

CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST

DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN
GERMANY DURING THE EURO AND REFUGEE CRISES OF THE EU

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the manifestations of European identity construction by the political and media discourses within the depressing context of the Euro crisis and refugee crisis of the European Union (EU) in a case study country- Germany. It utilizes the main aspirations of the Social Identity Theory (SIT), which asserts that social, economic, and political processes are highly critical in forming an ‘ingroup’. This research argues that political and media discourses became a critical tool of disseminating the collective identity construction during the times of crises that posed rigid challenges to political, social, and economic processes of the EU. This is because the crises provided a viable ground for the articulations of the different manifestations of the European identity construction implying ‘what it means to be European’ due to the incremental salience of the European affairs within the public. While the crises have opened up leeway for the member states to become less Euro-centric because of the possible dramatic repercussions, identity construction, focusing on increasing the levels of commitment to ingroup for the sake of the common good of the community, may play an instrumental role in convincing European citizens to bear the dramatic consequences and costs of the crises. Therefore, an inquiry concentrating on answering how the European identity is manifested and instrumentalized in responding to and answering the crises is of critical importance. Based on such premise, this research will conduct extensive qualitative frame analysis of political and media discourse at key moments of the crisis.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The process of European integration aimed to raise the feeling of common European identity which triggers the sense of belonging of the European public to the European community. That was self-evident in Jean Monnet's statement that "We are not bringing together states, we are uniting people" in 1952. As against the difficulties in forming a shared European identity, European unification adopted the precious motto of "United we stand, divided we fall". The concept is mostly based on the envisagement of common European cultural policy initiatives in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty's object to "... bring the common cultural heritage to the fore".¹ The treaty also refers that "the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states while respecting their national and regional diversity". With this respect, the Treaty envisaged constructing a common European identity based not only on gathering shared culture and history, but also conformity with the 'cultural diversity'.² In this light, formation of the collective European identity appeared as a continuous process of formation that involved discursive constructions within the public spheres by the political and media discourses promoting achievements of the Union such as common currency, motto, flag, anthem as the symbols of the sense of solidarity that can boost and increase the sense of belonging to and identification with Europe.

Against the backdrop of such a top-down process of identity construction in the making, the EU has always faced various forms of crises posing critical junctures and uncertain moments for the course of the European integration process³. While they entailed a risk of temporary stand stillness for the healthy process of European political project, historical overview of the crises revealed that general understanding has been that European integration has been moving forward through crises which have a certain role in shaping what the EU of today has become.⁴

Yet, recently experienced crises starting from the economic crisis of the Eurozone, challenged EU so unprecedentedly that the repercussions of the crises included EU's loss of its legitimacy to a certain extent, decreasing trust of the people to elite-driven policies, blossom of Eurosceptic movements and rift towards national-interest based policies and political agendas. The crises plunged the EU into various forms of challenges within which reconciliation among

¹ Tsaliki, L. (2007). The construction of European identity and citizenship through cultural policy. *European studies: a journal of European culture, history and politics*, 24(1), 157-182, p.159.

² Kap, D. (2006). *European Identity & The European Union: The Prospects and Limits*. MA Thesis: Middle East Technical University, p. 59.

³ Kjaer, P. F., & Olsen, N. (2016). Critical theories of crisis in Europe: from Weimar to the Euro..

⁴ Özoflu, M. A. (2017). *Rethinking European integration process in the light of crises* (Master's thesis).

member states for the common European good became an incrementally daunting task.⁵ Therefore, the relevant scientific inquiries within the literature often engaged with the questions of European solidarity, member states' willingness of giving up their sovereignty to a certain extent in times of crisis.⁶

Because of the emergence of the above-mentioned issues, the crises triggered the fundamental issues of identity which need an approach encompassing a certain sociological reference beyond the technocratic levels of economic and political setbacks. The reason was that technocratic setbacks including insufficiency or overload of the existing mechanisms stemming from the repercussions of the crises forced member states to formulate temporary/permanent mechanisms in responding to the crises. Accordingly, European integration became incrementally salient and politicized within the national political settings of the member states along with the wide articulations of both political and media discourses debating about Europe in addressing formulation of and formulated policy responses to the crises. In this context, the experienced euro and refugee crises of the EU have provided a viable ground for the articulations of the different manifestations of the European identity construction implying 'what it means to be European' as well. In this context, identity construction in shaping in-group members' social cognition and levels of identification with and sense of belonging to an in-group by the political and media discourses gained relevance and critical importance.

This is because, during these times of social, reorganization of multiple identities of the individuals presenting the typical shape of Russian Matroska dolls which refers that the member of a smaller community is also a member of a larger community at the same time come to the fore.⁷ It resulted that in-group members may experience doubt about each other and themselves.⁸ They have doubts about which identity to present and how to present it or about whether the presented identity is validated or to what extent. Too much identity doubt makes planning difficult and leads to deeper doubt about the self. In this respect, we conclude that the social, economic, and political processes may affect the construction, deconstruction, and

⁵ Ross, G. (2011). *The European Union and its crises: through the eyes of the Brussels' elite*. Springer, p.2.

⁶ Jabko, N., & Luhman, M. (2019). Reconfiguring sovereignty: crisis, politicization, and European integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(7), 1037-1055.; Beetz, J. P. (2019). Safeguarding, shifting, splitting or sharing? Conflicting conceptions of popular sovereignty in the EU-polity. *Journal of European Integration*, 41(7), 937-953; Parsanoglou, D. (2020). Volunteering for refugees and the repositioning of state sovereignty and civil society: the case of Greece. *Citizenship Studies*, 24(4), 457-473.; Kramer, Z. (2019). Fiscal Sovereignty under EU Crisis Management: A Comparison of Greece and Hungary. *Acta Oeconomica*, 69(4), 595-624; Saurugger, S., & Terpan, F. (2019). The Court of Justice of the European Union, conflicts of sovereignty and the EMU crisis. *Journal of European Integration*, 41(7), 903-920.

⁷ Weigert, A. J., Teitge, J. S., Teitge, J. S., & Teitge, D. W. (2007). *Society and identity: Toward a sociological psychology*. Cambridge University Press.

⁸ *Ibid.*

reconstruction of the identity. They may be subject to change or fluctuate because of the social, economic, or political instabilities and setbacks within the ingroup. In this respect, crises have opened up a possible leeway for the member states to become less Euro-centric because of the possible dramatic repercussions.⁹ Therefore, political and media discourse became a critical tool of disseminating the collective identity construction that may increase citizens' sense of belonging to and identification with Europe. Especially, identity construction focusing on increasing the level of commitment to ingroup for the sake of the common good of the community is regarded as highly instrumental in convincing European citizens to bear the dramatic consequences and costs of the crises. Hence, I believe that any investigation of the crises of the EU needs to set up a certain emphasis, reference, and ground for the way how European collective identity construction is manifested at both national and European levels. Only through such an approach, the micro-level of the individual and the macro-level of the social order within the crises can be bridged.¹⁰

Based on such a departure point to the phenomena of the crisis, this research aims to reveal the manifestations of the European identity construction by the political and media discourses respectively during the Euro crisis and the refugee crisis within the case study country: Germany. The two crises, as internal and externalized crisis, are identified as having a concrete point of repercussions to the identity-formation related matters, since they have affected the two milestones of the in-group of the European identity i.e., the common currency and the common external borders that frame the economic and spatial boundaries of the in-group vis à vis its out-groups. Moreover, they are chosen as the representatives of different forms of crises which contribute to increasing the scope and in-depth levels of understanding the political and media discourse constructing the European identity while framing the crises.

The importance of the media and political discourse for the central tenets of the research can be explained by the fact that they both became important arenas for the formation of public opinion on crisis-related matters and the relevant European identity construction. Within the political realm, the discourse served as a means of instrumentalization of the identity construction regarding the justification of the adopted decisions and policies for the solution of the crises that would also include the persuasion of the European public to bear the dramatic repercussions of the crises. In addition, political discourse in fact includes political information processing by providing a “mental representation about political situations, events, actors, and

⁹ Zielonka, J. (2014). *Is the EU doomed?*. John Wiley & Sons.

¹⁰ Preece, S. (Ed.). (2016). *The Routledge handbook of language and identity*. Routledge., p.3.

groups.”¹¹ Such representations unravel the political beliefs or political judgments hidden behind the cognitive foundation of the discourse, which is called political cognition by Van Dijk.¹²

As for the media realm, discursive practices in the media can enlighten the critical inquiries regarding:

“How is the world represented?”¹³

“What identities are set up for those involved in the story?”¹⁴

“What relationships are set up between those involved?”¹⁵

Through giving a viable ground of analysis for such inquiries, media discourse is expected to constitute social and culture change within the society. Moreover, it also provides a critical interface for the transaction between policy makers and the civil society.¹⁶ Therefore, the political and media discourses are chosen as a framework of analysis.

Within a plethora of political and media discourses, German national newspaper articles, political statements including press releases and public speeches of the policymakers are chosen as data to be collected. Rather than discursive materials such as party programs or election materials having diverse focal points with an agenda of electoral competition and concerns, the research is particularly interested in how discursive material communicating about the crisis constructs identity explicitly or implicitly. Thus, political speeches, newspaper articles and press releases specifically produced over the crisis-related issues were points of the target.

The chosen case study country i.e., Germany has a unique position in mediating and solving both crises which deemed the country to take somehow a leadership position against its traditional ‘leadership avoidance reflex’¹⁷ because of its Nazi past that presents its historical otherness to Europe. In this respect, on the one hand, crises have created a place for the country to demonstrate its historical commitment to Europe, on the other hand, they led to the articulations of different understanding attributed to the meaning of being a European and European community. Moreover, the fact that post-war national German identity is constructed hand in hand with the European identity, levels of identification is relatively higher than other member states. Germany which embraced the commitment to the project of Europeanization is

¹¹Van Dijk, T. A. (2002). Political Discourse and Political Cognition. In Chilton, P., & Schäffner, C. (Eds.). (2002). *Politics as text and talk: Analytic approaches to political discourse* (Vol. 4) (pp. 203-239). John Benjamins Publishing., pp.206-207.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Fairclough, N. (1995). *Media discourse*. London: Edward Arnold.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (Eds.). (2010). *The making of a European public sphere: Media discourse and political contention*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁷ Hyde-Price, A. G. (2015). The “sleep-walking giant” awakes: resetting German foreign and security policy. *European security*, 24(4), 600-616.

generally regarded as the promoter of the European integration process.¹⁸ Thus, it is believed analysis on Germany will produce a valuable output in terms of the motivations of this research in the face of the arising question of whether manifestations of European identity construction are successfully articulated only in periods of prosperity. Accordingly, the main research question of the current research is formulated as such:

How European identity construction was manifested during the Euro crisis and refugee crisis of the European Union by the political and media discourse in the German national setting?

Establishing such a central research question necessitated taking various issues into account to reach overarching findings and results. As complementary to such inquiry, the relevant hypotheses are formulated as in the following:

Hypothesis 1. The change in the identity construction is directly correlated to be reflected by the social processes within the society.

Hypothesis 2. The manifestations of the European identity construction appeared differently in framing the different EU crises.

The given stance of the research regards that the continuous process of European identity formation involves a discursive construction by the political and media spheres within the public spheres targeting the public in order to promote a sense of belonging to and identification with the in-group of European communities. Based on such stance, to answer the formulated research question and the hypotheses, the research will employ critical discourse analysis (CDA). The specific emphasis will be given to the discourse-historical approach (DHA). Several studies are utilizing quantitative methods in addressing European identity.¹⁹ However, this research shares the argument that quantitative methods such as survey research such as Eurobarometer or opinion polls do not adequately address the issue of European identity and identity construction. While they provide valuable insights especially in understanding the political orientations of the mass public,²⁰ quantitative methods risk imposing outlined answers

¹⁸ Hurrelmann, Achim. "Constructing multilevel legitimacy in the European Union: A study of British and German media discourse." *Comparative European Politics* 6, no. 2 (2008): 190-211.

¹⁹ On the studies employing quantitative methods to analyze the identity, see: Bruter, M. (2005). *Citizens of Europe?: the emergence of a mass European identity*. Springer.; Ejaz, W. (2019). *European Identity and Media Effects: A Quantitative Comparative Analysis* (Doctoral dissertation, Universitätsbibliothek); Van de Steeg, M. (2006). Does a public sphere exist in the European Union? An analysis of the content of the debate on the Haider case. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(4), 609-634; Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (Eds.). (2010). *The making of a European public sphere: Media discourse and political contention*. Cambridge University Press.

²⁰ Moravcsik, A. (2006). What can we learn from the collapse of the European constitutional project?. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 47(2), 219-241.

of the surveys.²¹ Moreover, although previous studies²² have developed various methodological guides on how to measure identity, it is still seen as a slippery concept because of the abstract nature of the identity itself.²³

Therefore, a qualitative analysis frame employing CDA with a special reference to Ruth Wodak's DHA appears a reasonable and suitable choice because of the analytical tools they offer which enable to investigate the main research question of this study aiming to reveal the construction of the European identity in Germany contextualized within the crisis context of the EU. CDA regards the context within which the discourse is produced as crucial.²⁴ Moreover, both media and political discourse have been the central focus of analysis in CDA.²⁵ Thus, adopting a qualitative research frame better answers the research focus of this study, which is to conduct a deeper-interpretative analysis based on framing the discursive construction of the European identity at times of crises.

Adopting a qualitative research frame also helps operationalization the theoretical framework by the analysis part of the research. Since the research is intended to have a rigorous ground for the sociological aspects of the crises, social identity theory (SIT) is employed as a theoretical framework. One of the main arguments of the SIT regards that self-concept of the individuals is shaped by and derived from their cognition to group membership. In this respect, identity formation involves a cognitive process of categorization and identification of oneself with an ingroup. Since this cognitive process is heavily influenced by the social construction of identity shaped by the specific social, political, and economic processes of the context, it is necessary to take words and communicative utterances seriously²⁶ to analyze the discursive construction of identities.

Here CDA emphasizing the power of language will help this study grasp the construction of the European identity and to reveal the linguistic manifestations of identity embedded within the particular political and social context. Combining SIT with the lenses of critical discourse

²¹ Checkel, J. T., & Katzenstein, P. J. (Eds.). (2009). *European identity*. Cambridge University Press.

²² On the studies developing concept for measuring identity, see: Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I., & McDermott, R. (Eds.). (2009). *Measuring identity: A guide for social scientists*. Cambridge University Press; Schwartz, S. J., Zamboanga, B. L., Wang, W., & Olthuis, J. V. (2009). Measuring identity from an Eriksonian perspective: Two sides of the same coin?. *Journal of personality assessment*, 91(2), 143-154; Adams, L. L. (2009). Techniques for measuring identity in ethnographic research. *Measuring identity: A guide for social scientists*, 316-341; Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I., & McDermott, R. (2006). Identity as a Variable. *Perspectives on politics*, 695-711.

²³ Flesher Fominaya, C. (2010). Collective identity in social movements: Central concepts and debates. *Sociology Compass*, 4(6), 393-404.

²⁴ Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is about—a summary of its history, important concepts and its developments. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.) *Methods of critical discourse analysis*, (pp. 1-13). Sage Publications.

²⁵ Van Dijk, T. A. (2015). Critical discourse analysis. In D. Tannen, H. E. Hamilton & D. Schiffrin (Eds.), *The handbook of discourse analysis*, (pp. 466-485). John Wiley., p. 477-478.

²⁶ Risse, T. (2009). Social Constructivism and European Integration. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), *European Integration Theory*, (pp. 144-160). Oxford, Oxford University Press: 144-160., p. 149.

analysis will allow investigating how identities are discursively constructed and framed by the political and media actors within the ‘communicative action’. In this respect, the constructive power of language²⁷ is acknowledged as crucial in the process of constructing European identity. Therefore, discursive approaches to investigate the construction of European identity intend to reveal the way political and media discourse communicate about crises and identity to reveal the discursive manifestation of identity construction at times of crises.

The underlying rationale behind the decision to choose SIT as a theoretical framework is that SIT differs from other social psychological theories of intergroup relations by focusing on the process of collective identity rather than on the self-concept of the individual. In this respect, it is regarded as highly responsive to the inter-group dimensions of various social comparative contexts. Therefore, it offers highly dynamic and elaborated features in analyzing certain inter-group phenomena.²⁸ In this vein, SIT deals with contextual salience by handling the social comparative factors, self-esteem motivation, uncertainty reduction, and social explanation.²⁹ That is why the implications for the self-concept within the social identity tradition come secondary³⁰. Since it covers all these aspects, SIT is broader than other social psychological theories of intergroup relations including equity theory, cognitive dissonance theory, or relative deprivation theory.³¹ Since SIT has emerged as a meta-theory that can be utilized efficiently in explaining various phenomena,³² it emerges as highly applicable for numerous research purposes ranging from unequal power relations, social movements to ethnolinguistic vitality. Moreover, the theoretical framework it offers enables much empirical research to employ a diverse collection of research techniques for the measurement of social identity and related formation.³³

In this light, the contributions of this research to the existing literature on European studies are expected. Conducting research providing an impression of the social-psychological dimensions of the European identity has been not a tradition within the literature until recently. The traditional theories of European integration namely, liberal intergovernmentalism by

²⁷ Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A. (1999). The Social Construction of Europe., *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(4), 528-544, p. 535.

²⁸ Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory. *Social psychology quarterly*, 255-269.,p. 261.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 263

³⁰ Cinnirella, M. G. (1993). *Social identity perspectives on European integration: A comparative study of national and European identity construction in Britain and Italy* (Doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom)., p. 23.

³¹ Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1994). *Theories of intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives*. Greenwood Publishing Group., p.5.

³² Abrams, D. (2015). Social identity and intergroup relations. In M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver, J. F. Dovidio, & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), *APA handbooks in psychology. APA handbook of personality and social psychology, Vol. 2. Group processes* (pp. 203-228). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.

³³ Cinnirella, M. G., *op.cit.*, p. 20.

Moravcsik³⁴ and neo-functionalism by Haas³⁵ have no emphasis on identity politics³⁶. Moreover, they have partially failed to explain the euro and refugee crises. Post-functionalist theory recently developed by Hooghe and Marks³⁷ gives priority to factors of ‘identity’ and ‘the mass public opinion’ while explaining the European integration process. It argues that there has been a recent shift from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’³⁸ within the European public would have supposedly posed a certain restriction for further deepening of the European integration process. Therefore, it does not offer a plausible account for the Euro crisis which resulted in the deepening of the fiscal integration despite the asserted shift within the European public. Thus, there is a gap in the literature in terms of explaining the European integration process and its setbacks by taking identity politics into account through keeping social psychological factors in mind. That is why one of the main motivations of this research is to contribute to social psychological knowledge of the European integration process on the nexus of the manifestation of the European identity construction.

Accordingly, this research aims to contribute to the literature by proposing an approach incorporating the identity dimension in analyzing the discourses debating the crises of the EU. In doing so, it is aimed to provide influential output for the implications of the future research agenda that can fulfill the existent theoretical gap within the literature incorporating the identity dimension with the theoretical debates revolving around the crises in/of the EU. In this direction, this research will present an insightful analysis on the discursive act of othering, ingroup favoritism, and outgroup discrimination triggered by the crises in terms of both intra-group and inter-group relations of the in-group of European identity. To this end, utilization of the SIT is expected to stimulate an interdisciplinary theoretical debate.

While the examination of the European identity from the lenses of the social identity has been done previously³⁹, these have not been incorporated with the debate and relevance to the crises of the EU yet. In other words, the crisis of identity as a challenge to the intra-group and inter-group relations of the European identity was not investigated through the lenses of the SIT. Thus, this research offers new insight into the effects of crises on the European Identity from the SIT perspective which diverges itself from the traditional and cultural approaches to

³⁴ Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe*. Princeton University Press.

³⁵ Haas, E. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford University Press.

³⁶ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1), 83-108., p. 84.

³⁷ Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining. *British journal of political science*, 1-23.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Cinnirella, M. (1997). Towards a European identity? Interactions between the national and European social identities manifested by university students in Britain and Italy. *British journal of social psychology*, 36(1), 19-31.

the European identity. While the traditional approaches are not able to offer an insightful explanation over the European identity on the nexus of the emergence of the crises because of the divergences over the meaning of the European identity at the different national settings, SIT offers simplicity for identification of social connections into groups by utilizing ‘minimal group paradigm’ offering existence of minimal conditions required to formulate ingroup is sufficient. Thus, SIT deserves much more attention and further exploration within European studies especially with regard to the euro and refugee crises.

In this light, this research aims to contribute theoretically and empirically to the existing body of literature on the European identity. Theoretically, it aims to draw an alternative theoretical guide to the existing theories of European integration through adopting a multi-disciplinary approach that entailed utilizing the social psychology theory of SIT. Therefore, the performed discourse analysis will also contribute to the enrichment of the literature on the European studies by developing a better understanding of the explanation of the operationalization/instrumentalization of the European identity construction by the discourses framing the crises of the EU. Empirically this research will go one step further of the existing studies by adding empirical data on the European identity in Germany.

To this end, chapter 2 will summarize the main literature on the European identity. Through the literature review, it is aimed to demonstrate that how the conceptualization of the concept by the works of the pioneering scholars in the field is indeed diverging. Different approaches to the European identity reveal that there is no agreement on the existence and source of the formation of the European identity. On the one hand, there are scholars talking about the possibility of the formation of the European identity. On the other hand, there are Euro-pessimist scholars arguing the impossibility of such formation of the identity. This chapter will also consider the main issues of European integration often correlated with the European collective identity such as legitimacy of and trust to the EU institutions. It will shed light on how the political and media discourses became pivotal in enhancing the sense of identification with and belonging to the in-group of European identity as a critical viable in determining the legitimacy of and trust to the EU institutions. In this way, it will prepare a robust ground to investigate the main inquiries of the research.

With respect to the increasing scholarly attention to the debates revolving around the European identity, the literature review will demonstrate arising scholarly attention to the importance of the presence of the sense of belonging of the European public during the times of crises. In order to avoid the contested nature of the European identity within the literature which is lost within the divergences over the meaning of the European identity at the different

national settings, the study employs social identity theory. Thus, chapter 3 will focus on identifying the essence of the social identity theory. The main aspirations of the theory as covered by this chapter show that unlike nationalist, conventional, cultural, and modernist approaches to the European identity, social identity puts its emphasis on the social, economic and political processes in addressing the formation of an in-group and inter-group behavior.⁴⁰ Covering the main aspirations of the theory will help utilize them to provide an in-depth discourse analysis covering the crises as social, economic, and political processes of the EU upon which the European identity is formed. Therefore, investigating the European identity construction in times of crisis through CDA would become relatively easier.

Since identity involves a historical process of formation, the process of Europeanization as a historical phenomenon offers valuable insights underlying origins and myths as the bases of formation of the European identity through which discursive construction of the European identity is conducted. This is believed to be considerably helpful in taking political, economic, and social processes in terms of the process of identity formation as argued by SIT into account. Therefore, chapter 4 will outline the process of Europeanization with a specific focus on Europe's self-construction as against its others during the different periods of time.

The adopted historical conceptualization perspective will give a specific focus on the emerging process of 'EU-ization'⁴¹ within the broad scope of Europeanization. It will help provide an encompassing overview of the term Europeanization with its relationship with the European identity formation as the social, political, and economic processes that the EU went through. In this way, it will provide a viable ground for building interlinkage between the main aspirations of the theoretical framework and the concept of European identity. The fourth chapter argues that while Europeanization is broadly referring to the adoption of a "set of norms, rules, and practices ... and impact of these new institutions on political structures and processes",⁴² EU-ization embedded within the Europeanization refers to the political integration of the member states. In this respect, while the European integration process is not the synonym of the Europeanization process,⁴³ the development of the EU is regarded as a product of the ongoing historical continuum of the Europeanization.⁴⁴ Therefore, addressing the historical background of the European identity and the process of Europeanization will give critical

⁴⁰ Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Information (International Social Science Council)*, 13(2), 65-93., p.65.

⁴¹ Wallace, H. (2000). Europeanisation and globalisation: complementary or contradictory trends?. *New Political Economy*, 5(3), 369-382.

⁴² Börzel, T. A. (2002). Member state responses to Europeanization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 193-214., p.193.

⁴³ Featherstone, K., & Radaelli, C. M. (Eds.). (2003). *The politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press., p. 3.

⁴⁴ Wallace, H., *op.cit.*, p.369.

insights regarding the European values promoted as the common heritage of Europe which can be enlightening to a great extent in conducting the discursive analysis as well.

Chapter 5 will operationalize the given framework of the research. It will outline the research design of this dissertation. It will first address the socio-cognitive approach of the CDA and DHA as employed as a research method. It then explains the underlying reasons behind choosing Germany as a case study country. After that, selected time frames will be defined. Since the time period of the research encompasses approximately from 2010 to 2017, the selected time frames as the time limitation of this research will be sketched out in order to avoid larger body of data. After clarifying the time periods, the materials utilized and collected from various sources will be introduced.

Chapter 6 will discuss the empirical findings from the Euro crisis in Germany. In the light of the established research frame, it shows the different manifestations of the European identity construction by the political and media discourse framing the Euro crisis in Germany. Since Germany occupied the main creditor position during the euro crisis, the possible identity shift in the European identity within the German case study has been expected to be sparked by the euro crisis. On the one hand, the possible identity cleavage became in question since European solidarity and unity were challenged. On the other hand, because of the newly designed mechanisms to solve the crisis, debates about the EU integration issues were widely articulated which have opened up leeway for the articulation of the different ideas and visions regarding the European integration process. They found a concrete place within the discourses of the political, economic actors, and the mass media. Due to the crisis, Germany has also found a suitable ground to prove its commitment to Europe and to the idea of the EU.

Thematically divided discourse analysis shows how media discourses within the different sides of the political spectrum approach differently to the phenomena of European identity in addressing the crisis. The performed analysis also reveals how the political discourses instrumentalize the European identity construction to boost both intra-group identification and intra-group differentiation. In doing this, it reveals that the constructed mainstream political discourse has highly relied on the German understanding of the European identity based on the *ordo-liberal* norms and rules creating ‘conditional solidarity’ among member states expected to be committed to the rules as ‘good European’. Member states’ compliance with the designated in-group behavior by Germany is understood as the source of high levels of affiliating with the European identity. On the other hand, internal othering is usually referred by the anti-establishment right-wing party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). In sum, the chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the different political and media

discourses having different approaches on the identity-related matters within the manifestations of the construction of the European identity fluctuating between in-group favoritism, out-group discrimination, intra-group differentiations, and internal othering within the context of the internal crisis.

Chapter 7 will focus on manifestations of the European identity construction within the context of the European refugee crisis. The empirical findings of the discourse analysis intend to show how the political and media discourses enclosed both intra-group group and inter-group differentiation in constructing the formation of in-group behavior and in-group European identity because of the internalized crisis. As in the Euro crisis, Germany has occupied a dominant role also during the refugee crisis. Its national initiatives to formulate a solution to the crisis became a subject of political and media discourse in terms of shaping an in-group behavior for the in-group of European identity, intra-group differentiation directed against the unwilling member states to welcome the refugee for the sake of the common good of the European community and increasing the in-group favoritism/bias of the German commitment to the European community. In this respect, it will also shed light on how European identity construction is instrumentalized for the political calculations of both establishment and anti-establishment parties in Germany.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarizing the empirical findings of the case study with respect to the theoretical implications. In this way, it will clarify the contributions of the research. It will discuss the manifestations of the European identity that are widely constructed in framing both crises by both political and media discourse. The reason for employment is revealed to be diverging especially within the political discourses since the manifestation and instrumentalization of the European identity construction became subject to different political calculations. In this light, the chapter will answer the formulated main research question of the current study both for the Euro and refugee crises. It will lastly address the limitations of the study in order to put forward various directions for the future research agenda. The arising issues brought about by the crises as discussed by this thesis show that the future research agendas will be shaped highly by the imperatives of taking identity issues into account in investigating EU-related phenomena.

CHAPTER 2: MAIN LITERATURE ON EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Literature review means the analysis and synthesis of the body of research that has been previously produced by scholars dealing with the same topic.⁴⁵ It is an essential part of the project. This is because the literature review clearly depicts the existing research. By doing this, it provides the necessary background of knowledge to facilitate the theory development, to find the relevant gap within the literature which might be valuable output for the added value of the newly conducted research. In addition, it helps locate where the plethora of research within the academic debate exists.⁴⁶

With this literature review part, this research aims to give an overview of how the European identity is conceptualized and investigated so far by the different scholars in the literature. Firstly, it will briefly address the concept of nations and nationalism from the nexus of their importance for endeavors for a common European identity. Later, components of the positive-self image of the European identity will be overviewed to answer the critical questions ‘What determines Europeanness?’, ‘What is boosting the sense of belonging to the EU?’, ‘What the European integration process tells us about the formation of the European identity?’, In this way, the demonstrated importance of the identity for the European integration process by different studies will be highlighted.

The literature review will also reflect the current studies on the issues prevailing to be correlated with the existence of the European collective identity. Accordingly, scholarly debate addressing European identity as a critical viable in determining the legitimacy of and trust to the EU institutions for further integration will be discussed. In this way, how the political and media discourse became crucial in its quest for more legitimacy and trust as a variable of sense of identification of the European citizens will be presented. Lastly, it will reflect on the discussions on the possibility of the European identity and the relevant definitional standpoint of the research.

The concept of identity is attributed as very elusive. However, before dealing with the problems and challenges of the concept itself we should first acknowledge at least two common themes used as reference points by the literature while investigating the concept of ‘identity’ regardless of the cleavages among different approaches and theories of identity (e.g., Habermas’ universalistic approach of constitutional patriotism⁴⁷, Giddens’ sociological theory

⁴⁵ Webster, J., & Watson, R. T. (2002). Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: Writing a literature review. *MIS quarterly*, 13-23. p. 13.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Habermas, J. (1976). Können komplexe Gesellschaften eine rationale Identität ausbilden. In J. Habermas. Habermas, J. *ZUR Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus*.(pp. 92-126). Suhrkamp.

of identity⁴⁸) dealing with the identity in general. Firstly, identity is not a static but rather a dynamic concept constantly going through the process of evolving⁴⁹. In this respect, people's categorization of the world as ingroups and outgroups, leading to the formation of the group membership with which the individuals develop emotional attachment, is ever-evolving.⁵⁰ Therefore, European identity has a dynamic and ever-changing nature as it has become evident with the recent challenges of Europe.⁵¹

Secondly, identity has time dimensions i.e., past, present, and future assuring consistency and continuity.⁵² As Jacobs and Maier argue that identity formation involves a historic process which implies the fact identity cannot be described in a static way.⁵³ That is why this research needs to regard the past and future perspectives while handling the complex issue of the ever-evolving concept of European identity, which will be clarified by the Europeanization chapter of this research.

There are different categories of identity such as individual identity, collective identity, or social identity as well as different levels of identity e.g., local, regional or national identity, ethnic identity, cultural identity gender identity, religious identity, racial identity.⁵⁴ Within this categorization of sub-levels of identity, individual identity is expected to be co-determined under the influence and construction of these different levels of identities of the self. In this respect, "... All identity is individual, but there is no individual identity that is not historical or in other words constructed within a field of social values, norms of behavior and collective symbols."⁵⁵ Triga and Vadratsikas argue that identity is, in fact, individual phenomena expressing the sense of belonging of the individual to the in-group of a specific community.⁵⁶

Along with the different layers of identity, the concept of the European identity is constantly mediated within the different levels of multiple identities of the individual. As some identities are given, European identity can be regarded to exist owing to Europe's historical and

⁴⁸Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Stanford university press.

⁴⁹ Jones, S. R. (1997). Voices of Identity and Difference: A Qualitative Exploration of the Multiple Dimensions of Identity Development in Women College Students. *Journal of College Student Development*, 38(4), 376-86.

⁵⁰ Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual review of psychology*, 33(1), 1-39.

⁵¹ Gobel, M. S., Benet-Martinez, V., Mesquita, B., & Uskul, A. K. (2018). Europe's Culture (s): Negotiating Cultural Meanings, Values, and Identities in the European Context. *Journal of cross-cultural psychology*, 49(6), 858-867.

⁵² Syed, M. (2012). The past, present, and future of Eriksonian identity research: Introduction to the special issue. *Identity*, 12(1), 1-7.

⁵³ Jacobs, D., & Maier, R. (1998). European identity: construct, fact and fiction. *A United Europe. The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity. Maastricht: Shaker*, 13-34., p. 14.

⁵⁴ Bolborici, A. M. (2016). The immigration crisis—reflections concerning the crisis of european identity. *Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov, Series VII: Social Sciences and Law*, 9(1), 39-46.

⁵⁵ Balibar, E., Wallerstein, I. M., & Wallerstein, S. R. I. (1991). *Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities*. Verso., p74.

⁵⁶ Triga, V., & Vadratsikas, K. (2016). The impact of media representations of the EU and its policies on European identity. *EU Cohesify Project.*, p.4.

geographical position only.⁵⁷ The relevant theories and the propositions to the origins of the European identity formation on the nexus of its relations with different layers of identity will be argued in the following parts.

2.1. Nations and Nationalism

The concept of nations and nationalism are important for the EU citizenship and endeavors for a common European identity. National identities are still the strongest social affiliations in the member states of the Union organized as nation-states.⁵⁸ As Wodak and Boukala put forward, the debates about European identity have been fueled with national concerns and nationalism since the euro and refugee crises.⁵⁹ Economic security and cultural concerns led to the emergence of the new inter-group differentiations as, the real Europeans versus Others.⁶⁰ In this context, understanding the structures of the nations will play a major role in making sense of the nationalist reactions to European identity, since European identity is shaped in these national spaces where there is a constant survival fight for state security and independence⁶¹.

There is a harsh cleavage between the modernist theories and the perennialist theories in explaining the nations and nationalism. Perennialist/ primordialist theories⁶² emphasize the permanence of nations. In this sense, for them the source of nations is biological⁶³. For example, Edward Shills argues that kinship forms the basis for the nation.⁶⁴ Such a kinship covers blood, race, habitat, language. In this sense, this approach takes ethnicity as the root of a nation. Van Den Berghe presents this connection as the root of national and ethnic identity.⁶⁵ As these approaches have a strong relevance with the social biological roots, these theories are mostly referred to as approaches regarding the nation and nationalism as an ancient phenomenon. In

⁵⁷ Mayer, F. C., & Palmowski, J. (2004). European identities and the EU—the ties that bind the peoples of Europe. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(3), 573-598., p.579.

⁵⁸ Gerim, G. (2014). Yurttaşlık ve Milliyetçilik Bağlamlarında Avrupa Birliği'nin Ortak Kimlik Arayışı. *İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi*. p. 48.

⁵⁹ Wodak, R., & Boukala, S. (2015). European identities and the revival of nationalism in the European Union: A discourse historical approach. *Journal of language and politics*, 14(1), 87-109.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Gellner, E., & Breuilly, J. (1983). Nations and nationalism (Vol. 1). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

⁶² Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures* (Vol. 5019). Basic books.; Van den Berghe, P. L. (1978). Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 1(4), 401-411; Armstrong, J. (1995). Towards a theory of nationalism: consensus and dissensus. *Notions of nationalism*, 34-43.

⁶³ Anbarani, A. (2013). Nation, Nationalism in Controversial Debates and Thought: A Review of Origin of Nation and Nationalism. *Canadian Social Science*, 9(3), 61-67.

⁶⁴ Leoussi, A. S. (2013). Max Weber in the thought of Edward Shills (1910–1995) and Ernest Gellner (1925–1995): the paradox of two Weberian approaches to the understanding of nations and nationalism?. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(12), 1957-1976.

⁶⁵ Conversi, D. (2006). Mapping the field: Theories of nationalism and the ethnosymbolic approach. *Nationalism and ethnosymbolism: History, culture and ethnicity in the formation of nations*, 15-30.

parallel to this argumentation, the European public prioritizing the ethnic identity does not completely support the idea of the political unification of Europe.⁶⁶

The second group of theories is modernist/ instrumentalist theories.⁶⁷ They are based on the constructed nature of the nation. Within the literature, this perspective is often uttered to Anderson's definition of national identity as an imagined and socially constructed community. In this respect, national identity came into existence by the imagination of the people perceiving themselves as a part of a group. Understanding how the members of the nations do perceive attached themselves to the national identities is crucial in understanding why the European identity is still in the making of itself. Focusing on the interconnectedness between the tradition and the identity in their valuable contribution of 'The Invention of Tradition', Hobsbawm and Ranger argue that cultural tradition is invented and is heavily dependent on the 'continuity and change.'⁶⁸ That is why it can be called as imagined traditions. In this respect, they regard nations as constructed and invented. That is why they argue that the idea of nations and nationalism is not biological but rather a cultural phenomenon.

Amid this harsh cleavage, there is also an ethno-symbolist approach to nations and nationalism. In his ground-breaking work on nations and the nationalism, Anthony D. Smith developed the ethno-symbolist theory focusing on the study of ethnicities which can be defined as the study naming "... human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity'."⁶⁹ With regard to this, it deals with the various aspects of the main components of the nationalist doctrine including myths, symbols, traditions, heroes, and holy places.⁷⁰ This is closely related to his definition of nations which is regarded as cultural communities, whose members are united by shared memories, myths, traditions, and symbols.⁷¹ Therefore, Smith defines the identity as an "... the aggregating and motivating nucleus of values, symbols, and meanings that translate into norms of coexistence, political and social institutions as well as life practices...."⁷²

⁶⁶ Habermas, J. (1996). The European nation state. Its achievements and its limitations. On the past and future of sovereignty and citizenship. *Ratio juris*, 9(2), 125-137.

⁶⁷ Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verso books.; Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (2012). *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge University Press; Gellner, E. (1983). Nationalism and the two forms of cohesion in complex societies. London: British Academy; Breuilly, J. (1993). *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester University Press.

⁶⁸ Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (2012). *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁹ Guibernau, M. (2004). Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical assessment. *Nations and Nationalism*, 10(1-2), 125-141.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Smith, A. D. (1991). *National identity*. University of Nevada Press.

⁷² Martinelli, A. (2005). The European identity. *Comparing Modernities. Essays in Homage to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt*, 581-604.

This is why the historical territory, common civic culture and ideology, legal-political community, and legal political equality of the members are seen as the vital elements of the national identity. Smith argues that these elements are essential in binding the communities.⁷³ In this sense, the process of construction of a nation is assumed highly as the product of a top-down process that is driven by the elites. Accordingly, it appears that the construction of the nation is the political product of the elites aspiring for mass support.⁷⁴ In forging a sense of belongingness and loyalty to the national community, states are responsible for boosting these myths, symbols, tradition, and values which are the main constituent elements of the nation⁷⁵.

Özkırımlı states that ethno-symbolist approach appears in three ways in nationalism studies. The first one is antiquity, it claims that nations have existed since ancient times and have come from past to present without much change; argues that national essences remain the same. Socio-biological primordialism looks for the origin of ethnic loyalties in genetic characteristics and instincts and sees the nation as a family in this sense. Cultural primordialism on the other hand, emphasizes the belief in elements such as religion, language, and common past, which are thought to separate the individual, ethnic group and nation from others. Faith gives these elements a mystical air and strengthens ethnic ties.⁷⁶

Regardless of the cleavages, many scholars in academia have agreed that the nation has both objective and subjective dimensions. The objective dimension includes sovereignty, territory, common legal rights, and education while the subjective dimension covers culturally specific elements to the nations uniting the members of the community.⁷⁷ Thus, national identity is expected to be constructed by a group of people within “the system of shared meanings to interpret and make sense of the world, has traditionally been tied to the idea of a fixed territory.”⁷⁸

2.1.2 Elements of the European identity

In the light of the contemporary approaches to nations and nationalism, the analysis of the European identity formation might be posited now. Since European identity formation is constructed and boosted by both objective and subjective dimensions, the process of European

⁷³ Smith A.D. (1991) *ob.cit.*

⁷⁴ Brass, P. R. (1991). *Ethnicity and nationalism: Theory and comparison*. Sage Publications (CA).

⁷⁵ Schöpflin, G. (1997). *Myths and nationhood*. Taylor & Francis. See also Breuilly, J. (1993). *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester University Press; Breuilly, J., & Balakrishnan, G. (1996). Approaches to nationalism. *Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, 1, 324-352.; Cinpoes, R. (2008). Thematic Articles: National Identity and European Identity. *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies*, 2(1), 3-14.

⁷⁶ Özkırımlı, U. (2017). *Theories of nationalism: A critical introduction*. Palgrave.

⁷⁷ Cinpoes, R. (2008). Thematic Articles: National Identity and European Identity. *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies*, 2(1), 3-14.

⁷⁸ Inda, J. X., & Rosaldo, R. (2002). Introduction: a world in motion. In *The anthropology of globalization: A reader* (pp. 1-34). Wiley-Blackwell., p.10.

identity construction is directly linked in the same way as to how the national identity is constructed.⁷⁹ The dimensions creating the sense of belonging to the European community include European territory, legal rights within the EU as well as norms, values, symbols such as the European flag, anthem, and European day.⁸⁰ Castano acknowledges such dimensions of identity construction as the ‘entitativity’ prioritizing the psychological existence of the community for the formation of a sense of community.⁸¹ These are the elements that would decrease the level of abstractness of European identity. From a social identity perspective, this is explained by the fact that people do need concrete concepts for uncertainty reduction regarding their self-conception in the social contexts which can be achieved through group identification.⁸² Accordingly, entitativity helps boost group identification which is motivated by the uncertainty reduction of the individual.⁸³ From this stance, it is necessary to point out that the process of European identity construction is still under process with some aspects more developed- high entitativity- while others still need to be accomplished -low entitativity-.

For instance, the institutional developments e.g., the establishment of the European Commission, European Court of Justice, and European Central Bank at the subnational level of the EU which is independent of national governments is self-evident that the purpose of legal and administrative integration is in progress towards boosting the feeling of belonging to the community of Europe. In addition, since the early 1990s, social integration has been given priority along with the legal concept of European citizenship.⁸⁴ European citizenship refers to a post-national citizenship conferring political and social rights to the citizens of the Member States of the EU.⁸⁵ In this light, European citizens enjoy exclusive rights such as free movement within the EU borders, suffrage right in municipal and European elections, right to address appeals to the European Parliament and European Ombudsman.⁸⁶ Hence, through involving European citizens with the integration process, European citizenship is expected to foster the

⁷⁹ Matiuta, C. (2013). How to build the European Identity? Attitudes towards the European Union across its countries. *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies*, 7(2), 2., p.3.

⁸⁰ Matiuta, C., *op.cit.*, p. 4.

⁸¹ Castano, E. (2004). European identity: A social-psychological perspective. *Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU*, 40-58.

⁸² Hogg, M. A., Sherman, D. K., Dierselhuis, J., Maitner, A. T., & Moffitt, G. (2007). Uncertainty, entitativity, and group identification. *Journal of experimental social psychology*, 43(1), 135-142.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Delanty, G. (2000). *Citizenship in a global age*. McGraw-Hill Education (UK).

⁸⁵ Delanty, G. (1997). Models of citizenship: defining European identity and citizenship. *Citizenship studies*, 1(3), 285-303., p. 287.

⁸⁶ Jacobs, D., & Maier, R., *op.cit.*, p.19.

development of “...European identity, an identity which complements those – national, regional, ethnic, religious – that citizens already have.”⁸⁷

Accordingly, supranational institution-building as a promoter of the European values reinforces the sense of belonging of the European citizens to the EU⁸⁸. For this reason, European identity is regarded as elite-driven construction of identity⁸⁹. In a critical manner, Schmitter refers to such attempts as ‘making Europe without Europeans’⁹⁰. In order to convey a sense of belongingness, EU elites employ specific myths and values with which European people can closely affiliate themselves⁹¹. The discourse employed by the elites is mostly focusing on the values and the norms of the EU such as ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, ‘rule of law’, and ‘unity’,⁹² based on the elements of cosmopolitan, civilian, and normative power Europe. This research regards that the most important symbol uniting the European public is having the common currency i.e., Euro. The importance of the common currency from the nexus of identity and crisis will be addressed in detail in the analysis part of this dissertation.

Regarding the institutional-led formation and development of the European identity as a concept, Smith argues that European identity lacks deeply rooted dimensions of collective identity and thus European identity is not likely to form such unity and commitment among the European public.⁹³ This can be explained by the fact that while the European integration process is mostly engaged with the political, economic, and legal dimensions of the integration, it overlooks the cultural level of boosting the sense of European community,⁹⁴ although its foundations are deeply rooted in common values and symbols such as ‘Greco-Roman tradition’, ‘Judeo-Christian ethics’, Renaissance humanism and individualism, civil rights tradition, rule of law.

2.1.3. Coexistence of the European and National Identities

In addition to this historical perspective of the European identity, there is also another factor that should be addressed. Since the EU evolved with its political, economic, and legal systems in the course of time, whether European identity would replace the national identities

⁸⁷ Communication from the Commission Making Citizenship Work: fostering European culture and diversity through programmes for Youth, Culture, Audiovisual and Civic Participation. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0154&from=en>. (Accessed on 27.10.2020).

⁸⁸ Bruter, M. (2003). Winning hearts and minds for Europe: The impact of news and symbols on civic and cultural European identity. *Comparative political studies*, 36(10), 1148-1179., p.1151.

⁸⁹ Kuhn, T. (2019). Grand theories of European integration revisited: does identity politics shape the course of European integration?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(8), 1213-1230.

⁹⁰ Schmitter, P. C. (2005). Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12(2), 255-272., p. 258.

⁹¹ Cinpoes, R., *op.cit.*, p. 4.

⁹² Bruter, M. (2005). *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a mass European Identity*. Springer.

⁹³ Smith, A. D. (1992). National identity and the idea of European unity. *International affairs*, 68(1), 55-76.

⁹⁴ Llobera, J. R. (2003). The Concept of Europe as an Idée-force. *Critique of Anthropology*, 23(2), 155-174., p.155.

lively discussed within the literature.⁹⁵ Accordingly, the question of whether the relation between European identity and national identities a zero-sum type is mostly put under evaluation. Bruter finds the correlation between the European identity and the national identity is problematic on the grounds that the concept of identity cannot be defined by the universally accepted terms.⁹⁶ In addition, these discussions do not necessarily conclude the incompatibility of the national and European identities. The case study country example of this dissertation i.e. Germany presents a viable example of such complementary nature of the European identity. This will be further enlightened by the case study chapter.

In fact, what is clearly stated by the official narrative that “The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common heritage to the fore.”⁹⁷ is self-evident the main motivation of the European identity whose cultural wealth is founded upon the ‘diversity’. Adopting such a position would relieve the tension between the national and European identities.

However, these debates are aggravated because of the existence of the European citizens who identify themselves exclusively with their own national identity.⁹⁸ As Castells’ network society focusing on the rise of inequality, polarization within the societies and social exclusion, argues that the forces of globalization led individuals to identify themselves with sub-level of identities such as local identities as a mechanism for inclusion themselves.⁹⁹ The inclination of the people to identify themselves exclusively with national identities can be explained by the economic factors regarding how much they are benefitting from the EU’s existence.¹⁰⁰ In this respect, since no one falls in love with the common market¹⁰¹ which means that the economic and political integration is lagging behind producing a sense of community without the cultural elements, the economic factors can lead to estrangement of the European public from the EU. In this vein, Hooghe and Marks argue that economic interests and social identities are

⁹⁵ See Bruter, M. (2003). Winning hearts and minds for Europe: The impact of news and symbols on civic and cultural European identity. *Comparative political studies*, 36(10), 1148-1179; Olausson, U. (2010). Towards a European identity? The news media and the case of climate change. *European Journal of Communication*, 25(2), 138-152; Habermas, J. (1996). The European nation state. Its achievements and its limitations. On the past and future of sovereignty and citizenship. *Ratio juris*, 9(2), 125-137.

⁹⁶ Bruter, M., *ob.cit.*, p. 1159.

⁹⁷ Article 151. Maastricht Treaty. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. (Accessed on 28.10.2020).

⁹⁸ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1), 83-108., p.86.

⁹⁹ Castells, M., & Cardoso, G. (Eds.). (2006). *The network society: From knowledge to policy* (pp. 3-23). Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations.

¹⁰⁰ Kuhn, T., & Stoeckel, F. (2014). When European integration becomes costly: the euro crisis and public support for European economic governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(4), 624-641., p.625.

¹⁰¹ Shore, C. (2004). Whither European citizenship? Eros and civilization revisited. *European journal of social theory*, 7(1), 27-44., p. 28.

intertwined so deeply within the EU as elsewhere that neoliberal economic challenges, the economic core-periphery division cannot be considered without identity politics within the community.¹⁰²

In this respect, Triga and Vadratsikas argue that national identities and European identity coexist at the multi-level polity, however, they are always in a competitive struggle with each other.¹⁰³ As it became clear, there is also disagreement within the literature about how the repercussions of globalization may affect the 'identity formation of individuals. Accordingly, Petrila argues that as European identity is a multicultural identity, it is not competing with the national identities.¹⁰⁴ This perspective is complementary to the vision of the persistence of multicultural Europe.¹⁰⁵ Petithomme argues that due to the rise of globalization and social integration, speaking of 'exclusive identities' is not possible anymore.¹⁰⁶ Multiple identities are becoming widespread on a global scale. As Hooghe and Mark highlight that these multiple identities might cover identities at the local, regional, national, or European levels.¹⁰⁷

Risse explains this coexistence of the European and national identities through the existence of the nested identities.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, people can have multiple identities which presents the typical shape of Russian Matroska dolls which refers that the member of a smaller community is also a member of a larger community at the same time come to the fore.¹⁰⁹ Some scholars investigating nested identities¹¹⁰ make categorization of goals between levels of regional, ethnic and national identities as proposed by the social identity theory. Accordingly, different levels of identities of the individuals will be prevailed within different social contexts according to the prioritization of individuals' positive social identities. As they¹¹¹ suggested that such inclination of the individuals is to prevail the positive identity of him/herself. In his

¹⁰² Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2005). Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration. *European Union Politics*, 6(4), 419-443., p.420.

¹⁰³ Triga, V., & Vadratsikas, K., *op.cit.*, p.4.

¹⁰⁴ Petrila, L. (2014). The challenges Europe faces at the beginning of the 21st century. Multiculturalism as an end to the European identity?. *Analele Universității din Oradea. Relații Internationale și Studii Europene (RISE)*, (VI), 115-124.

¹⁰⁵ Ammaturo, F. R., *ob.cit.*, p.5.

¹⁰⁶ Petithomme, M., *ob.cit.*, p.28.

¹⁰⁷ Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. *British journal of political science*, 39(1), 1-23., p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ Risse, T. (2004). European institutions and identity change: what have we learned?. *Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU*, 247-271., p.250.

¹⁰⁹ Weigert, A. J., Teitge, J. S., Teitge, J. S., & Teitge, D. W. (2007). *Society and identity: Toward a sociological psychology*. Cambridge University Press.

¹¹⁰ Calhoun, C. (1994). *Social theory and the politics of identity* (pp. 9-36). Blackwell. See also Brewer, M. B. (1993). Social identity, distinctiveness, and in-group homogeneity. *Social cognition*, 11(1), 150-164.

See also Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this "We"? Levels of collective identity and self representations. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 71(1), 83.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

work on the relation between the social interaction and salience of the collective identities of the self, Lawler calls this categorization nested groups of a lower-order or a higher-order.¹¹²

The existence of multiple identities paves way for the interaction and the mutual reconstruction of the national and European identities.¹¹³ Within this positioning of the multiple identities, there might be an expected strong correlation with the levels of support for European integration. However, as Risse finds out in his valuable work that citizens identifying themselves both with the national and European identities show rather a low level of support for European integration.¹¹⁴ Stoeckel argues that people having an attachment to the EU show rather vague feelings regarding EU policies.¹¹⁵

Regarding the European identity, nature of the multiple identities, and recategorization of these identities by the people, Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM)¹¹⁶ foresees that recategorization of the subgroups within the multiple identities would reduce the outgroup discrimination and bias that poses an intergroup threat regarding the social exchange in multi-ethnic societies¹¹⁷. On the superordinate identity, CIIM asserts that since individuals are expected to arrange their multiple identities in different social contexts, European identity is likely to have the potential to offer one overarching superordinate identity between the people of Europe¹¹⁸. Such an inclusive formation of identity leads to a decrease in intergroup bias and activates intergroup tolerance. With this aspect, European identity as a role model of supranational identity formation presents an example for other regional integration attempts worldwide as well. Here it is important to acknowledge the fact that recategorization of the multiple identities of the people is getting harder in times of social change as in the context of the Euro and Refugee crises.

2.2. Positive self-image of the EU identity

According to the SIT terminology - whose aspirations will be further explained in the following chapter of this thesis-, Europeanization process leading to the formation of an in-

¹¹² Lawler, E. J. (2003). Interaction, emotion, and collective identities. In *Advances in identity theory and research* (pp. 135-149). Springer, Boston, MA.

¹¹³ Triga, V., & Vadratsikas, K., *ob.cit.* p.6.

