilateral economic institutions and actors.

• There is a need to protect human and environmental rights from exploitation by multinational corporations and multilateral economic institutions. Therefore, greater transparency, regulation and accountability is required of both. This calls for the democratization of institutions of global governance, opening them up to civil societies for increased participation in decision-making, policy formation and implementation.

The globalization of communications and the democratic potential of the internet and networked media has become operational and effective "from below," by globalization sceptics and critics, NGOs, activist groups, and anti-globalization movements. PAUL KINGSNORTH (2003, p. 67) observed that "The Internet engine of financial and corporate globalization, has become the engine, too of the globalization of resistance; a vital tool for the creation of a global network of dissent that could probably not have been created without it." This is the irony of globalization that the technologies that enabled global economic expansion, have also provided the means for dissent. The so-called "anti-globalization" movement might be better defined as a movement for global social justice in opposition to the power relations of control that exist today in the global political economy. There are two fascinating challenges for the 21st century in the context of global media and global activism: one is reconciling the potential of increased democratic participation that globalized media could provide to overcome the democratic deficit at the global level; the second is whether the criticism and activism directed against economic globalization and existing global governance institutions can move from resistence and rejection towards the formulation of concrete alternatives for change.

2.1. *One World?*

The worldwide web, which transformed our lives, celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2005. For an increasing number of us, it is hard to imagine ever having lived without it. According to the statistics presented below internet usage has increased on average by nearly 250% worldwide from 2000-2007, and by over 177% in Europe from 2000 to 2005.

Table 1.
WORLD INTERNET USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS[10]

World Regions	Population 2007 Est.	Population % of World	Internet Usage	% of Population Penetration	Usage %of World	Usage Growth 2000-2007
Africa	941,249,130	14.2%	44,234,240	4.7%	3.5%	879.8%
Asia	3,733,783,474	56.5%	461,703,143	12.4%	36.6%	303.9%
Europe	801,821,187	12.1%	343,787,434	42.9%	27.2%	227.1%
Middle East	192,755,045	2.7%	33,510,500	17.4%	2.7%	920.2%
North America	334,659,631	5.1%	237,168,545	70.9%	18.8%	119.4%
Latin America/ Caribbean	569,133,474	8.6%	122,384,914	21.5%	9.7%	577.3%
Oceania/Australia	33,568,225	0.5%	19,243,921	57.3%	1.5%	152.6%
WORLD TOTAL	6,606,970,166	100%	1,262,032,697	19.1%	100%	249.6%

Table 2.
INTERNET USAGE IN EUROPE

Europe	Population 2006 Est.	Population % of World	Internet Usage	%Population Penetration	Usage %of World	Usage Growth 2000-2005
European Union	462,371,237	7.1%	230,396,996	49.8%	22.5%	147.3%
EU Candidate Countries	110,206,019	1.7%	19,055,671	17.3%	1.9%	450.7%
Rest of Europe	234,711,764	3.6%	42,148,231	18.0%	4.1%	397.5%
TOTAL EUROPE	807,289,020	12.4%	291,600,898	36.1%	28.5%	177.5%
Rest of World	5,692,408,040	87.6%	730,462,384	12.8%	71.5%	185.5%
TOTAL WORLD	6,499,697,161	100.0%	1,022,063,282	15.7%	100.0%	183.1%

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[10] See, ‹http://www.internetworldstats.com/stat4.htm›.

Internet Usage and World Population Statistics are for November 30, 2007. Demographic (Population) numbers are based on data from the US Census Bureau. Internet usage information comes from data published by Nielsen//NetRatings, by the International Telecommunications Union, by local NIC, and other reliable sources. ‹http://www.internetworldstats.com›. Copyright © 2000 - 2008, Miniwatts Marketing Group.

The first mobile phone handsets were available in 1983 and had 10 million subscribers in the US; today the statistics reveal a dramatic picture, with billions of people connected globally through mobile phone access:

> 2 billion Analogue Users, 34m US Mobile users, 160m Global GSM users, 1.5 billion Global CDMA Users, 202m Global TDMA users, 120m Total European users, 342.43 Total African users, 83m Total 3G users, 130m Total South African users, 30m #1 Mobile Country China (300m), #1 GSM Country China (282m), #1 in Handsets 2Q04 Nokia(35.5%), #1 Network In Africa Vodacom(11m), #1 Network In Asia Unicom (153m), #1 Network In Japan DoCoMo, #1 Network In Europe T-Mobil (28m), #1 In Infrastructure Ericsson, Global monthly SMS 36/user, SMS Sent Global 1Q06 235 billion. (GLOBAL MOBILE USERS: 2006.)

As these statistics reveal, we are more connected to each other than ever before and have access to more information at our fingertips than we can manage to digest. Most of us have been propelled into a new global information society that effects and transforms our lives daily. Many of the changes we are experiencing have been attributed to "globalization" and the spread of the term in the 1990s is itself evidence of the developments to which it refers. One study alone illustrates its increasing resonance and vibrancy. The final report of the Study Commission of the German Bundestag, *Globalization of the World Economy*: *Challenges and Answers*, notes that the term "globalization" was used 34 times in 1993 in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and 1,136 times in 2001. (ILO: 2004, p. 24, fn. 8.)

Even the developing world is less isolated as a consequence of globalization. In fact anti-globalization protests are a product of this new inter-connectedness which has allowed them to effectively network their protests globally primarily through the Internet. More people have more access to more information than ever before. This does empower new social networks at the local/national, regional/international and global levels. The building of social networks and social capital through knowledge and information-sharing can enable new modes of democratic participation in public life. This process has the potential to radically change the way we organize ourselves and our societies and the way we view democracy and participate in its practice.

But a digital divide does exist which reveals global inequalities in terms of access to the new technologies. Statistics range from 5% to 18% of the world's populations that have access to this resource. Transition to a global knowledge-based economy will increase these inequalities. In some developing countries even access to electricity is only 2-6%.[11]

Although not many of us would consider giving up our new capabilities, there are increasingly numerous and loud voices insisting that the direction of globalization must change or the process itself stop. They are demanding more say and influence in the progress of globalization in order to better insure that the benefits of globalization are more democratically and justly available to more people. **The debate on globalization has become in essence a debate on democracy, social justice and governance at the global level**.

2.2. *Netizens of the Blogosphere: E-democracy or E-ristocracy?*

> Free to explore different points of view, on the Internet or on the thousands of television and radio channels that will eventually become available, people will become less susceptible to propaganda from politicians who seek to stir up conflicts. Bonded together by the invisible strands of global communications, humanity may find that peace and prosperity are fostered by the death of distance. (CAIRNCROSS: 1998, p. 279.)

2.2.1. *The Birth of Cyber-Language*

Taken directly from *Wikipedia*, a dissertation study in itself, are the following definitions and discussions of these terms: A **Netizen** (a portmanteau of Internet and citizen) or **cybercitizen** is a person actively involved in online communities. Netizens use the Internet to engage in activities of extended social groups, such as giving and receiving viewpoints, furnishing information, fostering the Internet as an intellectual and a social resource, and making choices for the self-assembled communities. Generally, a netizen can be any user of the worldwide, unstructured

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[11] Several tables are provided in Appendix A which clarify recent trends in internet users, internet access and usage, and access to communication technologies.

forums of the Internet. The word "netizen" was coined by MICHAEL HAUBEN. Netizens are Internet users who utilize the networks from their home, workplace, or school (among other places). Netizens try to be conducive to the Internet's use and growth. Netizens, who use and know about the network of networks, usually have a self-imposed responsibility to make certain that it is improved in its development while encouraging free speech and open access.

The term **blogosphere** was coined on September 10, 1999 by BRAD L. GRAHAM, as a joke. It was re-coined in 2002 by WILLIAM QUICK, and was quickly adopted and propagated by the warblog community. The term resembles the older word "logosphere" (from Greek *logos* meaning *word*, and *sphere*, interpreted as *world*), the "the world of words", the universe of discourse. It also resembles the term "noosphere" (Greek *nous* meaning *mind*). As of 2007, a lot of people still treat the term *blogosphere* as a joke; however, the BBC, and National Public Radio's programs "Morning Edition," "Day To Day," and "All Things Considered" have used the term several times to discuss public opinion. A number of media outlets in recent years have started treating the blogosphere as a gauge of public opinion, and it has been cited in both academic and non-academic work as evidence of rising or falling resistance to globalization, voter fatigue, and many other phenomena, and also in reference to identifying influential bloggers and "familiar strangers" in the blogosphere.

Sites such as Technorati, BlogPulse, Tailrank, PubSub, and BlogScope track the interconnections between bloggers. These sites can follow a piece of conversation as it moves from blog to blog. These also can help information researchers study how fast a meme spreads through the blogosphere, in order to determine which sites are the most important for gaining early recognition. Sites also exist to track specific blogospheres, such as those related by a certain genre, culture, subject matter or geopolitical location.

2.2.2. *The Reorganization of Social and Political Space*

Globalization also entails global networks of social relationships, flows of meaning as well as people and goods. According to a series of articles in *The Economist* from 2006, the global digital age, besides provoking a plethora of new vocabulary, has profoundly impacted, among other things, the way people organize

and conduct their social lives, the way we access information and news (now everyone can be a journalist[12]) and the way businesses do business.

> Today a new blog is created every second of every day, according to Technorati, a search engine for blogs, and the "blogosphere" is doubling in size every five months (see Graph 1). From teenagers to corporate executives, the new bloggers all have reasons of their own for engaging in this new pursuit. (*THE ECONOMIST*: 2006c)

Graph 1.

Elaborating on LIPSCHUTZ's bifurcation of the media, explained earlier, we can align media interests, technology and markets, and economic interests. Businesses are increasingly using the new technologies to provide customer services, marketing and public relations, and internal communications. At the same time, the alignment of the media, technology and political interests is also clear. Very recently, a Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Report found that the percentage of Americans who go online regularly to find out about the presidential campaign has increased from 13% in 2004 to 24% percent for the 2008 elections. 42% of young adults, ages 18 to 29, use the Web as a primary source of news today, up from 20% in 2004. As a whole, nearly 25% of American adults regularly learn about campaign information from the Internet, up from 9% percent during the 2000 presidential

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[12] See, for example: www.indymedia.org, www.wearemorethanme.org, www.kuro5hin.org, www.ohmynews.com, www.wethemedia.com, www.instapundit.com.

campaign (*The Economist*: 2006c). Sometimes the media, technology and political constellation can provide the tools for better governance, by enabling a better informed citizenry.[13]

MANUEL CASTELLS argues that the electronic media has become the "privileged space of politics." (CASTELLS: 1998, p. 311.)

> Without an active presence in the media, political proposals or candidates do not stand a chance of gathering broad support. Media politics is not all politics, but all politics must go through the media to affect decision-making. So doing, politics is fundamentally framed, in its substance, organization, process, and leadership, by the inherent logic of the media system, particularly by the new electronic media. (CASTELLS: 1998, p. 317.)

2.2.3. *New Technologies and New Dangers*

But we should always keep in mind that the new media can also invent new ways to deceive and mislead through abuse and manipulation, promoting anti-cosmopolitan values and interests like nationalism, xenophobia and exclusion. A recent example of this reality was found during the investigations of "Terrorist 007," an Islamic extremist who worked not just at the level of Al-Qaida propaganda, but actively created websites like ‹www.YouBombIt.com› and links for marketing and distributing Al-Qaida's message. Students radicalized each other through the Internet terrorist propaganda machine where the whole world became a virtual terrorist training camp.

"Terrorist 007" was finally located and arrested in England, after a nearly successful suicide bombing attack in Sarajevo last year which was planned and made operational on the Internet. A global network of terrorists, from Denmark, Canada, the US and Great Britain, were involved and as a result an American military spokesman acknowledged that fighting the internet war has become part of military strategy. This has grave consequences for freedom of speech on the net and

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[13] A very good example of this can be found at: www.earth911.com, which is a public-private partnership and the brainchild of a single, motivated citizen. (*The Economist*: 2006c.)

questions whether people can be arrested for what they download, and not for what they actually do with the information. Freedom of speech and the new communications technologies is going to be an area of increasing debate and confrontation.

RICHARD SCLOVE (1995, p. 7) has observed that "technology is implicated in perpetuating antidemocratic power relations and in eroding social contexts for developing and expressing citizenship." It has also been observed that if the business of politics is increasingly conducted in virtual spaces, the new media presents new forms of disenfrachisement from the political process because of the digital divide, i.e., not only in the lack of access to the new media but also in the lack of knowledge of how to exploit it effectively for political change.

Simultaneously, the economic and political interests and aspirations of society exploit the new media technologies. This is visible in the use and development of cyberspace by new social movements and expanded social activism and advocacy by an emerging global civil society in the areas, for example, of environmental and citizens' rights.[14]

According to JOI ITO: "The monolithic media and its increasingly simplistic representation of the world cannot provide the competition of ideas necessary to building consensus." (ITO: 2003.) One of the significant differences between the printed media and the web is that web-based conversations transcend geographical boundaries. They are also conversations (designed for both many-to-many and few-to-few), and not monologues or sermons (designed as one-to-many). So far the traditional media has been slow to jump into the realm of blogs, but it can be predicted that this reluctance will quickly change and accelerate to engagement in the future, especially, if as PHILIP MEYER predicts the last reader will recycle the last newspaper in April 2040. (*THE ECONOMIST*: 2006b.)

The net has also become a sphere of new constellations of social relationships and social networking which have no overt political or economic motivations. You can see this in the expansion of such sites and services as Facebook and MeetUp. One question that arises is can virtual communities really constitute the basis for new forms of community in the digitalized age?

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[14] Here, ‹http://www.McSpotlight.org› is a good example.

The present openness of the new web technologies is not something to take for granted or to become complacent about. There are already expressed state and economic interests converging in efforts to control and govern access and content of what we have taken, until today, as being a free medium, open to all who have access to the technology.

2.2.4. *Challenges and Opportunities: Towards a Proletarian Cosmopolitanism?*

The era of participatory media provides challenges and opportunities, but also dangers. The designation of a potential global public sphere connoting forms of global communicational life (as oppose to the designation of civil society with associational life) has been especially influential in media studies. This generates much debate about democratic participation and its limits in the new, globalized media and communications spaces. Some foresee the renaissance of the notion of a truly informed citizenry, others want to know who is being left outside the global conversations and why? Are we seeing the rise of a new, globalized, digitalized proletariate or the formation of new global elites who feel increasingly comfortable in digitalized, virtual worlds which are further distanced from the "real" life worlds of the majority?

Transnational cultures have been, first and foremost, the realm of intellectuals who share, according to ALVIN GOLDNER, a "culture of critical discourse." (GOULDNER: 1979; and FIELD: 1971.) There are increasing numbers, however, of students, activists, bureaucrats, politicians, journalists, diplomats, etc., that are transversing national boundaries and cultures through technology in a " 'Cambrian explosion' of creativity: a flowering of expressive diversity on the scale of the eponymous proliferation of biological species 530m years ago." Are we "entering an age of cultural richness and abundant choice that we've never seen before in history"? (*THE ECONOMIST*: 2006a.)

Cosmopolitanism, if viewed as a mode for managing meaning, entails a willingness and openness to become involved with the Other, in relationships to a plurality of cultures. For Cosmopolitans there is a value in diversity as such. KAI HAFEZ (2007, p. 113)admits that "People who spend alot of time romping around in

the global spaces of the internet can expand their knowledge of the world in all directions," but he questions the authenticity of these virtual encounters.

Is the media that is being produced for local consumption, which speaks of other distant cultures and places, making everyone more cosmopolitan and promoting proto-global citizens? ULF HANNERZ (1996, p. 249) asks the question: Is it possible to become a cosmopolitan without ever leaving home? Is it possible to become a cosmopolitan in virtual social, political and economic spaces? Will what HANNERZ calls the "implosive power of the media … make … everybody a little more cosmopolitan"?

3. TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN CONSENSUS?

(There has been a shift) in the character and goals of international society: away from minimalist goals of co-existence towards the creation of rules and institutions that embody notions of shared responsibilities, that impinge heavily on the domestic organization of states, that invest individuals and groups within states with rights and duties, and that seek to embody some notion of the planetary good. (HURRELL: 1995, p. 139)

3.1. *Mediated Cosmopolitanism*

Cosmopolitanism used to be defined as an individual rather than group project and appeared to be more a quality of individual human beings than a group process or group quality. For some it is expressed in the ability to live in the local and the global at the same time. Cosmopolitanism is very much linked to globalization and can be viewed as one of the reactions and responses to global processes.

TERHI RANTANEN (2005) emarks that when cosmopolitanism is defined in an elitist way, there is little scope for ordinary people to achieve cosmopolitan qualities. It has also been criticized as a white, male and Western concept. If the possibility of cosmopolitanism draws heavily on access to global spaces (physical or virtual), RANTANEN asks: can someone become a cosmopolitan through media and communications? She continues that a cosmopolitan identity is like other identities – it is partial and does not exclude the possibility of other identities. People can develop cosmopolitan qualities, identities and values through mediation which connects strangers to one another. "The media can offer the global ingredients for the development of cosmopolitan awareness, but it is up to people what they make of these ingredients." (RANTANEN: 2005 p. 126.)

3.2. *Cosmopolitanism from an Historical Perspective*

Tracing the roots of cosmopolitanism back to the Stoics, DAVID HELD and others claim that the within the classical conception of cosmopolitanism the person becomes a citizen of the world and owes a duty to the world community of human beings. This notion encompasses the idea that we all live in two worlds, the local and the wider community of what is truly common among human beings – ideals, aspirations, values. This principle of universal belonging has resonance in the world today in treaties, customary rules, conventions, regimes and organizations. Most recently, with the acceleration of global climate change, the concept of a global community has gained force.

Already between the 14th-15th centuries, the Spanish international lawyer, FRANCISCO DE VITORIA gave the term *bonum commune totius orbis*, i.e., "the common good for the whole world," to refer to the assets and values that are shared by the whole of mankind and to which the particular interests and demands of individual states should yield. (CASSESE: 2005, p. 16.)

Later, in the 18th century, the concept of cosmopolitanism was introduced with the term *weltbürger* or world citizen which became key during the Enlightenment especially in Kant's writings.

> Kant conceived of participation in a cosmopolitan (*weltbürgerlich*), rather than a civil (*bürgerlich*), society as an entitlement – an entitlement to enter the world of open, uncoerced dialogue – and he adapted this idea in his formulation of what he called "cosmopolitan right". This cosmopolitan right transcends nations and states to all in a "universal community … It connotes a right and duty which must be accepted if people are to learn to tolerate one another's company and to coexist peacefully. It is the condition of cooperative relations and of just conduct. (HELD: 2003, p. 310.)

The Kantian notion underscores membership in both national communities and the wider cosmopolitan society, or *civitas maxima*. This finds expression in a number of international resolutions today like the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

A more recent conceptualization of cosmopolitanism (BARRY: 1998; BEITZ:1994; POGGE: 1994) clearly distinguishes three key elements in the idea of egalitarian individualism: 1) that the ultimate units of moral concern are individual human beings, not states; that humankind belongs to a single moral realm in which each is regarded as equally worthy of respect and consideration; 2) this status of equal worth should be recognized by everyone; 3) that cosmopolitanism is the moral frame for specifying rules and principles that are universally shared and applied. Evidence for this in the contemporary world can be found in the UN Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent covenants, and the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC in 1998). In international law today we are moving away from the traditional (Grotian), and realistic, statist vision characterized by the cooperation and regulation of individual sovereign states pursuing their own interests to a modern, idealistic view "based on a universalist or cosmopolitan outlook which sees at work in international politics a potential community of mankind and lays stress on the element of transnational solidarity (*jus cosmopoliticum*)." (CASSESE: 2005, p. 21.)

In the concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, initiated in 1967 by ARVID PARDO, the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations General Assembly, we can see a particularly clear potential for the further elaboration of a global community and its subsequent rights and obligations.[15]

Individuals are recognized and viewed as new subjects of international law with legal status (even if they possess limited legal capacity), besides being viewed as members of a world community, a *cosmopolis*. Obligations and rights are "directly conferred on individuals by international rules." (CASSESE: 2005, p. 146.)

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[15] This concept articulated that the right to the exploitation of the seabed be made solely for peaceful purposes, and *for the benefit of mankind as a whole*. It incorporates five elements: 1) the absence of a right to appropriation, 2) the duty to exploit the resources in the interest of mankind in such a way as to benefit all, including developing countries, 3) the obligation to explore and exploit for peaceful purposes only, 4) the duty to pay due regard to scientific research, and 5) the duty to protect the environment. For, for a fuller discussion of these issues, including the important 1979 Treaty on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (CASSESE: 2005, pp. 92ff).

This new and unique legal regulation is evaluated by ANTONIO CASSESE (2005, p. 146) as significant evidence of the growing direct impact of the international legal system on the action of individuals living in sovereign states.

