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THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MIGRATION

A Critical Cosmopolitan Care Approach
Institute of Social and Political Science

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Doctoral Dissertation

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List of Abbreviations

CCC A Critical Cosmopolitan Care approach to migration

ToJ A Theory of Justice (1999 [1971]) by John Rawls

PL Political Liberalism (2005 [1993]) by John Rawls


RLoP A Republican Law of Peoples (2010) by Philip Pettit

CSP The Closed System Premise

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN United Nations

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Migration is an ineliminable feature of human life. However, it is common to see it as a problem. Indeed, numerous social, political, economic, and environmental challenges arise in relation to the reasons, the process itself, the outcomes, and later impacts of human migration. The dissertation investigates the proper place of migration in our lives and, at the same time, formulates a political theoretical approach that addresses so-far undervalued dimensions of human migration and movement. This chapter aims to offer some introductory remarks about the followings. Section 1.1. shows why it is essential to revisit our ideas about migration; Section 1.2. sketches how contemporary discussions frame the issue, and why it is problematic; Section 1.3. summarizes the fundamental elements of an alternative Critical Cosmopolitan Care approach to migration; Section 1.4. outlines the main tenets of the argument; and Section 1.4. outlines the structure of the dissertation.

1.1. Migration: An Issue?

Political theoretical works on migration usually begin with shocking or even outrageous stories about the death and suffering of migrant people. Most of us are informed about some of these tragedies of persons on the move and ‘outsiders’ thankfully to the world press. We are sometimes even familiar with the names of these people who came into the spotlight either because of the battles they fought for their rights or the tragedies which caused their violent death.

This work is as much about these people as those without a name. When I am saying ‘without a name’, I have two things in mind. Apparently, I am thinking about
the refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, immigrants, so-called resident aliens, and members of ethnic minorities whose individual sufferings are collectively represented in the stories that have gained public attention. But I also have in mind another person who is ‘nameless’. This person is *the migrant* whom all of us might become. This is the person who might move voluntarily, partly voluntarily, or coerced to move by force, for some reason; either from one area of her home country to another or by crossing state-borders. Her movement might be of a short period, recurring, or continuous. And her movement could fundamentally affect her fate, her future, her possibilities, and the very foundations of the security and decency of her life. In some senses, all of us are this individual concerning that there is an ongoing possibility of human life that a person migrates in one way or another.

This dissertation is about this permanent characteristic of social and political life. It is not only an empathetic or solidaristic attempt to raise awareness of the challenges, dangers, and sufferings, which we could all face in case of becoming a migrant. It is also an inquiry to understand what migration really is, and to get closer to recognize the fundamental role that human movement and migration plays in our social and political communities.

### 1.2. Migration in the Literature

The term ‘migration’ originally derives from the Latin term *migrare* that means ‘to move from one place to another’. Later, migration has become to be seen as ‘change of residence and habitat, removal or transit from one locality to another, especially at distance’.¹

In this broad sense, migration is intertwined with human existence ever since early humans left Africa and a group of them arrived at the Australian shores at least 40,000 years ago. Interestingly, migration in this broader sense is still relatively unrecognized in political thought. While both ancient and modern political philosophy has addressed other issues of social and political relevance, the political theory and the ethics of migration came to the fore only in the past three decades. The inquiry about the topic is still partial and impoverished because political theorists and ethicists focus mainly on the admission and inclusion of immigrant people to host countries. Concerning admission, the mainstream liberal literature is occupied primarily with the debate about closed versus open borders (the latter usually formulated as a position for more open borders, referring to a dissatisfaction with the status quo). In this regard, the fundamental question is whether the state has a right to restrict immigration. Regarding inclusion, political theory focuses on whether and how non-citizens should be included in societies and what challenges the inclusion of non-native populations inflicts.

I do not deny the importance of these questions. Our societies are constantly changing, and with the current acceleration of technological and informational developments and expanding possibilities and modes in human movement, these changes are hastened to a visible extent. Immigrants indeed have an impact on the number and composition of the population, culture, economy, environment, and politics of contemporary societies, but also on their fundamental values and norms. What I believe to be a mistake, however, is to give unproportionate attention to these

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2 There is a debate whether a distinction should be made between political philosophy and political theory, and if this is so the case, what is their relationship to each other (see, for example, Smith 2021 in relation to my argument in Chapter 2.). Although, I find this an interesting question from the perspective of how one should do political theorizing, it does not straightforwardly affect the argument of this dissertation, therefore, I will not distinguish between them here.
problems inflicted by migration, and especially, by migrants themselves, and to frame them as irreversible changes and threats to the otherwise seemingly persistent states. In my view, the problem with this framing is twofold: first, it offers a partial view about migration by implying that the pivotal momentum of migration is when a migrant crosses the territorial borders of a country. In this framing, the diverse reasons for such movement, the effects of migration on countries of origin, and on migrants themselves, including their future prospects, remain of secondary importance. Second, such an approach to migration is necessarily intertwined with the viewpoint of host states and their population, while the perspective of the migrant appears as the viewpoint of the ‘other’, the ‘stranger’, the ‘alien’.

In my view, the current mainstream political theoretical literature on migration must be complemented with a more complex view of migration. It means that the political theory of migration should descriptively, analytically, normatively, and prescriptively address migration in its broader sense and pay particular attention to the challenges in migration per se. In other words, besides their effects on destination countries, the intrinsic dangers of movement and migration must be equally considered. Consequently, this perspective implies

(1) a more complex understanding of how borders and boundaries affect people’s lives (depending on one’s gender, race, social class, ethnicity, age, and other social characteristics) and the spatial and temporal nature of migration controls (that does not only occur at state borders nor at the exact moment of admission);

(2) an equal consideration of domestic and regional, as well as circular and seasonal migration besides the more frequently addressed international migration and refuge;
(3) the recognition of the uncertainities and losses inherent in movement and migration concerning the voice, rights, statuses, properties, and welfare of migrants; and

(4) an awareness of the deep alliance between movement and the exclusion from different levels of the political sphere.

I do not claim that the contemporary political theory of migration should be abandoned for the viewpoint of 'the migrant'. Instead, I argue that to be successful, it must acknowledge the complex nature of migration and address it with a keener eye.

1.3. A Critical Cosmopolitan Care Approach to Migration

The aim of the dissertation is twofold. First, it critically examines the current state of the literature. In doing so, it puts forward a two-pronged criticism of the mainstream political theory of migration: on the epistemological level of the argument, it criticizes the most prominent works for their bias towards methodological nationalism, by which they treat the nation-state in an inadequate way and give preference to immobility, sedentariness at the expense of mobility, motion, and change. On the normative level, it challenges what I call the host standpoint of the mainstream literature, manifested in what I label as the thesis of benevolent superiority and the alarmist agenda. The argument in this regard is that the normative discussion about migration is addressed from a perspective analogous to the viewpoint of host or destination states; and this partial approach leaves out several essential elements of migration from consideration.

The second aim of the dissertation is to outline an alternative approach to migration on both levels of the argument. On the epistemological level, methodological nationalism is substituted with critical cosmopolitanism, which includes a more complex understanding of borders and boundaries in its agenda and
describes migration as a broader phenomenon with various possible forms, reasons, and effects. On the normative level, the host standpoint is supplemented with a feminist *care* approach to the ethics and politics of migration. The care approach is intended to highlight the limitations of the individualistic and universalistic ethical and political theories and offers a perspective to migration in which care and vulnerability gain moral importance, and the recognition of others and ‘otherness’, as well as the interconnectedness of the world are properly addressed.

The resulting approach to migration is what I call the *Critical Cosmopolitan Care* (CCC) approach which aims not only to critically examine the current discussions about migration but also to offer a substantive solution to it (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Epistemological level</th>
<th>The Mainstream Political Theory of Migration</th>
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<td>Normative level</td>
<td>The <em>Host Standpoint</em></td>
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Table 1. Mainstream approaches to migration versus a CCC Approach

1.4. The Main Tenets of the Argument

Migration and mobility are considered more and more salient topics in different disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, ethnography, migration studies, empirical political science, and of course, normative political theory. Although this doctoral dissertation focuses on the latter and offers criticism and a corresponding answer to the normative political theory of migration, it also draws upon the findings of other disciplines. Therefore, this work is interdisciplinary in the sense that it does not confine itself to the boundaries of influential normative debates on migration and borders. On one hand, it originates partly on the empirical realities of human movement and migration, but on the other hand, it builds on the belief that thinking about our social
and political circumstances in a way of how we could remedy certain wrongs, injustices, and dangers is more than experimenting with ideas in an ivory tower.

The dissertation is a programmatic work for altering our thinking on human migration in a way that helps us to formulate the right and relevant answers and even policy solutions to address movement, migration as well as the rights and obligations connected to the movement of persons not only during times of their actual movement but also prior and after that.

According to the International Migration Report 2019 (UN 2019) in the year 2017 around 272 million people has not lived in their country of birth which means a constant growth in the number of migrants living abroad (for example, in 1990, this number was 153 million worldwide, while in 1970, the estimated number was around 84 million). Among these people around 48 percent has been girls and women.\(^3\) According to the Global Trends Forced Displacement 2021 (UNHCR 2021) at the end of 2021, an estimated 89.3 million people were forced to leave their homes. Among these people, around 53.2 million were displaced internally.\(^4\) The World Migration Report 2022 (IOM 2022) showed that although the COVID-19 Pandemic with strict travel restrictions from the parts of governments worldwide resulted in unprecedented immobility, it affected migrant people’s lives in several ways: people were prevented to leave their residence, great numbers of persons were stranded in transit or host countries or even in refugee camps with exceptionally high health risk factors.\(^5\) Soon after the continuous suspension of pandemic restrictions, the war of Russia against Ukraine from 2022 forced more than 7.89 million Ukrainians fled their home country.

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up to now. This number can be contrasted with the 2015 Refugee Crisis when around 65.3 people were forcibly displaced worldwide (UNHCR 2015). The interpretation of these numbers could be manifold, however, it is clear that there are several tragic and less tragic reasons that make plenty of people a migrant, and that migration and movement are not likely to disappear from human life for quite some time.

In practice, there are several attempts to regulate human migration globally, for example the Global Compact on Refugees (UN 2018a) and the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (UN 2018b). However, as Santos (2021) shows, the Compacts offer a comprehensive framework for the displacement of refugees and migrants in a way that leaves much room for sovereign states to voluntarily consider the implementation of the suggested mechanism. Moreover, as Shachar (2022), for example, shows, states can selectively control access to their territory and membership by playing around with the norms via different mechanisms in a way that prevents migrants and refugees from getting into contact with transit or host states, making it difficult for them to appear as migrants and refugees with consecutive claims.

The manipulative techniques and policies are often coupled with hostile narratives towards migrants and refugees in the public discourse, such as in the case of Donald Trump’s wall on the US-Mexico border or the adversary communication and policies towards ‘immigrants’ of Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister. These examples along with Brexit show how international movement as well as borders and boundaries in territory and membership became highly politicized topics in public discourse. And the discourse is often built on fears connected to the cultural, economic,

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8 https://www.unhcr.org/5c658aed4 Accessed: 04 December 2022
and other threats that people on the move might bear on transit and host states and their societies.

The dissertation offers a view on migration that challenges the implicit ideas underlying these fear-focused discourses that asymmetrically highlight the aspect of viewing migration from the perspective of host states, and more broadly, immobility. It starts from the impression that human movement and migration are neutral natural facts of our lives, and that their inherent dangers and vulnerabilities on migrants must be equally considered through the means of normative political theorizing as the threats of the movement of these people for host countries.

The main idea behind this work is to argue that there are indeed answers to these problems inflicted by migration in contemporary mainstream normative political theory of migration, these answers are partly unsatisfactory in depicting what human migration truly is, analyzing its own underlying problems, and offering the right normative answers for it. This work is purely normative in the sense that it does not contain own empirical findings, however, the critique and the answers this work offers build on existing literature on normative political theory as well as ‘theoretically grounded normative theory’ (Ackerly et al. 2021) or ‘unified political theory’ (Bauböck 2008). It also borrows ideas and results from more interdisciplinary research for strengthening its arguments.

An important preliminary example of the interdisciplinary sensitivity behind this work is related to the very notion of the migrant and migration. While most of normative theory focuses on immigration, the dissertation borrows a broader definition of these concepts from other disciplines (such as migration studies, sociology, and demography studies)\(^\text{10}\), that give equal consideration to a broad range of migrant

\(^{10}\) See for example: Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. (2014), or Weinstein – Pillay (2016).
persons, such as long-term non-citizen residents, temporary and guest workers, circular migrants, foreign students, visitors and, of course, refugees, asylum seekers, trafficked persons, and forcedly displaced people. It is also particularly sensitive to the different social characteristics of migrant people, such as race, gender, social class, and age that can seriously affect their migratory experiences. Furthermore, the dissertation offers a broader understanding of migration: it reflects on the similarities and correlations between international and internal migration, while giving space to understand the dimension of emigration. The work is also deeply committed to the idea to theorize migration not only as a phenomenon during persons’ movement but also as something that affects our lives before attempting to migrate and long after we have migrated.

This work is placed on the more critical side of contemporary debates about the political theory of migration. It attempts to show that there is indeed a wide normative literature on migration, however, this influential literature is inapt to offer answers for several issues on human movement, and the reasons for these are rather systematic underlying biases in the way we conceive of political theorizing (and, more broadly, how we are doing social sciences) rather than results of ad hoc inaccuracies. In order to formulate this criticism, it welcomes a broad range of alternative research on the topic, however, it does not stop here. It also offers one possible solution, which is partly feminist, to show that migration is a broader and more profound part of human life with its diverse and serious implications on our lives. It does not claim that the mainstream literature and its focus on the admission and inclusion of migrants would not be of huge importance, rather, it re-oriens normative political theory of migration to equally consider more aspects of migration, and in doing so, to challenge the ways in which we typically answer the questions around migration. In this sense, the Critical
Cosmopolitan Care approach that the dissertation offers as a solution is a novel approach rather than a novel substantive theory for normative political theorizing.

The novel approach implies a framework that might highlight diverse implications. To offer a brief, non-exhaustive list of these, the CCC might show that:

1. migration is gendered, most strikingly in the case of the global care chain in which the (usually low-wage and low level of social standing) work of maintaining daily life in households of the North is performed predominantly by immigrant women;

2. there are forms of migration, such as circular and seasonal, as well as domestic or regional migration, that do not involve claims of long-term residence nor citizenship status, although inflict really different kinds of vulnerabilities on the parts of the involved people that might be as serious as the difficulties of immigrants face;

3. discriminatory and strict border policies, racism, and sexism might affect the very attempt to migrate for populations whose movement would involve a high risk of failure in getting to the destination or living a decent life in transit or destination countries (as well as the fear of failing to grant a decent life for descendants might affect the very choice to migrate);

4. hence social statuses and benefits often depend on residence, membership, and language skills in a certain political community, every movement, from the worst-off to the better-off might involve serious, sometimes even life-threatening effects for the people on the move.
1.5. The Structure of the Doctoral Dissertation

The structure of the dissertation is as follows. The First Part considers the current state of the art with a critical stance.

Chapter 2. offers a literature review on the political theory of migration. Section 2.1. highlights that migration has been an absent or at least a marginal issue in the history of political thought and offers some uncommon appraisals of the topic. Section 2.2. demonstrates how migration has been formulated as a problem from the emergence of contemporary political theory. For illustrating this framing of the issue, Subsection 2.2.1. demonstrates how the topic of migration appears in the works of John Rawls and outlines the characteristics of a Rawlsian legacy to the later distinctively emerging field of the political theory of migration; while Subsection 2.2.2. demonstrates how this Rawlsian legacy permeates the most systematic work on contemporary republican political theory, namely Philip Pettit’s republicanism as well.

Section 2.3. reviews the contemporary literature of the political theory of migration as a distinct field of inquiry and portrays its main topics and debates.

Chapter 3. offers a comprehensive criticism of this literature. Section 3.1. outlines the circumstances in which what I regard as the dual bias of the political theory of migration appears. Section 3.2. elaborates on one part of this dual bias. Subsection 3.2.1. shows how methodological nationalism permeates social scientific research, and Subsection 3.2.2. demonstrates how this borrowed notion of methodological nationalism can be interpreted with regard to normative discussions about migration. Section 3.3. elaborates on the other part of the dual bias: the host standpoint represented by normative inquiry on the topic. First, Subsection 3.2.1. offers an argument about how the unique language of political theory predetermines the way migration appears in the literature. Then, Subsection 3.2.2. demonstrates how
the host standpoint is manifested in the thesis of *benevolent superiority* of the work of advocates of justice and human rights; and finally, Subsection 3.2.3. shows that the same perspective is applied in the *alarmist agenda* of migration.

The **Second Part** constitutes the formulation of a *substantive* approach to the political theory of migration that I call the *Critical Cosmopolitan Care (CCC)* approach. Chapter 4. sketches the basics for *critical cosmopolitanism* on the epistemological level: Section 4.1. outlines the characteristics of the existing critical cosmopolitan or methodological cosmopolitan agenda, while Section 4.2. displays this agenda as a framework for understanding migration.

Chapter 5. outlines the normative part of the argument: it presents *care* as an ethical and political theory applicable to addressing migration. Section 5.1. offers an argument for why the political theory of migration should invoke empirical, political theoretical, and ethical arguments of various *feminisms*. Section 5.2. sketches a framework of *care* for the normative inquiry of migration.

Chapter 6. deals with the *implications* of the CCC approach for migration. Section 6.1. summarizes three more abstract and three more practical *implications*. Section 6.2. explores the possible *objections* to the CCC approach. Section 6.3. displays the similarities of *feminism and republicanism* by offering a specific joint interpretation of both streams, embodied by the notion of *dispossession*. Therefore, the section offers an indirect justification for the abundance of the feminist potential in overcoming the flaws of mainstream literature. Section 6.4. offers a similar indirect argument for the substantive content of the CCC approach: it argues that besides feminism and republicanism, Judith Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’, and Hannah Arendt’s notion of ‘the right to have rights’ are similarly capable of highlighting the nature of what contemporary political realists call the distinctive *political normativity*, specifically expressed here in the notion of *exclusion*. Moreover, this section
formulates an argument that this characteristically ‘political’ exclusion is inherent in movement and migration, therefore, it should gain specific attention when addressing migration.

Finally, **Chapter 7.** concludes the overall argument.
Chapter 2. Migration as a Political Theoretical Issue: A Literature Review

Migration is an exceptional topic in political thought in the sense that it has only been recognized as a central topic of inquiry in the past few decades. The interesting paradox in this late recognition of the topic is not only that people have always been moving (at least, if they were not restricted from or compelled not to do so), but also, most of the earth’s population have always been deprived of citizenship rights. Therefore, from a historical view, it would be mistaken to regard the migrant as the exception. The chapter offers an overview of how migration appears in normative political thought.

Section 2.1. addresses how migration appeared as a marginal issue in the history of political thought. Section 2.2. shows that with the emergence of contemporary political philosophy, migration was assigned a secondary role, and it has long remained not only relatively unimportant, but also as a problem for Western political thought. Subsection 2.2.1. sketches how the topic appears in the works of John Rawls, who is, perhaps, the most influential theorist of the 20th century, and it highlights the elements of a Rawlsian framework of political theorizing in which migration is appointed an odd, circular status. Subsection 2.2.2. shows that despite the potential of contemporary republican political theory in eschewing the limitations of the Rawlsian approach of migration, the Rawlsian legacy lives on in the ideas of Philip Pettit, who has the most systematic work of contemporary republicanism. Section 2.3. contains a literature review of the contemporary political theory of migration, with attention to the most influential topics, debates, and authors of the mainstream literature, and with equal consideration to less influential, alternative approaches that challenge some presuppositions of the mainstream.
2.1. Migration as an Absent Issue in the History of Political Thought

Normative inquiry of migration is a relatively novel invention in political theory. In political thought, migration has mostly been an unimportant, marginal, if not absent issue. Although the role of ‘strangers’ in the history of political communities is undeniable, the thorough investigation of the non-members of the political community has been long-awaited. It is undeniable that the conceptualization of movement may be challenging, as any other phenomena for which change and transformation are essential constituents. It is also beyond dispute that political thought has always favored the ‘domestic’ against the ‘outside’ world, and the ‘citizen’ against the ‘alien’. However, there are arguments about migration in Antique and classical political thought, to which, in the following, I offer some brief insights.

‘Metics’ (metoikoi) in ancient Athens has been a significant in size, albeit disenfranchised population of resident aliens, considered inferior to Athenian citizens. Euripides’ play Ion (Kasimis 2013; 2018), Plato’s Republic (Bogiaris 2020) and Crito (Kasimis 2018, Kirkpatrick 2015), Demosthenes’ Speeches (Kasimis 2018), and even The Politics from Aristotle, a metic himself (Walzer 1983, pp. 53–55), are sources of the issue of this odd status which is, simultaneously, an insider and an outsider status. These works can show us that even way before the birth of the modern state with its practices of establishing membership (primarily by birth, and secondly, by naturalization), migration had entailed serious moral and political costs for individuals. These works are also sources for ideas on the issue of exclusion, the issue of birth descent or what we call now a ‘birthright’ citizenship, questions of identity, and problems around the infringement of free movement.

An inescapable momentum in the history of human movement was the birth of the modern territorial state with the creation of the Westphalian world order and the
emergence of the modern conception of state sovereignty. It is not surprising that a later ancestor of contemporary discussions about the issue of migration is Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* (2006 [1795]) (which is also the ancestor of certain forms of contemporary cosmopolitanism), an essay in which Kant formulates three definitive articles for perpetual peace among states. For Kant, a fundamental conception that ought to regulate the conduct of states toward strangers is *hospitality* (a right to visit and not be treated with hostility), which is regarded as a right, rather than mere philanthropy in the Kantian framework. Kant connects his argument to the fact of the territorial sphericity of the earth, and he condemns a world-state, among other arguments which are echoed and debated in contemporary political theorizing (Benhabib 2004; Bohman – Lutz-Bahmann 1997).

In *Utilitarianism*, published in 1863, John Stuart Mill defended colonialism (Bell 2010), while Sidgwick’s argument in the *Elements of Politics* (1897) is more nuanced regarding the principle of mutual non-interference and the states’ right to exclude non-members (Sager 2016a). The notion of the ‘right to have rights’ by Hannah Arendt, who has been a refugee herself, is also an honor to the issue of migration (Benhabib 2004; De Gooyer et al. 2018).

Michael Walzer’s chapter on *membership* in his *Spheres of Justice* (1983) is often regarded as an antecedent of the migration literature. Building on his communitarianism, he argues for the right of self-determination, and consequently, a right to restrict entry (Walzer 1983, pp 62-63). At the same time, he argues for a right to emigrate and an obligation to admit refugees grounded in the principle of mutual aid.
2.2. Migration as a ‘Problem’

The political theory of migration is hardly separable from the so-called *rebirth* of liberal political theory in the second half of the 20th century. The latter is intertwined with the name and influence of John Rawls, who is probably the most cited political philosopher ever. However, postwar political thought, with Rawls at the forefront, has been preoccupied with the question of justice within the political community. Issues relegated to the broader domestic sphere were not discussed in detail even when global justice has become a prominent question in political theory (Bader 2005).

This section offers two arguments. The first one in *Subsection 2.2.1.* aims to illuminate how a particular characteristic of Rawls’s political theorizing influences his own — although obscure and, in the scheme of his *oeuvre*, marginal — ideas on migration. This argument also sketches that from a fundamentally Rawlsian framework, his nationalist or conventional notes on migration are not completely justified. This outlook to Rawls’s political theory serves an elucidatory role in showing that there has been a Rawlsian framework that fundamentally designated the directions of future discussions on migration. The other argument in *Subsection 2.2.2.* aims to illustrate that the Rawlsian *legacy* is so powerful that it hindered the possibility of a challenging republican political theorist, namely Philip Pettit, to offer a genuinely republican approach to migration.

### 2.2.1. A Rawlsian Legacy: The Closed System Premise (CSP)

In the following, I demonstrate how a fundamental methodological preconception, what I call the *Closed System Premise* (CSP) and its normative implications influenced

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11 The subsection borrows in part from ‘Rawls és a migráció’ (Ujlaki Forthcoming in: *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle*).
the particular way that political theorists have started to understand migration in the past decades. The argument traces back to the *renaissance* of political philosophy, by claiming that, although Rawlsian political philosophy has been challenged for countless reasons by a myriad of critics, its underlying framework has imperceptibly outlasted in the past half-century since the publication of *A Theory of Justice* in 1971. My claim is that, although the aim of Rawls’s political theorizing is far from addressing migration, it apparently marked the way for contemporary discourse on migration, in the sense that it tends to apply uncritically the same implicit presuppositions as Rawls did for his own theoretical aims. My argument is purely analytical. It means that it will not address the arguments raised by proponents of history of philosophy and which analyze Rawls’s political ideas in the historical and political context of their publication.\(^\text{12}\)

It might be questioned whether it is in our power to retrospectively criticize Rawls for ignoring migration and addressing other issues in more details instead. I believe that this question could be answered in two ways. First, Rawls indeed

\(^{12}\) See, for example, Katrina Forrester’s book titled *In the Shadow of Justice* (2019) or Smith et al. (2021) and the special issue titled *The Historical Rawls in Modern Intellectual History* 18(4) published recently in 2021. As these authors highlight, the transformation of liberal political philosophy and the consequent success of egalitarian liberalism in the second part of the 20th century did not start with and due to Rawls’s publication of his influential *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, but rather, it has been a consequence of the ‘seismic events of the post war order’ (Forrester 2021, p. x). This dissertation begins with the idea that in the history of political philosophy in the past few decades, a great part of the debate had been about issues, including migration, gender equality, and colonialism, that Rawls neglected or put aside, and how this framework constrained the theoretical choices of post-Rawlsian political theorists (Bauböck 2008, p. 43; Forrester 2021, p. xxi). There is a debate between Forrester and Smith whether Rawlsian liberalism had become ‘hegemonic’. I am sympathetic to the idea that we must be aware of the underlying problems of canonization itself (such as its patriarchal bias) (Matsuda 1986, cited by Smith 2021, p. 918). Nevertheless, I believe that starting my inquiry from the Rawlsian origins of contemporary political theory explains why certain questions and answers had become more prominent in areas such as the political theory of migration, while other issues are less likely to be considered as important in this literature.
formulates some ideas on the topic, therefore, it is comprehensible to address, criticize, and compare them with other views of the author. Second, it might be illuminating to retrieve the origins of contemporary debates about migration from a point where migration did not gain importance in political thought. It is worthwhile to search for the foundations of the epistemological and normative preconceptions of political theorists of migration in the works of their antecedents, moreover, experts of migration are definitely accountable for justifying the ways they approach migration.