¹¹⁴ Risse, T. (2014)., *ob.cit.* p. 1209

¹¹⁵ Stoeckel, F. (2013). Ambivalent or indifferent? Reconsidering the structure of EU public opinion. *European Union Politics*, 14(1), 23-45., p.25.

¹¹⁶ Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. *European review of social psychology*, 4(1), 1-26.; Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Nier, J. A., Banker, B. S., Ward, C. M., Houlette, M., & Loux, S. (2000). The Common Ingroup Identity Model for reducing intergroup bias: Progress and challenges.

¹¹⁷ Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000). Subgroup relations: A comparison of mutual intergroup differentiation and common ingroup identity models of prejudice reduction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(2), 242-256.

¹¹⁸ Curtis, K. A. (2014). Inclusive versus exclusive: A cross-national comparison of the effects of subnational, national, and supranational identity. *European Union Politics*, 15(4), 521-546., p. 522.

See also Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. *European review of social psychology*, 4(1), 1-26.

group can be defined as the construction of its own positive self-identity and self-image of the EU which will later result in the ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination. During this process, the EU constructs itself on this model of utopia.¹¹⁹ Such a standpoint is closely related to the constructive accounts within different disciplines¹²⁰ adopting constructivist explanation of European identity. For instance, Olausson approaches European identity as a discursive construct highly ingrained in the discursive elements based on the positive self-images of the EU.¹²¹ These elements laid the basis for the construction of the distinctive features of the ingroup triggering the outgroup discrimination.¹²²

Karolewski explains the positive self-image of the collective EU identity in three factors: the images of cosmopolitan Europe, civilian power, and normative power.¹²³ Accordingly, cosmopolitan Europe is originated from thoughts of Jurgen Habermas' constitutional patriotism. He argues that the European constitution-making will boost the sense of solidarity and loyalty among the European citizens.¹²⁴ He describes it as a construction of solidarity among strangers.¹²⁵ That is why the cosmopolitan image of Europe is associated with a constitution with shared culture and values. He argues that today's pluralist societies are getting away from the traditional notion of a nation based on a rather homogenous population and thus nationalism can be replaced by constitutional patriotism where generalized political cultures are shaped by the universalistic principles rather than the particular history of a nation.¹²⁶ With these aspects, Habermas, in fact, disagrees with the theories of nationalism which emphasize on pre-modern roots of nations as defended by Smith who argues that once the national identity is established it is nearly impossible to remove the dimensions of it i.e. the older myths, traditions, and memories from the mindsets of the people. In this vein, Laclau refers to national identities as being 'sticky'.¹²⁷

¹¹⁹ Diez, T. (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe'. *Millennium*, 33(3), 613-636., p. 626.

¹²⁰ Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (Eds.). (2001). *The social construction of Europe*. Sage; Fligstein, N. (2008). *Euroclash: The EU, European identity, and the future of Europe*. Oxford University Press; Polyakova, A., & Fligstein, N. (2016). Is European integration causing Europe to become more nationalist? Evidence from the 2007–9 financial crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(1), 60-83; Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., & Sandholtz, W. (2012). European integration, nationalism and European identity. *JCMS: journal of common market studies*, 50, 106-122; Checkel, J. T., & Katzenstein, P. J. (Eds.). (2009). *European identity*. Cambridge University Press.

¹²¹ Olausson, U. (2010). Towards a European identity? The news media and the case of climate change. *European Journal of Communication*, 25(2), 138-152., p. 141.

¹²² Triga, V., & Vadratsikas, K. (2016). The impact of media representations of the EU and its policies on European identity. *EU Cohesify Project*., p.7.

¹²³ Pawel Karolewski, I. (2011). European Identity Making and Identity Transfer. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63(6), 935-955., pp. 945-946.

¹²⁴ Habermas, J. (2003). Toward a cosmopolitan Europe. *Journal of Democracy*, 14(4), 86-100., p.98.

¹²⁵ Habermas, J. (1996). The European nation state. Its achievements and its limitations. On the past and future of sovereignty and citizenship. *Ratio juris*, 9(2), 125-137., pp.133-137.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

¹²⁷ Laclau, E. (2007). *Emancipation(s)*. London – New York: Verso.

Habermas is criticized by the different scholars on the grounds that he has only given importance to the legal political norms covering the civic duties and human rights aspects of identity formation by ignoring the emotional aspect of the identity formation which would bond the people.¹²⁸ In fact, the proposition put forward by Habermas is directly related to the fact that Europe consists of a very diversified culture. In his constitutional patriotism doctrine, which understands European identity as based on universalistic terms, he considers that culture does not necessarily need to be given or the prior condition to form the European identity. That is why Habermas regards human rights and human dignity as the core of the European identity. Müller calls this conception of European identity as the moralization of European politics.¹²⁹

The second positive self-image of the EU is its civilian power which was originally proposed by François Duchêne. According to him, the two prominent distinguishing features making the then EEC civilian power that “it has economic power despite lacking armed forces and it mainly concerned with international diffusion of democratic and civilian principles.”¹³⁰ In this respect, civilian power Europe refers EU’s external promotion of democratic principles in building its foreign policy aspirations while developing the capacity to act of the Union towards common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).¹³¹ This type of method promotes economic and political means instead of military measures in world politics. In this direction, the international identity of the EU covers all aspects of the external policy of the Union towards constructing itself as the “world’s civilian centers of power”¹³², which makes the EU’s international identity distinctive. The civilian perspective of the EU as conceiving its international identity is mostly and especially uttered while differentiating the EU from the US.

The third positive self-image attributed to the EU is its normative power, which refers to the constitutive societal values of the European communities as an ingroup.¹³³ The term was initially proposed by Ian Manners as a reformulation of Duchêne’s civilian power concept. Accordingly, he proposes the ideological power of the EU based on human rights, good governance, peace, security, development, liberty, anti-discrimination as enshrined by the

¹²⁸ Lysoňková, M. (2017). Should a European project be universalistic? The case of Jürgen Habermas’ conception of European identity. *Human Affairs*, 27(1), 3-14.

¹²⁹ Müller, J. W. (2007). A general theory of constitutional patriotism. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 6(1), 72-95.

¹³⁰ Stavridis, S. (2001). “Militarising” the EU: the concept of civilian power Europe revisited. *The international spectator*, 36(4), 43-50., p. 44.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹³² Whitman, R. (1998). *From civilian power to superpower?: the international identity of the European Union*. Springer., p.11.

¹³³ Sijursen, H. (2006). The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?. *Journal of European public policy*, 13(2), 235-251., p.236.

Article 3 of the TEU.¹³⁴ In this respect, Georgievska-Jakovleva points out that the EU has a vision, which is closely attached to the international law and institutions in maintaining the world order.¹³⁵ Such a vision would be exposed through contagion and transference. The earliest would mean the EU's being a role model as a success story for the other countries that would imitate and adopt its values.¹³⁶ The latter means that the EU's values would be transmitted through its assistance to third countries in trade, economic and financial matters.¹³⁷

Such a designated role for the EU is explained by Waever's thesis of post-war European identity.¹³⁸ In this respect formation of European identity should be closely aligned with the peace-building initiatives, multilateralism, and enforcement of rule and law. Thus, these three features; cosmopolitan Europe, civilian power Europe and normative power Europe are regarded as the main construction elements of the European identity. Bearing these factors in mind is of critical importance since these are the traits forming the identity markers of the European identity.¹³⁹ In addition, these traits by being categorized distinctively 'European' play a fundamental role in the formation of the 'ethnocentric tendency' of the members of the ingroup which leads to favor his own group members at the expense of the members of the outgroups.¹⁴⁰

In a similar way, the essentials of the European identity are summarized by Passerini as such, "... the identity of Europe... should be based on a common heritage: identical attitudes toward life, converging on a creation of a society responding to the needs of individuals; the principals of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and respect for human rights."¹⁴¹ In this sense, the concept was originally based on the notion of 'common history', 'common values and norms', 'common sense of solidarity' and 'common response to the challenges'.

2.3. 'European identity' as an institutional Identity of the EU

There are different explanations proposed by social scientists within the literature regarding the definition of the concept of European identity. Moreover, the concept is

¹³⁴ Treaty of the European Union. Article 3. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008M003> (Accessed on 26.10.2020).

¹³⁵ Georgievska-Jakovleva, L. (2012). Europe without Borders: Questioning the Idea of a Common European Identity. *Kyymypa/Culture*, (3), 33-55., p.35.

¹³⁶ Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. *JCMS: Journal of common market studies*, 40(2), 235-258., p.244-245.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ Wæver, O. (1998). Insecurity, security, and asecurty in the West European non-war community. *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, 62(1), 69-118., p.19.

¹³⁹ Ammaturo, F. R. (2018). Europe and whiteness: Challenges to European identity and European citizenship in light of Brexit and the 'refugees/migrants crisis'. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 1368431018783318., p.552.

¹⁴⁰ Citrin, J., & Sides, J. (2004). European Immigration in the People's Court: Economic Need or Cultural Threat?. *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, 327-61., p. 332.

¹⁴¹ Ongur, H. O. (2014). *Minorities of Europeanization: The New Others of European Social Identity*. Lexington Books.

approached differently by different disciplines as it has been subject to many various research disciplines. Nevertheless, in most cases, European identity is referred to as the feeling of belonging to the Europe and European Union.¹⁴² As Mayer and Palmowski put forward that European identity is usually expressed through EU law and EU institutions which shows us the pivotal role of the European integration process in the formation of the European identity.¹⁴³ European integration promoted European identity by encouraging people to identify with Europe.¹⁴⁴ Although there is a conceptual differentiation between European and EU identity, what can be seen in the literature is that these two identities have been mostly associated with each other. This can be explained by the EU policy makers' endeavor to promote the common European identity to assure the public support towards further integration of the EU.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, with its 60 years of institutional development, cooperation, and expansion, 'European identification' appeared as an identity alternative for EU citizens.¹⁴⁶ It is also of critical importance to note down that social and political changes within the European political landscape which were fostered by the European integration process brought about the issue of European identity. That is why there is an intertwined link between the concept of European identity and the European integration process.

Within the official documents of the EU, the first time when 'European identity' was brought up as a subject within the economic interests-based European Community (EC) was 1972 during the Copenhagen European Summit by the then Heads of States. The Declaration on European Identity (1973) emphasized on 'principles of the unity of the nine', 'common responsibilities with regard to the world', 'the dynamic nature of the construction of Europe', and 'a basic necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which the member states have in common'. Within this legal framework, the constitutive elements of the European identity are safeguarded by its founding treaties. Accordingly, the EU is founded "on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law."¹⁴⁷ Since then, the issue of European identity has often caught scholarly attention.

Accordingly, the notion of European identity is a post-war concept that is attained meaning by the 'EU-ization' genre which is highly associated with the term

¹⁴² Jentges, E., Trenz, H. J., & Vettors, R. (2007). Von der politischen zur sozialen Konstitutionalisierung Europas. Verfassungsgebung als Katalysator europäischer Vergesellschaftung?. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 48(4), 705-729.

¹⁴³ Mayer, F. C., & Palmowski, J., *op.cit.*, p. 573.

¹⁴⁴ Curtis, K. A. (2014). Inclusive versus exclusive: A cross-national comparison of the effects of subnational, national, and supranational identity. *European Union Politics*, 15(4), 521-546., p.522.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Treaty on the European Union. Article 6. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20000222/libe/art6/default_en.htm. Accessed on 19.04.2018.

‘Europeanization’.¹⁴⁸ In fact, Europeanization, which refers to the normative perspective of the EU along with the institution-building process and policymaking, is attributed to many different aspects of the European integration.¹⁴⁹ That is why it appears as de-facto ‘institutional identity’.

2.3.1. European Identity and Legitimacy of the EU

The above-mentioned intertwined link between the concept of European identity and the European integration process can be explained with the fact that European identity appears as the main determinant of the sustainability of the European political project.¹⁵⁰ The scholarly debate usually puts forward that the EU’s desire for more legitimacy can be only achieved by forming a collective identity.¹⁵¹ Identity fosters the legitimization and decision-making of the institutions; therefore, it is seen as a fundamental perspective of the EU’s decision-making mechanism.¹⁵² In this regard, European identity appears a critical viable in determining the legitimacy of the EU institutions for further integration by increasing the feeling of community and community of fate among European citizens. With regard to this, Fligstein Polyakova and Sandholtz define European identity as the main building block for the healthy development of European integration.¹⁵³ Fuchs refers to the necessity of the European for the assurance of the democratic legitimacy of the Union.¹⁵⁴ Petithomme points out that legitimacy is the prior condition for the existence of a specific political entity.¹⁵⁵

The existence of the sense of belonging to a community is expected to provide the required legitimacy to conform with the decisions taken at the elite-level of the EU’s political institutions.¹⁵⁶ Regarding this, Risse argues that the high level of European identification would likely result in a high level of support for economic governance including even the possible harsh redistributive consequences.¹⁵⁷ In this direction, as Karolewski argues that collective

¹⁴⁸ Ongur, H. Ö. (2011). *Europeanization of minorities vs. minorities of Europeanization: Historicizing European identity* (Ph.D. dissertation). Middle East Technical University., p. 59.

¹⁴⁹ Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2000). When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change. *European integration online papers (EIoP)*, 4(15), p.2.

¹⁵⁰ Verhaegen, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2017). The effect of political trust and trust in European citizens on European identity. *European Political Science Review*, 9(2), 161-181., p.161.

¹⁵¹ Karolewski, I. P., & Kaina, V.(2011, August 25-27). Does the European Union need a collective identity? Paper presentation]. 6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik. <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/a29312b9-240b-4326-af1c-9fff86a6e49b.pdf>; Fuchs, D. (2011). Cultural diversity, European identity and legitimacy of the EU: A theoretical framework. *Cultural diversity, European identity and the legitimacy of the EU*, 27-57; Karolewski, I. P. (2009). *Citizenship and collective identity in Europe*. Routledge.

¹⁵² Galpin, C. A. (2015). *Euro crisis... identity crisis? The single currency and European identities in Germany, Ireland and Poland* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Birmingham), p.7.

¹⁵³ Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., & Sandholtz, W. (2012). European integration, nationalism and European identity. *JCMS: journal of common market studies*, 50, 106-122., p.116.

¹⁵⁴ Fuchs, D. (2011). Cultural diversity, European identity and legitimacy of the EU: A theoretical framework. *Cultural diversity, European identity and the legitimacy of the EU*, p. 28.

¹⁵⁵ Petithomme, M., *ob.cit.*, 15.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Risse, T. (2014). No demos? Identities and public spheres in the Euro crisis. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(6), 1207-1215., p. 1209.

identity has the ability and the perspective to contribute efficiently to the political and societal cohesion among the European public and elites.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, the legitimacy of the EU institutions hinges on the Europeans' identification of themselves with the shared norms and values of the EU. In this respect, a shared identity at the EU level will result that citizens prioritize the interests of the ingroup of the European community rather than their personal/national interests especially in critical matters and policies such as redistribution. Such a point is closely related and relevant to show the importance of the main motivation of this research which is to address the construction of the identity during the crises, which has gained relative importance in prioritizing the interests of the community over the personal/national interests.

While it should be acknowledged that these ambitious aims of keeping citizens' European identification alive is relatively waning with the multiple crises within the Union, Karolewski proposes any gradual attempt to increase the sense of community among European citizens would be an antidote against the emerging challenges with which the Union is currently facing.¹⁵⁹ This is because it will decrease the infamous democratic legitimacy issue of the Union.

The issue of legitimacy is also explained by the European integration theory of post-functionalism. While there have been references- despite in a very limited space- to the public opinion in the classical European integration theories, post-functionalism has gone a step further through incorporating identity politics into European studies which had been missing in the literature of the European integration.¹⁶⁰ Hooghe and Marks argue that while the integration process had been maintained by the elites in the first decade of the integration under the conformity of the public consensus i.e. the so called 'permissive' consensus', there happened an increased public awakening and interest since the Danish objection to Maastricht Treaty in 1992.¹⁶¹ The rejection triggered the fierce political discussions within the Union regarding the *finalité politique* about the European integration.¹⁶² With regard to this, Hooghe and Marks argue that permissive consensus shifted to 'constraining dissensus'¹⁶³, which means the

¹⁵⁸ Pawel Karolewski, I., *op.cit.*, p. 935.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 936. See also; Boomgaarden, H. G., Schuck, A. R., Elenbaas, M., & De Vreese, C. H. (2011). Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support. *European Union Politics*, 12(2), 241-266; De Vreese, C. H., & Boomgaarden, H. (2006). News, political knowledge and participation: The differential effects of news media exposure on political knowledge and participation. *Acta Politica*, 41(4), 317-341; Maier, J., & Rittberger, B. (2008). Shifting Europe's boundaries: Mass media, public opinion and the enlargement of the EU. *European Union Politics*, 9(2), 243-267.

¹⁶⁰ Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2005). Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration. *European Union Politics*, 6(4), 419-443.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Özoflu, M. A. (2017). *Rethinking European integration process in the light of crises* (Master's thesis).

¹⁶³ Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). *ob.cit* p.5.

increased public awareness started to be incrementally constraining.¹⁶⁴ As Hooghe and Marks argue that the recent inclination to the constraining dissensus is stemming from the increasing politicization within the European public.¹⁶⁵ Schmitter defines politicization as an incremental interest for the quest for active participation in the integration process of the EU.¹⁶⁶ In this respect, the EU has incrementally politicized over the years.¹⁶⁷ Accordingly, the shift to constraining dissensus has implied the domestic politicization of the European public which would be at the expense of the decision-making authority of the Union which had been previously reinforced by the Brussels' elites for further integration without any obstacle.¹⁶⁸ Hence European elites do not hold the conformity of the public consensus to push for further integration.

Börzel and Risse offer three dimensions of politicization at the European level; the eminence of the European affairs, polarization within the Union in general, increasing mobilization of the Eurosceptic politicians.¹⁶⁹ With these aspects, politicization might both constrain and paralyze the European integration process.¹⁷⁰ As a result, these dimensions have a prominent effect on the diminishing levels of European identification of the people.

2.3.2. European Identity and Trust to the EU Institutions

The debates revolving around the existence of the EU's legitimacy discussed in the previous part have triggered the scholarly debate regarding the determinants of the support for the EU in invigorating the sense of belonging of the European public.¹⁷¹ While there is no consensus within the literature in terms of offering a plausible answer to this issue as well, determinants of support and sense of belonging to the EU gained even more relevance in the light of the fact that crises have not contributed to the popular appeal of the EU at all.¹⁷² Hence, this sub-chapter will briefly discuss the various answers given by the literature.

Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier regard that trust as the main building block of the development of the sense of community.¹⁷³ They define European identity with the social and

¹⁶⁴ Down, I., & Wilson, C. J. (2008). From 'permissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus': A polarizing union?. *Acta politica*, 43(1), 26-49., p.47.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.6.

¹⁶⁶ Schmitter, P. C. (1969). Three neo-functional hypotheses about international integration. *International organization*, 23(1), 161-166., p.166.

¹⁶⁷ De Wilde, P., Leupold, A., & Schmidtke, H. (2016). Introduction: the differentiated politicisation of European governance. *West European Politics*, 39(1), 3-22., p. 12.

¹⁶⁸ Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009)., *op.cit* p.6.

¹⁶⁹ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1), 83-108., p. 86.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Moravcsik, A. (2002). Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union. *JCMS: journal of common market studies*, 40(4), 603-624.

¹⁷² Hooghe, M., & Verhaegen, S. (2015)., *op.cit.*, p. 162.

¹⁷³ Verhaegen, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E., *op.cit.*, 163.

political trust within the Union. Therefore, the issue of a diminished sense of belongingness to European identification is correlated with the trust of the European citizens. Regarding the nexus on the European identity and trust, Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier classified two approaches; a society-based approach where European identity is seen as trust among the European citizens and an institutional approach where European identity is seen as a trust in European institutions.¹⁷⁴ Accordingly, the society-based approach foresees that an authentic European community of citizens is formed through building trust of the citizens in each other which would increase European citizens' identification with other Europeans towards forming a European sense of identity, i.e. social trust. In this respect, Habermas asserts that the acceptance of the level of governance and legitimacy are hinged on the establishment of the democratic community of European citizens.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, the institutional approach envisages that the development of European identity can be accomplished by the presence of trust in political institutions of the EU, i.e., political trust.¹⁷⁶ Verhaegen and Hooghe in their conceptualization of European identity explain this division as a civic form of identity and cultural European identity.¹⁷⁷ According to them, a civic form of identity stems from being a European citizen as a part of the political community and of its political institutions while cultural European identity derives from a shared history, norms and values.¹⁷⁸

In their research addressing the social and political trust as critical determinants of support for European integration and identification with the European community, Verhaegen et al. conclude that political trust in the European institutions is proved as more critical than the trust in other citizens.¹⁷⁹ This is highly correlated with the institutionalist approach foreseeing that the performance level of the EU institutions such as economic growth, prosperity will be highly determinant in developing an attachment to the EU and thereby contributing to the formation of the European identity.¹⁸⁰ In this respect, if European institutions perform well, the citizens' trust in the political institutions will be boosted and they will be more likely to feel attached to the Union.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*; See also Triga, V., & Vadratsikas, K. (2016). The impact of media representations of the EU and its policies on European identity. *EU Cohesify Project*.

¹⁷⁵ Habermas, J. (2011). *Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay*. Suhrkamp Verlag.

¹⁷⁶ Hooghe, M., & Verhaegen, S. (2015)., *op.cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ Verhaegen, S., & Hooghe, M. (2015). Does more knowledge about the European Union lead to a stronger European identity? A comparative analysis among adolescents in 21 European member states. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 28(2), 127-146.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Verhaegen, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E., *op.cit.*, 171.

¹⁸⁰ Verhaegen, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2014). European Identity and Support for European Integration: A Matter of Perceived Economic Benefits?. *Kyklos*, 67(2), 295-314.

¹⁸¹ Haller, M. (2008). Divisions on Europe between elites and citizens. *Review of Sociology*, 14(1), 67-92., pp. 83-92.

Such explanation is referred to as ‘utility-based approach to integration’ by Hobolt and Wratil in their classification of ‘utility-based’ and ‘identity-based’ perspectives of the public support for the European integration.¹⁸² According to the utility-based approach, winners of the European integration will have a stronger sense of European identity than the losers of the European integration.¹⁸³ From this perspective, the utility-based approach is in line with how social identity approaches European identity since it is directly related to the economic, political, and social processes in the formation of the European identity.

In this vein, neo-functionalist scholars regard that levels of European identification and the positive sense of belonging to a European community can be calculated by analyzing the costs vs. benefits,¹⁸⁴ advantages vs. disadvantages, or risks vs. chances of European integration. Likewise, Scharpf argues that the EU is suffering from ‘output’ legitimacy deficiency because the Euro crisis resulted in the decrease of the welfare and prosperity of the European citizens.¹⁸⁵

In a parallel way, having divided the two facets of the European identity as a collective identity as ‘image’ and ‘belonging’, Recchi and Salamońska argue that economic setbacks can weaken the image of the EU, while the sense of belonging can be maintained in the long run¹⁸⁶. That is why with recent waves of crises, when these processes are stalemated, the sense of belonging of the people to the Union and EU’s image has been weakened. While investigating the repercussions of the Euro crisis to the collective European identity, they found out that while the Euro crisis has affected the EU’s image badly, it did not affect the sense of belonging to the EU in the countries (i.e. Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) harshly affected by the economic deterioration.¹⁸⁷ The most important factor explaining this was the trust of the EU institutions as already explained as a determinant factor.¹⁸⁸ This tendency, which came out during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is explained by Börzel and Risse with the depoliticization through the supranational delegation.¹⁸⁹

That is why the eurozone sovereign debt crisis resulted in the reinforcement of the supranational integration by establishing a Banking Union or European Stability Mechanism.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸² Hobolt, S. B., & Wratil, C. (2015). Public opinion and the crisis: the dynamics of support for the euro. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2), 238-256.

¹⁸³ Kritzinger, S. (2005). European identity building from the perspective of efficiency. *Comparative European Politics*, 3(1), 50-75.

¹⁸⁴ Hobolt, S. B., & Wratil, C. (2015)., *op.cit.*

¹⁸⁵ Scharpf, F. W. (2009). Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity. *European Political Science Review*, 1(2), 173-204., p.182.

¹⁸⁶ Recchi, E., & Salamońska, J. (2014). Keeping the European faith. Collective identity before and after the Euro-crisis. *Partecipazione e Conflitto*, 7(3), 509-531., pp. 511-512.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ Verhaegen, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E., *op.cit.*

¹⁸⁹ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018)., *ob.cit.*, p.85.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

They also refer to the traditionally symbolic importance of the Euro for the European political project from the very beginning¹⁹¹. However, Hobolt and Wratil argue that they tried to preserve the euro because of the utilitarian considerations rather than the identity-based considerations.¹⁹² They argue that during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis people adopted ‘utility logic’ rather than the considerations of the ‘identity logic’. Accordingly, while the levels of support for the Euro have remained the same, the determinants of the support for the Euro have shifted to rather more cost-benefit considerations.¹⁹³ In this respect, identity plays a less determinant role now.

The same pattern of unchanged levels of European identification was also revealed in the work of Eichenberg and Dalton who conducted research to reveal the relation between macroeconomic factors and levels of support to the European integration.¹⁹⁴ In a similar line with the division between image and belonging of the collective identity,¹⁹⁵ Ejaz explains this by utilizing Easton’s model of diffuse support and specific support.¹⁹⁶ While diffuse support means the feeling of belonging to the political community (i.e. belonging as in the division of Recchi and Salamońska), specific support refers to reactions of the individuals within the community in the face of the authorities’ actions or changing circumstances (i.e. ‘image’ as in the division of Recchi and Salamońska).¹⁹⁷ Accordingly, while the crisis may have a negative impact on the specific support, the diffuse support remains unchallenged.¹⁹⁸ Hobolt and Wratil have also reached the same conclusion in their research that investigates public opinion about the eurozone sovereign debt crisis¹⁹⁹. This unchanged trend has been self-evident also in the Eurobarometer surveys demonstrating the attachment to the EU institutions has not been affected at all.²⁰⁰

Here, it should be highlighted that the same empowerment of the EU institutions was not achieved during the refugee crisis of 2015 because of the governance failures in crisis management which have aggravated the politicization at the European level.²⁰¹ This can be also regarded as the one natural outcome of the ‘constraining dissensus’ which has limited the trust

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² Hobolt, S. B., & Wratil, C. (2015), *ob.cit.* 238.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ Eichenberg, R. C., & Dalton, R. J. (2007). Post-Maastricht blues: The transformation of citizen support for European integration, 1973–2004. *Acta politica*, 42(2-3), 128-152.

¹⁹⁵ Recchi, E., & Salamońska, J., *op.cit.*

¹⁹⁶ Ejaz, W. (2017). Analyzing Malaise and Mobilization: The Effects of Media on Political Support and European Identity in Old and New Member States. *Politics in Central Europe*, 13(2-3), 33-51.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Hobolt, S. B., & Wratil, C. (2015), *ob.cit.*, 251.

²⁰⁰ See European Commission. Eurobarometer datasets; 62.0, 64.2, 67.1, 73.4, 76.4, 77.3 <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/>. (Accessed on 15.04.2020).

²⁰¹ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T., *ob.cit.*, p.91.

towards the EU institutions. As a result, how the mobilization by the right-wing parties has been performing well was manifested itself by the failure to delegate any supranational authority²⁰².

There are also other scholars regarding trust as the main factor in forming the collective identity. Easton in his valuable work analyzing political support argues that a sense of community can be realized by the support for a political community.²⁰³ That is why it can be argued that trust towards both other European citizens and European institutions will facilitate European identification and the sense of ‘belonging together’. Moreover, it will provide support and legitimacy to the European institutions. Having been influenced by the valuable works of Easton and Fuchs, Ejaz in his research investigating the effects of mobilization of the political support within the EU formulated the table below explaining the correlation between the political support and European identity as in the following;

Types of Political Support	Political Support Constructs	Political Support Sub-constructs
Political community Sense of community (diffuse support)	Identity	European identity
Regime Legitimacy (diffuse support) Trust (diffuse support)	Legitimacy Trust	Satisfaction with European democracy Trust in EU institutions
Political authorities (specific support)	Evaluation of short-term output	Evaluation of the national and European economies

Table 1: Political Support Framework²⁰⁴

Here in the light of public support framework, it is also valuable to highlight the fact that if the political trust, which is the direct variable regarding the levels of the legitimacy and political support as presented by the valuable work of Ejaz (2017), highly hinges on the satisfaction with the levels of output and European economies. What became clear by the table above is the difference in the political support constructs between European and national settings. while the people’s prior political support is unavoidable in national input-oriented democracies, at the European policy-making level this is not the case²⁰⁵. Accordingly argues that since European policy making is an output-oriented democracy the legitimacy of the Union is highly hinged on the effectiveness of the political choices. Such a relation gained critical

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British journal of political science*, 5(4), 435-457., p.447

²⁰⁴ Ejaz, W. (2017)., *ob.cit.*, p.35.

²⁰⁵ Petithomme, M., *ob. cit.*, p.24.

relevance during the Euro and Refugee crises since the political support levels became highly in question.

2.4. The possibility of the European Identity

In light of the above-mentioned issues regarding the European identity, this last sub-chapter will address the general summary of the scholarly thoughts on the possibility of the European identity within the literature. There are diverged opinions regarding such a possibility for the formation of the European identity. By briefly covering the different academic stances towards such a possibility/ impossibility, this part will provide a valuable background in handling the European identity from the social identity theory perspective.

Accordingly, Habermas prioritizes the societal approach which gives importance to the trust in other European citizens in achieving legitimacy of the European Union and a sense of European identity.²⁰⁶ This is directly related to his thoughts about the public sphere as an essence of the process of identity-building. D' Haenens explains such a process of identity-building with the ideology.²⁰⁷ Accordingly, that collective identity formation in Europe can be achieved only through the dominant ideology which should be based on a common culture, the existence of the outgroups, common history, common geographic, political, and cultural ground.²⁰⁸ Such a proposition refers to the mobilization of emotions involved within the process of collective identity formation which implies the fact that collective identity cannot be determined by the cost-benefit calculation²⁰⁹ as proposed by the neo-functionalist explanations of collective identity formation.

There are also other scholars that do not see the European identity as a possibility. Contrary to the traditional motto of 'United in diversity', Euro-pessimist scholars argue that European identity, which is blurred by Europe's *archipelago of diversities*, is not possible. This is explained basically by ethnic and linguistic differences. In this respect, there are many references emphasizing lacking a common language or common European media system through which the essential building blocks for the creation of a nation are constructed.²¹⁰ Kandyla and De Vreese argue that linguistic homogeneity and common media are the key

²⁰⁶ Habermas, J. (2011). *Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay*. Suhrkamp Verlag.

²⁰⁷ D'Haenens, L. (2005). Euro-vision: The portrayal of Europe in the quality press. *Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands)*, 67(5), 419-440., p. 425.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ Melucci, A. (1995). The process of collective identity. *Social movements and culture*, 4, 41-63.

²¹⁰ Maier, J., & Rittberger, B. (2008). Shifting Europe's boundaries: Mass media, public opinion and the enlargement of the EU. *European Union Politics*, 9(2), 243-267; Schlesinger, P. (1991). *Media, state and nation: Political violence and collective identities*. Sage.

ingredients for the European public sphere.²¹¹ Clement argues that the absence of the common media results that the dissemination of the information regarding European matters is conducted only through the lens of their own national media whose openness might be open to discussion in some of the national cases.²¹² This is of critical importance because of the essential role of the media in the construction of European identity as well as in communicating about the crises.²¹³ Supporting all dimensions of identity including cultural, historical, linguistic, territorial, religious, Smith argues that neither schools nor media do contribute to enhance the ingroup of European identity in supporting all dimensions of identity including culture, history, language, territory, religion.²¹⁴

Apart from linguistic differences, Karolewski highlights that the EU has adopted a top-down manner while trying to construct the collective identity at the European level.²¹⁵ What is ironic is the fact that the way how the European identity is imposed actually the same as national identities are exposed by the national elites as already explained in the previous part of this paper. In a parallel way with the national identity construction, such construction process has been mainly elite-driven project and process. That is why the EU could become popular only within the elite level of the society. It has been evident also in Eurobarometer surveys which revealed that a higher level of social status, education, and knowledge results in a higher level of identification with the EU.²¹⁶ In the same direction, Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi argue that European citizens do not affiliate themselves with the European governance authority since it was a process of integration as initiated by the will of the political elites.²¹⁷

Considering the approaches taking national identity formation as an elite-driven process from the top to the bottom it creates somehow inconsistency as it has been basically the same way followed by the Brussels' elites.²¹⁸ Thus, it is again a very debatable issue in the eyes of the academicians within the realm of the contentious nature of the European identity.

The existent aloofness of the European public manifested itself in return as the gap between citizens and the institutions of the EU. In fact, the approaches adopted by the EU to

²¹¹ Kandyla, A. A., & De Vreese, C. (2011). News media representations of a common EU foreign and security policy. A cross-national content analysis of CFSP coverage in national quality newspapers. *Comparative European Politics*, 9(1), 52-75., p. 53.

²¹² Clement, A. A. (2015). Reporting on the 'ever closer union': narrative framing in national news medias and resistance to EU integration. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*, 6(1), 123-135., p.124.

²¹³ Triga, V., & Vadratsikas, K., *ob.cit.*, p.13.

²¹⁴ Smith, A. D. (1992). National identity and the idea of European unity. *International affairs*, 68(1), 55-76.

²¹⁵ Karolewski, I. P. (2009). *Citizenship and collective identity in Europe*. Routledge., p. 53.

²¹⁶ European Commission. (2018c). Public Opinion: Public Opinion. Retrieved on 18/04/2019: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Archive/index>.

²¹⁷ Polonska-Kimunguyi, E., & Kimunguyi, P. (2011). The making of the Europeans: Media in the construction of pan-national identity. *International Communication Gazette*, 73(6), 507-523.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

increase the sense of identification of the people with Europe have triggered a lively academic debate in the literature. In the European identity literature, scholars²¹⁹ investigating the relation between the levels of the knowledge and levels of the identification with the EU claim that when the citizens are informed adequately, the levels of attachment to the EU and European ideals are increasing.

As Verhaegen and Hooghe argue that such a correlation between the knowledge and identification levels is explained by the cognitive mechanism as proposed by Inglehart's theory of cognitive mobilization.²²⁰ Accordingly, the prior condition to promote a sense of belongingness and self-identification is highly dependent on how much they are aware of the concept itself. This is because as Inglehart explains; "One must become aware of it [the European Union] before one can develop a sense of commitment."²²¹ Janssen who replicated Inglehart's analysis on the cognitive mechanism and European identity has found a firmer relation between the two than the relation between the postmaterialist values and European identity.²²²

That is why the cognitive basis is expected to decrease the level of abstractness of the community which is something European identity formation is criticized for in the literature as explained in the above parts of this chapter. As the fundamental aspirations of the social identity theory come from the basic connection between the social identity of the people and their levels of awareness to their group membership which is called as cognitive aspect, this is a highly relevant point that should be taken into consideration at the level of the European identity. This is because people being aware of their group affiliation attach positive emotional value to their group membership which is explained as the emotional aspect.²²³

Therefore, the feeling of belonging of the European public should be boosted as a shield against the endogenous and exogenous shocks ranging from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2009, the refugee crisis of 2015, Brexit to the recent Covid-19 global pandemic. Since the crises have aggravated the social and economic inequality within the community, the EU has faced new source of challenges and tensions. In addition, these crises are experienced under the

²¹⁹ Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive mobilization and European identity. *Comparative Politics*, 3(1), 45-70; Janssen, J. I. (1991). Postmaterialism, cognitive mobilization and public support for European integration. *British Journal of Political Science*, 21(4), 443-468; Medrano, J. D., & Gutiérrez, P. (2001). Nested identities: national and European identity in Spain. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 24(5), 753-778; Kuhn, T., & Stoeckel, F. (2014). When European integration becomes costly: the euro crisis and public support for European economic governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(4), 624-641; Beaudonnet, L., & Di Mauro, D. (2012). Support for Europe: Assessing the complexity of individual attitudes. *Beyond Euro-skepticism: Understanding Attitudes towards the EU*, *European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)*, Special Mini, (2)

²²⁰ Verhaegen, S., & Hooghe, M., *ob.cit.*, pp. 127-132.

²²¹ Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive mobilization and European identity. *Comparative Politics*, 3(1), 45-70., p. 47.

²²² Janssen, J. I. (1991). Postmaterialism, cognitive mobilization and public support for European integration. *British Journal of Political Science*, 21(4), 443-468.

²²³ Verhaegen, S., & Hooghe, M., *ob.cit.*, pp. 127-132.

shadow of the increased influence and political credit of the Eurosceptic parties established upon the exclusive nationalist politics defending both anti- EU and -immigrant attitudes and stance in the European political context.²²⁴

Accordingly, the diminished feeling of attachment of the people worsens the situation even dramatically. Construction of the European identity is a critical step in boosting the feeling of belongingness of the European people. This gained even more importance on the grounds that as Börzel and Risse highlight that the above-mentioned crises changed identity politics within the EU, as there is a strong specific referential point to the crisis of identity in each crisis.²²⁵

Since the lack of cultural integration and democratic representation and the feeling of belongingness stems from the economic rationality upon which the EU integration has been designated,²²⁶ European collective identity should embrace the shared cultural values, human rights, democracy, rule of law, civil rights and the European norms without clashing with the national identities. This can be achieved through the political and media discourses strengthening the sense of community and European belonging.²²⁷ Such an enhancement of the policy of identity appears as an antidote against the difficult challenges and setbacks with which the Union currently faces.

In the light of the given literature review, this thesis regards European identity as a context-dependent and dynamic notion that can be constructed and reconstructed with respect to the shared socio-psychological processes. These commonly experienced socio-psychological processes through forming an-group of European community allow inter-group comparisons, group differentiation, othering, and forming inter-group relations. Common elements of the in-group such as Euro, EU flag, anthem of Europe as means of a sense of solidarity are often attached to such socio-psychological processes with regard to the collective European identity. In this context, political and media discourses undertake the role of conveyance and dissemination of identity construction.

Through the literature review, this chapter has provided the main discussions regarding the nature of the European identity formation within the literature. As it became clear that there is no agreement on the standpoint and source of the formation of such an identity. Nevertheless, what is became clear that the presence of the sense of belonging of the people has gained critical

²²⁴ Dunn, K. (2015). Preference for radical right-wing populist parties among exclusive-nationalists and authoritarians. *Party Politics*, 21(3), 367-380., p. 370.

²²⁵ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018)., *ob.cit.*, p. 87.

²²⁶ Martinelli, A. (2005). The European identity. *Comparing Modernities. Essays in Homage to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt*, 581-604.

²²⁷ Ammaturo, F. R., *ob.cit.*, p. 6.

relevance recently especially in times of crises. Accordingly, European citizens who have developed a greater level of identification with the EU have prioritized the interests of the supranational level of the EU. In this respect, strong identification levels with the EU boost the legitimacy and trust levels of the EU which can emerge as an important solution in dealing with the harsh repercussions of the crises. In this context, the constant construction of the European identity by the media and political actors appears as an important tool in enhancing the sense of belonging to and identification with the EU. Such a finding during the course of the literature review provides a robust ground of motivation for the main endeavors of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT) AND IMPORTING SIT TO EUROPEAN IDENTITY

*“And when you appear to lose yourself completely, compare yourself to others, so that you may recognize yourself.”*²²⁸

3.1. Introduction

Even though the Euro-pessimist side may be given credit by the EU literature regarding the impossibility of construction of European identity as clarified by the previous chapter, following Ongur’s argument that even though common culture, a common history, or a common set of traditions, values are not shared, there is the possibility that Europeans might practically or discursively form an ingroup which allows the ability to construct a European social identity.²²⁹ Unlike nationalist, conventional, cultural approaches to the European identity, social identity puts its emphasis on the social, economic, and political processes in addressing the formation of an in-group and inter-group behavior.²³⁰ That would provide the conceptual simplicity to examine the European identity. Therefore, investigating the European identity construction in times of crisis would become relatively easier. Moreover, utilization of the SIT makes it possible to conduct a case study research by relieving the tension of forming a common basis to examine the concept stemming from disagreements over whether common culture, history, norms, values, and traditions are shared by the different national settings.

In addition, social identity tradition defines groups as constitutive of two or more persons socially or psychologically interdependent in attaining the needs and goals and invalidating themselves in terms of their attitudes and values.²³¹ That is why they perceive themselves as belonging to the same social category.²³² Such categorization is simply enough to generate social comparisons with other groups within the social environment. Tajfel argues that having the same social category creates interaction, mutual attraction, and influence between the members of the ingroup which reinforces the inter-group boundaries in return.²³³ With its specific focus on group processes and intergroup behavior, SIT will be enlightening in

²²⁸ Von Goethe, J. W. (1893). *Torquato Tasso: ein Schauspiel*. Nicholaische Verlags-Buchhandlung.

“Und wenn Du ganz Dich zu verlieren scheinst, vergleiche Dich, erkenne was Du bist.” Translated by the Author.

²²⁹ Ongur, H. O. (2010). Towards a social identity for Europe? A social psychological approach to European identity studies. *Review of European Studies*, 2(2), 133-143., p. 133.

²³⁰ Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Information (International Social Science Council)*, 13(2), 65-93., p.65.

²³¹ Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (2010). *Social identity and intergroup relations* (Vol. 7). Cambridge University Press., p.15

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*

analyzing the bases of ‘belonging’ to a group and thereby derived action, opinion, and practices of the individuals.

There are several other rationales behind the decision to choose SIT. There are other social psychological theories of intergroup relations such as equity theory, cognitive dissonance theory, or relative deprivation theory.²³⁴ However, SIT is regarded as the most influential theory of social psychology for many critical reasons. Social identity differs from other theories of intergroup relations and group processes by focusing on the process of identity rather than only focusing on the self-concept of the individual. Hogg et al argue that social identity is responsive to intergroup dimensions of various social comparative contexts thanks to its being highly dynamic and elaborated feature both in type and content.²³⁵ In this vein, SIT deals with contextual salience by handling the social comparative factors, self-esteem motivation, uncertainty reduction, and social explanation.²³⁶ That is why the implications for the self-concept within the social identity tradition come secondary.²³⁷ Rather, it has a strong focus on the social context as a determinant of intergroup relations.²³⁸

Since it covers all these aspects, SIT is broader than other social psychological theories of intergroup relations. Furthermore, the applicability of the theory by the enormous number of studies has been proved by the replication of the research studies utilizing the key findings of the theory. These findings open a suitable ground for formulating testable hypotheses that can be applied to a wide range of groups as well. Moreover, that has enabled much empirical research to employ a diverse collection of research techniques for the measurement of social identity and related formation.²³⁹ In this way, SIT broadened the vision of the literature in handling the various group-mediated phenomena.²⁴⁰

As Abrams defines that with these features the approach adopted by SIT has emerged as a meta-theory that may be utilized efficiently in explaining various phenomena.²⁴¹ Therefore, adopting SIT theory was often employed as a framework for numerous research purposes

²³⁴ Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1994). *Theories of intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives*. Greenwood Publishing Group., p.5.

²³⁵ Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory. *Social psychology quarterly*, 255-269., p. 261.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 263

²³⁷ Cinnirella, M. G. (1993). *Social identity perspectives on European integration: A comparative study of national and European identity construction in Britain and Italy* (Doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom).), p. 23.

²³⁸ Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical review. *Social and personality psychology compass*, 2(1), 204-222., p.205.

²³⁹ Cinnirella, M. G., *op.cit.*, p. 20.

²⁴⁰ Hornsey, M. J., *op.cit.*, p.205.

²⁴¹ Abrams, D. (2015). Social identity and intergroup relations. In M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver, J. F. Dovidio, & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), *APA handbooks in psychology. APA handbook of personality and social psychology, Vol. 2. Group processes* (pp. 203-228). Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association., p.203.

ranging from unequal power relations, social movements to ethnolinguistic vitality. In this way, it has also reached beyond the social psychology discipline. Overall, based on these accounts, this research regards adopting the lenses of SIT to address the European identification in times of crisis is reasonable and suitable.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will enlighten the main premises and aspirations of Henri Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (SIT), along with the historical context it was developed. In this way, I aim to shed light on the function of the social identity concerning one's cognitive process to categorize oneself within an ingroup. In the first section, I will address how interindividual behavior becomes intergroup behavior. In addition, I will also explain how and why group memberships become salient, which lays the necessary ground to test the hypotheses of this thesis. The second section will import SIT to European identity literature. Building the interconnection between European identity formation and SIT will enable us to sufficiently discuss the ways how one positively and distinctively evaluates his/her ingroup producing ingroup bias, and outgroup discrimination by reinforcing ingroup favoritism. Besides, such interconnection will help sufficiently deal with the positive distinctiveness of the European identity construction in times of crisis. Such import will also provide a suitable ground for this thesis to develop multidisciplinary research encompassing Social Psychology and European Studies.

Although the literature previously engaged in explaining the formation of European identity through the lenses of the SIT, the theoretical novel of this research comes from the fact that it will investigate the way European identity is constructed, instrumentalized, and manifested during the financial and refugee crisis experienced more or less simultaneously which is of critical importance for the enrichment of the discipline, since social identity is mediated by the involvement of different social comparative contexts and content.²⁴²

3.2. Social Identity Theory (SIT)

In explaining the human ability to form an ingroup, and investigating the intergroup formation, this research will rely on the main aspirations of the SIT. To fully acquire the main premises of the SIT, it is necessary to outline the context from which the development of European Social Psychology and the major context from which the concept of 'identity' and relevant theories have arisen. In this way, the central concepts developed within the social identity will be enlightened. That would be critically helpful in building up the relevance between SIT and European Studies for the main tenets and motivations of this research.

²⁴² Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (2001). Collective identity: Group membership and self-conception. In M. A. Hogg, & R. S. Tindale, (Eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes* (pp. 425–460). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

The concept of identity was left unexplained before the early 1940s.²⁴³ However, after the Second World War, identity studies gained theoretical and empirical importance and recognition under the scholarly dominance of North America.²⁴⁴ With an attempt to address the psychological causes resulting in the genocide of the Jews- the most horrific and concrete form of discrimination and prejudice-, social psychologists especially engaged in investigating the characteristics of human capability to form social groups with a special focus to enlighten the intergroup relations and intergroup behavior.

From the 1960s onwards, European social psychology has distanced itself from the North American scholars to become more responsive to the social concerns and intergroup clashes of continental Europe.²⁴⁵ That was because social psychology in North America has had traditionally an inclination to describe people living in cohesion.²⁴⁶ However, European social psychology evolved in a very different direction. This has been especially because of the accelerated unease and tension triggered by radical movements in Europe in the late 1960s. Within this context, European social psychology emerged as a research field putting its emphasis on the individual during the social changes where the groups are struggling to enhance their position vis-a-vis other groups.²⁴⁷ To this end, the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology (1969), the European Journal of Social Psychology, and the European Monographs in Social Psychology (1971) were established.²⁴⁸

One of the main contributions of social psychology is its theory of ‘social identity’. Social identity theory is originated from its pioneer Henri Tajfel’s earlier works on social factors in social categorization, perception, and on cognitive dimensions of stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and racism.²⁴⁹ His idea of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum was heavily influenced by his personal life. As a Polish Jew, Tajfel emigrated from Poland to France in 1936 to obtain a University degree, as getting a university education became almost impossible for Jews at that time. In France, he became closely attached to the Parisian life and French language and culture. During the Second World War, he was taken as a prisoner of war by the German army while he was serving in the French army.²⁵⁰ To survive during his captivity, he

²⁴³ Weigert, A. J., Teitge, J. S., Teitge, J. S., & Teitge, D. W. (2007). *Society and identity: Toward a sociological psychology*. Cambridge University Press., p.5.

²⁴⁴ Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (Eds.). (1999). *Social identity and social cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.p.7.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1994)., *op.cit.*, p.65.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.64.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.63.

²⁴⁹ Witte, E. H., & Davis, J. H. (Eds.). (2013). *Understanding group behavior: Volume 1: Consensual action by small groups; Volume 2: Small group processes and interpersonal relations*. Psychology Press.

²⁵⁰ Robinson, W. P., & Tajfel, H. (Eds.). (1996). *Social groups and identities: Developing the legacy of Henri Tajfel*. Psychology Press.

strictly concealed his Polish Jewish identity and assumed the false identity of being French.²⁵¹ His assumption comes from the fact that regardless of good interpersonal relations with the German guards, had his true identity been revealed, intergroup and social category dynamics (of being Polish) would have prevailed.²⁵² Therefore, Tajfel, who was heavily motivated to understand the root causes of discrimination, prejudice, and intergroup conflict, developed the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behavior as “acting in terms of self” as “acting in terms of the group.”²⁵³ He came to the conclusion that the attitudes of the ingroup members towards out-group members are heavily shaped by intergroup relations and behavior. Accordingly, his personal life laid the basis of his deep inquiry about inter-group relations.

The human ability to form ingroup and align with intergroup behavior has caught the attention of the social psychologists all the time. In order to enlighten the group formation, social identity investigates how people identify themselves with an in-group and the consequences of such group identification. In this respect, SIT is looking for answers regarding how the perception and attitudes of the in-group members towards the out-groups are affected by their group affiliation incorporated into their self-concept.²⁵⁴ SIT also addresses how the self-conception, which constructs individuals through the normative and consensual practices of the group mediation, is constructed by society.²⁵⁵

The social-psychological definition of a nation proposed by Emerson gives us a clear path to understand the ‘group’ as a concept. He defines the nation as a “body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well.”²⁵⁶ In his definition, Emerson puts a certain emphasis on individual’s cognitive and emotional belonging to an in-group. In the same direction, Tajfel defines a group as a cognitive entity that is meaningful to individuals who feel attached.²⁵⁷

Regarding people’s group identification as a determinant of social uniformities, Tajfel puts forward three cognitive-social components that a group should co-habit. Accordingly, there must be a cognitive component referring the people’s knowledge to their affiliation to an in-group, an evaluative component through which one develops positive/negative connotation, and an emotional component shaping the emotions of the in-group members towards in-group

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Tajfel, H. (1974)., *op.cit.*, p.87.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.66.

²⁵⁵ Turner, J.C., (1984). Social identification and psychological group formation. In H. Tajfel. C. Fraser. &, J. M. F. Jaspars (Eds.). *The Social Dimension: Volume 1: European Developments in Social Psychology* (Vol. 1) (pp.518-536). Cambridge University Press., p.526.

²⁵⁶ Emerson, R. (1960). *From Empire to Nation: The rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*. Harvard University Press., p.102.

²⁵⁷ Tajfel, H. (1978)., *op.cit.*, p.62.

and out-group members.²⁵⁸ As the individual's awareness and membership of evaluative and emotional components of an in-group increase, his/her own group identification prevails.

These three components lay the basis for intergroup behavior as well since an in-group membership is regarded to construct the notion of the group members.²⁵⁹ Sherif stresses that the instance of intergroup behavior appears when in-group members interact with the members of the outgroup in terms of group identification.²⁶⁰ In this regard, intergroup relations are referred to as the states of harmony, conflict, competition, and cooperation between the in-group and the out-groups.²⁶¹ However, here it is necessary to highlight the fact that group identification is not fixed and stable since social settings and social situations constantly redefine the group membership of an individual, which in return reconfigure his/her socio-cognitive components of group identification.²⁶² In this respect, there might be some social settings prevailing individual's different level of group identities regardless of his/her weak level of identification to the in-group in question. Therefore, social situations may increase the significance of one's group memberships. In addition, as individuals belong to different social categories simultaneously, they acquire different identities. Based on the temporality and their function in the social contexts, some of the different levels of the social group membership of an individual may become more salient than others.²⁶³ The determinants of the salience of social categorizations will be further explained in the following sub-section of this chapter.

SIT has been built on the foundations of Festinger's theory of Social Comparison.²⁶⁴ Festinger was concerned with the interindividual comparison with an aim to reveal people's driving urge to evaluate themselves to achieve a positive image of him/herself.²⁶⁵ Tajfel argues that such a comparison ignores the individual's group membership heavily contributing to his/her image positively or negatively in the process of self-definition.²⁶⁶ Accordingly, Tajfel extended Festinger's interpersonal domain to the intergroup domain,²⁶⁷ including cognitive aspects of stereotyping and prejudice within the intergroup behavior as well. One of the best-known contributions of him to the Social Psychology literature was his article 'Social identity and intergroup behavior' published by the Journal of Social Science Information'. His research

²⁵⁸ Tajfel, H. E. (1978a). *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*. Academic Press.

²⁵⁹ Tajfel, H. (1979). Individuals and groups in social psychology. *British Journal of social and clinical psychology*, 18(2), 183-190.

²⁶⁰ Sherif, M. (2015). *Group conflict and co-operation: Their social psychology*. Psychology Press.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² Tajfel, H.E. (1978a), *op.cit.*, p. 39.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

²⁶⁴ Cinnirella, M. G. (1993), *op.cit.*, p. 27.

²⁶⁵ Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human relations*, 7(2), 117-140., p. 117.

²⁶⁶ Tajfel, H.E. (1978a), *op.cit.*, p. 61.