CASSESE argues that states do not find it as difficult as it may appear, after accepting the jurisdiction of international bodies, to act at the request of individuals to remedy situations. International law has developed to the point that the way states treat their citizens is no longer considered as an internal matter. The growing normative scope and influence of developments in international law, and its growing institutionalization can be observed as the globalization of international law.

When speaking of the potential of cosmopolitanism as a myth for the future, HELD asserts that to think of it as something "imagined by political theorists distant and remote from the world is erroneous. We already live in a world of multilevel power and multilayered citizenship. It is fragile. It is subject to the uncertainties of politics. … but in the post war era we have entrenched cosmopolitan values in international institutions which have given genuine expression to the delimitations of sovereignty on a national basis." (THORUP and SORENSEN: 2004.) Bridges need to be built, HELD insists, between international economic law and human rights law, between commercial law and environmental law, between state sovereignty and transnational law, and between cosmopolitan principles and cosmopolitan practices. Examples do exist in the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, for example. The transformations will require the adoption and implementation of cosmopolitan social values in the economic realm, as well as necessitate the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism in a complex structure of multi-level, multi-stakeholder governance. We will continue by looking at the ramifications of a cosmopolitan outlook in the realms of the state, the market and society.

4. THE HYBRID, "ADAPTIVE" STATE

Beforehand, the sovereign state was for its subjects an iron cage whence they could communicate legally with the outside world only through narrow bars. Under the pressure of necessities of life, those bars have progressively loosened. The cage is starting to wobble. It will eventually fall to bits. Men will then be able to communicate beyond the frontiers of their respective countries freely and without any hindrance. (POLITIS: 1927, in CASSESE: 2005, p.39)

So dominant in contemporary consiousness is the assumption that authority must be centralized that scholars are just beginning to grapple with how decentralized authority might be understood … but the question of how to think about a world that is becoming "domesticated" but not centralized, about a world alter "anarchy," is one of the most important questions today facing not only students of international relations but of political theory as well. (WENDT: 1999, p. 308).

4.1. *The Nation State in Globalization Debates*

The debates about globalization often concentrate on its effects and implications for the nation state. Under the impact of globalization, sovereignty has become "fuzzy". Do nation states, and also national political leaders, still play an important global role or are they becoming increasingly irrelevant compared to other forces shaping the world? After decades of never-ending theoretical debates, we can say that nation states remain powerful, and political leaders can play decisive roles in the world, but the question is what to do with the large democratic deficits opening up nationally and globally. Nations today face more risks and dangers than they do enemies. In the globalizing context the nation state is being reshaped. Some argue that the nation has become too small to solve regional and global problems, but too large to solve local ones. "Shell institutions," survive, emptied of content and unable to perform the tasks required in the new era in an ever-widening and

competitive field of players. (GIDDENS: 1999.) This is particularly obvious in the transition countries of East and Central Europe.

In the globalization debate two voices are prominent in the discussion of state power. The first, labelled by DAVID HELD as "hyperglobalists," assert that globalization has diffused power and authority away from the state to regional, global and private actors, making the state a peripheral actor on the global stage. They argue that globalization increasingly hollows out the state, as well as citizenship both at the level of global market forces and at the level of regional blocs like the EU. This circumscribes the range of choices states have and they simply become the link between citizens and global markets. The result is called "redistributive repression" at the national level.

The second group, labelled by HELD as the "sceptics," claim that we are not living in an era very much different from the past and that most of the changes we are experiencing are superficial. They argue that the evidence points to intensified internationalization, not globalization. According to the sceptics, discussions about globalization are empty. The global economy is not really new or different from previous eras. Most countries, they argue, only gain a small amount of their income from external trade. Most economic exchange is between regions, rather than being truly global. Globalization, they say, is an ideology put about by free-marketeers who wish to dismantle welfare systems and cut back on state expenditures. As one writer put it recently, rather than a global village, this is more like global pillage. (THORUP and SORENSEN: 2004.)

In these typologies, the state and globalization are seen as competing forms of social and political organization engaged in a "zero sum battle for power and authority in world politics where any advance for the forces of globalization is automatically assumed to weaken the authority of the state." (THORUP and SORENSEN: 2004.) This rather dualized view of the relations between states and globalization makes them seem entirely distinct and mutually exclusive.

In fact, both approaches are difficult to argue, since most states (not, of course, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea and perhaps Hungary soon) have become enthusiastic supporters of globalization and, at the same time, it is hard to argue that nothing has changed in world politics. Globalization has, in fact, required the increase in states' relations with eachother to address the consequences of globalizational processes like financial instability and crises, environmental

degradation and crises, migration and terrorism. There is clearly an increase in importance and impact of non-state actors in the international system which will be discussed later, but it would be an exaggeration to say they supplant state authority in the international arena today. It is still a question, however, if the state will inevitably and successfully evolve into this new role with its new requirements.

There are also the "transformationalists", who argue something between the sceptics and hyperglobalists. They agree that there have been major spatial shifts in trade and finance and environmental challenges that cannot be compared to 400 or 600 years ago. There were interregional shocks with colonization, but even the environmental shocks they produced do not compare to the extensity, intensity and velocity of global warming today.

However, while there have been massive global shifts over the past fifty years or more, is it true that state powers have been whittled away by the processes of globalization? Politics has become more complicated, multi-level and multi-dimensional and we live with an increasingly multi-layered politics. Alongside economic globalization, there has also been political globalization, i.e., the growth of politics across localities, cities, regions, supranational regions, and intergovernmental and international organizations.

A review of the areas of disconnect between globalization and the nation state can be summarized as follows:

Increasingly, a self-determining collectivity can no longer be located simply within the territorial boundaries of single nation states. There are now multi-loci of power, of which only one remains the nation state, and the power located at the nation state level is transforming. We are moving beyond the articulation of the public good from the nation state level to regional and even global constructions in new patterns of multi-level governance. Domestic challenges are more and more being redefined and recontextualized as international affairs that require international if not global coordination and regulation by groups of nation states. (HELD: 2003b.) These changes have instigated the transformation of state authority, but not necessarily the hollowing out of state-based political power.

4.2. *The Hybridization and De-Nationalization of the Nation State*

> We have indeed entered a new phase, but we are at its beginning. We don't know what's coming. But I don't think it will be about the national vs. the global. I see, rather, a multiplication of what is beginning to happen today: the formation of partial, often very specialised, assemblages of bits and pieces of territory, of authority, of rights, that used to be lodged in national states. Some of these assemblages will be private, some public, some will continue to inhabit national spaces but be actually denationalised, others will be global. The future we are entering may turn out to be very, very bad, or it may turn out to be reasonable. We don't know, partly because it will be shaped not only by technology and power but also by the dispossessed. The past shows us that history has also been made by the excluded. We can make politics even if we lack power. (*EUROZINE:* 2006.)

Recently, SASKIA SASSEN articulated the view that globalization is partly contained within and implemented by national states. This tendency blurs the borders between what constitutes the national and the global. (SASSEN: 2006a.) She concludes that this results in the denationalization of some specific components of nation state functions, and not just in the area of economics.

She claims that we are witnessing the transformation of what has traditionally constituted the state into a **hybrid state** with different functions, scope and competencies. She argues that the mix of processes we describe as globalization are producing partial yet significant changes in the forms of authority inside the nation state. **This is a hybrid that is neither fully private nor fully public, neither fully national nor fully global**. It is just this hybrid quality, that is neither national as historically understood, nor global as the term is interpreted today, that signals the reconstituting of sovereignty.

She suggests that we look at the state mode of authority in a new way, reflecting contemporary contextual changes that globalization has required, in a sense decoding or "unbundling" some of what continues to be experienced as national. She says: "While seeming national, these types of practices and dynamics are actually constitutive of global scalings we do not usually recognize as such.

When the social sciences focus on globalization it is typically not on these practices and dynamics but rather on the self-evidently global scale." (SASSEN: 2006a.)

Multi-scalar globalizational processes are located at the supranational, global and subnational levels, so studying globalization requires looking at not just that which is explicitly global in scale, but should also focus on locally-scaled practices and the multiplication of cross-border connections among different locales. The state (as well as other actors like TNCs and NGOs) needs to be placed into a context of multiple globalizations.

States provide the enabling environment not only for corporate capital but also for those seeking to subject the latter to greater accountability and public scrutiny. Global markets have a global reach through electronic markets, but are also embedded in local conditions and financial centers. This includes, for example, the reorientating of national agendas towards global ones, the construction of private agendas that become national, and the privatization of norm-making capacities that were once in the public domain.[16] This is also happening in a more restricted and circumscribed, or regulated, way within the boundaries of the European Union. At the same time, it is the institutional apparatus of states that actually implement international law, including the implementation of the human rights regime. One of the tests, in fact, to establish whether and to what extent a state is open to international values can be judged by how they adopt international customary law, treaties and the decisions of international organizations into their national systems. The fact that few adopt automatic incorporation into their own national systems (like Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain do[17]), does not mean that states normally and systematically disregard international norms. States remain the primary technical administrative core for adoption of international rules and norms. There is as yet no subsitute or replication of these duties by other institutional arrangements, including regulatory agencies. (CASSESE: 2005, pp. 234-237).

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[16] This discussion will be expanded in the section on global governance.

[17] In addition to automatic adoption, in Greece both cutomary and international rules and treaties override national legislation which demonstrates Greece's commitment to an internationalist approach. In the Netherlands, international treaties override the Constitution. In Spain, national authorities are oblidged to construe national legislation on human rights according to international instruments as well as providing for the primacy of international treaties. (CASSESE: 2005, pp. 234-237.)

While the state participates in enabling the expansion of the global economy, it does so in a context increasingly dominated by deregulation, privatization, and the growing authority of nonstate actors, some of which assume new normative roles. In many of these new dynamics and conditions, the state continues to play an important role, often as the institutional home for the enactment of the new policy regimes we associate with economic globalization. (SASSEN: 2006b, p. 269.)

What SASSEN does see as a danger, however, is the increased power of national executives and an alignment of interests between the executive (prime minister's office) and the global corporate and political agenda that is growing farther away from the larger public agenda set by legislatures and democratic representations.[18] In this sense, economic globalization rather empowers national executives, strengthening their roles at the expense of national legislatures and national polities.

SASSEN concludes that the national is not mutually exclusive from the global, but that the "container category" of nation no longer adequately encompasses (if it ever did) the proliferation and transformation of traditional state activities and responsibilities.

4.3. *Conceptions of the "Adaptive" State*

One new construction is called the "adaptive state" into which current state configurations are to evolve. (BIERMANN: 2006, p. 21.) These adaptive states will be confronted with challenges in terms of 1) decreased autonomy because of increased dependence on other states, 2) the increasing requirements for legitimacy, and 3) the need to adapt to sudden dramatic climatic changes in the natural environment, human migration, and international criminal activities. These will increase the burden on state capacities. Successful states will be those that are able to "adapt internally and externally" to large scale challenges. (BIERMANN: 2006, p. 21.)

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[18] This can be seen, for example, in IMF programs that only deal with the executive branch not legislatures.

If the hybridization of the nation state and its functions is to contribute fruitfully to the elaboration and implementation of global governance in the future, further evaluation of its transformation is required. There will, of course, be states better and worse prepared for this transformation. This may lead to an increased polarization in states' competencies at the global level – those better able to adapt will have a greater voice in global arrangements. This also has consequences for enabling democracy at the local and national levels. It is clear that electing competent national leaders, able to balance the challenges of economic globalization with national social and political interests, have a greater chance of successfully navigating their nations into the position of net beneficiaries of the global economy. Unfortunately, for most developing and transition countries, the necessary leadership with the required skills and vision are all too lacking. Just as progressive or positive hybridization could empower states and strengthen national democracies in this new global scenario, a regressive or negative hybridization, which ransoms representative state institutions like legislatures to multi-nationals and sympathetic executive branches will further weaken national democracies and increase the risk of a country's exclusion from the benefits of globalization.

5. GOVERNING GLOBAL MARKETS

A multi-dimensional, "eclectic" (to quote SZENTES) approach to governing global markets is recommended from the start since one formula alone is insufficient to manage the complexity of market mechanisms and their interplay with multiple social forces. Analysts differ in their interpretions of how the "global financial architecture" should be transformed.

> …modest reformers want only to upgrade the wiring and plumbing. More ambitious reformers want to break down walls and reconstruct the interior of the building. Radicals want to create an altogether new building on different foundations. (SCHOLTE: 2003, p. 205.)

If we look at the historical development of global business regulation, we may perhaps begin to understand the direction in which governance is moving in the sphere of Global Merchants. We will then move on to a case study of the IMF and World Bank as potential components of new multi-stakeholder governance of global markets and finance.

It should not be surprising that with the acceleration of economic globalization within the past three decades, that there has been a responding proliferation of global business regulation. In this sense business regulation is seen in terms of a spectrum from loosely defined standards and limits on the behavior of economic actors, to the rules and regulations that bind them contractually and legally. Most all of the recent developments are targeted at Transnational Corporations (TNCs) which are, correctly, viewed as the prime movers of economic globalization and which are to a great extent unrestrained from public regulation. In terms of scope, depth, number and size, TNC influence has grown exponentially. Just as one example, the yearly sales of General Motors exceeded the GNP of developed countries like Norway and Finland; only 49 of the largest economies are states. (LOVE: 2003, p. 98.)

Most TNCs (90%) are located in the Triad (North America, Europe, Japan). TNCs consume a large quantity of resources and leave enormous ecological footprints. They institutionalize unsustainable transport linkages and upset social and cultural patterns. They are becoming increasingly powerful also in terms of

influencing world politics, but do corporations really rule the world? The need to regulate TNC activity and behavior has grown as their influence has grown with the increasing gobalization of economies.

Although state influence in attracting TNCs and foreign direct investment is still substantial and often crucial, the state has lost much of its regulatory function in terms of non-state economic actors. Here we see the tension created between nationally- and territorially-based political systems and international business activity. The globalization of business standards, rules and principles along with the important globalization of enforcement mechanisms will be essential to breach the disjuncture we face today and this development has speeded up since the 1970s.

A recent OECD report has surveyed 246 codes of conduct, defined as "commitments voluntarily made by companies, associations or other entities, which put forth standards and principles for conduct of business activities in the marketplace." (OECD: 2001, p. 3.) These codes cover a range of areas like consumer protection, information disclosure, environmental and labor standards. Most of the codes are issued by the businesses themselves (48%) and business associations (37%), but an increasing number are constructed through a partnership of stakeholders (13%). (OECD: 2001, p. 5.) Verification, certification and reporting are also moving from self-regulation to co-regulation.[19]

Many have designated this new direction as a trend towards private governance, shifting from public to private forms of governance through new institutional modes. This may be part of a cycle of developments that began in the 1960s and 1970s when mandatory regulation was implemented and enforced by states changed to self-regulation in the 1980s and 1990s which corresponded with increasing de-regulation by the state. This has led to cooperative rule making between NGOs and business actors in the late 1990s and 2000s.

Some of the new institutions and initiatives that arose from discussions around the New International Economic Order in the mid-1970s were: the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and its Commission on Transnational Corporations, the UN Center on Transnational Corporations (UNTNC), the OECD's Guidelines

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[19] Coregulation occurs when two or more stakeholders design and implement norms and mechanisms to improve the social and environmental performance of firms.

for Multinational Enterprises, and the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, etc.

Based on voluntary compliance and self-regulation, these initiatives were soon neglected during the period of neo-liberal, Reaganite and Thatcherite economic policies. There was little progress in this area until the catastrophic environmental accidents of the 1990s. The combined processes of globalization and de-regulation strengthened the position of TNCs in relation to states. One of the results was that civil society began to turn its regulatory eyes directly at TNCs waway from nation states, and throughout the 1990s increasing pressure was put directly on business.

The Exxon Valdez oil spill lead to the formulation of the Valdez Principles (later called Ceres Principles).[20] Over 60 companies, including 13 Fortune 500 firms have adopted these principles. By endorsing the Ceres Principles or adopting their own comparable code, companies not only formalize their dedication to environmental awareness and accountability, but also actively commit to an ongoing process of continuous improvement, dialogue and comprehensive, systematic public reporting. Companies that endorse the Ceres Principles have access to a diverse range of experts, from investors to policy analysts, energy experts, scientists, and others.[21]

These principles establish a framework of norms and standards within which companies operate and commit them to public disclosure. Enforcement consists of the threat to withdraw public endorsement of a company that violates the principles. The move from second party reporting (regulation of standards and compliance by corporations themselves) to third party reporting (regulation independent of the corporation through certification by independent organizations) reveals the emergence of a multi-stakeholder approach and the privatization of business regulation.

In the environment of self-regulation, Responsible Care (RC) was established in the chemical industry (in response to Bhopal) which developed into a global movement covering 85% of the world's chemical production. Other internal

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[20] These are: 1) protection of the biosphere, 2) sustainable use of natural resources, 3) reduction and disposal of wastes, 4) energy conservation, 5) risk reduction, 6) safe products and services, 7) environmental restoration, 8) informing the public, 9) management commitment, 10) audits and reports.

[21] For the Ceres Principles see, ‹http://www. ceres.org›.

monitors include, e.g., British Telecommunications which has a Corporate Reputation and Social Policy division, Shell which has a Social Accountability Team, and Nike who has a Vice President for Social Corporate Responsibility. The inadequacy of self-regulation, however, led to increasingly more initiatives like CorpWatch, a non-profit advocacy group which monitored and brought to the public's attention companies (like Monsanto, Shell and Ford) that did not live up to their prescribed self-set standards. "Private regulation became institutionalized between a range of divergent and antagonistic actors, including transnational business and their civil society counterparts." (PATTBERG: 2006, p. 10.)

The reformulation of the political field in response to growing public criticism against self-regulation and changes in the discourse in the 1990s prepared the way for new multi-stakeholder initiatives and co-regulation. The change in sustainable development discourse emerged at this time. MARC NERFIN's is one of the novel, new approaches that addressed the rampant failures of global development policies. The Brundtland Report (1987), *Our Common Future*, brought the critical issues of environmental degradation and the failure of development programs to alleviate world poverty and hunger to the global agenda. It is now recognized that sustainable development, in the words of the World Commission on Environment and Development, should meet "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" and these environmental, social and economic concerns are incorporated within its scope. (PATTBERG: 2006, p. 12.)

The discourse of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that proclaims ethical corporate behavior enhances profits emerged partly in response to the new claims. The European Commission in 2001 defined CSR as: "a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis". (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 2001, p. 6.)

Other definitions, for example the one given by the Business for Social Responsibility, calls for "achieving success in ways that honor ethical values and respect people, communities and the natural environment." The basic notion of CSR is that not only do companies need to perform ethically in the communities where they are located, but that the community is also an important stakeholder in the companies' activities. The concept of the "triple bottom line" was employed to

define profitability not only in economic terms, but in social and environmental terms as well. CSR and environmental responsibility could increase a firm's competitive advantage and create new markets. This discourse is prominent today from the UN's Global Compact to Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). Besides CorpWatch, there is also the influential Dow Jones Sustainability Index, and EthicalCorp, among many others, that regularly report on corporate behavior.

Companies that "learn" do better, especially since much of contemporary economic exchange is in the area of knowledge-production and transfer. The Commission on Global Governance in 1995 issued a broad statement for the building of partnerships: "networks of institutions and processes that enable global actors to pool information, knowledge, and capacities and to develop joint policies and practices on issues of common concern." It came to be felt in some business circles that they might profit from partnerships with civil society in terms of receiving expertise, feedback and support (and legitimation) on the ground in new and emerging markets.

5.1. *New Models of Corporate-Civil Innovation*

Countless new networks and networks of networks have emerged partnering business with society. The Social Venture Network, the Schwab Foundation, the Global Challenge are only a few that have taken up the gauntlet of CSR and as a movement it is clearly on the rise. The advocacy of such high profile personalities as Anita Roddick of the Body Shop and the multi-millionaire Stephan Schmidtheiny, founder of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, has brought the discourse into the mainstream. It is a concept that is ignored by companies at their own risk. It has become the subject of books, seminars and even university programs and it is on the rise in the North and South.

> CEOs and boards are finding that public relations efforts alone are not enough to satisfy the market. Rather, corporate leaders are discovering that by engaging stakeholders, adopting rigorous business strategies, and implementing reputation management systems, they can more effectively establish trust with stakeholders, gain a competitive advantage, mitigate the impact of crises, and preserve a company's

most important asset − its reputation. (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: 2000.)