It can be said that Rawls’s oeuvre has three cornerstones — certainly, if measured with their extraordinarily high citation rate —, embodied in *A Theory of Justice* (1999 [1971], abbreviated as *ToJ* in the followings), its correction, titled *Political Liberalism* (2005 [1993], *PL* in the followings), and in Rawls’s final book on *The Law of Peoples* (2000 [1997], *LoP* in the followings). The core argument of *ToJ* is that

> *Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override* (*ToJ*, p. 3).

Therefore, according to the argument, a society, which realizes justice as fairness, must regard individual liberties as inviolable. Social institutions of a *well-ordered society* are just when ‘no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties’ (*ToJ*, p. 5). Because in existing societies, agreement on what is just would be difficult, there is a need for an agreement on the
principles that regulate the well-ordered society. Such principles – precisely, the two
principles of justice (ToJ, pp. 266–267) – are chosen behind the veil of ignorance in
the original position (ToJ, pp. 15–19).

Reflecting on some of the criticisms of ToJ, Rawls made some modifications
to his theory in PL, where he admits that in a democratic society, because of the
existence of ‘a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’, a
well-ordered society in which all the members affirm the same ‘comprehensive liberal
doctrine’ of justice as fairness is impossible (PL, p. 489). Accordingly, the central
question of PL had become that

How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable
though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?
(PL, p. xviii).

The offered solution is based on a political conception which – as opposed to the
reasonable doctrines – can be ‘shared by everyone’ because of its public basis of
justification (PL, p. xix).

At this point, before I outline the main characteristics of LoP, which is more
‘international’ in character, it seems right to briefly review how all these ‘domestic’
ideas relate to the contemporary political theory of migration. The essence of Rawlsian
political philosophy is individual liberty and the question about the possibility of
reconciliation of diverse individual worldviews, which is a bedrock for contemporary
discussions about migration. Therefore, two contrasting observations arise. On the one
hand, before the publication of Rawls’s last influential work, LoP, some of his
contemporaries (primarily, Beitz, 1999 [1979]; see also Barry 1982; Benhabib 2004;
Caney 2005; Pogge 1992) may rightly have believed that from a Rawlsian conception
of justice, with its appraisal of individual liberty, an argument for moral or political cosmopolitanism would clearly follow for the international sphere. On the other hand, PL is more restrictive than ToJ in the sense that it regards the fact that the political conception of a democratic regime is favoring some doctrines over others is not an arbitrary bias, rather a ‘social necessity’, since ‘no society can include within itself all forms of life’ (PL, p. 197). This remark is analogous to the argument of some contemporary political theorists of migration who advocate the state’s right to exclusion (e.g., Blake 2013; Isbister 2000; Miller 2016a, 2016b; Pevnick 2011; and also Wellman in his article [2016] and in the book about the debate between Wellman – Cole [2011]). Therefore, with ToJ and PL, Rawls left open both ways of a more cosmopolitan argument emerging from the concept of individual liberty and a more restrictive one emerging from the political conception. But which road did he choose?

Eventually, LoP offered more materials for the second option: Rawls disappointed his cosmopolitan adherers and rejected cosmopolitanism in favor of more or less closed borders (Martin – Reidy 2006; Pogge 1989; Sadurski 2014). In this last book, Rawls attempted to outline an answer to some practical political problems of foreign policy by representing the moral vision that citizens and officials of liberal (and ‘decent nonliberal’) peoples ought to follow when trying to address these challenges

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13 Moral cosmopolitanism refers to a commitment to the moral equality of persons, while political cosmopolitanism is the doctrine of a specific – global, supranational, international – arrangement of political community and political institutions. Political cosmopolitanism covers a range of diverse views, among which this dissertation refers primarily to ‘moderate’ and ‘weak’ cosmopolitanism (while ‘strong’ cosmopolitanism would mean something like a world-state which is not discussed here as a morally and politically appealing possibility, since most advocates of cosmopolitanism – following Kant – tend to refuse the idea of a world-state) (e.g., Beitz 1999, Pogge 1992). Cosmopolitan democracy should be mentioned here as another line of cosmopolitan reasoning. It is a model of global democracy, which seeks to replicate democratic institutions on the global level (see for example: Archiburgi – Held 1995; Caney 2005; Held 1992, 2002). And there are republican cosmopolitans as well (such as Bohman 2007, Laborde 2010, Pettit 2010).
(in the main part, what he calls ideal theory on the model of the domestic theory, Rawls addresses these two types of peoples, while the nonideal part addresses the appropriate conduct towards ‘outlaw states’, ‘societies burdened by unfavorable conditions’ and ‘benevolent absolutisms’) (LoP, pp. 4–5; Martin – Reidy 2006, p. xvi). In Rawls’s words, the Law of Peoples is

developed within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples.

I emphasize that in developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people (LoP, pp. 9–10).

Migration is considered a marginal issue for Rawls’s theories. However, what is truly problematic from a political theoretical perspective is that the problem of migration slips out from the Rawlsian framework, generating a problem of circularity, which makes it difficult to a posteriori formulate a possible Rawlsian interpretation on the topic.

A fundamental methodological presupposition of ToJ and PL, which form together Rawls’s domestic theory (see Pogge 2004), is what I call the closed system premise (CSP), which is intended to show that these theories are worked out for society as a ‘closed system isolated from other societies’ (ToJ, p. 7) to which members enter ‘only by birth and leave only by death’ (PL, p. 12). As Samuel Scheffler (2003, p. 33) notices, these statements followed closely from the primacy of the individual society in political theory are beyond problematization for Rawls, however, they cannot be sustained convincingly in a global age. Similarly, in my view, the CSP justifies why migration is absent in the domestic theory, however, it is not clear why it is regarded marginal in his later work.
LoP has two relevant characteristics which make the theory suitable for including at least some aspects of migration even though, in the book, Rawls does not pay attention to the topic, or he does it in an unhelpful way. The two characteristics are its focus on foreign policy and its conception of a realistic Utopia. The foreign policy characteristic designates the scope of the theory by highlighting that LoP is not a fully developed theory for international relations of states, rather, it is a theory worked out for the particular conduct of liberal peoples. This condition implies that since most forms of migration occur among states and involve crossing state borders, foreign policies and practices of liberal (and perhaps nonliberal) states should include these aspects of migration. Therefore, at least to some extent, a theory of foreign policy of particular states is expected to deal with migration. The realistic Utopia characteristic illuminates how Rawls understands the possibilities of political philosophy as such. According to Rawls, answers to the mutual relations of states (or peoples, as he calls them)\(^{14}\) should be examined in a political philosophy of a realistic Utopia which 'extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility and, in so doing, reconciles us to our political and social condition' (LoP, p. 11). This reconciliation implies that there is no reason why most aspects of migration should be excluded from political theorizing of this kind, hence it can easily be regarded as a discernible reality of the modern world.\(^ {15}\) Migration can be regarded

\[^{14}\] Rawls uses the term ‘peoples’ instead of states because, according to him, only the former are able to have moral motives (LoP, p. 17), but that terminology does not seem convincing. Political conduct is rather a feature of states that have the required actors and authority to put decisions into effect.

\[^{15}\] I do not claim here that migration must be analyzed either within the framework of ToJ, PL, or LoP. The answer to the question, whether there is a necessity of including migration into arguments of justice depends highly on the approach from which one analyzes Rawls’s works. There would be probably different answers from intellectual historians or nonideal theorists. Here, I only claim migration does not strikingly seem a phenomenon that could not fit into a realistic Utopia if the latter is defined according to Rawls’ explanation.
as a fact to which political theory reconciles. Thus, while the former characteristic, the focus on foreign policy makes it reasonable for Rawls to put aside the task of examining the entire phenomenon of migration in current circumstances, the latter characteristic, the conception of realistic Utopia implies that there are at least some aspects of international migration which a political theory for international relations of liberal states should include.

There are some conceptual discrepancies between Rawls’s conceptions and the realities of the modern world. Rawls believes that the reasons for immigration, among which he calls some ‘great evils of history’, are forms of injustice and will eventually disappear. He argues that following just policies and establishing just institutions – like the ones he proposes in his domestic theory – will eliminate the very existence of those injustices (LoP, pp. 6–7). Therefore, he surprisingly claims, ‘the problem of immigration is not, then, simply left aside, but eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic Utopia’ (ibid. pp. 8–9). He fails to recognize that migration (opposite to seeking refuge) is not an extreme case that could or even should be eliminated. Actually, migration, either we define it broadly, as a relocation for an indefinite time or we see it as a means for a further claim to renouncing one’s citizenship for various reasons, for example, is instead the result of the normal operation of modern societies than a last resort. In contrast to the case of refugees, which clearly belongs to nonideal circumstances, it is not given any justification why immigration and emigration should be placed outside of ideal theory.

Initially, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory emerged from Rawls’s work. The framework of Rawls’s theories is built on the belief that any urgent and pressing problem of a nonideal world can be solved only if principles that are appropriate to guide the basic institutions of the society are worked out under idealized, therefore favorable, circumstances, and under conditions of strict compliance. Only
then, when this primary step is made, one can start to think about how problems of our actual, unfavorable circumstances, in which only partial compliance can be hoped for, might be solved according to social justice (ToJ, p. 216; PL, pp. 284–285; LoP, p. 5; Stemplowska – Swift 2012, p. 374).

The intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts. The first or ideal part assumes strict compliance and works out the principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances. It develops the conception of a perfectly just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of persons under the fixed constraints of human life. My main concern is with this part of the theory. Nonideal theory, the second part, is worked out after an ideal conception of justice has been chosen; only then do the parties ask which principles to adopt under less happy conditions. This division of the theory has, as I have indicated, two rather different subparts. One consists of the principles for governing adjustments to natural limitations and historical contingencies, and the other of principles for meeting injustice (ToJ, p. 216).

Since Rawls is explicit on the precedence of ideal theory over nonideal theory, it is understandable why he regards migration – seen as a consequence of natural limitations and historical contingencies – as belonging to the latter. Moreover, because of the closed system premise of the domestic theory, international migration is purely excluded from the domain of the domestic realm. With the help of CSP, Rawls implicitly hides the moral arbitrariness of this distinction. At first sight, it might seem that Rawls needs the CSP because of the contractualist nature of his theory.
Contractualism usually presupposes a *bounded* political community, and for contractualist theories, it is not necessarily an important question how membership is generated itself. Benhabib, for example, highlights that neither domestic nor international theories of justice give importance to the question of political membership (Benhabib 2004, p. 1762). However, contractualism – in spite of *contractarianism* – does not exclude the possibility to work with subjects that do not have membership in the political community. Therefore, the motive for applying the CSP could rather be found in the political philosophical tradition that connects its subjects primarily to the state’s territory or jurisdiction. This explanation is in line with Rawls’s explanation for a dichotomy between the domestic and the international, and claims that ‘[t]he conditions for the law of nations may require different principles arrived at in a somewhat different way’ (*ToJ*, p. 7). This suggests that, for Rawls (way before the publication of *LP*), the abandoning the model of closed society would lead to an entirely different model of international sphere.

Although *LoP* addresses some forms of migration (immigration, primarily), it suffers from some serious conceptual difficulties. For instance, it defines immigration as a result of *injustice*. Presumably, Rawls thinks of refugees and forms of forced migration here. Still, if a conceptual clarification between forced and (a somewhat) voluntary migration is made, one pressing suspicion remains: is it truly just a result of natural limitations and historical contingencies that people tend to move from a territory to another? Would not they move in an ideal world as well?

Questions about what should be fit into ideal theory and ideal theory’s usefulness are prevalent in contemporary political theory. Rawls’s belief in the possibility of elaborating the principles of justice for basic social and political institutions inspired numerous political theorists. Some critics, however, argue that this enterprise is flawed, among them, several authors believe that nonideal theory should
get more attention in political theorizing. However, these advocates of nonideal theory are manifold in their argument, ideas and even in the definition of ideal theory (Jubb 2012; Lawford-Smith 2010; Valentini 2009; 2012). The complexity of the topic leads to a certain confusion about what is exactly problematic with ideal theory (Stemplowska – Swift 2012, p. 374). Still, what nonideal theorists have in common is the notion that ideal theorists necessarily make some mistakes when trying to elaborate theories by disregarding some crucial elements of real-world circumstances.

The debate between ideal and nonideal theory illuminates why the Rawlsian framework is unsatisfactory in offering ideas about migration. Rawls must use some abstraction for creating a systematic account of justice; however, this abstraction often involves idealization, which means, according to the most influential definition, that he does not merely ignore some facts but also assumes falseness regarding some aspects of the theory (O’Neill 1989; 1996). More precisely, idealization disturbs nonideal theorists in three distinct ways (Valentini 2012). Some nonideal theorists claim that idealization makes a theory unable to give prescriptions about what to do in real-world circumstances in which some people are not doing their fair share (see Miller 2011; 2016a). Others, such as contemporary political realists, claim that ideal theory, especially Rawls’s one, has feasibility problems. Their critique highlight that since the prescriptions articulated by ideal theorists are unable to reach, ideal theory fails to offer practical guidance for political action (see, for example, Cozzaglio – Favara 2021; Galston 2010; Geuss 2008; Horton 2010; Rossi 2019; Williams 2005). A similar problem bothers some other critics for different reasons: some nonideal theorists argue that to make a theory of a more just world, we do not need a theory of a fully just world (see Sen 2006; 2009).

The three most referred works of Rawls that I cited in this subsection show that there is indeed a line of reflections on the part of Rawls to the criticism elaborated by
nonideal theorists. As *PL* with its supplemented idea of *reasonable pluralism* shows, Rawls expressly realized that some of the idealizations of his original idea worked out in *ToJ*, are untenable. Therefore, in his later works, he started to regard some circumstances of particular modern societies as crucial, among them, some contingencies, such as states and state borders; thus he transferred these from the nonideal part of his theory to the ideal part. In *LoP*, it is explicitly stated that the existence of the boundaries of a state is, actually, a historical contingency, however, they are not to be discarded for this reason (*LoP*, p. 8). As stated in *ToJ*, ‘the natural distribution is neither just or unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. They are simply natural facts’ (*ToJ*, p. 102). Parallelly, this remark implies that boundaries of states and the fortune that some of us born into one geographical location and others into another are also mere natural facts. What only might be just or unjust is the way institutions deal with these contingencies (ibid.). Therefore, it is questionable why activities such as movement and migration, which are hardly separable from human existence, would not fit into a theory of compliance.

The distinction between strict and partial compliance can be illuminating in this regard. On the one hand, there are levels of compliance that do not affect the reasons for complying: these can be called ‘sufficient compliance’. And there are, on the other hand, all levels below, which can be called ‘insufficient compliance’ (Kis 2008). Although politics is, in fact, the domain where compliance is usually insufficient, it would be perverse from Rawls ‘to allow the standards of fairness and justice to be manipulated by the failures to comply’, and this explains while Rawls is ‘silent about politics as we know it’ (ibid., p. 33). It also explains why some contingencies do fit into the ideal theory without preventing it from achieving its aim, which is to create the principles of justice that can guide action even in nonideal circumstances. One might reformulate the question: would taking migration into
account in ideal theory prevent sufficient compliance? I sincerely doubt it. While reasonable pluralism intertwined with the recognition of deep and irresolvable disagreement between different views of individuals is considered in PL, it does not follow that migration as another fact intertwined with human existence should be regarded as something that endangers the political community with an even more profound disagreement.

A seemingly unusual interpretation of Rawls’s domestic theory of ToJ and PL offers insights about how migration could be alternatively regarded in the same Rawlsian framework. Rawls’s theories rest on a theory of moral development. According to this theory, after human beings are born, they set out on a road of acquiring the skill of judging what is just and unjust, and they become capable to understand why just institutions are valuable in themselves (ToJ, p. 46). Rawls maintains that ‘those who grow up under just basic institutions acquire a sense of justice and a reasoned allegiance of those institutions to render them stable’ (PL, p. 142). Therefore, as Rawls insists, those who are socialized under just institutions are more likely to be fair and tolerant with others (ToJ, p. 17; 41 – 42; 229; PL p. 142; LoP, p. 15). The implication of this empirical hypothesis for the problem of migration (at least in cases of immigrants from unjust societies) is clear: if immigrants are not socialized under the circumstances of social justice, then they are more probable to become a threat to the just institutions of the host society.

The question is whether this is the only way to look at the problem of migration in Rawlsian terms? Suppose that we abandon the closed system premise and include migrants in the framework of the Rawlsian domestic theory. What remains of the persuasiveness of the above empirical hypothesis then? In that case, we should consider migrants in the first place as future entrants to the political community, and
simultaneously, just like all other sane adults, as parties present in the original position where bargaining about the principles of justice takes place.

Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to start with Rawls’s claim that ‘all sane adults, with certain generally recognized exceptions have the right to take part in political affairs’ (ToJ, p. 222) and the question to be formulated is whether there is anything that makes future adult entrants incapable of this minimum requirement to participate in political life? In other words, apart from differences in their legal status, are these prospective members different from citizens in a moral sense? We have reasons to be doubtful about that. Actually, in Rawls’s view, there may be even citizens who do not acquire a sense of justice and it does not automatically deprive them of their political rights. Quite the contrary, Rawls claims that although there are people who ‘lack the requisite potentiality either from birth or accident’, we should not be bothered too much by this because it is more important that ‘there is no race or recognized group of human beings that lacks this attribute’ (ToJ, p. 506). Significantly, the few (or more) individual exceptions are not merely excluded from the deliberation by Rawls: instead, he applies the principle of paternalism to their case, that is: ‘we must choose for others as we have reason to believe they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally’ (ToJ, p. 209). In other words, there is a simple Rawlsian way to argue against the anti-immigration implications of his empirical hypothesis about the effects of socialization: even if the empirical hypothesis were correct, we should respond to it not by exclusion but by applying a paternalistic principle to their situation and provide them the rights they would choose for themselves if they were at age of reason and deciding rationally. The paternalism principle shows us that even in the case of the lack of an effective sense of justice, exclusion from the scope of the original position is not the only possible solution. To an analogy to this logic, a possible Rawlsian reasoning could be that noncitizens
lacking an effective sense of justice should also not be necessarily excluded. I do not claim that not including migrants who lack such a sense of justice would be of equivalent moral weight than excluding citizens without an effective sense of justice. I simply used the paternalism principle to show that the mere lack of a proper socialization in itself would not be a threat that would require us to presume that the person is incapable of mastering what justice requires from her. The paternalism argument is, therefore, one possible source for arguing against the possible ‘anti-immigration’ implications of the empirical hypothesis connected to the socialization.

Considering the worst scenario in which immigrants pose a massive threat to the host society, there is the possibility of perceiving them as an intolerant group of society. ToJ offers several materials for this ‘intolerance argument’. In Rawls’s view, recognizing and accepting different points of view requires ‘extremely complex abilities’ (ToJ, pp. 468–469). Those who do not have the requisite abilities might become intolerant and therefore endanger just institutions (ToJ, p. 454). In their case, two options arise: either citizens can properly force the intolerant to respect the liberty of others if they pose ‘considerable risks’ or by recognizing that they benefit from just institutions, the intolerant will acquire allegiance over time, and will no longer pose a threat (ToJ, pp. 218–219). Besides these ideas in ToJ, the whole point of PL is to engage with the problem of how to tackle the fact that citizens are profoundly divided by different doctrines. In that sense, the real question is not whether a challenge from outside can undermine a society but how to address a challenge from the inside. Therefore, reframing the Rawlsian argument, if there is a threat to just institutions, it comes as much as from within the society as from outside of it.

My goal here is far from offering an elaborated Rawlsian position on migration. Instead, I aimed at demonstrating that there are serious obstacles – in the form of the CSP and the problem of circularity – in Rawls’s theory that make it challenging to
address migration adequately (or address it at all), however, if those barriers are lifted, the road is open to theorizing about migration in a way that is quite different in nature. The unusual solution of my offered interpretation is that there is a possibility to normatively address the topic of migration as part of ideal theory, with which Rawls is concerned the most. However, the solution I offered here is a radical one to some extent because it challenges a fundamental methodological assumption, the closed system premise, and eschews the circularity problem of the entire Rawlsian enterprise. As I will argue later, in Chapter 3, the Rawlsian legacy of CSP and circularity appears in the framework of contemporary debates about migration restraining its potential to address human movement and migration properly. Migration is seen as a problem for both reality and political theoretical inquiry rather than an ordinary, value-neutral, element of human life.

Summarizing the argument, I highlighted how what I called the closed system premise in Rawls’s theory generates a problem of circularity in which migration fits neither into Rawls’s domestic nor his international theory (although I claimed that the latter is a theory for foreign policy, rather than a theory of a broader scope of international relations). I also claimed that in Rawls’s own terms of ideal and nonideal theory, migration should be regarded as part of ideal theory, with which Rawls is primarily occupied. In doing so, I sketched an alternative interpretation of Rawls’s domestic theory to analytically include migrants in the argument, and I showed that there is nothing that makes deep disagreements between migrants and citizens more dangerous than domestic disagreements. However, to reach this conclusion, the CSP must be rejected. In the following subsection, I demonstrate how the CSP undermines contemporary republican political theory’s potential to address migration from a genuinely republican viewpoint.
2.2.2. Republicanism: A Different Approach, Still the Same Solution

This subsection offers a last detour to a possible alternative approach to migration, before I address mainstream discussions about migration in Section 2.3. The need for the detour is the following. While for Rawls’s political theory – as I showed in the former subsection – migration is primarily a problem both in analytical and practical terms, there are reasonable claims that contemporary republican political theory could easily eschew the problems of the Rawlsian ‘legacy’ and could, therefore, offer essential insights about migration. In some sense, Pettitean civic republicanism is regarded as a friendly amendment or critique of liberalism (see: Forrester 2019: 259; Saenz 2008.) In this subsection, I demonstrate that (1) (i) contemporary republican political theory indeed has such potential to address migration in a particular way which is more elaborate in several aspects than the Rawlsian approach and (ii) there are some more or less elaborate republican arguments on several issues concerning migration. Then, I argue that (2) Philip Pettit, the author of the most systematic works on contemporary republican political theory, does not take the opportunity of his own ideas to work out a genuinely different, republican account of migration, rather, he simply copies the Rawlsian solution with few modifications in discussing migration.

Before I begin my argument, let me offer a further justification for the place of the republican detour in the structure of the overall argument of the dissertation. Two things should be mentioned here. First, until there is a detailed ‘republican political theory of migration’, I understand the republican attempt in its current form to view the topic from a genuinely different perspective as belonging to the tradition of

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16 This subsection is a modified version of my original article titled Republikanizmus: a migráció egy lehetséges értelmezése? (the English title is Republicanism: A Possible Approach to Migration?) published in Politikatudományi Szemle (Ujlaki 2020).
regarding migration as a problem.\footnote{It is not surprising that republicanism is underrepresented in discussions about migration. International and global issues are traditionally a blind spot for republicanism, just think about the old republican claim about \textit{extra rempublicam nulla justitia} which implies that republican values can be realized only within the \textit{polis} \cite{Laborde2010}.} A deeper inquiry about the republican potential offers here a specimen of the usually limited view of migration. Second, the question goes like this: why not, then, the \textbf{Second Part} of the dissertation offers the missing republican framework for the political theory of migration? In other words, why do I not regard republicanism, \textit{deprived of} the Rawlsian legacy, as the missing piece of the solution to the problem of migration? The answer is that, although I think republicanism offers valuable ideas about what injustices should be addressed from a normative point of view, these ideas are elaborated in a language which, as I will offer my main critical arguments in \textbf{Chapter 3}, unnecessarily limit the scope of our normative arguments about migration. That is why in the substantive part of the dissertation, I will offer a different, partly feminist approach while in \textbf{Section 6.4.}, by formulating a particular interpretation of republicanism and feminism, I will explicitly demonstrate the common advantages of republicanism and feminism concerning migration, building on the notion of \textit{dispossession}.

Returning to the current argument, let me introduce the main characteristics of \textit{contemporary republican political theory} briefly. Republicanism has been experiencing its \textit{renaissance} in the past few decades, after some philosophers revived the republican tradition in general, and others contributed to a contemporary republican political theory (some of the most influential are: Bohman 2007; Honohan 2002; Honohan – Jennings 2015; Laborde 2008; Laborde – Maynor 2008; Lovett 2010; 2016; Lovett – Pettit 2009; Martí – Pettit 2010; Pettit 1996; 1997; 2012a; 2012b; 2014; Skinner 1998; 2007; 2008; 2010; Viroli 1995; Weinstock – Nadeau 2004).
The most systematic work is Philip Pettit’s, whose civic republicanism is also called neorepublicanism or neo-Roman republicanism, elaborated primarily in his book titled *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (1997) and based on a specific understanding of freedom as non-domination (Honohan 2002, p. 8; Lovett – Pettit 2009, pp. 12–13). The republican understanding of freedom entails a status in which the individual enjoys immunity from the arbitrary interference of others (Pettit 1997, pp. vii–viii, 5, 22, 52). In Pettit’s understanding, republicanism differs from liberalism mainly with respect to this republican conception of freedom, while he identifies liberalism with a conception of freedom as non-interference.

In the Pettitean approach, domination has three aspects. In Pettit’s (1997, p. 52) view,

*someone dominates or subjugates another, to the extent that*

1. *they have the capacity to interfere*

2. *on an arbitrary basis*

3. *in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.*

The archetypical dominating relationships are the ones between the master and his slave or servant, the husband and his wife in a patriarchal marriage, and the relationship between the employer and the employee may have a similar dominating nature in the workplace. It is easy to see that even in case of lack of any active interference on the part of a benevolent master, the slave is still not free; hence the master can anytime change his behavior arbitrarily, and thus restrict the choices of the slave. In Pettit’s view, the republican notion of freedom succeeds the liberal notion in this respect: the latter is counterintuitive in the sense that it regards active interference

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18 A great and frequently used illustration of the dominating nature of such relationship is a play by Henrik Ibsen titled *A Doll’s House*, published in 1879.
as a condition of unfreedom, therefore, for the liberal, the benevolent master would not restrict the freedom of the slave (ibid., p. 22). However, as the republican sees it well, at the end of the day, slavery and servitude remain ultimately oppressive.

Two fundamental implications follow from the identified difference between the republican and the liberal notions of freedom. For the republicans, first, freedom might be absent even without any active interference; and second, not every active interference restricts freedom. For example, if laws are just, republicans, opposed to some liberals, do not see the rule of law as restrictive (ibid., pp. 63–66; 84–85; Lovett – Pettit 2009, p. 16; Pettit 2012b, p. 67). For Pettit, the laws that restrict or even sanction individuals for their own sake cannot be regarded as arbitrary. Moreover, freedom as non-domination is a political ideal that should be secured by the state (Pettit 1997, p. 92). In other words, it is a supreme ideal that should be realized in the design of social institutions, and it is a neutral ideal that can be realized despite the diversity of the individuals’ conceptions of the good (ibid. pp. 96–97; cf. Rawls 2005, pp. 29–35).