²⁶⁷ Cinnirella, M.G., *op.cit.*, p. 27.

was based on categorization and social perception concerning intergroup behavior and intergroup conflict.²⁶⁸

The fact that social identity puts ‘identity’ to its focus of research while explaining intergroup behavior has been the most important impetus for social psychological research on intergroup relations since the late 1970s. This is because it incorporated the concept of social change into an explanation of the individual behavior within the social order.²⁶⁹ Such an account of SIT gives a valuable background for this research regarding the moments of crises as social change, which is likely to alter the established social order within which the group identifications of the individuals and intergroup dynamics are formed.

According to Tajfel, the central issue within social psychology is needed to be given to “... psychological processes accompanying, determining and determined by social change.”²⁷⁰ It provides us a wider ground for investigating the intergroup processes. In this regard, SIT is originally built upon the analyses of dynamics of intergroup discrimination and how its application can explain real-life social conflicts and social changes.²⁷¹

Since the concept has evolved tremendously over time, there are two theories referred to as social identity theory in the literature. The original intergroup theory analyzes the individuals’ aspirations to enhance their positive distinctiveness via their group memberships in comparison to the out-groups. The recent theory of self-categorization which was developed by Turner regards that group membership depersonalizes the individuals, thus the individual perception and action are shaped by the group processes.²⁷² These two theories co-contribute to the advancement of debates in social psychology.²⁷³ Therefore, the term social identity is used interchangeably to refer to both theories by the literature. Although they have different focal points as clarified in the above, the theories have an overlapping hypothesis that “individuals define themselves in terms of their social group memberships and that group-defined self-perception produces psychologically distinctive effects in social behavior.”²⁷⁴ Accordingly, they regard people as socially embedded, group-based located, situated and social human

²⁶⁸ Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1998). *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes*. Routledge.

²⁶⁹ Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1994)., *op.cit.*, p.65.

²⁷⁰ Sablonnière, R., & Usborne, E. (2014). Toward a social psychology of social change: Insights from Identity Process Theory. In R. Jaspal & G. Breakwell (Eds.), *Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action and Social Change* (pp. 203-221). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139136983.015.

²⁷¹ Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1998)., *op.cit.*

²⁷² Turner, J., (1998). Foreword. In Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes*. Routledge.

²⁷³ Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2011). Self-categorization theory. *Handbook of theories in social psychology*, 2(1), 399-417., p. 399.

²⁷⁴ Turner, J., (1998). Foreword. In Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes*. Routledge.

beings²⁷⁵. Moreover, both acknowledge that the nature of the mental processes is bound by the interdependence of mind and society within the socially structured system which inhabits group-based cognition, perception and conduct.²⁷⁶

There are various definitions proposed for the term ‘social identity’ since it is widely used by different social and behavioral disciplines from psychoanalytic theory to the sociology of social movements²⁷⁷. In its original form, social identity is an “individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of the group membership.”²⁷⁸ While Tajfel acknowledges that this is a narrowed-down definition of identity, he deliberately adopts such a position so that he could avoid the debates on the contested nature of the identity.²⁷⁹ Moreover, he argues that such a limited definition enables to efficiently address the theory and relevant research regarding social identity. Therefore, this research acknowledges the original definition of the social identity as the basis of the theoretical framework.

Accordingly, based on Tajfel’s accounts, social identity refers to when the self-concept of the individuals is defined through their group memberships which constitute two or more individuals sharing common social identification and thus identified and perceived within the same social category.²⁸⁰ A social category is defined as the encompassing similar characteristics of the individuals, such as race, nationality, sex, social class, ethnicity.²⁸¹ Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, and Ruderman assert that physical and social distinctive features of the people e.g. sex and race are highly likely to be used for the categorization within the social contexts.²⁸²

Turner and Reynolds define social identity groups as the ‘collective self’ of the group members which are the constituents of the shared collective entity represented by the shared cognition of the group members.²⁸³ Hogg and Abrams regard that groups have a tremendous impact on the formation of the individual’s identity.²⁸⁴ The in-group they feel they belong to determines people’s identity, intergroup behavior, and interpersonal relations. Accordingly,

²⁷⁵ Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2011)., *op.cit.*, p.400.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.399.

²⁷⁷ Brewer, M. B. (2001). The many faces of social identity: Implications for political psychology. *Political psychology*, 22(1), 115-125., p. 115.

²⁷⁸ Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour. *European journal of social psychology*, 5(1), 1-34., p.7.

²⁷⁹ Tajfel, H.E. (1978a)., *op.cit.*, p. 63.

²⁸⁰ Turner, J. C. (1982). Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. *Social identity and intergroup relations*, 1(2), 15-40., p.15.

²⁸¹ Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1998)., *op.cit.*, p.13.

²⁸² Taylor, S. E., Fiske, S. T., Etcoff, N. L., & Ruderman, A. J. (1978). Categorical and contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 36(7), 778., p.779.

²⁸³ Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J., *op.cit.*

²⁸⁴ Turner, J., (1998). Foreword. In Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes*. Routledge.

within a system of social group memberships, an individual identifies his own position with his group membership defining his social identity²⁸⁵. Therefore, beyond just being a cognitive phenomenon, group identification is also a psychological phenomenon, having critical self-consequences for the individual.

3.3. Conceptual Tripod of the Inter-group Behavior within the framework of SIT

Based on the fundamental aspirations of the theory, there are mainly three constituting elements of social identity namely, *social categorization*, *social identification*, and *social comparison* explaining the intergroup behavior. Called as a tripod of inter-group behavior by Tajfel, the constituting elements of the social identity were developed by the successive works of Tajfel and Turner respectively in 1978 and 1979, 1982 and 1986. They will help investigate the cognitive processes of the group memberships and gaining a social identity in accordance with it.

The group membership is primarily based on cognitive, perceptual, and evaluative structures.²⁸⁶ Group-belongingness is determined by asking the question ‘Who am I?’. It lays the foundation of the cognitive element of the self-description of the individual.²⁸⁷ This process is called as the *social categorization* of individuals. Tajfel defines social categorization as “ordering of social environment in terms of groupings of persons in a manner which makes sense to the individual.”²⁸⁸ Social categorization is regarded as a pivotal meaning-giving process of identifying things by knowing what they are and what they are not.²⁸⁹ Indeed, there are two types of categorization; defining the individual based on inter-personal comparison within the intra-group and defining the self and others based on inter-group comparison within the larger social categories. Through this process of social categorization, the subjective division into social groups is generated by the individuals. That shifts people from personal identity to social identity. People categorize in-groups and out-groups based on their self-aspect within a social context.²⁹⁰ Thus, social categorization establishes the differentiation between the ingroup as ‘us’ and the out-group as ‘them’.²⁹¹

²⁸⁵ Turner, J. C. (1975)., *op.cit.*, p.7.

²⁸⁶ Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (2010)., *op.cit.*, p.16.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁸ Tajfel, H. (1978a)., *op.cit.*, p. 61.

²⁸⁹ Oakes, P. (2001). The root of all evil in intergroup relations? Unearthing the categorization process. In R. Brown., & S.L. Gaertner (Eds.). *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes*, (pp. 3-21) Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

²⁹⁰ Simon, B., Aufderheide, B., & Kampmeier, C. (2003). The social psychology of minority-majority relations. In R. Brown. S.L. Gaertner (Eds.). *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes*, (pp. 303-323).). Oxford, UK: Blackwell., p.306.

²⁹¹ Ford, T. E., & Tonander, G. R. (1998). The role of differentiation between groups and social identity in stereotype formation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 372-384., p. 373.

Many scholars in the literature argue that categorization is an adaptive feature of the human organism since it simplifies the perception of an individual by separating the infinite variability of stimuli into distinct categories.²⁹² Once categories are separated based on perceived differences and similarities which in return produce relevant prototypes, they become a tool in accentuating the intergroup differentiations and intragroup similarities.²⁹³ As categorization activates the in-group category, it depersonalizes behavior regarding the in-group prototype.²⁹⁴ However, this is not to argue the loss of the self, but rather, to emphasize that the categorization process alters the self-concept of the individual from inter-personal to the inter-group domain.²⁹⁵

Through social categorization, an individual defines his/her place in society which is closely bonded to the social context.²⁹⁶ In this way, a causal understanding of the social environment is also gained. This concerns the objective reality referring that the existence of the in-group is hinged on the existence of the out-groups within the environment. As Tajfel suggests that “a group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived as having common characteristics or a common fate mainly because other groups are present in the environment.”²⁹⁷ Accordingly, “it is only through the relation to the other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term – and thus its identity – can be constructed.”²⁹⁸ Hogg argues that social meaning and evaluative and descriptive properties of the in-group are shaped based on their relation to the out-groups.²⁹⁹ Therefore, for the construction, formation and stabilization of the social group identity, the existence of the ‘other’, whose differences may be perceived by the in-group members, is of critical importance.³⁰⁰ Galpin regards that the role of the excluded other, through which the boundaries of the community are formed, is fundamental in the development of the political identity.³⁰¹

²⁹² Bruner, J. (2004). The narrative creation of self. *The handbook of narrative and psychotherapy: Practice, theory, and research*, 3-14; Rosch, E., & Lloyd, B. B. (Eds.). (1978). *Cognition and categorization*. University of Sussex; Cantor, N., Mischel, W., & Schwartz, J. C. (1982). A prototype analysis of psychological situations. *Cognitive psychology*, 14(1), 45-77.

²⁹³ Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995)., *op.cit.*, p. 261.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.262.

²⁹⁵ Cinnirella, M.G., *op.cit.*, p. 27.

²⁹⁶ Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1991). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge* (No. 10). Penguin UK., p. 107.

²⁹⁷ Tajfel, H. (1978a)., *op.cit.*, p. 66.

²⁹⁸ Hall, S. (1996). Who needs identity?. In S. Hall., & P.D. Gay (Eds.) *Questions of cultural identity*, (pp. 1-17). Sage Publications.

²⁹⁹ Hogg, M. A. (2001). A social identity theory of leadership. *Personality and social psychology review*, 5(3), 184-200., p. 186.

³⁰⁰ Triandafyllidou, A. (1998). National identity and the 'other'. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 21(4), 593-612., p.600.

³⁰¹ Galpin, C. A. (2015). *Euro crisis... identity crisis? The single currency and European identities in Germany, Ireland and Poland* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Birmingham)., p. 32.

The existence of the other became critically important in terms of the political identity construction within the EU during the crises, since it has multiple ‘others’. The construction of the other may be targeted to both external and internal others of the out-groups³⁰² during the crises which sharpened and deepened the social categorization criteria.

Accordingly, the groups i.e., ‘ingroups’ are expected to be categorized following social, economic, and political processes that differentiate them from others i.e., ‘outgroups’. Such an expectation relies on the *minimal group paradigm* of the SIT offering necessary ‘minimal’ conditions which would lead to formulating an ‘ingroup’. The concept became a standard tool to conduct experimental research on intergroup behavior.³⁰³ One of the prominent experiments of the minimal group paradigm was to investigate the decision-making process of the people based on their group affiliation. First, people were divided into groups simply based on their choice of pairs of stimuli. A simple way of group division made it clear that there was no economic self-interest and ingroup favoritism that might have been stemmed from any previous interaction and hostility between the individuals as the group members.³⁰⁴ Hence the groups were formed as minimal.³⁰⁵ After they were allocated to groups, they were provided with booklets in which they were required to make decisions to award money. They were supposed to allocate money to two individuals paired in three different forms: someone from the in-group vs. someone from the outgroup; both from the ingroup; and both recipients from the out-group.

A distribution matrix

Ingroup member	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Outgroup member	1	3	5	7	9	11	13	15	17	19	21	23	25

Table 1: Minimal Group Paradigm Experiment Matrix³⁰⁶

The experiment revealed that individuals allocated more to their in-group members than the out-group members. Therefore, it became evident that “mere perception of belonging to a group... i.e., social categorization”³⁰⁷ is adequate in generating in-group favoritism and intergroup discrimination. In the same vein, many scholars within the literature assert that since the intergroup processes and relations are shaped based on the social categorization of the individuals of a social group, the social categorization process lays the basis of the intergroup

³⁰² Risse, T. (2015). *A community of Europeans?: Transnational identities and public spheres*. Cornell University Press., p.53.

³⁰³ Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1998)., *op.cit.*

³⁰⁴ Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C., (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In M. J. Hatch & M. Schultz(Eds.). *Organizational Identity: A Reader* (pp. 56-65). Oxford: Oxford University Press., p.57.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁶ Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1998)., *op.cit.*, p.43.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.56.

bias and ingroup favoritism.³⁰⁸ Moreover, Hogg and Terry argue that since social categorization produces stereotypical perceptions and actions assigned to the group members, it sharpens the intergroup boundaries and intergroup competition.³⁰⁹

After the social categorization, individuals start to form social groups by affiliating with other individuals based on the common *social identification* of themselves.³¹⁰ Therefore, social identification is a process where individuals locate themselves within the system of social categorizations. Hogg and Abrams call the process as self-description of the individual deriving from his/her group membership (occupation, race, sex, nationality, etc.)³¹¹ People identify themselves with the other members of the ingroup. The social identification of the individual to describe him/her is his or her social identity.

Tajfel and Turner differentiated personal and social identity according to interpersonal and group situations.³¹² SIT is largely interested in the latter where the behavior is shaped by the category-based process rather than personal variables.³¹³ In this respect, through internalizing the specific form of social categorization, group members gain collective perception to act as a group. In other words, social identification designates a certain guide of social action for individuals. Members of the in-group act in accordance with the expectations of their group membership.³¹⁴

Therefore, the social identification process depersonalizes the self by promoting the ‘in-group prototype’ based on the collective behavior, shared norms, practices, and values. Regarding this, Turner later proposed the self-categorization theory which argues that depersonalization of the ‘self’ results in that ingroup prototyping in self-perception, action, and behavior as they feel attached to the common fate with the in-group members.³¹⁵ Self-categorization causes group members to perceive each other as identical and thus group members perceive the prototypical beliefs, opinions, and behaviors of their in-group positions

³⁰⁸ Billig, M., & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. *European journal of social psychology*, 3(1), 27-52; Bodenhausen, G. V., & Macrae, C. N. (1998). Stereotype activation and inhibition. *Advances in social cognition*, 11, 1-52.

³⁰⁹ Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. I. (2000). Social identity and self-categorization processes in organizational contexts. *Academy of management review*, 25(1), 121-140., p.123.

³¹⁰ Turner, J.C. (2010). Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social group. In H. Tajfel. (Ed.). *Social identity and intergroup relations* (pp. 15-40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 15.

³¹¹ Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1998)., *op.cit.*, p.22.

³¹² Henri, T., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. *Psychology of intergroup relations*, 2, 7-24.

³¹³ Özoflu, M.A. (2019). Perception Towards Others of Europe in Times of Crisis; A Visit to Social Identity Theory. In K. G. Sosnowska, M. Pachocka & J. Misiuna (Eds.). *Muslim Minorities and the Refugee Crisis in Europe* (pp.323-331). SGH Publishing House.

³¹⁴ Ongur, H. O. (2010)., *op.cit.*, p. 134.

³¹⁵ Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2001)., *op.cit.*, p.135.

through referent informational influence.³¹⁶ That generates the self-stereotyping whereby group members start to act in conformity with expectations of the in-group norms obtained from the referent informational process during which the group members emulate their beliefs and actions to the prototypical group member who is perceived as the most similar to the ingroup by the in-groupers.³¹⁷ This considerably affects the intra-group status of the group members.³¹⁸ In this respect, the peripheral group members are often concerned with enhancing their status within the group.³¹⁹

Accordingly, social identification also leads the members of the ingroup to evaluate others based on their group memberships. In this way, the intergroup boundaries and ingroup bias, which are triggered already during the process of social categorization were reinforced. It is especially correlated with the issue of *salience*. When the distinction between in-group and out-group becomes salient, an individual's group membership i.e., social identity prevails. In fact, salience is affected by both cognitive and contextual factors. Individuals would promote their specific social group membership based on the given context.³²⁰ The arising question here is that when a specific social group is negotiated by the individual. Tajfel put forwards two factors; contextual factors determined by the present environment and accessibility of the group membership (the degree of individual's identification with the group in question)³²¹. The situations when a particular identity becomes prevalent, the individuals' decision-making mechanism are shaped by their group membership and the relevant perceptions, beliefs, and behavior of that particular in-group.

The social identification being salient depending on the contextual factors gives leeway for the formation of the stereotyping for others (outgroups). Stereotypical dimensions whose certain aspects would be only salient at a time, might alter based on the intergroup context. Accordingly, certain aspects of the social stereotyping are likely to be exaggerated by the in-group members in certain inter-group contexts in order to prevail positive distinctiveness of the in-group. The most salient aspects of the social stereotyping within the intergroup situation would serve the positive distinctiveness of the in-group.

³¹⁶ Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social context. *Personality and social psychology bulletin*, 20(5), 454-463.

³¹⁷ Cinnirella., M.G., *op.cit.*, p. 258.

³¹⁸ Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2003). The impact of relative group status: Affective, perceptual and behavioral consequences. In R. Brown, S.L. Gaertner (Eds.). *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes* (pp. 325-343). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1998)., *op.cit.*, p.66.

³²¹ Tajfel, H. (1978b). Interindividual behaviour and intergroup behaviour. *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*, 27-60.

Here it should be acknowledged that the inter-group situation can be imposed differently to the different groups having their different access to the mass media.³²² It reveals that social stereotypes are situationally variable. With regard to this, discourse analysts argue those descriptions of the others are always constructed for some purpose fulfilling different functions leading to different consequences in terms of social perception. Potter and Wetherell highlight that social psychologists overlook the constructive and functional aspects of the descriptions, thus they misunderstand the meaning of the variability in investigating the bias by regarding that descriptions purely reflect the reality.³²³ As they also argue that adopting discourse analysis in addressing the issues of social psychology would enhance the theoretical and empirical adequacy of the discipline. In this respect, the current research is valuable also in terms of building a bridge between social psychology and discourse with its theoretical framework and chosen methodology i.e., discourse analysis. How discourse analysis is utilized in addressing the social-psychological notion of attitudes within different inter-group situations will be explained further in the methodology part.

Once the social categorization and social identification of the individual are set within the system of social categories, his/her inclination to compare himself/herself with the out-group members emerges. Festinger hypothesized that the *social comparison* process is applied by the people through their comparative assessment of the abilities and the opinions of the others.³²⁴ Having been heavily influenced by Festinger's ideas, Tajfel gave great importance to the maintenance of self-esteem behind the social identity processes.³²⁵ Therefore, the theory covers the whole range of responses of individuals to improve their individual or group positions. The groups by which the individuals are affiliated are regarded as the source of their positive self-evaluation and self-enhancement.³²⁶ It comes from the assumption that individuals are motivated to achieve a positive social identity by their group affiliations.³²⁷ Regarding their group memberships, the desire of the people to achieve positive social identity is conducted during the process of social comparison. Individuals compare their in-group with out-groups in a way to maximize the favorability of the attributes of their in-groups. Triandis and Trafimow argue that individuals conduct such comparisons based on the values of their culture so that

³²² Cinnirella, M. G., *op.cit.*, p. 31.

³²³ Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). *Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour*. Sage., p.36.

³²⁴ Festinger, L., *op.cit.*, p. 118.

³²⁵ Cinnirella, M. G., *op.cit.*, p. 25.

³²⁶ Çoymak, A. (2009). *Associations of religious identification, secular identification, perceived discrimination, and political trust with ethnic and societal (national) identification* (Master's thesis). Middle East Technical University, Ankara., p.4.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

they can subjectively maximize their group favorability.³²⁸ For comparison, stereotypical dimensions favoring the ingroup can be specifically employed to the benefit of the ingroup.³²⁹

The inclination for social comparison comes from the fact that group members do differentiate themselves from members of the out-group to enhance their positive self-esteem vis-a-vis the outgroups.³³⁰ Accordingly, in-group members achieve a positive identity and self-enhancement through a comparison between themselves and the members of the out-group. Through such self-enhancement based on the subjective belief structures, the intergroup differentiation is formulated.

This is closely correlated with the fact that every human grouping pursues goals in accordance with the needs of its identified members.³³¹ These goals also contribute to responding to the conditions for preserving the positively valued distinctiveness of the in-group from the out-groups to increase the group-identification levels of the group members.³³² Unless positively evaluated social identity of the ingroup is created, acquired, or fought for, individuals are likely to leave the group.

There are three dimensions which are highlighted by Tajfel and Turner that might influence the intergroup differentiation. People should be identified with the ingroup subjectively; the context would be suitable for intergroup comparisons, and the outgroup would be comparable in terms of similarity and proximity.³³³ Here it should be acknowledged that the value connotation of these differences is determined by the different social settings and by the perspective to change the social order.

With regard to the different social settings, relative deprivation can be given as an example. Accordingly, economic deprivation gains importance when it becomes relative deprivation. The concept of relative deprivation is likely to be in question when people compare their living standards and personal satisfaction of income with others in the same way they compare their opinions and abilities with the members of the out-groups.³³⁴ Therefore, the relative deprivation reveals the group-based social inequality within the society.³³⁵ If people perceive a gap between their in-group and others at their in-group's disadvantage, the feelings

³²⁸ Triandis, H. C., & Trafimow, D. (2003). Culture and its implications for intergroup behavior. In R. Brown, S.L. Gaertner (Eds.). *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes* (pp. 367-385). Oxford, UK: Blackwell., p.374.

³²⁹ Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995)., *op.cit.*, p. 260.

³³⁰ Turner, J.C. (2010)., *op.cit.*, p.17.

³³¹ Sherif, M. (2015). *Group conflict and co-operation: Their social psychology*. Psychology Press.

³³² Tajfel, H. (1978a)., *op.cit.*, p. 67.

³³³ Henri, T., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. *Psychology of intergroup relations*, 2, 7-24.

³³⁴ Tajfel, H. (1978a)., *op.cit.*, p. 66.

³³⁵ Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (2001). Aversive discrimination. In R. Brown, S.L. Gaertner (Eds.). *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes* (pp. 112-132). Oxford, UK: Blackwell., p.125.

of relative deprivation such as negative and hostile attitudes towards out-groups arise.³³⁶ This is referred to as fraternal deprivation in the literature,³³⁷ which plays a critical role in generating negative attitudes in shaping the intergroup behavior originated from the group-level dissatisfaction.³³⁸ Group-level dissatisfaction is found to reinforce especially the negative attitudes towards minorities, ethnic groups, national movements, and social change.

Bearing this in mind, scholars researching the field of social psychology focus on the relationship between conflict and identity. Conflicts are usually the moments that include the potential for competing over power, resources, and status.³³⁹ That is why these are usually the moments when the situations involve potential social change as it will be desired mostly by individuals who are not satisfied by the position of their 'ingroup'.³⁴⁰ That is why they will wish to achieve some change in the intergroup situation to enhance their in-group position vis-a-vis other groups. As many scholars present that this is stemming from the previous unequal conditions creating prejudice against the members of the outgroup within the society.³⁴¹ In this way, their social identity and self-esteem would be relatively improved as well.³⁴² Such an endeavor would result in competition and conflict within the intergroup situation. That is why competition and conflict brought by the 'social change' are recognized as the building blocks of intergroup behavior.³⁴³ For example, if there is a possibility for the members of the lower status in-group to pass psychologically to the higher-status group, the members of a lower status in-group would be less likely to engage in intergroup competition.³⁴⁴ Instead, they will be urged to gain psychological entry to the dominant group.³⁴⁵ However, if the higher status level group is not accessible, the members of the lower status in-group will engage in inter-group competition.³⁴⁶

The major outcome of the tripod process of social-categorization-social identity-social comparison is the establishment of the psychological distinctiveness, through which positive social identity is acquired as assumed by the SIT.³⁴⁷ Based on these three fundamental elements

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ Runciman, W. G., & Runciman, B. (1966). *Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England* (Vol. 13). Berkeley: University of California Press.

³³⁸ Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (2001)., *op.cit.*, p. 125.

³³⁹ Curtis, K. A. (2014). Inclusive versus exclusive: A cross-national comparison of the effects of subnational, national, and supranational identity. *European Union Politics*, 15(4), 521-546.

³⁴⁰ Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M., *op.cit.*, p.59.

³⁴¹ Huddy, L. (2001)., *op.cit.*

³⁴² Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. *Annual review of psychology*, 49(1), 65-85.

³⁴³ Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M., *op.cit.*, p.59.

³⁴⁴ Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995)., *op.cit.*, p. 260.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷ Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2001)., *op.cit.*, p. 138.

of the social identity process, the intergroup phenomenon is addressed by the SIT. In a nutshell, the general assumptions of SIT can be summarized as such;

1. People aspire to maintain or enhance their self-esteem and they strive for a positive social identity.
2. Through the self-categorization mechanism, members of the in-group develop the sense of being identical with the other in-group members. This leads individuals to develop a sense of action as a group, which produces self-stereotyping.
3. The social groups people are affiliated with are correlated with positive and negative value connotations contributing to people's social identity positively or negatively.
4. People evaluate their own groups based on the social comparisons they make with the other groups within a particular social context. Since social identity is self-evaluative, intergroup relations are highly shaped by the social comparison between groups through which members of the in-group seek self-enhancement and positive distinctiveness.³⁴⁸
5. A favorable outcome of social comparison will contribute to the positive distinctiveness of the in-group membership while an unfavorable outcome of the social comparison will result in low prestige.
6. If the social identity of an individual is unsatisfactory, he/she will strive to leave the group for the sake of joining a more positively distinct group or to engage in intergroup competition to enhance the positive distinctiveness of the in-group.

With all these inclusive elements, SIT remains the most influential social psychological model for intergroup research by building a bridge between "... the psychology of the individual-the representation of self-and the structure and process of social groups within which the self is embedded."³⁴⁹

SIT has gained several critiques regarding its application to political phenomena within the literature. Huddy argues that social identity theorists are disinclined to handle the sources of social identity heavily affected by historical and cultural factors.³⁵⁰ Accordingly, SIT fails to present an in-depth explanation of how an individual's choice is shaped for identification himself/herself with the group membership.³⁵¹ This is because, SIT simply assigns individuals to groups by utilizing its key paradigm i.e., minimal group paradigm, which would form a group

³⁴⁸ Turner, J. C. (1975)., *op.cit.*

³⁴⁹ Brewer, M. B. (2001)., *op.cit.*, p.115.

³⁵⁰ Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. *Political psychology*, 22(1), 127-156., p.129.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

identity.³⁵² After this categorization, SIT puts its emphasis on the consequences of intergroup differentiation and intergroup bias. That creates serious limitations and a relatively narrow sphere of research in the absence of group conflict. Besides, as the explanation of the development of identity is limited, the persistence and strength of the identity choice in different contexts or during the social change is missing in the SIT's explanations. While it might be assumed there is a gap in SIT tradition in explaining the individuals' strength of identification, SIT directs us to raise these questions. Raising these issues is the first step in finding satisfactory answers. Moreover, this research acknowledges the merits of the social identity on the basis of its total contribution to social psychology, rather than testing its strengths or weaknesses on particular series of studies. Therefore, investigating how the perception of the European identity is likely to change during times of crises by utilizing the main aspirations of the SIT is valuable and one step towards enriching the theory.

3.4. Importing SIT to the European identity

Brewer suggests that political psychology should provide a suitable background where different disciplines and theoretical frameworks can be connected.³⁵³ In the same vein, this research argues that social psychology is suitable to conduct multi-disciplinary research. Therefore, I adopt a multi-disciplinary stance in examining the European identity construction during the crises of the EU. This would be possible by importing SIT to the European identity studies which this sub-chapter will address in the following. In his valuable works,³⁵⁴ Ongur has previously dealt with the import of the SIT to European studies. By going a step further, this research will explore it through connecting the import of the SIT to the European studies from the nexus of the EU's crises.

As clarified by the literature framework chapter, scholars have frequently addressed the issue of European integration with a specific focus on the European societies and their possibility to form an ingroup of European social identity. Nevertheless, such an inquiry remains yet to be re-visited and answered. The reason is that there is a disagreement within the literature in terms of how to address the development of the European identity, stemming from various arguments asserting the commonality of language, tradition, common history, and common culture. These different concerns regarding the possibility of European identity are relieved by the SIT terminology and its minimal group paradigm. As Tajfel put forwards that

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ Brewer, M. B., *op.cit.*, p.123.

³⁵⁴ See: Ongur, H. O. (2010). Towards a social identity for Europe? A social psychological approach to European identity studies. *Review of European Studies*, 2(2), 133-143; Ongur, H. O. (2014). *Minorities of Europeanization: The New Others of European Social Identity*. Lexington Books; Ongur, H. Ö. (2011). *Europeanization of minorities vs. minorities of Europeanization: Historicizing European identity* (Ph.D. dissertation). Middle East Technical University.

“social-psychological variables are determined by the previous social, economic, and political processes, so they also acquire[d] in their turn an autonomous function which enables [d] them to deflect in one direction or another the subsequent functioning of these processes.”³⁵⁵ Thus, as Ongur puts forward that the thinking that social, economic, and political processes may influence the formation of identity has emerged.³⁵⁶ This is not to ignore the commonalities - including norms, values, etc.- established by the EU, but rather to change the focal point to address the formation of the European social identity.

For the European studies, the above-mentioned processes imply us the European integration as the product of the Europeanization process.³⁵⁷ Following Tajfel’s point of minimal group paradigm, the group of European states constitutes EU as an in-group (‘significant We’) which functions as the enhancement of their self-esteem (material or normative power) and higher social identity. Through being involved in the process of European integration, European member states gain both material and normative bases for social comparison that would elevate their self-esteem. The source of material gains can be summarized as upgrading of economic and military powers and intelligence. Normative gains can be described as the enhancement of democracy, human rights and rule of law.

Accordingly, European integration process appears as the robust example of grouping of European states for political, economic, security, strategic motivations, or combination of them.³⁵⁸ The common motivation for these states in constituting an enlarged European in-group can be described through Turner’s definition of a social group, “one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values that they privately accept membership in, and which influences their attitudes and behavior.”³⁵⁹ In this vein, European integration process offers European states a social comparison ground through the norms and values they acquired deriving from their membership.³⁶⁰

At the individual and inter-personal level, the cognitive aspect (recognition of belonging to a group) and the affective aspect (emotional feeling attached to the group) constitute main elements of identification with a social group³⁶¹. With regard to this, one can identify his/herself

³⁵⁵ Tajfel, H. (1974)., *op.cit.*, p. 65.

³⁵⁶ Ongur, H. O. (2010)., *op.cit.*, p. 134.

³⁵⁷ Bélanger, M. E. (2014). Europeanization as a foundation of the European construction. In *Europeanization and European Integration* (pp. 29-49). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

³⁵⁸ Ongur, H. O. (2010)., *op.cit.*, p. 134.

³⁵⁹ Turner, J. C., Hogg, M., Oakes, P., Reicher, S., & Wetherell, M. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell., pp.1-2.

³⁶⁰ Ongur, H. O. (2010)., *op.cit.*, p. 138.

³⁶¹ Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p.255.

also with the EU as a political and economic unity. In this direction, this research regards European identity as a social identity, which is defined as “ the part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”³⁶² Therefore, a person’s self-concept as being European covers both European citizens’ recognition of the membership and the group’s distinctive and defining features.³⁶³ In this respect, these features can be boosted factors including shared culture, common market, cognitive learning, norms, and values in order to enhance the level of identification with the European community.³⁶⁴ These factors imply the inherited or reinvented nature of the social identities.³⁶⁵ These identities can interact and intersect with each other.³⁶⁶

Depending on the social context, one of the different layers of identity can become more salient than the others. This gives the idea of the ‘situational European’ concept, which refers that under the circumstances the salience of the European identity of the European citizens prevails over their national identities.³⁶⁷ This builds a critical connection point concerning European identity construction as a relevance to the national identities when they intersect with each other during the quagmire of the crises of the EU.

Just as the political, economic, and social processes that led to the formation of an in-group, the emergence of the crises as the economic, and political processes are expected to have an impact on the formation of the identity as well. The crises appear as the critical, uncertain, and dramatic moments of economic, political, and social change.³⁶⁸ It is when important routine processes and habits cease to work.³⁶⁹ That is why major changes and reforms are needed to make the system function again.³⁷⁰ During these times of social change, reorganization of multiple identities of the individuals presenting the typical shape of Russian Matryoshka dolls which refers that the member of a smaller community is also a member of a larger community

³⁶² *Ibid.*, p.255.

³⁶³ Herrmann, R., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). Identities and institutions: Becoming European in the EU. In R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer (Eds.). *Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU* (pp. 1-22). London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

³⁶⁴ Verhaegen, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2014)., *op.cit.*, p. 299.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., & Sandholtz, W., *op.cit.*, p.110.

³⁶⁸ Kjaer, P. F., & Olsen, N. (2016). Critical theories of crisis in Europe: from Weimar to the Euro. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield., p.203.

³⁶⁹ Ross, G. (2011). *The European Union and its crises: through the eyes of the Brussels' elite*. Springer, p.2.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

at the same time come to the fore.³⁷¹ It resulted that the individuals may experience doubt about each other and themselves.³⁷²

Because of the fact that the social identity is contextual, individuals have doubts about which identity to present and how to present it or about whether the presented identity is validated or to what extent. Too much identity doubt makes planning difficult and leads to deeper doubt about the self. In this respect, I conclude that because of the social, economic, and political processes, setbacks or challenges, identity may be subject to change or fluctuate. Because the positive features of an ingroup are the main factors making it possible to differentiate the ingroups from the outgroups following the SIT's explanation of the European identity. Within the context of the Euro and Refugee crises, the issue of organization of the multiple identities became at issue.

The remaining question here is that how Europeanization would answer to the construction of its Others in respect to the in-group of the European identity in the moments of crises, since it is predominantly focused on EU's dimensions of self-esteem such as norms, values as the significant 'We'.³⁷³ As Ongur defines there are two prominent scholarly works in the literature that enlightens the conceptualization of the other from the perspective of Europeanization. One valuable explanation by Waever puts its history as its other.³⁷⁴ Accordingly, the agony of the past, nationalism, and World wars are constructed as its other. In a future-oriented manner, the second one proposed by Soysal focuses on the gains and positive distinctiveness of the Europeanization process he brought for the European states including democratization, rule of law, human rights, liberal market economy.³⁷⁵ In this respect, it constructs others as the states lacking these values and norms.

Yet these standpoints of construction of the Others of the in-group lack of considering the immediate emergence of the others of the in-group -especially in the event of crises- since identity as well as the European identification is situational. Hence, they remain to be the common denominators of 'the significant We'. Notwithstanding that, according to the account of the SIT research, the Others should constitute the immediate determinants of identification upon which a positive distinctiveness of the in-group of European identity is formed. In this

³⁷¹ Risse, T. (2004). European institutions and identity change: what have we learned?. In R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer (Eds.). *Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU* (pp. 248-253). London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield. See also Weigert, A. J., Teitge, J. S., Teitge, J. S., & Teitge, D. W. (2007). *Society and identity: Toward a sociological psychology*. Cambridge University Press.

³⁷² Weigert, A. J., Teitge, J. S., Teitge, J. S., & Teitge, D. W. (2007)., *op.cit.*, p.58.

³⁷³ Ongur, H. O. (2010)., *op.cit.*, p. 139.

³⁷⁴ Wæver, O. (1998). Insecurity, security, and asecurty in the West European non-war community. *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, 62(1), 69-118.

³⁷⁵ Soysal, Y. N. (2002). Locating Europe. *European Societies*, 4(3), 265-284.

regard, European identity is a constantly constructed phenomenon depending on the global and regional political, economic, and security contexts. Based on these ever-evolving conditions/socio-psychological processes, it reconfigures itself, inter-group relations, comparisons, othering, and inter-group differentiation.

Accordingly, when the main criteria of the formation of the positive self-evaluation i.e., for the formation of the ingroup of European identity are shaken in the event of a crisis, the possibility of members of the European ingroup to manifest themselves with the positive ingroup image became in question. That is why the crisis can be regarded as a perceived threat to European identity. At the practical level, such correlation shows the possible inclination of the European public from the European identification to the national identification in times of crises. This led othering within this ingroup of European identity to form smaller ingroups along with the lines of national identities. Moreover, members of the ingroup, being under such threat, are more inclined to differentiate themselves from that particular so-called out-group which paves the way for the in-group favoritism and intergroup discrimination. In return, this sense of being threatened aggravates the phenomenon of social comparison even worse.³⁷⁶ The ingroup bias becomes especially prevalent when intergroup competition and threat by the outgroup emerges.³⁷⁷ That is why the threat is regarded as a useful tool in predicting intergroup discrimination.³⁷⁸ Therefore, examining the European construction during times of crises would provide a valuable output in addressing how Europeanization would answer to the construction of the Significant We as versus to its Others through the SIT lenses. Formation and construction of the European identity in respect to the contextually changing outgroups will be overviewed historically during the course of the Europeanization process in the following chapter. And later how its construction is manifested in the crises context of the EU will be analyzed by the analytical chapters of this research.

³⁷⁶ Vignoles, V. L., & Moncaster, N. J. (2007). Identity motives and in-group favouritism: A new approach to individual differences in intergroup discrimination. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 46(1), 91-113., p.94.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸ Vignoles, V. L., & Moncaster, N. J., *op.cit.*, p. 93.

CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY: FROM EUROPEANIZATION TO EU-IZATION

4.1. Introduction

Since identity involves a historical process of formation, the process of Europeanization as a historical phenomenon offers valuable insights in terms of clarifying the formation of the European identity. The mainstream literature handles Europeanization³⁷⁹ from a broader angle by regarding it as a “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures, and public policies.”³⁸⁰ Within the scope of this definition, the research agenda of the literature has so far mostly focused on the political process and related effects brought about by the EU and its ‘Acquis Communautaire’ to its member states and candidate countries. By formulating a process- and geography-oriented manner, literature is heavily interested in dealing with the ‘impact of the EU’ as an ahistorical conceptualization of the term. Such a euro-centric perspective takes the process of EU’s own identity construction as a progressive and ultimately superior to other societies for granted. As a result, the mainstream literature overlooks the ideational foundation process of its own, which is in fact another critical process that should be taken into account within the scope of Europeanization. Regarding the fact that the idea of Europe was initiated long before people started to see themselves as Europeans,³⁸¹ this research opines that narration of history is the fundamental way to reveal the formation of identity over time.³⁸² Therefore, this research will adopt a different stance from the mainstream discussions by adopting a historical approach in dealing with the concept of Europeanization with the aim to understand underlying origins and myths which contributed to European culture’s construction as ‘the superior’. The adopted historical conceptualization perspective emerging

³⁷⁹ For the definition of the term see; Flockhart, T. (2010). Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and Space. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(4), 787-810.

³⁸⁰ Radaelli, C. M. (2000). Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change. *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, 4(8), p.4.

³⁸¹ Delanty, G. (1995). *Inventing Europe*. Springer., p.4.

³⁸² Ifversen, J. (2011). Myth and history in European post-war history writing. In M. Spiering & M. Wintle (Eds.). *European Identity and the Second World War*. (pp. 75-91). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

as a process of EU-ization³⁸³ within the broad scope of Europeanization will help provide an encompassing overview of the term Europeanization with its relationship with the European identity formation. Here it is important to clarify the difference between the Europeanization process and EU-ization. While Europeanization is broadly referring to the adoption of a “set of norms, rules, and practices ... and impact of these new institutions on political structures and processes”³⁸⁴, EU-ization embedded within the Europeanization refers to the political integration of the member states. In this respect, while the European integration process is not the synonym of the Europeanization process,³⁸⁵ the development of the EU is regarded as a product of the ongoing historical continuum of Europeanization.³⁸⁶

Adopting a historical perspective is justified by the fact this research is mainly interested in putting European identity formation in its center while handling the concept of Europeanization. This is to strengthen the arguments building bridge between SIT and European identity provided by the theoretical part of this dissertation. Moreover, since this research ultimately regards Europe as a construction serving the source of the positive self-image of the members of the community, the historical approach will be valuable in terms of understanding the rooted sources of such positive self-image of the Europeans.

Addressing the historical overview will also help grasp the legacy on which the European idea is based today. Therefore, addressing the historical background of the European identity and the process of Europeanization will be enlightening to a great extent in conducting the analysis part of the dissertation provided by the case study chapter as well. In this respect, it is necessary to demonstrate where the European values promoted as the common heritage of Europe, are originated from.

To this end, this chapter will first provide a brief historical overview of the formation of the European identity whose origins are rooted in numerous incidents tracing back to Ancient Greek. In this way, the common European values and heritage as the roots of the European idea will be dealt with. The specific focus will be given to Europe’s self-construction as against its others during the different periods of time. The historical overview will utilize Flockhart’s periodization chart of the Europeanization in order to demonstrates the shifting basis of the ideational origins of Europe in different stages of time. After providing the historical overview

³⁸³ Wallace, H. (2000). Europeanisation and globalisation: complementary or contradictory trends?. *New Political Economy*, 5(3), 369-382.

³⁸⁴ Börzel, T. A. (2002). Member state responses to Europeanization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 193-214., p.193.

³⁸⁵ Featherstone, K., & Radaelli, C. M. (Eds.). (2003). *The politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press., p. 3.

³⁸⁶ Wallace, H., *op.cit.*, p.369.

of the formation of the European identity, the research will address initiatives of the EU in forming a collective European identity via its institutional and legal mechanisms. This will be enlightening in terms of acknowledging the place of the European identity within this sui-generis organization.

4.2. Europae and Historical Overview of the Idea of Europe

The different periods of history embodied the different ways of construction and formation of the European identity. Moreover, different stages of history contributed to the origins of the European idea differently. For the sake of conceptual convenience, this research utilizes Flockhart's periodization where he offers a profound analysis for ideational structure, ideational agents, and process as well as the ways of ingroup and out-group formation of Europeans. These different stages illustrated below will be processed and clarified further through the provided overview of the historical formation of the European identity.






Historical Content	> 1450 European self- Realization	1450 – 1700 Proto Europeanization	1700 – 1914 Incipit Europeanization	1914 > Contemporary Inward Europeanization	1945 > Contemporary Outward Europeanization/ EU-ization
Sociological					
Ideational Structure	Christian Unity	Civilization Christianity	European reason and rationality expressed in admin.and org principles White man's burden	Wilsonian ideas Anti-imperialism Pro-nationalism	'Normative Europe's continually expanding norm set
Ideational Agents	Crusaders Traders Invading Moslems and Tartars	Traders Warriors/'Discoverers' Jewish scholars and translators	Agents of colonial states Missionaries	American policy-makers and their agents in various institutions	European policy-makers and their agents in European institutions and development agencies
Ideational Process	Ideational diffusion/Resource portfolios Adaptation & Assimilation	Ideational diffusion/Resource portfolios Adaptation & Assimilation	Colonialism	State socialization Institution-building	State socialization Institution expansion and integration Social learning
Norm-diffusion Direction					
'Other'	Barbarians Islam Tartars	Turks Savages	Barbarians Primitive people	Europe's past The Soviet threat	Europe's past Violent nationalisms Militant Islamism (?)
'Significant We'	Rome The Christian Church	The superior and limitless West	Civilized world Humans with reason and rationality	The 'free world'	The EU core members

Table 1: Flockhart's periodization of Europeanization³⁸⁷

The literature handles European history from the date roughly around 1200 BC when the foundations of the European myth were established. In this respect, the role of the myth, symbols, memories, and values in the formation of the identity is often addressed within the literature.³⁸⁸ In this respect, the literature gives a certain space to myths and memories in forming the political and communal identity of the society.³⁸⁹ It became evident that Europhiles

³⁸⁷ Flockhart, T. (2008). *The Europeanization of Europe: The transfer of norms to Europe, in Europe and from Europe* (No. 2008: 7). DIIS Working Paper., p. 22.

³⁸⁸ Smith, A.D. (1991). *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. Oxford: John Wiley and Sons., p. 15.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.* See also; Stråth, B. (2000). Introduction: Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of Community. In B. Stråth (Ed.), *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community. Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond: Multiple Europes* (Vol. 9, pp. 19-46). Peter Lang.

have acknowledged such a critical place of the myths and history narration in the formation of the identity.³⁹⁰ The draft EU constitution has reserved a place explaining the origins of the idea of Europe and its vision; “the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilizations of Greece and Rome ... and later by the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment, has embedded ... the central role of the human person and his inviolable and inalienable rights”.³⁹¹ In this respect, Ancient Greece, whose profound effect on western philosophy and emerging Western civilizations can be seen, stands out as the civilization on which the Western political institutions and concepts are established. Medieval and modern Europeans were heavily interested in ancient Greeks and Romans as a model for themselves and thus they collected Greek texts to be translated and studied.³⁹² Greco-Roman antiquity is accepted as the main influencer of the development of Europe.³⁹³ Therefore, European institutions give a special place to the mythical character Europa in narrating its Greek legacy within the construction of its history.

European foundational myth comes from Greek mythology. Europe was named after Europa who was the beautiful daughter of the Phoenician king. She was abducted by God Zeus who disguised himself as a white bull.³⁹⁴ He took her to the Greek island of Crete where Europa bore three sons; Minos, Rhadamanthus and Sarpedon.³⁹⁵ Later Europa married Asterius and she became the first queen of Crete. Then the continent comprising the area where Greek colonies expanded further to North and West started to be named after Europa. As a result, regardless of the geopolitical developments later, Europe upon which the European heritage and culture were established took its name from the Greek mythology.

There are two different explanations clarifying the meaning of the Europa. The first one explains it with the Ancient Greek language; eur meaning as ‘broad’ and ‘op’ as eye, thus the combination symbolizes the “wide-gazing” or “broad-faced”.³⁹⁶ The second explanation on the other hand argues that it derives from the Semitic language word ‘Erubu’ which means darkness referring to the sunset from the West.³⁹⁷ While neither of them was proved to be true, the word Europe was uniquely associated with the geographical expression of the continent at that time. With regard to this, it is still a contested issue that from where the continent starts and where it

³⁹⁰ Ifversen, J. (2011)., *op.cit.*, p.75.

³⁹¹ Eur-Lex. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. (18.07.2003).

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52003XX0718%2801%29>. (Accessed on 05.11.2020).

³⁹² Meier, C. (2011). *A culture of freedom: Ancient Greece and the origins of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press., p.7.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁴ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 17.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁶ Bainbridge, T., & Teasdale, A. (1995). *The Penguin Companion to European Union*. UK: Penguin., pp. 179-180.

³⁹⁷ Petersen, B. (2016). The Abduction of Europa. *Liberal Studies*, 1(2), 155-164., p. 156.

ends. The problem about its geography indeed stems from its eastern borders, since the boundaries were naturally settled in Western by the Atlantic Ocean, in Southern by the Strait of Gibraltar, and in Northern by the Arctic Ocean. The Ural Mountains were offered as presenting the divisional line by Swedish geographer von Strahlenberg in 1730.³⁹⁸ Ural division was nearly accepted universally. Gottman summarized the geographical border between Europe and Asia as in the following excerpt;

“The Eastern limit follows traditionally the line of Urals, that is the crest of Ural mountain range from the Arctic shores southward, then the course of Ural river which empties into the Caspian sea; the limit crosses the Caspian southward and swings to the Black sea westward along the crest of the Caucasus range.”³⁹⁹

Within the claimed geographical borders of the continent, the term Europeanization refers to the process of producing defining and distinctive European features that would differentiate Europe from the Orient/ others. Following Delanty’s argumentation, this can be explained by the fact that the sense of belongingness is defined through the typology of ‘us’ and ‘them’ which convey the idea that identity formation utilizes the negation of the other.⁴⁰⁰ In this sense, the identification of the Orient can be regarded as upon which the common heritage of Europeans was founded in identifying themselves with respect to non-Europeans.⁴⁰¹

This negation of the Orient in fact comes from the notion of the ‘the land of Christendom’. While European self-conception can be traced only under the Roman identity formed as ‘we’ the Christian roman civilization versus barbarian ‘others’ during the Middle Ages,⁴⁰² after the decline of the Western Roman Empire, the increasing Islamic threat from the Iberian region from the seventh century onwards pushed Europe to gain its self-consciousness and to unify under the Christendom.⁴⁰³ “Ethnic groups in Europe could not come together under the same cultural roof, if Islam would not exist as a common enemy.”⁴⁰⁴ In the same direction, Flockhart points out that “nothing consolidates an identity more than crisis....”⁴⁰⁵ Accordingly, Islam contributed to the formation of the collective religious Christian identity of Europe. The establishment of the differentiation of themselves from the non-Christian outside world is

³⁹⁸ Lewis, M. W., Wigen, K. E., & Wigen, K. (1997). *The myth of continents: A critique of metageography*. California: University of California Press., p.27.

³⁹⁹Gottman, J. (1950). *A Geography of Europe*. New York: Henry Holt and Company., p. 8.

⁴⁰⁰ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁰¹ Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.

⁴⁰² Hay, D. (1968). *Europe: the Emergence of an Idea*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press., p. 23.

⁴⁰³ Hodges, R., & Whitehouse, D. (1983). *Mohammed, Charlemagne & The Origins of Europe: Archaeology and the Pirene thesis*. Cornell University Press., pp.20-53.

⁴⁰⁴ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 24.

⁴⁰⁵ Flockhart, T. (2008). *The Europeanization of Europe: The transfer of norms to Europe, in Europe and from Europe* (No. 2008: 7). DIIS Working Paper., p. 23.

influentially rooted in the origins of the Crusades against non-Christians.⁴⁰⁶ The emerging European self-perception was based on the differentiation between ‘we’ as the Christian Church united under the Pope versus ‘others’ as Saracens.⁴⁰⁷ In this respect, after the reign of Charlemagne that achieved to keep Islamic threat under control the land of Christendom comprising the area from today’s France to Germany symbolized the area encompassing the religious Christian identity of the Europeans. That is why Charlemagne is known as the *rex pater Europae*.⁴⁰⁸ Moreover, the Carolingian Renaissance implying the period of unification of Western Europe from the relics of the Roman Empire is accepted as the root of the foundations of common European identity.⁴⁰⁹

During the fourteenth century, because of the fall of the Constantinople and Byzantine Empire, the church was still powerful and dominant in terms of the symbol of the Significant ‘We’ for Europeans as being associated with the religious identity. However, the rise of the West started to be in question with the numerous developments including the Renaissance, age of exploration, and discoveries of the new world, the Reformation. They generated the basis of the European culture which was spreading all over Europe especially during Renaissance through the ideational diffusion of the rationalization, humanism, industrialization literature, and science education. In addition, the age of exploration and discovery of the Americas led to the notion of colonialism in today’s north and south America.⁴¹⁰ On the other hand, the Reformation has diminished the monopoly of the church in organizing the political and societal life, which would imply the foundations of secular Europe.⁴¹¹ These developments, as well as the religious wars of the 17th century and expansion of the Ottoman Empire, led to the redefinition of the religion-based constructed identity and unity of Europe.⁴¹² While the former resulted in the elimination of the unified Christian church as constituting the ‘We’ as an ingroup, the latter generated a new ‘other’ i.e. Turks implying ethnicity rather than the religion. In addition, the exploration of the new world generated a new juxtaposition of the colonizer and the colonized that emphasized European superiority and civilization.⁴¹³ Accordingly, the colonized other was constructed as the uncivilized, while Europe was constructed as the civilized being the center of progress and development. In this respect, while the construction

⁴⁰⁶ Mastnak, T. (2002). *Crusading peace: Christendom, the Muslim world, and Western political order*. California: University of California Press., p.34.

⁴⁰⁷ Hobson, J. M. (2004). *The Eastern origins of Western civilisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 112.

⁴⁰⁸ Barbero, A. (2018). *Charlemagne: Father of a continent*. California: University of California Press., p. 3.

⁴⁰⁹ Pirenne, H. (2001). *Mohammed and Charlemagne*. New York: Dover Publications., pp. 147-186.

⁴¹⁰ Roberts, J. M. (1997). *A short history of the world*. USA:Oxford University Press., pp. 249-290.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 289-290.

⁴¹² Flockhart, T. (2008)., *op.cit.*, p. 26.

⁴¹³ Hamadi, L. (2014). Edward Said: The postcolonial theory and the literature of decolonization. *European Scientific Journal*. 39-46., p. 39

of the ingroup 'we' has gained new elements in differentiation Europe from the outside world, the so-called European unity was started to be challenged by the spark of capitalism that triggered the competition among societies.⁴¹⁴ The sparkle of capitalism indeed was initiated by the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution which was later followed by the French Revolution. All of them in various forms aggravated the competition among European societies and the wave of nationalism.

Accordingly, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution started as the period of glory for the Europeans within the constant process of rationalization and industrialization. The Enlightenment boosted the idea of estrangement of human imagination and science from the chains of Christianity.⁴¹⁵ Today's talk about human rights in Europe is usually associated with the roots of the Enlightenment process especially with respect to rule of law and democracy⁴¹⁶.