In fact, business is making a brisk business of CRS, as the PriceWaterhouseCooper quote above suggests. They, among others like McKinsey Consultants, are working with companies and civil society organizations to enhance the capacities of both, by sharing knowledge and expertise cross-sectorally. McKinsey & Company, a leading management consulting firm, created the first Center for Social Entrepreneurship (CSE) in 1996, in Brazil. McKinsey consultants provide *pro bono* management services to civil society organizations, strengthening institutional capacity and training social entrepreneurs to write business plans, make effective presentations, and market their work. In return McKinsey and its clients gain from the experiences of the civil society organizations with which they work. The stated mission of the CSE is to strengthen the profession of social entrepreneurship and innovation by building a community of cross-sectoral leaders, programs and innovations. By building a business-social bridge, it provides the framework for a range of opportunities for knowledge and skills-transfer, training, contacts and cross-sectoral understanding, deepening the ties between both sectors.

The partnership between McKinsey and civil society has created a win-win situation. NGOs gain technical and management expertise from working with companies, as well as influential contacts and possible financial support. At the McKinsey initiative in Sao Paolo, companies partner with civil society organizations when they request to increase their profile in certain areas of society. In return, their local reputation and commitment to local communities is enhanced. It also gives McKinsey employees the chance to work at the grassroots level for a period of time, getting them out of the office and into the everyday realities of the societies in which the companies they consult for work. This increases their knowledge of local conditions and consequently of local markets.

But it is not just businesses that are taking advantage of this new potential. NGOs are becoming more savvy and less reticent to dialogue and partner with corporations. Environmental campaigners become environmental consultants, for example. It is through practice and the process of such encounters that informs both spheres of their increasing inter-dependence and increases trust. Privatized forms of regulation replace state regulation which many companies see as an advantage. Whereas public/state regulation relies on possible coercion, private authority (e.g., in

independent civil society-based consumer or environmental groups) relies more on persuasion (with the inevitable "stick" of boycotts and naming and shaming campaigns).

Superbrands, founded by MARCEL KNOBIL in London in 1994 as a radio show, aimed to give customers insight into important brands. It is an example of an organization that acts as an "independent arbiter" on branding. It recognizes brands that it considers exceptional in terms of market dominance, longevity, goodwill, customer loyalty and market acceptancy. It has programs in over 55 countries. A Superbrands Council in each country selects the top brands in various categories and awards then the status of "Superbrands". They identify brands that "perform above and beyond other brands within their respective markets." Notable experts in branding, marketing and communications make up these independent councils and the opinion of thousands of consumers is sought via a partnership with the online research agency "YouGov." Brands that are rated highly by both the councils and consumers are eligible for award. This is an excellent example of a cross-sectoral partnership involving the media, business representatives and the public in the evaluation of products on the market.

Some of the successful strategies employed to regulate corporate behavior are listed below:

Direct action campaigns, i.e., naming and shaming, including boycotts that attract media attention and challenge the reputation and credibility of the corporations involved. This may have a long-term negative effect on companies and will affect brand loyalty and consumer choice. Today even the threat of a boycott can bring about change in company policy. There is an increasing correlation between good business practices and profit which is affected by both negative and positive publicity. Public awareness and information campaigns directed at consumers can have positive results when companies realize that lost reputations translate into lost profits.

What may finally convince corporations about the validity of CSR are increased profits due to responsible business practices. According to OLIVIERO and SIMMONS (2002, pp. 86-87), companies that have effective programs for corporate social responsibility have a rate of return that is 9.8% higher than companies that don't over a 10 year period.

The Economist in 2000 reported that although Shell did not suffer actual profit loss from boycotts in reaction to incidents in Nigeria, its corporate workforce was so demoralized and its reputation so badly damaged that the company changed its strategies and direction anyway. Today Shell is reportedly considered to be one of the models of corporate citizenship. ROGER COWE (2001, p. 6) writes that for a growing number of companies reputational risk is considered as important as the risk of fire or physical catastrophe.

Legal action by civil society organizations has also induced corporate accountability in the social, political and environmental spheres. International law and regulations have allowed for companies to be sued that do not conform to human rights and environmental standards.

According to reports (OLIVEIRO and SIMMONS: 2002, p. 87), socially responsible investing has skyrocketed, according to. In the 1990s, the amount of money invested with socially responsible funds rose from $40 billion to $2.2 trillion between 1985 and 2000 in the US. By 2000, $1 in every $10 invested in the UK and the US was linked to some kind of social criteria. Since 1999, US investors have been able to track the Dow Sustainable Group Index, and in the UK investory can follow socially responsible companies on the FTSE4good index.

Standard setting and monitoring are the areas in which civil society activity has increased the most in recent decades. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was formulated in response to the growing outcry against corporate human rights and environmental rights abuse. The GRI is supported by major corporations throughout the world and is building a consensus for a voluntary standard of corporate reporting requirements that transcends specific industrial sectors or geographic areas.

Civil society has assumed a central role in monitoring the implementation of agreed standards. Global civil society organizations can report on the extent to which companies or whole industries are enforcing codes and standards. This is especially important in developing countries that often do not have the resources to monitor companies on a regular basis. Lessons are still being learned on the best ways to monitor the variety of corporations and industries in a number of countries and here the flexibility of civil society is an advantage. While civil society is now filling an important gap by monitoring and setting standards, in the future it may be better for this work to be led in partnership with official international agencies or governments.

This increases the potential influence and oversight of locally-based groups to monitor and report on corporate activity in the places they operate. NGOs are changing their attitude towards business and vice versa: from an adversarial relationship of confrontation to one that can be characterized as more cooperative. As much as concepts like CSR and ethical business practices can be seen by companies as simply marketing tools, it can never-the-less be stated that these new partnerships and hybrid constructions of regulation are playing a greater role in determining the behavior of global economic actors.

5.2. *Business as Unusual: The Corporate Citizen Hybrid*

There are over 60,000 active multinational corporations with over 800,000 affiliates worldwide. At least 37 of the top 100 economies of the world are corporations. Some economists have found that the combined sales of the world's top 200 corporations are bigger than the combined economies of all but the 10 richest countries. This represents enormous power. A European survey, however, has shown that most elites trust civil society organizations more than either business or government. Amnesty International, the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace outranked the leading multinationals and are among the top 15 most trusted organizations. (OLIVIERO and SIMMONS: 2001.) With this kind of legitimacy, global civil society organizations (GCSOs) can wield power in response to the negligence and irresponsible behavior of corporations. The global reach of civil society organizations and networks is emerging equal to the extent of global market penetration of corporations today.

Holding corporate players accountable for their actions in global economies is not a new idea and can be traced back to the late 18th century. Modern campaigns are similar they say in that they rely on a broad coalition of people, media coverage, boycott, resulting in the reform of legislation. The debate on corporate behavior has increased due to:

1) the globalization of markets,

2) the establishment of the knowledge economy,

3) the ubiquity of global communications technology,

4) the coalescence of power, and therefore responsibility, in the hands of relatively few international and global corporations,

5) the need for new social partnerships between corporations, states and civil society seeking solutions to local and global problems. (MCINTOSH, LEIPZIGER, THOMAS and COLEMAN: 2003, p. 15.)

A distinction is made in the analyses between "insiders" and "outsiders". Insiders work closely with corporations to develop socially responsible programs and policies; outsiders are sceptical that profit-seeking organizations can act responsibly, and tend to emphasize public pressure and government action. Outsiders criticize CSR as a marketing tool that misleads the public and do not believe in the rhetoric of corporate citizenship. Some of the questions being raised are: how can civil society work with governments and multilateral organizations to institutionalize corporate social responsibilty? Can multinational corporations be trusted to act responsibly voluntarily or is there a need for legislation?

Corporate citizenship elicits a wide range of responses from business. Some embed CSR values from the ground up in the company's structure, like Jeffrey Hollender's 7th Generation, Anita Roddick's Body Shop, Ben Cohen's Ben and Jerry's, Michael Kieschnick's Working Assets, Margot Fraser's Birkenstock Footprint Sandals, just to name a few internationally known brands. Many business leaders are coming to appreciate that corporate social responsibility makes good business sense in terms of employee relations, risk control, and reputation promotion which is increasingly emerging as a necessary competitive advantage in world markets.

The ASPEN INSTITUTE (2001) outlines three types of corporate citizenship. The first includes those businesses that obey the law, operate in a transparent way, and focus on issues directly related to their business, in compliance with existing standards. At this level being a good corporate citizen is related to business and business strategy.

The second type of corporate citizenship includes businesses that move beyond compliance to address social issues and interface with society.

The third type encompasses business leaders who address social and environmental issues that may seem to be counter to their corporate interests. They view profit and profit-making in the long-term and understand that long-term business prospects require the protection of natural resources and the building of local infrastructures that will allow them to operate safely and effectively in the future.

> Business leaders can have a substantial impact as unlikely allies when they speak up on issues such as climate change and working conditions. They can shift norms and gradually isolate those who do not participate. (OLIVIERA and SIMMONS: 2002, p. 80.)

In response to the question: Can the needs of society be met through the wealth creation provided by global capitalism? The ASPEN INSTITUTE's discussions conclude:

> No, not yet – as the foundation for the alignment between shareholder value and social wealth is almost entirely lacking. The global rules of the game for business are dangerously nascent. We've globalized the private sector, but we have not globalized the values and institutions of global governance. This situation runs the risk of eroding the rules of the game in individual countries, even in developed countries.
> … The framework in fact defines a category of action where corporations cannot and will not work alone to achieve social progress. Yet rather than foreclose business as an actor, this framework illustrates the need and potential for multiple stakeholders – including businesses – to agitate and collaborate for change. (ASPEN INSTITUTE: 2001.)

This multi-stakeholder approach is spreading and is evidenced in a number of regional and global initiatives like the Business Enviromental Leadership Council, The Global Reporting Initiative, The Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, The Social Venture Network, Ethos in Brazil and MAALA in Israel, Transparency International, etc. But as the quote above reveals, business alone is not willing or able to address the global challenges and injustices brought about by economic globalization.

It is becoming increasingly clear that civil society is organizing effectively to ensure that companies that pollute and destroy the environment and that operate outside legally established labor codes are having a harder time doing business as usual. More effective partnerships between companies and civil society is also increasing the knowledge and trust between the sectors. This is not to underestimate

the legislative and enforcement capacities of states and intergovernmental agencies. This tripartite coalition could form a structure for governing economic globalization by setting universal standards, monitoring corporate behavior globally and enforcing action where necessary. The corporate citizen, as a hybridization of the traditional business player, could help to bridge the gap between markets, states and societies.

5.3. *The IMF, WTO and World Bank: Quo Vadis?*

> Globalization is … a project governed by the world's political and economic elites – the cosmocracy – for the benefit of a minority of humankind. It is this cosmocracy … centred on the United States, which promotes and organizes globalization principally through the formal institutions and informal elite networks of global governance … Dominated by powerful vested interest, the institutions of global economic management constitute the core of a wider system of liberal global governance enslaving the world and its people to the dictates of a neo-liberal ideology and global corporate capitalism. (HELD and MCGREW: 2002, p. 58.)

The goals of global economic institutions have moved from enhancing global stability to serving economic interests and finally the interests of global financing institutions. It is not surprising that the global institutions set up to navigate the global economy have made mistakes and rightly have taken the brunt of the criticism about globalization. The complexities of the processes and challenges today require more than the efforts of global economic institutions, and political and social processes cannot be governed in the same way, by the same rules, as economics. Economic management cannot substitute for political leadership. Social cohesion is an important requirement for economic development and much of the criticism today arises from the kind of economic thinking that pushes all other concerns into the background.

An overview of the contemporary global economic situation and future forecasts reveal that the system generates financial fragility and instability. The growth of US deficits results in the rapid growth of international reserves which lead to financial crashes like the Japanese bubble in the 1980s, the East Asian bubble in

the 1990s and financial crises in emerging markets have increased since the 1980s in relation to the post-war period until 1970. In the first months of 2008, we have witnessed market instability and increasing governmental interventions with measures to mediate this instability. The US Federal Reserve cut prime interest rates twice in a few days in the US to try to stabilize the US and global markets.

The system has also not produced higher growth globally. Wealth based on GDP per capita, fell from 2.7% to 1.5% between the 1960-1978 and 1979-2005 periods. The fall that occured between 1990 and 2004 is particularly revealing since it coincides with the effects (in the 1980s) of the policies of deregulation, privatization, and the liberalization of trade and capital movements. Growth in output (which rose to 2.3% for 2001-2003) may be the consequence of the liberalization that has occured over the past three decades or is the product of the boom in American consumer debt which draws on Chinese, Japanese and German trade surpluses. (MILANOVIC: 2005.)

Much of the world, especially the developing world, has experienced no growth at all, or even negative growth. Sub-saharan Africa's average real income is below the level of the 1980s and 1990s; Latin America is about the same as in the 1980s even though many countries in the region adopted the neo-liberal policies of the World Bank and IMF. Eastern Europe's economic performance has clearly steadily declined and created, as elsewhere, social reaction ranging from apathy to unrest. Only South Asia, beginning from a low base, can be said to have improved, as well as China and India, albeit with periods of instability.

DANIEL ALTMAN (2007) estimated that there are roughly 1 billion people in the high-income countries; 3 billion people in countries where growth rates have been substantially faster than in the high-income countries; and 2 billion people – some living in middle-income countries, others in low-income countries – where growth rates have been lower than in high-income countries.

> The brutal fact is that after decades of self-conscious development and market liberalization, the average income for the South is still only around 15% of that of the North in purchasing-power-parity (PPP) terms, and more like 5% in foreign-exchange-rate terms. Also, growth in the South is typically much more erratic than in a typical developed country,

with periods of relatively fast growth followed by deeper and longer recessions.

He concludes:

> In short, the Matthew effect is (still) operating with vengeance ("To him that hath shall be given, to him that hath not shall not be given"). There is deep irony here, related to the impact of the post-Bretton-Woods architecture on the lives of the poor.

Both the IMF and World Bank are experiencing what has been termed a "crisis of relevance" when faced with the rapid and fundamental changes that have occured in the market over the past two decades. Their traditional "products" – economic aid packages and policy advise to governments – are increasingly questioned as being outdated, targeted towards an earlier period of global economic development and are now subject to competition from a variety of new actors. These include global private foundations like the Bill and Melissa Gates Foundation and private banks. There has even been discussion to establish a similar institution to support the developing economies of Latin America, for example:

> Finance ministers from seven South American countries met in Rio de Janeiro on 8 October to discuss the future structure, leadership and funding sources for the so-called Banco del Sur (Bank of the South).

> Already, the idea of an alternative funding source for South American countries has been supported across the region … Once inaugurated, the multilateral financial institution will become an alternative to the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund for South American countries interested in loans for social and economic development – loans that come free of the conditions that South American leaders have associated with the failed neo-liberal economic policies of the 1990s. (LOGAN: 2007.)

"Debtonation" has been used to describe the systemic crisis that goes to the heart of the financial model and underpins economic globalization. As more and more banks feel the fiscal pressure,[22] consumers are surviving on credit in the developing nations. In the UK, in October 2007, it was reported by the BBC that 10% of homeowners, one million people int he UK, are paying their mortgages each month with credit cards. The so-called "invisible hand" is no longer relied upon in the financial markets even of the developing world.

JOSEPH STIGLITZ, chief economist at the World Bank from 1997-2000 and winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001, asserts that asymmetries exist in terms of information especially in the market place, between employer and employee, bank and borrower, etc. That is why increased transparency and improving information provided to citizens about what global institutions do should be included in discussions of reform. (STIGLITZ: 2002.)

He expands his argument by stating that the inherent imbalance of power, for example, between the IMF and its "clients" creates inevitable tension and IMF behavior exacerbates an already difficult situation. Lack of trust is the premise on which MEIs like the IMF and World Bank build their relationships with "client" countries. This undermines the effectiveness of economic reform because for an IMF program to be effective, client countries must muster the forces required, on the basis of a broad concensus, to stand behind the implementation of a program. This kind of consensus can only be achieved through dialogue, open discussion and the involvement of civil society and its representatives. The IMF and WB have begun to take notice and have initiated, among other changes, "participatory" poverty assessments in which client countries contribute to the assessment of the size and depth of the problems a country faces.

Sometimes it is hard to believe that the IMF is a public institution established and funded by taxpayers throughout the world since it does not report to those who finance it or to those whose lives it affects. It reports only to ministries of finance, banks and governments. This leads to the question: How can citizens find out what these institutions do and hold them accountable? The underlying problem with the

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[22] Great Northern in the UK is just one recent example of government bail out. The bailout has become a public-private partnership, a new hybrid form, something in-between nationalization and privatization.

IMF and other global institutions is the problem of governance: who decides what they do and how they do it.

MEIs like the IMF, WTO, and World Bank have come under increasing pressure from criticism by a coalition of civil society networks with regard to their decision-making process and operations, and they have begun to engage elements of what they "define" as civil society. These attempts have, with more or less success and sincerity, resulted in limited partnerships at least at the level of advertized programs at these institutions.

Increasingly vocal and concerted criticism that fostered real and imagined attempts at dialogue can be reviewed in the framework of a general mistrust of organizations that operate in a culture of secrecy, and who are viewed as having destabilized and undermined economic development in developing countries for decades. Their lack of transparency and exclusionary decision-making processes, and the human and social costs of their implemented programs erupted in violent and unprecedented protests against these institutions – unprecedented because of the cross-issue, transnational character of civil society's response. The message to the WTO by the Seattle to Brussels Network (a pan-European network of 99 associations), for example, was "Shrink or Sink!"

The WTO, in its Marrakesh Agreement, provides the potential for relationships with NGOs in Article V (2):

> The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and co-operation with non-governmental organisations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.

Caveats were made, however, in the guidelines adopted by the General Council of the WTO that state:

> … there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively through appropriate processes at the national level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making.

This is a typical argument against NGO observership. Representatives are viewed as representing national interests which should be dealt with at the national level. Another argument states that the WTO is a forum for negotiations between governments not societies. A third and more practical argument complains of the increased physical space required if NGOs are present. The argument continues that smaller WTO members would then fear that most negotiations would be held in private, marginalizing them. Subsequently, the sessions of WTO bodies would become mere public relations exercises.

The IMF has also been reticent to open up its policy-making process to what they see as undisciplined if not openly hostile representatives of civil society. Why should they, they ask?

In the contemporary context it seems evident that there will be increasing conflicts between institutions like the WTO, IMF and WB and the societies in which they work. More challenges to the system will be made including the questioning of power relations. These challenges question their democratic structure and decision-making processes, their lack of transparency, legitimacy and capacity to deal with increasingly complex, interrelated and divisive issues. Besides securing better access to information that would increase the possibility of building public trust in their operations, inclusion of civil society seriously promotes accountability at the global level.

Although the United Nations led in the engagement of civil groups in its proceedings,[23] the World Bank has made the most assertive attempt to give civil society a high profile at least with regard to appearance. Its website: ‹http://www.worldbank.org/civilsociety› could be a model for oganizational restructuring. The World Bank boasts Civil Society Teams (CST), Civil Society Groups (CSG) and over 80 Civil Society Country Staff (CSC). The purpose of these new structures and the website is "to provide CSOs [*civil society organizations*] with information and materials on the World Bank's evolving relationship with civil society throughout the world." This is taken in response to what the WB sees as the significant growth of civil society involvement in the area of international

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[23] Participation of NGOs in the UN system are characterized as: 1) Unstructured, open access, 2). Structured, open access, 3) Indirect, open access through a network, 4) External campaigning by a network, 5) Limited access to the secretariat, 6) Limited access to delegations. See, Willetts (2002).

development. This increased activity has, in some successful cases, lead to partnerships that have been effective in reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development.

The selections from the table below reveal just how sincerely and openly "civil society" is included in the proceedings of some of the global institutions. Only the World Bank NGO Committee selects its own members; in all other cases representatives of civil society are selected by the World Bank. This certainly has ramifications for the "type" of civil society that is included to represent "civil society" at the organizational level. The roles of these new civil partners range from *ad hoc*, to consultative and advisory. They have limited access to actual meetings of the organizations and in very few cases can contribute to the agenda or actually speak up at meetings. In only half the cases are they allowed to contribute written statements to participants. Access to information is controlled and at the discretion of the international institutions themselves.

Table 3.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF NGO PARTICIPATION IN A SELECTION OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES (ICTSD: 1999)[24]

	WTO	**ITO**	**ECOSOC (UN)**
Who selects the NGOs?	Secretariat + Member States consent	Member States on rec. of the Secretariat	Member States on rec. of a Cite on NGOs composed of Member States
Main criteria for selection	NGOs 'concerned with matters related to those of the WTO'	Expertise ECOSOC accreditation	Expertise Representivity NGO supports UN's work and principles Democratic structure Accountability
Form of participation	*Ad hoc* consultation	*Ad hoc* consultation + Advisory Committee	Consultative Status (General, Special, Roster)
Who administers NGO participation	Secretariat	Director General	Secretariat (NGLS, UN Department of Public Info., etc.)
Access to meetings of the org.	None except Ministerial Conferences	None except Ministerial Conferences	Yes
Can propose agenda items	No	Only for the Annual Conference	Yes
Can speak at some meetings	No	No	Yes
Circ. Written statements	No	No	Yes
Access to information	NGOs only have access to derestricted documents	Receive copies of all unrestricted documents	The Secretariat is authorised to distribute docs as appropriate in its judgement

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[24] Authors note: Not all information provided by the table is presented here; this is a selection of information provided by the table cited.