Pettit’s notion of freedom is a third alternative to Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) two conceptions of freedom. While Berlin differentiates between a negative and a positive conception, Pettit regards both the liberal notion of freedom as non-interference and the republican notion of freedom as non-domination as negative conceptions (Pettit 1997, pp. 17–19; 22). Partly because of this formulation of his conception of liberty, Pettit has received many criticisms. Some of these highlights that Pettit mistakenly identifies the liberal canon with the ideal of freedom as non-interference (Larmore 2002, 2003, cf. Pettit 1997, p. 50). Such criticism implies that Pettit’s ideas are partially liberal, they can be regarded as belonging to the liberal canon, or they are even characteristically Rawlsian (Demeter 2006; Larmore 2002; Saenz 2008; Simpson 2017; Tóth 2019). In reconstructing the possibilities of a republican approach to
migration from Pettit’s work, in the following, I set aside these criticisms and start from an interpretation that is drawing on what Pettit himself sees as the advantages of republicanism. Then, however, I reach the conclusion that Pettit does not take the opportunity to address migration from this genuinely republican approach, and he proposes a Rawlsian liberal understanding of migration instead.

Now, I reconstruct four characteristics that make Pettit’s republican political theory desirable as an approach to the topic of migration in a way which is clearly different from the Rawlsian, indeed undeveloped approach, reconstructed in the former subsection. In reconstructing the four characteristics, or possible advantages, I rely on arguments of other authors who addressed particular issues of migration in a republican vein, that is, on the works of political theorists who recognized the republican potential concerning migration. The four characteristics are

(1) the republican notion of freedom as non-domination,

(2) republicanism’s focus on injustice rather than justice,

(3) its radicalism, and

(4) its potential to offer consensus.

The first characteristic concerns the republican notion of freedom which could contribute to the political theory of migration in two ways. Firstly, in Pettit’s understanding, freedom as non-domination is a broader conception of freedom than the liberal notion of freedom as non-interference; therefore, it predestinates a broader range of interpersonal relationships as unfree. Thus, it allows to regard more relationships as dominating or unjust compared to the liberal approach (Pettit 1997, pp. 63–64). Therefore, applying the republican viewpoint to the global sphere, it is almost self-evidently inevitable to address freedom concerning immigration, emigration, refuge, and NGOs, just to mention a few examples. Secondly, the republican notion of freedom is simultaneously narrower than the liberal notion in the
sense that not every active interference counts as domination, for example, interference by the law (ibid., pp. 65–66). However, the scope of a state’s jurisdiction – and hence, the scope of its laws – are restricted to a limited collection of individuals, including citizens, non-citizen residents, temporary migrants, visitors, and some exceptions, such as refugees. In the designation of this collection of individuals, the state has some degree of discretion: in reality, many states simply exclude some persons from the protection of its laws by restricting immigration or secluding and deporting some persons who are considered ‘illegal’ by the state. Without the protection of citizenship status, several people are exposed to the domination of their employees, landlords, or human traffickers (Fine 2014). Moreover, since the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001 in the United States, it has become a common technique to deprive some persons of their rights or even dehumanize them by secluding them in institutions located in zones that are ‘lawless’ or ‘beyond the law’ (Ahmad 2009; Bosniak 2010). These extreme cases highlight that sometimes people, such as immigrants, temporary workers, and even visitors such as tourists and foreign students, stand at the ‘edge’ of the law, which allows the authorities to have wider discretion in particular decisions about whom to exclude and whom to include. The republican notion of freedom makes it possible to identify these exceptional cases in which the operation of the law is imperfect and where, for this reason, dominating relationships are more likely to occur.

The second characteristic which would make republican political theory a desirable approach to migration is its focus on injustice instead of the fundamental liberal notion of justice (Bohman 2012). While Rawls focuses on the idea of social justice (understood in terms of fairness), Pettit focuses on a notion of injustice (in terms of domination) when defining liberty. Therefore, republican political theory can be regarded as a kind of a nonideal theory and a critical theory that offers possibilities to recognize a broader, sometimes latent, set of injustices of the social world (ibid.).
Concerning the issue of migration, this characteristic allows republican political theory to focus on the most vulnerable members and prospective members of the political community. It also allows republican political theorists to reveal and analyze systematic injustices (Thompson 2013), primarily those committed by border control authorities and officials in refugee camps (these topics are addressed by, among others, Honohan 2014, Hoye 2018, Sager 2017). The focus on injustice involves a focus on social status. For Pettit, freedom is ‘the social status of being relatively proof against arbitrary interference by others, and of being able to enjoy a sense of security and standing among them’ (Pettit 1997, p. vii). Free persons ‘can look the other in the eye; they do not have to bow and scrape’ (ibid. p, 87). This status can be secured by citizenship; therefore, those who are excluded from citizenship rights in a particular country quickly find themselves in a subordinate position (Bosniak 2010, Benton 2014, Fine 2014; on ‘precarious citizenship’ see: Munck et al. 2011). Therefore, a republican approach to migration could be interconnected with a substantive claim for citizenship-like rights for those who are potentially vulnerable to domination.

The third characteristic that makes republicanism helpful in addressing migration is its radicalism towards existing social institutions. In Pettit’s view, his republican political theory is more skeptical about social institutions than liberal political theory, however, it is ‘less skeptical about the possibilities of rectifying those complaints by recourse to state action’ (Pettit 1997, p. 78). Supporting the argument, Pettit demonstrates that republicanism is an open-ended ideal that can be attractive to more or less radical environmental, feminist, socialist, or multiculturalist movements (ibid., pp. 130–147). He argues that minority opinions, dependence intertwined with roles that are traditionally attributed to women, the economic dependence of

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19 Interestingly, Walzer’s early contribution to the literature of migration in the Second Chapter of his Spheres of Justice (1983) addresses this problem thoroughly.
employees, and belonging to a minority culture are typical examples behind which domination should be suspected. Applying this argument to the issue of migration, it is possible to formulate arguments for demonstrating that the radicalism of republicanism involves the straightforward criticism of dominating relationships in which different migrant people often find themselves.

The fourth characteristic of republicanism is its potential to form a social consensus on certain issues.\footnote{Again, let aside the question of whether the belief in the possibility and the desirability of a social consensus is deeply rooted in a Rawlsian view of the political, characterized as ‘moralism’ by realist political theorists such as Bernard Williams (2005, 2006 [1985]) or Raymond Geuss (2008).} For Pettit, it is crucial that interests behind the actions of the state ‘must be open to challenge from every corner of the society; and where there is dissent, then appropriate remedies must be taken. People must find a higher-level consensus about procedures, or they must make room for secession or conscientious objection or something of that kind’ (ibid. p. 56). In my view, this allows us to identify other relationships that are capable of turning into domination, particularly which are relevant concerning migration, for example the relationship between citizens and non-citizens (Benton 2014, Fine 2014, Hovdal-Moan 2014, Hoye 2018). It applies to the relationship between migration controls, state bureaucracy, and some other authorities on the one hand, and immigrants, temporary workers, visitors, and refugees on the other as well (Honohan 2014, Sager 2017). Moreover, it is similarly identifiable in the case of international actors, like NGOs and multinational companies (Bohman 2012). To recognize how deeply domination permeates actual migration, it would be necessary to see that borders are ‘shifting’, rather than static, that is, they do not occur precisely at the exact location of state borders (Balibar 2002, pp. 75–79; Shachar 2020), neither at the exact moment of admission (Sager 2016a, Shachar 2020). It would also be illuminating to see that state officials usually exercise bureaucratic discretion in
migration controls (Sager 2017), and this discretion is usually coupled with racism and sexism (Fine 2016). In addition, domination affects not only those who claim admission but also second- and third-generation descendants of immigrants (Laborde 2008, pp. 184–201, Sager 2018, chapter 5.), and potential migrants who are discouraged from migrating precisely by the fear of being dominated during and after admission (see also Abizadeh 2008).

This sketch illuminates the potential of contemporary republican political theory to address migration in a genuinely republican way. However, as I will show in the following, in his later work on global issues, Pettit himself discards this substantive advantage of his approach and offers a Rawlsian understanding of the global realm. Apparently, he does not only feel sympathetic to a Rawlsian solution in this regard but explicitly imitates some of Rawls’s ideas about the topic of migration. This is reflected in his ignorance towards several forms of domination occurring in the international sphere, his strict distinction between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ realm, and his disregard of certain facts of the world, such as international migration.

Pettit summarizes the republican requirements for an international order in his article titled A Republican Law of Peoples (2010; abbreviated as RLoP in the followings), explicitly on the model of Rawls’s LoP, and he also addresses the issue in the last chapter of his later book, titled Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (2014). In these works, Pettit demonstrates what kind of institutional structure would be followed from the republican idea of freedom as non-domination in international relations (and he argues for the advantages of his approach against the liberal one, appearing specifically in Rawls’s vision). The idea of RLoP is preceded by Pettit’s former explicit sympathy towards Rawls’s ontology of the peoples (Pettit 2005, 2006).
The underlying question of Pettit’s theory of international relations in *RLoP* is what the ideal international order requires. In answering this question, he regards states as the units of his analysis.\(^{21}\) He differentiates between states among two dimensions: states can be effective or ineffective on the one hand (according to whether they have the capacity to provide basic services effectively), and representative and non-representative on the other (according to whether they represent their people properly) (*RLoP*, pp. 71–72). Similar to Rawls, Pettit applies his ideal to a selected set of states, which are effective and representative. Although Pettit argues that only the *structure* is borrowed from Rawls’s *LoP* (*RLoP*, p. 72), probably for the sake of comparison, this selection unjustifiably disregards several issues which would rightly arise from a genuinely republican point of view – primarily, the broad range of dominating, unfree relationships which would likely be regarded as free from a liberal point of view.

The ideal of the international order (between representative states) is non-dominination, which is, according to Pettit, ‘richer than that of non-interference, yet not as utopian as the cosmopolitan ideal of justice’ (*RLoP*, p. 73). He identifies three sources of domination occurring in the international level: other states, non-domestic private bodies (such as corporations, churches, terrorist movements, and powerful individuals), and non-domestic public bodies (such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the EU, or the NATO). Pettit demonstrates in detail how these actors might actively interfere, and by evoking the republican ideal, argues that these pose alien control over a state and its citizens even in the case of *threatening* with interference or appeal to the dependence of weaker states (*RLoP*, pp. 77–79).

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\(^{21}\) The focus on states is not an essential difference from Rawls’s *LoP*, where the basic units of analysis are the peoples. In Pettit’s view, a people acts through the government that represents it (Pettit 2005, 2006).
Pettit sees deliberation in international institutions and cooperation among weaker states against the stronger as the only solutions to domination (ibid., pp. 79–86), while he regards pressure and humanitarian intervention as the proper conduct towards non-representative states (RLoP, p. 90). In his view, the advantage of this approach over Rawls’s LoP is the feasibility of the realization of the republican ideal and the broader set of recognizable injustices from adopting the republican ideal (RLoP, p. 86). Unfortunately, here, Pettit does not have migration-related injustices in mind. In my view, the underlying reason for this is his copying of the Rawlsian scheme with its particular legacy on the discussion of migration.

This claim needs further explication. In the former subsection, I argued that the Rawlsian legacy to migration is constituted by what I called the closed system premise (CSP), which produces a problem of circularity, that is, Rawls regards society as a closed system, and the international realm as a distinct sphere of philosophical inquiry. It follows that in the process of theorizing migration and migrants are transferred circularly from one sphere to the other; therefore, they slip out entirely from the Rawlsian framework, and remain a problem both for reality and political theoretical investigation. In the case of Pettit’s approach, migration also appears as a problem, at least in cases in which Pettit addresses the topic by relying on the Rawlsian scheme. Moreover, in Pettit’s approach, it is not self-evident why migration is regarded as a marginal issue; hence Pettit mistakenly forgets about a fundamental difference between his and Rawls’s approach to their own ‘law of peoples’. Let me consider these two issues in more detail.

Why migration is a problem for Pettit? It is easy to see that he explicitly formulates the problem so that non-effective and non-representative states ‘may generate waves of illegal immigration into richer countries, threatening the political culture of those regimes’ (ibid., p. 90). This statement is problematic for two reasons.
First, it implies that migration would not occur in just circumstances, i.e., in a world of effective and representative states. And second, it introduces what I will later call an ‘alarmist’, although popular view about immigration, without explaining how and why the political culture of host countries are threatened by ‘illegal’ migration and whether this problem pertains only to ‘illegal’ forms of migration.

The first problem is more serious in the sense that it is the main reason that prevents Pettit from addressing migration in a genuinely republican way. On the one hand, Pettit’s ‘classical’ theory in his *Republicanism* book (1997) is a domestic theory, in which he does not address phenomena overarching the state’s borders and jurisdiction, similarly to Rawls’s domestic theory. On the other hand, as Pettit argues, the *RLoP* is a theory about an ideal of the international order (built on the model of Rawls’s *LoP*), which belongs exclusively to the international realm (Pettit 2014, chapter 6.). This means that the two different approaches to a ‘law of peoples’ are seemingly competing ideals of international conduct and by no means are comprehensive theories of the international order nor theories of migration. As I demonstrated it in the former subsection, Rawls’s *LoP* is indeed about such an ideal or, precisely: an ideal for foreign policy. However, Pettit does not recognize this special limitation of Rawls’s scheme and formulates his own ideal as a guiding principle of international relations. In my view, Pettit’s ideal is necessarily wider in its scope than Rawls’s, because the condition for the realization of the ideal of non-domination is that the (non-dominating) state protects the liberty of its citizens, for which a basic condition is that the state itself free from the domination of other states. If other, international actors dominate the state, then, its citizens are not free either. To put it differently, the freedom of individuals is protected only by a state which is simultaneously non-dominating and non-dominated (*RLoP*, p. 77). This means that, contrary to Pettit’s assertion, the ideal of non-domination cannot be applied
independently to the domestic or the international sphere, rather, it only makes sense if applied globally. It cannot be an independent ideal elaborated alongside the Rawlsian scheme because the full realization of non-domination can only be imagined in terms of a global theory of political liberty.

Now it is more striking why it is problematic that Pettit ignores several aspects of domination, primarily, the domination of non-citizens by representative states (Thomas 2015, pp. 579–580), in the form of migration controls, for example. While Rawls’s LoP has a limited scope, namely, the foreign policy (of a ‘reasonably just liberal people’) (LoP, pp. 9–10), and therefore understandably ignores the conduct of such states towards their citizens, Pettit’s RLoP with its ideal of non-domination cannot convincingly remain silent about these issues.

Summarizing the argument, I demonstrated that there are at least four advantages of applying a genuinely republican approach to migration. I also argued that Pettit, who elaborated the most systematic republican political theory among his contemporaries, has not utilized these advantages to ‘international’ issues such as migration. The reason for this flaw is that he mistakenly relies on the Rawlsian scheme with its CSP by which he sharply distinguishes the domestic from the international sphere and the circularity problem by which migration remains highly unproblematised in theories of both spheres.

A remark should be added here. As I showed, there are some attempts to address certain issues of migration from a republican point of view, but eventually, republican political theory is underrepresented in discussions about migration. However, some political theorists noted that republicanism might offer a novel framework to overcome certain limitations of the mainstream liberal approaches (Chung 2003, Laborde 2010). I do sympathize with that idea, and in a later part of the dissertation, in Section 6.4., I will show some examples, of how a particular
interpretation of republicanism and feminism can altogether be corrective in a way in assessing migration. But now, let me sketch the current state of mainstream literature.

2.3. Contemporary Discussions on Migration

Contemporary political theory of migration is a relatively novel field, given that, it has been established approximately three decades ago. This section offers a literature review of the political theory of migration of the past three decades. The overview starts from the moment when the discourse on migration in political theory is transformed into a separate field and sketches the main topics around migration which preoccupy liberal political theorists. It pays special attention to the closed versus open borders debate, which is a central debate that predominates the literature on migration, and it also offers a review of some unique, less-known ideas on the topic, some of which I will draw upon in the substantive part of the dissertation as potentially corrective works to the flaws of the mainstream literature.

It is a common claim that normative political theory has reappeared in contemporary political thought with John Rawls. In Subsection 2.2.1., I argued that Rawls’s work had been fundamentally determined and foreshadowed the way how migration has appeared as a sui generis topic in modern political theorizing. In my argument, I focused on the framework inherited from the Rawlsian legacy, however, there is another, a more explicit connection between Rawls’s political theory and literature on migration. The topic of migration appeared in mainstream theory with the influential early article of Joseph Carens in 1987. Carens’s surprising conclusions opened a debate that lasts today. The astonishing element of the article is that, there, Carens advocated a position for open borders and argued that all influential contemporary political theories (by which he meant Rawlsian, Nozickian, and
utilitarian political theories) would necessarily justify the same position on immigration. This closed *versus* open borders debate, parallel to the 'liberal nationalist' *versus* 'cosmopolitan' debate in political theory, has been predominating the field since then. The most often addressed topic about migration is whether the state has a discretionary right to restrict immigration to its territory and to select to whom to admit (to mention some of the most known among them: Abizadeh 2008; 2010; 2016; Blake 2013; 2014; 2020; Carens 1987; 1992; 2013; Fine 2016; Hosein 2013, Kukathas 2014; Miller 2005; 2010; 2016a; 2016b; Oberman 2016; Sager 2017; 2020; Shachar 2016; Song 2018; Wellman 2008; 2016). Before I address these arguments in detail, it must be mentioned that there is another early work on the topic of immigration, by Michael Walzer in the chapter about *membership* in his well-known *Spheres of Justice* (1983, Chapter 2.). Despite not being part of the aforementioned debate, Walzer’s classic discussion about immigration resembles the state of the literature on migration today. He addresses the *admittance* of strangers by an analogy between the political community and private associations, such as neighborhoods, clubs, and families; he also formulates an argument about refugees and guest workers; and he claims that the state has special duties towards needy foreigners.

In sum, contemporary discourse about migration is formulated around two groups of issues from the very beginning: around the question of immigration restrictions, on the one hand, that is, the state’s proper conduct and obligations towards those who seek admittance; and on the other, the question of inclusion or incorporation of non-members, that is, the circumstances of gaining membership in a host political community.

It may be criticized why these two types of issues disproportionately attract attention when a relatively broad conception such as *migration* includes several other dimensions. And not only if one thinks about it intuitively, but it is also ascertained in
sociology and migration studies for a relatively long time. These latter fields recognize
that migration can be typologized from multiple dimensions (e.g., Petersen 1958); for
example, a well-established threefold distinction differentiates between (i) internal
migration, (ii) immigration, and (iii) forced migration (Weinstein – Pillai 2016, p.
164). There is a possible distinction between (i) internal and (ii) cross-border
migration, and another one according to the dimension of cross-border migration,
which covers (a) immigration to a host country and (b) emigration from a country of
origin. There are also further clarifications in the literature. For example, there is a
distinction between asylum seekers, refugees, stateless persons (Costello 2017, p.
721), and other, not labeled categories (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014, p. 4). Migrants
can also be categorized according to their statuses in host countries: for example,
residents, non-citizens, temporary and guest workers, and visitors.

There are also novel and important conceptual clarifications about migration
that emerge directly in the field of political theory. For example, there is a debate about
whether ‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ migrants can be called ‘illegal’ (Mendoza
2016, Silverman 2016, see also Carens 2013, pp. 129–130). Not only categorization of
migrants may help acknowledge different types of migrants with specific reasons for
their migration. A possible alternative process is to consciously question the moral
distinctions among analytically formulated categories of migrants by evoking morally
neutral terms such as ‘attendance-seekers’ (understood as persons who seek
admittance independently of whether they are immigrants or refugees, see Miklósi
2017, p. 55), or as ‘denizens’ (used to substitute morally troubling notions such as
‘second-class citizenship’, see Benton 2014).

The focus of the political theory of migration on admission and inclusion of
immigrants is not entirely a discretionary choice to forget about other important
dimensions and reasons of migration. The differentiation and subsequent
disintegration of disciplines into several subfields is a common feature of contemporary political sciences. The contemporary political theory of migration addresses those issues which seem to be important from the perspective of the political community and comprehensible from a framework of rights and obligations, in other words, it is preoccupied with the question of rights and obligations the state has towards strangers. Other types of issues concerning migration are usually transferred to other fields (such as to international relations, migration studies, refugee and forced migration studies) or addressed alongside other political theoretical problems (such as democratic theory or global justice). However, In Chapter 4, I will argue why this selective approach of mainstream discussions about migration is problematic, and in the Second Part of the dissertation, I will offer an alternative approach that might be useful for exceeding the deficiencies of the literature. But first, I show the main topics and arguments of the mainstream political theory of migration in more detail.

Article 13 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)\(^\text{22}\) provides that:

(1) *Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.*

(2) *Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.*

Moreover, Article 15 adds that:

(1) *Everyone has the right to a nationality.*

(2) *No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.*

While the right to emigration is declared universal by the UDHR, there is no similar right to immigration accepted. This moral asymmetry between the right to enter and the right to exit raises serious questions for normative political theorists of migration. Among the firsts, Philip Cole (2000, pp. 43–45; also, in Wellman – Cole 2011, p. 193) acknowledged that the justification of this moral asymmetry is seriously doubtful in the framework of liberal political theory. Although, from a practical viewpoint, it is true that in current international circumstances, emigration necessitates the immigration to another country (Dummett 1992; Cole 2000), still, from the philosophical perspective, it is questionable that the reasons that justify leaving one’s hometown or region in domestic circumstances, does not justify cross-border migration as well. Regarding that, the moral asymmetry is addressed by several other authors (e.g., Bauböck 2006; Fine – Ypi 2016, Wellman 2016), it is clear why most political theories about migration are, in fact, about immigration. While the right to leave a state freely is less debated, the immigration debate seems to be more challenging. It is similar to the case of refugees: Article 14 of the UDHR declares that:

(1) *Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.*

(2) *This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.*

Therefore, it is clear that, theoretically, the case of immigrants poses a more significant challenge to the international community and to political theory itself than the case of refugees.
The *Conventional View* on immigration insists that the state has a discretionary right to control immigration (Carens 2013, pp. 10–12). According to the Conventional View, freedom of movement cannot constitute an absolute right (Miller 2005; Wellman 2008). There are different kinds of arguments for the ‘closed borders’ conclusion, among some are more in line with influential public opinions – even fears – about migration.

(1) The argument from the *number of members* justifies exclusion in terms of the effectiveness of the state (e.g., Miller 2005; 2016a; Rawls *LoP*, p. 39–40).

(2) The argument from *territorial jurisdiction* evokes the effectiveness of states as a justification for exclusion (Blake 2013).

(3) The argument from *self-determination* appeals to the legitimate state’s right to the freedom of association, which includes the freedom to refuse to admit non-members (Wellman 2011; he makes a similar argument in Wellman – Cole 2016).

(4) The argument from *culture* justifies exclusion based on the idea that mass immigration would fundamentally transform the culture of the host society (e.g., Miller 2016a; 2016b; Kymlicka 2003; Rawls *LoP*, p. 39–40, Walzer 1983; and even advocates of open borders, such as Carens [1992] recognize the argument from culture as a good reason to exclude immigrants; cf. Oberman 2016; Scheffler 2007).

(5) The argument from *nationality* (cf. Kukathas 2014) is closely connected to the former argument from culture. The latter appeals to the idea that obligations of the members of a state are owed precisely to fellow members. In this framework, the fundamental change of the society’s culture, the undermining character of fundamentally
different values (Buchanan 1995), and the lack of *solidarity* and *fairness* between members (Miller 1995) are all potential dangers connected to immigration (cf. Kukathas 2014).

(6) The argument from *distributive justice* justifies exclusion with the idea of the need to avoid deepening injustices (e.g., Isbister 2000; cf. Oberman 2016).

(7) The argument from *property rights* evokes considerations of ‘associative ownership’ (Pevnick 2011).

(8) A different kind of approach is Abizadeh’s (2008), call this the *democratic justification* argument. His approach is specific in the sense that it applies the perspective of democratic theory (instead of the predominantly egalitarian approaches of liberal theory), and claims that despite the widely accepted view that democratic theory is straightforwardly connected to the unilateral right to control borders, migration controls require a democratic justification for all, hence they coerce all outsiders.

Today, the case for open borders perhaps as influential as the Conventional View, enough if one thinks about Carens’s early statement about ‘borders have guards and guards have guns’ (Carens 1987, p. 271) and the intuitive power of this idea. There are three possible strategies to argue for a right to immigrate (categorized by Miller 2016b):

(1) the *direct strategy* (if it is declared as a basic human need),

(2) the *instrumental strategy* (if it is regarded as essential to the realization of an already declared human right), and

(3) the *cantilever strategy* (if there is a logical connection between a claim to the right to immigration and other already declared rights).
The most influential argument for open borders is offered by Carens, who relies on the cantilever strategy. In his view, the domestic freedom of movement (declared, in practice, by Article 13 of UDHR) and the freedom to move internationally are logically connected, and it would be irrational not to recognize the latter as a fundamental right (Carens 1992, 2013). In Carens’s view, ‘every reason why one might want to move within a state may also be a reason for moving between states’ (Carens 2013, p. 239). However, he recognizes that a world with open borders is currently only an ideal, because of feasibility issues. Therefore, in his later work, he addresses immigration, for the most part, within the framework of the Conventional View. He formulates his approach a ‘political theory from the ground up’, which starts with

actual problems and questions’ of immigration, such as these: Under what conditions should immigrants be able to become citizens? What legal rights should residents have? What can a receiving state legitimately ask (or demand) of immigrants with respect to cultural adaptation? (Carens 2013, p. 9).

Therefore, eventually, both sides of the closed versus open borders debate address the similar questions. Now I turn to what topics are underrepresented in the literature, at least, until the recent years. There are challenges of the liberal mainstream from republican and feminist political theorists, among others. As I already mentioned in Subsection 2.2.2., there is a growing, primarily republican, literature on the dominating character of border controls and immigration restrictions (see: Benton 2010, 2014, Bohman 2012, Honohan 2014, Hoye 2018, Laborde 2010, Sager 2014). Deportation, detention, and dehumanization are also less addressed issues in the political theory of migration (Ahmad 2009, Bosniak 2010, Silverman 2016), and there
are serious attempts to challenge the concept of ‘illegality’ of migrants (Benhabib 2004, especially p. 221; Mendoza 2016). Crimes related to trafficking and smuggling are also addressed lately (Ottonelli – Torresi 2016).

Specifically feminist contributions to the literature of migration are also relatively new. There are arguments about the feminization of migration (Castles – Miller 1993, Passerini et al. 2007, Nawyn 2010), family migration (Yong 2016, Thorne et al. 2003), and there is a growing literature about the feminist *ethics of care* understood as an ethic of migration (Datta et al. 2010; Hamington 2017; Raghuram 2016; Robinson 1999; Williams 2011). The issues of sexism and racism in the enforcement of migration controls have appeared as relatively new in the field (Fine 2016; Mendoza 2016). Furthermore, interestingly, temporary and seasonal workers are also underrepresented in the mainstream literature, opposed to legal residents (Bauböck 2011; Carens 2008), as well as external and transnational citizenship are underrepresented in mainstream discussions (Bauböck 2006). There are attempts to balance the topic of immigration with an inquiry about emigration and the phenomenon called ’brain drain’ (Blake – Brock 2014, Stilz 2016; Sager 2016b).