The emerging rationalism and philosophy along with the secularized values were built upon industrial capitalism⁴¹⁷. Progress and civilization, which are attributed as alien to 'others', are the common words in defining the 'European notion'.⁴¹⁸ In this respect, the new juxtaposition was based on racial identity; we as white Europeans versus uncivilized barbarians. On the other hand, in the eyes of the colonized people, white 'Europeans' regardless of their nation were identified with their being colonizers as a whole.⁴¹⁹ The Enlightenment process was problematic on the grounds that the prevalent ideas of European superiority over the non-European world which were coupled with Darwin's evolutionary ideas were culminated in the racist ideology conveying the idea of racial supremacy of the Europeans.⁴²⁰ Such a construction paved also the way for the inspirations of the Europeans as the civilized westerners to improve the non-European world.⁴²¹

The inspiration to so-called civilize the non-Europeans was conducted through a systemized process of colonialism. In this regard, the notion framed by the Enlightenment and social Darwinism was used as an ideological tool of justification and propagation firstly for colonialism and later for Fascism and Nazism.⁴²² The ideational diffusion implied the extracting the sources of the uncivilized world since the demand for sources increased

⁴¹⁴ Ongur, H. Ö. (2011)., *op.cit.*, p. 48.

⁴¹⁵ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 90.

⁴¹⁶ Porsdam, H. (2011). Human Rights and European Identity since World War II. In M. Spiering & M. Wintle (Eds.). *European Identity and the Second World War*. (pp. 75-91). London: Palgrave Macmillan., p. 22.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ Marcus, J. T. (1961). Time and the sense of history: West and East. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 3(2), 123-139., p.134.

⁴¹⁹ Erdenir, F. B. (2010). *Avrupa kimliği: Avrupa Birliği'nin yarım kalan hikayesi*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayıncılık., p. 59.

⁴²⁰ Flockhart, T. (2008)., *op.cit.*, p. 27.

⁴²¹ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 90.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, p.95.

considerably because of industrialization which triggering the competition between the emerging great powers. With these aspects, this period approximately lasting from the 1700s to the First World War established the mentality of expanding the state system, eurocentrism, and superiority employed within the construction of Europe.

The appearing competition was further aggravated by the other critical development of this period. It was after the French Revolution of 1789 that drift to nationalism gained a pace within history. The revolution gave a great stimulus to liberty and self-determination putting the idea of 'the people' above everything with regard to the demand for democracy and civil liberties. Through drawing a frame for a civilized polity of nation-states, the French Revolution symbolizing the common properties of the humane values embodied the idea of Europe.⁴²³ However, at the same time ironically enough it took the common sense of European identity away.⁴²⁴ Accelerated nationalist wave stemming from the French Revolution during which the concept of the 'nation' gained relevant importance and became the often emphasized and repeated term.⁴²⁵ The concept became even the transformed version of the imperialist program of France under Napoleon's plans for the reconstruction of Europe driving to Napoleonic Wars.⁴²⁶ Napoleon's vision for the re-designation of Europe aspiring for republican nationalism was based on the French dominance over the continental Europe. In this sense, his attempted to construct a Frenchified, European identity which he made clear himself with his words in 1805;

"There is not enough sameness among the nations of Europe. European society needs a regeneration. There must be a superior power which dominates all the other powers, with enough authority to force them to live in harmony with one another and France is best placed for that purpose."⁴²⁷

Following the defeat of Napoleonic France, his opponents attempted to establish the old order as well as a peace prescription for Europe in the form of an anti-French construct.⁴²⁸ To this end, the post-Napoleonic order was laid down by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.⁴²⁹ The Congress foresaw a notion of balance of power that would be achieved through the repartition of the territory between the main powers of Europe.⁴³⁰ In this way, while European politics was

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, p.65.

⁴²⁴ Thompson, M. P. (1994). Ideas of Europe during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 55(1), 37-58., p.40.

⁴²⁵ Burleigh, M. (2005). *Earthly powers: The clash of religion and politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers., pp. 1-22.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁷ Cited in Thompson, M. P. (1994). Ideas of Europe during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 55(1), 37-58., p.39.

⁴²⁸ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 73.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.75.

⁴³⁰ Schroeder, P. (2016). *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the international History of modern Europe*. Springer., p. 37.

re-ordered as the foundations of the Concert of Europe, the European unity under the religious identity of the former periods had become out of question.

The established system of balance of power was shaken off its foundations by the First World War (WWI). WWI had dramatic repercussions for world politics which would be driven to the Second World War (WWII), the most destructive version of world warfare. While the new Europe emerged with the Versailles peace settlement along with the ideas of collective security and international institutionalism enshrined by the establishment of the League of Nations and Pan-Europe Union by the Coudenhove-Kalergi initiative, the global scene of the interwar era subtly sparked off the shift from Pax Europaea to Pax Americana. At the same time, Europe was preoccupied with its own self-criticism and French nationalism against Germany. Moreover, Europe was about to get stuck in among rising ideologies communism, and fascism. Communism and fascism would soon challenge the existence of ascendant liberalism in Europe.⁴³¹ Furthermore, the previously constructed civilized European unity, image, and idea as the sole representative of the humane values as against its 'others' were abandoned and destroyed by the brutality of the war. The definition of what being a European means was altered dramatically.⁴³² Therefore, the Great War should be associated with not only the economic, political and military loss for Europe, but also with the loss of the European spirit accompanied by the very idea of a crisis of civilization. Spiering and Wintle argue that the concept of nation and technology dragged Europe to such a conclusion which dissipated the constructed European conscience and idea based on the Graeco- Roman tradition and Judeo-Christian ethics.⁴³³

Another important remark of WWI was the change in the ideational diffusion from the European idea sets to American idea sets. As Flockhart points out that European ideational diffusion to other societies marked an end with the beginning of the ideational diffusion flowed into Europe.⁴³⁴ These ideas were heavily shaped by the content of Wilsonism whose core principles envisaging the open market, democracy, and international institutions.⁴³⁵ While in essence they were aligned with the European idea sets, the vision was way more liberal than the thinking of the Enlightenment.⁴³⁶ Wilsonian ideas had also a tremendous effect on the reshaping of the European state-building frame.

⁴³¹Spiering, M., & Wintle, M. (2002). European Identity, Europeanness and the First World War: Reflections on the Twentieth Century an Introduction. In Spiering, M., & Wintle, M (Eds.). *Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War* (pp. 1-13). London: Palgrave Macmillan., p. 4.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, p.5.

⁴³⁴ Flockhart, T. (2008)., *op.cit.*, p. 28.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.29.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*

Accordingly, WWI resulted in the dismantling of the European powers culminating in the foundation of the new nation-states within the emerging political vacuum.⁴³⁷ These new foundations of the states following the fall of the empires can be explained with the diffusion of the Wilsonian ideas-especially the self-determination- that became considerably influential in reshaping Europe. The rising influence of ethnic nationalism within the continent created the states based on the mono-ethnicity which would later result in the ethnic-tensions within the continent.⁴³⁸ The ethnic tensions would continue to be felt acutely within the European political scene in the following period, however, what even coming closer was the ideas of the superiority of the race boosted by Nazism which was justified through social Darwinism. On the other hand, Fascist ideology was gaining pace, especially in Italy. In fact, both of the ideologies were aspiring to establish 'European supra-national civilization' according to their own vision of European ideals.⁴³⁹

While the initiative of international institutionalism and the credence to League of Nations were fading away, the incremental influence of Nazism and Fascism in Europe led Europe to WWII, which would result in a dramatic humanitarian and economic loss and literal division of the continent between Americanization and Sovietization.⁴⁴⁰ Following the repercussions of WWII, the ideological settlement of the Cold War during which Europe was trying to revive Europe and reintegrate within themselves laid the basis of today's idea behind European integration.⁴⁴¹ This can be explained by the self-reflexivity of modern Europe built upon a "conscious wish to learn from the terrible mistakes of its past."⁴⁴² However, since the war dramatically bolstered the feeling of detachment from Europe, the recreation of Europe was in the need of making up myths in and/or writing the new European history after 1945.⁴⁴³ In this respect, recalibration regarding its concept of civilization was needed.⁴⁴⁴ In this respect, the bipolar world order of the Cold War helped the redefinition of the European identity and construction of the ingroup based on the ideological differentiation; 'we' as the free world versus others as the communist world. During this period, the construction of the other as a security threat to the respective communities of each side played a critical role in exercising the

⁴³⁷ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 100.

⁴³⁸ McNeill, W. H. (2019). *Polyethnicity and national unity in world history: The Donald G. Creighton Lectures 1985*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.; Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Whose fault-line is it anyway?. *New Statesman and Society*, 5, 23-26.

⁴³⁹ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 112.

⁴⁴⁰ Ongur, H. Ö. (2011)., *op.cit.*, p. 36.

⁴⁴¹ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 125.

⁴⁴² Porsdam, H., *op.cit.*, p. 23.

⁴⁴³ Ifversen, J. (2011)., *op.cit.*, p. 76.

⁴⁴⁴ Ifversen, J. (2002). The crisis of European civilization after 1918. In *Ideas of Europe since 1914* (pp. 14-31). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

hegemonic concept of identity of power blocs.⁴⁴⁵ Delanty argues that European identity attributed as Christian and Humanist has gained also another construct by becoming a dimension of the industrialization of the war during the confrontation of the two civilizations.⁴⁴⁶ In the face of the communist security threat, the imperatives of the bipolar world such as strengthening of NATO, assessment of the European defense potential emerged. Accordingly, within the military vacuum of Europe, West German rearmament was regarded as the only way to resist any aggression from the East by the US.⁴⁴⁷ Thus, the hegemon of the liberal world the US appeared as the driving force behind the integration of the war-torn continent.

Against this background of ideological and political identity division within the continent, the self-reflective process of EU-ization signaling the establishment of the process of economic integration and cooperation between the European states was initiated. However, the German question and its re-industrialization and re-armament issues were still on the table, especially for France. Therefore, the initial steps of the integration were highly focused on the reconciliation of Franco-German relations. The French calculation was mainly about solving the German reindustrialization and remilitarization questions under the supranational entity, which would be established among European states. Accordingly, the Schuman Plan, envisaging the German re-industrialization under the supranational entity, was implemented by the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was signed by Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg in 1951.⁴⁴⁸ The establishment of the ECSC gave the Europeanization process the required impetus.

Following the same logic, the Pleven Plan foreseeing the re-armament of West Germany and integration of the European defense system under the supranational authority of the European Defence Community (EDC), which would necessitate the establishment of the European Political Community (EPC), was designated.⁴⁴⁹ While, the establishment of the EDC and the EPC was seen as an important initiative by the federalists in terms of further integration,⁴⁵⁰ in terms of defense mechanism it is regarded as the Atlantic defense consolidation in the face of the ingroup and outgroup differentiation between east and west.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁵ Delanty, G., *op.cit.*, p. 125.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ Dedman, M. (2009). *The Origins & Development of the European Union 1945-2008: A History of European Integration*. London and New York: Routledge., p. 64.

⁴⁴⁸ Dinan, D. (1999). *Ever closer union: an introduction to European integration*. Boulder: London., p. 27.

⁴⁴⁹ Kühnhardt, L. (Ed.). (2009). *Crises in European integration: challenge and response, 1945-2005* (Vol. 2). Berghahn Books., p. 39.

⁴⁵⁰ D.W.Urwin. (2009). The European Community from 1945 to 1985. In M. Cini & N.P.S. Borragán (Eds.). *European union politics*. (pp.15-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press., p. 23.

⁴⁵¹ Ari, M.T. (2004). The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context. *Journal of International Relations*, 9(1), 83-98., p. 86.

The French refusal to ratify the plan laid aside both the political and security ambitions of the integration steps. In addition, the refusal which undermined the sectoral cooperation posed a threat to the initiatives of the Franco-German rapprochement and general integration steps. What started as purely economic was going to evolve into political and social integration in line with the aspirations of Haas's spillover effect only later within the course of time. Thus, at that point, the issue of the search for an identity formation was yet to come as well.

Nevertheless, the economic integration continued to thrive with the signing of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom in 1957.⁴⁵² The Treaty foresaw "...a common market based on the free movement of goods, people, services, capital, which would contribute to ensuring economic and social progress based on balanced trade and fair competition...."⁴⁵³ With these aspects, the Treaty of Rome broadened the scope of the ECSC in various policy areas including economics, customs union, and nuclear power with the establishment of the EEC and Euratom. These institutions were later merged by the Merger Treaty of 1967. In his valuable analysis of the relation between nation-state and the European Union, Milward describes these initiatives as "the European rescue of the Nation-State" which is the title of his book comes from.⁴⁵⁴

The new decade marked the chain of water-shed events with the end of the post-war economic expansion, the eruption of the oil crisis, economic recession, and collapse of the Bretton Wood system, and decline of the US leadership. The economic stagnation in Europe was referred to as 'euro-sclerosis' because of the respective devaluation of the European currencies, the rise of unemployment, and inflation.⁴⁵⁵ That would lead the divergences among the Member States in responding to the economic regression.⁴⁵⁶ The economic protectionist measures of the member states aggravated the state-centric intergovernmentalism aspirations within the community.⁴⁵⁷ However, the severity of the economic regression necessitated the community-wide solutions in order to assure the healthy progress of the integration. In this respect, one of the critical indicators of the period was the inadequacy of the EC as a powerful actor in responding to the economic downturn. Therefore, the stand-still status of the political and economic development dragged the European integration process under a self-assessment of whether to change the logic of Europeanization, which so far had been conducted with a

⁴⁵² Kühnhardt, L. *op.cit.*, p. 46.

⁴⁵³ Eurolex. Treaty of Rome. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0023&from=EN> (Accessed on 06.11.2020).

⁴⁵⁴ Milward, A. S. (1992). *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*. London and New York: Routledge.

⁴⁵⁵ Waechter, M. (2009). Eurosclerosis or Europeanisation?. Introduction. *L'Europe en Formation*, (3), 5-11., p.7.

⁴⁵⁶ Dedman, M., *op.cit.*, p. 108.

⁴⁵⁷ Awesti, A. (2009). The Myth of Eurosclerosis: European Integration in the 1970s. *L'Europe en Formation*, (3), 39-53., p. 42.

focus on economic recovery. Accordingly, the question of political integration emerged from the 1970s onward. The first wave of enlargement in 1973 when the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the Community, contributed to this debate by culminating in the widening of the Europeanization to the new geography of Europe.

The same year European Summit in Copenhagen introduced the concept of European identity with regard to community's foreign relations by drawing up the Copenhagen Declaration on European identity towards a 'construction of a united Europe' based on the shared ideals and objectives⁴⁵⁸. In this direction, in contrast to past enmities, the Nine showed their political aim and will to construct a European unity involves;

"... reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community and assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this."⁴⁵⁹

The Declaration defined European Identity as in the following;

"The diversity of cultures within the framework of common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the constructions of a United Europe, all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism."⁴⁶⁰

In this respect, the fundamental elements of the European identity were also demonstrated as below;

"The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice—which is the ultimate goal of economic progress—and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity."⁴⁶¹

Inclusion of identity politics within the agenda of the Nine can be regarded as intentional steps of the Community towards building a political community. In this sense, initiatives for the construction and promotion of the European identity gained momentum in the following stages of the integration. Decisions of Fontainebleau European Council Meeting of 1984 showed such political motivation and will clearly:

"The committee will examine inter alia the following suggestions: (i) symbols of the Community's existence, such as a flag and an anthem; (ii) formation of European sports

⁴⁵⁸ European Communities. (1973). Declaration on European Identity.

<https://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=1KGyQ1tKtTpNjBQwQh6cwgC2yLn7BJMymvTrDq5s2rD3JYR9RfGQ!243197488?docId=203013&cardId=203013>. (Accessed on 07.11.2020).

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*

teams; (iii) streamlining procedures at frontier posts; (ill) minting of a European coinage, namely the ECD .”⁴⁶²

In addition, the European Council meeting has established the ad hoc Adonnino Committee called as ‘The Committee for a People’s Europe’. Chaired by the Pietro Adonnino, the Committee comprised of the personal representatives of the EC heads of government. It submitted interim report and a final text about responding “...to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world.”⁴⁶³ To this end, it laid down critical recommendations in its final report of June 1985 as in the following;

“Enhancement of the Political participation of the European citizens and their legal rights such as right of petition for European citizens
Simplification of the Community law,
Development of a European television channel, European Academy of Science, Technology and Art,
Fostering the information about the construction of Europe and its achievements including peace, security and freedom,
Fostering school exchange programs, voluntary work camps and vocational trainings among the member states,
Organization of the European Community events such as European sports, exchange of sportsmen, athletes and trainers”⁴⁶⁴

In addition to these recommendations, its main emphasis was also introducing common elements of the European identity with an aim of creating awareness about Europe and common heritage including common European symbols, European flag, European anthem, and 9 May of each year as Europe Day.⁴⁶⁵ Recognition of higher education diplomas among member states was launched in 1985. The European flag was officially adopted as the official symbol of the EU in 1986. Common European driving licenses were also introduced in January 1986. Moreover, post stamps with European emblems were introduced while the custom signs were removed within internal borders.

The weaknesses of the EC as an international actor by the member states resulted in series of institutional arrangements to create a unified image in the international arena. In this respect, as Kühnhardt regards that the Euro-sclerosis period opened a leeway for the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 designating the fully-fledged political system.⁴⁶⁶ The establishment of the single market, empowerment of the

⁴⁶² European Council Meeting at Fontainebleau Conclusions of the Presidency.(1984).

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20673/1984_june_-_fontainebleau__eng_.pdf. (Accessed on 08.11.2020)., p. 8.

⁴⁶³ The "Adonnino Report" - Report to the European Council by the ad hoc committee "On a People's Europe", A 10.04 COM 85, SN/2536/3/85. <https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/historical/en/4659>. (Accessed on 10.11.2021)

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁶ Kühnhardt., *op.cit.*, p 51.

supranational institutions by the SEA⁴⁶⁷ introduced this new face of Europeanization. With regard to this Ongur argues that the EU-ization process started with the political direction of the integration whose development would overlap with the process of Europeanization.⁴⁶⁸

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain would change the European atmosphere ultimately. The elimination of the East-West differentiation would have critical repercussions for the European States including the reunification of Germany and prospective eventual access of the Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the Community. In this light, while ingroup differentiation of the east was eliminated, European Communities became to the position of diffusers of ideas referring to the flow of Europeanization from and within and also into Europe.⁴⁶⁹ The division of the past was envisaged to be solved under the umbrella of the ingroup of ‘Significant We’ based on the liberal democracy of the West. Accordingly, the identity-building process for the former Eastern bloc was aligned with the democratic principles drew up and implemented by the West. With regard to this, yesterday’s ‘others’ became today’s significant ‘we’, leading the re-construction of the neighboring countries such as Western Balkans and Turkey as new ‘others’.

Following the end of the Cold War, the EU-ization process was further deepened with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) which is the treaty of founding the European Union. Accordingly, the Treaty initiated critical steps in terms of high political direction by introducing the supranational pillar i.e. the Community pillar forming the coordination towards single currency, single monetary policy, and harmonization of the economic policies.⁴⁷⁰ To this end, the establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) was envisaged.⁴⁷¹ Moreover, two intergovernmental pillars Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were designated to enhance cooperation among member states in these areas.⁴⁷²

Maastricht Treaty has an important place in terms of highlighting the aim of the Union to build ties with its citizens. Building such a tie with its citizens was regarded necessary for legitimacy reasons of the Union.⁴⁷³ One of the critical achievements of the treaty was the introduction of the single European currency, which is regarded as the critical step of the EU-

⁴⁶⁷ Single European Act. (1986) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0027&from=EN> (Accessed on 07.11.2020).

⁴⁶⁸ Ongur, H. Ö. (2011)., *op.cit.*, p. 37.

⁴⁶⁹ Flockhart., *op.cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁷⁰ Article B of the Maastricht Treaty. (1992). https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. (Accessed on 07.11.2020).

⁴⁷¹ Article 4a of the Maastricht Treaty. (1992). https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. (Accessed on 07.11.2020).

⁴⁷² Article B of the Maastricht Treaty. (1992). https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. (Accessed on 07.11.2020).

⁴⁷³ McGee, S. (2007). *Politics of collective belonging: loyalties in the European Union*. (Ph.D. dissertation). Texas A&M University., p. 20.

wide identity building and European unification. The importance of the Euro for the citizen's identification with Europe will be further addressed by the analysis chapter of this dissertation with a specific focus on the Euro crisis of 2009. In addition, the treaty presented and introduced the concept of European citizenship referring to the citizens of the Union would enjoy the rights endorsed by the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, the concept of identity is based on the envisagement of common European cultural policy initiatives in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty's object to "... the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore."⁴⁷⁴ With this respect, the Treaty envisaged constructing a common European identity based not only on gathering 'shared culture' and 'history', but also conformity with 'cultural diversity.'⁴⁷⁵ It also drew a framework of value system as a tool of identification the inheritance of the ingroup of the 'European' community. Accordingly, their "...attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law"⁴⁷⁶ was enshrined as the value system of the EU-ization process by the Maastricht Treaty.

These ambitious steps beginning with the Declaration on European identity, SEA, and Maastricht Treaty have remarked the newly established political direction that would yield a permanent identity of 'the European'. In this sense, it appeared that a common European identity gained solid interest within the Europeanization process. Within this context, the enlargement process gained special importance since the end of the Cold War. It became a critical tool to diffuse the Western liberal values and principles such as democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights. In 1993, relevant administrative (EU's *acquis*), political, economic criteria to become a part of 'Europe' foreseeing the establishment and enhancement of these principles were set out by the European Council in Copenhagen. These were defined as:

"Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; A functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; Ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the '*acquis*'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union."⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁴ Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty. (1992). https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. (Accessed on 07.11.2020).

⁴⁷⁵ Kap, D. (2006). *European Identity & The Euroepan Union: The Prospects and Limits*. (MA Thesis). Middle East Technical University, p. 59.

⁴⁷⁶ Preamble of the Maastricht Treaty. (1992). https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. (Accessed on 08.11.2020).

⁴⁷⁷ EUR-Lex. Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accesion_criteria_copenhagen.html. (Accessed on 08.11.2020).

In this respect, what was drawn out for the elements of the European identification as an ingroup by the Maastricht Treaty, formed the criteria for the states aspiring to be a member of the Union. Since these criteria appeared as the basic characteristics of the conditionality, it became the primary means of EU-ization. Madrid European Council of 1993 strengthened these elements with an emphasis on adherence to the motivations and aims of the Union.⁴⁷⁸ These initiatives placing the ideational dimensions to the forefront in politics uncovered the transformative power of the Union as a diffuser of the ideas in candidate countries in addition to its image as a builder of peace, stability, and economic recovery. In addition, this period initiated the framework of the political idea of European identity with development of legitimacy in the eyes of the European public.

The trend of political economic and social deepening was carried out by the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2000), and Lisbon (2007) as well. 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam clearly demonstrated the identity criteria by emphasizing the principles which were promoted and presented elements of the European identity; "...any European country which respects the principles set out in article F(1) - liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law - may apply to become a member of the European Union."⁴⁷⁹ Lisbon Treaty of 2007 enriched the scope and rights of European citizenship towards building unity among individual national identities of the Union:

- "a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;
- (b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State;
- (c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State;
- (d) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language."⁴⁸⁰

While the EU incorporated the concept of European identity and European citizenship to its institutional and legislative mechanisms as a supranational mechanism, the EU-ization process has given a special focus on the political symbols in boosting and providing European

⁴⁷⁸ European Commission. Madrid European Council (15 and 16 December 1995) : Presidency Conclusions. (16.11.1995). https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_95_9. (Accessed on 08.11.2020).

⁴⁷⁹ Article O of the Amsterdam Treaty. (1997). <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>. (Accessed on 08.11.2020)., p.24.

⁴⁸⁰ Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. (2007). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF>. (Accessed on 08.11.2020).

identification and belongingness. Hence, symbols like anthem (Beethoven-Ode to Joy), flag, emblem, European day (9 May), and European passport were promoted under the EU motto 'Unity in diversity' which was declared as EU's motto by the European Parliament on 4 May 2000. Moreover, in order to create a common identity, the Union designated cultural and educational policies as well. Examples of main programs having a considerable effect on the EU-ization process and formation of the European identity can be given as Bologna Process, Erasmus, Erasmus+, Lifelong Learning Programme-LLP, Socrates, Leonardo Da Vinci, and Youth. These educational programs contributed to the provision of cultural diversity and EU cultural identity as well as building a bridge between the member states and the unification of the people and through the mobility of the students.

Overall, within the course of time, the European identity formation evolved gradually from top to bottom just like the European integration process. To clearly demonstrate the EU-ization process embedded within the broader framework of Europeanization, this chapter first enlightened the historical origins of the 'European' idea with a specific reference to the elements of identification and belongingness to the European Communities. Those elements implied the self-construction of Europe's culture as 'the superior'. Such an overview, which was vital in terms of addressing and defining the EU's own ideational foundation process concerning the Europeanization, utilized the periodization sketched out by Flockhart's valuable work. The elements of construction and differentiation of the in-group as and out-groups changed according to the different periods of time within the history. In this respect, the ingroup of identity was constructed based on the existence of the 'other'. The presence of the other generated the presentation of the elements of the ingroup as a way to differentiate themselves within the identification process towards generating the idea of European unity. Accordingly, 'Christianity' prevailed in incubating the sense of togetherness in the face of Islam as 'other', while later it evolved into the concept of 'civilization' within the presence of the 'uncivilized world'. Then, it re-evolved again to 'rationality' within the context of colonialism. During the Cold War, the prevalent distinctive element of differentiation regained a new definition as a 'free and liberal world' with the rise of the Soviet threat and east-west partition of the continent.

After providing such a historical overview showing the evolving nature of the elements upon which the idea of a European identity based, the chapter addressed the EU's integration process with a specific reference to its identity construction. It demonstrated the EU's steps in the formation of European identity. The period from the 1970s signified the accelerated process of identity formation within the Union's agenda. Accordingly, the construction of the European identity was incorporated into the institutional and legal development mechanisms of the Union

from the 1980s and 1990s onwards. The agenda shaped was focused on fostering the EU citizenship and identity formation. Thus, as long as the European integration evolves, so the nature of the European identity simultaneously.

4.3. German National Identity as its Shaded Past Memory

After a detailed overview of the historical European identity formation, German identity formation in respect to the European identity will be overviewed to provide a general clarification for the sake of the analytical focus of the research based on the nexus of the crises and identity construction. Since Germany's existing strong attachment to the European integration and identity can be explained with its 'historical otherness' to Europe stemming from the surge of German nationalism following the defeat in WWI, the sub-chapter will address briefly the main tenets of German national identity construction, which led to the estrangement of the state from rest of the Europe.

The defeat of Germany in WWI and political and economic instabilities that the Weimar Republic could not effectively handle led to the rise of the 'Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei' (National Socialist German Worker's Party) which was promoted as the way of restoration of the lost German glory, pride, and territory.⁴⁸¹ Ethnic conception based on the Anti-Semitism and territorial expansion have been the main tenets of the national identity construction narrative of the Nazi party.

Originating from the idea of superiority of the Aryan race, it adopted "the violent exclusion of any non-Germanic ethno-cultural group within the Nazi realm."⁴⁸² Within such formation of a racially pure German state, the concept of 'Volksgemeinschaft' (people's community)⁴⁸³ under "one people, one empire, and one leader" supporting the unity of all Germans as 'Volksgenossen' (racial comrades) regardless of the different social and economic classes were intensively promoted. The racial conceptualization of the national identity would be at the expense of the Jews, Roma, homosexuals, and others of the Aryan race.⁴⁸⁴ In this respect, national identity was constructed through inter-group differentiation between us 'Germans' and the others 'non-Volks' (non-people). The latter was portrayed as an existential

⁴⁸¹ Hautefeuille, S. (2018). *The Transformation of National Identity in Germany: The Role of Political Parties* (Doctoral dissertation, Université d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa), p.34.

⁴⁸² Allen, R. (2010). Nationalism and Contemporary German Politics: Inclusion versus Exclusion. *POLIS Journal*, 3, 1-6.

⁴⁸³ Münkler, H. (2012). Populism in Germany: a history of its mentalities, myths and symbols. *Populist Fantasies: European revolts in context*

⁴⁸⁴ Stone, D. (2020). Ideologies of Race: The Construction and Suppression of Otherness in Nazi Germany. In S. Gigliotti and H. Earl, (Eds.). *A Companion to the Holocaust*. (pp. 59-74). USA: John Wiley & Sons.

threat to the purity of the Aryan race and the German nation in a way to justify the inter-group segregation:

“Aryan races – often absurdly small numerically – subject foreign peoples, and then, stimulated by the living conditions of the new territory (fertility, climatic conditions, etc.) and assisted by the multitude of lower-beings standing at their disposal as helps, develop the intellectual and organizational capacities dormant within them. Often in a few millennia, or even centuries, they create cultures that originally bear all the inner characteristics of their nature, adapted to the above-indicated special qualities of the soil and subjected beings. In the end, however, the conquerors transgress against the principle of blood purity to which they had first adhered, they begin to mix with the subjugated inhabitants and thus end their own existence; for the fall of man from paradise has always been his expulsion.” (Hitler 2021)⁴⁸⁵

The formed inter-group segregation laid the basis of the aim of producing a racially unified German population. Third Reich established twenty-seven main camps together with over 1,100 satellite camps during its twelve years’ ruling.⁴⁸⁶ The establishment of the camps through which the state-sponsored persecution, massive detention and murder were conducted became the main means of so-called ‘purifying the German race’ i.e., the removal of racial, political and social others of the nation⁴⁸⁷.

These main visions regarding the future of Germany have been amalgamated into the governing propaganda of the Nazi Party since 1930 national elections during which the Nazi party won 6.5 million votes and became the second most popular party.⁴⁸⁸ Following the electoral success, the party continued to increase its influence and consolidate its power incrementally that eventually led to the redefinition of the national identity based on the ethnocentric and xenophobic Nazi conceptualization of national identity.⁴⁸⁹

In addition to the inter-group differentiation within its internal borders, revisionist and hegemonic foreign policies of the Third Reich were culminated in the estrangement of the state from continental European states as well. The concept of Heimat translated into English as home or homeland, was became highly relevant within the context of the national identity narrative and appeared as one of the main building stones of German identity formation within the formation of the post-WWI German national identity.⁴⁹⁰ The aspiration for Heimat was accompanied by German expansionism which is closely tied to the concept of lebensraum (living space) referring to the necessity of constant territorial expansion under the influence of

⁴⁸⁵ Hitler, A. (2021). *Mein kampf*. New Delhi:Diamond Pocket Books Pvt Ltd.

⁴⁸⁶ Wachsmann, N. (2015). *KL: A history of the Nazi concentration camps*. Hachette UK.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Childers, T. (1983). *The Nazi voter: The social foundations of fascism in Germany, 1919-1933*. University of North Carolina Press.

⁴⁸⁹ Lee, S. J. (2013). *Hitler and Nazi Germany*. Routledge.

⁴⁹⁰ Smith, W. D. (1980). Friedrich Ratzel and the origins of Lebensraum. *German Studies Review*, 3(1), 51-68.

national socialism until 1945.⁴⁹¹ The expansionist aspirations were legitimized through the Third Reich's national identity narrative of *Volk ohne Raum* (people without space).⁴⁹² The excerpt from a middle school geography textbook clearly shows how Nazi Germany were justifying the territorial aspirations:

“Despite the great decrease in birth rate, the German people, with a population density of 133.5 per square kilometer, remains a crowded people. Other peoples with a much smaller population density still have large colonial holdings that can accept their surplus population. Although it is true that the Four-Year Plan has guaranteed our food supply and raw material needs, we lack the abundance that other nations have because of their colonies. [Here there is a pie chart that shows that England and its colonies are 27% of the earth, Russia 16%, the U.S.A. 7%, and Germany 0.6%.] Since we do not want to be a dying people, our goal is to increase our birth rate. But for a growing population we need space if we do not again want to see large amounts of German blood emigrating to other nations, as was the case before the World War. Each year, a large number of German emigrants left for foreign lands.”⁴⁹³

As implicitly defined in the excerpt, the formulated ‘Four-Year-Plan’ was to achieve the hidden agenda of weapon investment through making Germany self-sufficient and independent from the world market. In this respect, Hitler’s plan was designated in a way to serve the purpose of gaining more space i.e., ‘Lebensraum’ that would eventually lead to World War II. His aims were realized firstly through the annexation of Austria in 1938.⁴⁹⁴ That was followed by a ceding of Sudetenland, the German-speaking border regions of Czechoslovakia with the signing of the Munich Agreement.⁴⁹⁵ Although British and French initially adopted a policy of appeasement with a fear of war in the face of the developments, the aggressive territorial expansion desire of the Third Reich resulted in the outbreak of World War II, the most destructive humanitarian disaster in the history.

4.3.1. Overcoming the Nazi past and formation of a European-oriented National Identity

*“Collective identity formation is either constructed through an external identification with another country or ideology or through an internal identification with one's own past history.”*⁴⁹⁶

Following the defeat in WWII, economically and the politically devastated Germany was partitioned by the Allies into four military occupation zones during the Yalta Conference in 1945. West Germany (Federal Republic Germany) was founded in 1949 when the US, France, and the UK merged their occupation zones. On the other side, in East Germany, which was occupied by the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded. While

⁴⁹¹ Baranowski, S. (2016). Legacies of Lebensraum: German Identity and Multi-Ethnicity. In *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France* (pp. 35-52). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

⁴⁹² Giaccaria, P., & Minca, C. (2016). Life in space, space in life: Nazi topographies, geographical imaginations, and Lebensraum. *Holocaust Studies*, 22(2-3), 151-171.

⁴⁹³ German Propaganda Archive. <https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/textbk02.htm> (Accessed on 01.11.2021)

⁴⁹⁴ Deutsche Welle. How Nazi policies of expansion led to World War II. <https://www.dw.com/en/how-nazi-policies-of-expansion-led-to-world-war-ii/a-17889233>. (Accessed on 03.11.2021).

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁶ Kattago, S. (2001). *Ambiguous memory: The Nazi past and German national identity*. Greenwood Publishing Group.p.21.

the occupation of West Germany lasted till 1955, East Germany remained under Soviet rule until the dissolution of the USSR and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.⁴⁹⁷

A new political system, which is closely aligned to the West and democracy was formed within West Germany. The governance of the federal democracy was assured through the introduction of the new *Grundgesetz* ‘German Basic Law’ based on the federalism, division of powers, rule of law, party competition human rights, freedom, and independent judiciary system.⁴⁹⁸

The new political atmosphere offered a redefinition of the German national identity once again. Newly established political party Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) whose influence and popularity incrementally were spreading, elaborated a new national identity based upon western orientation (*westbindung*), Christian values and social market economy (*sozialen Marktwirtschaft*) and model of ordoliberalism.⁴⁹⁹ In this vein, German national identity was redefined through a strict “commitment to the democratic principles, values and institutions.”⁵⁰⁰

Within the international arena, FRG strongly committed itself to the increased European cooperation, the platform of the European Community, and Franco-German alliance with a strict concept of *nie wieder* ‘never again’ and ‘never alone’ referring to the non-occurrence of the gloomy WWII history.⁵⁰¹ Thus, it traditionally adopted a low international profile⁵⁰². While it also embraced a demilitarized strategic culture,⁵⁰³ the Cold War context contributed to the acceleration of West Germany’s integration into western security bloc and reproachment with the West. Its defense system was integrated into the umbrella of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Accordingly, West German security force were locked into NATO command while simultaneously assuring its contribution to the western defense.

Such western and multilateralist-oriented national identity construction was traditionally regarded as a fundamental means of disassociating Germany from its nationalist and military past by the German ruling elites.⁵⁰⁴ Katzenstein calls it as a ‘tamed power’.⁵⁰⁵ In this way, West Germany reinvented itself a value-based post-war national identity as a model

⁴⁹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. German Reunification. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_136311.htm (Accessed on 03.11.2021)

⁴⁹⁸ Kommers, D. P. (2006). The federal constitutional court: Guardian of German democracy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 603(1), 111-128.

⁴⁹⁹ Hautefeuille, S. *ob.cit.*, p. 109.

⁵⁰⁰ Wittlinger, R. (2010). *German national identity in the twenty-first century: a different republic after all?*. Springer.

⁵⁰¹ Langenbacher, E. (2014). Does collective memory still influence German foreign policy?. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 20(2), 55-71.

⁵⁰² Hautefeuille, S. *ob.cit.*, p. 2.

⁵⁰³ Marsh, S. (2002). The dangers of German history: Lessons from a decade of post-cold war German foreign and security policy. *Perspectives on European politics and society*, 3(3), 389-424., p. 391.

⁵⁰⁴ Capello, R. (2018). Cohesion policies and the creation of a European identity: The role of territorial identity. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(3), 489-503.

⁵⁰⁵ Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (1997). *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*. Cornell University Press.

of ‘good European’. Such reinvented Good Europeanness formed the post-war German national identity until the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany.

In foreign and European policy realm, the end of the Cold War posed the question of what kind of role Germany should undertake in a newly emerging European order since Germany became the dominant political and economic power in the continental Europe.⁵⁰⁶ Within Germany’s internal affairs, the reunification of the East and West also created nationality and national identity questions in Germany stemming from facing the separate East German identity and the necessity to embrace the distinct national identities within the upper level of German identity for the sake of the reintegration of the Federal Republic with GDR. Moreover, there have been economic repercussions of the reintegration originating from the influx of money and capital from the West to the East. Thus, especially with the reunification, the debates on Germany’s European-oriented national identity were revolved around ‘normalization of its identity’ with respect to the Europe. In a nutshell, normalization referred to a more self-assured German national identity prioritizing the German national interests stemming mainly from the financial costs and repercussions of the post-reunification period for Germany.⁵⁰⁷ Yet, normalization debates in respect to the reactions of the reunification of Germany within the international arena were rather mostly related to the arising concerns of the neighboring states whether Germany would act like ‘normal’ and dominate the Europe.⁵⁰⁸ United Germany eventually followed the constructed role model of Bonn Republic in respect to its foreign and European policy.⁵⁰⁹ Normalization debates gained considerable pace with the introduction of the Euro. Therefore, it has built up a unique connection on the nexus between Euro crisis and Germany’s constructed European-oriented national identity. Case study selection criteria in the following chapter will explain it in detail.

⁵⁰⁶ G., Pritchard (1996). National identity in a united and divided Germany. In R. Bideleux and R. Taylor. *European Integration and Disintegration: East and West*.

⁵⁰⁷ Galpin, C. (2015b)., *op.cit.*, p. 28.

⁵⁰⁸ Wittlinger, R. (2010)., *op.cit.*, p.6.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapters set out the theoretical framework, literature review, and the historical formation of the European identity. The present chapter will outline the research design and method employed by this dissertation to trace the construction of the European identity at times of crises. To this end, it will first enlighten the discourse historical approach of the CDA as employed as a research method. Clarifying the main tenets of the approach will be enlightening in employing the approach to our analysis. Secondly, the case study selection will be addressed to explain what makes Germany a suitable case study country with regard to the main aims and aspirations of this research. After that, time periods will be defined. Since the time frame of the research encompasses approximately from 2010 to 2017, the selected time frames as the time limitation of this research will be sketched out in order to avoid a large body of data. After clarifying the time periods, the materials utilized and collected from various sources will be explained. In this way, the research design of this dissertation will be completed to make the analysis part efficient in answering the main research question, as outlined by the first chapter:

- How European identity construction was manifested during the Euro crisis and Refugee crisis of the European Union by the political and media discourse in the German national setting?

5.2 Critical Discourse Analysis and Discourse Historical Approach

As outlined by the theoretical framework of this research, the prospective construction of the European identity is stalemated at times of crises since the healthy functioning and continuation of the political, economic, and social processes are obstructed. In order to exactly analyze the capacity of the crises to change the concept of the European identity which underlies the basis of the research question of this dissertation, it is necessary to look out how the crisis is discursively framed by the different political and media actors within the national contexts. Therefore, this research will employ critical discourse analysis, which regards the context of language use as crucial.⁵¹⁰ Several studies are utilizing quantitative methods in addressing European identity.⁵¹¹ Yet, a qualitative analysis frame employing critical discourse analysis

⁵¹⁰ Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is about—a summary of its history, important concepts and its developments. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.) *Methods of critical discourse analysis*, (pp. 1-13). Sage Publications.

⁵¹¹ On the studies employing quantitative methods to analyze the identity, see: Bruter, M. (2005). *Citizens of Europe?: the emergence of a mass European identity*. Springer.; Ejaz, W. (2019). *European Identity and Media Effects: A Quantitative Comparative Analysis* (Doctoral dissertation, Universitätsbibliothek); Van de Steeg, M. (2006). Does a public sphere exist in the European Union? An analysis of the content of the debate on the Haider case. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(4), 609-634; Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (Eds.). (2010). *The making of a European public sphere: Media discourse and political contention*. Cambridge University Press.

(CDA) with a special reference to Ruth Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) appears a reasonable and suitable choice because of the analytical tools they offer which enable to investigate the main research question of this study aiming to reveal the construction of the European identity in Germany contextualized within the crisis context of the EU. There are a number of reasons behind the preference of the discourse analysis to investigate the research question of this research.

Firstly, this research shares the argument that quantitative methods such as survey research such as Eurobarometer or opinion polls do not adequately address the issue of European identity and identity construction. While they provide valuable insights especially in understanding the political orientations of the mass public,⁵¹² quantitative methods risk imposing outlined answers of the surveys.⁵¹³ Thus, adopting a qualitative research frame better answers the research focus of this study, which is to conduct a deeper-interpretative analysis based on framing the discursive construction of the European identity at times of crises. Moreover, both media and political discourse have been the central focus of analysis in CDA.⁵¹⁴

Adopting a qualitative research frame also helps operationalization the theoretical framework by the analysis part of the research. One of the main arguments of the SIT regards that self-concept of the individuals is shaped by and derived from their cognition to group membership. In this respect, identity formation involves a cognitive process of categorization and identification of oneself with an ingroup. Since this cognitive process is heavily influenced by the social construction of identity shaped by the specific social, political, and economic processes of the context, it is necessary to take words and communicative utterances seriously⁵¹⁵ to analyze the discursive construction of identities.

Here CDA emphasizing the power of language will help this study grasp the construction of the European identity and to reveal the linguistic manifestations of identity embedded within the particular political and social context. Combining SIT with the lenses of critical discourse analysis will allow investigating how identities are discursively constructed and framed by the political and media actors within the 'communicative action'. In this respect, the constructive power of language⁵¹⁶ is acknowledged as crucial in the process of constructing European

⁵¹² Moravcsik, A. (2006). What can we learn from the collapse of the European constitutional project?. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 47(2), 219-241.

⁵¹³ Checkel, J. T., & Katzenstein, P. J. (Eds.). (2009). *European identity*. Cambridge University Press.

⁵¹⁴ Van Dijk, T. A. (2015). Critical discourse analysis. In D.Tannen, H.E. Hamilton & D. Schiffrin (Eds.), *The handbook of discourse analysis*, (pp. 466-485). John Wiley., p. 477-478.

⁵¹⁵ Risse, T. (2009). Social Constructivism and European Integration. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), *European Integration Theory*, (pp. 144-160). Oxford, Oxford University Press: 144-160., p.149.

⁵¹⁶ Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A. (1999). The Social Construction of Europe., *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(4), 528-544, p. 535.

identity. Therefore, discursive approaches to investigate the construction of European identity intend to reveal the way political and media discourse communicate about crises and identity to reveal the discursive manifestation of identity construction at times of crises.

CDA is discourse analytical research, which was developed in the 1970s by a set of prominent scholars of the field such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun Van Dijk. The main aim was to incorporate critical perspective into the discourse analysis. Its scope of research covers critical analyses of the texts and talks including political statements, newspapers, advertisements, and official documents. The analyses of the CDA mainly deal with covert discursive tactics and structural relationships of power, control, dominance, and discrimination present in the language.⁵¹⁷ With a close attachment to the social and political contexts, it focuses on social problems and political issues. Hence, the approach was previously utilized to investigate various subjects ranging from racism, anti-Semitism, discrimination⁵¹⁸ gender inequality,⁵¹⁹ injustice, oppression, discrimination, to ideology.⁵²⁰ The main principles of the CDA that make it a distinct approach of discourse analysis are summarized by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) as in the following:

- “1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action.”⁵²¹

⁵¹⁷ Van Dijk, T. A. (2009). Critical discourse studies: A sociocognitive approach. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of critical discourse analysis*, (pp.95-120). Sage Publications.

⁵¹⁸ Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2005). *Discourse and discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism*. Routledge.; Wodak, R., & Matouschek, B. (1993). We are dealing with people whose origins one can clearly tell just by looking': Critical discourse analysis and the study of neo-racism in contemporary Austria. *Discourse & Society*, 4(2), 225-248.; Van Dijk, T. A. (2015). *Racism and the Press*. Routledge.; Van Dijk, T. A. (1984). *Prejudice in discourse: An analysis of ethnic prejudice in cognition and conversation*. John Benjamins Publishing.; Van Dijk, T. A. (1989). Mediating racism: The role of the media in the reproduction of racism. In R. Wodak (ed.) *Language, power and ideology: Studies in Political Discourse* (pp. 199-226). John Benjamins Publishing.

⁵¹⁹ Lazar, M. M. (2005). Politicizing gender in discourse: Feminist critical discourse analysis as political perspective and praxis. In M. Lazar (Ed.) *Feminist critical discourse analysis: Gender, power and ideology in discourse* (pp. 1-28). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

⁵²⁰ Van Dijk, T. A. (2013). Ideology and discourse. In M. Freeden, L. Tower & M. Stears (Eds.) *The Oxford handbook of political ideologies* (pp. 175-196). Oxford University Press.; Van Dijk, T. A. (1998). *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*. Sage Publications.

⁵²¹ Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In T. A. Van Dijk (Ed.) *Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction* (pp. 357-378). Sage Publications.

In this light, it is understood that CDA is a form of social practice⁵²² that adopts a critical approach to bring hidden power relations within the spoken and written discourse to the surface. While analyzing the language use and linguistic characteristics of social and cultural processes, it mainly focuses on the social, political, economic, and cultural contexts.⁵²³ In this way, it interconnects textual and sociocultural analysis. The given contexts are heavily shaped by each instance of language use, which contributes to the transformation of society and culture. In this respect, social relations are realized and produced through discourse. Therefore, CDA regards discourse as a form of social action.⁵²⁴

One of the main branches of the CDA, the discourse historical approach, which was developed by Ruth Wodak at the University of Vienna, is preferred by this research as a qualitative methodological framework for conducting discourse analysis. DHA is widely applied by the various studies investigating the discursive construction of sameness and difference between ingroups and outgroups,⁵²⁵ as well as political and media discourses about migrants, racism, and Austrian national identity.⁵²⁶ Such studies on the social-political issues within a nexus of the identity formation and construction are focused on revealing the dialectic relation between the context and meaning-making within which the discourse is produced.⁵²⁷

While approaches within the CDA tradition generally deal with the relation between discourse and society, Ruth Wodak's DHA introduced argumentation and multi-perspectivity. While its emphasis on the argumentation will be defined in detail in the following, multi-perspectivity is assured through its triangulation approach. It enables analysis to integrate "...knowledge about historical, intertextual sources and the background of the social and political fields within which discursive events are embedded."⁵²⁸ Such description refers that discourse-oriented scientific research and studies adopt an interdisciplinary stance taking into

⁵²² Fairclough, N. (2013). *Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language*. Routledge.

⁵²³ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁴ Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997)., *op.cit.*

⁵²⁵ On the detailed account of those studies, see: Wodak, R. (2009). *Discursive construction of national identity*. Edinburgh University Press.; Matouschek, B., Wodak, R., & Janussek, F. (Eds.). (1995). *Notwendige Maßnahmen gegen Fremde?: Genese und Formen von rassistischen Diskursen der Differenz*. Passagen Verlag.; Wodak, R., De Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., Liebhart, K., Hofstätter, K., & Kargl, M. (1998). *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*. Suhrkamp.; Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. Sage.; Wodak, R. (2019). Entering the 'post-shame era': the rise of illiberal democracy, populism and neo-authoritarianism in Europe. *Global Discourse: An interdisciplinary journal of current affairs*, 9(1), 195-213.

⁵²⁶ Reisigl, M. (2018). The Discourse-Historical Approach. In J. Flowerdew & J.E. Richardson (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies* (pp. 44-59). Routledge., p.45.

⁵²⁷ Datondji, A.C. & Amousou, F. (2001). Discourse-historical Approach to Critical Discourse Studies: Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, Basic Characteristics and Analytical Tools, *Revue Internationale de Linguistique Appliquée, de Littérature et d'Éducation*, 2(2), 70–80.

⁵²⁸ Wodak, R. (2018, May). *Discourse and European Integration*. (KFG Working Paper Series, No. 86). Retrieved from https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/wp/wp86/WP_86_Wodak_Druck_und_Web.pdf (Accessed on 10.12.2020)., p.10.

account various theoretical and methodological perspectives.⁵²⁹ For instance, research adopting lenses of the DHA while investigating the phenomena of identity formation construction can combine historical, economic, linguistic, and socio-political perspectives.⁵³⁰ In approaching discursive phenomena, the triangulation approach offers four-level analysis⁵³¹ namely as text level (i.e. communicative event, the detailed transcription of the talk/speech), intertext level (e.g. relationship between utterances/statements), extralinguistic level (such as facial expressions, gestures) and socio-political and historical context (the discursive act is embedded to a broader context of political and historical relations and environment).⁵³² DHA regards these levels as crucial to conduct a discourse analysis since it regards language as a means of legitimizing or delegitimizing the power relations of the social actors within the society in their aspiration for hegemony or dominance.

The emphasis on the discursive and material and semiotic practices by the DHA necessitates adopting a multi-theoretical, self-reflective, and multi-methodological approach to reveal these power relations hidden within the society.⁵³³ Taking these dimensions into account as guided by the principle of triangulation is firmly believed to decrease the risk of being biased.⁵³⁴ Moreover, it increases the flexibility of the DHA in handling a variety of empirical data and background information. Accordingly, the approach will enable the study to grasp the large quantity of knowledge about social, political, and economic contexts of the EU in which the discursive events in respect to crises and identity construction are embedded. This is one of the value-added aspects of this study to the literature.

In the current study, the principle of triangulation refers to collecting and analyzing different sets of data including political speeches, press releases, and newspaper articles. Moreover, the research will consider the various levels of Europeanization and EU-ization implying the socio-political, historical, and economic processes of the EU. Thus, triangulation will help this study present a detailed account of the European identity construction in political and media settings at times of crises.

DHA embraces three interconnected aspects within its socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory.⁵³⁵ Accordingly, ‘text or discourse immanent critique’ aims to find out paradoxes,

⁵²⁹ Wodak, R. (2009)., *op.cit.*, p. 9.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵³¹ Wodak, R. (2018)., *op.cit.*, p.9.

⁵³² Wodak R., (2013). Politics as usual: investigating political discourse in action, In J. P. Gee & M. Handford (Eds.) *The Routledge handbook of discourse analysis* (pp. 525-540). Routledge.

⁵³³ Wodak R., (2015). The discourse-historical approach. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of critical discourse analysis* (pp. 63-94). Sage Publications.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.65.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

inconsistencies, dilemmas, and (self-) contradictions in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures, while 'socio-diagnostic critique' is mainly interested in going beyond the textual sphere to embed the wider context of the social, political and economic processes with the discursive event.⁵³⁶ The third aspect 'prognostic critique' assures transformation and improvement of communication.⁵³⁷

In addition to these social critiques, DHA offers two primary concepts in analyzing the political issues namely intertextuality and recontextualization. While the former implies interconnecting all texts including the ones produced both in the present and in the past, the latter refers to taking discursive practice out of context and implementing it in a new context. With these unique insights, DHA offers a viable ground to investigate the complexities of identity construction. Thus, it will help grasp the discursive construction of difference and sameness towards the formation of the ingroup/outgroup facilitating the ingroup favoritism at the expense of the outgroup discrimination. With this aim in mind, this research will follow the eight-stage program of analysis which is usually followed by DHA recursively:

Stage of the Analysis	Method
1. Consultation of existing theoretical knowledge	Collecting and discussing the existing body of knowledge and previous research
2. Systematic data collection and context information	Focusing of the relevant discourses and discursive events, actors, genres, social fields, as well as semiotic media, and texts
3. Selection and preparation of data for the specific analyses	Narrowing down the collected data in line with a specific criterion of the research
4. Specification of the research question/s and formulation of hypothesis	On the basis of a literature review and a first skimming of the data
5. Qualitative analysis	Allows testing categories and initial assumptions
6. Detailed case studies	Qualitative and/or Quantitative data analysis
7. Presentation of critique	Interpretation of results in respect to the relevant context
8. Practical application of analytical results	The possible application of the results aiming at having social impact and changing discourses

Table: Eight-stage program followed by DHA⁵³⁸

In order to reveal linguistic and rhetoric means of sameness and difference within the construction of self and other towards the formation of the European identity, this study will utilize argumentation schemes i.e. topoi whose origins date back to the Aristotelian thought of rhetoric and dialectic. The concept of topos, which means 'place', has attracted much attention from discourse studies.⁵³⁹ Topos appear as the main concept of the argumentative strategies of

⁵³⁶ Wodak, R. (2015)., *op.cit.*, p.65

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁸ The table is elaborated based on: Wodak, R. (2018)., *op.cit.*, p.9.