Table 3. Continued

	UNCED (UN)	NGO-World Bank Committee	OECD
Who selects the NGOs?	Member States on rec. of the Secretariat	The NGOs themselves	Member States on rec. of the Secretariat
Main criteria for selection	Expertise Representivity NGO supports UN's work and principles Organic structure ECOSOC accreditation	NGOs elected by regional assemblies of NGOWB Expertise Geographical representivity International /National structure	Expertise Representivity International structure
Form of participation	Consultative Status	NGO Advisory Committee at global and regional levels	NGO Advisory Committee - obs status at some meetings
Who administers NGO participation	Secretariat (NGLS, UN Department of Public Info., etc.)	NGOs and Bank staff	Secretary-General + Liaison Committee with NGOs
Access to meetings of the org.	Yes	No	No
Can propose agenda items	No	No	No
Can speak at some meetings	Yes	No	Yes
Circ. Written statements	Yes	No	Yes
Access to information	NGOs have access to official documents	The Bank may distribute docs as appropriate in its judgement	The Secretariat is authorised to distribute docs as appropriate in its judgement

Much of the participation outlined in the table above reflects a limited and strictly circumscribed partnership by international institutions and civil society representatives who act more to legitimize programs than to be taken seriously as equal partners in terms of program content, policy-making and implementation. These institutions are still far from actual dialogue, drawing upon the knowledge of local peoples to design programs which meet their actual needs.

More general criticisms recommend that the World Bank shift its activities to confront global problems, by developing new financial instruments to accelerate the implementation of environmentally-friendly technologies, such as a carbon fund and resources to encourage environmentalism in the use of land, transportation systems and power. The crux of the problem is seen in the control of these institutions by the White House which has used its directorship of the World Bank and the IMF to

promote American interests abroad. The problematic is viewed as how to de-couple these institutions from the Washington consensus. Not only the outcry from civil society, but the increasing power and confidence of economies like China and India, may result in the re-structuration of these global multi-lateral economic organizations to better reflect current realities. With the enhanced participation of civil society, the programs of MEIs could be strengthened and legitimized in local contexts. With more open representation, these institutions could provide the backbone of an evolving multi-stakeholder system of global governance.

6. *CIVIS MUNDI SUM*: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

> We are sceptical … of the claim that transnational or international NGOs constitute "global civil society" …the global civil society movement might better be understood as imagining itself as the bearer of universal values, both operating in the teeth of globalization and yet simultaneously using globalization as its vehicle for disseminating universal values. (HELMUT ANHEIER, et.al.: 2005, p. 26)

6.1. *The Postnational Constellation*

RONNIE LIPSCHUTZ saw that "the growth of global civil society represents an ongoing project of civil society to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world politics." (LIPSCHUTZ: 1992, p. 391.) HABERMAS calls this new constellation postnational.

> This theoretization of the postnational constellation or "supranationality," is not to deny the continuity and significance of territoriality and its institutions and geographic as well as metaphoric identities. Many emphasize that globality has not taken over territoriality but territoriality no longer has the monopoly on social geography…
>
> Crossborder cooperation strengthens "supraterritorial networks" which provide new loyalties and regional identities. As a consequence, there is a shift in the "geography of values" which supports the argument for an emerging global civil society.
>
> … many people in the contemporary globalizing world have become increasingly ready to give "supraterritorial values" related to say human rights and ecological integrity a higher priority than state sovereignty… (SCHOLTE: 2002, p. 287.)

The emergence of global civil society at this particular juncture is seen as a response to the "leaking away of sovereignty from the state both upwards, to supranational institutions, and downwards, to subnational ones … Global civil society is emerging as a functional response to the decreasing ability and willingness

of governments to undertake a variety of welfare functions." (LIPSCHUTZ: 1992, p. 399.)

Identification with the nation state as the primary social grouping has begun to wither partly in response. At the same time, identity based on consumption and the market is insufficient for establishing new identities. Therefore, there has been a rise in new forms of collective identities, new nationalisms in some places, but also the creation of cosmopolitan identities and a global consciousness. (LIPSCHUTZ: 1992, p. 399.)

Recognition of the democratic deficit on the level of global governance raises the question whether and how civil society can contribute to reducing it, dynamizing the process of global democratization. More precisely, what role can civil society play in a reconfigured democracy for global governance?

6.2. *Defining, Refining and Redefining Global Civil Society*

Even if the history of transnational or international organizations goes back to the 19th century, global civil society is a relatively new phenomenon. It became part of the official vocabulary in the mid-1990s when international funding institutions started to employ it in their program descriptions. This is also when we can observe the first theoretical and empirical analyses that accumulated around the turn of the century.

The need for global civil society stems from democratic deficits at the global level but global civil society remains vague and deficient without the articulation and application of global rights and responsibilities of citizenship. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights goes some way to defining a potential global citizenship, but we are still a long way from institutionalizing form(s) of citizenship rights at the global level. It is precisely the articulation of these sets of rights and responsibilities related to citizenship that guarantee a defence against the over-indulgent markets of turbo-capitalism. RALF DAHRENDORF characterizes citizenship as the epitome of freedom, and civil society as the medium through which this freedom is projected, boosted and dispersed. It thus constitutes the home of the Citizen:

> **...** **c**itizenship and civil society go one important step further than elections and markets. They are goals to strive for rather than dangers to

avoid. In this sense they are moral objectives … (DAHRENDORF: 1997, p. 60.)

It is an open question how effective global networks of civil society can be in creating meaningful links of interdependence between individuals, social groups and the institutions of Global Merchants and Princes, but the attempt is clearly being made. This is especially a question in terms of its still fragmented forms which reflect global inequalities in terms of participation and access to technology.

Global civil society as an existing, yet at the same time emerging and potential force can neither be encompassed by the total number of international NGOs nor is it synonymous with the anti-globalization protestors that receive so much of the media's attention. It emerged in response to what is viewed as the rampant and uncontrolled extension of liberal market processes that have caused and are causing increasing environmental and social insecurity.

Like the term "globalization", the definition of "global civil society" is debated and contested, and is one of the reasons it is attractive to stakeholders from differing fields of interest and activity. Sometimes it is described and explained in terms of new social movements that take place on a global scale. In international relations it is called "transnational civil society". In sociology it is identified with the emergence of a "world society". In economics it is related to the international labor movement and the public reaction to globalized markets and neo-liberalism. In political science the focus is on the characteristics of spreading democracy around the world. As seen in Section 5. in discussions of governing global markets and MEIs, civil society can be exploited to legitimize economic actors and the reforms economic institutions initiate and implement. It is important to reiterate SCHOLTE's formulation that "Globalization constitutes the sort of contextual change that requires new approaches to democracy and civil society". (SCHOLTE: 2002, p. 285.)

Normatively, global civil society is associated with initiatives that embody certain values like Médécins sans Frontiéres, Save the Children, Oxfam, Amnesty International or Greenpeace which have become the "brand names" of global civil society and provide humanitarian assistance and express global solidarity with the poor and oppressed who have become the victims of economic globalization's dark

side. [25]   Sometimes the term refers to the growing inter-connectedness and inter-dependence of citizens in new social networks among environmental and human rights activists, students, or global media. There is no agreement on its definition or scope, but its emergence, both in terms of new global social movements, and in the academic literature is recognition of a sphere of public activity that is above and beyond (yet often connected to) local, national, and regional societies. The globalization of civil society, like economic globalization, is a process that is extending into new areas of emergent global governance: environmental regulation, consumer rights and protection, and human security.

It is clear that in the 1990s, a supranational sphere of social and political participation became vibrant and allowed space for citizens, social movements, and individuals to dialogue, debate, and deliberate with each other, with representatives of governments and the business community in what can be called multi-stakeholder global conversations.

The number of international NGOs, their scope in geographic and thematic terms, and their level of organization has incalculably increased over the past 2-3 decades. They make up, however, only part of the increased activity at the global level. There are also grassroots groups with global reach (movements of indigenous peoples who have put their concerns on to global agendas) and multi-theme coalitions that form, transform and recede in response to global challenges.[26] Many different kinds of groups organized by citizens have come to play increasingly crucial roles since the 1990s by gathering and disseminating information and generally raising public awareness for advocacy and action to influence public policy. This shift in global dynamics is unprecedented.

Part of this vigorous development in the role, function and authority of civil society organizations at the global level is the growth of technological and financial

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[25] Like economic globalization, global civil society can be identified as being highly concentrated in north-western Europe, in Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. This is also where the concentration of TNC activity and financial capital is located, as well as being the area that is most interconnected by technology. (ANHEIER, et. al.: 2001.)

[26] See, for example, The Ruckus organization at: ‹http://www.ruckus.org›, which says it "… provides environmental, human rights, and social justice organizers with the tools, training and support needed to achieve their goals."

resources available to global civil society. INGOS have become the agents of directing private, corporate, bilateral and multi-lateral funding flows, thus increasing their power. It is estimated that global civil society receives approximately $7 billion in development funds and $2 billion in funds from US foundations. Figures show that the number of full-time employment in INGOs for France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom alone amounts to over 100,000 and that volunteers in INGOs represent an additional 1.2 million full-time jobs in these countries. (ANHEIER, GLASIUS and KALDOR: 2001, p. 6.)

INGOs and networks of global NGOs function to ameliorate and mediate the effects of economic globalization. They can provide a safety net in which to catch those who become the casualties of economic liberalization. By supporting democracy-building in the world, they help to establish the rule of law and respect for human rights, thus embodying global values that have evolved in the international system. This role moves them beyond the traditional responsibilities of the state.

For many, a primary role for global civil society is to re-politicize the economy and economic development by retaking control of economic instruments in order to redistribute, more equitably, transparently and with more accountability, political power. That is why debates about globalization and global civil society have become discussions about the future of democracy and social justice.

6.3. *Transnational or Global Civil Society?*

There is an important distinction made in the literature between international or transnational civil society and global civil society and the arguments can be summarized as follows. (ANHEIER, GLASIUS and KALDOR: 2001, pp. 16-17.)

Even if calling contemporary social movements and global networks "global civil society" overstates what is happening, the determination "international" or "transnational" understates what has and is occurring. In the past decade we have quickly moved beyond just the cross-border, transnational nature of relations. This revolutionary change, facilitated by technology and communication, has opened up traditionally closed societies to an unprecedented extent. (SZABÓ: 2004a, 2004b.) Even Myanmar, under strict military dictatorship, cannot keep the eyes of the global

public away from domestic violence and violations of human rights. The unprecendented global mobilization of civil forces in opposition to the Iraqi invasion catapulted global civil society forces into the global media arena, giving force and confidence to these increasingly coordinated and organized movements.

It is also argued that only a "global civil society" can be posed as a counterweight to "globalization". If democratic deficits of governance are to be addressed at the global level, only a global organization of civil society can hold global economic and political actors accountable. Global civil society is seen as the mechanism by which globalization can be "civilized". In addition, "global civil society" embodies a normative aspiration that cannot be said of "transnational civil society". Global civil society is an expression of the emergence of a global consciousness, of shared values and goals. It stresses, as ANTHONY GIDDENS phrased it, our "overlapping communities of fate" in which individuals act as global citizens. This encompasses our increasing environmental inter-dependence and vulnerability and is expressed in the Gaia principle that we all inherit, share and are responsible for one world.

The strength of global civil society lies in its ability to call powerholders to account by requiring transparency and the dissemination of information about their activities. It may also require compensation in response to the most blatant exploitation of resources, and abuse of human rights and the environment. Another strength lies in global civil society's ability to unite the cacophony of voices into an orchestra which is ignored by enterprises and multi-lateral economic organizations at their peril. Transformations in the context of international law and corporate monitoring and reporting have largely occurred as a result of pressures from civil society. It has also resulted in the direct intervention in states on behalf of its citizens when their rights are abused by state powers.

Despite extreme heterogeneity and fragmentation, much of the activity in the sphere of global civil society consists of what RICHARD FALK and others have termed "globalization from below", a project whose normative potential conceptualizes widely shared global values related to re-defining security in the 21st century. (DELLA PORTA, et.al.:2006.) These include the minimizing of violence, the maximizing of economic well-being, the realization of social and political justice, and upholding environmental quality. One way to juxtapose elite economic-driven globalization against global civil society can be seen below:

Table 4.

Elite Globalization	Global Civil Society
Empire	Community
Concentration Centralization of power and wealth	Equitable distribution Decentralization of power and wealth
The world is inherently hostile and competitive	The world is a place of creative opportunity
There are winners and losers and those with the most might have right to seize and hold power.	Cooperation and equitable sharing of power and control
Gives rise to authoritarian impulses.	Gives rise to democratic impulses.

Beyond the teargas clouds, riot police and the violence of small groups of protesters, broad alliances of NGOs, CSOs and concerned individuals have begun to reshape and address global issues. Even in a nascent form, global civil society has been successful. The worldwide civic movement against landmines, initiated by Jody Williams, enacted a treaty subscribed to by most nations. Jubilee 2000, an anti-debt movement achieved putting international debt on the global agenda of world leaders. The Kyoto Treaty on global warming and the establishment of the International Criminal Court of Justice can all be labeled as victories for global civil society.

A rapidly growing number of NGOs and CSOs are creating new alliances and gathering in transnational organizations such as the World Forum on Democracy, People's Summits at the WTO, or Summits of the Americas, etc. Subsequent parallel summits have resulted in the move from confrontation, conflict and protest to articulated and structured criticism. Far from being "one-issue movements", these new post-national social movements are not only protesting, they are networking and raising critical voices against the most outstanding injustices and inequalities of power monopolies. The move from monitoring to governing (actively shaping decision-making and participating in confrontative dialogues with decision-makers) is partly a result of a series of world conferences on contested issues like environmental protection, human rights, gender and global economic policies. This changed global economic and political constellations and lead the UN and other closed intergovernmental organizations or MEIs such as the World Bank, the IMF,

and the WTO towards dialogue and cooperation. It is also a result of a growing global consciousness and sense of responsibility. This reflects the changing values of an increasing number of citizens who not only protest, gather and organize themselves across frontiers, but who consciously develop networks on a more or less permanent basis. The World Conferences of the 1990s resulted in a cumulative vision of desired alternative futures. (Foster: 2001.)

LESTER SALAMON employs the term "associational revolution" to describe what lies behind the surface of public demonstrations and street confrontations at parallel summits that can be attributed to the expanding impact of the Internet (information, communication, shrinking of time-space), the growing networking among a great number and variety of locales, and the emergence of social movements with a global reach.

As MICHAEL EDWARDS, the director of the program on Governance and Civil Society at the Ford Foundation, reports, more than 49 million people joined the "Hemispheric Social Alliance" to control the Free Trade Agreements of the Americas, and more than 30,000 INGOs are active on the world stage, along with 20,000 transnational civil society networks.(EDWARDS: 2002, p. 77.)

EDWARDS clearly states that:

> In theory … civil society can make two contributions to effective global governance: First, improving the quality of debate and decision-making by injecting more information, transparency and accountability into the international system, based on a recognition that government and business have no monopoly of ideas or expertise. The Jubilee 2000 movement created enormous pressure for debt relief, but it also put new models and policy suggestions on the table that gradually worked their way into the international establishment.
>
> Second, strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of decisions … by providing a broader spectrum of those whose support is required to make them work. Governments can confer authority on decisions but rarely a complete sense of legitimacy, especially in a "wired world" … In this scenario, the weight of public pressure will be felt much more keenly by decision-makers … and support from non-state actors will be crucial in ensuring that decisions are actually implemented … This was part of

the rationale behind the success, for example, of the landmines campaign in 1997, the international certification of the diamond trade in 2000, and concessions at the Doha world trade talks in 2001 around intellectual property rights. (EDWARDS: 2002, p. 77.)

More humanized goals for our global future are in the process of formulation. However, the institutionalized forms and frames for a more systematic and structured horizontal or "civil-lateral"[27] organization and accountability of global players are still missing. It is too early to tell whether emerging global publics and civil networks will be able to deliver the enabling frameworks, institutions and fora which will be powerful and persistent enough to shape a new global public space where global civil society can develop and be sustained and contribute to global governance.

Some of this potential can be measured in the jump from 11 million shots on the Internet search in 2003 to over 304 million in 2007 on various global civil society topics. The results are formulated in the subsequent tables. It is of special interest which categories have become the focus today, i.e., the mechanisms driving and regulating global processes, especially in the area of global governance.

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[27] This is a term coined by LOUK DE LA RIVE BOX, director of the Insitute for Social Studies and professor of international co-operation at Maastricht University. He used this term to convey the idea that civil organization is lateral, not horizontal and hierarchical. Lecture at the Savaria International Summer University, Kőszeg, 2002.

Table 5.

2003 Table	Google	Questia	Amazon
European civil society	1.270.000	29.176	29
Trans-national civil society	229.000	213	1
Democracy + civil society	1.070.000	110	149
Language of civil society	1.280.000	32.556	22
Public spheres + civil	143.000	7	0
Citizenship + civil society	388.000	49	68
Globalization + civil	370.000	2	17
Development + civil society	2.170.000	34	74
Citizenship + civil society	388.000	49	68
Social movement + civil	994.000	93	25
Networks + civil society	823.000	5	17
Governance + civil society	797.000	4	25
Media + civil society	1.630.000	21	25
Civic discourse + civil society	40.900	4	4
Totals	9.737.900	62.323	524

Table 6.

Comparative Tables 2003/2007	Google 2003	Google 2007	Increase
European civil society	1,270,000	29,800,000	23.46
Trans-nationa lcivil ociety	229,000	1,890,000	8.25
Democracy + civil society	1,070,000	10,900,000	10.18
Language of civil society	1,280,000	42,100,000	32.89
Public spheres+civil	143,000	1,980,000	13.85
Citizenship + civil society	388,000	2,130,000	5.5
Globalization + civil	370,000	2,320,000	6.27
Development + civil	2,170,000	81,400,000	37.51
Social movement + civil	994,000	13,600,000	13.68
Networks + civil society	**823,000**	**51,900,000**	**63.06**
Governance + civil	797,000	2,910,000	3.65
Media + civil society	1,630,000	64,600,000	39.63
Civic discourse+ civil society	40,900	1,230,000	30.07
Totals	9.737.900	304.760.000	300%

Table 7.

Comparative Tables 2003/2007	Questia 2003	Questia 2007	Increase
European civil society	29,176	55,124	1.89
Trans-national civil society	213	28,169	132.25
Democracy + civil society	110	46,241	420.37
Language of civil society	32,556	61,482	1.89
Public spheres + civil society	**7**	**38,503**	**5500.43**
Citizenship + civil society	49	26,653	543.94
Globalization + civil society	**2**	**9,190**	**4595.**
Development + civil society	34	68,594	2017.47
Social movement + civil society	93	48,245	518.76
Networks + civil society	**5**	**23,634**	**4726.80**
Governance + civil society	**4**	**18,219**	**4554.75**
Media + civil society	21	38,850	1850
Civic discourse + civil society	4	16,416	4104.
Totals	62.323	479.320	8%

Table 8.

Comparative Tables 2003/2007	Amazon 2003	Amazon 2007	Increase
European civil society	29	1,199	41.34
Trans-national civil society	1	148	148.
Democracy + civil society	149	2,937	19.71
Language of civil society	22	617	28.05
Public spheres + civil society	0	927	927.
Citizenship + civil society	68	1,033	15.19
Globalization + civil society	17	588	34.59
Development + civil society	74	3,237	43.74
Social movement + civil society	25	798	31.92
Networks + civil society	**17**	**1,060**	**62.35**
Governance + civil society	**25**	**1,206**	**48.24**
Media + civil society	25	1,031	41.24
Civic discourse + civil society	4	56	14.
Totals	524	14.877	28%

It is clear from the comparison that there has been extensive growth in interest
on issues related to global civil society and governance. I have made bold the areas
in which there has been the greatest growth in interest.

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6.4. *Global Civil Society and Global Governance*

While interest in the relationship between emerging global civil society and global governance is growing, it is still unclear in what ways civil society can be institutionalized in new global governance structures. Global governance is not an embryonic form of a world government modelled after the modern nation state. Instead, global relations are regulated in a "poststatist" fashion with no single center of authority. Civil society, therefore, serves a different function than in the previous periods and has to find new ways for establishing itself within the new global, post-national constellation. If realized, the engagement between civil society and regulatory mechanisms could enhance the respect and legitimacy that citizens accord to global governance. Civil society could affirm and guide global governance arrangements and when necessary constrain their behavior. Civil society can also provide the space for expression of discontent when arrangements are regarded as illegitimate.