What seems to be troubling here, concerning the mainstream literature, is its simplified view about the state and the nation (sometimes the relationship between the two concepts are not explicates), the fixed nature of state boundaries, and a perspective that overrepresents the problems that migration bears on host countries, opposed to the problems with which different migrant figures face in connection to their movement. Fortunately, there are attempts in political theory to address these issues as well. The state centrism of contemporary approaches to migration is criticized by Benhabib (2004). In her view, liberal democracies are fundamentally devoted to claims to self-determination, on the one hand, and principles of human rights, on the other. She claims that to address this ‘dual commitment’, the state centrism of mainstream
approaches must be challenged, and cross-border migration should be treated as an essential feature of the modern world (Benhabib 2004, especially p. 2). Shachar (2020) challenges another presumption of mainstream theories, namely, their view of borders as territorially fixed boundaries, and she proposes the conception of the *shifting border* instead, by which states control migration in a highly selective way. The standpoint of mainstream theories, from which they are approaching migration, and which is analogous to the viewpoint of the state, is challenged by theorists who advocate an approach that takes the experiences of migrants, that is, the ‘migrants’ eye-view’ seriously (Sager 2018). Nail’s (2015) approach to historically address the ‘figure of the migrant’ is also exceptional in the sense that it highlights how migration is fundamentally intertwined with the conceptions of exclusion and expulsion. Both Sager and Nail challenge the common view that regards migration as a *problem* and argue instead that migration is an ordinary element of human life.

Summarizing this chapter, I outlined a literature review about migration. I attempted to show that migration has been treated as a marginal issue in the history of political thought and that, in cases it has been addressed, it has been regarded as a *problem*. I also addressed how migration appeared as a distinct topic in contemporary political theory in its own right, and I summarized the central issues about the topic that engage political theorists of migration, and I also outlined the prominent positions taken by them. I attempted to highlight that the literature is highly selective about what issues it regards important, and from what perspective it addresses these questions. I also sketched some exceptions that challenge some of the fundamental presumptions of mainstream approaches.
Chapter 3. The Deficiencies of Contemporary Political Thought on Migration

In the former chapter, I outlined the current state of the contemporary political theory of migration. In this last chapter of the First Part, I demonstrate why mainstream discussions about migration are insufficient in two regards. I argue that the political theory of migration offers only a partial understanding and explanation of migration both in an epistemological and a normative sense because of a dual bias towards methodological nationalism, on the one hand, and what I call the host standpoint, on the other hand.

3.1. The Dual Bias of Political Theory of Migration

The aim of political theory is to ‘theorize, critique, and diagnose the norms, practices, and organization of political action in the past and present, in our own places and elsewhere’ (Dryzek et al. 2008, p. 4). It might follow from this claim that when political theory addresses migration, it should take diverse reasons, forms, and role of migration in political societies into consideration. However, political theoretical work on the issue of migration is far from being exhaustive. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2., during the history of political thought, migration has always been overlooked or regarded marginal, or it has been viewed as a problem for (or even a threat to) the ordinary working of the social world. In addition, the contemporary political theory of migration is preoccupied with certain specific dimensions of migration (such as admission and incorporation of immigrants), while other important aspects (internal migration, emigration, temporary and circular migration, or different experiences of migrants, for example) are still remaining absent from it. Although I would not deny the importance of the questions around which the main lines of the debate are formed,
my claim is that these are not sufficient for addressing migration as an ordinary
element of human life rather than the exception. It is the case not only because the
scope of inquiry of contemporary discussions of migration is limited to some specific
questions, but because these arguments are grounded in specific premises that are not
capable for addressing novel phenomena which occur across borders of nation-states,
and which gained more and more importance in recent decades, such as migration. It
seems that a fundamental issue of the century is that serious environmental
transformations are expected to take place across the globe inevitably involving a
spatial restructuring of the human population. Besides these forecasts about that
migration will be a primary issue for scientific inquiry, there are dimensions about
more ‘general’ and ‘traditional’ types of migration, which receive less attention from
political theory than they deserve (for example, urbanization, guest work, or care
work) and whose political and social implications should also be considered in a larger
depth. Therefore, it is desirable for political theory to address migration in a broader
sense and in a more precise form.

In my view, there is a genuine problem for political theory that prevents it from
addressing migration properly and that emerges on two levels. I will argue in the
following that this problem springs from a dual bias. It should be noted here that
although both sides of the problem refer to the method of doing political theory, I
believe that it is helpful to analytically differentiate between an epistemological and a
normative level of the bias. In Section 3.2., I start by depicting what I see as the
epistemological level of this problem by showing that both political theory and social
scientific research in the broader sense are biased by methodological nationalism. In
Subsection 3.2.1., I demonstrate the characteristics of methodological nationalism of
social sciences by recalling some of the central arguments of critiques of
methodological nationalism from different fields. Building on this broad criticism, in
Subsection 3.2.2., I present how methodological nationalism pervades contemporary political theory of migration. Section 3.3. addresses what I see as the other level of the deficiency of political theory that hinders the possibility of addressing migration in a coherent way and offering guidance about how to respond to the diverse normative challenges inflicted by and inherent in migration. I argue that this, second, normative level of the problem emerges from what I call the host standpoint of political theorizing about issues that extend the political community in the narrow sense. Here I argue that the two dominant discourses about migration are flawed due to the host standpoint of advanced liberal democratic states. In Subsection 3.2.1., I show that the language of rights and obligations, especially the language of human rights, with its less adversary attitude to migration is biased by the perspective encompassed in what I call the benevolent superiority thesis. The thesis is intended to show that human rights arguments tend to be preoccupied with a particular dimension of aid and inclusion from the viewpoint of ‘host’ states of migration. Then, in Subsection 3.2.2., I show that the alarmist position on migration focuses almost exclusively on the threat that migrant – or more precisely, immigrant – persons might pose to the culture, the values, the solidarity, the economy, and the effectiveness of host societies and their population. I will argue that, hence both viewpoints identify with the perspective of host countries, they are unable to address migration as a broader phenomenon.

This two-level bias of political theorizing is both theoretically and practically problematic. It prevents political theory from ‘theorizing, criticizing, and diagnosing’ the political world accurately – a world in which migration becomes to be seen as a more and more striking characteristic –, and from offering practical guidance for political conduct about what to do when migration appears as a challenge for the political and social world. Although there is no agreement among theorists about whether political theory should be action-guiding, I intuitively rely on the idea that
migration is regarded as an urgent issue of our world, therefore, political theory should address it in a way that includes some practical considerations about what is to be done.

3.2. The Epistemological Bias: *Methodological Nationalism*

3.2.1. *Methodological Nationalism in Social Sciences*

Methodological nationalism is a term elaborated by some authors from various social scientific disciplines and it has been designed to criticize an implicitly accepted set of presuppositions of mainstream social sciences (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002). These presuppositions unfold from a widely shared ‘assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world’ (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, p. 302) and forming a social scientific paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. The methodological nationalist bias of scientific inquiry is particularly striking when social scientists attempt to address global phenomena that require the consideration of dimensions outside of national relevance or involve other actors beside the state and its citizens.

The critique of methodological nationalism emerged within sociology in the 1970s, firstly identified by Herminio Martins (1974). The critique gained more attention in the past two decades when Ulrich Beck (2000, 2002b), Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2002, 2003), among others, addressed the problem. With the rise of debates about globalization in the millennium, different disciplines have started to recognize the issue of methodological nationalism (Dumitru 2014). A crucial momentum in the history of methodological nationalism was when migration studies had to face the problem that some generally presupposed views of social scientific inquiry lead to the ‘fundamental misunderstanding of social reality’ (Sager 2014, p. 43). In the past few years, the criticism of methodological nationalism has been
becoming more prominent not only in sociology and in some disciplines as social anthropology, historiography, and geography. Interestingly, within political theory, its effects are still not widely noticed (Amelina et al., 2012; Bauböck 2017, p. 1; Sager 2018, p. viii).

Methodological nationalism is an *epistemological problem*, rather than a normative or an ontological one. It is not a normative problem in the sense that it is not identical with nationalism in the normative sense. With other words, it does not aim at challenging the idea of national self-determination normatively (although by rejecting methodological nationalism it is indeed easier to argue for normative cosmopolitanism or a ‘weaker’ version of nationalism while it makes it more difficult to argue for a ‘stronger’ version of nationalism). Therefore, criticism of methodological nationalism is neither equivalent with the rejection of nationalist politics or the nation-state in favor of a cosmopolitan ideal of politics. Consequently, it does not straightforwardly entail any normative idea of a cosmopolitan world-state. Nor it is an ontological problem, hence it does not imply the ontological viewpoint of a globalized world without borders (Dumitru 2014).

Critics regard methodological nationalism as an ‘epistemic structure’ to describe the social world (Wimmer – Glick Schiller, 2002, pp. 304–305) or a ‘perception-grid’ of social sciences that takes some ideal premises granted (Beck 2002a, p. 51). It is also depicted as a ‘conceptual scheme’ within which researchers and political theorists of migration operate (Sager 2016a, p. 41) or a ‘prism’ through which they address social and political reality while filtering out some essential features of the world (Sager 2018, p. 22).

The uncritically used set of presuppositions that constitute methodological nationalism are diverse. Typically, methodological nationalist bias should be
suspected when social scientific research simply equates societies with nation-states. Similarly, the assumption that ‘humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations which on the inside, organize themselves as nation-states and, on the outside, set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states’ should be treated with caution (Beck 2002a, p. 51). An opaque definition of methodological nationalism warns us that we still lack an understanding of what methodological nationalism precisely means, hence social sciences are still addressing nation-states with ‘historical opacity’, ‘sociological uncertainty’, and ‘normative ambivalence’ (Chernilo 2006, p. 6). In Chernilo’s definition, methodological nationalism is ‘the all-pervasive assumption that the nation-state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity, the nation-state is taken as the organizing principle of modernity’ (ibid., pp. 5–6). Accordingly, methodological nationalism poses real problems for social scientific inquiry because it demolishes the descriptive and analytical potential of inquiry (Chernilo 2011, p. 99).

For understanding methodological nationalism it is useful to recognize some modes of a methodological nationalist bias. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) have discovered three modes of methodological nationalism that distort mainstream scientific research. These modes are ignorance, naturalization, and territorial limitation of study of nationalism and state-building or, as they call it, territorialization of social scientific imaginary. With the first mode, namely ignorance, they characterize dominant trends of the past century that disregarded the national framing

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23 This equation could be explicitly or implicitly explained by the notion of national identity in more communitarian approaches to political theory, for example, in the case of Walzer (1983). In the egalitarian liberal stream of political theory, however, identity has been treated with skepticism (Forrester 2019, p. 253). In my view, the idea of identity is problematic in the sense that someone may consider herself as a member of a political community or society (and vice versa the others may consider her as a fellow member) even if she does not identify herself with that community. I address this problem elsewhere briefly in an article on political obligation (Ujlaki Forthcoming in 2023).
of modernity with *systematic blindness* (the criticism has first been applied to sociology; see Chernilo 2006, p. 10). Although nationalist politics and conflicts have shaped the history of the last two centuries, social scientific research has merely ignored these facts (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, pp. 304–305). Ignorance means that the nation-state is an *invisible background* for analysis which effects on theorizing are not taken into account (Sager 2014, p. 43).

The second form of methodological nationalism characterized by Wimmer and Glick Schiller is the *naturalization* of the nation-state and national discourses, agendas, loyalties, and histories. According to them, it is common for mainstream, postwar social sciences to take nation-states as the ‘naturally given entities to study’ without problematizing them. In their view, this problem affects all social scientific disciplines, hence contemporary social science is organized in a way that dissociates itself into different *national* academic fields. It means that the primary framework for academic research is national; funding is aimed to analyze and solve national problems; moreover, academic research is closely linked to national ministries of education that prefer issues of ‘national relevance’ (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, 305–306). This type of bias affects empirical research to a large extent because statistical indicators are exceptionally interconnected with the view of the nation as the ultimate unit of analysis (ibid; Beck 2002a, p. 51; Sager 2018, p. vii).

Naturalization, otherwise, is analogous to the definition formulated by Beck to describe methodological nationalism. Beck’s explanation goes back to the differentiation between *methodological* and *normative* nationalism. While the latter means that ‘every nation has the right to determine itself within the frame of its cultural distinctiveness’, the former assumes this normative claim as a given (Beck 2002a, p. 51). Although Beck’s definition covers only this one dimension of methodological nationalism depicted by Wimmer and Glick Schiller, its advantage lies in focusing on
the *connection* between social scientific research and nation-building projects of Western history.

The third form of methodological nationalism formulated by Wimmer and Glick Schiller is *territorialization of social scientific imaginary*. It means that – partly in connection to the institutionalization of academic research – social sciences have become obsessed with contrasting processes within nation-states with processes outside them, which has led to prioritizing domestic processes and actors (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, p. 307). Therefore, social sciences focus on the nation-state as the primary analytical unit of research, although this has two far-reaching consequences. Firstly, social scientists easily tend to cut analytically off what they regard as the ‘outside’ world as opposed to the inside life of nation-states, even if this makes the appropriate understanding of some processes difficult, especially when addressing our social and economic circumstances that have not been emerged within limited national spaces, but rather, they have been continuously formed by transnational effects. And it is also true for our scientific concepts: sovereignty and independence appeared in a certain historical context (ibid., pp. 307–308). Secondly, this ‘methodological limitation of the analytical horizon’ gave primacy to the *container society* view of social sciences. The container society presumes a homogenous ‘culture, a polity, an economy and a bounded social group’ (ibid., Beck 2000) where ‘society is thought to correspond the state’ (Sager 2018, p. 28). The problem is that this unified view of a background culture is a *myth*: ‘we should not assume that something as complex as a society can ever be adequately expressed in a single spatial structure’ (Taylor 2000, p. 1112; see also: Lewis – Wigen 1997, p. 7).

Identifying these modes of social scientific inquiry may help us suspect underlying methodological nationalist biases and it may offer us the possibility to challenge the *paradigm* of existing discourses on certain topics from a meta-
perspective. Indeed, it would not be fair to ignore some attempts to challenging the methodological nationalist paradigm of social sciences. Several scholars, from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (2015 [1848]), through Immanuel Wallerstein (2011 [1974]), Benedict Anderson (1991) or Basch et al. (1994), have worked to overcome what we now call methodological nationalist assumptions (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, pp. 304–305; Amelina et al., 2012). Still, mainstream social sciences have predominantly remained unreflective towards methodological nationalism. In the following, I highlight how this problem affects political theory and political theory of migration specifically.

3.2.2. Methodological Nationalism in Political Theory of Migration

The critique of methodological nationalism concerns social scientific research *per se*. However, methodological nationalism has its specific implications on the discipline of political science and, precisely, for political theory and political theoretical discussions about migration. It is specific in the sense that presuppositions of methodological nationalism affect some of the fundamental conceptions of political theorizing. *Nation*, *state* and *society*, the *borders* of the state (in the sense of territoriality) and the *boundaries* (in the sense of membership) are not only fundamental concepts of theories about the political realm, but they are also closely connected to the justificatory – that is, the normative – role of political theory. It follows that we have to be wary about how some assumptions distort our understanding of the socio-political world. Thus, from the perspective of political theory, it is extraordinarily important to understand if, why, and when a number of our ideas and theories are essentially biased with methodological nationalism. Several theories fail to address some phenomena properly, in the sense that they treat migration and immigration as synonyms, for example. Also, some of them are focusing only on the immigration and regarding it as
it poses problems both in terms of the justification of the actions of the state and in terms of migration’s effects on members of the society. This is a bias towards sedentarism (Sager 2018) or stasis (Nail 2015), or settler-based theoretical traditions (Coulthard and Simpson 2016: 255), that is a view with prepossession toward immobility as the basis of normality while regarding movement and migration as a problem or an anomaly.

Methodological nationalism is ubiquitous in the works of political theorists who ignore mobility and migration or who treat it as an ‘external’ problem for theories of the political community which can be separated from ‘internal’ or domestic questions (prevalent, among the firsts, in Rawls’s domestic theories in ToJ and PL, and his theory with an international scope elaborated in LoP). However, the implications of methodological nationalism for political theory are usually addressed rather from an interdisciplinary perspective than from the narrower perspective of political theory itself. Political theorists themselves have not really engaged in the criticism of methodological nationalism so far (Sager, 2014, p. 46), criticism mainly arises from outside the field, and – besides the thorough inquiry of Sager (2016, 2018) about the topic –, only a few theorists draw attention to some problematic premises of political theorizing (e. g., Bauböck [2017] on state practices of exclusion, Benhabib [2004] on ‘state centrism’, or Shachar [2020] and [2022] on ‘shifting borders’).

Among political philosophers, Rawls is criticized by Wimmer and Glick Schiller for building on methodological nationalism (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, p. 307). In sketching what she sees as a ‘stronger’ republican theory about global justice, Cécile Laborde also accuses not only Rawls, but Philip Pettit for endorsing a form of explanatory nationalism, by which she criticizes them for differentiating between types of states, regarding them solely responsible for their populations (Laborde 2010, p. 49; 64). Laborde’s claim seems to be in accordance with my former
argument in Section 2.2. There, I showed that Rawls’s liberal LoP, with its limited scope to the foreign policy of liberal and decent nonliberal states, is elaborated within a framework of the closed system premise and its consequent circularity problem. In arguing that in RLoP, Pettit mistakenly adopts this framework in elaborating a republican ideal of the international order (between representative and effective states), I showed that the republican ideal of non-domination requires that the domestic and the global realms must be investigated all at the same time (hence for the realization of the ideal, non-domination must be present in both spheres). Both Rawls and Pettit are implicitly excluding the option that even liberal and decent peoples (in the case of Rawls), or representative and effective states (in Pettit’s case) can be sources of unjustified or dominating actions. As Laborde demonstrates, Rawls and Pettit implicitly assume that nonliberal and unrepresentative states are ‘solely responsible for the problems of »abuse, poverty and insecurity« that their populations may suffer’ (Laborde 2010, p. 49; 64).

Wimmer and Glick Schiller use Rawls as an example to show how methodological nationalism permeates political theory. Nevertheless, they also provide insights about its implications for discussions about migration per se. They offer a historical interpretation that shows how the attitude of social sciences to migration has been changed throughout the history of more than the past two centuries. They present that, from the 1870s, there had been a widespread labor migration, and democratic inclusion through citizenship rights were relatively easy to gain. Nonetheless, in this prewar era, it had become the norm to conceptualize the world as it is divided up into peoples. Therefore, by the time the First World War broke out, ‘non-national’ citizens and immigrants had become seen as a political risk to the nation-state. The ‘friend and foe’ distinction reached its golden age during the interwar period when the state’s role in controlling movement through its borders had become
institutionalized, and immigrants became to be seen as the ‘natural enemies of the nation’. In the postwar era, the independence of former colonies and the growth of international organizations, as the United Nations, have helped to maintain the now widely shared view that the world naturally consists of nation-states. Parallely, methodological nationalism had become an unproblematized paradigm of social sciences (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, pp. 315–320). Only in the last few decades appeared the need for a paradigm shift to something like a transnational social science – although the concept of ‘transnationalism’ is still based on the similar methodological nationalist presuppositions (ibid., p. 324).

Now, recalling the three modes of methodological nationalism, identified by Wimmer and Glick Schiller, I demonstrate the implications these modes have for the political theory of migration in more detail. These modes not necessarily appear in distinct forms. On the contrary, theories with a methodological nationalist bias may represent all three modes at the very same time. However, it is analytically useful to say a few words about each one individually. The first mode is ignorance, which covers the ‘systematic blindness’ of social scientific inquiry about how nationalist politics have shaped the world. In virtue of the discussion on migration, ignorance may allow researchers and theorists to pretend that environmental, social, and economic phenomena are generally independent of human action and history. Moreover, it also enables them to conceal that those vast differences between who benefits and who suffers from these phenomena are not entirely consequences of mere fortune but, most of the time, a result of political action. Violent colonization, as well as the exploitation and subsequent abandonment of former colonies (which are left with the problems that are largely owed to those oppressive and exploitative mechanisms) are rarely mentioned as the primary reasons for the world being as it is now.
The second mode is characterized as the naturalization of nation-states and nationalist discourses in social scientific research. The importance of naturalization comes from the fact that the descriptive misunderstanding of the nation-state as a natural form of social and political cooperation may also easily lead to the normative misconceptualization of some phenomena. There are some notable exceptions to the predominance of naturalization of nation-states in political theory. For example, when Carens addresses open borders from a cosmopolitan perspective, he claims that ‘there is no natural social order’ (Carens 2013, p. 226). However, on the more conventional view on immigration (including Carens’s own approach in his influential book [2013] in which he addresses ‘actual problems’ concerning immigration), the naturalized conception of the nation-state remains intact. Influential positions on one of the central debates of the political theory of migration might be illustrative. There are arguments about states having a special moral status in excluding immigrants based on considerations of the number of members (e.g., Miller 2005; 2016a; Rawls LoP, p. 39–40), territorial jurisdiction (Blake 2013), considerations of self-determination (Wellman 2008, and himself in Wellman – Cole 2016), culture (e.g., Miller 2016a; 2016b; Kymlicka 2003; Rawls LoP; Walzer 1983; and even Carens [1992]), nationality (Buchanan 1995; Miller 1995), distributive justice (Isbister 2000) or property rights (Pevnick 2011).

The problem is that the focus on these considerations often helps to mask an important dimension of why such claims to admission occur in the first place. In several cases, real-world migration is a ‘product of structural dependence’ (Sager 2014, p. 55). Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) formulates this problem in a way that ‘the historical and systematic logic that ties’ nationalism and democracy together have ‘become eradicated from our historical memories (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, p. 307). But these problems hardly ever appear on the horizon of normative political
theory, due to its naturalized understandings of nation-states. Moreover, in a different type of argument, Yael Tamir highlights that the tension between nationalism and liberalism has been a longstanding problem for modern liberal theory because national values serve an important role in the liberal agenda (Tamir 1993, chapter 6.). Parallelly, Katherine Tonkiss shows that, traditionally, democratic legitimacy has been connected to ‘national identity and co-national loyalty’ (Tonkiss 2013, p. 1), while Ludger Helms argues that international migration has always been problematic for the ‘liberal foundations of liberal democracies’ (Helms 2009, p. 56).

The naturalization of nationalism in political theoretical discourse leads to some further profound implications for political theory and the political theory of migration. Naturalization may obscure that there are important internal differences between the members of the nation, such as class, gender, race, ethnicity, but age and sexuality can also be mentioned here, that affect people’s lives (Sager 2014, p. 54; 2018, p. 18; Fine 2016). Treating members as a collectivity instead of treating them as non-members or would-be members falsely makes room for impressions that underlie arguments about non-members threatening host states’ culture, economy, population, or stability. As I have formerly argued in an outlook to Rawlsian political theory in Subsection 2.2.1., an important question is whether members and non-members differ fundamentally in a way that the latter may carry a genuinely different kind of threat with themselves (and I attempted to show there that from a truly Rawlsian liberal perspective it is hardly the case). If internal differences between members and threats from within the society are not taken into account as sources of conflict, arguments about the special moral status of nation-states and the members’ right to exclude non-members are easier to remain without defense.

The third mode of methodological nationalism, that is, territorialization of social scientific imaginary, by which the ‘domestic’ and the ‘outside’ world is
analytically cut apart, implies the problem that, for political theorists and theorists of migration, it becomes difficult to address domestic and global issues at once. This has historical explanations leading back to interwar period American political theory (Almond 1989, p. 238, see also Forrester 2019), The Rawlsian framework of the closed system premise (CSP) and the circularity problem are good examples: for Rawls, the two realms are separable, and they have their own particular problems. However, concerning migration, for example, only some dimensions (precisely, immigration) gain importance from the viewpoint of the domestic theory, while similarly few dimensions of the phenomenon (e.g., international norms of conduct, human rights) are addressed from the viewpoint of the international theory. A coherent, all-inclusive theory of human movement with its various forms, reasons, and dimensions are evaded by both theories, and seemingly – but not successfully – transferred from one to the other.

Modes of naturalization and territorialization also imply what critics of methodological nationalism call the container view of society, by which the state is equated with the nation (Beck 2000, Sager 2018, p. 28). A related problem that follows from this view is what I call the anomaly problem: if the container society is taken to be the appropriate unit of analysis, any external phenomena instantly count as an anomaly for social scientific research. For example, there are cases when someone is subject of the state but has different nationality than the majority of the society, as is the case of national minorities. However, in the case of migrant persons who appear, for example, as residents of a particular state, nationality and membership would be entirely different characteristics (moreover, these often involve different rights and political obligations in relation to host states and home states).

This is connected to concerns, such as if territorial borders of a state and boundaries of membership regarded as unalterable facts, migration across borders will
appear as an anomaly or a *pathology* of the system (Sager 2018, p. 25), and migrants and outsiders will be regarded automatically as a potential *threat* (De Genova 2016, p. 315). It follows that *sedentariness* is rarely theorized in an explicit way, but still, migration is treated as puzzling or abnormal as if sedentariness were self-evidently true (Sager 2018, p. 3; 20). From the perspective of a more comprehensive view on migration, it can also be showed that internal migration is hardly ever considered to be similarly problematic (Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, p. 311; Sager 2018, p. 20; 27). Patterns of domestic migration, rural-urban differences, regional migration are just a few examples that suggest that there may be quite similar challenges involved in migration that does not involve border-crossing (although these issues are addressed by other fields such as urban studies).

This kind of asymmetrical view of domestic and cross-border migration in political theoretical approaches fetishizes the latter: it suggests an outlandish element in the phenomenon that people actually leave the territory or even jurisdiction of their nation. Not to mention special cases in which a nation does not have an internationally acknowledged territory or does not overlap with the state territory. Also, a prerequisite ‘one-person one-state’ model of methodological nationalism in which every individual belongs to a particular nation, dual and multiple citizenships, and transnational activities are either merely ignored or automatically taken to be anomalies and potential risk factors (Sager 2014, p. 47; 2018, p. 22).

This type of problematization of cross-border migration is intertwined with a method of understanding (im)migrants through the concepts of *assimilation* and *integration*. I am not saying that the issue of assimilation or the more permissive notion of integration (in the sense of respect towards diversity) would be theoretically uninteresting. Rather, I wish to highlight that even in cases where *assimilation* and *integration* are the focal points (e.g., Miller 2016a) rather than *inclusion* or *mutual*
adaptation (e.g., Carens 2013, especially p. 64. fn. 2), the underlying focus on the risk characteristic of non-members will be easily fuel the foundations of a migrant-as-political-enemy imagery.