⁵³⁹ For the studies which have a particular focus on the topos, see: Wodak, R., & Reisigl, M. (2001). *The Semiotics of Racism. Approaches in Critical Discourse Analysis*. Passagen Verlag.; Wodak, R. (2001). The discourse-historical approach. *Methods of critical discourse analysis*, 1, 63-94.; Wodak, R., & Boukala, S. (2015). European identities and the revival of nationalism

the DHA, which uses five types of discursive strategies⁵⁴⁰ in establishing the discursive dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’⁵⁴¹ (see table below). The five discursive strategies of the DHA including the argumentation strategies employing the use of topoi are involved in positive ‘self’ and negative ‘other’ presentation in revealing the main elements establishing the basis of the in-group and out-group formation.⁵⁴²

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
NOMINATION	Discursive construction of social actors, actions, events, processes and events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms
PREDICATION	Positively or negatively discursive qualification of social actors, actions, processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stereotypical attributions (adjectives, relative clauses, prepositional phrases, infinitive clauses) • Predicates or Predicative nouns • Collocations
ARGUMENTATION	Justification and questioning of claims normativity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Topoi • Fallacies
PERSPECTIVIZATION	Speaker’s point of view	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct or indirect speech • Quotation marks, • Metaphors
INTENSIFICATION OR MITIGATION	Modifying the illocutionary force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hyperboles or litotes • Indirect speech act • Modal particles, tag questions

Table: Discursive Strategies of DHA⁵⁴³

Aristotle approaches topoi as places for looking arguments since he regards topoi as argumentative schemes providing rhetoricians to construct an argument for a given conclusion.⁵⁴⁴ Following Aristotelian thought, Wodak defines topoi as “...the content-related warrant or ‘conclusion rules’ that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion or

in the European Union: A discourse historical approach. *Journal of language and politics*, 14(1), 87-109.; Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2016). The discourse-historical approach (DHA). *Methods of critical discourse studies*, 3, 23-61.

⁵⁴⁰ These are namely as “... referential or nomination strategies which focus on membership categorisation devices, such as ... depersonalising metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches in order to represent social actors, especially in-groups and outgroups; predication strategies, which connect already named social actors with negative and stereotypical attributions; argumentation strategies which are based on a fund of topoi; perspectivisation strategies, framing or discourse representation, which emphasise the way speakers express their involvement in discourse and position their point of view in reporting and discrimination utterances; and intensification and mitigation strategies, which justify the status of discourses of inclusion or discrimination”, see: Boukala, S. (2016). Rethinking topos in the discourse historical approach: Endoxon seeking and argumentation in Greek media discourses on ‘Islamist terrorism’. *Discourse Studies*, 18(3), 249-268., p. 266.

⁵⁴¹ Boukala, S. (2016). Rethinking topos in the discourse historical approach: Endoxon seeking and argumentation in Greek media discourses on ‘Islamist terrorism’. *Discourse Studies*, 18(3), 249-268.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁵⁴³ Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2016). The discourse-historical approach (DHA). *Methods of critical discourse studies*, 3, 23-61., Chapter 2. Pp.23-62., p. 33.

⁵⁴⁴ Rubinelli, S. (2009). *Ars Topica: The classical technique of constructing arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*. Springer Science & Business Media.

the central claim.”⁵⁴⁵ In this respect, topoi are elliptic arguments (enthymeme) that appeal to commonsense knowledge -endoxon- employed by rhetoricians to legitimize their decisions and to persuade their audience.⁵⁴⁶ Thus, topoi are often adopted by the research frame agenda within the literature to investigate the political rhetoric which is attributed as the art of persuasion⁵⁴⁷ and discourses aspiring to justify the transition from the premise to the conclusion.⁵⁴⁸ Utilizing topoi will be valuable to a great extent since this study addresses to the political and media discourses communicating about the crises of Eurozone and Refugee in respect to European identity construction with a particular aim to reveal the way policy decisions and changes are justified and legitimized.

The analyses of the political discourses whose aim to justify the transition from the premise to the conclusion⁵⁴⁹ mostly rely on topoi since it offers a profound ground for systematic in-depth analysis of various arguments. In this respect, I claim that as a rhetorical and dialectical scheme, the concept of topos is salient within the context of analysis of arguments that are widely adopted in discourses constructing the sameness and uniqueness of the in-group of European identity as a community of fate.

The table below specifically demonstrates the list of topoi, which were derived from the text mining of the collected data of this research which were employed in both crises. With an exception, the topos of humanitarianism are the only topos, which were not employed in both crises. The topos were utilized often only during the refugee crisis. In this respect, it is important to note that the list of topoi is not priori categories imposed on the data.

Topos	Strategies	Warrant
Topos of threat or Topos of danger	Unification and Cohesivation •unifying warning against the loss of European uniqueness/way of life •common characteristics and shared threats	“If there are specific dangers or threats, one should do something to counter them.”
Topos of humanitarianism	Positive self-representation Unification	“If a political action or decision does or does not conform to human rights or humanitarian convictions and values, then one should or should not make it. ”

⁵⁴⁵Wodak R., (2013)., *op.cit.*, p. 529.

⁵⁴⁶ Wodak, R., & Boukala, S., *op.cit.*, p. 94.

⁵⁴⁷ Dyck, E. (2002). Topos and enthymeme. *Rhetorica*, 20(2), 105-117., p.106.

⁵⁴⁸ Wodak R., (2013)., *op.cit.*, p. 530.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

	common humanitarian sorrows	
Topos of reality	Discontinuation •backgrounding of discontinuities Positive self-representation Positive political continuity	“Because the reality is as it is, a specific action/ decision should be taken/ made. ”
Topos of culture	Singularisation •supranational uniqueness /commonalities Exclusion • difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’	“Because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise in specific situations. ”
Topos of definition;	Continuation •simulative references and founding characteristics Positive political continuity	“If an action, a thing, or a person (a group of persons) is named/designated (as) X, the action, thing, or person (a group of persons) carries or should carry the qualities/traits/attributes contained in the (literal) meaning of X. ”
Topos of history	Glorification •difference between then and now/history as a teacher Continuation •positive political continuity Unification and Cohesivation •shared historical sorrows	“Because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to. ”

Table: Content-related topoi on European identity construction⁵⁵⁰

5.3 Case Study Selection

In exploring the nexus between the Euro and Refugee crises of the EU and European identity construction, this research adopts an empirical case study. While the case study

⁵⁵⁰ Author’s own elaboration adopted from the background list of; Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl, *The Semiotics of Racism. Approaches in Critical Discourse Analysis*, Vienna, Passagen Verlag, 2001, p. 74-80; Ruth Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Second Edition*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University, 2009, p.36-42.

approach may be associated with the disadvantage of the ‘small N’ problem of generalizability, the main goal of this research in fact differs from those of ‘large N’ studies. In this respect, the case study approach adopted by this research is to provide detailed, in-depth analysis to produce knowledge of particular economic, social, and political processes within the particular context of Germany. Accordingly, employing a case study enables in-depth inquiry into a topic or phenomenon within its real-life setting.⁵⁵¹ In this way, this study will contribute to the process of theory building concerning the role and impact of the crises on identity construction.

Both of the crises have sparked critical questions over the future and unity of the Union along with the identity that reverberated the in-group and out-group construction of/within the European identity. The emergence of the crises has two-faceted outcomes for identity politics. The first one is both of them have turned into ‘identity crises’ because of different reasons. The second one is that both of them have had important repercussions over the formation of the European identity.

Accordingly, they generated the debates such “two-speed Europe”, “Ins” and “Outs” of the Eurozone and Schengen area as well as the fracturing of the EU between core and periphery and new/old dividing line between the EU member states. In this respect, the crises have led the identity cleavage among the member states in terms of the construction of national identities and the European identity. This is because of the massive emergence of the prejudicial attitudes of the member states during the crises. Social identity asserts that such biased attitudes are typical in constructing the group-identity because of the inclination of the group-members for self-categorization as ‘us’ and ‘them’.⁵⁵² This established prejudice is often accompanied by the group-perceived threats that the out-group has the potential or intention to cause a nuisance for the ingroup⁵⁵³. Consequently, because of the presence of the crises, the EU faces problems in drawing a common frame of identification and sense of belongingness among the European public. Therefore, the construction of the European identity by the political and media statements communicating about the crises have gained critical importance especially in terms of addressing EU crisis policies and solutions.

Within this context, Germany is chosen as an empirical case study of this research. There is a number of underlying reasons behind such preference. With respect to practical reasons, it should be borne in mind that in qualitative study conducting discourse analysis, I am

⁵⁵¹ Thomas, G. (2011). A typology for the case study in social science following a review of definition, discourse, and structure. *Qualitative inquiry*, 17(6), 511-521., p.512.

⁵⁵² Matonytė, I., & Morkevičius, V. (2009). Threat perception and European identity building: the case of elites in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Poland. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61(6), 967-985., p.969.

⁵⁵³ Rousseau, D. L., & Garcia-Retamero, R. (2007). Identity, power, and threat perception: A cross-national experimental study. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(5), 744-771., p.747.

limited by language skills. The collected data will be processed and translated by myself since German is my second foreign language. Therefore, the discourse analysis would be conducted within the native language of the texts produced.

More importantly, Germany presents a significant case both for the identity politics of the Union and for its role during the crises. In respect to postwar national identity construction, Germany appeared as ‘tamed power’⁵⁵⁴ of the Union, which refers to Germany’s postwar commitment to Europe, multi-culturalism, and European integration process under the doctrine of ‘Nie Wieder Krieg’ (Never again war) contrary to its Nazi past and historical desire for expansion⁵⁵⁵. In this respect, Germany has constructed its national identity with a strong attachment to the European identity which contributed to the generation of the “Europeanized” nation-state identity.⁵⁵⁶ This commitment is explained with the collective memory of the destructive past of the ‘German catastrophe of dictatorship, war, and genocide’ by the literature.⁵⁵⁷ Accordingly, what makes the German case unique is the fact that Germany builds its European identity and its national policy interests closely aligned with the European ones in contrast to its being the constitutive ‘other’ for Europe with its Nazi past.

In addition, from the very beginning of the integration process, Germany has been at the frontline of the European policymaking towards further integration within the designated postwar normative framework of shared sovereignty under the supranational community foreseeing Franco-German reconciliation and partnership.⁵⁵⁸ Highlighting Germany’s importance for Europe because of its economic well-being, population size, location, and institutional influence, Hyde-Price and Jeffery argue that the functioning of the EU is highly determined by the normative foundations of German ‘Europapolitik’ (European policy).⁵⁵⁹ Because of these aspects, Schwarz calls Germany Europe’s central power. Here it is necessary to stress out the normalization debate on the European identity of Germany, which emerged following the end of the Cold War era.

As already explained in the previous chapter, normalization debate refers to international debates on Germany’s presumed normalization shaped by the development of a

⁵⁵⁴ The term ‘tamed power’ is coined by; Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (1997). *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*. Cornell University Press.

⁵⁵⁵ Galpin, C. (2015). Has Germany “Fallen Out of Love” with Europe? The Eurozone Crisis and the “Normalization” of Germany’s European Identity. *German Politics and Society*, 33(1), 25-41.

⁵⁵⁶ Marcussen, M., Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin, D., Knopf, H. J., & Roscher, K. (1999). Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities. *Journal of European public policy*, 6(4), 614-633.

⁵⁵⁷ Banchoff, T. (1998). *Germany’s European policy: a constructivist perspective*. Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

⁵⁵⁸ Banchoff, T. (1999). German identity and European integration. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(3), 259-289.

⁵⁵⁹ Hyde-Price, A., & Jeffery, C. (2001). Germany in the European Union: constructing normality. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(4), 689-717., p. 690.

more self-confident German national identity prioritizing the German national interests since the beginning of the post-reunification period of Germany.⁵⁶⁰ Hyde-Price and Jeffrey define the process as “...Germany becoming more like other powers in its class, e.g. France and the UK....”⁵⁶¹ There is not any pattern of change was identified by the analyses comparing the pre-1990 and post-1990 eras of Germany within the literature, rather it was identified that Germany continued relying on multilateral institutions within the post-1990 European environment as well.⁵⁶² Yet, normalization debates gained considerable pace with the introduction of the Euro.

The fact that Deutsche Mark and German stability culture based on the ordoliberal values were taken as a role model in designating the institutional architecture of the single currency was used as an argument to seek support from Germans for the introduction of the single currency in the face of the major opposition from the German public.⁵⁶³ However, replacing the German national currency that contributed to the self-confidence of the Germans in the post-war period,⁵⁶⁴ and increased prices led the low levels of support for the Euro.⁵⁶⁵ This can be explained by the critical role of money within the process of nation-building and state identity.⁵⁶⁶ In this vein, the introduction of the single currency is expected to contribute to the formation of the pan-European identity.⁵⁶⁷

Therefore, the Euro crisis is also handled within the framework of ‘identity crisis’ during which the sense of solidarity was contested. Besides, being on the frontline of the European integration process, Germany also assumed a leading role in mediating both crises as representing the Kerneurope (core Europe). This is another important reason making Germany unique as a case study. In the face of the eruption of the crisis which entailed a critical juncture for Germany’s future relations with Europe, Germany’s centrality to the Euro crisis was often uttered by the scholars.⁵⁶⁸ The special position where the crisis brought Germany is multifaceted. On the one hand, the crisis sparked the possible identity cleavage between ‘us’ and ‘them’ between the indebted member states and financially well-being member states since

⁵⁶⁰ Galpin, C. (2015b)., *op.cit.*, p. 28.

⁵⁶¹ Hyde-Price, A., & Jeffery, C., *op.cit.*, p. 690.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 696.

⁵⁶³ Howarth, D., & Rommerskirchen, C. (2013). A panacea for all times? The German stability culture as strategic political resource. *West European Politics*, 36(4), 750-770., p. 751.

⁵⁶⁴ Risse, T. (2002). The Euro and Identity Politics in Europe. *The Year of the euro, Nanovic Institute for European Studies.*, p.

⁵⁶⁵ Galpin, C. (2015a)., *op.cit.*, p. 80.

⁵⁶⁶ Helleiner, E. (2001, June). *One money, one people? Political identity and the Euro. (Trentu International Political Economy Centre Working Paper Series, No.1)*

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁸ Bulmer, S. (2014). Germany and the Eurozone crisis: Between hegemony and domestic politics. *West European Politics*, 37(6), 1244-1263; Paterson, W. E. (2011). The Reluctant Hegemon: Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union. *JCMS.*, 49, 57-75; Krampf, A. (2014). From the Maastricht Treaty to post-crisis EMU: The ECB and Germany as drivers of change. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 22(3), 303-317.

individual responsibility, European solidarity, and economic discipline are closely associated with being a good European by the German public. These debates were highly influential in labeling the indebted countries such as ‘deficit sinners’ including their possible exit from the Monetary Union.

On the other hand, while these countries (especially Greece) were represented as the violators of the meaning of ‘good European’, the thesis of good European was also used to justify Germany’s responsibility for prospective bail-out packages to Greece and other countries in constructing the common destiny of Europe. This was to provide a counterargument to the emergence of the debates emphasizing the German national interests since Germany was the largest contributor to the EU bailout funds.⁵⁶⁹ While such leadership led to the designation of the EMU based on the German Stability Culture which can be seen as the triumph of ordoliberalism and German Europeanism, it also triggered the debates on Germany as a ‘reluctant hegemon’. With these aspects which will be further analyzed by the analysis part of this research, Germany stood in a unique position within the Union during the Euro crisis.

Germany had an important position during the European refugee crisis as well. With several initiatives, it played a critical role in solving and managing the flow of people coming from the Eastern Mediterranean. In formulating effective instruments that would relieve the burden of the neighboring countries such as Greece and Italy, Germany mainly adopted two approaches. The first one was adopting the open-door policy that confirmed the voluntary acceptance of over 800.000 refugees⁵⁷⁰ for immediate relief while the second one was assuming ‘German Alleingang’ referring to the unilateral action taken by Germany to negotiate and reach a statement and migration deal with Turkey.⁵⁷¹ While the former implies Germany’s mediatory role in formulating an immediate solution, the latter implies its potential leadership in exerting influence on the agenda-setting and decision-making mechanisms of the EU.

In sum, both crises revealed the institutional power of Germany possessing the potential to exert influence on the agenda-setting and decision-making of the EU institutions, especially the European Council, which was working in ‘crisis mode’ with increased meetings. This was also dramatically related to what is called the ‘Merkel factor’, which is used to refer to the

⁵⁶⁹ Risse, T. (2013, May). *Solidarität unter Fremden? Europäische Identität im Härte-test*. (KFG Working Paper Series, No. 50)https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/37137/ssoar-2013-risse-Solidaritat_unter_Fremden_Europaische_Identitat.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2013-risse-Solidaritat_unter_Fremden_Europaische_Identitat.pdf (Accessed on 10.12.2020), p.15

⁵⁷⁰ BBC News. How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries? (04.03.2016). <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886>. (Accessed on 08.12.2020).

⁵⁷¹ Reiners, W., & Tekin, F. (2020). Taking Refuge in Leadership? Facilitators and Constraints of Germany's Influence in EU Migration Policy and EU-Turkey Affairs during the Refugee Crisis (2015–2016). *German Politics*, 29(1), 115-130.

Chancellor's significant role in mediating both crises defined the directions of the EU summits together with France and the UK.

5.4. Data Collection

Given the motivation of the research, which is to show the European identity construction within the communication about crises by the political and media discourse, articles of the German national newspapers complemented by the political statements including press releases and public speeches were chosen as data to be collected. Since the research is particularly interested in how discursive material communicating about the crisis constructs identity explicitly or implicitly, political speeches, newspaper articles, and press releases specifically produced over the crisis-related issues were points of the target. Therefore, discursive materials such as party programs or election materials that have different agendas such as electoral competition and concerns are excluded.

In addition, the potential of the newspapers in shaping the constructed realities and perceptions of the people in various matters⁵⁷² ranging from ideology, fundamental values to electoral voting behavior is acknowledged by the scholars within the literature.⁵⁷³ The discursive interactions of the EU leaders are mediated by the media which assumed the role of the transmission belt in conveying every kind of information including speeches, declarations, press conferences, etc.⁵⁷⁴ Previous studies have shown that quality newspapers are still the leader of reporting political events in Western European countries.⁵⁷⁵ In this respect, the published press is regarded as a critical 'agenda-setter'.⁵⁷⁶

Accordingly, media representations and outlined media agendas are important sources of understanding and analyzing the discourse on the European identity construction while communicating about the crises. In addition, the inclusion of the political statements will be complementary to the media discourses both by enriching the scope of the research allowing to see the elite level discourses in the analysis and by providing in-depth analysis on the matter, which reduces the risk of selection bias of the materials.

⁵⁷² Norris, P., Curtice, J., Sanders, D., Scammell, M., & Semetko, H. A. (1999). *On message: Communicating the campaign*. Sage; Hurwitz, J., & Peffley, M. (1987). How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical model. *The American Political Science Review*, 1099-1120. See also: Bruter, M. (2003). Winning hearts and minds for Europe: The impact of news and symbols on civic and cultural European identity. *Comparative political studies*, 36(10), 1148-1179.

⁵⁷³ Schmidt, V. A. (2014). Speaking to the markets or to the people? A discursive institutionalist analysis of the EU's sovereign debt crisis. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 16(1), 188-209.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁵⁷⁵ Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (Eds.). (2010). *The making of a European public sphere: Media discourse and political contention*. Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁷⁶ Conboy, M. (2010). *The language of newspapers: Socio-historical perspectives*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

The newspapers chosen for the analysis part of this research are Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), and Die Welt. They are the most circulated newspapers in Germany.⁵⁷⁷ Right-conservative tabloid newspaper Bild, which is published by the Axel-Springer-Verlag House, is the most popular daily publication in Germany.⁵⁷⁸ It has a conservative ideological leaning. Van Schaik regards the Bild as a sensationalist newspaper of Germany.⁵⁷⁹ Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) newspaper is also one of the largest broadsheet newspapers in Germany. It has a center-left leaning.⁵⁸⁰ On the other hand, Die Welt, which belongs to the Springer publishing company, has a center-right leaning.⁵⁸¹

The reason for choosing these newspapers was also based on the (freely) availability of the digital archive retrospectively. Accessibility of the digital archives of the articles of the newspapers online was especially important because the research is limited to rely on electronic archives under the pandemic conditions which does not allow the researcher to conduct field research to reach original copies of the newspapers existing in Berlin State Library. This should be noted as one of the mandatory limitations of this research. Thus, the websites of Bild (<https://www.bild.de/archive/>), Süddeutsche Zeitung (<https://www.sueddeutsche.de/archiv>) and Welt (<https://www.welt.de/schlagzeilen/>) were utilized.

In the same way, the political statements were also collected electronically. To avoid a large amount of data, speeches of the heads of government and relevant government ministers were collected mainly for the analysis. In order to provide views of the different leanings, the speeches of the main opposition leaders were also included. Speeches of Chancellor Angela Merkel, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel, and the leading opposition party Die Linke was collected for the euro crisis. For the refugee crisis, speeches of Chancellor Angela Merkel, Foreign Affairs Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel and leading opposition party Alternative for Germany were collected. Their political stance in respect to the crises will be further elaborated in the following part of this chapter. The official websites of the government (www.bundestag.de and <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/>) are mainly utilized for tracing Chancellor's speeches. Sigmar

⁵⁷⁷ Deutschland.de. (26.03.2020). Überregionale Zeitungen in Deutschland.

<https://www.deutschland.de/de/topic/wissen/ueberregionale-zeitungen>. (Accessed on 09.12.2020).

⁵⁷⁸ Mylonas, Y. (2012). Media and the economic crisis of the EU: The 'culturalization' of a systemic crisis and Bild-Zeitung's framing of Greece. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society*, 10(2), 646-671., p.657.

⁵⁷⁹ Van Schaik, R. (2016). Visual representations of (Syrian) refugees in European newspapers. (Master's Thesis, Malmö University). <http://muep.mau.se/handle/2043/20321>. (Accessed on 10.12.2020).

⁵⁸⁰ Koopmans, R., & Pfetsch, B. (2007). Towards a Europeanised public sphere? Comparing political actors and the media in Germany. *Public sphere and civil society*, 57-87., 70.

⁵⁸¹ Johnson, S., & Suhr, S. (2003). From political correctness' to politische Korrektheit': discourses of PC in the German newspaper, Die Welt. *Discourse & Society*, 14(1), 49-68., pp.53-54.

Gabriel's speeches were both collected through the website of the SPD and Bundestag archiv (<https://www.spd.de/service/pressemitteilungen/> and <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de>). For the foreign affairs ministry, the online political archive Invenio (<https://politisches-archiv.diplo.de/>) was used. The press materials for the leading opposition parties were gained through their official archive websites (respectively; <https://www.die-linke.de/start/newsletter/online-archiv/> and <https://www.afd.de/pressearchiv/>).

Since the statements of the political actors were publicly available on the websites of the government and parties, it was not hard to reach and collect the data. The search terms collecting both the media and political discourse were aligned with the motivations of the research. Accordingly, 'Euro', 'eurozone crisis', 'crisis', 'refugee crisis', 'migrant', 'European Union' were chosen as the basis in collecting news and political speeches to pinpoint the data centrally dealing with both crises. As Risse argues that since identity construction is mostly hidden within the produced text and talks, it is not possible to collect the data from the explicit headlines, references, and labels using the term 'identity', which appears as a methodological challenge of identity research.⁵⁸² The data, which do not mainly address the crises were discarded. The number of articles by the newspapers and political speeches collected within the time frame of this research is altogether 7100.

5.5. Time Periods

In order to restrict the collected data to manageable proportions for the analysis, key moments of both crises were chosen. This limitation of time periods was based on the remarkable political and economic events during which the EU policy-making and integration process became salient. Those moments were during which the solution at the EU level was debated. The time periods are outlined in the following:

April/May 2010	July 2011/ February 2012	June 2012	August 2013	February 2014	July 2015	May 2016
Financial Rescue call by Greece Eurozone meeting on 7th May 2010 when leaders	Early Draft of the Second Greek bailout to Final agreement	Euro Summit Debate	Schäuble's statement "there will have to be another (bailout) program in Greece", a	Troika was reported again to consider offering Greece a third bailout at €15–17b	Third Greek Bailout Agreed- the longest summit of the EU-	Eurogroup agrees on the new Greek loan in exchange of the harsh austerity measures

⁵⁸² Risse, T. (2015). *A community of Europeans?: Transnational identities and public spheres*. Cornell University Press.

agreed to the first Greek bailout,	of the bailout Introduction of crisis mechanisms		remark drawing heavy criticisms		Bail-out referendum	
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Table: Time frame for the Eurozone crisis⁵⁸³

May/September 2015	November 2015	February/December 2016	May 2017	September 2017
Temporary relocation mechanisms European Agenda on Migration	Paris Attacks EU-Turkey joint Action Plan	Terror attacks all over Europe Reintroduction of border controls EU-Turkey Deal	Prolonging temporary internal border control	German Federal Elections

Table: Time frame for the European Refugee crisis⁵⁸⁴

5.5.1 Eurozone Time Period April-May 2010

The Euro crisis has reached its peak in years between 2010 and 2012. Concerns were raised heavily indebted countries with a weak economic growth PIIGS countries Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain.⁵⁸⁵ On 23 April 2010, Greece called for a financial rescue by requesting initial loan from its EU partners and International Monetary Fund (IMF)⁵⁸⁶. Upon its request, euro area and IMF together agreed on loan of about €110 billion in May 2010.⁵⁸⁷ In exchange for the bailout agreement, austerity measures were requested from the EU and IMF, which evoked public anger among Greeks who suffered already drops in their incomes. Being the main creditor, Germany was especially strict in imposing harsh fiscal austerity measures in Greece.⁵⁸⁸ With the debates revolving around the Greek request for support for the common interests and economic safety of the common currency, the period appeared as the first test of European solidarity. Regardless of the initial reluctance of Germany to undertake some solution

⁵⁸³ Elaborated by the researcher herself.

⁵⁸⁴ Elaborated by the researcher herself.

⁵⁸⁵ Lapavistas, C. (2012). *Crisis in the Eurozone*. Verso Books, p.2.

⁵⁸⁶ The Guardian. Greece activates €45bn EU/IMF loans. (23.04.2010).

<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/apr/23/greece-activates-eu-imf-loans>. (Accessed on 10.11.2021)

⁵⁸⁷ European Commission. The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. (May 2010).

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf. (Accessed on 12. 11.2021).

⁵⁸⁸ Theodoropoulou, S. (2016). What solidarity in the Eurozone after the Greek crisis of 2015?. *Social policy in the European Union: state of the play*, 33-60., p.43.

mechanism, initial concerns regarding the possible spillover effect of the crisis appeared in Germany during this period. Thus, the rigid and indifferent attitude was left to be legitimizing the Greek bailout.

July 2011/ February 2012

The first Greek bail-out package was followed by the second bail-out package which is also called as Second Economic Adjustment Program worth of 130 billion euros for the years 2012-2014.⁵⁸⁹ Accordingly, early draft of the second Greek bailout to final agreement of the bailout was outlined also in this period. Since the agreement for bail-out was highly hinged on the conditional of implementing further austerity measures, the Greek government initially responded it with a decision to organize a referendum on the new rescue package. Later, the Hellenic government was forced to back off when it was threatened by EU partners with the overdue payment worth €6 billion which she was supposed to receive till mid-December.⁵⁹⁰ During the debates, the possible Greek leave from the Eurozone often came to the fore.

In August 2011, through a letter to EU's heads of state, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso warned of the possible contagion of the crisis beyond the periphery of the Eurozone.⁵⁹¹ That resulted in the sharp losses in the stock markets of the Eurozone. As a precautionary measure, ECB announced that it would buy Italian and Spanish government bonds to prevent financial market contagion to these member states.⁵⁹²

In September, Olli Rehn European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, reported that the economic growth "is coming to a virtual standstill towards the end of the year."⁵⁹³ As a response to the crisis and standstill levels of economic growth, EU engaged in economic reform initiatives including the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).⁵⁹⁴ Accordingly, two packages namely Two Pack and Six Pack were introduced respectively in November and December 2011.⁵⁹⁵ The two Pack was aimed to improve Commission's monitoring system through introducing Member States' obligation to present Draft Budgetary

⁵⁸⁹ European Commission. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (March 2012).

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf. (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁵⁹⁰ Financial Post. Greece backs off from referendum. (03.11.2011) <https://financialpost.com/news/economy/world-tells-europe-to-fix-crisis>. (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁵⁹¹ Deutsche Welle. Markets fall after Barroso raises specter of further EU debt contagion. (04.08.2011). <https://www.dw.com/en/markets-fall-after-barroso-raises-specter-of-further-eu-debt-contagion/a-15296351>. (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁵⁹² BBC News. Timeline: The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis. (13.07.2012). <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-13856580> (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁵⁹³ European Commission. Olli Rehn European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Europe's Economic Agenda: Restoring Confidence, Fostering Growth Petersen Institute for International Economics Washington, 22 September 2011. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_11_600 (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁵⁹⁴ European Commission. Fact Sheet- The EU's economic governance explained. (27.11.2015). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6071_en.htm. (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Plans, while the Six Pack was to surveil macroeconomic policies through introducing Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure”.⁵⁹⁶

Moreover, Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance which is also known as Fiscal Compact among 26 member states (the exception states were UK and Czech Republic) was signed in March 2012.⁵⁹⁷ The treaty agreed on to “...strengthen the economic pillar of the economic and monetary union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of their economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.”⁵⁹⁸ Based on the agreement for further integration of economic policy, willingness for sharing of sovereignty were shown and reinforced since fiscal integration initiatives were necessitated the further abandonment of national competences to the EU. These steps are regarded as the further spillover steps which were regarded as a necessity for the completion of the fiscal Union.⁵⁹⁹ The taken technocratic steps of economic governance diminished the levels of public politicization to a certain extent as well.⁶⁰⁰

June 2012

In addition to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the euro crisis has already spilled over further to Italy and Spain. On 9 June 2012, up to 100bn euros were announced to be requested from Eurozone funds for the recapitalization of banks.⁶⁰¹ Against the backdrop of economic setback within member states, Greek elections were organized on 17 June 2012. The socio-economic context showed that anti-establishment and anti-austerity parties were on the rise and made substantial gains.⁶⁰² It showed the political fragmentation and public resentment within the state regarding the austerity measures. Such electoral outcome aggravated the ongoing ‘Grexit’ debates and the state’s place in the EU.⁶⁰³

On 29 June 2012, the Euro Summit was held, and member states took initial steps towards common supervisory mechanism as put forward by the Commission’s proposal

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁷ European Commission. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20399/st00tscg26_en12.pdf. (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁵⁹⁸ Article 1.1. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20399/st00tscg26_en12.pdf (Accessed on 11.11.2021).

⁵⁹⁹ Vilpišauskas, R. (2013). Eurozone crisis and European integration: functional spillover, political spillback?. *Journal of European Integration*, 35(3), 361-373, p.363.

⁶⁰⁰ Schimmelfennig, F. (2014). European integration in the euro crisis: The limits of postfunctionalism. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 321-337., p. 323.

⁶⁰¹ The Guardian. Spain to get bank bailout that may run up to €100bn.(09.06.2012)

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/09/spain-bank-bailout-eurozone-crisis> (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

⁶⁰² Vasilopoulou, S., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2013). In the shadow of Grexit: the Greek election of 17 June 2012. *South European Society and Politics*, 18(4), 523-542.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.524.

following the summit: “When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly.”⁶⁰⁴ In this respect, the integrated banking and financial supervision was brought to the table.

August 2013

During this period, then German Federal Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble announced the third bail-out program by explaining that “There will have to be another bail-out program in Greece.”⁶⁰⁵ The announcement sparked off heavy criticism among opposition and was utilized within election debates. Chancellor Merkel was targeted by the SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel, “she will have to soon pour pure wine for Germans.”⁶⁰⁶ On the other side, Gerhard Schröder also accused Chancellor of covering up the truth and of adopting unilateral policy resulting that Germany will bear the costs of the European debt crisis.⁶⁰⁷ Given the opposition leaders' remarks, it became clear that Euro crisis-induced debates and issues became a part of the political contestation among the political parties of the German Bundestag before the German elections of September 2013.⁶⁰⁸

February 2014

This time period starts from the repercussions of the election victory of Syriza in the European elections in Greece. Since the party utilized the Euro crisis by bringing an anti-austerity and anti-establishment stance to the fore, its success is interpreted as the Greek dissatisfaction with the way the EU has dealt with the crisis. The then ongoing bailout program ended on 28 February 2014 therefore this period witnessed disagreements and divergences over formulating a new bail-out program between Greece and its EU partners; most notably with Germany as the main creditor. Regarding the then ongoing bail-out agreements, the new Hellenic government rejected a plan to extend its 240billion Euro bailout and applied for the loan extension with an aim of replacing the bail-out with a new agreement between Greece and Europe because of the strict austerity measures. Tsipras: “We are not in a hurry, and we will not compromise.”⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁴ European Commission. Euro Area Summit Statement. (29.06.2012).

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21400/20120629-euro-area-summit-statement-en.pdf>. (Accessed on 12.11.2012).

⁶⁰⁵ Bild. Schäuble: Griechenland benötigt drittes Rettungspaket. (20.08.2013) <https://www.bild.de/news/aktuell/schaeuble-griechenland-benoetigt-drittes-31913868.bild.html>. (Accessed on 12.11.2012).

⁶⁰⁶ Bild. SPD macht Griechenland-Hilfen zum Wahlkampfthema. (21.08.2012) <https://www.bild.de/news/aktuell/spd-macht-griechenlandhilfen-zum-wahlkampfthema-31918652.bild.html> (Accessed on 12.11.2012).

⁶⁰⁷ Tagesschau. Was ist im neuen Griechenlandpaket?. (21.08.2013)

<https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/schaeuble-griechenland-drittes-hilfsprogramm102.html>. (Accessed on 12.11.2012).

⁶⁰⁸ Wonka, A. (2016). The party politics of the Euro crisis in the German Bundestag: Frames, positions and salience. *West European Politics*, 39(1), 125-144.

⁶⁰⁹ BBC News. ECB offers Greek banks extra €3.3bn emergency cash. <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-31517363>. (Accessed on 13.11.2021).

Hellenic government's stance culminated in a bitter reaction from Germany, then German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble: "It's not about extending a credit program but about whether this bailout program will be fulfilled, yes or no."⁶¹⁰ Mr Schäuble added: "I don't have any new information, but there is no loan agreement, it's an assistance program. And in this seemingly unimportant detail lies the key: Greece would like to receive credit, but not fulfil the conditions to allow Greece to recover economically."⁶¹¹

As implied, during this period, the disagreement especially between Greece and Germany uncovered the different visions of the eurozone and the clash of the economic philosophies and policy preferences between northern and southern member states.⁶¹² Being concerned of moral hazard, Germany was focused on fiscal tightening, austerity and reforms on the tax system in Greece while the southern member states were rather focused on the flexibility and innovation.⁶¹³ Thus, the solidarity-based unity among member states was shaken critically among these debates and Euro crisis summits.

July 2015

Amid harsh divergences of economic policies among member states, the third Greek bailout which would keep Greece in the eurozone was agreed upon during this period. Yet, this was after the longest EU summit ever because of the existing disagreements and against the backdrop of Syriza's position to the third bailout. Syriza came to the power in January 2015 as an anti-austerity political party with its formulated Thessaloniki program referring to the amelioration to austerities of the EU and IMF and financial support to the Greek public.⁶¹⁴ Regarding the demanded conditions in exchange for the third bailout program, Tsipras announced a nation-wide bailout referendum on whether to accept bailout conditions on 5 June 2015.⁶¹⁵ The results of the referendum were overwhelmingly 61 percent opposing the conditions of the European creditors.⁶¹⁶ Yet, at the end, the Greek government had to compromise in various areas of reform including pensions, taxes, debt restructuring, cost of public administration, privatizing the energy transmission network operator.⁶¹⁷ The tougher austerities were met with anger among Greek public especially against Syriza.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁶¹² Brunnermeier, M. K., James, H., & Landau, J. P. (2016). *The Euro and the battle of ideas*. Princeton University Press.

⁶¹³ Caporaso, J. A. (2018). Europe's triple crisis and the uneven role of institutions: The euro, refugees and brexit. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(6), 1345-1361.

⁶¹⁴ Theodoropoulou, S., *ob.cit.*, p. 43.

⁶¹⁵ BBC News. Greece debt crisis: Tsipras announces bailout referendum. (27.06.2015) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33296839>. (Accessed on 13.11.2021).

⁶¹⁶ The Guardian. Greek Referendum: Full Results. (06.07.2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/jul/05/live-results-greek-referendum>. (Accessed on 13.11.2021).

⁶¹⁷ The Guardian. Greece Bailout Agreement: Key points. (13.07.2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greece-bailout-agreement-key-points-grexit>. (Accessed on 14.11.2021).

During this period, with the outbreak of the refugee flow to the Europe and refugee crisis, the two crises intersected as well and feed on each other from different angles as a part of accumulation of challenges to the EU.⁶¹⁸

May 2016

During this period, Eurozone countries agreed on the tranche of bail-out funds worth of €10.3bn which will be disbursed in two installments.⁶¹⁹ The first installment €7.5bn was delivered in June 2016, while the rest of €2.8bn in September 2016.⁶²⁰ The agreement was in exchange of the Greek acceptance of primary actions that cover contingency fiscal mechanism measures including budget savings worth €5.4bn and tax increases, Greek Privatization and Investment Fund.⁶²¹ Such from the Greek side was met with reassurances from the Eurogroup side as means of achieving primary surplus targets of 2018 as foreseen by the ESM program.⁶²² Yet, the agreement was against the backdrop of the harsh anger and riots from the Greek public. Sense of helplessness from the EU was highly circulated among the public. Moreover, the austerity measures were regarded as imposed by ‘Others’ which have culminated in the group differentiation within the in-group of the EU.⁶²³ Thus, while the austerity measures assured the creditors at the political level, it has had critical implications for the socio-psychological process of the ingroup of European communities.

5.5.1.2 Refugee Crisis Time Period

May/September 2015

Amid the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis has appeared during this period when record number of globally displaced Syrian refugees flew to the EU from the Syrian Civil War.⁶²⁴ The period witnessed both massive flow of people and record numbers of deaths and humanitarian tragedies within the transit routes to the Europe. In addition, there have been critical problems of refugee smuggling and human trafficking.⁶²⁵ Thus, the two-folded dimension of the crisis was unfolded among the humanitarian responsibility and border security of the EU.⁶²⁶ The

⁶¹⁸ Caporosa, J.A., *ob.cit.*, p.1345.

⁶¹⁹The Guardian.Eurozone unlocks €10.3bn bailout loan for Greece.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/24/eurozone-officials-hope-to-give-greece-next-tranche-of-bailout>. (Accessed on 16.11.2021).

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶²¹ ESM. Eurogroup statement on Greece, 25 May 2016. <https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/eurogroup-statement-greece-25-may-2016>.(Accessed on 16.11.2021).

⁶²² *Ibid.*

⁶²³ Theodossopoulos, D. (2013). Infuriated with the infuriated? Blaming tactics and discontent about the Greek financial crisis. *Current Anthropology*, 54(2), 200-221.

⁶²⁴European Commission. Refugee crisis in Europe. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en.(Accessed on 17.11.2021).

⁶²⁵ Demircioğlu, S. (2016). *Handling the Syrian refugee crisis Turkey and the EU* (Doctoral dissertation, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi), p.48.

⁶²⁶ Özoflu, M.A. (2017), *op.cit.*, p. 87.

critical situation triggered the formulation of the European Agenda on Migration during this period.⁶²⁷




Figure: Deaths in Mediterranean route per years⁶²⁸

Moreover, the fragmentation within the EU was observed among the member states having different reactionary stances to the crisis. The split includes the following: pro-refugee, anti-refugee camps as well as the geographically vulnerable member states (Greece and Italy).⁶²⁹ While Germany and Sweden adopted pro-refugee stance most notably, CEECs and Baltic States were in the anti-refugee camp. The discrepancies have shown the weakness of the solidarity in managing the Schengen system, external border management within the Union, and of the Dublin Regulation's sustainability. Therefore, in-group differentiation and self-interest of the national identities prevailed within the EU identity. Against the backdrop of the EU's divided picture over the crisis response, first and second temporary relocation mechanisms in May and September respectively were formulated as a response to the crisis.⁶³⁰ The relocation mechanisms foresaw the relocation of the in sum "160,000 refugees from Italy, Greece and Hungary within the EU."⁶³¹

This period witnessed also chaotic scenes of the refugees along the south-eastern borders of the EU as well as at the railway stations of Austria and Hungary that responded harshly to the flow of the people. Amid such humanitarian and solidarity crisis, in August 2015 Germany declared that it would accept 800.000 refugees from Hungary to relieve the situation.⁶³²

⁶²⁷ European Commission. (2015). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a European Agenda on Migration. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1485255362454&uri=CELEX:52015DC0240>. (Accessed on 17.11.2021).

⁶²⁸ Missing Migrants., Change in Mediterranean Sea Arrivals to Europe and Recorded Deaths January 1- June 7, 2016 & 2017., <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean>. (Accessed on 17.11.2021).

⁶²⁹ Greenhill, K. M., *ob.cit.*, p. 322.

⁶³⁰ Heisbourg, F. (2015)., *op.cit.*, p.10.

⁶³¹ European Commission. Refugee Crisis – Q&A on Emergency Relocation. (22.09.2015) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5698. (Accessed on 18.11.2021).

⁶³² TheGuardian. Germany urges other EU countries to take in more refugees. 31.08.2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/31/refugees-found-suffocated-lorry-austria-syrian-family-of-six>. (Accessed on 24.11.2021)

November 2015

During this period, concerns regarding the refugees have aggravated because of the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015. Following the attacks, French government immediately closed its border and declared state of emergency.⁶³³ Security concerns shaped the attitude towards both refugees and EU's response mechanism to the crisis in the member states which triggered the unilateral reactions of the member states. In the face of the increasing security threat and aggravation of the refugee influx, EU-Turkey joint action plan was signed on 29 November 2015 to collaborate to halt the refugee flow to the EU.

February/December 2016

This period mainly consists of successive terror attacks all over Europe; Brussels bombings in March 2016, Nice attack on Bastille Day in July 2016, Normandy church attack in July 2016, Berlin Christmas market attack on December 19, 2016.⁶³⁴ The successive attacks resulted in the reintroduction of the border controls within the member states of the Schengen area pursuant to the Council decision of "Council adopts recommendation for continuation of internal border controls."⁶³⁵ Accordingly, border controls were introduced respectively in Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.⁶³⁶ The repercussions of such measures against the terrorist threats led to the articulations of whether Schengen is dead. Moreover, together with the unilateral attempts of the member states in responding to the refugee crisis as generating sort of solidarity crisis as well, this period can be interpreted as one of the critical and vivid moments during which national security interests of the member states prevailed over the common European interests and unity.

On the other hand, during this process the dialogue with Turkey was deepened towards formulating a bilateral solution to the crisis. EU-Turkey statement and action plan of 18 March 2016 showed their willingness to cooperate in stopping the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU.⁶³⁷ The statement foresaw that "1. All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. 2. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking

⁶³³ Noack, R. What did it really mean when France 'closed' its borders?. (15.11.2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/15/what-did-it-really-mean-when-france-closed-its-borders/?utm_term=.bb4c31a447c1. (Accessed on 18.11.2021).

⁶³⁴ Express. Terror attacks timeline: From Paris and Brussels terror to most recent attacks in Europe. (18.08.2017). <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/693421/Terror-attacks-timeline-France-Brussels-Europe-ISIS-killings-Germany-dates-terrorism> (Accessed on 24.11.2021).

⁶³⁵ Council of the European Union. Council adopts recommendation for continuation of internal border controls. (12.05.2016). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/12/internal-border-controls/#>. (Accessed on 24.11.2021).

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁷ Council of the European Union. EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. (18.03.2016). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>. (Accessed on 24.11.2021).

into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.”⁶³⁸ Following the statement, the illegal crossings from Turkey to the EU dropped dramatically as illustrated in the figure below:




Figure: Levels of migration from Turkey to EU in before and after the EU-Turkey statement⁶³⁹

May 2017

During this period, the Council decided to prolongation of the temporary internal border controls by declaring its statement of “Council recommends up to six-month prolongation of internal border controls.”⁶⁴⁰ The relocation disagreements and mutual accusations among the member states continued. The fragmented picture of the EU over the crisis was continued to be shown through the unilateral statements of the national governments.⁶⁴¹ Thus, this period implied the importance of following up the course of the crisis even against the dropping numbers of refugees.

September 2017

During this period, the German Federal Elections of 2017 were held. The period was chosen to investigate the extent to which the group relations of the European identity in the face of the refugee flux to EU and German was utilized as a source of debate in the election debates of the political actors. The reason for that the election results showed that the German grand coalition government of CDU/CSU and SPD lost respectively 8.5 and 5.2 percent of their votes although they remained Germany’s two largest parties, while AfD came to the third place in

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁹ University of Oxford. Thomas Spijkerboer. Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number of Migrants and of Border Deaths?. (28.09.2016) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-eu>. (Accessed on 24.11.2021).

⁶⁴⁰ Council of the European Union. Schengen area: Council recommends up to six month prolongation of internal border controls. (11.05.2017). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/11/schengen-area-six-month-prolongation-internal-border-controls/>. (Accessed on 24.11.2021).

⁶⁴¹ European Parliament. EU refugee crisis: “Relocation is our shared moral duty”. (16.05.2017) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170515STO74806/eu-refugee-crisis-relocation-is-our-shared-moral-duty>. (Accessed on 24.11.2021).

the parliament by gaining 12.6 percent of the general votes, which is 7.9 percent higher compared to its previous election gains.⁶⁴²

5.5.2. Officials whose speeches collected

In addition to the ruling party and the opposition figures, there have been certain political actors and relevant ministries that became prominent in terms of policy and decision-making during both crises. Therefore, the speeches of the political actors and public releases of the ministries were collected from the websites of ministries' official pages during the course of each crisis.

5.6. Political Discourses Collected during the Euro Crisis

Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany 2005-2021

Having been the leader of the *Christlich Demokratische Partei* CDU (Christian Democratic Party) since 2000, Merkel has served as a Chancellor since 2005.⁶⁴³ During her entire time in office, she survived both Euro and refugee crises. Throughout the euro crisis, her party has been in coalition with CSU, *Christlich Soziale Union* (Christian Social Union) and FDP, *Frei Demokratische Partei* (Free Democratic Party) between 2009 and 2013 and later from 2013 onwards it formed grand coalition with CSU, and *Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany). She has been the first east German as a Chancellor. The effectiveness and success of Merkel's leadership during the euro crisis can be explained with her conciliatory attitude addressing the different layers of the policy including national and European. Moreover, Germany has preserved its economic strength. Thus, Merkel's leadership has not been contested within the internal affairs. In addition, at the European level, her pan-European leadership role has been often promoted in solving the crisis. Yet, Merkel is known for her adherence to German *ordo-liberalism*⁶⁴⁴ and thus the determination of saving the euro and unity of the eurozone have been strongly tied with a demand of commitment to the criteria of moral norms and values from the indebted member states. The strict attitude she showed was associated with her being Nazi and she was depicted within Nazi uniforms by the Greek public and media⁶⁴⁵ that limited her pan-European legitimacy.

⁶⁴² Bloomberg. 2017 German Election Results. (24.09.2017). <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-german-election-results/>. (Accessed on 24.11.2021).

⁶⁴³ Van Esch, F. A. (2017). The paradoxes of legitimate EU leadership. An analysis of the multi-level leadership of Angela Merkel and Alexis Tsipras during the euro crisis. *Journal of European Integration*, 39(2), 223-237., p.227.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁵ Deutsche Welle. Merkel as Hitler?. (18.04.2013). <https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-as-hitler/a-16753456>. (Accessed on 25.11.2021).

Wolfgang Schaeuble, Finance Minister 2009-2017

As a member of the CDU, he became finance minister amid the global financial crisis.⁶⁴⁶ Having been the finance minister of the world's fourth-biggest economy, Wolfgang Schäuble has been second most influential person after Chancellor Merkel.⁶⁴⁷ Having been attached to the ordoliberal economic of thought like Merkel, he has been strongly dedicated to the application of the strict rules and austerity measures by the indebted countries during the euro crisis.⁶⁴⁸ Thus, he has been mostly known with his uncompromising attitude regarding the debt relief of Greece. In 2012, he asserted that Greek exit from the eurozone would be the least-bad solution which was prevented later by Merkel.⁶⁴⁹ Couple of years later, Schaeuble proposed Greek's five-year exit from the Eurozone during July 2015 summit talks as well.⁶⁵⁰ While it raised tension within the internal political scene of Germany between the coalition partners of socialists and conservatives,⁶⁵¹ the repercussions of such a proposal led to harsh criticisms at the European level. Like Merkel, he has been also depicted as Nazi soldier in various Greek cartoons.⁶⁵² On the other hand, his proposals for Grexit are interpreted as a leeway for ordoliberal manner of regaining competitiveness within the eurozone through since the ordoliberals mostly regard the reason of crisis in the indebted countries as lack of competitiveness and excessive amount of indebtedness.⁶⁵³

Sigmar Gabriel, SPD leader 2009-2017

Sigmar Gabriel has been the leader of the SPD that formed a coalition partnership with CDU/CSU between 2013-2018. He has been the vice-chancellor during the coalition period, which encompasses the course of both crises. Moreover, he has been the minister for economic affairs and energy simultaneously. Thus, he has been one of the influential actors during the euro crisis. He has been critical of the austerity policies taken into effect previously by the coalition of CDS/CSU and FDP, "The stringent austerity policy prescribed for Europe by

⁶⁴⁶ BBC News. Wolfgang Schaeuble: Germany's man with a Grexit plan.(14.07.2015). <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33511387>. (Accessed on 25.11.2021).

⁶⁴⁷ The Wallstreet Journal.Q&A With German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. (23.05.2014). <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303480304579579753814951472>.(Accessed on 25.11.2021).

⁶⁴⁸ Young, B. (2014). German ordoliberalism as agenda setter for the euro crisis: Myth trumps reality. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 22(3), 276-287., p.276.

⁶⁴⁹ Financial Times. Schäuble eyes an opportunity in Greece's crisis. (05.07.2015).<https://www.ft.com/content/d69ceb4c-22ff-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c>. (Accessed on 25.11.2021).

⁶⁵⁰ BBC News. Wolfgang Schaeuble: Germany's man with a Grexit plan.(14.07.2015). <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33511387>. (Accessed on 25.11.2021).

⁶⁵¹ Reuters. German Economy Minister criticizes Schaeuble's proposal for temporary Grexit. (19.07.2015). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-germany-gabriel/german-economy-minister-criticizes-schaeubles-proposal-for-temporary-grexit-idUSKCN0PT0AP20150719?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>.(Accessed on 25.11.2021).

⁶⁵²Deutsche Welle. Germany condemns Greek cartoon depicting Schäuble as Nazi <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-condemns-greek-cartoon-depicting-sch%C3%A4uble-as-nazi/a-18256950>.(Accessed on 26.11.2021).

⁶⁵³ Young, B. (2014)., *op.cit.*, p. 278.

conservatives and liberals has forced the crisis countries into a spiral of economic slump and rising unemployment.”⁶⁵⁴ While Schauble regard the excessive indebtedness as the root of the crisis, Gabriel regard the real reason was the excessive speculations on the market. He often expressed the importance of the reforms and rebalancing the social market economy, “...we need to reassert the primacy of politics and thus of democracy over unrestrained financial capitalism.”⁶⁵⁵ He also criticized Schaeuble for his suggestion of Grexit by emphasizing the harsh consequences for the euro states.⁶⁵⁶ Therefore we have witnessed the disagreement between the finance and economy ministers in terms of understanding the root causes of the crisis as well as responding to it.

Die Linke, Leading Opposition Party 2013-2017

Die Linke came to the leading party of the opposition with the 2013 elections till 2017. Its co-chairs have been Katja Kipping and Bernd Riexinger. The co-chairs and party criticized bailing out the banks as a form of redistribution mechanisms instead of financing citizens and helping them directly.⁶⁵⁷ Moreover, they have been critical of euro and EU institutions -most notably of ECB- in terms of economy management on the grounds that they are allocated more powers than the national governments, “If one looks at the role of the ECB in Greece, which blackmailed Syriza because it threatened to stop the cash flow to Greece, it means we have got to discuss a radical reformation of the EU institutions.”⁶⁵⁸ The political orientations of the institutions was also subject of criticism of Die Linke asserting the imbalances of power in the currency union.⁶⁵⁹ Their prescription of the solution to the crisis was based on the democratic reconfiguration of the institution in line with the social democracy.

5.7 Political Discourses Collected during the Refugee Crisis

Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany 2005-2021

Angela Merkel has been in office also during the refugee crisis. Although her position was not challenged during the euro crisis, the outbreak of the refugee crisis brought about various political setbacks for her. In the face of the pressure of flux of people, her decision was to welcome refugees from Middle East and North Africa with a famous saying ‘Wir schaffen

⁶⁵⁴ Gabriel, S. (2013). Europe needs a new social balance. *Public Policy Research*, 19(4), 240-244., p.240.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁶⁵⁶ Reuters. German Economy Minister criticizes Schaeuble's proposal for temporary Grexit. (19.07.2015). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-germany-gabriel/german-economy-minister-criticizes-schaeubles-proposal-for-temporary-grexit-idUSKCN0PT0AP20150719?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>. (Accessed on 25.11.2021).