During the 1990s, both the engagement and the representation of civil society organizations and networks shifted from monitoring to active participation in governance. Signs of an emerging internationalism built around global social movements and a world public opinion can be viewed in the context of the associational revolution of the 1990s. JOHN FOSTER (2001) emphasizes that the development of social movements, NGOs and civil society organizations is uneven worldwide, but their growth in numbers and in reach around the world is unquestioned. We can employ the elaboration of globalization in terms of extensity, intensity, velocity and impact to the evolution and development of civil society since the 1990s. FOSTER has a strong argument when he claims that the associational revolution is extended by an organizational revolution on the part of civil society.

6.5. *The Social EntrepreneurHybrid*

"If you can capture the youth and change the way they think, then you can change the future."

With the American presidential campaign in full swing, the obvious way to change the world might seem to be through politics.

But growing numbers of young people are leaping into the fray and doing the job themselves. These are the social entrepreneurs, the 21st-century answer to the student protesters of the 1960s, and they are some of the most interesting people here at the World Economic Forum…

Today the most remarkable young people are the social entrepreneurs, those who see a problem in society and roll up their sleeves to address it in new ways. …

… Only one person can become president of the United States, but there's no limit to the number of social entrepreneurs who can make this planet a better place. (KRISTOF: 2008.)

The expansive development of civil society has been documented by, among others, a Johns Hopkins study of eight developed countries that found employment in the civil sector grew two and a half times faster than for the overall economy, between 1990 and 1995. This worldwide mobilization of citizens is new in several respects: It is occuring on a scale never before seen; organizations are more globally dispersed and diverse than in the past and increasingly, we find organizations moving beyond local solutions to more systemic approaches to problems. (SMITH and BORGMANN: 2001.)

Citizen organizations are less constrained by the church and state in their activities and can exert considerable pressure. They are forging partnerships with businesses, academic institutions, and governments – and, in many cases, refining the government's and international organization's representational function and accountability. This formerly restricted sector has suddenly opened up and new players are crowding onto the field. As a result, the citizen sector is experiencing the beneficial effects of entrepreneurialism, increased competition and collaboration, and a heightened attention to performance and efficiency. (BORNSTEIN: 2004, p. 5.)

This rapid, multi-level mobilization of civil actors has been attributed to the withdrawal of state responsibility from its traditional scope of activities. Some tasks have moved upwards towards supranational structures, like the EU and UN agencies, while others have moved downwards to subnational units of organization. Civil society development, in this context, is seen as the required response to the decreasing ability and willingness of the state to provide welfare services and functions.

Along with the emergence of what is now termed "global civil society," a variety of other terms, in fact a new vocabulary, has evolved to better understand and describe what is happening. One of the terms that has struck a responsive cord is the term "social entrepreneurship". GREGORY DEES maintains that:

> … [social entrepreneurship] is a phrase well suited to our times. It combines the passion of a social mission with an image of business-like discipline, innovation, and determination commonly associated with, for instance, the high tech pioneers of Silicon Valley. The time is certainly ripe for entrepreneurial approaches to social problems. Many governmental and philanthropic efforts have fallen far short of our expectations. Major social sector institutions are often viewed as inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive. Social entrepreneurs are needed to develop new models for a new century. (DEES: 1998.)

Identifying and solving large-scale problems requires a special kind of social change agent operating in the civil sphere. The unique personality identified here as such a change agent is termed "social entrepreneur" because the entrepreneurial personality has the committed vision and inexhaustible determination to persist until an entire (educational, ecological, health care, etc.) system has been transformed. Social entrepreneurs go beyond immediate problem solving, beyond offering a local solution to a local problem, to fundamentally changing communities, societies, and entire sytems. Social entrepreneurs have a profound effect on their societies and their presence is on the rise today along with the rise in civil activity globally.

The term"entrepreneur" originated in 17th-18th century France. It refers to someone who "shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and yield." (DRUCKER: 1993, p. 21.) In the 19th century, the

French economist, JEAN BATISTE SAY called entrepreneurs "the venturesome individuals who stimulated economic progress by finding better ways of doing things." In the 20th century, JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER styled entrepreneurs as innovators and the source of creative destruction necessary for economic advances. In his words, "the function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production" and they do this by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on." (SCHUMPETER: 1984.)

Although the term has been prominently extolled by economists, starting up a business is not the core of the notion. The role of the entreprenuer is seen as a catalyst and innovator for progress in a variety of fields, both economic and social. Entrepreneurs may not necessarily cause change in business, but they have the ability to exploit opportunities (in technology, consumer preferences, social norms) that do create change. Entrepreneurs are able to mobilize the resources of others to achieve their goals.

The term "social entrepreneur" has gained popularity in recent years. Even universities like Stanford and Harvard offer courses on the subject of social entrepreneurship. The term is increasingly invoked by journalists, politicians, philanthropists and development experts. In most analyses emphasis is placed on how business and management skills can be applied to achieve social goals. This view recognizes social entrepreneurs as "transformative forces;" people with new ideas to address major problems who are relentless in the pursuit of their visions. People who will not give up until their idea for social change has spread to replace unresponsive and archaic systems with new systems that work for the benefit of more people.

One of the most well-known examples is the Grameen Bank and its founder, MUHAMMAD YUNUS, who won the the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. The Grameen Bank originated in the mid-1970s when MUHAMMAD YUNUS launched an action research project to examine the possibility of designing a credit delivery system to provide banking services targeted at the rural poor. The Grameen Bank has reversed conventional banking practice by removing the need for collateral and created a banking system based on mutual trust, accountability, participation and creativity. MUHAMMAD YUNUS reasoned that if financial resources could be made available to

poor people on terms and conditions that were appropriate and reasonable, "millions of small people with their millions of small pursuits can add up to create the biggest development wonder." As of September, 2007, it has 7.31 million borrowers, 97% of whom are women. With 2,462 branches, the Grameen Bank provides services in 79,925 villages, covering more than 95% of the total villages in Bangladesh.

This created a revolution in the field of micro-credit. The model has been taken up and applied to developing countries throughout the world, and most recently in the EU. MUHAMMAD YUNUS is a quintessential example of a social entrepreneur: he identifies a problem, experiments to refine a systemic transformation, implements and continually revises the new practice while all the time feedback, transparency and accountability to constituencies are kept high priorities.

Instead of concentrating on how ideas move people, the focus of social entrepreneurship is on how people move ideas. Social entrepreneurs envision a solution to a social problem and with sustained energy and focus eventually overcome resistance until a marginalized idea has become the norm. Working in much the same way as business entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs adopt a mission to create and sustain social capital. They recognize and relentlessly pursue new opportunities to serve that mission. By taking risks and acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in hand, they engage in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation, and learning. Characteristically, they exhibit a heightened sense of accountability to the constituencies they serve and for the impact of their programs.

Social entrepreneurs are the reformers and revolutionaries described by SCHUMPETER, but with a social mission. They make fundamental changes in the way things are done in the social sector. They attack the underlying causes of problems, rather than treating the symptoms of those problems. They may operate locally as MUHAMMAD YUNUS, but their impact has the potential to stimulate global improvements in the fields of education, healthcare, or economic development like micro-finance.

According to WILLIAM DRAYTON, who is recognized as the individual who first popularized the term social entrepreneur, there are five essential components which distinguish social entrepreneurs from others who work in the social sphere. These characteristics have evolved through a study of business skills that have been adapted to the social environment. The first component is a powerful new system-

changing idea. The second is found in the attribute of both goal-setting and problem solving creativity. The third is the potential for spread of the idea as a model and its replication for widespread impact. The fourth is specifically the entrepreneurial quality that is required to engineer large-scale systemic social change. The fifth is that social entrepreneurs exhibit a strong ethical core because fundamental social change requires those affected to take many leaps of faith which individuals will not take if they do not innately trust the proponent of such change. In a business sense, the role of a social entrepreneur is more related to leadership than to management. This last feature can be one of the missing elements in traditional developmental philosophy.

Unless societies can be brought on board and carried along as partners, implementation of radical economic and social changes have little chance for success. As a strategy, involving local populations in the solutions to their own problems allows for the transfer of knowledge in both directions: both towards the social groups to be affected and back again in the form of feedback and local knowledge to the change makers. Therefore, we can say that social entrepreneurship extends the definition of entrepreneurship by its emphasis on ethical integrity and maximizing social capital rather than private profit.

6.5.1. *Social Entrepreneurs: Three Studies in Disruptive Innovation*

> The reasonable man adapts himself to the world, the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man. (GEORGE BERNARD SHAW.)

The disruptive innovation is one of the most important innovation theories of the last decade developed by Harvard professor CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN in his book *The Innovator's Dilemma*. The central dichotomy of Christensen's work is that of *sustaining* and *disruptive* innovation. Christensen's theory, applied to the economic sphere, can be applied to describe innovation in the social sphere, because social entrepreneurs appear to use a similar strategy when tackling social/structural change. They disrupt existing services or invent new services by implementing a new structural change in society.

In their new book ELKINGTON, HARTIGAN AND SCHWAB: 2008, show how social entrepreneurs are disrupting existing industries, value chains, and business models and creating fast-growing new markets around the world. What follows are three profiles of social entrepreneurs working in three different fields, in three different countries. They are disrupting existing systems and creating structural changes in their societies and beyond.

Electronic and computer-based communications and information systems have opened up new opportunities for many in education, employment and leisure activities, and the "global village," is becoming more than virtual. It is all too clear that the benefits of globalization are not being evenly distributed, accessed or shared. In countries like Brazil, where there is widespread poverty and where the education system can not keep up with the challenges and demands of globalization, the question of access to technology and to its benefits has increased the polarization of society.

RODRIGO BAGGIO BARRETO was born and raised in Rio de Janeiro. Because his father worked in a department for information management he was exposed to computers at an early age and clearly saw their potential in the *favelas* where he did volunteer work with street children when he was growing up. While attending university, he combined his interest in computers with his commitment to social justice. He now spearheads a growing movement that equips young people in low-income communities with the computer skills they need to gain access to modern society and employment.

After the successful completion of pilot training programs in two favelas in Rio de Janeiro in early 1995, Rodrigo and a small group of volunteers established a more permanent organization for the work that began to grow exponentially. After only two years, his remarkable "schools of computer science and citizenship" had expanded to 15 sites in Rio de Janeiro, while 10 more schools launched the project in other parts of the country (São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Paraná and Bahia). By early 1997, more than 5,000 students had participated in and completed the three-month courses.

The engine of the rapid expansion is a group of volunteers that have formed NGOs in many parts of the country. At the request of community groups located in the *favelas* and low-income communities, volunteers carefully and systematically

help to establish the computer schools. This entails feasibility studies, teacher training, and the acquisition, installation and maintenance of donated hardware. They also prepare their community clients for becoming self-sustaining.

The program pays qualified teachers a salary of about $200 per month which is more than twice the average salary of a teacher in a public school. Students, who are mostly teenagers or in their early 20s, pay approximately $10/month for courses in word processing, accounting, computer graphics, etc. Classes are held in rooms supplied for free by churches, community organizations and schools.

Many graduates from the program find new, well-paying and computer-related jobs. Others have gained employment in areas that were closed to them without computer skills. Many participants, with a heightened sense of self-worth, have gained or regained an interest in formal schooling, resisting the temptation to join street gangs. Many of them are also working in various community activities lke AIDS awareness and health campaigns.

The program has attracted considerable media attention (you can google his name and find 79,300 shots!), and many more communities are awaiting the implementation of such a school in their area. There is alot of support from the business community, in the form of donated equipment and financial contributions, and government agencies also provide modest subsidies for the program's expansion.

This strategy strongly emphasises self-management, financial independence and sustainability in each computer school. Teachers' salaries and facility maintenance fees are generated partly from student fees, but also from other sources. Graduates are encouraged after school hours to provide computer-generated services for local communities for which they receive a fee. Part of this fee they retain, and part of it goes back into financing and expanding the program activities.

To facilitate ongoing geographic expansion, Rodrigo set up working groups which include private, secondary and university teachers of computer science who must train and certify teachers for his computer schools. Others work helping communities to develop new schools, acquire equipment donations and maintain equipment throughout the network of schools. They also spread information about the program through a "home page," and a "bulletin board". The keys to success are the sharing and spreading of information and experience and they are encouraged to develop plans and proposals to work with private and public sector organizations.

This nation-wide initiative has worked out strategic public and private partnerships with the Foundation for Children and Adolescents, the city government of Rio de Janeiro and the national government to set up new programs.

Recent studies show how difficult it is to bridge the digital divide. In Brazil, fewer than 16% of households own computers and only 12.2% have access to the Internet. The majority of computer technology is concentrated in the federal capital, the south, and southeast. According to a 2004 study of 183 nations by the International Telecommunications Union. Brazil placed 65th in Internet connectivity, behind Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico. The high cost of personal computers, poor computer training in the classroom and inconsistent public policies are the main reasons why middle and lower income Brazilians are still outsiders in the modern information society.

The results of Rodrigo's work by 2007:

- Almost one million children at risk have been trained in computer and internet skills;

- His organization has established a network of over 200 self-managed computer schools in the urban slums of 17 Brazilian states;

- His program has expanded to other countries, including Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, and Argentina;

- They annually train approximately 28,000 new students.[28]

There is an urgent need to broaden access to the technologies of the new digital age in order to improve economic opportunities and participation in new globalized spaces. That is why any program that addresses the digital divide is in the forefront of the battle for increasing social justice globally. This struggle also has ramifications for the consolidation of democracy in weakly democratic or newly democratic societies by strengthening local communities and equalizing opportunities for young people.

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[28] Rodrigo Bagio has won numerous, prestigious, international awards. For more information on him and his Committee for the Democratization of Information Technology see, e.g.: www.ashoka.org, www.schwabfound.org, www.youtube.com, www.socialedge.org,.

Michal Kravcík loved nature since he was a child growing up in then Czechoslovakia. He was recognized and awarded several times when a student for his innovative approaches to complex issues. After the "velvet revolution" in 1989, he left the Institute of Hydrology and Landscape Ecology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences because he feared that the new government's water policy was a repetition of the old, communist policy. He knew, however, that he had to accumulate both the scientific evidence and public support to implement his ideas. This came to fruition in Tichy Potok

MICHAL KRAVCÍK[29] is an internationally known hydrologist and has developed the "Blue Alternative". This is a water management policy based on the utilization of many small catchments (reservoirs and depressions) to store water. Locally-managed water resources, utilizing many small catchments to absorb and store water, proved to be more cost-effective, efficient, and environmentally safe than mega-dam projects

Transfering control of water resources from the central government to local self-government runs entirely against official, traditional Slovak water management policy, that since the 1950s emphasized the construction of large dams. This is the case in nearly all the post-communist countries of East and Central Europe.The government rejected his alternative, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that his idea could produce enough water. The test case and site for his ground-breaking idea was near the 700-year-old village of Tichy Potok, in the Slovak mountains where, in 1992, the government intented, against the rejection by 98% of the local population, to build a massive dam.

Dams constructed in Slovakia over the past five decades destroyed more than 200 square kilometers of river systems and inundated adjacent wetland areas. They have also led to the forced relocation of more than 100,000 people. Many of the designs for the dam projects were based on inaccurate data and driven by ideology rather than practical needs. Social and environmental damage, and large financial costs far exceeded any benefits that may have been derived from their construction.

Most transition countries in East and Central Europe are burdened with the legacy of poor resource management. For example, water use per capita in East and Central European cities is higher than in most West European cities, often exceeding

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[29] For more on Michal Kravcik, see, e.g., www.goldmanprize.org, www.myhero.com.

300 liters per day. As much as 30% of the water supply is lost through leaking supply pipes and inefficient facilities.

The core to Michal's alternative water management policy is the revitalization of the existing landscape in order to store and absorb water through the construction of many small catchments, to create wetlands and ponds to slow runoff, and to establish supportive agricultural and forest-management practices. In spite of official opposition, Michal's strategy consisted of three major components: 1) a pilot project in the Tichy Potok region to demonstrate the feasibility of his alternative water supply system; 2) an energetic public review of the dam proposal, with special attention to the role of information and the importance of the media; and 3) the development of new management and financial systems to empower local citizens so they could assume more responsibility for their own development.

A citizens' organization was formed from the six villages in the area called "People and Water." With funding from NGOs and local governments, People and Water organized a camp in the summer of 1996 where a group of international volunteers from Canada, the Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine and the United States, as well as Slovakia, built sixteen small dams, three lakes and channels to increase infiltration of surface water in a fourteen-hectare watershed. People and Water used the media extensively and informed journalists throughout the duration of the campaign. By October 1996, the government put an end to the campaign, saying they were operating without a permit. People and Water responded by increasing even more media attention to the affair, which by this time had attracted substantial attention and coverage. Very soon the dam project had turned into a major headache for the national water company.

People and Water followed up with a series of town meetings where they questioned the legality of the government's plan for the proposed dam project. Residents of the villages in the area, local and national politicians, water company representatives, agricultural and environmental ministers, scientists and media representatives participated at these meetings. To take part in open discussion with state officials was a new experience for everyone, including the state officials. Opposition was made public and democratic mechanisms were strengthened in the process. The Ministry of the Environment revoked its earlier support for the state's plan and the proposal to build the dam was dropped in November 1996.

Michal started by carefully monitoring to gather evidence that his approach could generate enough water even as consumer demand increased in the cities downstream from Tichy Potok. The "Blue Alternative" also increased the ecological stability and biodiversity of the region by not requiring sophisticated equipment and large inputs of energy. It cost approximately 20% of the costs related to the dam construction and, in addition, implemented by local people, it provides jobs in an area where unemployment is twice the Slovak average. The community base of this project has changed the terms of the water management debate. Meanwhile, working also with the state authorities, he encouraged the water company to adopt policies for more efficient water use and repair leaks in the system.

In order to increase the empowerment of local communities and their development, Michal has developed a citizens' project called Village for the Third Millenium. It promotes privatization with a civic twist: the local governments in the Tichy Potok area set up a corporation through which they collectively manage the revitalization of their water resources and sell water to distribution networks downstream. The income generated is used to maintain the system and is a source of assistance for local governments and matching grants for local development initiatives. The Third Millenium project set up an education center for training in agriculture, alternative energy resource use and agro-tourism. It also publishes a bi-monthly newspaper.

Michal's dissemination strategy concentrates on two target groups. The first target group is the professional and academic community. With that community in view, he organized two summer schools related to his "Blue Alternative," in collaboration with the Technical University in Kosice, and he is in contact with the Dutch-sponsored International River Environmental Project. The second target group is the general public, which is addressed and served by extensive media coverage of public events including, for example, the public auction of children's paintings on the theme "Living Water."

The decision reached at Tichy Potok was the first time in 50 years that local Slovak communities took an independent decision about the land on which they live. The project generates community stewardship of land which had been collectivized and had caused widespread economic and environmental destruction. It was the beginning of local empowerment that stretched across to other areas. In Michal's words, "We are trying to show people that the cornerstone of democracy is speaking

up for what you want, but there isn't a long history of that in Slovakia, and people are afraid. In the past, people suffered serious repercussions like losing a job if they spoke against the government. Tichy Potok is not just about water. It is about [creating] alternatives."

FERENC ORSOS belongs to the group of gypsies called Beash and comes from a large family of eight children. His mother was a traditional Roma mother, and his father and most of his brothers are manual laborers. He was never encouraged in school but had the will and desire to succeed in spite of all the obstacles.

The continuous and overt efforts of the Hungarian government to assimilate the Roma minority have had a devastating effect on Roma children. Many have lost a strong sense of their identity and refuse to speak their language, because they are ashamed of their Roma roots or are not encouraged to do so. In some cases, the self-hate these children feel is so strong that they cut off all ties to their families in the belief that this is the only way in which they can succeed.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of Roma do not flourish in the school environment, and they very rarely reach institutions of higher education. Only one half of one percent of all Roma young people reach the university level. Although enrollments in primary and secondary schools have improved since the transition, there has been little to no improvement in university or technical school enrollment of the Roma.

Often Roma children are classified as either mentally retarded or handicapped and are placed in special classes or institutions from which it is hard to escape the stigma of "otherness" and live productive lives. This is because, first of all, the Roma culture is different in many respects to the Hungarian culture and is viewed by the majority as different and often inferior. At the same time, living in regions of the country with high unemployment is a grave problem. Roma families were the most vulnerable to the structural economic changes that have taken place. In some regions and cities, Roma unemployment reaches 100%. The elements are in place for a cycle of poverty, alcoholism, and despair. Roma children grow up as a disadvantaged group in disadvantaged areas of Hungary with much of main stream society, including educational institutions, working against them.