Concluding the argument, following some critics of methodological nationalism, I attempted to show that the widely shared epistemological bias of social sciences has serious implications for political theory, especially to the political theory of migration. Before I offer an argument for a paradigm change to a ‘critical cosmopolitan’ approach to migration in Chapter 4, to what I regard as the epistemological level of the problem, I outline how the methodological nationalist bias of political theory of migration is coupled with a normative bias.

3.3. The Normative Bias: The Host Standpoint of the Ethics of Migration

3.3.1. The Unique Language of Normative Political Theory

An epistemological bias, such as methodological nationalism, does not straightforwardly entail a particular normative bias, although it is conspicuous that some biases on one level cohere with certain biases on the other level. In other words, as a consequence of the epistemological presumptions, precisely, the methodological nationalist bias, some normative commitments are automatically seen in a more favorable light than others in contemporary discussions about migration (for example, Sager, a prominent critic of methodological nationalism argues for an open border approach in his more recent book [2020]). However, there is another source that directs normative discussions about migration towards a particular mode of thinking. In the following, I show that political theory (the political theory of migration) has a unique language that determinates the predominance of a certain framework of normative discussions about migration in political theoretical discussions. This framework is
manifested by what I call the *host standpoint* of the ethics of migration, by which I mean that issues of migration usually appear as issues from the perspective of host states of migration. I also argue that the host standpoint is manifested either in what I call the *benevolent superiority thesis* in the language of political theory or in the *alarmist view* on migration.

By arguing that the deficiency on the normative level stems partly from the methodology of contemporary theorizing, I mean that when political theory *intersects* with global issues – for example, with climate change displacement –, it often turns to the *application* of already existing political theories to novel issues (Gabrielson 2016). However, this mere application of existing tools appears to be unsatisfactory with regard to some global challenges.

Phenomena that are global in nature, are often simply impossible to address from the quite specific viewpoint and language of political theory which is fundamentally elaborated to describe and understand the operation of a *particular political community* and address its very specific problems. Although there are serious disagreements about some aims, methods, and principles of political theorizing, contemporary mainstream normative political theory is closely connected to some political values, such as democracy, personal autonomy, or political liberty. These concepts are usually addressed through a specific political theoretical language of the triad of *authority, legitimacy, and political obligation*, which are typically viewed through the lens of the specific relationship between the *state* and its *citizens*. As Caney ascertains, ‘until recently, if not indeed most, political philosophy focused purely on how a state should treat its own citizens’ (Caney 2005, p. 1). It is understandable if the state is ‘identified with the interests and goods of the local community’ and ‘justification of that state’s actions is something to which the citizens of that state are entitled’ (Blake 2005, p. 231). In contrast, several types of human migration and other
social, political, economic, and environmental issues extend both beyond the analytical and real boundaries of the political community and exceeds this special relationship between the state and its subjects. Therefore, addressing them from the ‘classical’ framework of political theory that focuses on the domestic realm would predetermine the language with which rights and obligations will be discussed. The preoccupation with certain concepts, issues, problems, and relations leads to the classification of several important phenomena as the ‘special’ case for political theory. In relation to migration, this means that political theory focuses on citizenship while regards ‘outsiders’ as the special case. The unique language of political theory, thus, make it uneasy to theorize the migrant and migration adequately.

The unique language is intertwined with what I call a host standpoint of normative political theory. This perspective is identical with the perspective of advanced liberal democracies that face a particular dimension of global issues, including cross-border migration. While the less fortunate parts of the world face serious problems indicated by climate change, starvation, and war, which forces masses to leave their home countries, the Western world is preoccupied with what to do with those who face such problems. This host standpoint is linked up with a language that I call benevolent superiority, especially in human rights discourses or with an agenda called an alarmist view and which regards migration, especially in its form of climate-displacement as a threat to destination countries of the displaced. Both types of the embodiment of the host standpoint imply a moral asymmetry between entry and exit in the focus of contemporary discourses, in which the former dimension of migration is predominant (Cole 2000; Fine – Ypi 2016, pp. 2–4; Wellman 2016; Wellman – Cole 2011). Meanwhile, the latter is rarely considered a problem, and if it is, then most of the time framed as a problem of ’brain drain’ (i.e., the emigration of skilled labor from poor countries).
The language of human rights and the alarmist agenda constitutes the host standpoint that is present in normative political theory, in the IR mainstream (Kavalski 2020), in public discourse, and in policymaking. However, the host standpoint with its characteristic mode of normative inquiry – embodied in questions such as what ‘we’ ought to do with or for ‘them’? – distorts our understanding of the political and social world and makes it difficult to properly address real challenges. In the following, I will show why.

3.3.2. The Benevolent Superiority Thesis

Until recent decades, the main issues for political theory have primarily been the domestic issues of the political community. Issues concerning the global realm grew out of ideas worked out for the domestic realm of politics: if we are to secure the principles that should govern our political community (at least in the influential tradition of Rawlsian political theory) we should also address them in a global scale (Caney 2005). Therefore, first, a broad discussion about global justice, and then, the closed versus open borders debate concerning immigration have emerged with Carens’s influential article (1987). Both streams of thought are dominated by a language of human rights: in the arguments of more conventional theories of immigration, human rights serve as (almost) ultimate constraints of the state’s rights (especially its right to exclude; e.g., in Miller’s [2016, pp. 23–24; 30] view, that makes his approach a ‘weak’ cosmopolitanism), while more ‘moderate’ cosmopolitan arguments (such as Carens’s [2013]; see also: Carens 2019) are more stringent about these minimum standards that ought to be obliged in any circumstances (see also Beitz 2009, Caney 2010, Vanderheiden 2008).

The language of human rights dominates not only political theory but also international practice in the form of international law, institutions, foreign affairs of
states, and even NGOs. The doctrine and practice of human rights are usually regarded to derive from deeper values such as autonomy, while others regard them as a distinct, *sui generis* class of norms (Beitz 2009, pp. 7–12). In both interpretations, human rights are necessary for a minimally decent life, and this decency of individuals’ lives is one of the fundamental elements of debates between liberal nationalist and cosmopolitan positions on migration (see the debate between Carens [1992, 2013] and Miller [2005, 2016a], or Wellman [in Wellman – Cole 2011, p. 113] and Cole [ibid., p. 193], for example). To lead a decent life, persons ought to have freedom of movement (and, in the case of international migrants, a possibility to gain equal rights as citizens of states, in which they reside, have).

Benevolent superiority can be found both in debates about admission and the inclusion of migrants. In the first case, considering people on the move, the language of benevolent superiority is used to define the obligations of host countries towards those who, for different reasons and duration, seek admission in such states. In this case, the arguments are formulated in terms of benevolent superiority; hence they are mainly about what these states should (at least, minimally) do for the migrants. It is *benevolent* in the sense that it starts from the idea that host states have certain obligations towards these people, however, this acceptance is connected to a moral stance of *superiority*, in the sense that it reserves the option to the unfulfillment of these obligations under certain contexts in which the fulfillment would require too high costs from the part of host states.

In the case of the issue of inclusion, the debates focus on the moral right of states to exclude immigrants on different bases, or the nature of immigration limitations, rather than considering the contributions of these states to the situation that inflicts immigration (although there is a broad literature on the topic, elaborated in the framework of global justice, however, that stream does not address migration in
In the second case, the language of benevolent superiority applies to states’ moral obligations towards migrants who find themselves in such states, be them long-term residents, guestworkers, or other migrants. In this case, the problem is usually formulated in terms of fairness and reciprocity, and primarily in economic terms: if the migrants contribute to the host society in some ways, they should benefit from the social cooperation (see Carens 2013), that is, admission should involve ‘mutual advantage’ (Miller 2016a, p. 15; and ibid. Chapter 6.) while less attention is paid to the unfair and unreciprocated treatment of migrants (cf. Ypi 2016)

There is a third and, in some respect, special case, in which the language of benevolent superiority is used in discussions about emigration. Benevolent superiority is the most striking in this case. As we have seen, there is not only an asymmetry between entry and exit in the analytical sense, but it also follows from the host standpoint of normative arguments that entry and exit are addressed asymmetrically. However, ‘brain drain’, a specific form of emigration, is more often addressed in debates about migration. The term is used for the emigration of skilled workers from developing states, which leaves those states with specific problems (such as a lack of skilled labor, relapse in certain sectors – regarded particularly problematic in health care –, and the failure from the part of the skilled workers to reciprocate fellow members by benefiting from but not contributing to the social cooperation among compatriots). In mainstream arguments, the question is usually formulated in a way that whether brain drain should be taken into consideration in arguments about immigration restriction, because brain drain is unfair to poor states (e.g., Miller 2016a, p. 109; Oberman 2013, cf. Brock – Blake 2015) In a book chapter, Sager (2016) shows that the heightened attention to the issue of brain drain is interconnected with a methodological nationalist bias. He claims that the framing of the issue is problematic at several points. First, in Sager’s view, the terminology is pejorative and
dehumanizing because it frames the issue as a *problem* from the beginning rather than a phenomenon to be investigated, and it treats workers merely as resources. Second, according to Sager’s criticism, the literature on the topic (especially Brock – Blake, 2015) uses empirical data selectively. Third, it frames the migration of skilled workers in terms of moral harm without investigating the broader circumstances of such movement, and fourth, the argument mainly focuses on the connection between brain drain and migration, in isolation of other, more complex circumstances. Fifth, in Sager’s view, the policy solutions offered by some theorists to ‘solve’ the brain drain problem – especially the arguments for the restriction of emigration – are ‘dubious’ (Sager 2016b, pp. 221–228). Sager’s criticism aligns with my argument that this type of framing of the issue involves the language of benevolent superiority because it implicitly affects how one should think about the problem, otherwise, is it a problem at all, or an issue to be investigated, it is selective about the question why brain drain should be regarded as a problem and prefers to address certain dimensions of the issue over others. The brain drain argument, in fact, offers reasons to argue for immigration restriction, framed on the basis of benevolent superiority as a concern for states which are ‘developing’ and typically countries of origin of migration.

In all three cases of the manifestation of the language of benevolent superiority, the arguments are formulated in a methodological nationalist way: it implies that either the world would be better without cross-border migration (while domestic migration is hardly discussed at all) or in a perfect world, cross-border migration would not happen; but in case if it happens, there are some ethical constraints about what can justifiably be done, in the form of human rights and other ethical and political values. Regarding these arguments, the burden of proof is on those who regard migration as a problem: would a statist world be more just or better in some regards than a world in
which humans do move? Moreover, is migration really something that would be eliminated in a perfect world?

The characteristic of the language of benevolent superiority that it grasps political and social issues in terms of rights and obligations makes it vulnerable to two objections. Firstly, it is a minimalistic ethic in which only rights impose obligations. Although there are debates about the content of basic human rights as well, the enforcement of other claims that are not formulated in terms of rights, such as slow onset climate change (Cole 2020) and climate-change displacement that involve gradual transformations, is not assured. Secondly, even a claim is recognized as a right by the international community, its enforcement, in practice, is ineffective, and masses of people continue to suffer or die in the face of the violations of their rights, that is, the formal granting of rights is in itself far from being sufficient to eschew evils in the world effectively.

The limitedness of the language of the normative political theory of migration partly originates from biases of the inquiry on the epistemological level. Epistemological partiality towards sedentarism normatively implies that ethics of migration are overwhelmingly preoccupied with the ethics of immigration, herewith focusing primarily on the challenges, or even threat, which international migration bear on host countries (and sometimes – in the case of ‘brain drain’, countries of origin as well).

3.3.3. The Alarmist View on Migration

Debates about migration are usually closely intertwined with an element of threat. Some distrust towards migrants can be found in more benevolent approaches to migration as well, in the sense that some threat by migrants on host societies culture, economy, and population, and even stability. These fears are touched upon both by
nationalist and cosmopolitan authors (for example, in the Carens – Miller debate; for a summary, see Carens 2019). However, the agenda which not only addresses but takes this threat element as its focus can be called the alarmist view (McAdam 2012).

The alarmist agenda is more pervasive in public discourse about migration, although, it is implicitly present in conventional academic views about migration as well. The concept of ‘alarmism’ can be defined as an unjustified pessimist approach to a certain phenomenon rather than an intelligible fear of an apparent threat. Still, it is meaningful to talk about alarmism in the case of arguments for immigration restrictions based on the threat posed by migrants to the culture, economy, population density, or political processes of host states, hence some critics of these arguments have shown that, in several cases, the arguments for these threats are more than problematic (e.g., Oberman 2016, Scheffler 2007).

Conceptionally, alarmism can be found in arguments which highlight that contemporary migration is problematic because people tend to relocate ‘en masse’ (e.g., Wellman – Cole 2011, p. 41), or which claim that there are ‘illegal’ migrants (e.g., Miller 2016a, cf. Carens 2016, Mendoza 2016). It suggests that the alarmist agenda of political thought partly builds on a conception of threat that is established mistakenly in public discourse. In contrast, the mass restructuring of human population on the earth for environmental, social, political, and economic reasons might indeed carry such a threat to which arguments for immigration control and social security refer. Still, as some authors claim, what is of real significance here – on the long term, at least – is the threat of these phenomena to humanity. According to McAdam (2012) and Cole (2020), what is flipped here to a discourse of sovereign nation-states’ self-protection has originally been a discourse on human security. Meanwhile, threats imposed domestically by native citizens as well as the phenomenon of internal
migration remain obscure in these arguments. I do not deny here that exclusion on the basis of some valid fears is an important question, however, alarmist arguments imply a fundamentally false view in which migration is an anomaly which should be definitely repelled.

Recall what I called the problem of anomaly in a former argument (in Subsection 3.2.2.) where I addressed the methodological nationalism of political theory of migration. If the container society view is not problematized, and moreover, borders of nation-states and boundaries of the political community are taken as unalterable and unquestionable facts, some phenomena necessarily emerge as anomalies. For the container society, immigrants or other forms of cross-border migration necessarily pose economic, cultural and security risks (Sager 2014, p. 47; Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002, p. 311), and migration is presented as a problem where ‘outsiders’ are automatically regarded as a potential threat (De Genova 2016, p. 315).

Returning to the argument about alarmism, I accept that are serious challenges involved in migration, both on the side of host countries, countries of origin, and, on the side of migrant persons. What I rather suggested above, however, is that it is normatively problematic to articulate our arguments on migration with certain preconceptions about the dangers migrant people may carry on host states and on their members.

Concluding the argument about a normative bias of political theory of migration, embodied in the host viewpoint, I attempted to show that besides the normative implications of methodological nationalism, certain normative presuppositions arise directly from the unique language of political theory, which – without critical attention paid to them – may predetermine the way we see migration.

The overall aim of Chapter 3. have been to argue that the mainstream line of contemporary discussions about migration is highly exposed to these types of flaws,
both on the epistemological and the normative level. Now I turn to the Second Part of the dissertation where I outline a different approach which I regard to be corrective to these problems, and which, hopefully, may reveal the true nature of migration.
SECOND PART: A CRITICAL COSMOPOLITAN CARE

APPROACH TO MIGRATION

Chapter 4. Critical Cosmopolitanism

This chapter aims to outline an alternative answer to the methodological nationalist bias of mainstream political theory of migration on the epistemological level. Borrowing the idea of a paradigm shift to ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ from some authors of different fields of social sciences (Section 4.1.), the chapter highlights the normative political theoretical implications of critical cosmopolitanism for the issue of migration (Section 4.2.).

4.1. Critical Cosmopolitanism in Social Sciences

Critical cosmopolitanism is a term for an alternative agenda or paradigm for social sciences elaborated by some critics of methodological nationalism. A paradigmatic shift to critical cosmopolitanism (Delanty 2006, Sager 2018) or methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2002a, 2004; Chernilo 2006) is not straightforwardly connected to moral or political cosmopolitanism in the sense that it neither coheres with the view that attributes equal moral worth to every human being, nor it means the advocacy of open borders or a cosmopolitan state (Sager 2018, pp. 9–10).

Advocates of the paradigm change from methodological nationalism to critical cosmopolitanism argue that the underlying premises of these paradigms fundamentally structure empirical as well as theoretical research. In their view, this makes the transformation of the agenda extremely difficult, hence these are not entirely inseparable, and empirical data and methods are strictly based on national units (Beck 2002a, p. 51; Sager 2018, p. 22–23). They believe that the need for a perspective
change is heightened in an age when we face global problems that ‘have only global solutions’ (Beck 2002a, p. 42). As Beck argues, ecological conflicts, global financial crises, and the threat of global terror have a global impact in the 21st century, therefore, these phenomena affect, to some extent, every individual in the world. However, Beck admits that the global character of these risks does not entail that they would affect every part of the world and all of its inhabitants equally, provided that political decisions that attempt to calculate and control the consequences of these risks are highly deterritorialized (ibid., pp. 40–43).

Beck’s criticism includes setting up a new agenda for social scientific research by elaborating a framework of methodological cosmopolitanism. In his view, this agenda is research program towards cosmopolitan, denationalized social sciences which is capable of addressing a broader set of agents and revealing underlying inequalities between them (Beck 2002a; 2004)

While Chernilo accuses Beck of solving the challenge of methodological nationalism by elaborating similarly problematic conceptions, such as the already-mentioned methodological cosmopolitanism (Chernilo 2006; pp. 12–13), Sager claims that rejecting methodological nationalism does not necessarily lead to the need of reforming the entire social scientific agenda. Instead, Sager says, it merely means that one should be vigilant of underlying presumptions while theorizing about the nation and the state (Sager 2018, 19). But whom should we believe more concerning the implications of the critique of methodological nationalism? Beck, Chernilo or Sager? In the following section, I will argue for a possible understanding of the normative implications of a critical cosmopolitanism approach for the political theory of migration.
4.2. Critical Cosmopolitanism as an Epistemological Framework for Migration

Political philosophy focuses on the ‘justification for institutions and practices that seem natural and inevitable’ (Sager 2018, p. 17). It follows that it must be extraordinarily cautious of how some assumptions distort our understanding of the world because some justificatory mechanisms (for example, arguments about immigration restrictions) highly depend on such presumptions. In his book about the criticism of the methodological nationalist bias of contemporary studies about migration, Sager (2018) offers a cosmopolitan ethics of mobility. In his view, such an approach is reformative about the political theoretical attitude towards borders and boundaries and about the relationship between international movement and internal phenomena such as domestic migration and urbanism.

Regarding borders and boundaries, the advantage of critical cosmopolitanism is that it helps understand how borders and barriers affect exclusion. Asylum seekers and other people die daily by drowning in seas, dried out in deserts, or because of illnesses and other reasons in detention camps set up at national borders. However, these are not the only dangers that migrant people face daily. Boundaries also produce ‘ghettos’, ‘racism’, and ‘illegality’, therefore causing a variety of forms of loss of migrant people’s dignity and lives (Sager 2018). National border controls play only a limited part in excluding people because exclusion takes place in many other places as well. In Shachar’s (2020, p. 4) words,

\[ \text{a new and striking phenomenon—the shifting border—has emerged.} \]

\[ \text{The notion that legal circumstances affecting non-members change} \]
\[ \text{substantively only after they “pass through our gates” is well} \]
\[ \text{entrenched in both theoretical debates and regulatory practice.} \]
remarkable development of recent years is that ‘our gates’ no longer stand fixed at the country’s territorial edges. The border itself has become a moving barrier, an unmoored legal construct. [...] the fixed black lines we see in our world atlases do not always coincide with those comprehended in—indeed, created by—the words of law. Increasingly, prosperous countries utilize sophisticated legal tools to selectively restrict (or, conversely, accelerate) mobility and access by detaching the border and its migration-control functions from a fixed territorial marker, creating a new framework that I call the shifting border (Shachar 2020, p. 4).

Although Shachar attributes this change in the view of borders to a ‘methodological turn’ in political theory, stemming from an attempt to answer nonideal circumstances (Shachar 2020, p. 15; 61), her argument can be inserted in the framework of critical cosmopolitanism. Similar to Sager, Shachar acknowledges that borders ‘penetrate’ the domestic sphere, but she also highlights that, in other cases, the process is the opposite, and borders are consciously ‘erased’ (Shachar 2020, pp. 4–5).

In a more recent article, Shachar (2022) continues her argument and highlights the invisible or shifting border creates ‘mobile portals’ by which states can regulate human mobility and migration. She shows how the ‘trinity of the territorial, the cultural, and the economic’ influence movement and access to membership at different consequent gates of admission. She borrows this idea from Hammar (1990) and complements it with the argument that states can filter access to their territory and membership not only at the three gates of entry, settlement, and naturalization, but also a gate four may appear after naturalization, for example, if we think about the delay or bar placed ahead the reunification with non-citizen family members. In Shachar’s view, an additional gate zero may appear before entry, for example when one is
required to ‘prove her worthiness’ by showing the prerequired linguistic proficiency, and income requirements. In arguing that these prerequisites and different filtering mechanisms of incomers affect people differently according to gender, race, class, and power (Shachar 2022).

This connects to the other reformatory aspect of critical cosmopolitanism. Opposed to how the mainstream political theory demonstrates immigration as a central problem for political thought, a critical cosmopolitan perspective shows that the distinctions between international and internal migration (Sager 2018), or the ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ (Shachar 2020, pp. 10–11) are, in fact, blurred. Saskia Sassen recognized relatively early that international and internal migration could not be understood separately (Sassen 1988). In Sager’s view, there should not be a separate ethics of immigration at all (Sager 2018, p. 92); hence, it necessarily offers an incomplete and impoverished view about borders, movement, and exclusion (ibid., p. 78).

Nonetheless, national borders are not the only means of socio-spatial exclusion: the spatial dimension of social exclusion at the urban and national level has important parallels with exclusion at the international level (Sager 2018, p. 92).

As Sager argues, the vital problem in migration is not the ‘immigration issue’, but rather a complex of other issues of segregation, power, inequality (ibid., p. 93).

This aspect can be connected to Thomas Nail’s conception of the figure of the migrant (2015). In his approach to migration based on the idea of the ‘primacy of movement’ (Nail 2015, p. 17), Nail demonstrates that human movement is politically and historically intertwined with exclusion. In his view,

there is no theory of the migrant ‘as such’. There is no general ontology of the migrant. There are only figures of the migrant that
emerge and coexist throughout history relative to specific sites of expulsion and mobility (Nail 2015, p. 15).

In accordance with these views, the critical cosmopolitan position I argue for in this section is intended to be a correction to the epistemological flaws of the mainstream political theory of migration in the first place. Its primary aim is, therefore, to help us better understand what migration is. However, I must acknowledge that certain normative positions are more likely to follow from critical cosmopolitanism than others. In my view, therefore, critical cosmopolitanism encourages and prepares us to be more empathetic with migration and to address it with the concern that what would we reasonably hope for if we were migrants.

The important implication from critical cosmopolitan part of a CCC approach to migration is that the concepts of borders and boundaries are more complex, that they seem from a perspective that is occupied with the closed versus open borders debate, which is the focus of mainstream theories on the topic; and that migration is necessarily intertwined with several types of exclusion. Later, in Chapter 6., I will address these implications in more detail by showing that the notion of dispossession interpreted from various republican and feminist arguments helps us understand this complexity of borders and boundaries (Section 6.3.), and by arguing that exclusion is inseparable from movement, and by attempting to show that this exclusion inherent in migration could help us to understand the distinctive nature of political normativity (Section 6.4.). But before doing so, let me show what the feminist ethics of care adds to the CCC project.
Chapter 5. Care as an Ethics and Politics for Migration

Feminist approaches to normative political theory are of great value especially because they offer insights into the flaws of mainstream political theorizing. They are sensitive to some dimensions of social and political life to which more conventional approaches have blind spots. Although the broad range of different kinds of feminisms is usually underrated outside of expressively feminist academic circles and public discourse, and even they are often received with skepticism and malevolence; this chapter aims to show that they are, in fact, of great importance. Usually, what is regarded as the most robust contribution of feminist approaches to social sciences, political theory, and ethics is their critical potential. This chapter not only highlights the strengths of feminist criticisms with regard to migration, but also addresses some of its substantive contributions to the topic of migration. Section 5.1. addresses the advantages of feminist approaches concerning migration in three aspects, the empirical, the political theoretical, and the ethical aspect. Section 5.2. explicates the contribution of the ethics of care to the CCC approach to migration in a corrective way to the normative bias embodied by the host standpoint of the mainstream literature.

5.1. Migration from a Feminist Perspective

Feminism has various forms. Therefore, it would be impossible to demark one specific approach to migration as ‘the’ feminist approach. However, it is still meaningful to speak about various feminist proposals concerning migration in two senses.\(^{24}\) First, there are several topics addressed by feminist authors which touch on issues that are

\(^{24}\) This section offers a modified version of my article under publication in Politikatudományi Szemle, originally titled Miért legyen a migráció politikaelmélete feminista? (the English title is Why Should The Political Theory of Migration Be Feminist?) (Ujlaki 2021).
explicitly connected to migration, and second, there are also other characteristically feminist arguments that have implications for migration. These may not constitute a coherent feminist theory of migration but they provide invaluable critical insights and important inspirations for the critical cosmopolitan care position defended in this dissertation. In this section, I demonstrate that feminisms can contribute to the political theory of migration in three aspects: the empirical, the political theoretical, and the ethical aspect.

My aim here is not only to introduce the circumstances in which a specific feminist idea, the ethics of care, appears as the most suitable normative framework of the CCC approach. My supplementary aim is to formulate a free-standing argument for introducing a feminist perspective to the discussion of migration. Therefore, it must be noted that the proper way of normatively addressing migration would be an exclusionary feminist perspective, in the same way, I have claimed that, on the epistemological level, the political theory of migration should be addressed in critical cosmopolitan terms. I admit that other types of approaches might be of great value as well in moving forward to a more complex and precise understanding of the role of human migration in the operation of political communities. Accordingly, in Chapter 6, I will demonstrate the similarities between feminist and other approaches (for example, political realism or contemporary republicanism) in this regard.

Before introducing the framework, I would like to clarify what I mean by ‘feminism’. In ordinary language, feminism is a contentious term. In contemporary scholarship, the term is generally defined as the belief in and advocacy of equal rights for women based on the idea of the equality of the sexes; although during history, the term was paired with several different meanings (Bryson 2003; McAfee 2018). Historically, feminism can be traced back to the 18th century, when it emerged as a movement; however, several scholars argue that feminist thinking can be traced back
to the ancient world (Hawkesworth–Disch 2016, p. 1). From a political philosophical perspective, feminism could be best formulated as a criticism of the most prominent Western philosophical traditions (Benhabib – Cornell 1987, p. 1; Tong 2009). The content of this criticism is manifold, depending on the issue feminists aim to theorize. Given the versatility of feminist inquiry, feminism in the broader sense is best understood as a range of feminist beliefs (McAfee 2018).