⁶⁵⁷ Wonka, A., *op.cit.*, p. 138.

⁶⁵⁸ Euroactive. Die Linke attacks EU institutions. (25.08.2015). <https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/news/die-linke-attacks-eu-institutions/>. (Accessed on 27.11.2021).

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

das', which received both appraisals and criticisms simultaneously and made her the European-wide leading actor in responding to the crisis. Mushaben emphasizes her origin as a GDR citizen in explaining her aspiration to turn Germany into a land of immigration.⁶⁶⁰ In fact, her association of Germany's past reunification with the refugee crisis is found her statements as such, "part of our country's identity to achieve great things."⁶⁶¹ Because of her 'Willkommenskultur', welcoming culture, she faced opposition from CSU which challenged the historic pact between CDU and CSU. She also encountered with discontent from the public especially after the sexual assaults during the 2015-2016 New Years' Eve in Cologne.

She engaged in formulating a common European response to the crisis. Notably, she has been the only actor suggesting common European solution. Yet, she simultaneously gave mixed signals by unilaterally declaring that Germany would accept 800.000 refugees from Hungary that resulted in bypassing of the Dublin system. Failing to receive the necessary support from EU partners in fair burden-sharing, she closely collaborated with Turkey to designate a joint action plan during a series of summits that helped relieve the refugee flows and tension.

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Foreign Affairs Minister- 2013-2017

Being a member of SPD, Steinmeier has been minister for foreign affairs till 2017 when he became president of Germany. He has adopted pro-refugee stance and often encouraged the openness of the German public towards refugees.⁶⁶² During the refugee crisis, he usually emphasized the importance of solidarity within the EU in formulating a solution to the crisis and addressing to the root causes of the crisis.⁶⁶³ One of his priorities was to generate a fair distribution system within the EU.⁶⁶⁴ He has been critical of EU partners' decision to build fences and walls in their borders,

"It's clear that simply constructing border fences will not resolve the refugee crisis. It rather shifts the burden of the problem onto other countries. There is no way to avoid coming up with a European response. This means distributing refugees fairly, developing common standards for taking in and recognising refugees, and undertaking joint border management and an effective policy on return. "⁶⁶⁵

Sigmar Gabriel, SPD leader 2009-2017

⁶⁶⁰ Mushaben, J. M. (2017). Wir schaffen das! Angela Merkel and the European refugee crisis. *German Politics*, 26(4), 516-533.

⁶⁶¹Deutsche Welle. Merkel pours oil on troubled CDU waters over refugee crisis. (14.12.2015) <https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-pours-oil-on-troubled-cdu-waters-over-refugee-crisis/a-18915554>. (Accessed on 27.11.2021).

⁶⁶² German Federal Foreign Office. Interview with Steinmeier. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/150816-bild-am-sonntag/273958>. (Accessed on 29.11.2021).

⁶⁶³ Steinmeier, F. W. (2016). Germany's new global role: Berlin steps up. *Foreign Affairs*, 95(4), 106-113., p. 113.

⁶⁶⁴ German Federal Foreign Office. Interview given by Foreign Minister Steinmeier on the refugee crisis in Europe. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/150918-bm-pnp/274936>. (Accessed on 29.11.2021).

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Being not necessarily critical of Merkel's welcoming culture, Sigmar Gabriel has requested expansion of the welfare policies of the German public in exchange for welcoming an increased number of refugees.⁶⁶⁶ That move is widely regarded as a move to increase SPD's electoral appeal.⁶⁶⁷ He also criticized the European partners and asserted that he found European policy of refugee crisis 'embarrassing',⁶⁶⁸ "The European lack of action in the refugee crisis is now pushing even Germany to the limit of its ability."⁶⁶⁹

AfD, Leading Opposition Party 2017-2021

Having shifted its stance gradually towards extreme right of the political spectrum since its foundation in 2013, AfD became the leading opposition party in the 2017 elections which has been interpreted as a watershed event for the future of the European Union. With a Eurosceptic agenda against Euro, EU, and refugees, the populist right-wing party seemed to achieve inserting its political influence on the German public as proved in the 2017 elections with a gain of %13 of the votes.⁶⁷⁰ Therefore, tracing her patterns of European identity construction when it was aspiring to receive electoral appeal during the refugee crisis was also chosen to be in line with the motivations of this research.

⁶⁶⁶ Dostal, J. M. (2017). The crisis of German social democracy revisited. *The Political Quarterly*, 88(2), 230-240., p. 234.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁶⁶⁸ Tagesspiegel. Vizekanzler Gabriel spricht von einer Million Flüchtlingen. (14.09.2015).

<https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/newsblog-zu-fluechtlingen-sigmar-gabriel-kritisiert-eu-fluechtlingspolitik-als-blamabel/12260632.html>.(Accessed on 29.11.2021).

⁶⁶⁹ Reuters. Minister says Germany reaching its limits in refugee crisis: newspaper.(13.09.2015). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-gabriel-idUSKCN0RD0JS20150913>.(Accessed on 29.11.2021).

⁶⁷⁰ The Guardian. German Elections 2017: full results. (25.09.2017). <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017-latest-results-live-merkel-bundestag-afd>.(Accessed on 29.11.2021).

CHAPTER 6: UNTIL DEBT TEAR US APART? EURO CRISIS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN GERMANY

6.1. Introduction

Previous chapters have addressed the theoretical framework, research method, and historical formation of the European identity. The main aim of this chapter is to investigate the manifestations of the European identity construction by the political and media discourses framing the Euro crisis in Germany. Based on the main premises of the SIT as the theoretical framework of this thesis offering the argument that social, economic, and political processes have an impact on the formation of an ingroup i.e., common European identity, the identity construction during the Euro crisis will be found out. To this end, discourses framing the crisis with respect to European identity will be investigated by utilizing the collected empirical case study data within the time frame outlined for the Euro crisis by the methodology part of the thesis.

On the one hand, the possible identity cleavage became in question since European solidarity and unity were challenged. The possible identity shift in the European identity within the German case study has been expected to be sparked by the euro crisis. As an answer to this inquiry, whether the crisis led to the group differentiation within the ingroup of the European identity will be examined. On the other hand, crises have opened up leeway for the articulation of the different ideas and visions regarding the European integration process, which manifest themselves within the discourses of the political, economic actors, and the mass media. Due to the crisis, Germany has also found a rigid ground to prove its commitment to the Europe and to the idea of the EU. In this regard, the construction of the common fate of the community of the Europeans as an ingroup will be given also focus of address.

This chapter aims to cover different positions framing the euro crisis on the nexus of the construction of the European identity within the German national political setting. It will first provide the background of the Euro crisis to understand the group dynamics of the ingroup of European identity during the crisis with respect to the position of Germany in the EU. This will also grasp the potential of the crisis to generate in-group favoritism and out-group differentiation within the upper level of the European identity. Later, the thematically divided parts will conduct the analysis of the manifestations of the European identity construction throughout the crisis.

6.2. Background of the Euro Crisis

The main premises of the theoretical framework of this research have a certain emphasis on the repercussions of the political, social, and economic processes on group formation. The Europeanization process provided the necessary background to understand the historical formation of the European identity. In relation to the specific address of this research aiming to understand how the European identity constructions are shaped throughout the two crises of the EU, this background will provide a brief summary of the Euro crisis. In order to understand the complete picture, the brief summary will focus both on the technocratic and political levels of the crisis.

The onset of the euro crisis within the EU was triggered with the eruption of the economic crisis because of the collapse of the sub-prime markets⁶⁷¹ in 2008 in the USA.⁶⁷² The reflections of the global economic recession in the EU were of the combination of both economic and political crises stemming from the structural flaws of the EMU having a monetary union without a fiscal union.⁶⁷³ Žižek argues that the structural inefficiencies of the system were relatively less prominent since the narratives of the crisis were mostly focused on the inherent characteristics of the countries that heavily suffered from the crisis.⁶⁷⁴ The infamous abbreviation i.e. (PIIGS) is used to refer to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. The cultural explanations were influential in understanding the standpoint of identity cleavage between north/south Europeans.⁶⁷⁵ This is because the essentialist stereotypes were manifested in the form of moral panic and rhetoric of blame which are used to show these countries as “a threat to societal values and interests” of the ingroup of European identity.⁶⁷⁶

The endogenous causes of the crisis in these countries were the main reason for such constructions, although each of them has a unique experience of crisis. Greece became particularly at the center of the constructions of ‘self-inflicted’ because of its mismanaged economy and misreporting of economic performance which was admitted publicly in 2009.⁶⁷⁷ Here it is important to point out that Greek’s monetary policy that converged with the Eurozone has been not compatible with the fiscal and political needs of the country. This is largely related

⁶⁷¹ Zestos, G. K. (2015). *The global financial crisis: from US subprime mortgages to European sovereign debt*. Routledge.

⁶⁷² Ergin, N. E. (2013). *Hasta adam Avrupa: Avro krizi: Avro bölgesinde borç krizi ve krize karşı alınan tedbirler*. Maliye Hesap Uzmanları Derneği.

⁶⁷³ Bordo, M. D. (2010). The Euro Needs a Fiscal Union: Some Lessons from History. *Economic Policies for the 21st Century*, 12.

⁶⁷⁴ Žižek, S. (2010). A permanent economic emergency. *New left review*, 64(1), 85-95., p. 85.

⁶⁷⁵ Mylonas, Y. (2012). Media and the economic crisis of the EU: The ‘culturalization’ of a systemic crisis and Bild-Zeitung’s framing of Greece. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society*, 10(2), 646-671.

⁶⁷⁶ Cohen, S. (2002). *Folk devils and moral panics: The creation of the mods and rockers*. Psychology Press., p.9.

⁶⁷⁷ Kindreich, A. (2017, July 20). *The Greek Financial Crisis*. Econcrises.<https://www.econcrises.org/2017/07/20/the-greek-financial-crisis-2009-2016/>. (Accessed on 01.12.2020).

to the lack of economic convergence between core and periphery. Moreover, there are divergences within the degree of competitiveness, growth models as well as variants of capitalism despite having a common monetary policy.⁶⁷⁸ Accordingly, the monetary union without a centralized fiscal union destabilized the financial markets and undermined the strength of the monetary union.⁶⁷⁹ Within the Greek crisis context, this resulted that in the face of the rise of interest rates and private debt, the country could not devalue its currency or reduce interest rates because of the monetary policy of the Eurozone while the fiscal deficits were surging between 2008 and 2010.⁶⁸⁰ While it is often connotated that Eurozone was put at risk by Greece,⁶⁸¹ on the other side of the coin, Greek membership in the Eurozone contributed to the aggravation of the crisis in return.

The crisis in Greece triggered EU-wide debates about financial aid and the non-bailout clause (Article 125) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) due to which the immediate action was hindered. Moreover, at the beginning of the crisis, it was largely attributed as 'home-made' crisis whose solutions should be taken care of at home.⁶⁸² While it gave the impression that the crisis is under control and it did not put the euro in danger, the markets were unsure whether Greece could pay its debts.⁶⁸³ The speculations continued to grow along with the issue of contagion, and the political division over the necessity for a centralized response. These all are counted as the root causes of the EU's delayed action, which deteriorated the financial fragility of Greece and situation of the crisis.

After the initial inaction, the bailing out mechanism was formulated by the tripartite inclusion of the European Central Bank (ECB), EU Commission and International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is called as Troika. Within this framework, in total the loan packages amounted to about €110 billion in May 2010⁶⁸⁴, €240 billion in February 2012,⁶⁸⁵ and €86 billion from 2015 to 2018⁶⁸⁶ were agreed. In order to solve the non-bail out problem and assure

⁶⁷⁸ Hall, P. A. (2014). Varieties of capitalism and the Euro crisis. *West European Politics*, 37(6), 1223-1243.

⁶⁷⁹ Vilpišauskas, R., *ob.cit.*, p.364.

⁶⁸⁰ Kindreich, A., *op.cit.*

⁶⁸¹ Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S. (2014). Greece, the Eurozone crisis and the media: The solution is the problem. *Javnost-The Public*, 21(4), 25-45.

⁶⁸² Elliott L. (2010, January 28). *No EU bailout for Greece as PM promises to 'put our house in order'*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jan/28/greece-papandreou-eurozone>. (Accessed on 03.12.2020)

⁶⁸³ Young, B., & Semmler, W. (2011). The European sovereign debt crisis: Is Germany to blame?. *German Politics and Society*, 29(1), 1-24.

⁶⁸⁴ European Commission. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Occasional Papers. No: 61. *The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece*. (2010, May 26). http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf. (Accessed on 10.12.2020).

⁶⁸⁵ European Commission. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Occasional Papers. No: 94. (2012, March). http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf. (Accessed on 10.12.2020).

⁶⁸⁶ Council of the European Union. *Greece: The Third Economic Adjustment Programme*. Consilium Europe. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/financial-assistance-eurozone-members/greece-programme/>. (Accessed on 10.12.2020).

the financial stability of the eurozone, the non-bail out clause was replaced by the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)⁶⁸⁷ and permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM),⁶⁸⁸ which were established respectively in 2010 and 2012. The permanent mechanism of ESM created €500 million funds in order to ensure markets for the long-term commitment to the single currency.⁶⁸⁹ In addition, two pillars of the banking union as the single supervisory system (SSM)⁶⁹⁰ and single resolution mechanism (SRM) were established.⁶⁹¹ In this way, the economic governance of the EMU was strengthened. The two legislative packages within the framework of the European Semester: Six-Pack and Two-Pack were formulated respectively in 2011 and 2013 in order to increase the discipline of the member states within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pack.⁶⁹²

With the German leadership, the intergovernmental treaty of the Fiscal Compact, which foresaw the national fiscal disciplines to run the balanced budgets, was signed in 2013.⁶⁹³ The ratification of the Fiscal Compact was mandatory for the eurozone countries within the specified one-year time frame.⁶⁹⁴ In this way, the technocratic level of integration proceeded within the context of the crisis. These initiatives are interpreted as the adoption of the neo-functionalist agenda foreseeing the complementary of the monetary union with the fiscal union.⁶⁹⁵ Despite the increasing Euro-sceptic voices, these initiatives towards further integration were achieved. The reason for that was the dependency on the Euro, high levels of transnational capital movement within Europe, and the rather obscure scenario for the future in the event of the exit of a member state.⁶⁹⁶

Nevertheless, at the political level, the bail-out was not a smooth process along with the disagreements among member states, pressures from the financial markets, and arising voices

⁶⁸⁷ European Stability Mechanism. EFSF- The temporary fiscal backstop. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/financial-assistance-eu/funding-mechanisms-and-facilities/european-financial-stability-facility-efsf_en. (Accessed on 11.12.2020).

⁶⁸⁸ European Stability Mechanism. Lending Toolkit. Retrieved from <https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/lending-toolkit>. (Accessed on 11.12.2020).

⁶⁸⁹ Glencross, A. (2013). *The EU response to the eurozone crisis: Democratic contestation and the New Fault Lines in European Integration* (No. 3/13). Discussion Paper.

⁶⁹⁰ European Commission. Single Supervisory Mechanism. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/banking-union/single-supervisory-mechanism_en. (Accessed on 11.12.2020).

⁶⁹¹ Single Resolution Board. Single Resolution Mechanism. Retrieved from <https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/single-resolution-mechanism-srm>. (Accessed on 12.12.2020).

⁶⁹² European Commission. The European Semester Explained. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/framework/eus-economic-governance-explained_en. (Accessed on 14.12.2020).

⁶⁹³ Glencross, A. *op.cit.*, p.10.

⁶⁹⁴ Kumar, R. (2014). *The Eurozone Crisis and the Future of Europe: The Political Economy of Further Integration and Governance*. Springer.

⁶⁹⁵ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1), 83-108.

⁶⁹⁶ Schimmelfennig, F., *ob.cit.*, p. 329.

regarding the unsustainability of the Greek public debt⁶⁹⁷. Because of the discussions over the likelihood of the exit of Greece from the Eurozone ‘Grexit’ which is sometimes manifested as a sort of threat to the country in the event of failure to comply with the austerity measures, full solidarity was not achieved.

Germany became the largest creditor during the crisis as the largest economy of the Union⁶⁹⁸. This placed the country in a critical position during the negotiations of the European summits to formulate bailout packages. However, there has been an expectation versus a capacity gap in terms of Germany’s leadership in solving the crisis. On the one hand, the Greek bailout was unpopular within the German public.⁶⁹⁹ In addition, there was the awaited Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on whether bailing-out to Greece would be in compliance with the Basic Law of Germany. Therefore, there was an initial political reluctance to formulate any bailout package to prevent a Greek default. The then finance minister Schauble’s initial vision for the possibility of a Greek exit from the eurozone was known as well. On the other hand, critics accused Merkel of delaying the EU’s reaction to the crisis by abstaining from making any decision regarding the rescue package. Thus, Germany was trapped between the domestic politics and demands of the European partners to show its commitment to the Union. Therefore, the centrality of Germany during the crisis appeared in the form of ‘reluctant hegemon’ of the Union.⁷⁰⁰

While the initial position was shifted after agreeing on the conditional loan agreement, Merkel’s firm attitude articulated within the political discourses based on the strict austerity and market liberalization in exchange for the bailing out was present throughout the crisis.⁷⁰¹ Nevertheless, that Angela Merkel’s center-right coalition has faced a loss of majority in the Bundesrat of North-Rhine Westphalia⁷⁰² was interpreted as the German reactions to the agreed first bailout package. Thus, the leadership commitment of Germany to the EU was constrained by the domestic political context. With respect to the domestic political context, German political actors have often been inclined to shape their discourses on the importance of the common currency, the historical importance of European integration, and how much Germany

⁶⁹⁷ Theodoropoulou, S., *ob.cit.*, p. 35.

⁶⁹⁸ Bulmer, S. (2014). Germany and the Eurozone crisis: Between hegemony and domestic politics. *West European Politics*, 37(6), 1244-1263., p.1245.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁰ Paterson, W. E. (2011). The Reluctant Hegemon: Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union. *JCMS.*, 49, 57-75., p. 57.

⁷⁰¹ Roose, J., Kanellopoulos, K., & Sommer, M. (2017). National Anti-austerity Protests in a European Crisis: Comparing the Europeanizing Impact of Protest in Greece and Germany During the Eurozone Crisis. *Journal of Civil Society*, 13(3), 284-306., p. 286.

⁷⁰² Connolly K., (2010, May 9). *Ruling Party Loses Election in key German State*. Los Angeles Times. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-may-09-la-fg-germany-election-20100510-story.html>. (Accessed on 15.12.2020).

benefitted from the common currency. In this way, they were trying to legitimize their decisions during the bail-out debates.

Political stance towards Greek bailout was mostly shaped by the ordoliberal ethics envisaged the austerity-solidarity pattern as a way of a solution to the crisis. The planned strict fiscal austerity measures were regarded as far from being acceptable for the Greek public. The designated measures resulted in anti-austerity protest waves targeting both national and European actors.⁷⁰³ The crisis and protests further politicized the European public in their gradual shift from 'permissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus'.⁷⁰⁴ While Germany was at the center of the targets with the allegations and representations of Germans as 'Nazis', European integration and Greek national government were also challenged unprecedentedly by the public disapproval and distrust. The protests further aggravated the polarization between Greece as the debtor and Germany as the creditor.

EU-wide polarization and politicization manifested itself within the subsequent national elections in the member states.⁷⁰⁵ While the general trend was the rise of the right-wing in west Europe, the triumph of the left-wing populist Syriza party in 2015 was one of the most remarkable events of the crisis in determining the future direction of the formulated austerity packages, since it came with a concrete position of anti-austerity promise to the Greek people.⁷⁰⁶ Before not too long, Tsipras's U-turn betraying its election promises and principles became apparent when he signed the bailout deal following the bailout referendum results that 60 percent of the Greek people were opposing the bailouts.⁷⁰⁷

In sum, the crisis implied a moment of critical juncture during which the legitimacy of the national governments and European institutions were contested through the polarizing discourses shaking the core values of European integration.⁷⁰⁸ At the functional level, the initiatives were achieved in order to overcome the structural deficiencies of the EMU, which generated new impetus towards fiscal union.⁷⁰⁹ However, at the political level, there has been a shift to constraining dissensus of the European public. Accordingly, the public dissatisfaction

⁷⁰³ Roose, J., Kanellopoulos, K., & Sommer, M. (2017). National Anti-austerity Protests in a European Crisis: Comparing the Europeanizing Impact of Protest in Greece and Germany During the Eurozone Crisis. *Journal of Civil Society*, 13(3), 284-306., p. 285.

⁷⁰⁴ Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2006). The neofunctionalists were (almost) right: politicization and European integration. *The diversity of democracy: Corporatism, social order and political conflict*, 205-222.

⁷⁰⁵ Özoflu, M. A. (2017). *Rethinking European integration process in the light of crises* (Master's thesis).

⁷⁰⁶ Theodoropoulou, S., *ob.cit.*, p. 43.

⁷⁰⁷ Kazamias A., (2019, July 5). *Syriza betrayed its principles and the Greek people. Its days are numbered*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/05/syriza-greek-alexis-tsipras-eu-imposed-austerity-polls>. (Accessed on 15.12.2020).

⁷⁰⁸ Michailidou, A. (2017). 'The Germans are back': Euroscepticism and anti-Germanism in crisis-stricken Greece. *National Identities*, 19(1), 91-108.

⁷⁰⁹ Ergin, N. E., *ob.cit.*, p. 23.

had a highly constraining effect on the counter-crisis measures and reforms which limited the room for maneuver for the political elites.⁷¹⁰ Moreover, anti-European sentiments found a ground to be widely articulated within the national political settings of the member states. Overall, while the formulated solutions under the shadow of the harsh public reactions and sharp political disagreements and divergences prevented the Greek bankruptcy, and secure its membership in the eurozone, they did not regenerate the European solidarity either. In this respect, the euro crisis unveiled the EU's inability to forge an immediate coherent response to the crisis.

6.3. Euro as a symbol of the European Identity

The introduction of the common currency is referred to as both an economic and political initiative since the ambitious project related to the sovereignty of the member states aims to foster the emergence of a European identity as well.⁷¹¹ In this respect, beyond just being an economic integration project, it has been also praised and promoted as a symbol of the collective identity of the Europeans including the ordinary European citizens as well as national and European political elites.⁷¹² Risse argues that the introduction of the common currency, which makes Europe a real political entity, has affected the citizens' identification with the EU and Europe in general by boosting the visibility of Brussels in the eyes of the European public.⁷¹³ Besides, using the same currency boosts the people's identification with the ingroup of the European identity as a source of solidarity among strangers. Negri and et.al. point out that Euro is one of the valid ways of identity making towards building an imagined community of Europeans.⁷¹⁴ Their research conducted on 26 EU countries by using a dynamic panel data model to investigate the introduction of the Euro on the European identity showed that there has been a 3 percent decrease in the share of people identifying themselves exclusively with their nation.⁷¹⁵ The conclusion of the research is attributed as small but still significant in proving the importance of the common currency for generating the incremental sense of belonging of the people to the European community.

The fact that the Euro is regarded as one of the important symbols of the European identity by being beyond just a 'currency' is a critical starting point for such research to understand the reason why the economic crisis turned into an 'identity' crisis. Moreover, it

⁷¹⁰ Vilpišauskas, R., *ob.cit.*, p.372.

⁷¹¹ Buscha, F., Muller, D., & Page, L. (2017). Can a common currency foster a shared social identity across different nations? The case of the euro. *European Economic Review*, 100, 318-336.

⁷¹² Calligaro, O. (2013). *Negotiating Europe: EU promotion of Europeanness since the 1950s*. Springer.

⁷¹³ Risse, T. (2003). The Euro between national and European identity. *Journal of European public policy*, 10(4), 487-505.

⁷¹⁴ Negri, F., Nicoli, F., & Kuhn, T. (2020). Common currency, common identity? The impact of the Euro introduction on European identity. *European Union Politics*, 1465116520970286.

⁷¹⁵ *Ibid.*

helps understand the importance of the crisis for the in-group of the European identity. This is because, in addition to the utility-based considerations articulated by the political and media discourse in justifying the bailing-out mechanism as a response to the crisis, identity-based considerations were also laid on highly to the thesis of the euro as the common value of the Union. For example, the *Die Welt* headline “The Euro makes us a community of fate.”⁷¹⁶ Or statements by the *Süddeutsche*, “The euro zone, with its twelve members today, represents a unique experiment. It unites states with very different political and economic traditions into a common destiny.”⁷¹⁷ clarify the importance of the Euro in the making of the EU as a community in building up a common fate. Political leaders such as then Chancellor Merkel and then Financial Minister Schäuble frequently highlighted the idea of the European Community as a project for common fate, common future, and responsibility.

“The euro is our common fate and Europe is our common future... This year we found out what constitutes the core of the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union: that Europe is a community of responsibility... This responsibility now has to be met together... The reason for our actions is the magnificent idea of the Europe...”⁷¹⁸ (Angela Merkel)

“... [The euro] is part of the European identity...”⁷¹⁹ (Angela Merkel)

Through utilizing topoi of reality and definition, Merkel demonstrated the origins of German interpretation of European identity and its commitment to the ingroup. Accordingly, the excerpt above as one of the examples of the *Schicksalsrede* (speech of fate) has implied the political discourse strongly attached to the idea of the European togetherness and Europe as *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* (community of fate), which was often utilized as a part of the German national identity after the Second World War (WWII). European integration has been/is regarded as historical responsibility for Germans. Such responsibility comes in the form of historical lessons drawn from the devastating Nazi past of the country. Thus, political actors often did stick to the commitment to European integration in their political statements during both of the crises. In this respect, German interpretation of European identity is often reconstructed and revived in different discourses.

⁷¹⁶ Greive, V.M., (2010, April 2). Der Euro macht uns zur Schicksalsgemeinschaft. *Die Welt*. <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article6988548/Der-Euro-macht-uns-zur-Schicksalsgemeinschaft.html>. (Accessed on 17.12.2020).

⁷¹⁷ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. (2010, April 20). Der Schulden-Pakt. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/kommentar-der-schulden-pakt-1.90760>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020)

⁷¹⁸ Merkel, A. (2010). Gemeinsam in Verantwortung für Europa. Speech on European summit to the German Bundestag. <https://www.bundestag.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/gemeinsam-in-verantwortung-fuer-europa-391634>. (Accessed on 18.12.2020).

⁷¹⁹ *Die Welt*. (2011, July 17). Kanzlerin Merkel beschwichtigt die deutschen Sparer. <https://www.welt.de/finanzen/article13492115/Kanzlerin-Merkel-beschwichtigt-die-deutschen-Sparer.html> (Accessed on 18.12.2020).

The demonstrated pro-European stance formed a solid ground during the Euro crisis especially because Germany has been financially doing well in contrast to indebted member states. In this respect, it opened up a leeway to show German attachment to Europe. Euro, which is referred to as the core of the Union by Merkel implies the same mentality of the origins of the European idea implying to the Franco-German reconciliation which necessitated both sides to demonstrate necessary responsibility and commitment. Germany's cause of European commitment of Germany was also found in the media discourse as well:

“...a German government that earlier generations in Europe could only dream of. A chancellor who - despite all the differences - coordinates so closely with the French president...a Germany that is striving for even closer cooperation and thus also renouncing its own sovereignty is a Germany that works in harmony with the founding spirit of the EU...”⁷²⁰ (Sueddeutsche Zeitung)

The excerpt above utilizes topoi of definition while explaining Germany's strong levels of attachment to European integration. The historical Franco-German reconciliation became an important part of the construction of the European identity in demonstrating the commitment and coordination during the debates about 'saving Euro' between Merkel and Sarkozy. The partnership of two actors will be addressed in detail by the later part addressing the German hegemony. In this respect, the possible solutions offering further economic integration such as common fiscal union were justified through the founding spirit of the EU which reflects giving up member states' sovereignty in the cause of European unity. While the euro crisis provided a solid ground for German demonstration of its loyalty to the Europe, it is of critical importance to assess the weight of the European unity against the given time frame of the crisis. Such discourses began to be articulated incrementally especially following July 2012 onwards when there appeared a possible spillover effect of the crisis. Accordingly, the initial unwillingness was, in fact, replaced by the demonstrated willingness to save the euro against such a threat of the possible spillover to the other susceptible economies of the eurozone first and the whole eurozone eventually.

While both sides of the political spectrum (left/right) acknowledge their attachment to the European integration through presenting their commitment to the Euro, the new political

⁷²⁰ Fried, N., (2011, December 3). Merkel ist nicht Bismarck. Süddeutsche Zeitung. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/deutschlands-rolle-in-der-eurokrise-merkel-ist-nicht-bismarck-1.1225309>. (Accessed on 20.12.2020).

party, Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD- Alternative for Germany) established in the middle of the Euro crisis in 2013 adopted a rather different understanding of European integration and the Euro:

“...we all want European integration, and we all want the internal market” and that the “[preservation of] the project of European unification in the tradition of Adenauer, Schmidt, Genscher and Kohl [was] one of the key ambitions of the AfD... Common currency represents an “historic mistake...”⁷²¹ (Bernd Lucke)

As it is implied by Bernd Lucke’s speech at the Founding Congress of the AfD, the party was originally founded as an anti-Euro party rather than Eurosceptic as a whole. Party’s attachment to the European unification was stated by utilizing the topoi of history referring to the post-war conciliation led by the EU’s German founding fathers. In this way, the founding narrative of the EU was reinforced. On the other hand, through employing topoi of threat, the introduction of the Euro is framed as a threat to the ingroup of Europeans formed upon the European unification and achievements of the post-war European peace since WWII. Chatzopoulou regards the establishment of the AfD as one of the politically most critical consequences of the Euro crisis in Germany.⁷²² Although AfD emerged as an anti-Euro but pro-European party, it gradually evolved and shifted into a populist radical right party. In fact, from the outset, there was an ideological division between the ordoliberal (position represented by the founder of Bernd Lucke) and national conservatives. Such divide was also representing the in-group differentiation between soft Eurosceptics having a West German profile and radical Eurosceptics having the East German profile.⁷²³

Following Lucke’s resignation in 2015, the party followed a more authoritarian and national conservative stance to attract its voters.⁷²⁴ The ideological reorientation of the party started to take place especially in the face of the incremental decline of the saliently contested position of the ‘common currency’ within the EU.⁷²⁵ The emergence of the refugee crisis provided another window of opportunity for the party in replacement of the ‘critique of the Euro’. Accordingly, the party subsequently radicalized amid the harsh political debates during the refugee crisis. Accordingly, the party subsequently radicalized amid the harsh debates during the refugee crisis. The success of the party during the federal elections of 2017 in

⁷²¹ Lucke, B. (2013). Speech Delivered at the Founding Congress of the Alternative for Germany in Berlin. <https://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Rede-Bernd-Lucke.pdf> (Accessed on 19.11. 2020).

⁷²² Conrad, M. (2020). From the Eurozone Debt Crisis to the Alternative for Germany. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 2, 4.

⁷²³ Jankowski, M., Schneider, S., & Tepe, M. (2017). Ideological alternative? Analyzing Alternative für Deutschland candidates’ ideal points via black box scaling. *Party Politics*, 23(6), 704-716., p. 705.

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁵ Schmitt-Beck, R. (2017). The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the electorate’: between single-issue and right-wing populist party. *German Politics*, 26(1), 124-148.

particularly five East German States where there are high levels of unemployment and stark ingroup-outgroup distinction⁷²⁶ coming from the past, needs to be given further importance by the literature.

6.4. Arising Greek otherness

As it is already clarified, on the one hand, the crisis opened a window both to show Germany's historical responsibility for commitment and solidarity with Europe. On the other hand, it also provided a new leeway for the different interpretations of the crisis and meaning of the solidarity within the ingroup of Europeans. This was at the expense of the traditional German commitment to European unification. In addition/parallel to the initial unwillingness to take responsibility for the crisis, during the course of crisis normalization debates were unleashed in Germany, which had become prominent following the reunification of Germany and Gerhard Schröder's term of office respectively. Proissl regards reunification as the reason for Germany's falling out of love with Europe on the grounds that the country has become less prosperous because of the reunification which deemed national interests to prevail in EU-related matters.⁷²⁷ The so-called normalization realized itself through the articulation of the national identity and interests-based discourse.⁷²⁸ Therefore, it also implies the potential changes that may occur within the construction of the European identity discourse.

The so-called emergence of German aloofness can be traced within the basis of the conditional solidarity in exchange for the strict austerity, which challenges the established ideational structure of European group formation. As Frieden and Walter point out that the creditor-debtor divide during the crisis became the main source of identity cleavage within the community of Europeans.⁷²⁹ Limited level of solidarity between Germany and Greece is observed particularly during the initial phase of the crisis:

"It is about the future of our common currency, the future of the euro. The entire economic and monetary union stands or falls with the euro. The stability of the euro is one of the most pressing concerns of the citizens of our country...Greece is in a difficult position today and Greece's problems can affect the entire euro area. Many of these problems are homemade. The real situation in the country has been veiled for years and we can feel it today. ...But we don't issue blank checks. It is not an answer to the crisis if the taxpayers in Europe automatically have to answer for the wrongdoing of others, so to speak. That's

⁷²⁶ Pesthy, M., Mader, M., & Schoen, H. (2020). Why Is the AfD so Successful in Eastern Germany? An Analysis of the Ideational Foundations of the AfD Vote in the 2017 Federal Election. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 1-23.

⁷²⁷ Proissl, W. (2010). Why Germany fell out of love with Europe. *Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series*, 1., p.9.

⁷²⁸ Hyde-Price, A., & Jeffery, C. (2001). Germany in the European Union: constructing normality. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(4), 689-717., p. 698.

⁷²⁹ Frieden, J., & Walter, S. (2017). Understanding the political economy of the Eurozone crisis. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20, 371-390.

why Greece has to do its own homework. Help can only be the last resort if we have to protect our own currency.”⁷³⁰ (Guido Westerwelle)

In the excerpt above, then Foreign Affairs Minister Westerwelle demonstrated the Euro crisis as the problem of the Greeks who are the *wrongdoing* others through utilizing topoi of reality. Such othering of Greeks who are covertly accused by him for their inherent problems and national debts, reverberates the group differentiation between European taxpayers and Greeks failing to do their ‘homeworks’ within the upper level of European identity as an ingroup. The homework emphasis is used to isolate Greece from other countries in differentiating failed ‘Greek other’ from the Europeans to highlight the ‘self-inflicted’ nature of the Greek crisis. Defining the Greek crisis as a ‘special case’ within the eurozone is found also in Merkel’s statements although she insisted that it should not be left behind at the same time.⁷³¹ The emphasis on the Greek crisis as a special case can explain the general tendency to place Greece in the center of the in-group/out-group differentiation, although the crisis spilled over to other member states including Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, which is found out during the course of this study. ‘Greek crisis’ is represented as an example of ‘exceptionalism’ and against the traditional understanding of German interpretation of European identity which is conveyed to publicly legitimize the strict austerity packages.⁷³² The emphasis on the ‘self-caused’ nature of the crisis was also highlighted to avoid from criticisms of the systemic deficiencies of the EMU, even though attitudes later changed to initiate structural reforms for the EMU system.

Westerwelle’s statement exhibits also the topoi of definition implying the definition of being European is constructed member states’ being responsible for the general cause of the European community which is closely aligning with the German interpretation of European identity. In this way, Greece is politically peripheralized on the grounds that shared identity is understood as having and being loyal to shared norms, which are defined as cultural solidarity.⁷³³ The construction of the Europeans as a responsible community is closely related to the idea of the ‘good Europeans’, which became a part of the group differentiation within the ingroup of European identity during the Eurozone crisis. In Merkel’s statement, the good

⁷³⁰ Westerwelle, G. (2010). Deutschland in Europa – eine Standortbestimmung. Speech delivered at University of Bonn. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/100427-bm-d-in-europa/216090>. (Accessed on 20.12.2020).

⁷³¹ BBC News. (2012 January, 9). Greece debt: Merkel urges deal soon on second bailout <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-16466135>. (Accessed on 22.12.2020).

⁷³² Mylonas, Y. (2015). Austerity discourses in “Der Spiegel” magazine, 2009-2014. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society*, 13(2), 248-269.

⁷³³ For a detailed account on the cultural solidarity, see: Jones, E. , 2014. Identity and solidarity. In: E.Jones, A.Menon, and S.Weatherhill , ed. The Oxford Handbook of the European union . Oxford : Oxford University Press, 690–702.

European is defined as: “a good European is someone who respects the European treaties and the respective national law and thus helps to ensure that the stability of the eurozone and the entire European Union is not damaged.”⁷³⁴ The statement utilizing topoi of culture implied the necessity of German commitment -as Europeans- for the solution of the crisis. However, it also revealed the initial political dilemma of Germany between assuring the responsibility for the stability of the union and satisfying the domestic political context in complying with the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling. The emphasis of the respect to both European and national ‘law’ reinforces German understanding of European identity. In this way, it answers to the criticisms which put Germany’s commitment to the European project under question.

On the other side, the division between good Europeans and bad Europeans generally took the shape of national discursive conflict conceived within the media discourse especially between Germany as the main creditor and Greece as the main debtor. The fact that Greece, which had been already regarded as the periphery of Western Europe with its weakest link to the Euro, became the epicenter of the Euro crisis did not make the situation easier⁷³⁵. Rather the division is manifested through the construction of we as the community of Germans versus Greeks. The in-group/out-group differentiation appeared often in the form of reaction to the Greek media adopting anti-German discourse⁷³⁶ by portraying Germans as Nazis⁷³⁷ and austerity program as a social genocide⁷³⁸ and to Greek protests to the austerity packages. In this respect, as Lialiouti and Bithymitris argue crisis signified a moment that established stereotypes, factious memories and concepts became dramatically salient within both German and Greek discursive construction.⁷³⁹

For example, the Bild Newspaper, which adopted a firm critical stance towards the Federal government’s bailing-out policy on Greece, conducted almost an anti-Greek campaign

⁷³⁴Angela, M., (2010). Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zu den Hilfen für Griechenland, Government Declaration on the Aid for Greece. <https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/regierungserklaerung-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-zu-den-hilfen-fuer-griechenland-1122362>. (Accessed on 23.12.2020).

⁷³⁵ Mylonas, Y. (2012). Media and the economic crisis of the EU: The ‘culturalization’ of a systemic crisis and Bild-Zeitung’s framing of Greece. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society*, 10(2), 646-671., p. 653.

⁷³⁶ For a detailed account of Germany’s representation in Greek media, see: Lialiouti, Z., & Bithymitris, G. (2017). A nation under attack: perceptions of enmity and victimhood in the context of the Greek crisis. *National identities*, 19(1), 53-71.

⁷³⁷ Bild. (2011, June 20). Nazi-Plakate bei Demo in Athen: Und DIE wollen UNSER geld?. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-krise/griechenland-krise-milliarden-fuer-athen-und-nazi-plakate-als-dankeschoen-18443154.bild.html>. (Accessed on 23.12.2020).

⁷³⁸ Dümer, V., Spyropoulou, I., Merholz, A., & Ronzheimer, P. (2015, July 16). PARLAMENTSPRÄSIDENTIN IN ATHEN» Der Euro-Deal führt zu einem Völkermord. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/athen/das-protokoll-der-abstimmung-41809902.bild.html>. (Accessed on 24.12.2020)

⁷³⁹ Lialiouti, Z., & Bithymitris, G. (2013). Crisis, hegemony and the media. The case of SKAI/Kathimerini. *Greek Political Science Review*, 40, 139-173.

accusing Greeks of having a luxury lifestyle,⁷⁴⁰ lacking saving discipline⁷⁴¹ in a bankrupt and deceived state with irresponsible politicians falsifying the statistics, inefficient system, and institutions.⁷⁴² These anti-Greek sentiments were further reinforced by the sensational headlines and statements such as “Bye, Euro! Bild gives back the drachmas to the bankrupt Greeks,”⁷⁴³ “We pay, and they abuse us, finally kick the Greeks out of the euro!”⁷⁴⁴ (topos of reality/topos of threat) “Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, he wants to protect taxpayers from Greek debts.”⁷⁴⁵ (topos of threat), “The Greeks, Save up? How so? You'd rather strike!”⁷⁴⁶ (topos of culture), “The comeback of the beggar Greek!”⁷⁴⁷ “Greeks broke again? Crisis phone call! Tsipras pumps Merkel”⁷⁴⁸, “Our billions for the bankrupt states. In return, the guilty sinners could sit back comfortably and continue to live beyond their means. True to the motto: Germans pay.”⁷⁴⁹ However, this was not to imply German estrangement from the ingroup of the European identity. On the contrary, the German Europeanness and their sense of belonging to the European community were not questioned:

“Yes, the euro is a godsend! Yes, the euro guarantees peace, our prosperity. Yes, the exit from the euro should never be an issue for us Germans. But the “rescue package” for the euro is Europe's fall from grace! For ten years we Germans toiled for a stable euro, made sacrifices... We footed the bill - while others could shamelessly party at our expense! The others have incurred debts beyond measure, we have to tighten our belts for it!”⁷⁵⁰ (Bild)

⁷⁴⁰ Ronzheimer, P. (2010, April 26). BILD BEI DEN PLEITE-GRIECHEN: Krise? Welche Krise?. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/machen-weiter-wie-bisher-von-krise-keine-spur-12327120.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020); Hoeren, D. & Santen, U. O. (2010, April 27). STREIT UM MILLIARDEN-HILFE: Warum zahlen wir den Griechen ihre Luxus-Renten?. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/wir-zahlen-luxus-rente-mit-milliarden-hilfe-12338430.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴¹ Bild. (2010, April 27). GRIECHENLAND MUSS MIT DEM SPAREN ERNST MACHEN: Griechen kämpfen um 130-Milliarden-Hilfe! <https://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/griechenland-krise/griechen-kaempfen-um-130-milliarden-hilfe-22262244.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020)

⁷⁴² Ronzheimer, P. (2010, April 26). BILD BEI DEN PLEITE-GRIECHEN: Krise? Welche Krise?. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/machen-weiter-wie-bisher-von-krise-keine-spur-12327120.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴³ Ronzheimer, P., & Kalozois, G. (2010, April 27). TSCHÜS, EURO!: BILD gibt den Pleite-Griechen die Drachmen zurück. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/bild-gibt-den-pleite-griechen-die-drachmen-zurueck-12338432.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴⁴ Laubach, F.S. (2012, February 2). WIR ZAHLEN UND SIE BEPÖBELN UNS: Schmeißt die Griechen endlich aus dem Euro! Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-krise/schmeisst-die-griechen-endlich-aus-dem-euro-22678402.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴⁵ Hellemann, A., & Lambeck, M.S. (2011, July 16). BUNDESBANK-PRÄSIDENT JENS WEIDMANN: Er will Steuerzahler vor Griechen-Schulden schützen. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/griechenland-krise/bundesbank-praesident-warnt-vor-griechenland-umschuldung-18899388.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴⁶ Bild. (2010, April 27). DIE GRIECHEN: Sparen? Wieso? Sie streiken lieber!. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/noch-nichts-gelernt-streik-wutwelle-der-bild-de-leser-12342820.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴⁷ Spyropoulou I. & Tiede, P. (2016, October 20). TSIPRAS WILL SCHULDENSCHNITT VON MERKEL: Das Comeback des Bettel-Griechen. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-krise/tsipras-fordert-schuldenschnitt-von-merkel-48381684.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴⁸ Spyropoulou I. & Tiede, P. (2016, April 20). GRIECHEN SCHON WIEDER PLEITE?: Krisen-Telefonat! Tsipras pumpt Merkel an. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/alexis-tsipras/pumpt-merkel-an-45453124.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁴⁹ Schäfer, J.W. (2011, August 15). Europas Zahlmeister. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/news/standards/bild-kommentar/europas-zahlmeister-19412898.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

⁷⁵⁰ Koch, E. (2010 May 10). Rettet den Euro!. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/news/standards/kommentar-von-einar-koch-12498920.bild.html>. (Accessed on 25.12.2020).

The excerpt above taken from Bild's newspaper article strengthened the Germans' group identification with the European community through topos of reality and definition while praising the importance of the euro for the in-group. Thus, identification with European identity is observable. Rather than the decrease in the German sense of belonging, the othering of the indebted countries from the ingroup of European identity prevails. To construct otherness of the indebted countries, topos of culture is utilized that culminated in the group differentiation between those living beyond their means and we sacrificed for the ingroup as a committed member of the eurozone.

Description of Greece as having the contrast economic behavior of the ingroup of European communities as valued by the Germans is present also within the discourse of Die Welt and Süddeutsche Zeitung. Accordingly, they often labeled Greeks as "Euro debt sinner,"⁷⁵¹ "Greece's fiscal sloppiness"⁷⁵², "guilty sinner,"⁷⁵³ "debt sinner,"⁷⁵⁴ or "clammy Greece".⁷⁵⁵ Accordingly, these kinds of labeling reveal Germans' interpretation of the European identity which is defined by Galpin as member states' having firm compliance with the fiscal discipline within the framework of ordoliberal ethics and consent to the European community rules.⁷⁵⁶ In this sense, stereotyping and labeling employing topoi of threat constructing Greeks as the other of and a threat to the European identity are justified through the ordoliberal thinking based on the monetary stability, economic morality, and budgetary discipline⁷⁵⁷ injected into the European community since the establishment of the EMU. Therefore, German solidarity within the in-group of European community should be understood within the limits of the 'ordoliberal solidarity' demanding reciprocal responsibility from Greece which is represented as non-European enough if not the complete other. Accordingly, the Greek counter-austerity attitude, stress protests, and referendum on austerity packages laid another basis for the

⁷⁵¹ Süddeutsche Zeitung. (2010, April 14). Griechenland: Lehren aus dem Desaster: Schutz und Sühne. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/griechenland-lehren-aus-dem-desaster-schutz-und-suehne-1.3334> (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁵² Süddeutsche Zeitung. (2010, April 20). Deutschland lebt unter seinen Verhältnissen. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik-deutschland-lebt-unter-seinen-verhaeltnissen-1.942761> (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁵³ Gammelin, C. (2011, September 28). Schuldenkrise in Europa: Wie ein Sixpack ein zweites Griechenland verhindern soll. Süddeutsche Zeitung. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/schuldenkrise-in-europa-wie-ein-sixpack-ein-zweites-griechenland-verhindern-soll-1.1151866>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁵⁴ Kremp, V.H., (2010, May 18). Schuldensünder schröpfen die soliden Staaten. Die Welt. <https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article7685879/Schuldensuender-schroepfen-die-soliden-Staaten.html>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁵⁵ M. Winter, M. & Hulverscheidt, C. (2010, May 21). Kampf gegen Spekulanten: 560 Milliarden für klamme Euro-Staaten. Süddeutsche Zeitung. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/kampf-gegen-spekulanten-560-milliarden-fuer-klamme-euro-staaten-1.941498>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁵⁶ Galpin, C. (2017). *The Euro crisis and European identities: Political and media discourse in Germany, Ireland and Poland*. Springer., p.116.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.118.

construction of the Greek otherness failing to comply with the values of the community as the ‘failed other’:

“How do you want to explain to German taxpayers that they should help if Greece doesn't save?”⁷⁵⁸ (Hans-Werner Sinn)

“It is absolutely legitimate for the Greek citizens to decide in a referendum... The core question is: yes or no to remaining in the eurozone... If the Greek citizens commit themselves to the offer of the states of the European Economic and Monetary Union, then the members of the euro zone will and must of course be ready to continue and conclude the negotiations; this is also completely clear to the federal government. ...One can only appeal to the Greek government to reflect, so to speak, on the principles and rules of a common Europe. These first consist of mutual trust and respect as well as joint action based on partnership. In any case, negotiations between the eurozone and the Greek government were guided by these principles. If, from our point of view, the referendum fails, i.e., if you decide against the offers, then I think, however, ...that is a clear decision against staying in the euro.”⁷⁵⁹ (Sigmar Gabriel)

“I say Oxi on Friday [Bundestag voting for third aid package for Greece on 17.07.2015] because we made a promise in 1998 before the euro was introduced: No country is liable for the debts of another country!”⁷⁶⁰ (Bild)

The first two excerpts above reveal the general attitude of the German political discourse putting an emphasis on the necessity of Greek compliance to formulated austerity programs in exchange for the bail-out packages. Greek compliance with the austerity packages is constructed as their demonstration of the commitment to the European values and norms constituting the basics of the ordoliberal ethic of the ingroup of the European community. Therefore, the reactions and protests to the austerity packages in Greece are interpreted as Greek incompatibility with the founding principles of the European identity. In this context, the group differentiation was triggered between Greeks, who regard austerity packages as imposed by the others, and Germans who are put in a position to pay the debts of the others. In this way, two imagined community of discontent Europeans within the upper level of the European identity was constructed.

The first excerpt utilizes the topoi of threat/ danger to implicitly refer to protecting the money of the ‘German taxpayers’ from Greeks who are deemed to comply with the austerity since they failed the European community. Topoi of threat/danger are used to construct irresponsible Greeks as a threat to the German taxpayers’ money. Othering through the

⁷⁵⁸ Süddeutsche Zeitung. (2010, May 21). Notopfer Griechenland: Noch teurer als gedacht. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/notopfer-griechenland-noch-teurer-als-gedacht-1.937977>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁵⁹ Gabriel, S., (2015, June 29). Press Conference from Chancellor Merkel and Finance Minister Gabriel. <https://m.bundestkanzlerin.de/bkinm-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenz-von-bundestkanzlerin-merkel-und-bundeswirtschaftsminister-gabriel-844308>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁶⁰ Kain, F., Mössbauer, K., Krüger, L. & Schuler, R. (2015, July 14). GRIECHENLAND-KRISE: Jetzt sagen WIR mal OXI!. Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-krise/jetzt-sagen-wir-mal-oxi-41787476.bild.html>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

articulation of the ‘German taxpayers’ is closely related to the neo-liberal thinking that hard-working taxpayer is entitled to benefit from specific services.⁷⁶¹ In this context, the demand for austerity from Greece is constructed as the right of the hard-working German taxpayers by utilizing topoi of definition. In this way, the so-called austerity imposition is justified and group differentiation between German taxpayers as ‘good Europeans’ versus irresponsible riot Greeks as ‘bad Europeans’ is established. Accordingly, the rights of the hard-working taxpayers are constructed to be protected from the lazy others. The appraisal of the disciplined and hard-working German taxpayers is placed often against Greeks represented as bankrupt and economic immoral of the European community within in-group/out-group differentiation. The culturally oriented explanations⁷⁶² of the crisis often address the issue as cultural racism that implicitly accuses ‘consumerist’ ‘Greek character’ by having ontological shortcomings.⁷⁶³ Such a basis in fact generates the differentiation between North and South Europeans. In referring to all the indebted (Southern) countries, Matthijs and McNamara call the group differentiation between the core and periphery within the in-group of European identity as the division between northern saints and southern sinners.⁷⁶⁴

Quoted in Bild Zeitung, Merkel brought about the same mentality in desire of the neo-liberal restructuring the southern EU member states: “It's not also about the fact that in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, you can't retire earlier than in Germany, but also that everyone makes a little effort - that's important.”⁷⁶⁵ In her statements, topoi of culture are employed as a way to construct southern countries public policy and their attitude as the root causes of the crisis. Harvey describes crises as the moments when radical reconfigurations can be injected into the particular structures of the states.⁷⁶⁶ In this respect, the crisis served as a basis for capitalism to correct itself by envisaging the reconfiguration of the system, which is called as shock therapy by Klein.⁷⁶⁷ Merkel's statement implying the restructuring attempt is criticized by Streeck on the grounds that EU's core countries impose neo-liberal reform and austerity programs to donor-countries through the loaning mechanism by curbing the democratic sovereignty and citizens rights.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶¹Basu, L., Schifferes, S., & Knowles, S. (Eds.). (2018). *The media and austerity: Comparative perspectives*. Routledge.

⁷⁶² Žižek, S., *op.cit.*, p. 86.

⁷⁶³Mylonas, Y. (2012)., *ob.cit.*

⁷⁶⁴ Matthijs, M., & McNamara, K. (2015). The euro crisis' theory effect: northern saints, southern sinners, and the demise of the Eurobond. *Journal of European Integration*, 37(2), 229-245.

⁷⁶⁵Bild. (2011, May 19). MERKEL ERHÖHT DRUCK AUF EUROPAS SCHULDENSTAATEN: Griechen sollen weniger Urlaub machen. <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/griechenland-krise/griechen-sollen-weniger-urlaub-machen-17973738.bild.html>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁶⁶ David, H. (2010). *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism*.

⁷⁶⁷Klein, N. (2007). *The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism*. Macmillan.

⁷⁶⁸ Streeck, W. (2016). The rise of the European consolidation state. *Policy change under new democratic capitalism*, 39-58.