Poverty, large families, and chronic unemployment put the vast majority of Roma children at risk for poor academic performance. In response to the problem of

Roma education, the Hungarian parliament passed legislation that mandates schools to provide minority education programs. The Hungarian parliament, did not, however, offer an example of the curriculum or teacher training that would be necessary to put the new laws into practice. As a result, even those teachers wishing to implement Roma-centric components in their classroom lessons, do not know how to do so. Instead, the extra funds that the government provides for minority education programs goes to teachers in the form of hardship pay for those who have Roma students. **The inability of the official state educational system to provide the necessary educational curricula and training predestines the Roma children to failure.**

In response to the mounting problem of Roma education, Ferenc developed a Roma-centric curriculum designed to instill pride and dignity in the Roma children of Central and Eastern Europe. Through his program, which operates both in the classroom and at home, he strives to ensure that 1) Roma children succeed in school and 2) that the Roma culture will survive well into the 21st century. Taking advantage of the new, post-1989, Hungarian legislation that requires schools to implement minority education programs, Ferenc Orsos launched a program to train teachers in the special techniques he has developed and refined over a seven years to teach Roma children. His work represents one of the first serious attempts within the Hungarian educational system to address the needs of the most under-served and disadvantaged minority group in Hungary and Central and Eastern Europe. Ferenc's work goes beyond simply wanting to improve the test scores of Roma children. He is fighting to preserve his people's cultural heritage, which is disappearing in this era of globalization and cultural homogenization.

When Ferenc began working with Roma children in 1979 he soon realized that it was very difficult for them to keep up with the demands of school, and he eventually found that their lack of knowledge about their own culture was directly linked to their failure, because of its relationship to self-esteem and self-confidence. In the beginning he developed courses on Roma identity for the primary schools. When asked to describe his approach to education, he likes to give the example of a young boy he taught in the town of Csapi. A young boy named Imre was failing in school. Ferenc managed to turn the boy around and change his attitude about school by first teaching him about Roma folklore. He helped the boy memorize Roma songs and stories, and then he incorporated them into the boy's lessons. This approach to

learning helped improve the boy's performance, and he became a very successful student. With his improved self-image, he also began to win the acceptance of his non-Roma classmates and take his rightful place among his cohort.

Based upon this type of success, Ferenc developed a program that can be implemented by teachers in their classrooms. He has also developed after school programs that employ members of a Roma student's extended family as mentors who teach them about their culture as well as teachers who help them with the academic side of their studies. Because Ferenc's model has been successful, schools are now inviting him to implement his program so that they can fulfill the requirements under the minority education law.

The use of cultural mythology and indigenous languages to instill a sense of ethnic pride is not new, but Ferenc's work is more complicated because, unlike other historically oppressed minorities and their cultures, Roma culture has always been held in the lowest regard by all other groups in the region. The Roma have always been considered and viewed as the quintessential "Other" in East and Central Europe.

In his program, therefore, he must combat the sense of self-loathing that many children have about their culture and identity. By teaching Roma students about their cultural heritage, through music, dance, and mythology, Ferenc and the "patrons" and "mentors" he recruits to work with children after school, are building awareness, self-confidence, and pride in the Roma heritage. Ferenc has found that these qualities directly increase a child's chances for academic success. The goal is for Roma children to be able to comfortably take an equal place in the Hungarian educational system and society-at-large without sacrificing their special cultural identity. Ferenc has witnessed a renaissance of Roma culture among the Roma youth he has worked with, and he believes that an ambitious young nation is on the horizon.

6.5.2. *A Framework for Success: Strategies that Work*

Successful strategies for the implemetation of structural innovations are listed below and are the conclusions of the research conducted in the field of social entrepreneurship. The list of best practices is, however, globally applicable.

A New Idea. The new idea can comprise the following: Fundamental System Change: An idea that alters the fundamental characteristics of an existing system, and has the possibility of worldwide adoption (e.g, micro-credit as pioneered by the Grameen Bank). Sector Specific Strategic Element: An approach that consists of one or more new strategic element(s) that modify some existing practises in a particular sector (housing, environment-water management, micro-enterprise). Comprehensive/Integrated Strategy: A strategy focused on combining an array of existing services (cultural heritage preservation). Although no single service is revolutionary, the integration of services is a more effective way to achieve impact. Importation/Adaptation: An approach that a social entrepreneur observed outside of his/her local context. The innovation lies in the way that the social entrepreneur has adapted the approach to the local context.

Social Impact. Social impact can be defined in terms of numbers of beneficiaries of certain new services, but also in terms of the comprehensive and multi-faceted nature of a new approach. The past two decades has seen an extraordinary explosion of entrepreneurship and competition in the social sector. The social sector has discovered what the business sector learned from technology, markets and the digital revolution: the most powerful force for change in the world is a new idea in the hands of a leading social entrepreneur. This is often highly dependent on the political and economic context in which a social entrepreneur works.

Leveraging Resources not usually tapped. One aspect of effective innovation encompasses accessing resources not normally utilized by traditional organizations such as community-based operations and volunteers. This approach has unexpected results in terms of local empowerment and building up individual and social autonomy.

Strategic Partnerships. Working with networks/Civil-lateral cooperation: In addition to focusing on one critical audience, successful strategies involve the forming of coalitions with many others in order to achieve one's objectives, like in

the Baggio and Kravcik models. This includes sectoral and cross-sectoral linkages. Coalitions with governments and business, for example, are new ways of forming untraditional partnerships in order to increase the impact of a new idea.

Pragmatic Ideology and Certainty that Emphasizes Action and Results. While many civil organizations have entrenched prejudices (for example, against government, against business), some of the most effective approaches and projects do not appear to have these biases and are willing and open to work with a wide array of partners.

Using Market-Based Incentives to Forge Social Change. Successful interventions in the social sector often require the realignment of incentives and flexibility to solve multiple social problems.

Constant Innovation/Strategic Changes. This addresses how flexible strategies are refined based on new opportunities and changes in the political and economic context; and how strategies change in response to feedback.

Operational Efficiency. "Enterprises are enterprises" whether profit-oriented or non-profit. Always seeking to leverage resources, successful social entrepreneurs focus on the means to develop reinforcing layers of efficiency and sustainability.

Geographic Spread Models. Several models need to be advanced to define and locate the nature of social impact. These include: The Franchise Model, Network Model, Third-Party replication, Promoting Broad Awareness, and Creating Centers of Excellence. Consequently, keys to replication rely on identifying what all franchise-like organizations should share (e.g., the philosophy of interacting with clients and responding to feedback), and finding the creative, "intra-preneurial" individuals who can flexibly and innovatively manage these franchises, adapting them to local needs.

Just as it is not sufficient simply to start a new business to be entrepreneurial, not all new actors in civil society can be called social entrepreneurs. Social entrepreneurs play analogous roles to the business entrepreneur in the fields of education, healthcare, environmental protection, disability, human rights, etc. Social entrepreneurs advance systemic change, shifting perceptions and behavior patterns. This has become a global phenomenon because people are encountering similar problems around the world, e.g., inadequate, outdated, inappropriate education and healthcare systems, environmental problems, mistrust in political institutions, etc.

The difference between business and social entrepreneurs is clear. For the social entrepreneur the social mission is explicit and central. The range and depth of impact becomes the central mission, not the accumulation of material wealth. Wealth, put another way, is redefined in social terms: the greatest number served in the best possible, most efficient and sustainable way. In this way the social capital of a society is increased.

7. FUTURE SCENARIOS OR PRESENT REALITY?

7.1. *Safe Within these Walls*

Camp Bondsteel[30] is located in the eastern part of the UN-administered Serbian province of Kosovo, near the town of Uroševac. It is the main base of the United States Army under KFOR command and serves as the NATO headquarters for KFOR's Multinational Task Force East (MNTF-E).

Camp Bondsteel [CBS] is quite large: 955 acres or 360,000 square meters. If you were to run the outer perimeter, it is about 12 kilometers. The base was constructed by flattening out two hills, by removing 150,000 cubic meters of earth that was redistributed to fill in the valley between them. In order to secure the area, trees were removed to allow sufficient fields of fire and nine wooden guard towers were built around the perimeter. The elevated towers improve the soldier's view and line of fire. The entire perimeter is surrounded by an earth wall 2.5 meters high. Altogether about 6,000 soldiers live at Camp Bondsteel. There are another 500 Americans who serve as support staff from Camp Able Sentry in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Camp Bondsteel boasts many facilities for the use of both the soldiers and civilian employees who live and work there. "The post exchange (PX) is the largest military exchange in southeastern Europe and contains all the necessities and more that someone may need while in Kosovo, including TVs, phones, books, DVDs, CDs, small furniture, video games, computers, clothes, shoes, food*, and more* …"[31]

There are two dining facilities, where the food is reported to be very well prepared, offering a variety of dishes, salads, and desserts. Due to General Order #1, only alcohol-free beer is served, but as they say on the website: it is better than nothing! There are set hours for meals, but each dining facility also has a 24-hour section for sandwiches, coffee, fruit, and continental breakfast items.

CBS also claims to have "the best hospital in Kosovo; a movie theater; three gyms; two recreation buildings with phones, computers and Internet connection, pool tables, video games *and more*; two chapels with various religious services and other activities; two large dining facilities; a fire station; a military police station;

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[30] For photos of Camp Bondsteel, see Appendix B.
[31] For direct quotations, see: www.globalsecurity.org.

two cappuccino bars, a Burger King, Taco Bell, and a pizzeria; two barber shops; two laundry facilities employing local nationals who do the laundry for those living on base; two dry cleaners; a sewing shop; two massage shops employing mostly Thai women who conduct various massages and are regulated by military officials; a shoppette that sells snacks and drinks, DVDs and CDs, office products, magazines, and essential personal hygiene items; various local vendors who sell Kosovo souvenirs and products; softball and soccer/football fields; *and more"* [my emphasis].

Soldiers live in SEA (Southeast Asia Huts). There are about 250 SEA Huts for living quarters and offices. The buildings have five living areas that house up to six soldiers each. Each building has one large bathroom with multiple showers and bathroom stalls. The beds are comfortable and each room has its own heating/air conditioning unit. As reported earlier, you can buy almost anything from the PX to make your living space more comfortable. You are recommended to buy an approved surge protector for European voltage to improve the safety of your room, but adaptors, rest assured, are also available.

There are Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) buildings in the north and south parts of the town. The facilities offer billiards, ping-pong, video games, Interenet access and a video teleconference room. They also offer movies to check out and watch on several TVs in the MWR facilities. There are a total of three gyms, two of which have basketball/volleyball courts, exercise equipment, weight machines and free weights. The third gym is strictly for weight lifting.

The two chapels at CBS offer services in several denominations. The Laura Bush Education Center offers college courses to suit your needs. "Want to learn Albanian, Serbian, or German? Improve your computer skills? The variety of college credit and certificate courses is staggering. There are two colleges represented at US base camps: the University of Maryland and Chicago University. For those with easy access to the Internet, online courses are offered too.

CBS has an improved detention facility, with a 75-100 meter temporary structure composed of tents with electricity, heat, and lights. The project also includes a separate shower point and security measures - perimeter fencing, triple-standard concertina wire, locking gates, and an upgraded guard tower. The facility replaced an interim holding cell at Bondsteel and provides space for persons detained in incidents throughout the US sector in Kosovo."

The United States Army has been criticized for using the base as a detention facility, and for the conditions faced by the detainees there. In November 2005, ALVARO GIL-ROBLES, the human rights envoy of the Council of Europe, described the camp as a "smaller version of Guantanamo" following a visit. In response, the US Army stated that there were no secret detention facilities in the Camp and that such criticism is unwarranted since the detention facilities at CBS are *mostly* empty and unutilized [my emphasis].

7.2. *One-Stop, Cradle-to-Grave Living Experience*

On another side of the world, another new development is taking shape on the 200 hectare farm known as Die Bos, 30 km from Cape Town: an entire and completely secure town called Heritage Park. They boast that the entire town is actually bigger than the Mediterranean principality of Monaco! Here the developers plan to "create employment for around 6000 people and homes for a whole new community". And you will be reassured to know that "the natural beauty of the area will not suffer as existing woodlands and mountain streams will be retained while landscaping and beautification around the developments will ensure a pleasing environment …Throughout the town there are several clear mountain streams which have been left to provide a major feature of the town. In the centre of Heritage Park a dam has been stocked with trout and hundreds of water birds have adopted the lake as their sanctuary."[32] The development which began in 1996 is planned to house 1,500 residents.

Like all other towns, it will have homes, sports facilities, theater, schools, shops, offices, churches, parks. The school is of particular interest because it combines a unique blend of internationalism and the ethos of Christian love and care which underpins its discipline and relationships. Its balanced curriculum is based on the UK National Curriculum, leading to University of Cambridge IGCSE and A level certification which has proved to be attractive to both citizens and overseas visitors alike.

"The difference is that the whole town will be secured by an electrified perimeter fence monitored by the town's own security force. Although an attractive

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[32] All quotations taken from: www.heritageprk.com.

pallisade style, the fence is forcefully electrified to deter even the most insistent intruder and it is monitored every 200 metres.

In essence its: "Back to the future! We have taken a leaf or two out of the medieval past and placed it in our future. To be precise we have stolen the concept of whole town fortification to create a crime free state".

And there is more!: "*A whole team of hand picked security guards will be on duty and security boxes will be positioned at every entry gate.* Anyone living, working or doing business inside Heritage Park will do so in the knowledge that their homes, children and property are as safe as they can possibly be" [my emphasis].

The development has just four access points, each with a manned sentry post. To enter, residents have to produce an electronic "smart card" and visitors must have security clearance before being allowed inside. In addition, panic buttons and alarms are an optional extra in each home and business, and the entire complex is under surveillance by security cameras.

7.3. *Contemporary Global Metaphors*

Both Camp Bondsteel and Heritage Park can be taken as metaphors of the contemporary world. Camp Bondsteel is the atttempt to create order out of disorder and Heritage Park is an escape from disorder. Heritage Park represents one of many kinds of escape from an increasingly polarized world shaped by market growth and affluence for the few without emancipation and justice for the many. Most of this goes unrecognized by the lucky minority ensconced and isolated behind more and more physical and mental walls of rejection and protection.

In a study from the World Institute for Development and Economics, a research center of the United Nations University, it is claimed that by the year 2000, the richest 10% of the world owned 85% of household wealth, whereas the poorest 50% owned barely 1% of the wealth. (DAVIES, et.al.: 2006.)

There are many Heritage Parks around the world and over 700 American military bases in 130 countries around the globe.[33] These developments are reflected

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[33] This is a low estimate. The number of bases globally is probably closer to 1000, with 6000 bases in the US and its territories. See, Johnson (2004).
Around 1000

in the wall between Israel and the Palestinians, between the US and Mexico, and the proposed barrier between India and Bangladesh. The extreme divisions of wealth and security leads to desperation, radicalization, and emigration.

When confronted daily with wars, terrorism, climate change and global warming, storms, tsunamis, fires, fuel shortages, pandemics, it is no wonder that those who can opt for life in closed and secure communities do; while those that cannot become radicalized. Both are attempts to go back to a simpler time when simpler rules determined the course of our lives.

MARY KALDOR describes Iraq today as being divided into a "Green Zone" and a "Red Zone".(ANHEIER, et. al.: 2005, pp. 1ff.) The Green Zone is where the Americans and their coalition partners are housed. It is a suburb of Baghdad, heavily guarded, with fountains and palaces, palm trees and grass. In the Green Zone, American and British officials, who are not allowed to leave the zone, plan the future of Iraq. There are notices everywhere that ask: "What have you done for the Iraqi people today?" The Iraqi government and ministries are housed partly in the Green Zone and partly in mini-Green Zones throughout the city – in buildings that are heavily guarded. The illusion of security crumbles in daily press reports about incursions into these zones with disastrous effects. Neither the Green or Mini-Green Zones are completely secure.

The rest of Iraq is the Red Zone. It is full of human activity – people, shops, meetings, kidnappers and bombs. In the Red Zone there is debate and self-organization, extremism and crime. There is deep mistrust and suspicion here of those in the Green Zone who are blamed for everything. Consequently, many people find it easier to sympathize with the insurgents than with the Coalition forces. There is a refusal to believe this in the Green zones. MARY KALDOR traveled several times to Iraq and is reporting on what she has seen and experienced there.

The Iraqi Green Zones and the Red Zones are taken as metaphors to describe the gulf that exists on a global scale between the Global Green Zones (Camp Bondsteel, Heritage Park), where the political and global elites live and meet around boardroom tables and at summits, and the Global Red Zones – a heterogeneous complex world characterised by tension, frustration, despair, humiliation and powerlessness, where most of the world can be found.

For KALDOR, and many of us, the war in Iraq starkly revealed this gulf between Global Green and Red Zones. The global debate about Iraq has had a

powerful impact on domestic debates and politics, not only in countries that sent coalition forces, but also in Mulim countries where conflict between different factions became worse like in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and also in Latin America, for example, where the global role of the US is hotly contested. KALDOR reminds us that today the real choices are not about embracing or rejecting globalization, but between multilateralism and unilateralism, between cosmopolitanism and particularism.

Three possible frameworks are outlined in ANHEIER, et. al: 2005. One is designated "Global America," and described as the deep entrenchment of American political, social and cultural institutions in key countries and institutions of the world (like the UN, the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank). The paradox is that the US, which has been instrumental in making globalization possible, is increasingly unwilling to live as a citizen in the very world it has created. This can be observed in the unilateral use of force that has contributed to the gap between the Green and the Red Zones and increased global insecurity. This is termed one form of "regressive globalization".

A second possible framework is "Global Islam," and describes the reaction of Islamic elites and militants to internal modernization failures by seeking to establish a more global cultural and political presence in the name of religious devotion and tradition. Global Islam exports internal conflicts and failures to the outside world (to the US and Europe, but also to Africa and Asia). It is termed as another form of "regressive globalisation".

The final possible framework that is outlined is the victory of multilateralism and what is called the "reformist" and "supportive" tendencies in global civil society. This includes a vigorous and vibrant global civil society combined with a loose international order (for example, a reformed UN system), permeable and multicultural nation states, with the rise of regional governments such as the EU and other regional formations like the Mercosur and ASEAN, and a strong presence of global market institutions and corporations. One of the criticisms of this outlook is that it takes the normative stance that all civil society is "good" civil society.

The real "clash of civilizations", according to MOHAMED EL-SAYED SAID, was found in the gap between Global America and global civil society during the time leading up to the Iraq war and was greater than the conflict between Global America

and Global Islam.[34] The continuing war in Iraq is played out as a conflict between two forms of regressive globalization. On the one side are the supporters of Global America. On the other side is a mixture of militants from the former Iraqi regime and from extreme Islamic groups, who are beginning to coalesce around a kind of new Islamic nationalism.

MOHAMED EL-SAYED SAID argued that

> … the spectacular rise of the anti-war movement during 2002–3 was instrumental in preventing the full triumph of the "clash of civilizations" and "crusade" theories in Arab minds. Furthermore, global civil society offered a brilliant opportunity for voicing Arab protests against injustices seen to be inflicted upon the Arab world by the present international system. As a result, there was "a shift in position towards global civil society by a small but growing segment of the Islamic movement." (EL-SAYED SAID: 2005, pp. 60-61.)

The West, therefore, was no longer seen as monolithic. The involvement of Muslims along with Western peace activists offered a political space where it was possible to oppose both American neoconservatism and fundamentalist Islam. Resolution of this conflict is approached in an analysis of the mediation of the construction and expansion of global and cosmopolitan identities.

7.4. *Global and Cosmopolitan vs. National and Parochial*

An important part of the inquiry reported in *Global Civil Society 2004/5* is the impact of globalization on self-formation. I feel this report is so important to discussions about the future path of globalization that I want to present and discuss it briefly here. The report confirms that more people, in more parts of the world are imagining lives for themselves with a greater range of possibilities than ever before and increasingly dissociating their identity from territorial communities; but the findings reveal important regional differences. The information the study provides on these shifting identities, is indeed, relevant to the discussion of constructing mechanisms for governing globalization, since identification – be it nationally- or

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[34] This has also been dealt with by BENJAMIN BARBER: 1996.

regionally-based – could be said to impede the formulation of more global structures. Identities are shifting globally, but to varying degrees and at different speeds. Here is a summary of the survey findings:

- South Asia (India) saw an increase in national identity and a decrease of local identity, as did Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, South Africa), but with a decline in supranational identity.

- Europe sees the emergence of a dual identity whereby over half of the respondents state "national and European" or "European and national" as opposed to national identities alone. What is more, the dual identity is more pronounced among younger people (51%) than Europeans aged 55 and above (42%); and more among the well-educated (57%) than the ess well-educated (39%).

When they looked at identification as "Global Citizen", respondents were split between one-quarter who regarded themselves as global citizens and three-quarters who did not. Global citizens are most frequent in Germany, Canada, Russia, the UK, Italy, Sweden, and South Korea, with about one-third of respondents, and least frequent in Indonesia, Brazil and Chile, with about one in ten.

Globally, there was not a significant shift in national versus global identities, but national identities seem stronger in weaker economies and more peripheral countries, as well as among poorer population groups. This creates more opportunities for exploitation by the regressive globalism embodied in Global Islam or nationalism in the US. It is therefore not surprising that more global, cosmopolitan and supranational identities seemed to be more prevalent in more developed countries, and among the more educated and wealthy.