In the following, I distinguish between three aspects in which feminisms might foster the political theoretical inquiry about migration. The first group of topics and approaches constitute what I call the empirical aspect, and among which I mention the implications that research on gender would have on the political theory of migration if taken seriously. The second group of topics and approaches constitute what I call the political theoretical level. Here, I demonstrate how feminist approaches to specific topics – namely, the place of interests in politics, the focus on dependency, and the dichotomy between the public and the private – might be formulated as a challenge to the mainstream political theory of migration. In the case of the third aspect, what I call the ethical aspect, I show in what sense would a feminist ethics contribute to the ethics of migration.

Let me consider the empirical aspect first. A fundamental concept that can be found in contemporary feminist thinking independently from disciplines is gender. Although the term is as much contested as the term feminism, the most frequently used definition is the one that regards gender as ‘the social meaning of sex’ (Haslanger 2012, p. 7), or in other words, gender is a social construction, ‘an intended or unintended product[s] of a social practice’ (Haslanger 1995, p. 97; see also Pateman 1988, p. 225). Now I attempt to show how the notion of gender has challenged mainstream views of migration, among the firsts, from an empirical perspective.
Sociology and the relatively novel field of migration studies usually analyze certain aspects of migration and migrant lives (Gold – Nawyn 2013; Váradi 2018). It is established to differentiate between three stages of empirical gender analysis in migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003, pp. 4–10; Nawyn 2010, pp. 750–751; see also Donato et al. 2006):

(1) The notion of gender appeared first in the 1970s and early 1980s, as the binary category that inflicts different (im)migration experiences of women and men.

(2) Later, in the 1980s, the main focus of gender analysis had become the system of social relations, and scholars started to address inequalities between households, labor markets, and cultures; they also started to pay attention to the circumstances in which the decision to migrate emerge and to postmigration experiences.

(3) Today, contemporary migration studies regard gender as ‘a constitutive element of migration’, they focus on how gender relations are transformed following migration, and they pay consider the migratory experiences of men as well.

Despite all its advantages, this area of gender analysis and migration studies (which I call together as the empirical aspect) suffers from the very same weakness as mainstream (non-feminist) political theory of migration. That is, it usually regards ‘migration’ as a synonym for ‘immigration’, hence it focuses on the experiences of immigrants in host countries (e.g., Bonifacio 2012). Therefore, instead of discussing most of the dimensions of human movement, the literature passes several forms of migration to other areas of research – for example, internal migration to demographic research (e.g. Riley – Brunson 2018; Smith et al. 2015), forced migration to refugee and forced migration studies (e.g. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014), while other forms of
forced migration, such as sex trafficking, which has an extremely gendered nature, is regarded marginal in the literature (Nawyn 2010, p. 758).

Nevertheless, sociological contributions to a feminist political theory of migration are essential in the sense that theoretical (political theoretical and ethical) approaches usually build on empirical observations. Thus, normative approaches are influenced by research on the different migrant experiences according to gender, living conditions, power relations in families, employment opportunities, and other political, social, and economic opportunities of (im)migrant people.

A fundamental empirical discovery of feminist research on migration is that immigrants have vastly different experiences according to their gender. Among these, literature has uncovered three important characteristics. One is the increase in the number of women migrants, called the ‘feminization of migration’ (Castles – Miller 1993; Passerini et al. 2007). Another contribution of the literature is the recognition that immigrant women face gender-specific disadvantages in several regards. Their access to social networks; their home opportunities (especially education), and cultural norms (rather than human capital characteristics) affect their opportunities in host countries in a gender-specific way. Moreover, whole industries (mainly care work, cleaning services and ‘sex work’) in affluent countries are built on immigrant women’s work. A third finding is that increased labor market participation in host countries transform the relative power of immigrant women (and girls) in their families (Nawyn 2010, pp. 753–757).

Another important recognition of feminist empirical research is that it highlights the differences between the migratory experiences of adults and children, and the differences between the opportunities of migrant and native children as well. In the empirical literature, it is more and more accepted to regard children as the most vulnerable subjects in migration (Hart 2014). In contrast, children and childhood are
still highly disregarded in political theory.\textsuperscript{25} Although the formerly common practice of regarding women migrants as a ‘luggage’ of migrant men has become largely abandoned by now, ‘children remain in a peripheral and luggage-like conceptual space, mostly framed as a source of contingency in decisions to migrate, stay, or return’ (Thorne et al. 2003, p. 242). In practice, this perspective that regards children as marginal, altogether with practices of granting citizenship leads to the statelessness of thousands of children (Kerber 2009). Besides, research on the educational performance of immigrant children shows that factors as lower socioeconomic status and school segregation play a part in the reproduction of social inequalities (Jacobs – Devleeshouwer 2016).

These feminist explorations have a direct impact on normative political theory and normative theories of migration. They support normative discussions that challenge the widely shared general point of view that stems from the fundamental values of equality, autonomy, and rationality of the tradition of liberal political philosophy (Benhabib 1987; Okin 1989a; 1989b; Hirschmann 2003; Young 1989). Building on the recognition that gender structure influences persons’ opportunities in life, feminist political theorists criticize mainstream liberal theorists of social justice because the latter do not understand the relevance of sex differences on opportunities of persons (Okin 1989a). An evident implication of this fact (primarily for Rawlsian contractualism) is that, from a feminist theoretical perspective, the ‘worst-off’ position in society (which is of great significance for Rawls’s domestic theory) cannot be

\textsuperscript{25} One obvious reason for this is that, in political theory and in law, only adults are regarded as autonomous, decision-making subjects, capable of rational agency. Another possible reason is that political theorists might assume that adulthood makes no difference in their arguments. In my view, the justifiability of the ignorance of children in political theory depends on the aim and mode of the theory in question. However, I sympathize with the claim that there are good reasons, in general, for addressing the interests of children in political theory (Gutmann 1980) or focusing expressively on childhood experiences that fundamentally determine our adult opportunities (Bojer 2000).
defined only in economic terms, but also in terms of gender (Okin, 1989b, p. 245). Sociological evidence can be used parallelly to theoretical arguments of migration that bypass the androcentric bias of non-feminist theories. The bias would mean, in this regard, to falsely assume that that most migrants are men or there are no differences between immigrants according to gender (Nawyn 2010; Tong 2009, p. 33). These findings demonstrate that, generally, women and children are more vulnerable subjects of migration, and immigrant women are a more exploitable labor source than either immigrant men or native women. In sum, the empirical aspect of the feminist potential in addressing migration contains the complexity of the circumstances that impact individuals’ and groups’ reasons for migration and the recognition of how gender and age affect the diverse experiences of migrants.

Now, I turn to the political theoretical aspect of the existing and possible contributions of feminism to migration. The long tradition of feminist thought traces back to early feminist authors of the 17th and 18th centuries, such as Mary Astell or Mary Wollstonecraft. A cornerstone for feminist scholarship has long been the criticism of mainstream liberal political theory for being ‘malestream’ (the term was coined by Mary O’Brien in 1983). Feminist criticism in its liberal form has been the most striking as a challenge to political philosophy focusing on the notion of social justice; perhaps because contemporary theories of social justice were created precisely as projects aimed at overcoming arbitrary inequalities between persons, against which feminists per definitionem struggle. While criticizing their non-feminist contemporaries with false gender-neutrality, which only hides the underlying gender structures both of societies and the theories of those societies (Okin 1989a, pp. 10–11; see also Hirschmann 2003; Pateman 1988), authors of this stream often created their own theories of social justice (Richards 1980; Okin 1989a; 1989b).
Political theories of migration with an admittedly feminist perspective are uncommon in the literature, though. Feminism appears in debates of migration in an ad hoc way. This means that several topics and arguments in theorizing about migration are clearly motivated by a feminist perspective; however, no such thing as a feminist political theory of migration exists in the literature. Therefore, in the following, I will gather and classify actual arguments that might serve as a guideline to create a more comprehensive feminist approach to migration. In doing so, I identify three groups of feminist topics. The first is about the role of interests in politics and migration, the second is dependency and domination closely related to movement and migration, and the third is connected to the critique of the dichotomy between the private and the public realm.

In the first group of feminist political theoretical approaches with the potential to address issues of migration I list arguments connected to the role of interests in politics. Primarily liberal feminist scholars criticize mainstream political theory for overly emphasizing the importance of interests in politics. The liberal feminist criticism highlights two problems. Firstly, regarding individual interests as pre-given and fixed conceals the inequitable and internalized power structures that shape our self-image. Secondly, the politics-of-the-marketplace view, which focuses on bargains and contracts, rules out the opportunity to take those crucial human relations and emotions seriously that essentially affect our lives.

This emphasis on the interests shapes mainstream political theory in two ways. One case is when scholars regard the political sphere, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, as a masculine sphere, while they view the private sphere as a historically feminine one. A criticism of this phenomenon is raised by liberal, radical, and Marxist feminists, although their substantive conclusions differ radically from each other (I will discuss the public/private dichotomy later). The other solution
emerges from abstraction in theorizing (Jaggar 1983; Schwartzman 2006, pp. 6–7). Feminists connect the latter solution to an *androcentric* bias that presumes that all individuals have similar interests (this problem has already appeared in the case of empirical research on male and female migrants). In their view, the bias underlies in arguments – especially Rawls’s one in *ToJ* – assuming that the family is a harmonious unit in which all members have the same interests (that can be represented by the head of the family). Also, feminists argue that the same eradication of the interests of women from the political sphere is performed by *false gender-neutrality* and claiming (in this predominantly English-speaking academic field) that the term ‘man’ can stand for ‘woman’ as well (Bryson 2003, p. 244; Okin 1989a; Pateman 1988).

As Seyla Benhabib (1987) and Iris Marion Young (1989) demonstrates, such a generalized viewpoint amplifies existing inequalities in a society where certain groups are privileged while others are oppressed. From a feminist perspective, mainstream theories with their applied abstractions and idealizations are mistaken; hence, real societies are strongly influenced by gender which determine women’s specific experiences and restricting opportunities available to them. Kimberlé Crenshaw (1998) adds the conception of *intersectionality* to this criticism, by which she describes the exclusion caused simultaneously by considerations of gender and race.

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26 There is a wide discussion about the nature and role of *abstraction* and *idealization* in political theory. A widespread practice following Onora O’Neill’s definition (1989; 2002) regards abstraction as the mere ignorance of certain real-world characteristics, while it regards idealization as assuming falseness about reality. However, this definition is strongly debated, especially because of its pejorative understanding of idealization, which, according to some authors, should rather be conceived as a method for arguing about the achievement of *perfection*. This view is supported by the argument that we already have a conception for assuming falseness, and it is *utopia* (Jubb 2012). For a conceptual map on the topic, see Valentini (2012), and for the problem of abstraction in political theory, see my article (Ujlaki 2019).
These criticisms are extremely important when it comes to the political theory of migration. As empirical research (Nawyn 2010, p. 752) and the formerly addressed critical cosmopolitanism demonstrates (in Chapter 4.), movement and, primarily, cross-border migration is connected to deprived statuses in all dimensions. In contrast, underlying the mainstream literature, there is the idea of all individuals as equals. Feminist political theories have the potential to reveal that this idea of equality is fiction. The situation of migrant women and children is generally worse than that of migrant men or native women; therefore, any feminist approach to migration would necessarily require taking the distinct interests, needs, and relationships of migrant people into consideration.

In the second cluster of feminist topics and approaches generally suitable for discussing migration, I address approaches that potentially acknowledge that relationships of dependency, domination, oppression, and exploitation are inherent in human movement and migration. Feminist scholarship is extremely rich in topics about the different forms of suppression of women, especially about arguments that show that gender inequalities are reproduced even in Western liberal democracies (Jaggar–Rothenberg 1984, p. 186; Lindemann 2019, pp. 23–39). From the perspective of migration, the question can be reformulated as to whether (and how) certain forms of internal, international, and forced migration reinforce gender inequalities. The feminist answer is that, most likely, it does. Movement and migration are often connected to discrimination based on gender (and race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, or social class).

A hitherto not mentioned stream of feminist theories, multicultural feminism, is more nuanced in this regard. It focuses on the differences between groups of women, especially on the distinct experiences due to migration, colonization, color, and ethnic affiliation (Tong 2009, pp. 200–220). Multicultural feminism depicts how gender and
race are connected, forming the same set of attitudes and patterns (Haslanger 2012, p. 7; Pateman – Mills 2007). A feminist approach to the political theory of migration helps to relocate our focus on how patriarchal structures are reinforced in immigrant families or, on the contrary, how migratory opportunities help some women in breaking away from oppressive power relations. It is also valuable to the inquiry on migration to add a feminist analysis of the connection between labor force participation and gender. There is a rich feminist scholarship on the role of education opportunities in labor market opportunities and on reproductive issues (that is, oppression in connection with reproduction-controlling techniques; Tong 2009, pp. 218–23.). Also, the scholarship focuses on unrecognized work as housework, childcare, elder care, sick care. It also highlights that low-wage factory work, sexualized work, and prostitution (often understood as ‘sex work’), carried out primarily by women or operating through the sexual exploitation of women by men (Ferguson 1989; Freibach-Heifetz – Stopler 2008; Pateman 1988; Okin 1989a; 1989b; Tong 2009, pp. 223–224). These streams of the feminist literature, with particular attention to the uncertainty, discrimination, dependency, domination, oppression, and exploitation, all that human movement and different forms of migration potentially carry within themselves, may serve as a rich basis for extending our inquiry about migration.

In the third group of feminist contributions that might offer fundamental arguments for political theories of migration, I address the already mentioned feminist critique of the dichotomy between the public and the private spheres. The critique of this classical liberal dichotomy stems from the famous radical feminist claim that ‘the personal is political’. As I already mentioned, feminist authors criticize their non-feminist contemporaries, primarily advocates of mainstream liberal theories, for being ‘male-centric’, thus accepting a fundamental dichotomy of the ‘public’ world of the political life and the ‘private’ domestic world of family life and personal relations
(Okin 1989a, pp. 110–111; also, MacKinnon 1989, p. 95). In the 1960s and 1970s, radical feminists started accusing the family as the root of women’s oppression, and similarly, liberal feminists have been challenging gender-structured forms of the family (see: Okin 1989a, pp. 121–122). From a feminist perspective, family is essential in our perception of ourselves and others, hence it is the primary place where socialization takes place, and therefore, it is a primary source for the reproduction of gender inequalities and further exclusions of women from the public sphere (Haslanger 2012, p. 285; Okin 1989a, 1989b, pp. 128–132; Pateman 1988, p. 141).

Radical feminist literature based on the critique of the public/private dichotomy might serve as a basis for theories of migration. While feminist criticism shows that the dichotomy implies that the private life is free from state intervention, the reality is that the state is decisive in several aspects of our private lives and especially of our family lives (starting from the practice that it defines what a family is). Consequently, a possible aspect of this line of research is focusing on how the state reinforces gender inequalities and remains blind to serious violence that takes place in the ‘private’ sphere of migrant people, given that, as I already mentioned, female and underage migrants are usually invisible for authorities, or at least they are regarded as the ‘luggage’ of male migrants; and not least, they are usually disadvantageous before and after movement compared to both native women and migrant men. This viewpoint might challenge the mainstream view of political theories of migration that emphasize the state’s right to control admittance and disproportionately focuses on the effects of migration to host countries compared to the experiences of migrants themselves.

The third aspect in which feminisms can, in my view, contribute to the discussion about migration is what I described as the ethical aspect. The most-known ethical theories that are regarded as distinctively feminist theories are ethics of care and ethics of responsibility. Although by ‘feminist ethics’ literature refers to
approaches that aim to ‘understand, criticize, and correct how gender operates within our moral and social beliefs and practices’ (Lindemann 2019, p. 15), care ethics and responsibility ethics are substantive normative ethical positions as well. Ethics of care challenges standard ethical theories, such as Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, or theories of justice based on the idea of caring relationships which should – according to care ethicists – bear moral importance; hence caregiving is an essential practice around which our social lives are fundamentally formulated (Gilligan 1982; Held 1993; 2006; Kittay 1999; Noddings 2013 [1986]; Ruddick 1990; Tronto 1993). In this sense, ethics of care calls for the extension of the boundaries of political and moral life and includes the activities of the less powerful members of the society (Tronto 1993, p. 20). The ethics of responsibility is a broader ethics in which responsibilities and emotions formulate our ordinary life. It is an ‘expressive-collaborative’ way of morality in Margaret Urban Walker’s (1988, p. 63) words, ‘a way of going on together as »us«’ (Lindemann 2019, p. 117).

Theorists of the more influential ethics of care offer an ethics based on ‘womanly values’ of care and recognition of human connectedness. Care ethicists build on the facts that empirical and political theoretical aspects of feminist contribution indicate, that is, both paid care work and unpaid care work, including childcare – with protection, nurturing and training –, care of elderly and sick people, and care of persons with disabilities are mostly brought off by women. Theorists of care ethics claim that based on these types of caring relationships, especially *mothering*, that are primarily regarded as ‘feminine’ (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 2013), caregiving should be valued both morally and politically. Moreover, they claim that caring should be a responsibility independent from gender (Held 2002), and our moral and political theories should start from the assumption of *dependency* (Kittay 1999) rather than from the fiction of equality.
Care is not only a moral but also a political idea. In Joan Tronto’s words, ‘[c]are is always infused with power. And this makes care deeply political’ (Tronto 2015: 9). In this sense, it ‘helps us to rethink humans as interdependent beings. It can serve as a political concept to prescribe an ideal for more democratic, more pluralistic politics’ (Tronto 1993, p. 21). Tronto regards the care approach as a ‘paradigm shift’ (ibid. p. 157) in the sense that it is relational and it requires us to reformulate our views about dependence and autonomy, needs and interests, moral engagement, the private sphere, justice, and democracy (ibid. pp. 162–170; Tronto 2015: 4). Caring well should be a central moral and political concern in order to have a functioning democracy (Tronto 2015: 4–9). Therefore, Tronto offers a novel definition of democracy built on the responsibility of care: ‘[d]emocracy is the allocation of caring responsibilities and assuring that everyone can participate in those allocations of care as completely as possible’ (2015: 15; emphasis in original; see also 2013: xiii, 56).

Accordingly, as Fiona Williams acknowledges, care ‘exists as a relational practice, as policy, as an ethic, and as the basis for making claims, as a commodity, economy, and power’ (Williams 2018, p. 547). Concerning care as a political conception with transformative claims about our political world and our ideas about that world, it is obvious that what I called here the ethical aspect of feminisms might also contribute to the theorizing about migration. I address these existing and possible contributions in the following section. My proposed approach, the critical cosmopolitan care approach to migration builds partly on this care approach as a ‘paradigm shift’ in the sense as Tronto understands it to what I formerly described as the host standpoint of the normative political theory of migration.
5.2. Feminist Care as a Normative Framework for Migration

So far, in the Second Part of the dissertation, I have depicted critical cosmopolitanism and showed its strengths when formulating it as a paradigm change or change of the agenda from the underlying methodological nationalism of the political theory of migration on what I called the epistemological level of the argument. Now, after I similarly sketched a feminist framework as a source for a possible paradigm change from the host standpoint of the mainstream approaches, I attempt to describe substantively what that change implies to what I called the normative level of the argument for a CCC approach.

The feminist conception of care can be regarded as a successful alternative to the host standpoint of political thought. While the host standpoint is, either in the form of a benevolent superiority in the language of human rights or the alarmist agenda, about the threat intertwined with migration, an alternative care-view can bypass these flaws of normative inquiry. Instead of talking in the language of individuals’ rights, an approach to migration elaborated in the framework of the ethics and politics of care regards the values of care and human interconnectedness as the main virtues of moral conduct. It makes a difference by approaching ‘the problem of otherness’ and ‘morally distant others’ in a specific way (Tronto 1993, especially pp. 13–14), by dissolving the simplified distinction between ‘we’ and ‘them’. This paradigm shift helps us to depart from what Benhabib (1987) calls the standpoint of the ‘generalized other’ and relocates our focus to what she calls the ‘concrete other’. The main characteristic of such a feminist approach is its acknowledgment of particular situations and experiences of involved agents (especially of their gendered experiences). For example, in the case of dependency work, that is, the work of caring for the dependent and which, traditionally regarded as a part of familial obligation, and therefore, in practice, usually carried out
by the unpaid or low-paid work of women who are, therefore, also vulnerable to the risk of becoming dependent (Kittay 1999).

Globalizing care, what Fiona Robinson (1999) attempts to do, helps us recognize exploitative and dominating social relationships at the global level (although Robinson actually understands care as an international theory, ibid. 1999; 2011). In Robinson’s view, the main achievement of care ethics applied on a global scale as an alternative against universalist, rule-based, and minimalistic ethics is that it is sensitive to the patterns of exclusion that characterize the contemporary world and normatively committed to those individuals and groups who are marginalized and oppressed either by exclusions in the global economy, by gendered norms and practices, or by the cultural hegemony of Western values (Robinson 1999).

Feminist approaches to care associate moral significance to the intrinsic vulnerability in human life (and life in general), from which dependency on other’s care might arise (Dodds 2014; Mackenzie et al. 2014). Although, it does not restrict itself to the most urgent or most extreme deprivation, such as the human rights language does in its ‘check-list’ form but allows for the consideration of any unequal or dependent social relationship. It starts from the recognition of those relationships that may be formally equal but actually are not.

The main advantage of introducing care to the normative discussion of migration is that it allows addressing migration from the viewpoint of the migrants as well, because, as I already mentioned, human movement always involves some kind of uncertainty and vulnerability. These characteristics of a care approach help political thought dissociate itself from an impoverished view of the social and political world.

But why care and not empathy, for example, the appropriate principle generating responsibilities? Empathy is rather a competence that some individuals possess, while others do not. Empathy may be important or useful to recognize and
carry out responsibilities of care (e.g. Tronto 2013, p. 151) and the humanity and needs of other persons (Freibach-Heifetz and Stopler 2008, p. 526), however, empathy is a way of relating to the other, rather than the act of fulfilling our responsibilities of care, and caring actively. In other words, responsibilities of care can be fulfilled even without the ‘right reasons’ – in this case, an empathetic recognition of the other’s humanity and needs –, while empathy in itself could not guarantee the fulfillment of our responsibilities.

In response to the global ‘care chain’ that depicts the flow of care-intensive labor force, a few scholars introduced care ethics to the context of migration, as an alternative view to mainstream ethics of (im)migration. Hamington (2017) claims, for example, that since the ethics of care is founded in the particularity of the relation between the ‘one-caring’ and ‘cared-for’, therefore care towards (im)migrants cannot be universalized (see also Raghuram 2012). Thus, Hamington argues that the ethic of care in this context should be manifested in the ideal of hospitality (Hamington 2017, p. 249). Similarly, building on empirical research, Datta et al. (2010) introduces a migrant ethic of care that ‘is fundamentally shaped by transnational migration, nationality, gender (which is taken here to include not only migrant women but also migrant men) as well as ethnicity and race’ (Datta et al. 2010, p. 94).

There are fundamental tasks that a care theory of migration should perform in order to successfully understand and answer challenges stemming from migration. In contrast to what I called the host standpoint of mainstream political theories of migration, a care theory of migration has to acknowledge how relationships of care and power relations continue to exist and transform after migration. A care theory of migration must acknowledge that mobility per definitionem does not happen in a fixed place; therefore, the place of care is also changing. A care theory of migration must see that practices of care are changing culturally as well. And not lastly, a care theory
of migration must address that care itself is always an ongoing relationship that is transformed by the participants themselves (Raghuram 2016). And in the long run, a care theory of migration must outline a proper institutional and policy framework to maintain efficient care (Engster 2007).
Chapter 6. The Critical Cosmopolitan Care (CCC) Approach for Migration

So far, I sketched critical cosmopolitanism as a suitable framework for the political theory of migration on the epistemological level and care as a framework on the normative level. Now I outline the implications of a critical cosmopolitan care approach for migration. Section 6.1. addresses the direct implications of a CCC approach for the political theory of migration. Section 6.2. explores objections that exist in the literature against critical cosmopolitanism and the ethics and politics of care; moreover, it sketches and answers some possible objections against the CCC approach. Section 6.3. demonstrates the joint strengths of feminism and republicanism concerning migration. Finally, Section 6.4. demonstrates how a CCC approach highlights that exclusion is inherent in movement and migration, and therefore, a CCC approach helps us understand the specifical nature of political normativity, an issue that has long occupied political realists.

6.1. Implications of the CCC Approach to Migration

How should, then, we imagine an approach that includes components such as critical cosmopolitanism, care-focused ethics and politics, and the perspective of the migrant, and which addresses movement and mobility as equally important as sedentarism and immobility, and which is not adhere to a temporally and spatially fixed view of movement but concerns phenomena preceding and implied by human movement as well?

In this section, I demonstrate some of the most important implications of applying a critical cosmopolitan care approach to migration, namely, the acknowledgment of
(1) the complexity of the social-political world;

(2) the role of our joint responsibilities in the formation of unequal statuses; and

(3) the moral and political significance of human vulnerability.

The first implication relates to the complexity of the social-political world. As Caney (2005) calls it, a ‘global political theory’ addresses the operation of the entire global realm. Globally relevant issues, however, have extensive causes and effects on the individual lives of people, on the operation of domestic societies, and on international relations; and one of their specificities is that some of these effects often felt only on the long term. In my view, the CCC approach offers an open-minded position to recognize those causes and effects in their complexity. Take the examples of mobility and migration: because CCC does not rely on methodological nationalist presuppositions nor on a host standpoint view embodied in the language of benevolent superiority or alarmism, CCC enables us regard both the human potential for movement and actual migration as normal components of the ordinary operation of social and political life, rather than as an anomaly or a threat, and therefore, it approaches it from the perspective of migration itself, rather than a perspective similar what I called the host standpoint (De Genova 2016, Sager 2018, Wimmer – Glick Schiller 2002). Moreover, a CCC approach is not biased towards host states’ viewpoint when addressing migration: it can consider the phenomenon in its complexity and address its causes and effects on several agents. It is indeed global rather than international: instead of taking states almost exclusively as the appropriate unit of analysis of the international sphere, it considers individuals as equally important subjects of the inquiry. However, CCC is not individualistic in the same sense as mainstream ethical and political theories are. It does not lend disproportionate weight to individual interests, but rather, it calls for taking other human reasons for action and
social relationships as well into consideration for getting a balanced view of ethically significant reasons. Furthermore, it does not address individuals separately from the social groups and the characteristics of those groups in which they are members. I take CCC to be a suitable candidate for a global political theory of migration because it can address migration from a broader perspective rather than from the narrow one that focuses on types and dimensions of migration that affect the nature of the domestic political community.