The second excerpt is related to the articulation of legitimacy debates in Greece which accuses of EU -and Germany- being the perpetrator of harsh austerity conditions and of the main policy directions. While acknowledging the referendum as citizens' say in the public policy, through employing topoi of definition Gabriel emphasizes austerity-solidarity linkage to which Germans are strongly committed as the basics of the 'mutual trust and respect as well as joint action based on partnership'. Such framing of the solution to the crisis in relation to the construction of the European identity is related to the fact that the political actors' actions and decisions should be grounded in the domestic political culture and beliefs based upon the ordoliberal ethics within the German example. The obedience of the rules of common Europe is the way to demonstrate the Europeanness of Greece. In this way, the excerpt questions the Greek Europeanness which is constructed as an answer which will be given by the results of the referendum to approve bail-out. He also refers to the likelihood of the Grexit debates which would have been brought by the negative outcome of the referendum by using topoi of reality.

The last excerpt adopts a strong attachment to the European foundation values which is in high compliance with the German definition of European identity. In this respect, topoi of definition are used to show German attitude towards bailing out which is justified by their commitment to the foundational norms of the ingroup of European identity. This in fact reveals the fact that manifestations of the European identity construction did not move to be alienated from the in-group of the European identity, rather they reproduce their strong attachment to the in-group in a German way of understanding the European identity. In sum, the ideal European self is represented as everything that Greece is not / cannot be. Greece is constructed and othered as the failed while Germany is highlighted to be stuck to the basics of the European identity which generates the ingroup favoritism of the German national identity at the expense of the outgroup discrimination of the Greeks within the upper level of European identity.

6.5. Saving Greeks equals saving Euro

The initial German reluctance to Greek bailout both in the media and in the political discourse is presented, although it also became clear that the criticisms continued if not dramatically increased throughout the crisis. However, the change within the political discourse of the German ruling elites regarding the bail-out was observed although it was still accompanied by the mantra of "austerity plus more rules".⁷⁶⁹ Galpin highlights that the change in the political discourse happened following the Federal Constitutional Court's ruling that the

⁷⁶⁹ Blyth, M., & Matthijs, M. (2012). The world waits for Germany. *Foreign Affairs*, 8.

Greek bailout was found compliant with the German Basic Law.⁷⁷⁰ However, the discursive construction of the ‘keeping the Euro at all cost’⁷⁷¹ solution appeared as a challenge to Merkel since bailing out was still unpopular in the eyes of half of the German population as well.⁷⁷² Moreover, there was the pressure of the media especially the Bild newspaper as a reaction to the increasing anti-German sentiments because of Germany’s policy preferences. Thus, German political elites necessitated finding ground of reasoning to bail-out.

They were in the position of the dilemma between practically utile yet politically difficult options available. The quotation from Thompson’s valuable research clarifies the situation well, “The more practically beneficial option of periphery bailouts appeared more domestically politically difficult.”⁷⁷³ Therefore, European identity construction with relevance to the framing and legitimizing the formulation of the solutions to the crisis has gained remarkable importance. To a certain extent, this was achieved through the representation of the ‘Greek crisis as European crisis’. In a close link with the Euro presented as the concrete building block of the European identity, the discourses are attached to the theses of German historical obligation to European commitment in overcoming its Nazi past as the historical other of the Europeans. Hertner and Miskimmon argue that Germany’s post-war identity construction was informed by the importance of the German and European unification which was represented as the ‘two sides of the same coin’ by Helmut Kohl to tie the fate of Germany to Europe and vice versa.⁷⁷⁴

The political and media discourses uttered in framing the crisis in relation to the common fate of the European community have been usually within this line equating the Euro with the foundations of the European idea. Saving the Euro is associated with a matter of protecting the foundations of the European idea. Such vision was stated by Merkel: “It’s about nothing more and nothing less than the preservation and validation of the European idea.”⁷⁷⁵ In the same direction, one of the most prominent utterances motivated to prove the commitment to the common fate was Merkel’s statement during her speech at the Charlemagne Prize Award

⁷⁷⁰ Galpin, C. (2017). *The Euro crisis and European identities: Political and media discourse in Germany, Ireland and Poland*. Springer.

⁷⁷¹ Jurado, I., Walter, S., Konstantinidis, N., & Dinas, E. (2020). Keeping the euro at any cost? Explaining attitudes toward the euro-austerity trade-off in Greece. *European Union Politics*, 21(3), 383-405.

⁷⁷² Bild. (2011, September 11). Athen kann sparaufgaben wohl nicht erfüllen: Jeder 2. Deutsche will Griechen pleitegehen lassen. <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-krise/jeder-zweite-deutsche-will-griechenland-pleite-gehen-lassen-19889856.bild.html> (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁷³ Thompson, H. (2015). Germany and the Euro-zone crisis: The European reformation of the German banking crisis and the future of the Euro. *New Political Economy*, 20(6), 851-870., p. 859.

⁷⁷⁴ Hertner, I., & Miskimmon, A. (2015). Germany’s Strategic Narrative of the Eurozone Crisis. *German politics and society*, 33(1), 42-57., p. 46.

⁷⁷⁵ Angela, M., (2010). Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zu den Hilfen für Griechenland, Government Declaration on the Aid for Greece. <https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/regierungserklaerung-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-zu-den-hilfen-fuer-griechenland-1122362>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

Ceremony: “If Euro fails, then Europe fails.”⁷⁷⁶ Kim describes the rhetoric framing the crisis as the discourse of ‘Alternativlosigkeit’ Alternative-less,⁷⁷⁷ which is connected to the establishment of the right-wing party under the name of ‘Alternative for Germany’. This alternative-less evokes topoi of threat/danger to the constructed community of ‘Schicksal’ (fate). In this way, the statement aimed to regenerate the domestic sense of belongingness to and identification with the ingroup of European identity that would rationalize formulated responses to the crisis in invoking the collective European response. Accordingly, while the ingroup of European identity is aimed to be boosted, topoi of threat/danger are often utilized in constructing the ‘Vereinigung des Schicksals’ (a union of destiny) by the government policy statements as well: “More is at stake than just helping Greece. The stability of the euro itself is at stake.”⁷⁷⁸. In this direction, the bailout decisions were usually grounded in the debates of common fate and future of the common currency of the in-group which was also existent within the left-leaning media discourse:

“No topic will influence life in Germany more than the future of the Euro in the long term. No task is more important than securing a common European future. The country owes Konrad Adenauer its ties to the West, Willy Brandt for its Ostpolitik, Helmut Kohl for reunification, and the euro.”⁷⁷⁹ (Angela Merkel)

Through the utilization of topoi of history, the excerpt above constructs the European community as a union of destiny. Achievements of German founding fathers for European integration is represented as at stake because of the crisis. Preserving the European reunification is hinged on Germany's taking responsibility for saving the historical achievements of the founding fathers as the nation's historical commitment not only to Europe but also its German founding fathers. Accordingly saving the euro is equated with saving the achievements of European integration. In this way, the post-war duties of Germany that build its national identity against in close line with the European identity that is built on the ‘common future’ was reminded. The fate of the euro linked closely with the fate of the European project was also explained by Germany’s national interests. As the EU’s largest beneficiary and the architect of

⁷⁷⁶ Angela M., (2010b). Speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel on Awarding of the International Charlemagne Prize to Prime Minister Tusk. <https://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundestkanzlerin-angela-merkel-zur-verleihung-des-internationalen-karlspreises-an-premierminister-tusk-319910>. (Accessed on 26.12.2020).

⁷⁷⁷ Kim, S. (2017). The populism of the Alternative for Germany (AfD): an extended Essex School perspective. *Palgrave communications*, 3(1), 1-11.

⁷⁷⁸ The Federal Government of Germany. (2010, May 7) Press Article on *Euro Stability*: Rescue package for Greece adopted. <https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-en/articles/rescue-package-for-greece-adopted-474098>. (Accessed on 27.12.2020).

⁷⁷⁹ Braun, S., (2011, August 30). Schwarz-Gelb und Europa:Raus aus der Defensive. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/schwarz-gelb-und-europa-raus-aus-der-defensive-1.1136601>. (Accessed on 27.12.2020).

the common currency alongside France, this appeared as no surprise.⁷⁸⁰ In this respect, the EU's merits for German national economic interests were praised:

“The euro is our common currency. As the largest economy in Europe, a country like Germany may have benefited more than others from the euro. It is hard to imagine if this euro had not existed in the international financial and economic crisis, how many purchases of other currencies, and how many currency crises we would have had in various European countries.”⁷⁸¹ (Angela Merkel)

“Everything we have done and will do serves the goal of protecting our currency, our economic power, and thus our prosperity... Without a united Europe, without the large internal market with 500 million Europeans, even a large and strong country like Germany would not be able to cope with the challenges of globalization and competition with the world's new powerhouses in Asia and Latin America. That is why the Federal Government will continue its policy of protecting our currency and maintaining our prosperity.”⁷⁸² (Guido Westerwelle)

The excerpts above employ topos of definition to refer to Europe as a space for prosperity while elucidating the instrumental function of the German membership to the ingroup of the European community. In this way, German national economic benefits from the single currency and common European market are highlighted to portray Germany as the ‘Euro winner’. Accordingly, along with the historical commitment to the European project, utilitarian considerations of the integration are also used to rationalize bailing-out to southern European member states. The common European space for prosperity intends to trigger the ingroup favoritism over others of Europe. Diez argues that a particular identity for the EU is established through the discourse of turning third countries into others.⁷⁸³ In this vein, Westerwelle utilizes topoi of threat/danger in referring to globalization and competition. His argument is developed further by constructing the European economy as a shield against its others, countries in Asia and Latin America. Therefore, saving the Euro for the sake of protecting the common European prosperity is explained as in the best interests of the Germans. In this respect, the predominance of the German national interests is tied to the EU as an economic entity that assures and achieves fostering the community of common interests. Die Welt quotes the then Finance minister Schäuble's statements defining the euro as a success story: “The euro is a success story... Our economic performance, our good job market would not be so good without the euro, we would

⁷⁸⁰ Hertner, I., & Miskimmon, A. (2015). Germany's Strategic Narrative of the Eurozone Crisis. *German politics and society*, 33(1), 42-57., p. 49.

⁷⁸¹ Merkel, A., (2011, March 23). Speech by Chancellor Merkel at Frankfurt Finance Summit 2011. <https://m.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkinm-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-angela-merkel-anlaesslich-des-frankfurt-finance-summit-2011-794472>. (Accessed on 27.12.2020).

⁷⁸² Westerwelle, G., (2011, October 16) Interview with Bild. <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/guido-westerwelle/wie-viele-schulden-muessen-wir-griechenland-erlassen-20480670.bild.html>. (Accessed on 28.12.2020)

⁷⁸³ Diez, T. (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe'. *Millennium*, 33(3), 613-636.

have a lot more unemployed people, we would have a lot less economic power.”⁷⁸⁴ Yet, the political discourse linking the German national economic interests to the European space as a community of common interest is faced with the criticisms:

“The euro rescue packages endanger the financial stability of the Federal Republic of Germany.” What flows to Greece and Portugal to maintain the standard of living there is at the expense of the standard of living in Germany. “The German pensioners will be among the first victims of the rescue package warned Sinn.”⁷⁸⁵ (Die Welt)

“The euro actually jeopardizes the peaceful co-existence of those European nations who are forced into sharing a common destiny by the Eurocracy among countries in Europe... The legacy of Europe’s history is the democratic rule of law and the peaceful co-existence of sovereign nation-states. The establishment of the Eurozone thus threatens to destroy this cultural heritage... AfD advocates an end to Germany’s continued participation in the mistaken rescue politics, which are economically and legally flawed....”⁷⁸⁶ (AfD)

In both excerpts above there is a clear group differentiation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in reporting the agreed austerity packages as a response to the euro crisis. Within the construction of such intragroup dynamics, opposition to German contribution to the bailout is reflected through the topos of danger/threat. Financial stability is one of the main ordoliberal values of Germany. Here it is necessary to point out that the high standard of living in Germany has been achieved thanks to the German economic culture including saving culture, technological innovation, organizational efficiency, and hard work which even bore the burden of German unification.⁷⁸⁷ The threat constructed by the first excerpt above is directed against Germany as a successful stable community. In this way, a new division between Germany and indebted countries is constructed. As already discussed in the earlier part, one of the prominent arguments of the critics of the bailout was the economic culture of the indebted countries especially Greece. The constructed group differentiation between German pensioners and indebted countries is often brought about by provoking questions of the media discourse such: “Why are we paying luxury pensions to Greek pensioners?”⁷⁸⁸ or “And in Germany more and

⁷⁸⁴ Die Welt. (2011, July 12). Schäuble bezeichnet Euro als "Erfolgsgeschichte". <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article13483670/Schaeuble-bezeichnet-Euro-als-Erfolgsgeschichte.html>. (Accessed on 28.12.2020).

⁷⁸⁵ Die Welt. (2011, July 5). Deutschland zahlt Grossteil der Griechenland-Hilfe. <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article13468034/Deutschland-zahlt-Grossteil-der-Griechenland-Hilfe.html>. (Accessed on 28.12.2020).

⁷⁸⁶ Alternative For Germany. Basic Programm. <https://www.afd.de/grundsatzprogramm/#englisch>. (Accessed on 29.12.2020).

⁷⁸⁷ Grimm, R. (2015). The rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland, between ordoliberal critique and popular anxiety. *International Political Science Review*, 36(3), 264-278., p.269.

⁷⁸⁸ Bild. (2010, April 27). Warum zahlen wir den Griechen ihre Luxus-Renten? <http://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/griechenland/wir-zahlen-luxus-rente-mit-milliarden-hilfe-12338430.bild.html>. (Accessed on 29.12.2020).

more citizens are asking: There is Money for Greeks. But when is there something for me, the ordinary taxpayer? ”⁷⁸⁹

The second excerpt adopts a different stance while criticizing the German contribution to the bailout. The instrumentalization of the past is utilized generally for community building within the nation-states.⁷⁹⁰ The second excerpt through topos of history constructs an alternative historical narrative to the European integration process based on the national sovereignty of the European states. Within such alternative instrumentalization of the past, the euro is represented as a threat to the European cultural heritage which is exemplified as based on the sovereignty of the European nation-states. Through directing sovereignty thesis in the center of the bailout criticisms through employing topos of danger/ threat, the common currency is interpreted as the flawed promoter of the common destiny. In terms of identity politics, such statements construct a different kind of Europe that is distracted from the formation of the European identity while they dismiss the common pressures and common imperatives of the Europeans in terms of economic calculations.

6.6. German Hegemony

Lübke-meier argues that collective goals for the EU are achieved by the willing and capable actors that presume co-leadership roles.⁷⁹¹ As already discussed, Germany has taken a major role during the bailout debates and eurozone summits, as the largest creditor. The historical Franco-German rapprochement became critically important also during the debates about ‘saving Euro’ where Sarkozy and Merkel tried to find a common ground for the crisis management. Together with France, Germany pushed the strict demand for austerity and reform framework of the eurozone. The repercussions of such collective leadership were the consolidation of Franco-German unity. In this sense, the foundational idea of European integration based on the Franco-German engine was reinforced. Süddeutsche newspaper discusses the Franco-German alliance by stating that “Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy demonstrate unity at their press conference and speak of ‘we’ instead of ‘me’. France and Germany speak with one voice....”⁷⁹² In the same direction, Bild reinforces the founding narrative of the EU while reporting the French-German duo: “Shoulder closure with Merkel:

⁷⁸⁹ Baldauf, A., & Blome, N. (2011, June 19). IMMER MEHR DEUTSCHE FRAGEN SICH: Für Griechen ist Geld da, wann gibt’s was für mich?. <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/griechenland-krise/geld-fuer-griechen-da-wann-gibt-es-fuer-den-steuerzahler-18435444.bild.html>. (Accessed on 29.12.2020).

⁷⁹⁰ Larat, F. (2005). Present-ing the past: political narratives on European history and the justification of EU integration. *German Law Journal*, 6(2), 273-290.

⁷⁹¹ Lübke-meier 2007, as cited in Schild, J. (2013). Leadership in hard times: Germany, France, and the management of the Eurozone crisis. *German Politics and Society*, 31(1), 24-47.

⁷⁹² Ischinger, C., (2011, October 24). Merkel und Sarkozy beim Euro-Krisengipfel: Stille Sportfreunde. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/merkel-und-sarkozy-beim-euro-krisengipfel-stille-sportfreunde-1.1171455>. (Accessed on 29.12.2020).

France and Germany finally found each other after tragic times, said Sarkozy. A united German-French couple means a united Europe.”⁷⁹³

The bilateral leadership has been often referred to as ‘Merkozy’ which was based on the balance of power between Germany and France. The characteristics of the partnership are summarized by *Süddeutsche Zeitung* as: “That people in France immediately spoke of ‘Sarkel’ is more than just an amusing detail: it shows the sensitivities that characterize the Franco-German relationship. Sensitive minds in the neighboring country recognized in all seriousness a political evaluation in the ranking of the names. ‘Merkozy’ as proof that the second named Sarkozy is only an appendage of the German Chancellor?”⁷⁹⁴ The topos of history used by the quotation refers to the existent sensitivity among the French people to Germany’s past otherness to Europe by its Nazi history. While the harmonious co-leadership between Merkel and Sarkozy was disrupted following the France 2012 elections and when France was downgraded to an AA+ rating by credit rating institutions Standard and Poor’s Moody’s and respectively.⁷⁹⁵ While this led to the ultimate rise of the discussions over the German hegemony, the reflection within the German domestic politics was rather different. This is usually referred to as something unwanted due to the nation’s own political history and post-war constructed national identity built upon it:

“Hegemony, this undisputed strength, is part of the republic's genetic material. Whoever deals with the accumulation of power and its decay will find many unfortunate examples in German history. Germany's post-war experience in a divided and enclosed country was not least the result of multiple abuse of power. The European Union itself was also the institutional answer to the problem nation in the middle...Even if Germany refuses to meet leadership expectations if the country is blind and deaf: the gaze of the neighbors remains, as the Greek drama shows. If Berlin had watched the decline indifferently, it would have been found just as guilty: for inaction.”⁷⁹⁶

The excerpt above praises the history of a united Europe by employing topos of history. In this vein, it introduces the European integration as designed to contain the destructive German power in Europe. Besides, the hegemony is defined by a strong association of topos of threat/ danger highlighting the scars of the nation’s Nazi past which othered Germany across European nations and later resulted in the division of the country, which was overcome by the European reunification. Thus, hegemony is represented as a threat to European and national

⁷⁹³ Bild. (2011, December 2). Sarkozy hält Schicksalsrede an die Nation. <https://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/euro-krise/euro-krise-ticker-alle-infos-news-zur-schuldenkrise-1-21321818.bild.html>. (Accessed on 29.12.2020).

⁷⁹⁴ Klasgaen, M., (2012, January 17). Deutschland und Frankreich nach S&P-Abwertung: Adieu, Merkozy <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/deutschland-und-frankreich-nach-s-p-abwertung-adieu-merkozy-1.1259408>.

⁷⁹⁵ Schild, J. (2013). Leadership in hard times: Germany, France, and the management of the Eurozone crisis. *German Politics and Society*, 31(1), 24-47.

⁷⁹⁶ Kornelius, V.S. (2015, July 26). Deutschland Europas Zögerlicher Hegemon. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/deutschland-europas-zoegerlicher-hegemon-1.2580542>. (Accessed on 30.12.2020)

unification. Peterson calls this as ‘leadership avoidance reflex’ of Germany.⁷⁹⁷ Amid the existent domestic reluctance to the bailout, German reform initiatives and formulated bailout packages are legitimized for the sake of preserving the European unification is presented as its being responsible and committed partner to the European countries and neighbors. The repercussions of debates revolving around the reluctance of Germany to become the main driving force of European integration are reflected by the critical voices against the bailing out by Germany as such: the slogan of the AfD’s poster: “Greeks suffer. Germans pay. Banks cash in”⁷⁹⁸ or in Bild’s headlines: “Will Germany become Europe’s paymaster?”⁷⁹⁹ Accordingly, Germany’s leadership position is associated with Germany’s undertaking the largest share of bailouts which has created an opposition within the domestic politics culminating in the group differentiation as us versus them.

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter has considered articulations of the European identity construction in the German national political setting during the euro crisis. It conducted a detailed qualitative analysis of the political and media discourses communicating about the crisis in relation to the European identity formation. Conducting such an analysis was of critical importance to give a plausible answer to the emerging question of whether the crisis triggered a shift in the articulations of the European identity construction in Germany which represented a unique case by being the largest contributor of the formulated bailout packages.

The infamous non-bail-out clause and lack of the fiscal union have paved a way for the articulations of the different arguments in constructing the meaning of the crisis with its relevance to the European identity German domestic politics. Although manifestations of the European identity construction have not indicated a radical shift, the crisis triggered a cleavage between political and media discourses of the European identity framing the crisis. Thus, there has not been a unified voice between political and media discourses. One of the important points was that there have been changing attitudes of the German politicians in their reactions to the crisis between the earlier and later phase of the crisis. The changed attitude of the German elites provided an important ground for this study to trace the way how euro is utilized in triggering group identification and sense of belonging during the European identity construction throughout the different phases of the crisis.

⁷⁹⁷ Paterson, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

⁷⁹⁸ Süddeutsche Zeitung. (2013, September 14). Euroskeptiker demonstrieren vor EZB. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundestag-euroskeptiker-demonstrieren-vor-ezb-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-130914-99-01556>. (Accessed on 30.12.2020).

⁷⁹⁹ Bild. (2011, August 4). Wird Deutschland jetzt Zahlmeister Europas?. <https://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/euro-bonds/euro-bonds-deutschland-bald-zahlmeister-europas-19390060.bild.html>. (Accessed on 30.12.2020).

Another important point was that meanings attributed to the European integration and the European identity connote differently within the different sides of the political spectrum for both the political and the media discourse. On the one hand, the crisis has reinforced the established ideas about the European identity embedded within the construction of the German national identity upon/against the country's Nazi past representing otherness of Europe. In this respect, German commitment to the European community in general and to the euro, in particular, was often expressed. To show such commitment firstly this chapter outlined how adopting common currency was constructed and regarded as part of the European identity. In this sense, euro was often utilized in utterances aiming to increase the sense of belonging to and group identification with the European identity. Secondly, it showed how the repercussions of the crisis developed the group differentiation within the European identity which brought the normalization debates to the surface. Thirdly, it demonstrated the discourses constructed upon the community of fate which endeavoring to legitimize the actions of the German ruling elites. The last section showed the repercussions of the representations of Germany as a reluctant hegemon in German domestic politics.

There have been diverging discourses in each thematic standpoint of discourse analysis both for the political and the media discourse. With regard to the common currency as the critical denominator of increasing the sense of belonging to the European community, it is possible to argue that adoption of the common currency is attributed as an important symbol in achieving the positive self of the European communities. In this way, how the euro is regarded as a part of the European identity for Germany laid the basis for the utilization of the affirmative value of the common currency as a subject of construction of the group formed in the third section. Yet the crisis context resulted in the emergence of the Eurosceptic actors. It was remarkable that even they were committed to the European project and defined the euro as a threat to the ingroup of the European identity by narrating an alternative history of European integration. Here it is necessary to point out that within the specific example of the euro crisis, it has been hard to see that AfD gained remarkable momentum. This can be evidenced from the 2014 European elections during which Germans remained supporters of the pro-European major parties. The subsequent increase of its votes in the 2017 Federal elections and 2019 European elections is overlapping with the outbreak of the refugee crisis. Therefore, their rising influence cannot be solely attributed to the repercussions of the euro crisis. The complete picture can be understood along with the analysis of the refugee crisis in the following chapter.

In respect to the debates revolving around the possible drift toward German national identity at the expense of the European identity, it can be argued that this was rather embodied

anti-Greek sentiment which culminated in the differentiation of good and bad Europeans within the ingroup of Europeans. Such constructions usually located German taxpayers or pensioners versus irresponsible Greeks living beyond their means. Here, utilization of topos of culture was highly instrumental. Accordingly, it is observed that European identity construction is reinforced within the frame of German understanding of the European identity based on the ordo-liberal norms and rules. Being committed to these rules as ‘good European’ is generally understood as the source of high levels of affiliating with the European identity. With regard to this, Greece representing the epicenter of the crisis was given particular emphasis as Europe's new other. The German understanding of the European identity within the strict frame of ordoliberal ethics has led to the identity cleavage within the union since it constructed the indebted countries in general and the Greeks in particular as the new other of the Europeans. In this regard, it led to the ingroup favoritism among Germans at the expense of the outgroup differentiation of the indebted others. In this sense, Euroscepticism in the form of opposition to the bailouts and anti-Greek sentiment was relatively intensified by the crisis. Moreover, the rigid emphasis on the austerity measures as a part of German ‘ordoliberal’ solidarity was regarded as a symbol of Greek commitment to the European identity by Germans. Therefore, the anti-austerity protests and anti-German sentiments further aggravated the friction between Germans and Greeks, which aggravated the anti-Greek tone of the discourses in return. However, this was not necessarily to imply the complete German estrangement from the European identity. On the contrary, referrals to the German commitment to the founding values of the European integration and the common currency was utilized to show its further alienation from its Nazi past constituting the other of the Europeans.

In the face of the critics of the bailout packages accompanied by the anti-Greek sentiment manifested especially by the media discourse and the aggravation of the crisis, Germany remained in between the domestic politics and its responsibility for the European community. Therefore, political actors were required to find a ground legitimizing the agreed bailout packages. In this respect, the third section has demonstrated the construction of the EU as a space for prosperity for the Europeans. The discursive shift from the Greek crisis to the European crisis was one of the starting points of presenting the German contribution to the bailouts reasonably. To this end, the crisis is represented as a threat to the stability of the whole community. Moreover, the othering of the third countries represented as a threat to the European economies also served as the basis for boosting the cognition of ‘us’ versus them. With regard to this, the ingroup favoritism was directed to the European community rather than the German national identity. In this way, the conception of Europeanness was injected into the arguments

of rationalization of the German contribution to the bailout packages. The speeches of the community of fate foreseeing a common future based on European values and prosperity were prominent tools for enhancing European ingroup identification. These were further reinforced by the statements uttering the importance of the common currency for the German national economic interests. Therefore, utility-based considerations of the integration became also prevalent.

While this laid the ground for the legitimization acts of the political actors for the bailouts, the central role of Germany by being the largest creditor of the financial aid which was reflected through the debates of it is being a 'hegemony' for Europe, has connotated differently within the domestic politics. On the one hand, the Franco-German alliance for the resolution of the crisis was interpreted as the reinforcement of the foundational idea of the European project. On the other hand, Germany's leading position especially after the fall of France to the secondary position was something undesired due to the nation's history therefore dangerous to its national identity constructed in close alignment with the European idea and European identity. The critics associated its central role with being a 'paymaster' connotating the group differentiation between us as the creditors and others as the debtors.

In sum, the political and media discourses fluctuate between the opponents and supporters of the bailout packages. With regard to the major parties' employed discourse, the way how they were trying to frame the crisis in accordance with their political calculations was remarkable. They often brought forward the feelings of solidarity and commitment to the European project and the European identity in containing the critiques within the domestic politics. In this respect, the traditional articulations of the European identity construction upon which the German national identity was built were reinforced. In boosting the sense of belonging as ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination towards third countries was also employed. On the other hand, the critiques of the bailout packages further developed the group differentiation within the ingroup of European identity. This drew highly on the ingroup favoritism of Germans as us and outgroup discrimination of the indebted countries as others. Therefore, it is possible to assert that the euro crisis triggered the identity cleavage within the ingroup of European identity to some extent. However, this was not to contest the Germans' sense of belonging to the European identity but rather to contest and criticize the European identity of the other that financially not aligned with the German ordoliberal values attributed to the founding stones of the European identity. Here, Greece was the point of target. Within the different time frames of the crisis, the German, interpretation of European identity was subject to use from different angles by different political actors that (re)construct the in-

group/out-group differentiations to prove their own political causes. The study found out that identity construction turned into a tool of legitimization and operationalization. At the onset of the crisis, it was based on the countries' stickness to the rules of the community on both sides of the political spectrum and not to interfere. The government later emphasized its understanding of German interpretation of European identity towards being united and leaving no one behind in an act of legitimization to interfere with the crisis and to bail out. On the other hand, the critics emphasized being compliant with the rules and austerity packages in an act of legitimizing their aloofness to the harsh austerity packages. Thus, it is evidenced that social, political, and economic developments became a critical tool in the way of shifts in the construction of an in-group identity, the construction of identity is conveyed as an instrument of legitimization and operationalization on the given reactions to those developments. At the media discourse level, the study showed that the media discourse changes among the different political spectrums. Accordingly, the harshest criticisms came from the Bild newspaper that did run an anti-Greek campaign throughout the crisis, while Die Welt adopted a milder but still critical position. In contrast, the left leaning Süddeutsche newspaper adopted a discourse that would contribute to the European solidarity and German commitment to the preservation of the common currency to great extent, although it also sometimes contained critical judgments as well.

CHAPTER 7: EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN GERMANY

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter has addressed the construction of the European identity by the political and media discourse in Germany within the context of the Eurozone debt crisis. This chapter investigates manifestations of the European identity construction within the context of the European refugee crisis, which started in 2015 with the flow of people coming from the Eastern Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War. It aims to reveal how the construction of the European identity is manifested by the political and media discourse while framing the European refugee crisis. To this end, the discourse analysis on the collected data will be analyzed and discussed by this chapter.

The eruption of the refugee crisis triggered the crisis of Schengen, which is regarded as one of the achievements of European integration.⁸⁰⁰ Moreover, it traditionally draws concrete borderlines within which the European identity is formed and constructed. In this respect, the European borders provide a 'space for Europeans' in the minds of the European citizens as an in-group. Therefore, the construction of the European identity both as a source of triggering the European feeling of 'aid' to 'others' and as an ingroup facing with 'others' representing a potential threat to the common borders and the ingroup of Europeans gained critical importance.

Germany became a key actor in the relief of the crisis by adopting a human rights-based approach⁸⁰¹. However, discursive representations framing the crisis within the internal political setting were diverging. Such divergence was especially triggered by discourses of the non-establishment party of AfD. The welcoming attitude was often presented and justified through constructing foundational attributions of the European identity in line with the sources of in-group favoritism while putting other member states' commitment and solidarity in question. On the other hand, right-wing discourses of the AfD are shaped around the essentialist and reductionist discourses of identity construction based on the traditional intergroup differentiation between the East/West, including the otherness of the refugees as well as perceived threats to the host communities. They have utilized the discursive constructions of outgroup derogation, which aimed to generate intergroup threat to and ingroup bias of the ingroup of Europeans. This chapter will highlight such divergences of the discourses framing

⁸⁰⁰European Parliament. Fact Sheets on the European Union. Free movement of Persons.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/147/free-movement-of-persons>. (Accessed on 01.01.2021).

⁸⁰¹Momin, S. (2017). A human rights based approach to refugees: A look at the Syrian refugee crisis and the responses from Germany and the United States. *Duke FL & Soc. Change*, 9, 55.

the crisis in respect to the European identity construction. To this end, it will first give a brief background on the European refugee crisis of 2015. This will be valuable to grasp how the member states have diverged in their responses to the humanitarian situation. Then, analysis of the manifestations of the European identity will be discussed throughout the thematically divided parts.

7.2. Background of the European Refugee Crisis

The ongoing eurozone crisis and the Grexit debates within the Union were soon to be overshadowed by the European refugee crisis of 2015, which has witnessed the highest number of displaced people since the Second World War.⁸⁰² The onset of the refugee crisis resulted that the EU experienced both internal and external crises more or less simultaneously. Börzel and Risse argue that while the eurozone crisis was about the ingroup of Europeans which contested the existential definition of the Europeans as ‘who are we as a union, Schengen crisis was about others emerging the question of ‘who belongs to us’.⁸⁰³ These accounts are acknowledged, yet it is important to highlight the fact that although the crisis was borne out within its outside borders, EU internalized the refugee crisis because of the divergences of the member states’ responses, reciprocal accusations of the member states, and the enforcement problem of the formulated solutions at the European-level. Moreover, later it was also accompanied by the security crisis. Therefore, this brief introduction aims to give an idea of why the crisis is called as ‘European’ refugee crisis in a general sense. Acknowledging the crisis context of the Union is especially important to critically discuss the articulations of the European identity constructions framing the crisis. Accordingly, for the main motivations of the current study, this part will give a brief overview of the development of the refugee crisis and how it turned into a humanitarian crisis. To this end, the legal meaning of the term ‘refugee’ needs to be clarified:

Any person [subject to] “...well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”⁸⁰⁴

⁸⁰² UN. Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase. (18.06.2015). <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/6/558193896/worldwide-displacement-hits-all-time-high-war-persecution-increase.html>.

⁸⁰³ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1), 83-108.

⁸⁰⁴ UN. Article 1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. (1951). <https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html#:~:text=The%201951%20Refugee%20Convention%20and,the%20basis%20of%20our%20work.&text=The%20core%20principle%20is%20non,to%20their%20life%20or%20freedom.> (Accessed on 03.01.2021)

The term is often confused with the ‘migrant’ which implies the various reasons for leaving one’s own country including economic, professional, or education other than the humanitarian crisis. The differentiation between a refugee and a migrant has gained remarkable importance during the refugee crisis in terms of the discursive construction of these people seeking international protection as the victims of ethnic conflicts or civil wars.⁸⁰⁵ It is enshrined by Article 14 of the Universal Human Rights declaration that “Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries.”⁸⁰⁶ Thus, the humanitarian aspect of the flow of people who are deprived of protection and security in their home countries⁸⁰⁷ is borne a responsibility by the European countries. During the crisis, Chancellor Merkel has also made a clear distinction in her statement: “The hope for a better life is not a sufficient reason to seek asylum or residence permit here.”⁸⁰⁸ It was a clear sign for the people coming from the countries in Western Balkans or in North Africa to Germany for economic gains.

The outbreak of the European refugee crisis was sparked off by the Arab Revolutions of 2011 in the Middle East. The repercussions of the revolutions dragged Syria into the civil war when the Assad regime violently oppressed the protests. Kashani argues that Syria presents a unique case with its complexities of being an uprising, a civil war, radical Islamic terrorism, and a sectarian division.⁸⁰⁹ The situation aggravated further after the radical Islamist terrorist organization, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took Aleppo, the capital city, and extended its control over the territories in western and northern Syria in 2012. ISIS posed a new form of hybrid threat for the international community since it combined both conventional and non-conventional means in pursuing their objectives of territorial expansion.⁸¹⁰ The massive destruction of the country, dramatic violation of human rights, and barrel bombs dropped on civilians forced the Syrian war victims to escape to other countries in search of security and shelter,⁸¹¹ resulting in the displacement of over 6 million Syrians.⁸¹²

The displaced Syrians initially fled to neighboring countries respectively Iraq, Jordan Turkey, and Lebanon.⁸¹³ As the situation was deteriorating, and the neighboring countries were

⁸⁰⁵ Kale, B. (2005). The impact of Europeanization on Domestic Policy structures: Asylum and refugee policies in Turkey’s accession process to the European Union. *Middle East Technical University Ankara*.

⁸⁰⁶ UN. Article 14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/#:~:text=Article%2014.,principles%20of%20the%20United%20Nations>. (Accessed on 05.01.2021).

⁸⁰⁷ Agustín, Ó. G., & Jørgensen, M. B. (2018). *Solidarity and the refugee Crisis in Europe*. Springer., p. 3.

⁸⁰⁸ Dario Sarmadi. Euroactiv. Merkel urges Afghans to stay at home. (03.12.2015). <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/merkel-urges-afghans-to-stay-at-home/>. (Accessed on 05.01.2021)

⁸⁰⁹ Khashanah, K. (2014). The Syrian Crisis: a systemic framework. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 7(1), 1-21.

⁸¹⁰ Jasper, S., & Moreland, S. (2014). The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does That Matter?. *Journal Article/Dec*, 1(11).

⁸¹¹ Sorenson, D. S. (2016). *Syria in Ruins: The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War: The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War*. ABC-CLIO.

⁸¹² UNHCR. Syria Emergency. <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>. (Accessed on 05.01.2021).

⁸¹³ Sorenson, D. S., *op.cit.*, p.2.

falling behind in providing sufficient access to basic needs and services such as education, healthcare, and employment⁸¹⁴ because of the unprecedented overcrowd of refugees, the massive influx of Syrians spilled over to the European doors as well. They often risked their lives and took dangerous routes in order to reach Europe. That would soon generate a critical challenge with the record number of asylum applications for the EU which had already been confronted with the euro crisis.

The refugee crisis is often described as a test for the EU because of the multiplication of the problems.⁸¹⁵ The roots of the multiplication of the challenges can be discussed in two dimensions. The first dimension is the humanitarian aspect of the crisis which necessitated the EU to stick to its guiding core values, norms, and freedoms upon which its common European identity is formed. Syrians that were escaping from persecution to Europe in search of security and protection, took dangerous sea routes by often exposed to the abuse of the human smugglers. Sinking boats, tragic images of drowning children at the Mediterranean coast became the symbol of their odysseys to Europe. The year 2016 has been recorded as the deadliest year for the Mediterranean Sea as more than 4000 refugees died during their dangerous journey to Europe.⁸¹⁶ Therefore, then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini has openly stated that “The refugee crisis puts our identity to the test.”⁸¹⁷ In terms of European values, Greenhill defines that it is hypocritical that the EU both failed in providing immediate aid and relief to the burdens of the frontline member states Italy and Greece, and in proposing a common European response as a solution at the pan-European level to the arising humanitarian crisis.⁸¹⁸

The second dimension is the divergences of the member states in proposing a response to the crisis. They were basically split into three groups; those welcoming the refugees, those having a firm stance of anti-refugees, and those faced with the burden of the flow of people because of the geographical proximity at the EU’s southern borders. Therefore, any perspective to formulate a unified voice at the European level was far from an achievement. The southern

⁸¹⁴ Kirişçi, K. (2014). *Syrian refugees and Turkey's challenges: Going beyond hospitality* (pp. 1-46). Washington, DC: Brookings.

⁸¹⁵ Spijkerboer, T. (2016). Europe’s refugee crisis: a perfect storm. *Border Criminologies*, 10.

⁸¹⁶ UNICEF. Children and pregnant women among those lost at sea in latest tragedy on the Mediterranean. <https://www.unicef.org/turkey/en/press-releases/children-and-pregnant-women-among-those-lost-sea-latest-tragedy-mediterranean-unicef>. (Accessed on 13.01.2021)

⁸¹⁷ EEAS. The refugee crisis puts our identity to the test - Federica Mogherini in the EP. (01.06.2016). https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2559/the-refugee-crisis-puts-our-identity-to-the-test---federica-mogherini-in-the-ep_en. (Accessed on 13.01.2021)

⁸¹⁸ Greenhill, K. M. (2016). Open arms behind barred doors: fear, hypocrisy and policy schizophrenia in the European migration crisis. *European Law Journal*, 22(3), 317-332., p.323.

flank of the EU, which was receiving the massive flow of people, was blaming the northern EU member states on the grounds that they were not showing their commitment and solidarity. On the other hand, northern partners were accusing them of violating the Dublin Regulations of ‘first country’ by letting them trespass to the other EU member states in the north without registering them in their country as the first country of entry to the Union.⁸¹⁹ That generated a leeway for a dilemma between remaining faithful to the EU law and showing concrete solidarity with the burdened member states. Moreover, the reciprocal accusations deepened the existing cleavage among member states -especially between Germany and Greece- stemming from the euro crisis⁸²⁰ and simultaneously ongoing debates on the third bailout to Greece under the shadow of the so-called threat of Grexit.

The divided image of the EU worsened further also because of the member states adopting an anti-refugee attitude. Having been indifferent to the immediate action to the situation, Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the Baltic States were opposing two implemented packages within the framework of the European Agenda on Migration formulated respectively in May and September 2015. While the first package mainly envisaged the relocation of the 400 000 refugees from Italy and Greece along with a financial allocation of 6 000 EUR for each person to relocating member state, the second implementation package was designed to relocate 120 000 refugees, with a financial allocation of 500 € for each refugee to cover the transfer costs of Italy and Greece.⁸²¹ The quota system for the redistribution of the refugees among member states was formulated based on the measurement of the member states’ GDP and their population.⁸²² Here it is important to remind that since the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark already opted out from the Title V of the TFEU enshrining the area of freedom, security, and justice, they were considerably indifferent to the formulated initiatives to solve the crisis.⁸²³ The Baltic States often put forward the financial hardships that cannot handle the newly comers.⁸²⁴ On the other hand, CEECs refused to show any solidarity through constructing refugee arrivals as a threat to the in-group of European identity. Hungary adopted

⁸¹⁹ Achiume, E. T. (2015). Syria, cost-sharing, and the responsibility to protect refugees. *Minn. L. Rev.*, 100, 687.

⁸²⁰ Postelnicescu, C. (2016). Europe’s new identity: The refugee crisis and the rise of nationalism. *Europe's journal of psychology*, 12(2), 203.

⁸²¹ Council Decision on Establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece (22 September 2015). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1601&from=EN>. (Accessed on 13.01.2021)

⁸²² European Politics and Policy. Luc Bovens and Anna Bartsch. Why the refugee quota system is unfair on poorer eastern and southern EU states. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/10/01/why-the-refugee-quota-system-is-unfair-on-poorer-eastern-and-southern-eu-states/>. (Accessed on 13. 01.2021).

⁸²³ European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a European Agenda on Migration. (13.05.2015) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1485255362454&uri=CELEX:52015DC0240>. (Accessed on 13. 01.2021).

⁸²⁴ Heisbourg, F. (2015). The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. *Survival*, 57(6), 7-20., p.10.

the most critical stance in refusing to accept refugees, which became evident in Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's statements such as "Migration turned out to be the Trojan horse of terrorism" or "Europe's Christian identity is under threat"⁸²⁵. Moreover, he describes refugees as they "look like an army."⁸²⁶ In order to curb the flow of people, Hungary built barbed wire fences on its border with Serbia.⁸²⁷ That kind of precautions sparked the debates of 'European fortress'. In addition, Hungary has also received harsh criticisms on the grounds that it was violently pushing back the refugees on its borderlines.⁸²⁸

When thousands of refugees piled up in Budapest's Keleti railway station in order to cross to Austria and the northern Member States, Germany's unilateral decision to lift the Dublin Regulation by declaring that it would accept refugees without sending them to the first country they entered to the European soils, relieved the tension.⁸²⁹ In this respect, Germany which had already assumed leadership in solving the economic crisis undertook a critical responsibility in both showing solidarity and repairing the EU's damaged image within the international arena. Although the adopted open-door policy under Merkel's leadership resulted in disagreements between sister parties CDU and CSU,⁸³⁰ it played a critical role in releasing the tension of the crisis among the member states. Moreover, other member states also criticized the unilateral decision of the open-door policy.

Yet, the fragile situation of the refugee crisis was exacerbated dramatically because of the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. The following process with conducted terrorist attacks respectively in Brussels in March 2016, in Nice in July 2016, in Normandy in July 2016, and Berlin in December 2016 generated a Europe-wide feeling of insecurity. Thus, the humanitarian crisis which previously evolved into an identity crisis turned into a security crisis. Therefore, the problems of the Union were multiplied. On the one hand, terrorist attacks strengthened the hands of the far right-wing associating the refugees as a security threat to the

⁸²⁵ Jim Brusden. Orban: EU's 'Christian identity' under threat from Muslim migrants. Financial Times. (30.03.2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/7ecde2c2-af12-329a-9133-29a7bee08e31>. <https://www.ft.com/content/7ecde2c2-af12-329a-9133-29a7bee08e31>. (Accessed on 14.01.2021)

⁸²⁶ The Guardian. Refugees 'look like an army', says Hungarian PM Viktor Orban. (23.10.2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/23/refugees-look-like-an-army-says-hungarian-pm-viktor-orban>. (Accessed on 14.01.2021).

⁸²⁷ BBC News.. Migrant crisis: Hungary declares emergency at Serbia border. (09.2015) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34252812>. (Accessed on 14.01.2021).

⁸²⁸ Kardos Kaponyi, E. (2018). A real threat: Compliance with human rights is no longer a value in Europe. *Corvinus Journal of International Affairs*, 3(3), 3-20.

⁸²⁹ Andrea Dernbach. Germany suspends Dublin agreement for Syrian refugees. (26.08.2015). <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/germany-suspends-dublin-agreement-for-syrian-refugees/>. (Accessed on 14.01.2021).

⁸³⁰ Bild. Seehofer watscht Merkel ab. (11.09.2015). <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/fluechtling/seehofer-watscht-merkel-ab-42542086.bild.html>. (Accessed on 14.01.2021).

existence of the European community. Anti-refugee discourses became the influential tool of the far right-wing parties to politicize and terrorize people in claiming political credits. The statements interlinking terrorism with refugee arrivals were articulated. On the other hand, the Union faced with the necessity to protect its citizens while being challenged considerably in fulfilling its commitment to the values of the community. Major pro-European parties were deemed to confront the Eurosceptic waves and nationalist tendencies. The increased political power of the non-establishment political party AfD could be traced during the 2017 national elections mainly in France and Germany.⁸³¹

The immediate reaction to the terrorist attacks was the reintroduction of the border controls within the Schengen area. It was adopted respectively by France, Malta, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Norway in pursuant to the Council of Europe's "Recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk".⁸³² In this respect, it can be argued that national security interests prevailed. Against the backdrop of existing cleavage among member states in formulating a common European response with a politicized European public on a large scale, the possible demise of Schengen became consequently in question.

In this context, a critical initiative between EU-Turkey was initiated under the leadership of Merkel in order to relieve the refugee tension of the EU.⁸³³ Because of its geographical location, Turkey has gained remarkable attention in formulating any solution to the crisis to safeguard the EU's external borders.⁸³⁴ Moreover, Turkey was the main host country of Syrian refugees since it accepted over 3 million refugees from Syria.⁸³⁵ Therefore, collaboration with Turkey is regarded as one of the milestones of the crisis. Accordingly, first, the Joint Action Plan was agreed in October 2015.⁸³⁶ The plan envisaged the financial support to Turkey to halt the irregular flow of people transiting from Turkey to Europe (mainly Greece). In order to strengthen the bilateral cooperation, the EU-Turkey summit of 29 November 2015 was arranged. One of the critical decisions was Turkey's full application of the Readmission

⁸³¹ Arzheimer, K., & Berning, C. C. (2019). How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the radical right, 2013–2017. *Electoral Studies*, 60, 102040.

⁸³² Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/818 of 11 May 2017 setting out a Recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk. (11.05.2017). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0818&from=EN> (Accessed on 14.01.2021)

⁸³³ Csicsmann, L. (2016). The Syrian refugee crisis reconsidered: The role of the EU-Turkey Agreement. *Corvinus Journal of International Affairs*, 1(1), 83-98., p. 83.

⁸³⁴ European Commission. (2015). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a European Agenda on Migration. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1485255362454&uri=CELEX:52015DC0240>. (Accessed on 14.01.2021) .

⁸³⁵ UNHCR. Syrian Regional Response. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>. (Accessed on 14.01.2021)

⁸³⁶ European Commission. Refugee Crisis: Joint action Plan with Turkey. (16.10.2015). https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151016_1_en. (Accessed on 14.01.2021)

Agreement which foresees the readmission of the third-country nationals and stateless persons that entered into the EU arriving from Turkey.⁸³⁷ That opened a leeway for sending refugees back to Turkey from EU member states. Moreover, European incentives based on the financial aid to Turkey were also planned in order to support Turkey in providing the necessary facilitations for refugees, which was aimed to deter refugees from reaching the EU. To this end, payment of a total of 6 million EUR in two installments as financial assistance was agreed.⁸³⁸ European incentives also included the visa liberalization to Turkey on the condition that Turkey would fulfill the 72 benchmarks.⁸³⁹ Moreover, new chapters for the regeneration of Turkey's access negotiations to the EU were opened.⁸⁴⁰ In the following process, the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016 envisaged Turkey to take back EU's all irregular refugees trespassing to Europe from Turkish soils.⁸⁴¹ In exchange, a resettlement mechanism of 1:1 scheme for each Syrian being returned to Turkey from the EU, another Syrian would be resettled from Turkey to the EU.⁸⁴²

After the statement entered into force, the number of Syrians crossing from Turkey to Greece rapidly decreased. It is of critical importance to highlight that the partnership was agreed basically between Germany and Turkey, which put Germany on the spots whose open-door policy was already criticized. Moreover, the rapprochement between EU-Turkey gained criticisms on the grounds that the EU aspiring to transform Turkey into the EU's buffer zone did ignore the democracy deficits of the country along with the violations of human rights through suppressions, detentions and indictments of the journalists and the opposition for the sake of its own security interests.⁸⁴³ This was the EU's concrete estrangement from its own values and norms in exchange for a 'shield' against refugees. Overall, considering the cleavages within the member states in responding to the flow of people, prominence of the national interests over the common European interests, and the rise of the Eurosceptic right-wing challenged the unity and harmony of the EU which had been already shaken by the financial

⁸³⁷ Delegation of the European Union to Turkey. Readmission Agreement. <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/readmission-agreement-6895>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸³⁸ Council of the European Union. Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement. (29.11.2015) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29/eu-turkey-meeting-statement/>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁰ Council of the European Union. Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement. (18.03.2016). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*

⁸⁴³ Krumm, T. (2015). The EU-Turkey refugee deal of autumn 2015 as a two-level game. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 14(4).

crisis. It is with this contextualization of the crisis in mind that the following section will discuss the analysis of the discursive manifestations of the European identity construction.

7.3. Refugees Welcome

As already discussed by the theoretical framework of this research, individuals are allocated by the social identities to their social group. European identity as generating the significant 'we' is formed on the demarcation lines between who is in and who is out⁸⁴⁴. Schengen contributes to the demarcation lines between the in-group of Europeans and its out-groups by drawing common external borders and assuring the free movement of the Europeans. Thus, it is noteworthy reason to address the constructions of the European identity in the context of the refugee crisis which later turned into a Schengen crisis through the internalization of the crisis.

During the course of the refugee crisis, the vast majority of the flow of people entered Germany⁸⁴⁵ following Chancellor Merkel's declaration of the open-door policy in September 2015. Discursive constructions framing the refugee crisis in a manner of welcoming refugees mostly relied on what is considered to be aligned with the societal values of the German national identity which is closely bonded with the European identity. Here it is necessary to remind one of the aspirations of the SIT that group memberships can promote a positive identity of the individuals.⁸⁴⁶ In this respect, belonging to a group that provides humanitarian aid to deserving others in need of help can be associated with the enhancement of the self-esteem of the group members.⁸⁴⁷ Thus, within their discourses framing the crisis concerning the identity, mainstream political parties (CDU, SPD, and Die Linke) often portray refugees and asylum seekers as the victims of the civil war, persecution, and violence in need of humanitarian responsibility to justify their policy responses to the crisis throughout the crisis. The discourses embracing diversity and multiculturalism were also constructed as a contribution to the multiculturalism of German and European society. Large-scale analysis of the media coverage of the crisis was converging with such political discursive representations of the refugees.

The repercussions of the adopted pro-refugee stance by Germany have been the cleavage within the EU stemming from the different interpretations of the meaning of European identity with respect to the crisis and the flow of people. Moreover, there have been different

⁸⁴⁴ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T., *op.cit.*, p. 87.

⁸⁴⁵ Eurostat. Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data (rounded). http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en. (Accessed on 15.01.2021)

⁸⁴⁶ Jetten, J., Branscombe, N. R., Haslam, S. A., Haslam, C., Cruwys, T., Jones, J. M., ... & Zhang, A. (2015). Having a lot of a good thing: Multiple important group memberships as a source of self-esteem. *PLoS one*, 10(5), e0124609.

⁸⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

interpretations regarding the refugees and asylum seekers both within the German and European political settings. In this context, the crisis presents a challenge because of the absence of some member states' willingness to accept burden-sharing mechanism for the common good of the European community. Such a challenge is associated by Börzel and Risse with an enforcement problem.⁸⁴⁸ Therefore, criticisms and failure of European member states in taking responsibility for one another as belonging to the same political community have been mostly put forward by the German political and media discourse. Accordingly, pro-refugee discourses are often shaped around how Germany felt alone because of the unwilling member states failing to act in solidarity that creates the discourses perpetuating the intra-group differentiation within the European identity following the May/September 2015 onwards when the first temporary relocation mechanisms were introduced.