When they compared religiosity around the world, it turned out that both secularization and religious revival are occuring simultaneously, although religious belief or religiosity seems to effect more people than secularization.

- There is greater importance attached to religion in Nigeria, South Africa, India, and Mexico.

- A rise in religion is much less evident in most of Central and Eastern Europe.

- A slight increase in religiosity can be detected in the US.

- The growth of religion in Asia, the Middle East and Africa is less with institutional structures like the Catholic Church, but within less institutional religions like Protestantism and Islam.

- In Western Europe, by contrast, the importance of religion dropped in 12 out of 14 countries, with only Portugal showing an increase, and Sweden basically steady.

In conclusion, they state that the world is drifting apart on the issue of religion and this could have ramifications for the globalization of civil society since the countries of northwest Europe, identified as the centers of globalization and of global civil society, are moving in an opposite direction to the rest of the world. (ANHEIER, et.al.: 2005.) Therefore, it is of utmost importance to facilitate a dialogue between secular and religious worldviews in order to support and enhance the development of global civil society in the future. Global civil society is seen as one mechanism for crossing the chasm between the Global Red and Green Zones. It consists of various channels – groups, movements, organizations – through which people living in the Red Zone try to influence the elites in the Green Zones, by first of all attempts at democratic accountability.

What may be happening is the reformulation of globalization − a redefining of sovereignty and democracy in a global context. Globalization does not mean the end of the state, or the emergence of a global government. The state is changing and being transformed, in different ways and at different speeds, and what has been described as governance without government is emerging as a new kind of global politique, with its consequent regional (e.g., EU) and global public spaces, with the state as one among many actors. This new, multi-layered, multi-level, multi-sectoral construction has penetrating and fundamental implications for democracy. It would entail promoting and empowering local communities in order that they be able to shoulder the burdens traditionally assigned to the province of national authorities. Citizens and local networks of citizens need to become stakeholders in terms of public policy construction and mediation, implementation and management.

8. A CALL FOR CHANGE

As the world becomes more interdependent, both states and other global actors have greater obligations. The state-centered model of accountability must be extended to the obligations of non-state actors (such as the transnational corporations) and to the state's obligations beyond national borders. Global rules are being developed in all areas, from human rights to environment and trade. But they are developing separately, with the potential of conflict. (BLAHÓ: 2001.)

Some critics want to put the genie of globalization back into the bottle of the nation state, but there is no way to turn the clock back. Globalization has brought benefits, including an active global civil society that is increasingly becoming an effective watch dog of global economic and political institutions, striving for more democracy and justice at the local, national and regional levels. The problem can be identified not with globalization itself, but with who and how it is governed.

In BLAHÓ (2001) the issues that must be confronted and the articulation of a new development paradigm are clearly framed and can be summarized as follows:

Globalization is private-sector driven, yet responsibility for its effects in both economic and social terms is the duty of nation states. Since TNCs increasingly operate worldwide, they owe little to national governments, but they need to be mobilized to support social rights. The public sector is far behind the private sector in the national and international contexts and societal restructuring is required to catch up with the economy and technology.

Globalization exacerbates the intensity of competition which is increasingly seen as the only way to survive. This extreme competition diminishes diversity in societies and contributes to social exclusion: individuals, enterprises, cities and nations that are not competitive (enough) are marginalized and eliminated. With this loss of diversity, countries loose the necessary capacity to renew themselves. This, in turn, limits their ability to flexibly and innovatively confront and solve problems.

At the same time, while enormous global wealth is being generated in the global economy, the income of many nation states is in decline. A new distributional problem, in terms of resources, has been created. This has occurred at the very

moment when nation states need the resources most to confront and manage the new social needs and demands.

Globalization has intensified outstanding social problems like poverty and income distribution and created a new series of problems like new forms of international crime, the growing gap between rural and and urban, new forms of international migration (also economic and environmental migration, my addition) which can often be linked to civil wars, the lack of economic opportunity, and the drug trade.

While the labor-saving nature of globalization is well documented, there has not been enough attention payed to its labor-creating potential. Attempts must be made to balance labor-saving economic benefits with the social costs of unemployment and social exclusion. A new development paradigm must clearly address these new, concrete problems.

The system based on the international agreements between nation states needs to be globalized. The positive discrimination of economically weak nations also needs to be globalized so more countries and more people can take advantage of the opportunities opened up by globalization and the new technological revolution, at the same time minimizing their negative effects. This entails the global coordination of national social policies instead of their eradication dictated by global economic forces. Nation states need to be empowered as defenders of democratic principles and as vehicles for social self-defense. There is not the equivalent of a global welfare state, but we urgently need the creation of an active international social policy. Social rights and global social and economic development need stronger international action and the international social rights machinery needs to be further strengthened.

What BLAHÓ (2001) recommends is bold new approaches to achieve global social priorities, leading to the reduction of global inequalities and the marginalization of poor countries and people; that nation states need to strengthen their social organization, institutions, legal frameworks and an enabling economic environment, without being dependent on external help. Poverty eradication must be central to all state and international policies and nation states must fulfill their obligations to implement policies that do the most to secure economic and social rights for the most deprived ensuring their participation in decision-making.

Increasing social protection and reducing vulnerability requires the institution of global justice.

JAN AART SCHOLTE, in the final pages of his *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* sets out proposals which give particular emphasis to the development of global public policies through transworld institutions. Some of these are delineated under the subheadings below and may help to focus reform efforts in the areas which touch people's lives most directly. (SCHOLTE: 2005.)

Enhancing human security. On the basis of the two global covenants on human rights (signed in 1966 and in force since 1976), cases could be made against the IMF or WTO, for example, when their measures violate basic rights, if these rights could be legally enforced as a "transplanetary bill of rights". In addition, a global arms control authority which supplements not supplants national governments could impede the development and spread of conventional arms as well as WMD. UN peacekeeping operations could be enhanced to link governments and civil society watchdogs to a conflict prevention division of the Secretariate, thereby with better, on the ground intelligence, reducing the damage of conflicts with faster interventions.

Many suggestions in fact enhance and empower multi-level governance mechanisms, like the provision of financial incentives administered locally, nationally, regionally and globally to encourage the development and use of renewable energies. The creation of a Global Environmental Organization (GEO), for example, could monitor and coordinate activities that are today spread across a multitude of environmental agreements and monitoring agencies.

Global health has received little attention but there has been more discussion recently about access to life saving drugs as being a human right. This puts into question the prioritizing of profit by large pharmaceutical companies at the expense of millions who suffer from AIDs and malaria. New companies with a social conscience are being established as well, for example in India, which produce effective treatments that are affordable for the world's poor and developing countries.

Enhancing social equality. Some interesting proposals include the introduction of a global redistributive taxation system and the abolition of offshore finance. Similarly, to improve the imbalance in North-South global economic decision making, votes in Bretton Woods institutions could be redistributed away

from the major states. This might occur anyway, if pressure from the new economies (India and China) is effective. Other agencies like the OECD could expand and broaden their membership. The abolition of agricultural subsidies in the North is long overdue and alternative trade schemes need to be formulated which would enhance export earnings for poor countries.

Enhancing democracy. Local and national democracies are part of global democracy and strengthening each level strengthens the whole. Further devolution to substate authorities in terms of public participation and accountability in the governance of global flows would better integrate local governments and civil societies in the formulation and execution of policies of global concern. The convening of Civil Forums could help to promote the discussion and debate of complicated issues which is necessary in democracies. We should not assume, however, that local societies are more naturally democratic and all societies can profit from the increased practice of democractic procedures, thus strengthening democratic thoughts and behaviors as well as accountability from the individual on up to the level of global institutions.

Public education about globalization and its governance could also promote democratization by informing citizens of their rights and responsibilities as global citizens. In this civil society can play an important role. Related to public education is the greater need for transparency of relevant policymaking processes to citizens, e.g., employing non-technical, non-bureaucratic language and terminology and translation into local languages. People who are better informed are better able to take responsible decisions at all levels of governance. Efforts also have to be made related to the democratization of private regulatory mechanisms as discussed. Public consultation and evaluation, achieved by greater dialogue with civil society and legislative bodies, could be a step forward towards this end.

The greatest number of proposals for the democratization and governance of globalization lie in the potential of civil society. Supporting and developing civil society could contribute to advances in all the areas outlined above. Therefore, more investment of resources should be secured to realize the potential of civil society at the global level. State and economic actors could improve the depth and breadth of their engagement with civil groups. In the long run this will enhance their own efficiency and acceptance in local environments as well as globally.

In order to acomplish even a minimum of these broad changes, let us look again at the "missing links" in the globalization equation. One of the most valuable, and yet surprisingly most overlooked publications for this discussion was produced by the International Labor Organization entitled, *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All.* (ILO: 2004.) This document is the product of 30 national, regional (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America) and Key Actor (civil society, employers, business leaders) dialogues that took place in 2002-2003. In many areas this report agrees with the suggestions of SCHOLTE, emphasizing that the imbalance between the economy and society is subverting social justice; and the imbalance between the economy and the polity is undermining democratic accountability. They use the term "networked governance" to express the participation of more people on more levels of global agenda setting, policy formation and implementation. In their *Vision for Change* they call for respecting the rights of people, their cultural identity and autonomy, their right to decent work and empowerment of the local communities in which they live. They call for a democratic and effective state that is capable of managing integration into the global economy and providing social and economic opportunity and security. Sustainable development is emphasized as the basis for economic and social development at all levels. Productive and equitable markets require sound institutions to promote opportunity and enterprise in a well-functioning market economy. The rules of the global economy must offer equitable opportunity and access for all countries and recognize the diversity in national capacities and development needs. They see that responsibility to assist countries and people excluded from or disadvantaged by globalization must be shared among cooperating partners. Globalization must help to overcome inequality both within and between countries and contribute to the elimination of poverty. Public and private actors at all levels must be democratically accountable for the policies they pursue and the actions they take. They must deliver on their commitments and use their power with respect for others.

They also emphasize that the many actors that are engaged in the realization of global social and economic goals – international organizations, governments and parliaments, business, labour, civil society – need to dialogue and partnership with each other in order to form the democratic instruments needed to govern globalization. The United Nations needs to be strengthened as a key instrument for

an efficient system of multilateral governance so that it can provide a democratic and legitimate framework for globalization.

This is a call for **a stronger ethical framework.** So far globalization has developed in an ethical vacuum with successful markets being the only measure of success. Market-driven globalization does not promote values like respect for human rights, respect for diversity, protection of our shared natural environment and an awareness of our common humanity. It has instead weakened social trust in institutions at all levels of governance and has indeed weakened our democracies and the very fabric of our societies.

The "invisible wars," bread by global inequalities, tend to generate "visible wars." (SZENTES: 2003, p. 367.) It is good to be reminded here of some of the "historical lessons" mentioned in SZENTES (2003, pp.359-366): about the interaction of internal and external factors of develoment, about acting in time, about the need to reduce asymmetries in interdependence, about increased state responsibility for development, and the need for changing the world system as a whole. There is also the lesson about the need for countervailing forces (mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation), i.e., the need for a civil society for controlling both the state and the market. He concludes that "a truly democratic world order cannot rely on the spontaneity of the market, nor on the dirigism of some state-power. Instead, it must ensure the upper hand to the **global civil society** unfolding and organizing on the world level." (SZENTES: 2003, p. 385).)

A global civil society emerged in the 1990s in part to respond to the most blatant abuses of market-driven globalization. A cohesive global society can be built around shared values which can stimulate the creation of a Global Commons or Global Public Space where a moral and ethical framework can be constructed for private and public behavior. Realizing the shared values upon which our future depends requires the actualization of these values on the parts of both individuals and institutions – all actors participating in globalization (states, markets, civil societies). Accepting these values and responsibilities with the accompanying public scrutiny and accountability that they require should become the platform on which the Global Commons rests.

Global civil society is not, however, a panacea. MICHAEL EDWARDS soberly warns that the outcome of civil society involvement in global governance depends, among other factors, on whose voices are heard in global debates, and "whether civil

groups are effective in playing the roles assigned to them in the evolving international system." (EDWARDS: 2002, p. 72.)

The danger is real: in the absence of accepted rules of the game, the loudest and the strongest groups will dominate.

One of the dangers that is often brought up is the argument that global civil society is not democratically elected and therefore it is neither accountable nor legitimate. Groups and organizations that call themselves "global civil society" and claim to represent world opinion could replace civil activity at the national level, thereby weaking democracy at the local level. Global civil society becomes equated with particular groups that might be described as social movement missionaries (e.g., environmentalists, feminists, human rights activists, economic regulators, sustainable development addicts). They have been chosen by multi-lateral economic organizations and intergovernmental agencies to represent interests that may or may not be genuine. Too often they are accused of having been coopted by the representatives of Global Princes and Merchants who have chosen them as the representatives of civil society. Although what is termed "global civil society" is increasingly participating in multi-stakeholder discussions, and partnering with states and corporations in alliances that are characterized as public-private and private-private, too often it is only those groups that appear less radical and/or threatening that are chosen. This perception has lead to the construction of frames to compartmentalize NGOs and CSOs which ultimately has led to the selective exclusion of certain groups from participation at the global institutional level.

Another criticism leveled against global civil society is its lack of legitimacy. Global civil society organizations like other levels of civil society activity should be judged according to the views and values they represent and on their activities and achievements. But too often this question has been insufficiently answered by the statement that civil society regulates and is accountable to itself, thus reiterating the justification given by Princes and Merchants.

Some of the global representations of global civil society (among them usually the most internationally recognized, efficient and well-funded NGOs) do express a tendency to develop a neo-liberal, bureaucratized "professional" language which can reproduce power relations and hierarchies, thereby recreating through self-regeneration the already contested and deficient mechanisms of global governance. Civil society should not, however, be viewed as the simple sum total of NGOs,

CSOs, INGOs. It is more fluid, chaotic, pluralistic, diverse and changing than a simple register of non-governmental organizations can encompass.

An even bleaker view is expressed by STANLEY HOFFMANN in his article, "Clash of Globalizations." (HOFFMANN: 2002, p. 111.) In answer to his own question about the contribution of the emerging global civil society to world order, HOFFMANN answers that NGOs have little independence from governments. In addition, what we call "global governance" is partial and weak and, in contrast to SCHOLTE, HOFFMANN does not see the rise of a collective global consciousness or solidarity and as a consequence a sense of world citizenship. In sharp contrast with most of the authors writing about globalization, he believes that in opposition to economic life, "human identity remains national." (HOFFMANN: 2002, p. 111.)

8.1. *Strengthening the Global Community through Dialogue and Good Governance*

We are living in a Chaordic Age[35] which can be characterized by:

- the hybridization of the state, business and civil society;
- emerging new forms of governance without government, especially in the emergence of private governance structures;
- innovative models for business, investment and philanthropy;
- cosmopolitan citizenship;
- new models of public-private and private-private partnerships and multi-stakeholder alliances;
- dynamic approaches to collaboration and new forms of leadership;
- the construction of new, global architectures of relationships in a multitude of fields.

This multi-stakeholder world is increasingly networked. These networks evolve, amorphously transform and recede based on the intensity of common bonds of interests. This is a process that is being driven by globalization too. Within this global associational revolution lies the seeds for a more participatory and democratic

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[35] Chaordic, Chaordic Age: the science of complexity; the behavior of any self-governing organism, organization or system which harmoniously blends characteristics of order + chaos, neither hierarchical nor anarchic (‹http://www.chaordic.org›); see also, Chaordic Commons of Terra Civitas.

system of global governance. But to sustain its development **dialogue**, **discourse** and **deliberation** need to become more systematic. The "dialogue of the deaf" must be replaced by strategic partnerships − new, innovative and substantive initiatives which put the social dimension back into the globalization equation. This will ensure wider participation and help to aleviate the inevitable stress and pressure that economic globalization creates when, as it is today, not linked to social progress.

Traditionally, civil society promoted and managed the values of democracy and tolerance within the bounds of the nation state and was located between the state and the family. Global civil society is not nation state-based civil society that becomes transnational or global in its scope and activities. Global civil society encompasses civic activity that: (a) addresses transworld issues; (b) involves transborder communication; (c) has a global organisation; (d) works on a premise of supraterritorial solidarity. Often these four attributes go hand in hand, but civic associations can also have a global character in only one or several of these four respects. Civic associations often operate in regional and global spaces as well as in local and national contexts and, as a consequence, conceptions of civil society need to be recast to reflect these changes. (SCHOLTE: 2002a, p. 285.)

Today, global civil society is actively shaping and informing new constructions for governing globalization as an, if not equal partner, an important actor that can no longer be ignored in global politics. The discussion about global civil society focuses on its potential to manage diversity and conflict, encouraging, supporting and sustaining public debate at all levels and advocating non-violence. Democracy in the new century may come to be defined in terms of conflict management and that requires the empowerment of local communities. That is why a discussion about the potential for democracy-building at the local level should not be ignored in the scope of globalization studies.

8.2. *Glocal and Glocalising Democracy*

Procedural democracy is still predominantly territorial bound, although rapid and fundamental changes have occured at the level of international law and regimes, particularly with regard to human rights. Substantive democracy, however, which is about political equality and the democratic role and participation of citizens in rule-making is steadily increasing at the global level. (KALDOR: 2002.)

One contemporary paradox is that while procedural democracy is spreading from Latin America to East Central Europe and Asia, traditional decision-making at the level of the nation state is being challenged. This has been connected with globalization and the increasingly institutionalized role of global civil society in its governance. It is harder to maintain authoritarian regimes in a climate of rapid communications, inter-dependence, and global markets. The pressure to democratize can be provoked from above (international financial institutions, external governments, and private donors) and from below. Civil societies at the local and national levels are increasingly connected to global communications and social networks that they exploit to push reforms forward. (ANHEIER, et. al.: 2005, pp. 16-17.)

It has been mentioned earlier that political apathy is also a product of globalation with low voter turnout in elections, low interest in national and regional politics and traditional parties, low levels of trust in democratic institutions (especially in East and Central Europe), and lack of visionary and efficient national leadership and bureaucracies. This has led to the "glocalization" of many issues by civil society; that is, addressing a local problem in a globalized space or emerging globalized public sphere. From Manila to Madrid, civil society is organizing itself into "smart mobs" via SMS messaging from mobile phones and through the internet.

Civil society is also beginning to understand that the framework of good global governance requires competent state representatives and that who they elect nationally can make a difference at the global level. They are also learning very fast how to make use of global networks to enhance democracy at the national level.

Many theorists argue that an important way to reinvigorate democracy is greater devolution to the local level. They insist that nation states tend to centralize authority and increased public participation can best be achieved at the local level. While it is true that many decisions are now taken at the supranational and global

levels, it is also the case that the increased complexity of decision-making allows for greater "subsidiarity", that is to say, allowing as many decisions as possible to be taken at the level closest to the citizen. The new technologies and e-government make this possible.

Does global civil society enhance or undermine democracy at the local level? The conclusion is that it does both. Civil society can improve the substantive democratic conditions of local governments through global links that provide activists and their issues with a higher profile. It allows them to place new issues on the global agenda to be discussed in the emerging global public sphere.

It is also the case that sometimes local positions can be strengthened nationally by the globalization of local problems, thereby pressuring national governments for changes. An important caveat, however is that there is also a tendency of NGOs and INGOs to be coopted by donor organizations and funders who set agendas and, through professionalization, become increasingly separated from the grassroots conditions and needs. (JENSEN and MISZLIVETZ: 1998.)

Often demand for external help emanates from civil society groups within countries that are experiencing difficult and rough transitions. External support can provide necessary resources and reduce the vulnerability of local actors when confronting state authority. Different agencies provide different kinds of help. Some of the following players have had a role in empowering local civil society groups during transition periods (SISK: 1999):

- Regional organizations like the EU and OSCE aid countries in the management of their economies and in security cooperation. They also assist in the supervision and evaluation of elections. The EU and the Council of Europe, for example, promote the democractic development of aspiring applicants who want more political, social and economic integration in Europe.

- International organizations like the UN and its agencies promote human rights, and also assist in election administration and monitoring. They can also promote information sharing and capacity-building.

- Private philanthropic foundations like Ford or Soros promote open and pluralistic societies, civic education, and freedom of information. They train opposition parties, inform legislation and advance human rights such as minority and women's rights in political life.

- NGOs with global programs like the International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance (IDEA) promote country-level capacity-building and the development of codes of conduct for political parties.

- Regional NGOs specialize on the development and support of regional transnational networks of local NGOs, political parties and the mass media.

- Country-specific NGOs develop local capacity-building in the areas of democracy promotion and participation. (SISK: 1999.)