The second implication of CCC to migration relates to the joint responsibilities that humans have in the reasons and effects of human migration. An aspect of the acknowledgment of the role of human conduct in the challenges that migration has on migrants and non-migrants, as well as on destination countries and countries of origin, is the proper understanding of the role of history. While some contemporary political theorists address the responsibility of advanced states in contributing to the disadvantages of the rest of the world (primarily in economic terms), mainstream political theories tend to forget the role of these states in the formulation of the social-political world. In contrast, the CCC approach I am arguing for highlights that the world as we see it now is partly a result of human conduct and there is a responsibility for it that can be reasonably attributed to those whose agency in creating this state of affairs can be established. Nation-building, colonization, and technological development, in fact, largely determine the distribution of environmental, social, and economic resources, therefore strongly influence different claims. From this approach, others’ deprivations can no longer be seen as results of their ‘misfortune’, rather, as Sager (2016a) calls them, they are humanity’s problems. And these problems should be addressed with a critical attitude towards the underlying causes of inequalities, dependencies, and oppressions. In other words, patterns of exclusion related to migration should be recognized (Robinson 1999).
The third implication connects to vulnerability, which has central moral significance for a critical cosmopolitan care approach. Migration is an experience depending on one’s race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, and social class. A CCC approach is especially sensitive to the fact that the most vulnerable groups of contemporary societies suffer from the very same patterns of dependency and domination. For example, as empirical research indicates, in advanced societies, care work is almost entirely brought off by immigrant women (Nawyn 2010). The consideration of these vulnerabilities and dependencies is accompanied by challenging the content of the notion of threat in connection to migration. As I argued, an element of threat seems ineradicable for the host standpoint of the political theory of migration, either in less skeptical approaches of benevolent superiority or its more alarmist positions. The threat, in this formulation, is carried by the migrant and poses dangers primarily to the host society. However, the CCC approach makes it possible to address the threat inevitable in migration and movement itself. Migration always carries the possibility of some losses for the migrants themselves: either in economic terms or in terms of losing some kind of statuses and its related rights (Nail 2015). The claim that migration is a process with heightened vulnerabilities may help us to reformulate our conventional ways of understanding what is of real stake in human movement.

These characteristics of the critical cosmopolitan care approach do not entail that the debates about borders should be dismissed entirely nor that they should be replaced by the viewpoint of the migrants. They only suggest that the migrants’ perspective should be given due weight even in political theoretical approaches that are primarily occupied with domestic issues, hence the domestic world cannot be comfortably detached from human migration and other phenomena which are often global in character.
The list of implications of a critical cosmopolitan care approach to migration could easily be supplemented; however, these three implications seem to be the most conspicuous. They reveal the CCC approach’s potential to address urgent and serious issues from the perspective of political thought and offer practical guidance to what to do in an era vastly characterized by global challenges. I admit that action-guidance is not a necessary role of normative political theoretical inquiry. However, it is not a particularly unusual component of it, and I believe that in an era of heightened attention to migration, it is reasonable to assert that political theory, beyond understanding and explaining the nature and role of migration in the social and political world, should also be able to propose an answer to the question of what is to be done.  

What are the implications of the CCC approach for migration in more practical terms? I would like to argue for three possible phenomena that could only be insufficiently addressed from the framework of mainstream arguments on migration, however, whose approach from the CCC perspective would be more highlighting. This also means, that for these phenomena, the CCC approach could offer more robust normative answers. The three cases are

1. the case of persons stuck in transit states or camps,
2. the case of slow onset climate change migration, and
3. the case of the global care chain.

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27 The problem of the self-understanding of political theory is unfolded recently in the works of contemporary realist political theorists, primarily following the works of Williams (2005) and Geuss (2008). One of their charges against mainstream (Rawlsian) political liberalism is that it is incapable of offering practical guidance to political conduct in real-world circumstances. I investigated this criticism among other charges of contemporary political realists in an article titled Rawls, a realizmus előfutára? A moralista szerző elméletének változása realista szemszögű A Theory of Justice-tól a Political Liberalismig (the English title is Rawls, the Forerunner of Realism? Changes of the Theory of the Moralist Author from a Realist Angle) (Ujlaki 2016).
Regarding the first case, concerning persons stuck in transit states and camps it is important to see that the need for a comprehensive framework for migration and refugee policies in the international realm is more and more acknowledged (the relatively recent global Compacts of the UN point to this direction, see UN 2018a; UN 2018b). However, as research from the areas of empirically grounded normative theory (Ackerly et al. 2021) highlights, these frameworks cannot be regarded as truly effective until their applicability depends greatly on the voluntary decisions of sovereign states (Santos 2021).

There are widely accepted principles such as the non-refoulement principle (which prohibits states from transferring or removing individuals from their jurisdiction in cases where the person would be expectedly exposed to harm upon return) has been reaffirmed recently (UN 2018a) as a primary and cardinal, however not legally binding, guiding principle of the international protection of refugees. The problem is that states that do not attempt to openly defy the principle, still have a broad range of tools and mechanisms to avert their share of responsibilities. Especially developed countries apply ‘non-arrival measures’, such as ‘the use of visa regimes, carrier sanctions, immigration pre-inspection, and interdiction at sea’ (Santos 2021, p. 14). These practices serve as to prevent certain persons from arriving to the territory of the state, and therefore, these states can claim that principles such as non-refoulement do not apply without the physical presence of migrant people at the territory of the state. Some practices are applied to a broad range of migrants, as Shachar argues, even in the post-migration period, or during migration and arrival. Border fences, surveillance in transit countries, ‘waiting zones’ as well as cultural, linguistic, and economic preconditions might prevent people from migrating or continuing their movement (Shachar 2022, especially p. 628). These practices prevent migrants and refugees to get into a legal relationship with host or destination states.
that would enable them to raise certain claims connected to their movement and migration.

This leads to the fact that several migrants, especially refugees, spend plenty of time, sometimes years, in transit countries, waiting zones, refugee camps, or immigration detention centers, sometimes under undesirable living conditions, such as in the case of Hungarian transit zones in the Hungarian-Serbian border between 2015 and 2020. The COVID-19 Pandemic, for example, heightened the health risks for people living ‘temporarily’ in these areas.\(^{28}\) As other research also indicate, in practice, the installation of these areas often serve the objectives of states avoiding responsibilities towards migrant and refugee people, rather than the interests of these persons. Stivens (2017) shows how *cosmopolitan practice* is deeply gendered in the example of Australian advocacy groups for asylum seekers and refugees. She demonstrates that most of the volunteers working in these groups, as well as the participants of protests against government refugee and migration policies are mostly women who explicitly emphasize protective ‘maternal’ and ‘grandmaternal’ emotions (especially rage) in social movements.

This not only shows how the notion of care could lift the asymmetrical view of migrants and refugees as individuals from the perspective of the host society (or even the perspective of the homogeneous container society) but also highlights that, in practice, care is not necessarily based on soft feelings and positive relating to others. It can also be a basis for harsh emotions that indicate political and social empowerment, mobilization, and change. This case shows the ineffectiveness of the human rights language and how care could indicate the appearance of caring

relationships between citizens and outsiders, leading to truly responsive political and social relationships.

The second case regarding slow onset climate change is different from the case of persons in transit areas in the sense, that here, not their existing claims are denied or suspended by certain mechanisms, but rather, their situation does not necessarily appear as claims similar to refugees and asylum seekers. Global climate change indicates that particular areas of the world slowly become unlivable, as in the case of the Pacific Island States. Slow onset ‘events’ (or, more precisely, slow onset ‘changes’ or ‘processes’, see: Van der Geest – Van der Berg 2021) happen gradually. Typically processes like sea level rise, salinization, drought, and desertification could be mentioned here, and according to an annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, their problem is that

> these effects will combine with individual vulnerabilities and socio-economic, demographic, and political contexts to affect the ability of people to respond to stressors and enjoy human rights. This leads some people to move internally or across borders, and renders others unable to move away from affected areas (OHCHR 2018, p. viii).²⁹

Similarly to the case of sudden onset disasters, there are certain substantive rights that may be harmed in situations of slow onset events, for example, the right to adequate food, water, health, housing, or rights to participation and information. Also, both cases could motivate migration or displacement. However, there is a gap in the protection of migration and displacement related to slow onset climate change (ibid.), because during the gradual degradation of certain environmental, social and political circumstances, it is not easy to ascertain the point from which one should be considered as a refugee and not an economic migrant, for example.

This case, again, shows some lacks of the human rights discourse, and if we add the practical mechanisms by which states usually operate to eschew responsibilities towards refugees and migrants, it is easy to see that gradual environmental changes with their foreseeable challenges could simply put aside from the scope of responsibilities of the members of the international community. However, a change of focus from the minimalistic language of human rights and the host standpoint to a CCC approach could show that global environmental changes affect humanity \textit{per se} and, eventually, we will have to offer truly global and truly effective solutions to the restructuring of the population of the earth. It would be naïve to claim that slow onset changes are neither problems of the developed world nor problems that should be addressed now. People reasonably will migrate from areas with a high risk of environmental catastrophe in the near future, and this migration will affect the subsequent movement of other persons. Rather than repeatedly redefining the boundaries between who counts as a refugee and who is not, applying the perspective of CCC and putting care needs into the focus, it is easier to acknowledge that certain people are more vulnerable to certain risks, even if that risk, in a given period of time, seem less radical than the effects of sudden disasters. In the third case, the \textit{global care chain} reflects on the ‘most paradigmatic phenomena of the current feminization of migration’ (Orozco 2009, p. 4.). The term was coined by Hochschild (2000) and it is used for

\begin{quote}
\textit{Global care chains are networks of transnational dimensions that are formed for the purpose of maintaining daily life. These networks are comprised of households which transfer their care giving tasks from one to another on the basis of power axes, such as gender, ethnicity, social class, and place of origin} (Orozco 2009, p. 4.).
\end{quote}
In several cases, for middle-class households in developed states, the ‘cheapest’ solution is to hire an immigrant from a poor country for this care work (Ehrenreich – Hochschild 2003; Orozco 2009; 2010; Yeates 2012, see also Minh Nguyen et al. 2017).

For example, Parreñas (2015) showed that Philippino migrants, more precisely female Philippinas do low-wage care work around the world, and there is literature on eastern European care chains (e. g. Palenga-Möllenbeck 2013).

Women in global care chains do not abandon their traditionally unpaid care ‘duties’ at home, but the opposite: they have parallel responsibilities and often send *remittances* to their families left in their countries of origin (Orozco 2010). Therefore, these women are regarded to have multiple, although low-paid or unpaid jobs, exposed to several vulnerabilities resulting from their gender, race, class, economic situation, language skills, culture, and they are highly exposed to physical violence, mental and emotional deprivations, if we think about the distance they live from their families, even young children. They are often invisible in two senses: the care work they do is usually regarded as invisible in patriarchal societies, but very often they are invisible themselves in the sense of being ‘unauthorized’ migrants (Orozco 2009).

In this case, the problem is not only that human rights are ineffective or inapplicable, but rather, the underlying dichotomy between the public and the private, where care work is primarily regarded as part of the domestic work in public sphere, prevents us to see the underlying vulnerabilities of women, migrant people, and the specific challenges migrant women face in global migration systems. A CCC approach could reveal these vulnerabilities and highlights care needs with regard to the intersectional characteristics of human experience in movement and migration.
6.2. Exploring Some Possible Objections to the CCC Approach

In this section, I examine some objections to both the critical cosmopolitan part and the care part of the proposed approach respectively, and I also address possible objections to the entire CCC approach in detail. Let me consider critical cosmopolitanism first. A most obvious objection is questioning whether the critique of the methodological nationalist bias of social sciences necessarily leads to a substantive appraisal of critical cosmopolitanism. As Chernilo (2006) argues what Beck calls ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ is an ‘allegedly autonomous research programme that bullies previous social sciences and declares them obsolete’ (Chernilo 2006, p. 11). The question is whether critical cosmopolitanism can be successful as a fundamentally reformed social scientific paradigm. As Chernilo highlights, in elaborating the methodological cosmopolitan paradigm, surprisingly, Beck himself offers a methodologically nationalistic account of the nation-state. For example, Beck does not satisfactorily address the operation of nation-states and he does not see that the harmonious view of the nation-state has always been a myth (ibid., p. 12). In contrast to Beck’s methodological cosmopolitanism, Sager’s proposal about critical cosmopolitanism does not involve a complete paradigm change, and, in Sager’s view, it would be more effective to regard it as a critical stance (Sager 2018, p. 19). Thereby, this less radical view involves the claim that because nation-states play an essential role in modern social and political life, we should always acknowledge their relevance in any reflection on political issues. Critical cosmopolitanism in this latter form implies that, in some cases, it is indeed helpful to address some issues from within the framework of methodological nationalism, but with an awareness of its influence on our judgments.
Now I turn to objections to feminist approaches, especially care approaches and their application to the topic of migration. The first, general objection to feminist approaches to migration and other topics concerns the marginalized role of feminisms per se. Feminist approaches are largely unnoticed in several academic disciplines and it raises the question whether this lack of attention stems from some internal problem of feminist theorizing. Consider its quite different conclusions and allegedly ‘too radical’ demands like the challenge of the public/private dichotomy or the acknowledgement of the importance of social relationships as care which might be morally unimportant to certain people. My answer to these concerns is similar to my previous answers to the objection to critical cosmopolitanism. The main strength of critical cosmopolitanism and feminism lies in their critical potential. By comparison, the substantive claims following from the compelling critiques provided by feminism might be considered to be of secondary importance. These substantive claims might be divergent, incoherent, vague, or controversial but even if it were the case, the robustness of the feminist critique could not be called into question. In other words, the critical assessment of these claims does not straightforwardly entail the refusal of the subjects of their criticisms. Agreeing with Valerie Bryson (2003, p. 4) who said about feminist political theory that it ‘cannot be conveniently »ghetto-ised«, for the issues it raises are of vital importance to any understanding of political power; any political theory that ignores it is inevitably partial and impoverished’, I believe that, for the very same reason, the political theory of migration cannot and should not do without the feminist contributions if it really wants to understand and explain human movement and migration, and offer plausible answers to it in normative political theoretical terms.

Of course, it is not useless to address the wide variety of objections to feminist approaches and, particularly, to the ethics of care. Any political philosophy might have
an internal and an external criticism (Skorupski 2017), and care approaches are no exception to this. Regarding external criticism, the ethics of care is accused by being a ‘slave morality’ (a term echoing Nietzsche’s infamous critique of Christian morality) by sublimating and exploiting care-givers, ‘empirically flawed’, ‘theoretically indistinct’ by making no difference from approaches of justice, for example, ‘parochial’ by bypassing other social dynamics besides caring relationships, ‘essentialist’ by reinforcing gender stereotypes, and ‘ambiguous’ by failing to offer guidance for action (Sander-Staudt, 2011, see also Tronto 1993). Some of these are also formulated as internal criticisms on the part of feminist ethicists. Primarily, the potential of care ethics in reaffirming exploitation, posing a threat to the integrity of care-givers, and making no difference from justice are often brought up by from within feminist circles (Lindemann 2019, pp. 110–112, see also Kittay 1999). Social

A related concern is whether care is the real alternative on the normative level of the CCC argument. I already acknowledged that the criticism of the host viewpoint does not directly entail a care approach. It merely opens a theoretical space for a number of candidates for offering a more suitable alternative to the mainstream political theory of migration. According to advocates of care ethics and politics, some of these are less appropriate for offering normative insights into the political theory of migration. For example, Marxists and communitarians criticize the abstract individualism of liberal political theory similarly to feminists, however, they do not precisely criticize the deep gender structures of our societies, the role of interdependence, and caring relationships in human life. As Virginia Held highlights,

30 Since this dissertation is a programmatic work offering a framework for addressing the normative aspects of migration, I do not intend to make justice between different feminist political theories. Rather, I invite the reader to engage in a discussion in which one could see the fruitful contributions of feminist approaches in highlighting some relevant characteristics of the social and political world, especially those which, in case taken into consideration, would alter our views on human movement and exclusion.
Marxist approaches rather focus on the economic dimension of inequalities, while communitarian approaches evoke more communal, however, at the same time, patriarchal relations. In my view, some other alternatives, such as contemporary republicanism, the Shklarian ‘liberalism of fear’, or an Arendtian argument for ‘the right to have rights’ might be suitable for the role of substituting or, more preferably, supplementing the mainstream literature. In Sections 6.3. and 6.4., I explain these ideas in detail, and I sketch their possible connection points to my CCC approach.

Now, let me address some possible general objections towards a CCC approach to migration as a whole. There are two immediate objections. These are whether, in order to be successful, a critical cosmopolitan approach would indeed need the ethics and politics of care as well; and inversely, whether a care approach would really need to be complemented with critical cosmopolitanism. Concerning the first option, critical cosmopolitanism in itself, as I pictured it, offers a shift of viewpoint on the epistemological level. Therefore, it leaves open what can substantively be said about what is justifiable in relation to migration. In other words, it remains silent about what should be answered to ‘immigration ethicists’ about migration, borders, and migration controls. It will make certain claims more difficult to maintain and others easier, but it does not necessarily require the complete reformulation of the entire discourse on migration in the sense that, after the introduction of the critical cosmopolitan approach, it still remains possible to address the same old topics with which mainstream authors have always been preoccupied, the only change is that now they are looking at it from a critical cosmopolitan viewpoint. Although even this would be a welcome change, it would still offer an impoverished view about what migration really is and what is its actual role in our political communities.

What about care without critical cosmopolitanism? A typical solution like this would be Fiona Robinson’s (1999) attempt to propose a so-called ‘globalized’ view
about care. However, her approach cannot be regarded ‘global’ in the sense that it addresses the specific feminist explorations from the perspective of IR, and focuses on problems of international relevance, such as world poverty. In doing so, she appeals to some methodological nationalist biases and keeps the distinction between the domestic and the international in place. To illustrate this, it can be said that she does not acknowledge the transforming nature of borders and boundaries or how internal and international movement, as well as inequalities, dependencies, and exclusions are interrelated. In formulating a framework in which normative questions of migration could be comprehensively addressed, we not only need an international approach to care relations between states, but also an approach that is both critical of states’ discretionary power over deciding specific issues of access and skeptical towards the overly voluntary nature of states’ implementing mechanisms of migratory policies and tools.

Another, more practical objection from a different angle should be answered here. Despite, as I argued, rights are not sufficient for answering normative challenges around human movement, but still, in migration policies and practices, the idea of rights, especially human rights is an indispensable means for migrants and refugees to effectively struggle for recognition, personal security, well-being, and other fundamental claims. For this reason, it would not be useful to entirely abandon the language of rights or human rights. In care ethics, there are different views on the proper relationship between rights and care. Still, most feminist theorists of care do not argue for the entire rejection of rights per se (Held 2002: 161-163). There are different views on what precisely equal rights for women would require (ibid. 163; Young 1989), and as an analogy to the rights of women in circumstances of democratic societies, it can be said, that in global circumstances of migration, differentiated rights of migrants could be regarded as a possible means for fulfilling certain individual and
group claims and needs. At the end of the day, from a feminist perspective, ‘rights are not timeless or fixed, but contested and developing. Rights reflect social reality and have the capacity to decrease actual oppression’ (Held 2002: 164). Therefore, from the perspective of CCC, rights should not be eschewed entirely, rather, there should be room for reconciling rights and care.31

There is one more possible objection to the whole project I have been arguing for. This objection could be raised in the following form: it can be argued that it is only a conceptual misunderstanding that motivates my challenge to the mainstream literature. This ‘misunderstanding’ objection would mean that the ‘ethics of immigration’ is aroused precisely for what it is: a debate of a simplified theoretical question with a limited scope, that is, ‘whether the state is justified in restricting immigration?’ and, therefore, it would be unfair to criticize it for not having a broader scope. In this case, there is no reason to require that migration be regarded as a broad phenomenon appearing in a variety of complex situations, involving continuous temporal and spatial transformations and encompassing a wide range of causes and effects. My answer to this objection is that from the mere fact that a question has been widely considered to apply to a narrower set of phenomena it does not follow in any meaningful way that actual and possible criticism could not lead to the questioning and that it could not engender the need of rethinking the implications of mainstream theories. Therefore, on the one hand, a rich literature of the ethics of immigration might need a reformulation in light of new viewpoints like, for instance, the so-called ‘migrant’s-eye view’ or the role of international actors and political, social and economic structures that affect human movement. On the other hand, political theory

31 For example, Freibach-Heifetz and Stopler (2008) offer a simultaneously abstract and practical argument for the reconciliation of justice and love, as a possible solution for overcoming the oppression that originates in the division between the public and the private.
of migration might be widened, including topics that belong broadly to migration, such as historical or structural factors that play part prior to, during, and following actual movement and migration. In other words, the ‘ethics of immigration’ should not simultaneously be ‘a political and ethical theory of migration’, however, in the way of moving forward that role, the ethics of immigration should be considered only as one of the important aspects of the inquiry.

6.3. Vulnerability and Domination

Concerns of vulnerability and domination are fundamental not only for feminist political thought. As I mentioned already, there are important similarities between feminist and republican approaches concerning the topic of migration. This section aims to elaborate on these connections.

Although, at first sight, republicanism and feminism may seem to be antagonists – especially because of the former’s underlying sexism (at least in the past, republicanism was overwhelmingly about how to secure the non-dominated status of male citizens) –, the two streams of political thought become more closer recently than they have been in their earlier forms. One reason for this is that contemporary republicanism is, in feminist terms, less ‘male-stream’ than its predecessors (Phillips 2000, p. 279), and the other reason is that they both appeared as an alternative of their common adversary: namely, mainstream liberal political theory.

A possible objection to the attempt to ally republican and feminist political theories might be that their structures are incomparable. On the one hand, I showed that while several authors advocate contemporary republican political theory, the most systematic work among them is Philip Pettit’s Republicanism (1997), therefore, the most fundamental ideas of contemporary republicanism might be derived from Pettit’s
work. Moreover, Pettit sets Rawls explicitly as his opponent in elaborating a republican political theory. On the other hand, contemporary feminist political theory is a more fluid stream, regarded, among others, as a movement or a criticism of other Western philosophical traditions. With several different areas of interest and fundamental conceptions and beliefs feminist authors are also quite disparate in their radicalism and relation to other streams of thought (Bryson 2003; McAfee 2018; Tong 2009). Therefore, as I already argued, feminism can be defined as a range of feminist beliefs (McAfee, 2018).

A noteworthy article on the possibility of the alliance of republicanism and feminism is elaborated by Anne Phillips (2000). Her method to reconcile the two streams is that, first, she identifies three main themes around which contemporary republican thought is centered, and then, she demonstrates that each of these topics also appears either in the long-standing tradition of feminism or in its contemporary forms. This argumentation might be useful, hence, as I argued, the main ideas of contemporary republicanism may be detected more quickly, while feminist ideas are more multifaceted, especially if regarded from different historical perspectives. However, I would like to argue that underlying this seemingly ad hoc checklist of common themes, there is a stronger link between how these streams of thought formulate their fundamental conceptions. This link is formed by the lack of certain possessions, and it may be perceived truly if one takes the lack of certain possessions by the individual (particularly, in the case of migration, the lack of certain possessions by ‘the migrant’). But before presenting my argument, let me briefly sketch how Phillips presents the commonalities of the two streams.

Phillips identifies the first of these three common themes of republicanism and feminism as a criticism of or dissatisfaction with the interest-driven view of politics,
which regards almost everything in politics as a ‘rational pursuit of long-term interests’ that are regarded as ‘pre-given and fixed’, and which is blind to how people internalize ‘inequitable power relations’ (Phillips 2000, p. 284; see also Putnam 1993). Both republicans and feminists criticize this politics-of-the-marketplace view for being too individualistic (Phillips 2000, pp. 283–284). Contemporary feminists are even more radical in their criticism: they argue that the general point of view promoted by mainstream liberal theorists, such as Rawls, leads to the marginalization or silencing of several groups of people (ibid., p. 286; see also Benhabib 1987, Okin 1989a; 1989b; Young 1989).

The second common theme addressed by Phillips is dependency and domination, which is not only a central issue for feminist thought but is the fundamental notion of contemporary republican political theory. A main struggle for feminism regarded both as a movement or as a theory is to highlight and criticize the long-standing and overarching dependency and domination of women (i.e., Wollstonecraft 1790). For Pettit, as well, the main idea behind republicanism is a particular ideal of freedom, that is, freedom as non-domination (Pettit 1997; see also Honohan 2002, p. 8; Lovett – Pettit 2009, pp. 12–13). As I showed in Subsection 2.2.2., Pettit considers freedom as non-domination a condition in which the individual is relatively immune to the arbitrary interference of others, that is, one is free from others’ potential interference in one’s choices that are central in her life (Pettit 1997, pp. 52–58). According to Pettit, this ideal of freedom is the main difference of republicanism from liberal political theory: while the latter considers only active interference as the absence of freedom, for the republican, the chance of being unfree may also lead to unfreedom. Pettit illustrates this difference with the relationship between the master and the slave, where our intuitions highlight that a relatively free slave of a benevolent master is still suffering from servitude because of the dependency
of the arbitrary power of the master (Pettit 1997, p. 22). The other famous depiction of a relationship of domination is familiar for feminists. Pettit argues that the relationship between the wife and the husband in a patriarchal marriage is also an archetype of domination (ibid.). The feminist tradition is also susceptible of this relationship: from the early concerns of women’s dependency and oppression by men (from Wollstonecraft 1790, see also Phillips 2000, p. 290.) to later literature on gender (e.g., Bryson 2003; Haslanger 2012; Jaggar–Rothenberg 1984; Lindemann 2019; Okin 1989a; Pateman 1988; Pateman–Mills 2007, Tong 2009).

The third common theme of republican and feminist political theories, in Phillips’ view, is an appeal to a revitalized public sphere (Phillips 2000, pp. 291–292). As in the case of the idea and criticism of interests-focused politics, some feminists again are often more radical because, as opposed to republicans, they usually challenge the entire public/private distinction (ibid; c.f. Benhabib 1998; Fraser 1997). The main criticism from the part of the feminist and republican challengers of liberal theory is that characteristically ‘female’ activities are left out from the public sphere, thus consigned to the private sphere, and that this leads to the exclusion of women from political life.

Phillips’s thematization of the common topics of the two streams are, again, helpful, even though it may be objectionable that grabbing out some important elements of each direction of political thought might seem an ad hoc argumentation. There are disagreements about these issues or their order of importance among both republicans and feminists. However, it is possible to address these common ideas from a perspective which is less ad hoc and more synthesized. The dissatisfaction with interest-driven politics, the criticism of dependency and domination, and the claim of the revitalization of the public/private dichotomy might be regarded through a lens that
focuses on a lack of a certain possession. As opposed to mainstream liberal political theory (and mainstream approaches to migration), both contemporary republicanism and feminism highlight that these criticisms are best understood if the perspective of the person or group (or the migrant, in the case of discussions about migration) is applied instead of what I called the host standpoint. The underlying argumentations of these criticisms might be seen as detecting the absence or deprivation of a certain possession. In my view, the reformulated contribution of the synthesized republican–feminist position is its acknowledgment of the dispossession of

(1) a voice,

(2) a status, and

(3) the very possibility to formulate claims for acquiring such a status.