“Cardinal Woelki ringed hundreds of bells in the Archdiocese of Cologne on Friday. 23,000 chimes to commemorate the 23,000 people who have drowned in the Mediterranean...Why don't the bells ring all over Europe?... All the bells should ring, because Europe giving away the values. We are so proud that there is freedom here. How great it was when the barriers were opened and we could go over the borders. How happy we were when the wall came down and freedom of travel was also possible for East Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles. And now we are betraying this freedom because we deny it as a right to those who are on the run from war and misery, from hunger and destruction.”⁸⁴⁹ (Bild)

“Europe betrays its values instead of acting. Most EU states want to have nothing to do with refugees as much as possible. The cowardly fear is: They cost money and could lead to resentment in their own people. Germany is a notable exception - respect.”⁸⁵⁰ (Welt)

“Rightly! Germany helps. But who will help Germany now? The Germans open gyms and barracks, collect clothing donations, and take refugees into families. Other countries lay the barbed wire on the borders and close the gates. Europe is a community of values that is also based on humanity and solidarity. And those who do not share our values cannot hope for our money in the long run. If this continues, Europe is in danger. More than from the financial or Greek crisis.”⁸⁵¹ (Sigmar Gabriel)

“Germany has benefited more than any other country from open borders, open markets and freedom of movement. The worst thing would be if we locked ourselves down now. Building walls is a very bad idea - no matter who pays for it. In the refugee crisis, pragmatism is now required.”⁸⁵² (Frank-Walter Steinmeier)

⁸⁴⁸ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1), 83-108., p. 92.

⁸⁴⁹Bild. Glocken für tote Flüchtlinge. (21.06.2015). <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/fluechtling/glocken-fuer-tote-41437176.bild.html>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021)

⁸⁵⁰ Welt. Europa rettet lieber Griechen als Flüchtlinge. (10.07.2015).

<https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article143817785/Europa-rettet-lieber-Griechen-als-Fluechtlinge.html>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸⁵¹ Sigmar Gabriel. Wir können nicht allen Menschen eine Heimat sein. (17.09.2015)

<https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/sigmar-gabriel/wir-koennen-nicht-allen-menschen-eine-heimat-sein-42621470.bild.html>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸⁵² Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Steinmeier warnt in Flüchtlingskrise vor Abriegelung in Europa.

<https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/konflikte-steinmeier-warnt-in-fluechtlingskrise-vor-abriegelung-in-europa-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-160301-99-47851>

Within the intertextuality of the discourse analysis, against the background of the traditional construction of Europe as a community of fate often repeated by the German political discourse, the excerpts above demonstrated the German disappointment and criticisms against other member states. These excerpts are the given example of the construction of the internal others of the EU during the course of the crisis. Within such discursive act of othering, their unwillingness in keeping up with the solidarity and burden-sharing in the European sense to maintain the European community was often brought up by both political and media discourse. To this end, the discourses are shaped within the underlying message referring to priorities of the European identity values and norms. The first excerpt implicitly referred to the European failure to safeguard the lives of the ‘others of Europe’ who are constructed as in need of the European aid invoking topos of responsibility. Such failure is strictly associated with the estrangement from the European values strongly accepted as the markers of the formed in-group of European identity. The refugee crisis is borne out as a discursive instrument that provides a space for the reinvention of the European self which was based on the group differentiation between the European self and its others.⁸⁵³ In this respect, topos of the definition are utilized to point out compliance with the identity markers of the European self. Such an argument is further augmented with the topos of history which narrated the common history of Europe built upon which the fundamentals of the European idea was designed which enabled the return of historical others of Europe to Europe against the history of the Cold War and Iron Curtain. Thus, freedom of movement is attributed as one of the historical achievements of European integration. Through invoking collective memory of the past as the lessons of history and historical experience of the Eastern Europeans, utilization of topos of history help criticize the unilateral decisions of eastern European member states.

The second excerpt cited from the newspaper article of *Die Welt* embodied criticisms against other member states. Through the use of topos of definition, ‘to act’ meaning to provide humanitarian help in solidarity with the European member states in the face of the European refugee crisis is constructed as the identity marker of Europe. In this way, it also highlights Germany’s commitment to its post-war European identity. Such articulations putting forward Germany’s fulfilling its duty to the European community while covering the crisis with respect to the European identity have found a viable place to strengthen Germany’s value-based understanding of the European identity. On the other hand, the discursive representations of the refugees as ‘defenseless’ other, provides an answer to the reluctant member states’ discourses

⁸⁵³ Cantat, C. (2016). The ideology of Europeanism and Europe’s migrant other. *International Socialism*, 152.

associating the economic hardships with the refugee arrivals and their statements politicizing the European public by utilizing the essentialist accounts on the European identity which are based on the demarcation of the cultural lines between European and the ‘Oriental’, which is portrayed as incompatible with the European values.

Pro-refugee stance in providing plausible answers to such constructions was often encountered through the political and media discourses framing the crisis: “How much has been argued about these people. Migrants? Refugees? An invasion, a horde, a swarm that invades Europe like grasshoppers and means the end of our “Christian culture”, as Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán says. But here, on the endless street in the afternoon heat, it's just people who need help.”⁸⁵⁴ Accordingly, the pro-refugee attitude often engages itself with the humanitarian aspect of the crisis in the face of the anti-refugee constructions as the ‘alien’ of the European identity. Anti-refugee discourses within the German national context, which aim to evoke the skepticism toward the ‘cultural other’, will be discussed in the following part of this chapter. The articulated anti-refugee discourses within the EU generally invoked the East/West divide which was also witnessed in the previous excerpt. Here, it is essential to acknowledge that to a large extent, the pro-refugee side situates these constructions within their discourses in order to criticize their estrangement from the humanitarian response and European solidarity which are represented as the markers of the European identity.

In the last excerpt quoted in *Bild Zeitung*, then SPD leader, Sigmar Gabriel, castigates the absence of European solidarity. He conceptualizes his discourse on the European identity as ‘identity-inclusive’ favoring the humanitarian response. In this respect, compliance with the European community values is promoted through the adoption of the ‘welcoming culture’. Accordingly, the way to deal with the European refugee crisis is discursively constructed as the question of European spirit, values, and ideas which are supposed to reverberate the European solidarity by employing the topos of definition. Germany's European identity is consolidated through using topos of responsibility which putting forward the German initiatives provided as humanitarian aid and relief to refugees.

In the same direction, during the peak time of the crisis in August 2015, Chancellor Merkel expressed her identity-inclusive pro-refugee stance with her most remarkable statement: “We can do it.”⁸⁵⁵ In addition to providing relief to the increased tension among member states,

⁸⁵⁴ Welt. Die Nacht, in der das Tor nach Deutschland aufbrach. (05.09.2015)
<https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article146068106/Die-Nacht-in-der-das-Tor-nach-Deutschland-aufbrach.html>. (Accessed on 16.01.2021)

⁸⁵⁵ Bundesregierung. Sommerpressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel. (31.08.2015).
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenzen/sommerpressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-848300>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

through such statement she repeated her vision on fair burden-sharing and member states' commitment to the common European responsibility. This was derived from the envisagement of the social cognition of the 'we-mode' often founded in her utterances referring to the reluctance of the other member states: "This is not the EU we want."⁸⁵⁶, "The situation is not worthy of Europe, Europe as a whole must also move on this issue."⁸⁵⁷

In addition to the construction of the values-based community of ingroup of European identity, national utility-based considerations derived from EU membership is also uttered by him. He directs his criticisms to the member states gaining financially from the EU as a financial and economic union without internalizing the group identity of the European community. With regard to this, topos of threat/danger are utilized to portray such attitudes of the member states failing to show full solidarity as detrimental both for the unity of the Union and for the togetherness of the Europeans as 'we'. Through the lenses of SIT, he basically criticizes the alienation of the member states from the 'we-mode'⁸⁵⁸ which is a social cognition referring to the necessity to act as group members for a common group reason proving collective commitment to the European identity. Such criticisms of the pro-refugee political and media discourses rely on the expectations of the presence of we-ness that generate the collective behavior to a large extent.

The utility-based approach of identity construction is also seen in Steinmeier's speech in the last excerpt. Hobolt and Wratil argue that high levels of sense of belonging are achieved through the relative gains, advantages and benefits from the membership of an in-group of European identity.⁸⁵⁹ Steinmeier employs utilitarian considerations in the German national political setting by building connection between Germany's EU membership and its export levels and derived economic interests from the Schengen zone. In this way, he portrays EU membership as a positive-sum game and EU as a national interest maximizer.

The criticisms raised against other member states' reaction to the crisis also included the historical experiences of Europe in castigating the unilateral decisions of the member states to close the borders or to build barbed wire fences. They brought forward the infamous debates of the 'European fortress (Festung Europa)'⁸⁶⁰ frequently by the headlines and statements of

⁸⁵⁶ Bild. Syrien-Flüchtlingen droht keine Abschiebung mehr. (25.08.2015).

<https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/fluechtling/fluechtlings-ticker-42313948.bild.html>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁸ Gallotti, M., & Frith, C. D. (2013). Social cognition in the we-mode. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 17(4), 160-165.

⁸⁵⁹ Hobolt, S. B., & Wratil, C. (2015), p. 238-256.

⁸⁶⁰ During the WWII, Nazi propagandists employed the term Fortress Europe in order to refer to "Hitler's project of fortifying the whole of occupied Europe, as a response to the failure of the German campaign in Russia and to the resulting threat of a double invasion of the Reich, both from the East and from the West", Francesco Tava. Europe should be understood not as an idea but rather as a clash of ideas. (17.07.2014). <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2014/07/17/europe-should-be-understood-not-as-an-idea-but-rather-as-a-clash-of-ideas/>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

the newspapers such as, “Refugee crisis: more and more countries want to close borders; Is Europe becoming a fortress?”⁸⁶¹, “The EU wants to destroy tugboats. It is irresponsible and illegal. You can’t build a wall around Europe.”⁸⁶² These statements utilizing the topos of history drew on the bitter experiences of European history referring to the Second World War and Cold War in narrating the unilateral responses of the member states during the refugee crisis. Accordingly, within the context of the refugee crisis, pro-refugee mainstream political and media discourse ascribed European fortress metaphor in order to connote anti-refugee member states’ indifference to the humanitarian crisis in the European backyard. The employment of the European fortress metaphor revealed the identity-exclusive nature of the anti-refugee sentiments.

When the existent tension among member states stemming from unilateral responses to the crisis escalated because of the terrorist attacks, pro-refugee discourses faced with the anti-refugee discourses revealing their incremental association of Islam with terrorism that help them portray refugees as a threat to the European heritage.⁸⁶³ Argues that threat perceptions can trigger unilateral defensive practices which in return undermined the cooperative norms of the collective identity group.⁸⁶⁴ In this context, pro-refugee discourses constructed refugees as the victims of the terror rather than othering the refugees in framing the emerging security crisis. In this way, they reinforced their arguments constructed on the defenseless and deserving others of the EU. Then deputy CDU chairwoman Julia Klöckner is quoted as saying “It would be completely wrong to condemn refugees across the board now. The people who come to us are fleeing from the terror we saw in Paris. We are in the same boat with them and are not allowed to equate strangers with terror.”⁸⁶⁵ These kinds of discourses aimed to trigger the sense of empathy for the cause of refugees which would contribute to generating community responsibility through constructing the terrorist attacks as a common threat both for the in-group of the European community and for the refugees. In this way, the threat is equated to the Europeans and its others. The boat metaphor employed by her was often given a reference by the political and media discourse throughout the crisis. While the previous connotations of the

⁸⁶¹ Bild. Wird Europa zur Festung? (12.11.2015). <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlingskrise/wird-europa-jetzt-zur-festung-43368732.bild.html>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸⁶² Süddeutsche Zeitung. Europa im Wahnsinn. (19.05.2015). <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/prantls-politik-europaeische-fluechtlingspolitik-1.2484653>. (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁸⁶³ Junuzi, V. (2019). Refugee Crisis or Identity Crisis: Deconstructing the European Refugee Narrative. *Journal of Identity & Migration Studies*, 13(2).

⁸⁶⁴ Alkopher, T. D., & Blanc, E. (2017). Schengen area shaken: the impact of immigration-related threat perceptions on the European security community. *Journal of international relations and development*, 20(3), 511-542.

⁸⁶⁵ Bild. Flüchtlinge nicht mit Terror gleichsetzen!. (14.11.2015). <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/terrorismus/terrorismus-konsequenzen-deutschland-43402820.bild.html>. (Accessed on 16.01.2021).

metaphor ‘boat’ were referring only to the limited space in the 1990s,⁸⁶⁶ during the refugee crisis it gained another implication meaning the refugee-inclusive statements of the discourses. The metaphor was often associated with the dangerous journey of the refugees who risked their lives because of the leaking or sunken boats by the statements framing the crisis. While the far-right employment of the metaphor is associated still with ‘boat is full’⁸⁶⁷ metaphors were used to evoke community responsibility within the mainstream political and media discourse in Germany.

To this end, pro-refugee statements often employed topos of responsibility and topos of humanitarianism in constructing the in-group behavior of European identity with respect to the out-group of refugees. Such statements include: “The Basic Law is clear and unmistakable: Those who are politically persecuted enjoy the right to asylum. The boat is never full for them.”⁸⁶⁸, “The refugee boats show a Europe that scorns the terrible image of a Brussels superstate...The national tendencies must stop.”⁸⁶⁹ Accordingly, intergroup relations constructed by these kinds of discourses rely on the metaphor of boats in some cases to highlight the necessity that ‘we’ have to help ‘them’. In this way, the reluctance of the member states in fulfilling the expected group behavior is also criticized. Such criticisms directed against the unwilling member states to undertake the community responsibility brought forward also the threat of the demise of Schengen, which is constructed as a European space of prosperity:

“There should be a “better burden-sharing” when taking in refugees in Europe. If there is no new solution, the Schengen Agreement, which guarantees free movement, will not last.”⁸⁷⁰(Welt)

“The European Union can fall apart. That can happen incredibly quickly when isolation instead of solidarity, both internally and externally, becomes the rule. Germany and most EU countries have understood that the Geneva Refugee Convention applies...However, “there are also some who really have not internalized the values of the European Union, which are not just material values”. “The glue that holds us together is still the culture of humane values.”⁸⁷¹(Bild)

“It cannot be that Germany, Austria, Sweden and Italy bear the burden alone. That’s not how European solidarity works...and if there is no other option, we should seriously

⁸⁶⁶ Vollmer, B., & Karakayali, S. (2018). The volatility of the discourse on refugees in Germany. *Journal of immigrant & refugee studies*, 16(1-2), 118-139., p.123.

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁸ Bild. Mehr Flüchtlinge in Ostdeutschland unterbringen. (02.08.2015) <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/winfried-kretschmann/fordert-mehr-fluechtlinge-in-ostdeutschland-unterbringen-42034050.bild.html>. (Accessed on 16.01.2021).

⁸⁶⁹ Welt. Hühner haben in Europa mehr Rechte als Flüchtlinge. (04.05.2015) <https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article140482470/Huehner-haben-in-Europa-mehr-Rechte-als-Fluechtlinge.html>. (Accessed on 16.01.2021)

⁸⁷⁰ Welt. Polizeigewerkschaft schließt Grenzkontrollen aus. (10.08.2015). <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article144999531/Polizeigewerkschaft-schliesst-Grenzkontrollen-aus.html>. (Accessed on 17.01.2021)

⁸⁷¹ Bild. Die Krise kann zu einem Krieg führen. (09.11.2015). <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/politik-ausland/luxemburgs-aussenminister-warnt-vor-spaltung-europas-43323410.bild.html>. (Accessed on 17.01.2021)

consider using majority voting as well... Instead of seeking the consensus of all member states, individual ones would then be overruled.”⁸⁷² Frank-Walter Steinmeier

Unilateral responses of the member states were debated also in terms of the weakened European solidarity as in the above-quoted statements of Chancellor Merkel and the newspaper article of the Bild and then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The solidarity frame in covering the crisis was realized through the employment of the topos of threat/danger which was revealed by the disappointment with the social cognition formed upon the expectation that the member states will follow the ingroup behavior. The criticisms are raised through the threat of the demise of the common internal borders, as can be seen within the first two excerpts above. The statements implying the demise of Schengen through topos of threat/danger shattered the discursive constructions of the community of fate during the euro crisis which was utilized in order to justify the formulated bail-out packages. Such discourses of the pro-refugee camp framing the crisis often put forward that the freedom of movement is put in danger because of the anti-refugee member states. They stated that the unilateral responses deemed EU to face both the failure of the historical achievement and the welfare losses stemming from the reintroduction of the border controls within the Union. Thus, statements framing the crisis in relation to the threat of demise of Schengen included accusations to anti-refugee member states and possible introduction of qualified majority voting which means loss of veto power of individual member states.⁸⁷³ While such statements which frame the crisis covertly implying the overwhelming situation in some countries may function as to encourage solidarity among Europeans, they also create a sort of division since they embodied accusations of other countries to a certain extent. In this way, it reinforces the constructions of the internal others within the Union. Accordingly, rather than the essentialist account of the intergroup differentiation between Europeans and refugees, intra-group differentiation based on the different and unilateral responses of the member states associated with the different interpretations of the European values were questioned by the pro-refugee discourse.

7.4. Anti-Refugee Sentiments

As discussed in the previous part, pro-refugee mainstream political and media discourse often relies on the ‘internal othering’ within the in-group of European identity while framing the crisis in terms of solidarity and crisis policies. Accordingly, they mostly explain their

⁸⁷²Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Steinmeier droht im Quoten-Streit mit Mehrheitsentscheidung. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fluechtlinge-steinmeier-droht-im-quoten-streit-mit-mehrheitsentscheidung-1.2653315> (Accessed on 01.03.2022)

⁸⁷³ Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12(2), 291-309., p.291.

welcoming attitude with values of European humanitarian/responsibility perspective. In contrast, anti-refugee sentiments often utilize the positive representation of the European self as an in-group and negative representation of its others. This part will give a focus on such constructions of othering which are mostly based on the intergroup differentiation between ‘us’ the Occident versus ‘others’ the Orient. Based on framed intergroup differentiation, they are mostly inclined to construct the refugees as a threat to the ingroup identity of Europeans.

It is necessary to highlight that the discursive construction of the intergroup differentiation strengthened following the waves of the terror attacks all over Europe and Germany. While terror attacks and the sexual assaults forfeited the initial welcoming waves of the pro-refugee stance of the media and political discourse, anti-refugee discourses of the Pegida movement (abbreviation for the ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident’ (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*)) and the AfD sharpened especially after the sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve of 2016. The attacks on refugees included discursive outgroup derogation as well. The offensive slogans were articulated with a t-shirt printed with offensive pun ‘rapefugees’ stating ‘rapefugees not welcome’⁸⁷⁴ or ‘RefugISIS’ in Europe.⁸⁷⁵ In this respect, the change in the identity construction is correlated to be reflected by the social processes within the society.

Accordingly, the anti-refugee camp became much more visible and prominent than before following the November 2015 and February/December 2016 periods. Also, during the 2017 national election campaigns, it incrementally increased its voice against refugees. Hermanni and Neumann argue that immigration increases the political influence of the AfD in Germany.⁸⁷⁶ In this respect, this can be associated with the electoral success of the AfD in the 2017 national elections, during which it achieved to mobilize the core voters from the right.⁸⁷⁷ Considering the fact that the eruption of the refugee crisis coincided with the AfD’s shift to be a radical far-right party,⁸⁷⁸ analyzing the party’s discourses became critically relevant.

⁸⁷⁴ Welt. Grüner zeigt Bachmann wegen Volksverhetzung an. (10.01.2016). <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article150828327/Gruener-zeigt-Bachmann-wegen-Volksverhetzung-an.html>. (Accessed on 17.01.2021).

⁸⁷⁵ Welt. Lutz Bachmann nutzt Terroralarm zur Provokation. (01.01.2016). <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article150508906/Lutz-Bachmann-nutzt-Terroralarm-zur-Provokation.html>. (Accessed on 17.01.2021).

⁸⁷⁶ Von Hermanni, H., & Neumann, R. (2019). ‘Refugees welcome?’ The interplay between perceived threats and general concerns on the acceptance of refugees—a factorial survey approach in Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45(3), 349-374.

⁸⁷⁷ Marx, P., & Naumann, E. (2018). Do right-wing parties foster welfare chauvinistic attitudes? A longitudinal study of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ in Germany. *Electoral Studies*, 52, 111-116.

⁸⁷⁸ Arzheimer, K., & Berning, C. C. (2019). How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the radical right, 2013–2017. *Electoral Studies*, 60, 102040.

The discourses framing the crisis of the EU became the backbone of the Eurosceptic and anti-refugee stances in Germany. AfD mostly called the refugee arrivals as ‘anarchic influx’⁸⁷⁹ or ‘invasion’⁸⁸⁰ negatively predicting the refugee arrivals as a problem by default, which was discursively covered as the escape of the people from persecution by the mainstream political and media discourse. Counterarguments to the mainstream discourse framing the refugee were formulated in defining their political positions vis-à-vis their political opponents. During this discursive act, the internal othering is also constructed based on the group differentiation between ‘us’ the people (Wir sind das Volk) and ‘them’ the system (The Federal Republic of Germany).

7.4.1. Islam and The Orient as the traditional other of Europe

As already discussed by the previous chapters, the traditional construction of the European self which shapes the conversation about Europeanization is based on culture, history, freedom, values, and norms. Such construction of the ingroup of European forging a sense of belonging to Europe often utilizes the existence and presence of the ‘other’. One of the recent and most prominent arguments discussing the group differentiation between East/West has been Huntington’s thesis clash of civilizations basically arguing the cultural conflict between societies.⁸⁸¹ Within this underlying notion of a clash of civilizations, the discourses produced during the refugee crisis often rely on making the attributes of the refugees thought to be different from the European self thereby increasing the cleave of intergroup differentiation.⁸⁸² In this respect, the flow of people from the external borders of the EU unleashed the discourses of the identity formulated upon the traditional othering of the East/ and Islam, which often reminded Huntington’s cultural conflict thesis. In this respect, the discourses became a tool of marginalization, social exclusion, and disempowerment of the anti-refugee rhetoric:

“Europe is essentially shaped by Greco-Roman antiquity, Judeo-Christianity, the Enlightenment, and human rights. In the spirit of freedom, the rule of law, and democracy, we want to permanently preserve this Europe for ourselves and our descendants. We will defend Europe against an Islam that, based on the Koran and Sunna, is incompatible with the basic European principles of law, freedom, and democracy, that claims to be the only religion to rule and wants to enforce Sharia law.”⁸⁸³

⁸⁷⁹ Welt. AfD will „anarchischen Migranten-Zustrom“ regeln. (24.06.2015). (Accessed on 18.01.2021)

<https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article143010052/AfD-will-anarchischen-Migranten-Zustrom-regeln.html>.

⁸⁸⁰ Alternative für Deutschland. Speech for the demonstration of the AfD Thuringia on September 16, 2015 in Erfurt.

<https://www.afd-thueringen.de/thueringen-2/2015/09/rede-zur-demonstration-der-afd-thueringen-am-16-september-2015-in-erfurt/>. (Accessed on 18.01.2021)

⁸⁸¹ Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? (1993). Foreign Affairs. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations>. (Accessed on 18.01.2021).

⁸⁸² Weiss, R. S. (1995). *Learning from strangers: The art and method of qualitative interview studies*. Simon and Schuster.

⁸⁸³ Alternative für Deutschland. https://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2019/03/AfD_Europawahlprogramm_A5-hoch_web_150319.pdf, p.51.

“Imperialist Islam, which had ruled parts of Europe for centuries since the early Middle Ages, has been expanding in European states for over fifty years due to the immigration of Muslims and their higher birth rate. The integration of most Muslims in Europe is failing... We will not agree with the endangerment of peace, our legal and value system, and our culture through the spread of Islam. We don’t want to become a minority ourselves in a few decades and lose our free and diverse Europe to Islam. The AfD is convinced that only resolute joint action by all European states can prevent the impending Islamization of Europe. Because never in the history of Europe has this danger been as great as it is today.”⁸⁸⁴

The excerpts above demonstrate that the AfD’s historical narratives communicating about the cultural and historical bases of Europe stick with the general construction of the European Self formed upon the historical processes including the Greco-Roman roots, the Enlightenment, development of human rights, freedom, the rule of law and democracy which are presented essentially as the European characteristics. This refers to the ‘inherent criteria’ of the formation of the European identity to exclude its others/outgroups. Such statements were incrementally articulated especially following the successive terrorist attacks in the European member states within the period of February/December 2016.

Both excerpts construct the European cultural homogeneity through giving primacy to cultural, primordialist, and essentialist accounts of the European ‘Self’. This helps construct European identity in a fixed opposition with its culturally alien other i.e., Islam. Both excerpts utilize the topos of history in order to construct Islam as both the ultimate and the historical other of the Europeans. While doing this, the internal group differentiation within Europe was erased by the first excerpt’s reference to the ‘Judeo-Christianity’ which was formed in post-WWII⁸⁸⁵ through eliminating the historical otherness of the Jews.

In both excerpts, Islam is constructed as a threat to the essential property and identity markers of the European identity. Such intergroup differentiation is legitimized through topos of culture and topos of threat presenting the Orient negatively based on the outgroup derogation. The first excerpt situates Islam as a threat to European democracy through constructing it as a political religion shaping the political and social life of the Orient in accordance with Sharia law. This is in line with the general assumption that Islam as a dominant superstructure within the life of the Orient is portrayed fundamentally incompatible with the democracy of the Occident.⁸⁸⁶ In contrast to the incompatibility of Islam, the excerpts covertly refer to the Western trait laicism as a European culture through which the European/Western superiority over others/the Orient is asserted. In this respect, religion is also equated with the culture paving

⁸⁸⁴ Alternative für Deutschland. https://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2019/03/AfD_Europawahlprogramm_A5-hoch_web_150319.pdf, p.52.

⁸⁸⁵ Asad, T. (2003). *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford University Press.

⁸⁸⁶ Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon Books.

way for the construction of the cultural others of Europe. As a result, the Orient is constructed as the cultural, religious, and political other of the Western/European civilization.

The cultural and political incompatibility of the Orient is also highlighted by the second excerpt by referring to the integration problems of the Muslims constructing the intergroup differentiation through topos of culture. In addition, the second excerpt's referral of Islam as an 'imperial' implies the Crusades against Muslim expansion through topos of history. In this way, Islam is constructed as a threat to the Christian world by the topos of threat thereby evoking the spatial othering which draws the spatial boundaries between the Western and Eastern world. Such utilization of the topos of history is associated with negative othering of the Muslim people as an expansionist by also referring to the birthrates of the Muslim population within the constructed homogenous European host society evoking the topos of culture that reinforces the consolidates the intergroup differentiation.

The spatial othering is also conveyed through the deictic expressions such as "we", "our", ourselves, and "they", which culminated in the bases of the ingroup 'us' versus outgroup 'them' as accommodated by both excerpts. These expressions are also collectivized as "our people" as 'all European states' in the face of the constructed threat of Islam. Peck argues that refugees and foreigners in Germany are constantly reminded that they do not belong to the German community.⁸⁸⁷ This also involves the future perspective implying the ultimate their otherness: "The future of Germany and Europe must be secured in the long term. We want to leave a country for our descendants that are still recognizable as our Germany."⁸⁸⁸ Considering the excerpt within the intertextual context where it is produced, it covertly gives the implication that demographic change would transform the European civilization because of the flow of people. In doing this, it utilizes topos of threat which in a way demographic change is implied to have social, political, and cultural repercussions over the identity of Europe and Germany.

7.4.2. The Constructed Perception of Threat as a means of Legitimizing the Intergroup Differentiation and Policy Responses

In addition to the cultural dissimilarity associated with the religious affiliation, the discourse on the intergroup differentiation between refugees and the Europeans utilizes also argumentations of concerns based on the financial burden, public health, and security in Germany. Showing how refugees are othered within the German national political setting is beyond the aim and scope of this research, yet, it is necessary to give few examples of such

⁸⁸⁷ Peck, J. M. (1995). Refugees as foreigners: The problem of becoming German and finding home. *Mistrusting refugees*, 102-25.

⁸⁸⁸ Alternative für Deutschland. Zuwanderung | Asyl. <https://www.afd.de/zuwanderung-asyl/>. (Accessed on 19.01.2021).

othering in order to understand how AfD legitimizes its policy position against the federal government and the EU that create internal othering within the ingroup of European identity. In doing this, it often relies on the intergroup threat. The intergroup threat is analyzed within different categories including physical and material harm, health, and personal security.⁸⁸⁹ AfD often utilizes construction of refugees based on such threat representations:

“We reject any family reunification for refugees because the German social systems could not bear these burdens.”⁸⁹⁰

“Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, there has been a significant increase in infectious diseases, including an increasing number of resistant pathogens.”⁸⁹¹

“Because of lack of security at the external borders, there is an uncontrolled influx of illegally entering foreigners. Borderless Europe created by Schengen Agreement is increasingly posing a threat to the internal security of Europe and creates considerable terrorism risks. Internal security is no longer provided and perpetrators who entered the country illegally often referred to as refugees have become disproportionately high criminals.”⁸⁹²

As the excerpts above show that marginalizing political discourse adopted by the AfD reinforces the othered positions of the refugees within different realms of Germany and Europe as the host society. Such othering mostly utilizes topos of threat by portraying the refugees as a financial, health, and security threat. The first excerpt above mentions the potential negative economic consequences of the reunification of refugees, while the second excerpt refers to the public health concerns represented as stemming from the existence of the refugees. The last excerpt contains the reductionist construction of the refugees as an existential danger to the European community. It addresses the fear of crime as a counterargument to the ‘constructed Europe security community’. Such constructions of the refugees as a security threat is by no means a novel to the international security discourse produced in the post 9/11 era. Fairclough refers to such discourses as ‘discourses of malignity’⁸⁹³ through which overlexicalization is used to present antagonist as malign while representing the protagonists as benign. In this respect, the refugees are often over-lexicalized through illegality, criminals, and terrorism as presented by the last excerpt. The othering based on the topos of threat helps portray Schengen

⁸⁸⁹ Rios, K., Sosa, N., & Osborn, H. (2018). An experimental approach to intergroup threat theory: Manipulations, moderators, and consequences of realistic vs. symbolic threat. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 29(1), 212-255.

⁸⁹⁰ Alternative für Deutschland. Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag. https://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf. (Accessed on 19.01.2021).

⁸⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹² *Ibid.*

⁸⁹³ Fairclough, N. (2005). Blair’s contribution to elaborating a new ‘doctrine of international community’. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 4(1), 41-63., p. 47.

as a threat to the European secure space as well. In this way, it lays the basis for the formulated policy positions of the party.

By and large, the established intergroup differentiation with the aforementioned arguments provided a space for the AfD to legitimize their restrictive refugee policies in Germany. In this sense, the policy responses of the AfD are constructed based on differences between the in-group and out-group situating the refugees as the ultimate other. In addition, such constructions of the formulated responses to the crisis are aimed to delegitimize the policy responses of the government and the EU at the same time. In some cases, this involves scapegoating the federal government and the EU:

“Political elites and institutions of the EU pursue an asylum and immigration policy which puts European civilization in existential danger... The policy of opening borders will result in cultural breakdown and also turn the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy, which have developed in Europe since the Enlightenment, upside down...”⁸⁹⁴

“The AfD, therefore, calls for a fundamental paradigm shift in migration policy. All immigration to Europe must be limited and controlled in such a way that the identity of the European cultural nations is preserved under all circumstances.”⁸⁹⁵

The excerpts combine topos of threat with the topos of reality in order to legitimize the anti-refugee stance of the AfD against the established parties and the EU in general. Topos of threat is used to construct anti-refugee policies as a prerequisite for the endurance of the internal security of Europe as a security community that would be risked upon further refugee arrivals. The established portrayal of refugees as a threat to the defined borders of the European space of security is used to rationalize the marginalization of the formulated policies at the EU and national level. In this respect, the discourses have created a cleavage within the in-group. The rhetoric of the AfD often involves the reference to the ‘old parties’ as the constitutive other whose actions are countered by the AfD. Unity of Europe in pursuing the immigration policy is constructed as undermining of the fundamental principle of the European identity. Accordingly, what presented as the markers of the European identity that invokes the topos of definition and the topos of humanitarianism in defining the ingroup behavior to respond to the crisis by the mainstream political and media discourse is constructed alternately as a danger to the very nature of the European identity by the AfD. In this way, the non-establishment party presented an alternative discourse framing the crisis in relation to the European identity construction during which the old and establishment parties and the European unity are othered.

⁸⁹⁴ Alternative für Deutschland. Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag. https://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf.

⁸⁹⁵ Alternative für Deutschland. Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag. https://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf.

7.5. Conclusion

This chapter has addressed articulations of the European identity construction in the German national political setting during the European refugee crisis. It conducted a detailed qualitative analysis of the political and media discourses communicating about the crisis in relation to the European identity formation. Conducting such an analysis was of critical importance to give a plausible answer to the emerging question of whether the crisis triggered a shift in the articulations of the European identity construction in Germany which represented a unique case by adopting an open-door policy within the Union.

The analysis found out that the construction of ‘otherness’ of refugees in respect to the in-group of European identity is present in both pro-refugee and anti-refugee political parties in Germany. By analyzing the various forms of political discourses, this chapter demonstrated that the construction of the otherness of the refugees is utilized in legitimizing their policy responses within both sides of the political spectrum. Accordingly, it revealed that European identity construction is formed based on the political agenda and policy responses of the political parties. Regarding the media discourse, it is found out that the newspapers analyzed within the limits of this research adopted widely the pro-refugee stance. In this respect, the analysis shows that their discourses and how they are framing the crisis in relation to the European identity and the construction of the refugees as the others of Europe are highly converging with the pro-refugee stance.

By discursively analyzing the large body of data of political discourse, the analysis, highlights that value-based arguments of the pro-refugee discourses contribute to the ingroup favoritism of the EU as a ‘benign protagonist’. In this respect, it is found out that the pro-refugee stance is justified through constructing the refugees as the needy, deserving, and defenseless others of Europe. Accordingly, what is articulated as the German interpretation and construction of European identity is attained through fulfilling the humanitarian responsibility of the member states. Such understanding constructs the expectation of the fixation of the open-door policy as a common ingroup behavior of the Europeans in the way of German interpretation of European identity. In this respect, the German understanding of the European solidarity and the feeling of common responsibility in line with one’s European identity is evaluated according to the member states’ commitment to fair burden-sharing in solving the crisis.

In this light, as the other noteworthy result, this analysis revealed that on the one hand, the open-door policy of Germany is associated with German commitment to the European values as the protector of the common European good. On the other hand, it opens up leeway for the othering of other member states in light of Germany’s commitment to fair burden-

sharing. Therefore, pro-refugee discourses are found out to adopt refugee inclusive identity construction in respect to the intergroup relations, while they contain internal divide and intra-group othering most notably against the CEECs and the Baltic States failing to show solidarity and commitment. This analysis shows that discourses articulated within the German political setting based on the reinforcement of the compliance with the attained values and the norms of the European identity created idiosyncratically a polarization within the in-group of the European identity.

On the other side, the analysis revealed that anti-refugee discourses adopted an alternative way of framing the crisis in relation to the European identity construction. Accordingly, it showed that the different forms of othering and different perceptions of threat are constructed against the refugees in forming their intergroup relations with the ingroup of the Europeans while framing the crisis. The othering is generally culminated in the intergroup differentiation relied on the traditional division between the Orient and the Occident often portrayed as stemming from the incompetency of Islam in complying with the Western values. The threat perceptions, on the other hand, are conveyed mostly through the raised concerns on the public health, financial burden, and security. With these aspects, the refugees as the others constructed as the 'malign antagonist'.

The discursive analysis of the anti-refugee discourse also indicated how the AfD utilizes such discursive acts in order to rationalize and legitimize its anti-refugee position against the government and the establishment parties. The entrenched intergroup differentiation between refugees and Europeans is found out being used as a tool to marginalize the Schengen and the open-door policy of the Federal government of Germany.

In sum, the analysis showed that the construction of otherness is contained by both sides, yet they are attained interpretations and meanings differently by either side in relation to the construction of the European identity while framing the crisis. In this respect, the discourses became a subject of justification, rationalization, and legitimization of the stances of the either side in respect to the refugee crisis. Therefore, the analysis revealed that discourses framing the crisis itself idiosyncratically creates division both at the intra-group and intergroup level of the European identity.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1. Summary of the Empirical Findings

As already discussed by the previous chapters, crises led to insufficiency or overload of the existing mechanisms in solving both crises which deemed member states to formulate temporary/permanent mechanisms in responding to the crises. Accordingly, debating about Europe as well as its formulated policy responses to the crises became incrementally prominent and salient within the national political settings of the member states. The sixth and seventh chapters as the analysis parts of this research have demonstrated how often identity politics and identity dimension is referred by both political and media discourses framing the crises, which validates the established main research inquiries and motivations of the present research. In this respect, the research has shown that the experienced euro and refugee crises of the EU have provided a viable ground for the articulations of the different manifestations of the European identity construction implying 'what it means to be European'. Against the backdrop that crises have opened up leeway for the member states to become less Euro-centric because of the possible dramatic repercussions,⁸⁹⁶ the political and media discourse became a critical tool of disseminating the collective identity construction that may increase citizens' sense of belonging to and identification with Europe. Such identity construction focusing on increasing the level of commitment to ingroup for the sake of the common good of the community is regarded as highly instrumental in convincing European citizens to bear the dramatic consequences and costs of the crises. Thus, an inquiry concentrating on answering how the European identity is manifested and instrumentalized in responding and answering the crises gained critical importance.

Bearing this fact in mind, this research has investigated the political and media discourse framing the crises in respect to the European identity construction within the German case study example. Within a specified timeframe, it conducted a detailed qualitative analysis on how political and media discourse from each side of the political spectrum drawn on the European identity while uncovering the crises. In this way, the study contributed to the enrichment of the literature on the European studies by developing a better understanding of the explanation of the operationalization/instrumentalization of the European identity construction by the discourses framing the crises of the EU. In addition, theoretically speaking, it draws an alternative theoretical guide to the existing theories of European integration through adopting a

⁸⁹⁶ Zielonka, J. (2014). *Is the EU doomed?*. John Wiley & Sons.

multi-disciplinary approach which entailed utilizing the social psychology theory of SIT in approaching the phenomena. The research also contributed to the enrichment of the social identity theory which focuses on the intergroup relations within a social environment by building a bridge between the identity and group dynamics and the crisis context with which an ingroup faced, which is often overlooked within the existing literature. The empirical contribution of the current study accommodates the extension of the empirical body of knowledge in Germany, which has occupied a key, initial, and unique position during both crises in formulating these mechanisms to fight with the crises.

As discussed by the sixth and seventh chapters, the manifestations of the European identity construction are found to differ between two crises during the course of the analysis, which can be explained by the fact that the imperatives of the crises altered considerably. Therefore, the reflections on the findings of the research will be discussed respectively in two different parts.

8.1.1 European identity construction and the Euro crisis

The detailed qualitative analysis of the media and political discourse covering the euro crisis found out that European identity construction is initially manifested through the intra-group differentiation implied the internal othering within the in-group of European identity by both the media and the political discourses. Nevertheless, later they began to be diverging which led us to assume the general conclusion that they generally did not form a unified voice or vision while framing the crisis. This was partially stemming from the deterioration of the crisis in the following phases that deemed the federal government of Germany to take the initiative to prevent further deepening, aggravation, and possible spillover of the crisis which necessitated the instrumentalization of the European identity construction in seeking for the political credits. Moreover, with the establishment of the Eurosceptic party AfD, the further cleavage within the political discourse itself became in question due to the articulation of the different political agendas and understandings of being a European.

The initially converging media and political discourses externalized the crisis rather than claiming a common responsibility for the cause of the community. Accordingly, they revolved around the debates of cultural differences in maintaining and presenting a commitment to the European norms and values in the sense of German *ordo-liberalism* which brought traditional North/South division to the surface. Within such German conception based on the *ordo-liberal* values, traditional good European is constructed as the one that firmly sticks to the European rule of law, norms, and values culminating in the designation of the ingroup behavior for the European communities. On the one hand, such understanding leads to the discursive construction of economically backward member states as the so-called ‘bad Europeans’ failing

to fulfillment of the group behavior. In the middle of such classification, Greeks and Greece were given a particular space and emphasis as a subject to intra-group differentiation. On the other hand, German ordo-liberal based understanding of acting resulted in initial German hesitation that hindered the immediate reaction to the crisis and thereby leading to the aggravation of the economic situation.

This led the crisis to come to the point where an effective policy response under the German initiative would be formulated. The political discourse started to diverge accordingly. In this respect, the study traced a discursive shift from externalization to the internalization of the crisis as a common European crisis in the political discourses. The performed analysis demonstrated that the discourses framing the crisis at the later phases of the crisis by the government and the establishment parties, which were deemed to formulate a solution, instrumentalized the European identity construction while explaining the formulated policy responses to the crisis. It revealed that the European identity construction is manifested through frames of togetherness, solidarity, and community of fate, which played a contributing role in assuring the group cohesiveness. In this respect, European identity construction is manifested in a way to be instrumentalized for political legitimization and justification of possible costs of the crisis for the German public. Within such an act of discursive construction, European identity construction is manifested as an operationalization of consolidating Germany's commitment to the European community, which is regarded as its historical responsibility, vis a vis its historical otherness to Europe.

Here, as another noteworthy result, the study showed that such solidarity-based discursive construction of the European identity was manifested within the limits of 'conditionality', which hinged on the fulfillment of the in-group behavior i.e., the firm compliance of the indebted member states to the strict austerity packages. Such construction of the in-group behavior affirms the European identity construction is manifested through the German understanding of solidarity and interpretation of European identity based on the ordo-liberal ethics, although it later shifted because of the imperatives of the deterioration of the situation.

On the other hand, in contrast to the mainstream political discourse, the discourses of the non-establishment party, AfD, which was originally established as an opposition to the common currency, was shaped to construct the common currency as a threat to the sovereignty of the European nation-states. In fact, the alternative discursive construction by the AfD built a bridge between discourses of nationalism and populism in manifesting internal othering which was based on the positioning of the German people as against its enemies i.e., EU, Euro, the process

of European identity formation. Thus, European identity, which was presented as a part of the top-down process driven by the EU elites, was constructed as the other of the German citizens. In this respect, European identity construction is manifested through being internally othered that locates the in-group of European identity in the position of the 'other' in respect to the German citizens which serves for the intra-group differentiation. The function aimed via such construction differs considerably from the mainstream political discourses.

Media discourses did not present such sharp divergences within themselves as in the political discourse, since the general stance is shaped in terms of the cultural differences of the indebted member states in framing the crisis. Nevertheless, the levels of critical stances of the media discourses differ in constructing the group differentiation. Accordingly, the analysis showed that the harshest criticisms came from the Bild newspaper that did run an anti-Greek campaign throughout the crisis, while Welt adopted a milder but still critical position. On the other hand, the discourses adopted by the Süddeutsche newspaper were sometimes converging with the mainstream political discourses in terms of the manifestation of the European identity through European solidarity, group cohesion, and German commitment to the preservation of the common currency to great extent.

8.1.2. European identity construction and the refugee crisis

The performed discourse analysis of the media and political discourse covering the refugee crisis found out that regardless of the political leaning and stance in respect to the crisis, the European identity construction is manifested as a tool of both internal and external othering to bolster both intra- and inter-group differentiation. It demonstrated that the pro-refugee stance adopted by the media discourses regardless of their political leanings exhibited often external othering vis a vis the in-group of the European community presented as a community of humanitarian responsibility. Therefore, they were highly converging with the pro-refugee mainstream political discourses. In this respect, the divergences between the political and media discourses manifesting the European identity construction in framing the crisis can be traced in accordance with their having whether pro-refugee or anti-refugee stances.

The research showed that media and political discourses that employed pro-refugee stance expressed two-folded othering within the construction of the European identity. The external othering relied on the construction of the refugees as the needy, deserving and defenseless others of the EU. Thus, European identity construction is manifested in a way to invoke a formation of an in-group behavior for the European community which would imply the behavior of welcoming refugees for the member states. In this respect, the inter-group differentiation and intergroup bias embodied within such discursive construction remain to be

considerably limited. Accordingly, the study showed the European identity construction is manifested through external othering that functions as an inclusive identity towards its 'needy' others. In addition to such othering invoking the European values of humanitarian responsibility, European identity construction was also manifested as an instrument to evoke a sense of commitment to the solidarity for the common good of the Europeans as in-group, in the face of the overloaded mechanisms of the southern member states because of the crisis. While doing so, the pro-refugee discourses highlighted an in-group favoritism of the European identity as a source of self-esteem for the members i.e., the European citizens through topos of humanitarianism and topos of culture which implied showing solidarity with overloaded member states and welcoming refugees. On the one hand, the constructed in-group behavior which was associated with the European humanitarian values and norms as the identity markers of the in-group of the European community serves as a means of political legitimization and justification for the open-door policy of the federal government. In this respect, the study showed how the European identity construction is instrumentalized for the political calculations. On the other hand, the existence of the anti-refugee member states refusing to comply with such constructed in-group behavior for the European community led to the internalization of the crisis culminating in the eventual internal othering within the pro-refugee discourses.

The unwillingness of those member states is often handled through solidarity and burden sharing-based argumentations by the pro-refugee media and political discourses employing inclusive-identity in respect to Europe's other. They illustrate solidarity as the demonstration of willingness by the Europeans as an in-group to sacrifice for the common European good in realizing the necessities of being an in-group of the European community. Accordingly, the in-compliance of those member states in adopting in-group behavior is often read as a reluctance to render European solidarity leading to the intra-group differentiation. With regard to this, topos of threat are utilized within such internal othering against the anti-refugee member states which are constructed as deeming European in-group to lose its status by not following the framed European commitment to the humanitarian values, norms.

In fact, the performed discourse analysis presented descriptions of the others are constructed for some purpose fulfilling different functions leading to different consequences in terms of social perception for both sides of the political spectrum. Regarding the other side of the political spectrum, the study revealed that anti-refugee stances that were incorporated sometimes also with anti-European sentiments were predominantly expressed by the AfD. The performed discourse analysis found out that anti-refugee discourses also exhibited two-folded

othering including both internal and external. Nevertheless, the way how they employ internal and external othering differs highly from the pro-refugee discursive constructions. During the course of the crisis, the incremental shift of the party towards being far-right was traced by its discursive construction of the EU as the other of German citizens. In this respect, European-level formulated solutions were also presented as a threat to the in-group of German community. That implied intragroup differentiation vis a vis the in-group of European identity. However, external othering directed against the refugees idiosyncratically utilized cultural and primordialist essentialist accounts of the European 'Self'. Accordingly, the discourses constructed inter-group differentiation as the European self/European community as a whole versus its others.

The constructed inter-group differentiation involved out-group discrimination and out-group derogation implying the in-group favoritism and bias of the European self. The discourses revolved mainly in two categories, refugees as cultural aliens and refugees as a security threat to the European community. Accordingly, the cultural-based othering referred to the incompetence of the Orient with the developed homogenous European systems of norms, values, freedoms, and rule of law which is commonly explained with religious-based associations that Islam is incompatible with the Western values. In this way, the traditional east/west divide was resurfaced. Moreover, the emphasis on the Greco-Roman roots and process of Europeanization contributed locate refugees as 'the Orient' as the ultimate and historical other of the European societies. Based on the established inter-group differentiation, the discursive act of securitization was employed to construct cultural security representing refugees as an external danger for the survival of the Western civilization.

In addition to the cultural securitization, external othering against refugees, vis a vis the European community, was constructed through representing refugees as an existential threat also to the internal security of the European peaceful society. In a context where the successive terrorist attacks were conducted, what started as a refugee crisis developed into a security crisis. Thus, anti-refugee discourses of the AfD found a viable place for the negative rendering of migration directed towards refugees and asylum seekers. The internal securitization contained security connotations of illegal and criminal activities, terrorist attacks, which were highly interlinked with the asylum seekers and refugees. Moreover, internal securitization also covered argumentations of concerns based on the financial burden, public health.

In this light, the study showed that European identity construction is manifested by AfD through situating it facing the external dangers coming from the out-groups that expose the identity markers of the in-group and European space to the existential threats. In doing such

manifestation of the European identity implying the protection of the fragile in-group prone to the danger/threat from the out-groups, AfD proposes the restriction of the population flow. In this respect, European identity construction as manifested within the inter-group differentiation instrumentalized to justify and legitimize the discriminatory attitudes towards and exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers of the political party. In this respect, the European identity construction can be assumed to be employed by the AfD to claim political credits.

As a sum of the findings of the analysis of both crises, the research revealed that different phases of the crises have involved different discursive practices of identity construction, thus, the first hypothesis, ‘change in the identity construction is correlated to be reflected by the social processes within the society’ is proven to be right. Although identity construction encompasses different angles as per each crisis, it has been mainly within the German understanding of the European identity. Therefore, the second hypothesis, ‘The manifestations of the European identity construction appeared differently in framing the different EU crises’ is proven to be wrong.

8.2. Limitations and Future Research

The thesis has important theoretical and empirical contributions to the existing literature on the European studies dealing with the crises from the nexus of identity construction. Considering the existent gap in the literature that the traditional EU integration theories are failing to provide a plausible account on explaining the identity dimension of the crises, this research has provided a concrete ground for future research agenda that can build a new theoretical framework keeping social psychological factors in mind. The traditional theories of European integration namely, liberal intergovernmentalism by Moravcsik⁸⁹⁷ and neo-functionalism by Haas⁸⁹⁸ have no emphasis on identity politics⁸⁹⁹. Moreover, they have partially failed to explain the euro and refugee crises. Post-functionalist theory recently developed by Hooghe and Marks⁹⁰⁰ gives priority to factors of ‘identity’ and ‘the mass public opinion’ while explaining the European integration process. It argues that there has been a recent shift from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’⁹⁰¹ within the European public would have supposedly posed a certain restriction for further deepening of the European integration process. Therefore, it does not offer a plausible account for the Euro crisis which resulted in the

⁸⁹⁷ Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe*. Princeton University Press.

⁸⁹⁸ Haas, E. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford University Press.

⁸⁹⁹ Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2018). From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration theories, politicization, and identity politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1), 83-108., p. 84.

⁹⁰⁰ Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining. *British journal of political science*, 1-23.

⁹⁰¹ *Ibid*.

deepening of the fiscal integration despite the asserted shift within the European public. Thus, there is a gap in the literature in terms of explaining the European integration process and its setbacks by taking identity politics into account through keeping social psychological factors in mind. Through linking socio-psychological factors such as sense of belonging, social identification, group memberships, intra/intergroup relations within the German political context, the research contributed to social psychological knowledge of the European integration process. Such contribution is especially on the nexus of the manifestation and operationalization/ instrumentalization of the European identity construction. Theoretically, it drew an alternative theoretical guide to the existing theories of European integration through adopting a multi-disciplinary approach which entailed utilizing the social psychology theory of SIT. Empirically this research went one step further of the existing studies by adding empirical data on the European identity in Germany.

However, there are some issues of limitations that need to be addressed for future research implications. Firstly, methodologically speaking, the study relies on a case-study of Germany in approaching the nexus between identity construction and crisis framing. That hinders the generalization of the findings to other member states on this issue. Thus, one of the low levels of generalizability can be mentioned as one of the limitations. Here, the language competency-related limitations of the study arise. Since the discourse analysis is conducted in the native language of the case study country to present an in-depth study, it was limited for the language skills of the researcher. For the future research agenda, different language competencies can be incorporated to provide interesting and valuable comparative studies across member states. That would also increase the levels of generalizability of such research.

Moreover, within the designated time span, the research has focused only on the euro and refugee crises of the EU. At the time of writing this thesis, the Brexit and coronavirus crises have vastly occupied the EU's agenda. Moreover, Angela Merkel's legacy was replaced in 2021 elections. The repercussions of her departure and new Chancellor Olaf Scholz's route in terms of changes and different emphases remain yet to be seen and need to be taken into account for European politics and the future direction of European integration. In addition, due to the current Russian-Ukrainian war, nearly 3 million people had to be displaced from Ukraine in recent weeks, most of them seeking refuge in neighboring countries. The new challenge of 'migration' along with the new security and geopolitical threats to the eastern neighboring of the EU will be on the EU's agenda. That would be definitely a new dimension on the discussion about the European identity and crisis of migration, which also needs to be visited also together with the German socio-political context as well.

Consequently, future research based on the qualitative analysis tracking the construction of identity by the discourses framing those crises can also provide valuable insights in terms of demonstrating future developments in European identity construction in the context of the other forms of crises each have brought about different imperatives for the member states to assure European togetherness and commitment to the common European good.

As another implication for the future research agenda, the employed discourse analysis may be referred to. Accordingly, this research has utilized the CDA in approaching the analysis of the produced text and material. CDA is criticized on the grounds that it focuses on the meaning put into the produced discourse which possibly opens up a gap between what the meaning of the addresser aimed and interpretation of this meaning by the addressee⁹⁰². This is because the function of the discourse is determined by the addressee's already existent knowledge and beliefs⁹⁰³. Since the research is intended to enlighten such hidden meanings and power relations by the producer side, this is beyond the scope and motivations of this research. However, future research analyzing the addressee's interpretation of the meaning of the produced discourse might reveal how the repercussions of the identity construction may work in the mind and sense of belongings of the European citizens. Such analysis utilizing different forms of methods either qualitative or quantitative may give also valuable input. Hence, I believe that further research on European identity construction within both different contexts and different methodological frameworks may expand and deepen our understanding of the transaction between crisis and identity construction.

⁹⁰² Tenorio, E. H. (2011). Critical discourse analysis, an overview. *Nordic journal of English studies*, 10(1), 183-210., p.195.

⁹⁰³ *Ibid.*

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