Efficient cooperation and coordination among all these levels of actors is crucial. Building trust between these actors and institutional learning are important components in the construction of mutually-supporting networks. These networks together engage in some of the following tasks:

- The promotion and advocacy of global norms at national and local levels;

- Providing financial, technical and infrastructural support for local NGOs;

- Capacity-building and civic education within societies in transition;

- Consultative programs and facilitating the sharing of best practices and information at the national, international and local levels;

- Administrating and monitoring elections.

8.3. *Post-National Democracy: Towards New Forms and New Contents*

Democracy, however, involves more than elections and institutions as we have become only too aware of lately in East and Central Europe. It requires a bottom-up dynamic that has often been lacking in transitional states. It is true that the democratization of societies takes much longer than the establishment of democratic institutions. Much of the recent turbulence in East and Central Europe is evidence which points to the long process required for embedding social democratic principles in societies that are traditionally authoritarian and paternalistic. Bottom-up approaches to democracy-building in these cases become more important in the long run than top-down, elite-driven approaches.

Another contemporary irony in the era of globalization is that many of the actors mentioned above (regional and international organizations, private

foundations and global NGOs) are refocusing their activities from the national to the local level. Some economists suggest that global trends are converging to create conditions whereby economic development may be best approached at the local, not national level. (SISK: 1999.) Therefore, the tendency to decentralize economic decision-making to the regional if not local levels, as in the EU, has gained force. The EU's principle of subsidiarity recognizes that the emergence and development of new global norms or standards needs the development of local democracies if they are to be acted upon.

In an era of rapid and pervasive globalization, local governments face increasingly complex and interdependent challenges, e.g., environmental threats, pandemics, employment, trade- and finance-related questions, human migration and refugee flows, organized crime and trafficking. Most citizens typically look to local authorities first to solve their immediate social problems. These new challenges are putting tremendous pressure on local societies, and in order to be able to address and manage these challenges local communities need new and innovative democratic alternatives.

Democracy itself has come under scrutiny in the recent decades, and particularly in the aftermath of the decision to invade Iraq. The question has been posed as to whether or not democracy can be imposed on societies from the outside, and whether or not traditional (Western) democratic practices are universally applicable. In many parts of the world today democracy might better be defined in the context of conflict management. There may be a strategic advantage to furthering NGO participation, cooperation and collaboration in conflict zones. Their participatory decision-making system, their local knowledge and expertise, the trust they have built int o their practice and their commitment to the communities they serve, make them important actors in the field of local conflict management.

Not only INGOs and international organizations need to play a role in strengthening local capacities to handle an increasing number of complex tasks. An active role needs to be played by educational systems, by universities and think tanks, to help empower communities, enhancing their capacities to improve the quality of governance locally and nationally. An informed public makes better decisions. There is increasing determination and commitment to creating and supporting tripartite networks of public officials, the private sector and civil society

to establish *ad hoc* networks (public-private, and private-private governance arrangements) for local democracy protection and promotion.

Multi-lateral economic institutions are also finding that their programs are more efficiently implemented and managed when they work with local groups. On the other side, local civil society actors gain legitimacy at home from the international recognition of their work.

Democracy-building, however, is a long-term project and commitment and coordination on the part of all actors acting at all levels is crucial. There are strong developmental reasons for enhancing local democracy that are widely recognized by the international community and a more systematic inclusion of NGOs in the system of multi-level governance is inevitably required.

To be suspicious and doubting of the possibilities of democracy at a global level is understandable, but developments in the areas of civil society, national sovereignty, and economics have moved too far and too fast to return to pre-globalized or less globalized times. The question and the challenge is how to make global institutions sensitive to the demands of individuals and open towards citizens.

Dialogue and deliberation, which are in principle open to all civil society groups and which take place at many levels, are the next best options. Global civil society is not representative and not the same as democracy. But it could be an "alternative mechanism" for democratizing global governance and "civilizing" global economic processes. Moreover, if global civil society was combined with subsidiarity – more decision-making at a local level – it could enhance the participation of individual citizens.

Global debates can be domesticated and domestic debates globalized. Redefining democracy in the context of globalization contributes to the global debate about governing globalization and may help to alleviate the gulf between vast regions of poverty, hopelessness and the despair which breeds terrorists (the Red Zones) and the global fortresses of plenty (the Green Zones). If global civil society does not cross this gap, then increasing insecurity, violence and terrorism will. We need to think innovatively about new varieties of flexible, multi-stakeholder mechanisms of global governance which respond to both local and global demands.

There is an enormous cost to prolonged global instability that results from an ungoverned or not well governed globalization, first of all in human terms. Globalization has been rejected as both morally unacceptable and politically

unsustainable. There are many who want to promote a fairer and more inclusive globalization. Some critics speak of formulating a "Global Marshall Plan" (RADERMACHER: 2004), "Global New Deal" or global social contract, recommending the formation of Policy Coherence Initiatives, a Global Council of Wisemen (and women it is to be presumed) and global public institutions. There are no lack of innovative and visionary choices. DAVID HELD's proposal for a Global Covenant derived from the core principles of cosmopolitanism (equal worth, active agency, accountability, sustainability, consent, democracy, inclusiveness) could be considered. (HELD: 2004.)

The concept of "Global Public Goods" is another elaboration designed to address contemporary economic, political, social and environmental realities that require the concerted efforts of diverse actors across the globe which link the local, national, sub-regional, regional and global levels. "At its simplest, the principle suggests that those who are significantly affected by a global good or bad should have a say in its provision or regulation, i.e ., the span of a good's benefits and costs should be matched with the span of the jurisdiction in which decisions are taken about that good. Yet, all too often, there is a breakdown of 'equivalence' between decision-makers and decision-takers, between decision-makers and stakeholders." (HELD: 2008).[36] Stakeholders need to move from trying to manage contemporary and future problems with mechanisms from the past. These challenges and conflicts require the elaboration and consensus-driven implementation of new vehicles for global problem-solving.

It may be, as JOSEPH STIGLITZ suggests, that academic discussions should become more policy-oriented and less theoretical, but at the same time ensure that policy recommendations are not politicized by those in power. Politicians, on the other hand, could become engaged in more academic-style debates based on hard facts and evidence.

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[36] For a fuller discussion, see KAUL: 1999, 2002; and RISCHARD: 2002.

8.4. *Facing the Challenges of the 21st Century*

Today we are faced with an unprecedented complexity and intensity of challenges: environmentally (the unquestionable consequences of global warming), politically (the Middle East, Iraq and Iran, North Korea), and human security generally, as well as the crisis of democracy in developed countries. DAVID HAYES strenuously argues that

> … as the first decade of the 21st century nears its end, it is becoming ever more evident that the processes of transformation the world is experiencing are – in their scale, their speed and their character – complex and daunting to a perhaps unprecedented degree. In almost every geographical region and sphere of human life, immediate tensions and challenges are also the visible sign of profound structural problems that demand coordinated, focused attention. (HAYES: 2008.)[37]

One of the greatest challenges for our societies is the lack of leadership at all levels of governance and a sense of global responsibility for our common futures. Changing the nature and path of globalization, by making it more inclusive and ethical, is in our best interests because it will be the key to a more secure and better life for more people. The challenges and responsibilities, some of which are outlined above, are grave, imminent and unavoidable.

There is a fundamental role in these changes for global civil society, but civil society alone is not enough. The appeal to mobilize for change requires the formation of bold, new, innovative hybrid forms of states, markets and societies and a broader coalition of forces between different sectors of global stakeholders. Taking full advantage of the resources of the Prince, the Merchant, the Citizen and the Trickster and the interfaces of new hybrid forms, and by opening the space for more participatory and accountable decision-making and policy-implementation, we may begin to achieve a more equitable and just distribution of the benefits of globalization to more people in the new century.

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[37] For his list of twelve prominent global trends see Appendix C.

Epilogue

The Clock of the Long Now

> How do we make long-term thinking automatic and common instead of difficult and rare? How do we make the taking of long-term responsibility inevitable?
>
> … Civilization is revving itself into a pathological short attention span. The trend might be coming from the acceleration of technology, the short-horizon perspective of market driven economies, the next election perspective of democracies, or the distractions of personal multi-tasking. All are on the increase. Some sort of balancing corrective is needed – some mechanism or myth that encourages the long view and the taking of long-term responsibility, where the "long term" is measured at least in centuries.
>
> What we propose is both a mechanism and a myth. (BRAND: 1999, pp. 2-3.)

The idea of the Clock of the Long Now is to create a device that will keep track of time, hours, days, years, centuries, millenia over the next 10,000 years. 10,000 years was decided upon because it was 10,000 years ago that the Ice Age ended and agriculture and civilization began. It will be designed to operate with regular human maintenance for the whole period, and when that is not available, it will adjust itself. It will stand over 18 meters high and cost tens of millions of dollars. The purpose of the clock is not just to measure out time over the millenia, that is to say, not just in its physical form. It is proposed to get us thinking again about the Future, the Future that we do not just bequeath to our descendents, but inherit as humankind.

The Future as an idea, a scenario, a narrative can be full of hope or dread. This project questions our ability and desire to envision the Future. It makes us think about what we might imagine 10,000, 5,000, 1,000 years from now, or even the next decade or century. It stimulates us to think beyond ourselves in a profound way, and asks us to imagine. It gives us a concrete and also mythical new framework for envisioning new futures – futures that may already in some ways be with us in our interdependent world.

Something has happened to the Future; in a sense we have lost it. Concentrating on the moment, on the immediate fulfillment of our desires, we have forgotten how to dream. We have lost the capacity and skill to form a picture or idea of a world we want to see in the Future. We have lost our belief and even interest in the Future. Embracing uncertainty was never one of humanities strong points. But in contemporary society we don't project interest or imagination beyond our own short life spans, or maybe those of our children. Even most of our children, if asked, I believe would respond that the world will end, if not in their lifetimes, then sometime soon. They have been indoctrinated with the idea that the Future does not hold anything for them – they do not feel they are part of it and it is not part of them. Most young people today think in terms of short-term goals and not long term visions. The present conjunction of seemingly chaotic and overwhelming forces needs to be confronted, and maybe the first step is to begin contemplating how we want the world to look like in the decades and centuries to come. Maybe we are living on the last pages of history; but if we do not believe in the Future, we become paralyzed living the cliche, "In the long term we are all dead."

In a recent lecture, Dr. J. Craig Venter (2007), the inventor of the human genome project, confronts the argument concerning how we can depend on new technologies that don't yet exist to solve existing and future problems. Theories of exponential change, he answers, (Moore's Law, and Butter's Law) reveal that exponential change has already occurred in the human population, in electronics and biology. He said we need "new disruptive ideas and technologies to solve … critical global issues." And giving the Wikipedia definition of disruptive technology (or sometimes called disruptive innovation), he defines it as a technological innovation, product or service that eventually overturns the existing dominant technology or status quo product in the market.

What we need today is disruptive innovation at the human level, the level of societies, consciousness and imagination. Within each of us is a The Clock of the Long Now. We should use both the myth and the mechanism to disruptively provoke our own imaginations about the Future.

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‹creativecommons.org/›. Global movement based at Stanford Law Shool.

‹cyber.library.harvard.edu/home/›. Harvard Law School's site on intellectual
property rights, Internet law and policy.

‹en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page›. Online, contributor-generated encyclopedia,
consisting of over 9.25 million entries in 253 languages.

‹globalization.about.com›. Resources and arguments pro- and anti-globalization,
also trade, media, etc.

‹http://www.bbc.co.uk/learning/index.shtml›. For innovative learning portal.

‹http://www.benton.org.›. For digital divide statistic.

‹http://www.blogger.com/›. For blogging information.

‹http://www.ceres.org›. For CSR principles and discussions

‹http://www.chaordic.org›. For discussion of our AGE.

‹http://www.clickz.com/stats/›, formerly *Cyberatlas*, for Internet usage statistics.

‹http://www.gprg.org›. Global Poverty Research Group site.

‹http://www.gppi.net›. Global Public Policy Institute.

‹http://www.indymedia.org›. For alternative news reporting.

‹http://www.internetworldstats.com/stat4.htm›. For global Internet statistics.

‹http://www.itu.int/.osg/spu/ni/futuremobile/general/index.html›. For trends in
mobile technologies.

‹http://www.itu.int/wsis/›. For information about the UN's International
Telecommunications Union for the WSIS.

‹http://www.makepovertyhistory.org›. For alternative social movement.

‹http://www.mediawatch.com›. Challenging racism, sexism and violence int he
media through education and action.

‹http://www.meetup.com›. For social networking.

‹http://www.newmediastudies.com/›. For resources in new media, social and cultural
history.

‹http://www.nua.com/surveys/›. For global Internet usage information.

‹http://www.oecd.org›. For reports on media impact on economies.

‹http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/›. For understanding new media from research and policy
perspective.

‹http://www.oecd.org›. For reports on media impact on economies.

‹http://www.opendemocracy.net›. For alternative news and analysis.

‹http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/infoecon/›. For understanding new media
from an economic perspective.

‹http://www.superbrands.com›. For consumer information on awarded market
brands that out-perform competitors in terms of market dominance, longevity,
goodwill, customer loyalty and market acceptancy.

‹http://www.technorait.com›. Search engine for blogs and the blogoshpere.

‹http://www.whiteband.org›. World's largest civil society movement calling for the
end of poverty and inequality.

‹http://www.wired.com›. Online site for *WIRED* magazine.

‹http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/education/›. For seducational issues in developing
countries.

‹http://www.worldwidelearn.com/›. For global directory of online courses in over
250 subjects.

‹http://www.zmag.org›. Alternative Media Watch.

APPENDIX A

DIGITAL DIVIDE TABLES

Table 9. Worlds largest Internet users, 2004: Source, *Cyberatlas 2004,* in FLEW: 2005, p. 72..

Country	Percentage of world Internet users	Number of internet users (million)	Percentage of Population online
USA	27.4	165.75	59.1
Japan	9.2	56	44.1
China	7.5	45.68	3.6
United Kingdom	5.66	34.3	57.24
Germany	5.3	32.1	38.9
South Korea	4.2	25.6	53.8
Italy	3.3	19.25	33.37
Russia	3	18	12.42
France	2.8	16.97	28.4
Canada	2.78	16.84	52.8
Brazil	2.3	14	7.77
Australia	1.75	10.63	54.38
Netherlands	1.6	9.73	60.83
Spain	1.3	7.9	19.7
India	1.15	7	0.67
Sweden	1.0	6	67.8
Malaysia	0.94	5.7	25.15

Table 10. Global Inequalities in Internet use. Changes between 1996-2002: Sources: *CyberAtlas 2002, Population Reference Bureau,* in FLEW: 2005, p. 73.

	Number of Internet users (million) 1997	Internet users as % of population 1997	Number of Internet users (million) 2002	Internet users as % of population 2002	% of change 1997-2002
North America	70	23.3	163.2	52.7	133
Europe	31.7	4.5	138.84	19.1	338
Asia-Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand)	19.3	0.05	109.25	2.7	466
Latin America	7.25	0.15	14.14	1.85	95
Middle East	0.75	0.004	7	3.6	833
Afria	0.80	0.001	2.22	0.27	178

Table 11 Global access to communications technologies. Source: *World Bank 2004*, in FLEW: 2005, p. 73.

|	Televisions per 1000 (2001)	Cable subscribers per 1000 (2001)	Personal computers per 1000 (2001)
Low-income countries	91	24	6.1
Middle-income countries	291	56.7	35.4
High-income countries	677	178.2	416.3

APPENDIX B

CAMP BONDSTEEL, KOSOVO

Camp Bondsteel, 15 June 1999

Camp Bondsteel, 15 October 1999

APPENDIX C

TWELVE TRENDS

From: DAVID HAYES, "A World in Contraflow."
www.opendemocracy.net/articles/a_world_in_contraflow
January 3, 2008

1. the long-term shift of global economic and financial power from the United States and Europe to Asia, especially China

2. the unavoidable and pressing threat of global climate change

3. the economic and social effects of globalisation (among them greater inequality within countries, and the increasing danger of global epidemics)

4. armed conflicts, insurgencies, and "frozen" disputes, often accompanied by humanitarian crises (among them Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, southeast Turkey, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, southern Thailand, and western Sahara)

5. geopolitical quarrels with great destructive potential (among them those involving Iran, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo/Serbia, China/Taiwan, and Pakistan)

6. the crisis of states where citizens' lives are especially degraded (among them Burma, Zimbabwe, and North Korea)

7. the problems of nuclear proliferation and the spread of other weapons of both mass and small-scale destruction (among the latter small arms and cluster-bombs)

8. the change in world order signified by the rising confidence of emergent powers fuelled by incremental strategic influence and / or "resource nationalism" (among them China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela), alongside the confusion and misdirection of the United States

9. the impacts of Islamist and other forms of radicalisation on nation-states in the Muslim world and beyond; more generally, the emergence of a global Muslim political identity as part of what has been called "the divine supermarket"

10. the consequences of immigration and "people flow" on both sending and receiving countries and across the range of political, social and cultural life (not least, on attitudes towards national identity and social diversity)

11. the impact of new technologies (the internet, mobile phones, social networks) on human experience, identities and life-chances

12. the new vulnerability of democracy, both as idea and as uniquely legitimating political model - in face of authoritarian regimes and of crass, insurgent populism in democracy's western, liberal-democratic heartlands.

APPENDIX A

DIGITAL DIVIDE TABLES

Table 9. Worlds largest Internet users, 2004: Source, *Cyberatlas 2004,* Flew (2005), p. 72..

Country	Percentage of world Internet users	Number of internet users (million)	Percentage of Population online
USA	27.4	165.75	59.1
Japan	9.2	56	44.1
China	7.5	45.68	3.6
United Kingdom	5.66	34.3	57.24
Germany	5.3	32.1	38.9
South Korea	4.2	25.6	53.8
Italy	3.3	19.25	33.37
Russia	3	18	12.42
France	2.8	16.97	28.4
Canada	2.78	16.84	52.8
Brazil	2.3	14	7.77
Australia	1.75	10.63	54.38
Netherlands	1.6	9.73	60.83
Spain	1.3	7.9	19.7
India	1.15	7	0.67
Sweden	1.0	6	67.8
Malaysia	0.94	5.7	25.15

Table 10. Global Inequalities in Internet use. Changes between 1996-2002: Sources: *CyberAtlas 2002, Population Reference Bureau,* Flew (2005), p. 73.

	Number of Internet users (million) 1997	Internet users as % of population 1997	Number of Internet users (million) 2002	Internet users as % of population 2002	% of change 1997-2002
North America	70	23.3	163.2	52.7	133
Europe	31.7	4.5	138.84	19.1	338
Asia-Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand)	19.3	0.05	109.25	2.7	466
Latin America	7.25	0.15	14.14	1.85	95
Middle East	0.75	0.004	7	3.6	833
Afria	0.80	0.001	2.22	0.27	178

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Table 11. Global access to communications technologies. Source: *World Bank 2004*, Flew (2005), p. 73.

|	Televisions per 1000 (2001)	Cable subscribers per 1000	Personal computers per 1000 (2001
Low-income countries	91	24	6.1
Middle-income countries	291	56.7	35.4
High-income countries	677		416.3

APPENDIX B

CAMP BONDSTEEL, KOSOVO

Camp Bondsteel, 15 June 1999   Camp Bondsteel, 15 October 1999

APPENDIX C

TWELVE TRENDS

From: DAVID HAYES, "A World in Contraflow."
www.opendemocracy.net/articles/a_world_in_contraflow
January 3, 2008

13. the long-term shift of global economic and financial power from the United States and Europe to Asia, especially China

14. the unavoidable and pressing threat of global climate change

15. the economic and social effects of globalisation (among them greater inequality within countries, and the increasing danger of global epidemics)

16. armed conflicts, insurgencies, and "frozen" disputes, often accompanied by humanitarian crises (among them Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, southeast Turkey, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, southern Thailand, and western Sahara)

17. geopolitical quarrels with great destructive potential (among them those involving Iran, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo/Serbia, China/Taiwan, and Pakistan)

18. the crisis of states where citizens' lives are especially degraded (among them Burma, Zimbabwe, and North Korea)

19. the problems of nuclear proliferation and the spread of other weapons of both mass and small-scale destruction (among the latter small arms and cluster-bombs)

20. the change in world order signified by the rising confidence of emergent powers fuelled by incremental strategic influence and / or "resource nationalism" (among them China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela), alongside the confusion and misdirection of the United States

21. the impacts of Islamist and other forms of radicalisation on nation-states in the Muslim world and beyond; more generally, the emergence of a global Muslim political identity as part of what has been called "the divine supermarket"

22. the consequences of immigration and "people flow" on both sending and receiving countries and across the range of political, social and cultural life (not least, on attitudes towards national identity and social diversity)

23. the impact of new technologies (the internet, mobile phones, social networks) on human experience, identities and life-chances

24. the new vulnerability of democracy, both as idea and as uniquely legitimating political model - in face of authoritarian regimes and of crass, insurgent populism in democracy's western, liberal-democratic heartlands.