In the case of the criticism of interest-driven politics, the reformulated republican–feminist criticism might be about the dispossession of marginalized individuals or groups of their voice. Feminists criticize the individualistic generalized viewpoint of liberal theories uninterested in the concrete viewpoint (Benhabib 1987, Young 1989). Feminist political theory highlights that not only interests guide politics: the role of emotions, relationships, and particular characteristics such as gender differences are also of significant impact on political life (Lindemann 2019; Tong 2009). Parallelly, Pettit pays explicit attention to the notion of voice, and argues for a view of politics that understands why it is important that every member of the society is to be heard (Pettit 1997). Moreover, Pettit argues that this characteristic of his theory is the reason why the republican language might be attractive to so-called radical movements such as feminism (Pettit 1997, pp. 130–147). Therefore, the criticism of mainstream literature’s focus on interests is also interpretable as a criticism of the lack of potential of particular people or groups of people to take part in politics.
archetypes of this group in liberal democracies might be women, minorities, and people with disabilities. However, if we regard the political world with skepticism to the domestic/international dichotomy, migrant people, non-citizen residents, people on the move, and even two- or second-generation descendants of immigrants become immediately visible from a theoretical perspective and their inescapable lack of voice becomes troubling. A possible objection, of course, might be that politics is about the political community, and not about people at the ‘edge’ of the polity. However, it is hard not to see that (as Nail [2015] argues, for example) the political community has never been entirely inclusive: in different places and in different historical ages, certain people have been excluded from society. Therefore, we must be cautious when regarding the momentary exclusion of certain individuals or groups from political community as an excuse for disregarding them.

Let me discuss the second common topic of republicanism and feminism (which is, at the same time, the central notion for Pettit’s republican political theory). For these streams, domination and dependency are not only evil within the boundaries of the polity. Since freedom is a fundamental and universal ideal of both streams, domination, and dependency (and, of course, oppression and exploitation, which are considered obviously as evil in liberal political theory also) do not pertain only to the domestic sphere of the political community. Here, notions as lack, absence, or dispossession are again decisive. Domination – especially in its Pettitean republican form – means per definitonem the lack of freedom. The dominated individuals are dispossessed of their freedom, or they have never been granted it. The dependent persons or groups are in an unequal relationship with other people. Therefore, their moral, political, social, physical, psychical, financial, or other kind of equality is denied. Again, the viewpoint of the individual, and in the case of migration, the
viewpoint of the migrant allows to detect the dispossession of certain (for example, equal) statuses.

The third common criticism of republicanism and feminism, identified by Phillips, is the view of the public sphere of mainstream political theory. According to Phillips, among the three themes, this is the least similarly explicated theme by feminism and republicanism, partly because while the disappointment with the public/private dichotomy is a powerful element of feminist movements and theory, republicanism has a long misogynist history and advocacy of the sharp public/private dichotomy and of the exclusion of women from the public sphere. However, Phillips argues, that the similarity of the two streams lies in their belief that ‘participation in public life’ is a ‘key constituent of human freedom’ (Phillips 2000, pp. 291–292). Therefore, a possible clarification of what Phillips demonstrates is that this view of the public sphere is not an entirely separate common theme of these streams but an implication of the second theme – dependency and domination –, that is, the notions centered around the ideal of freedom. However, the reformulated republican–feminist view with attention to the perspective of the individual, rather than the state, highlights not the mere lack of a possession here, but a stronger exclusion of certain people from the possibility of having the required possessions for autonomous conduct. In this respect, it is useful to detach this theme from the theme of dependency and domination, hence exclusion is the dispossession of the mere possibility of having the ability for doing something (for example, take part in the political process or have a voice against an issue). According to feminists, the public/personal dichotomy pervades not only modern political thought but also contemporary political theory (Okin 1989a; 1989b). This exclusion, viewed from the perspective of the political theory of migration, highlights the multiple or systematic disadvantages that migrant people suffer from (this is captured well, for example, by the enormous empirical and theoretical literature
on immigrant women who perform most of the care work in liberal democracies, see: Hamington 2017; Lindemann 2019, pp. 105–107; Nawyn 2010).

In summary, I argued that instead of finding main themes of republicanism and feminism, it is more helpful to perceive the joint ideas of these two streams through the viewpoint of the lack or absence of certain possessions of ‘the individual’ (or, in the particular case of migration, ‘the migrant’). This is a solution that synthesizes the republican–feminist position among one conception, and an interesting element of this conception is that it is built on a dispossession or a deprivation, rather than a possession of a certain matter. In this formulation, feminism and republicanism might bypass several biases of the mainstream literature on migration articulated earlier in the dissertation.

Summarizing the argument, I demonstrated in this section that feminism and republicanism not only have a lot in common in their contemporary forms, but they can be reinterpreted in a way that a central characteristic, their focus on dispossession, becomes the main connection between them. This newly interpreted republican–feminist approach helps us to see that, when synthesized, both feminist and republican approaches might be corrective in highlighting what is problematic in migration from the perspective of the subjects, which is often missing from mainstream arguments.

6.4. Experience, Exclusion, and Political Realism

In this section, I demonstrate a further, indirect implication of my CCC approach to migration by addressing the issue of political normativity. In doing so, I apply the underlying claims of the CCC approach to investigate the (essentially political realist) question of whether a distinctively political normativity exists and what its standards are. Contemporary realist political theorists usually argue for a distinctively political
normativity. Although, at first sight, this claim could be appealing for all political theorists, showing that there is something unique in the subject matter of their inquiry, it is more difficult to agree on precisely what constitutes this distinct normativity of the political realm. The section aims to show that this peculiar normativity should be addressed through the lens of human migration and movement, more precisely, on the permanent fact and possibility of exclusion in movement.

The argument builds on the relationship between exclusion and movement. For the dynamic of the political realm, exclusion is an essential element that has been discovered and condemned by several political theorists working within various streams of contemporary political thought. However, liberals, Marxists, feminist, or republican thinkers have immensely different views on what precisely counts as exclusion, which exclusions are relevant, the normative implications of specific exclusions, and the appropriate normative responses to them. Therefore, saying that exclusion is a specific characteristic of the political does not lead us very far by itself. In other words, being realistic about the fact of exclusion in social and political relationships may offer a picture about the nature of the political, but this picture will be overly vague. Here, movement is evoked. In my view, movement is special in the sense that it is deeply interconnected with the fact and possibility of exclusion. In human history, movement and migration have always involved some kind of uncertainty in the sense of the lack of voice or status, the obscurity of future prospects, and deficiencies in capabilities of self-organization and self-defense, among others. The reasons for these dispossessions are twofold: either the desire for settlement of some groups has been incompatible with the more mobile way of life of other groups, or political communities have been producing their excluded subjects, and forcing them to move. Therefore, while exclusion is a broad term for manifold social dynamics, movement is a concept that is inherently linked to the fact of exclusion.
That is why I argue that the nature of the political should be understood through the lens of movement. This argument may seem unconventional for both political theorists concerned with the nature of the political realm and for political theorists of migration.

My argument is structured as follows. First, I present how the theme of exclusion as a specifically political phenomenon appears in various streams of thought. Then, I highlight the special relationship between exclusion and movement. Finally, I argue for a view that acknowledges the inevitable possibility of exclusion in movement, and I draw the conclusion to the nature of political normativity.

A fundamental complaint of contemporary realist political theory against mainstream Anglo-American political theory is that the latter does not realize the specific political nature of the subject of its inquiry (Galston 2010). Realists challenge Rawlsian political philosophers for being *political moralists* and doing ‘applied philosophy’, since they tend to apply moral norms for the realm of the political (Williams 2005) and to forget about what real politics is about (Geuss 2008). Therefore, contemporary political realists seek to delineate a distinctively political normativity and argue that political theory must treat the political as a sphere that is autonomous from morality.

The political realist view of the political implies that there are specific – *political* – norms and standards of politics. However, about the nature and extent of these standards, political realists disagree. For example, the concept of *legitimacy* has a prominent role in realist political theory as a distinctively political standard (Williams 2005; Sleat 2014), while other political realists focus on the specific norms of political conduct, which are regarded as profoundly context-bounded and limited (Philp 2007, Sabl 2002).

These claims stem from the idea that political theory should focus on specifically political phenomena, such as struggles for power, articulation, and
representation of interests, formulation of policy proposals, decisions of political agents, or social relations. It should also acknowledge the inherently conflictual or agonistic nature of such phenomena (Honig 1993, Mouffe 1999).

In the following, I would like to argue that despite there is indeed a broad range of fundamentally political elements of the political realm, there is an essentially political conception, exclusion, that defines – in some sense, exclusively – the political sphere. In my view, the peculiar normativity of the political should be comprehended through the lens of exclusion; more precisely, I shall argue that the political is the realm of the perpetual fact of exclusion. My view implies that the political is the sphere which is led by the endless struggle for not to be excluded at various levels of politics. This might mean the struggle for not being excluded from governmental power or party politics, but it might also mean one’s fight for not being excluded from the possibility that one’s voice is heard. Furthermore, in a more fundamental level, it might mean the very exclusion from the political community, which could involve a sequence of several other – often fatal – exclusions. The conceptual advantage of exclusion as the essence of the political lies in its passive characteristic, in the sense that it does not require any actual claims to appear at the side of the excluded subjects. In this understanding, the political is not necessarily intertwined with explicit claims of recognition nor actual participation. It does not depend on someone’s actual will to be heard; rather, it can mean both the intentional and the unintentional exclusion of certain individuals (and even subjects that are not regarded as persons) from the politics and the political community.

My argument that the nature of the political is to be examined through the concept of exclusion presupposes the argument that exclusion is peculiar to the political. It is indeed possible to imagine several not characteristically political forms
of exclusion, for example, if someone is excluded from a private club, such as a sports club, or from a circle of friends, or even if one’s own family disowns one. However, there are three reasons why exclusion is inherently political.

(1) First, exclusion is *definitive*. It hinders any further possibilities for the excluded to get back into the game – or even be included in the first place. It enables those who exclude to not play by the rules when it comes to the excluded or the will-be-excluded. It can be fatal for the excluded because it deprives them of the basic prerequisites needed to formulate claims of recognition, voice, or participation. The exclusion in this sense is equivalent to the threat of the Hobbesian state of nature for the excluded.

(2) Second, exclusion is *propulsive*. It is a primary driving force for the political sphere. Be it a struggle for governmental power, a fight in party politics or an interest group, or a movement of individuals for recognition, politics always produces its excluded, even in its very basic form, such as the political community. Moreover, those who exclude often benefit from the very fact of the dispossession of liberty, equality, recognition, voice, economic security, or certain statuses of the excluded. Political communities are, therefore, dependent on exclusion.

(3) Third, exclusion is *structural*. Exclusions that may seem ‘private’ at a first sight, such as exclusion from a sports club, a circle of friends, or a family, emerge very often from deeper, structural exclusions. For example, even I am offered reasons for being excluded from the university football team for being presumably too weak or too slow,
the genuine reason for my exclusion may be attached to me being a woman and therefore regarded unfit for playing football. It is similar to the case of friends and family: gender, race, sexual orientation, and other social characteristics can be underlying reasons for excluding someone even from the circle of the most loved ones.

Exclusion is, thus, a characteristically political venture. However, the peculiar role of exclusion in the political sphere is not entirely undetected in political theorizing. In fact, it is realized by political theorists advocating different streams of thought. Exclusion has always been a key concept for feminist political theory, which is not a coincidence. Feminist political theory is not detached entirely from feminist movements motivated by the resentment about the exclusion of women from several areas of the political. Feminist political theory is plentiful of references to such exclusion. In her book, Nancy Hirschmann (2003) demonstrates that mainstream arguments on freedom are ‘masculinist’ and their established typology of positive and negative liberty is ‘theoretically inadequate to deal with many questions raised by women’s historical and material experience’, therefore Hirschmann introduces a feminist reading of freedom and she addresses exclusionary practices (Hirschmann 2003; especially p. 32). Elizabeth Frazer (2018) should also be mentioned here. Frazer demonstrates that besides several realist themes appearing in the work of feminist political theorists, there is a *distinctively realist feminism* that can be captured in arguments about intersectionality. In her view, not only ‘conflict, dissent, and friction’ is recognized long by feminists, but feminists also correctly see that ‘where systems of inequality, oppression, and exploitation intersect, the results are not straightforwardly predictable’, given that they could be ‘additive’ and lead to ‘double or triple’ oppression (Frazer 2018, pp. 335–336; see also Crenshaw 1998). Intersectionality, therefore, implies some of the multiple exclusions one may face in a
political community. Although feminists prefer applying the concepts such as oppression, the idea of exclusion runs along with feminist thought but contemporary republican political theory.

As I argued in Section 6.3., contemporary feminist and republican political theorists have similar ideas about exclusion which appear as a central political notion in their works. Anne Phillips (2000) identified three common themes of feminist and republican political theory. As I also argued, these themes can be reformulated in a way to reflect the exclusory character of the political sphere. As a result of this interpretation, what feminist and republican approaches have in common is that their focus on certain dispossession, precisely, the dispossession of (1) a voice, (2) a status, and (3) the possibility to acquire such a status.

These three types of exclusions recognized either implicitly or explicitly as exclusions by feminist and republican political theorist are peculiar to the political sphere. Recall the argument about exclusions as a particularly political matter. They are (1) definitive in the sense that either type of exclusion entails the possibility to hinder all further claims of subjects to be effectively included in the political community; they are (2) propulsive in the sense that they are often serving as the driving force of the political in the sense that those who exclude others, usually benefit politically, socially, or economically from such exclusion. Moreover, they are (3) structural in the sense that they are generally connected to institutionalized practices of exclusion of persons along with their personal or group characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, social class, or age.

Similar considerations about exclusion can be found in the works of Hannah Arendt (1949, 1951). Her concerns of domination have directly aroused the interests of both republican and feminist political theorists, however, a particular interpretation of her notion of the ‘right to have rights’ implies some explicit remarks about her views
on the relationship of exclusion and the political sphere. DeGooyer et al. (2018) criticize the common interpretation elaborated primarily by Arendt’s most influential reader, Seyla Benhabib, who claims that the underlying idea of ‘the right to have rights’ refers to human rights as the only warranty of protection to stateless people. DeGooyer et al. demonstrate that Arendt, a former refugee herself in the age of mass statelessness of the 20th century, should be interpreted in a way that she argues that the only protection against this fundamental exclusion is the granting of citizenship rights of these people, and hence rights are political artifacts rather than natural facts, only states can grant them. This interpretation shows that in Arendt’s view, the loss of citizenship status means the loss of a ‘status of right-bearing individuals’; therefore, the right to have rights should be understood as a citizenship right which is the prerequisite of the possession of other rights (DeGooyer et al. 2018, pp. 42–44).

Not only feminist and republican political theorists regard exclusion as fundamental in the political sphere. Judith Shklar (2013 [1989]), another political thinker with refugee experiences, builds on the very idea that the main aim of what she calls the ‘liberalism of fear’ is to secure freedom from the abuse of power. Her idea focuses on the summum malum, which is, in this case, equivalent to cruelty and the fear of cruelty, and which is the unavoidable evil of liberalism because the government must use the threat of punishment. Shklar argued that fear of systematic cruelty (which should be regarded the worst among vices) is universal in the sense that political life builds on the fear of fellow members and that abuses of power are present in all regimes. Therefore, in her political theory, the basic units of political life are the weak and the powerful, where the possibility to act in an arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed way is always a possibility for the agents of the government. War, racism, sexism, and systemic governmental brutality are real dangers in all kinds of regimes, and it is the task of the citizenry – through legal
procedures, primarily through the rule of law – that no one’s freedom is intimidated in that way. However, she also criticized that kind of realism (Weber’s or Walzer’s) that focuses on the actions, decisions, and personalities of political actors. Instead, for Shklar, those over whom power is exercised (who are usually victims of injustices) were as important as those who exercise power. Shklar’s liberalism of fear is motivated by the idea of exclusion at all levels of the political world. In Robert Jubb’s (2019) view, the Shklarian view of the political embraces precisely the kind of distinctiveness which political realists are searching for because it takes seriously the effects of political relationships on both those over who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.

I argued that contemporary feminist and republican political theories and some fundamental elements of Arendt’s and Shklar’s works appeal either directly or indirectly to a concept of exclusion as something specific to the political. They are also offering certain ideas on their view about the normativity in politics. It means that, in some senses, they can be labeled as realists about the nature of the political, but more importantly, they offer us evidence of what makes the political realm distinctively political. Some of their arguments imply that exclusion is a permanent possibility of political life, and therefore, must be taken into consideration while theorizing about political reality. Still, exclusion might emerge at any level of political and social life (and in private life as a nevertheless political phenomenon). Therefore, while it serves as an appropriate starting point for understanding the nature of political normativity, exclusion could be further decomposed. Now I turn to the next step of my argument and attempt to show that political normativity can be discerned by addressing a particular case of exclusion, that is, exclusion inherent in human movement.

In the previous step of the argument, I attempted to demonstrate that exclusion could be regarded as a characteristic that makes the political realm distinct from other
spheres of life, and I also highlighted that this idea is already implicit in the works of political theorists from several streams of thought, who address several types of exclusions. Now, I would like to narrow down the scope to the fact of exclusion that pervades human migration and movement and argue that since movement is a common element of human life, the fact of exclusion inherent in it is a specific feature of the political realm. In my view, movement is an appropriate phenomenon that helps us understand the peculiar nature of political normativity.

As my criticism of the mainstream political theory of migration implies, the leading discussions in the field are less interested in certain aspects of migration that would stem from a broader understanding of movement and migration. Consequently, it is less interested in the exclusion inherent in human movement.

In my view, Thomas Nail’s (2015) unusual approach to migration appropriately covers all three characteristics of exclusion. In his book, Nail shows how the theme of ‘the figure of the migrant’ runs along with human history, although changing from one context to another, yet carrying an element of exclusion perpetually. At the same time, in my understanding, Nail’s view on movement implies a distinctively political normativity, in which the practices and values of the political sphere emerge indirectly from the political community’s ability to exclude certain people from its membership. Nail’s view on exclusion intertwined with migration corresponds to the condition that I depicted as being (1) definitive. In his view,

*Even if the end result of migration is a relative increase in money, power, or enjoyment, the process of migration itself almost always involves an insecurity of some kind and duration: the removal of territorial ownership or access, the loss of the political right to vote or to receive social welfare, the loss of legal status to work or drive, or the financial loss associated with transportation or change in*
residence. The gains of migration are always a risk, while the process itself is always some kind of loss (Nail 2015, p. 2).

Nail’s focus on insecurity and loss highlights that migration always bears the possibility of different types of exclusions, whose consequences can even be permanent.

The second formerly identified characteristic of exclusion is one main topic of Nail’s argument: he shows that ‘societies are dynamic processes engaged in continuously directing and circulatating social life’, and in doing so, exclusions, more precisely, ‘the expulsion of the migrant is a condition for social expansion and reproduction: it is constitutive’ (Nail 2015, p. 236; emphasis added). In this sense, the expulsion of migrants is (2) propulsive, meaning that they also serve as a driving force for political communities’ operations. The metoikoi of Athens and the barbarians of Rome played an important part in maintaining the well-being of the members of these ancient empires. In medieval Europe, serfdom has been the key element behind the organizing principle of feudalism, and later, in capitalism, the proletariat have been generating social, economic, and political benefits for the ruling class.

And finally, exclusion related to movement is always (3) structural in Nail’s perspective: it applies to individuals precisely because of their membership in some groups, such as in the case of the nomad, the barbarian, the vagabond, and the proletariat, and to contemporary migration as well.

Summarizing the argument of this section, I argued that for understanding the distinctive normativity of the political realm, we should address the unique normativity embedded in movement. My argument relied on the idea that the distinctiveness of the political should be addressed through the lens of exclusion as, I demonstrated, several streams of political thought and individual authors have recognized it, at least, in an implicit way. However, hence exclusion is still a quite broad term to help us understand
the peculiarity of the political, I attempted to narrow the focus down to exclusion inherent in human movement and migration. I aimed to show that the operation of the political with its practices and norms can be understood if we look at how exclusion is a fundamental mechanism for the dynamics of political relations. Since the mainstream political theory of migration is silent on several forms of exclusion, therefore, building on the work of Thomas Nail, I attempted to outline a different approach to migration and movement that realizes the fundamentally political characteristics of exclusion.

Such a view is helpful for any political theoretical stream, besides political realism, to understand how the political realm works and why we are incapable of resolving some of its permanent problems. It directs our focus from attempts to find solutions for once and for all to what is more important: it allows us to recognize different forms of exclusions and to address their underlying causes, motivations, operations, and roles in our social and political life.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

The dissertation aimed to offer a criticism of and a substantive proposal to the mainstream political theory of migration. The initial idea of this work was that there is something ultimately troubling with recent discussions about migration both in academia and in public opinion. My engagement with the topic of migration started at the same time when migration came to the fore for a lot of other people. With the eruption of a new global refugee crisis in 2015, the Western public started to see, on the one hand, that it is time to consider the fact that people are and will be moving on a massive scale in the near and distant future, and on the other hand, there is something fundamentally wrong with current migration regimes. As I started to investigate the topic, I had to become aware of two things. The first was that the unjustifiability of the current arrangement of the world, especially the migration policies of actual states, has been acknowledged for a relatively long time by certain influential political theorists. The second was that despite of the relatively popular position of these authors on the topic, certain characteristic statements of public opinion about migration are deeply infiltrated into the academic discussion, even into the works of those theorists who have long been questioning the status quo. I slowly have realized that there is another, let us say, a meta-debate, underlying the influential debate of so-called liberal nationalist versus cosmopolitan or the open versus closed border debate. Along the newly reconstructed lines of the debate, there are, on the one side, those authors who focus on the justifiability of immigration restrictions, who argue about the effects of migration on host countries, and who treat migration almost as a synonym for immigration.

The question is, what is on the other side? I believe the reason why this is a question is not that there would be no such thing as a comprehensive ‘political theory
of movement and migration’. Instead, it is a question because there are plentiful
sources of a more complex and more nuanced understanding of migration in political
thought. What is missing, though, is the arrangement of such ideas to help us to finally
see the essential role that human movement and migration plays in the operation of
social and political communities.

I believe that it is crucial to understand, both as political theorists aspiring for
analytic rigor and as individuals with their own opinions about the social and political
world, that unfortunately, some fundamental ideas about the operation of our societies
are continuing to prove to be hardly more than myths. In most cases, for instance, equal
citizenship means formal equality at most, the protection by the rule of law is often
incomplete, and the reparative attempts for making amendments for injustices,
offenses, and crimes are highly selective. We must re-examine our collective
responsibilities, and repeatedly realize that the world as we see it now is largely shaped
by social and political conduct rather than mere coincidence and can be judged
accordingly.

This work is a small part of that project. It offers a critical insight into a
particular topic, that is migration, which is embedded into the complex context of
social, political, economic, and environmental processes. These processes have
domestic reasons and effects, as well as international and global ones. The emphasis
on the global reasons and effects is grounded in the idea that, in the global sphere,
besides the relations of nation-states, there are, eventually, individual human lives at
stake. As I stated at the very beginning of this work, each of us could have been that
person whose voice is muted, whose possibilities are essentially restricted, whose
choices are made dependent from others’, whose work or body is exploited, and whose
fate becomes the toy of other people. Moreover, each of us could have been that person
whose body is washed ashore dead due in a large part to the fact that one person happened to find oneself in a situation of being migrated.

My doctoral dissertation has an important conclusion: exclusion is inherent in political life; therefore, exclusion is where political theory must start its inquiry of the social-political realm. Moreover, this inquiry should not pertain only to the political realm in the strict sense: as the famous feminist idiom goes, ‘the personal is political’ which means in this regard that political theory of migration cannot be successfully formulated without having understood how politics influences human lives to the utmost.

In sum, the dissertation has had two aims. First, it offered a critical argument about the way how mainstream political theory regards migration. In this regard, I showed that migration appeared something as a problem from the very beginning, rather than a factual element of the ordinary working of human life. I showed that this framing of the issue partly stems from the specific characteristics of contemporary sciences. On the one hand, the fragmentation of social sciences into diverse fields pushed migration to the edges of both theories of the domestic realm and theories of the international world. On the other hand, social sciences’ largely implicit preferences for immobility and their focus on the nation-state lead to a view in which migration is merely an anomaly. Political theorists of migration tend to adhere to this problem-view of migration and usually address migration through the lens of the host state. I labeled these problems jointly as the dual bias of the political theory of migration, and I argued that on the epistemological level, the bias contains methodological nationalism. In contrast, I argued that, on the normative level, the bias is embodied by the host standpoint either advocated by those authors who operate with what I called the benevolent superiority thesis or within the agenda of alarmism. Concerning the former, I argued that less skeptical approaches to migrants and refugees offer arguments using
the language of human rights in a way that is preoccupied with aid and inclusion in a way that prioritizes the cost that these obligations have on host states. I showed that the latter position is preoccupied with the different potential threats that migrants, more precisely, immigrants, might pose on host and destination countries. I argued that this limited view on migration prevents us from addressing several other important aspects of migration, including the viewpoint of the migrant.

As opposed to what I diagnosed as the dual problem of the literature, I proposed what I call the Critical Cosmopolitan Care approach to migration. I argued that the CCC approach offers a framework that proves to be corrective on both levels. On the epistemological level, I argued for critical cosmopolitanism as the proper framework for addressing migration, while on the normative level, I introduced the feminist notion of care as the appropriate ethical and political theory of migration. I sketched some of the general, direct implications of my proposed CCC approach, such as its aptitude to acknowledge the complexity of the social-political world, our joint responsibilities in the formulation of such a world, and the importance of focusing on vulnerability. I also sketched some more practical implications of the CCC approach, such as the case of persons who spend significant time in transit zones, the case of the effects of slow onset climate change on human migration, and the case of global care chains where predominantly women immigrants do low-paid care work far away from their own families.

Then, after I had addressed some possible objections and had argued why the CCC approach must be simultaneously critical cosmopolitan and care-focused, I also addressed some of its indirect implications, concerning the problem of how to do political theory and what are the fundamental notions of the political realm with which political theory should engage besides the ones that preoccupy mainstream theories. I demonstrated that there is a possible interpretation (relying on the notion of
dispossession) of both contemporary feminist and republican approaches in which their similarities become visible, and their strengths concerning the inquiry of migration emerge. I also showed that this proposed way of looking at migration helps us understand what contemporary realists call the distinctively political normativity, by arguing that the distinctiveness of the political realm must be searched for in the phenomenon of exclusion and in the exclusion inherent in movement and migration.

Like any argument, this one has its limitations as well. The CCC approach does not offer prescriptions for all challenges individuals and states face with regard to migration. It does not include a particular policy neither for the domestic nor the international or global levels. However, it stays naturally closer to certain policies than others. As other ideas with a robust emancipatory purpose, the real strength of the CCC approach lies in its critical potential: within its framework, it can be explained more easily and more plausibly why current border controls and admission policies of Western states are unjust. However, it is more difficult to recommend what precisely ought to replace those practices and norms. Nevertheless, it is not to be discarded as an impossible project, but its accomplishment requires further investigation to which this work is only the beginning of the road.
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