

Author: Mohammad Ali Samay
World Economy Subprogram
Supervisor: Professor Dr. Trautmann László

The Dynamics of Eurasian Comprehensive Security, Political and Economic Cooperation

Corvinus University of Budapest
Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of World Economy

1 Contents

| | | |
|-------|--|----|
| 1 | Contents | 2 |
| | LIST OF FIGURES:..... | 4 |
| | PREFACE | 5 |
| 1. | INTRODUCTION | 9 |
| 1.1 | Concepts: | 9 |
| 1.2 | Hypothesis and Methodology | 16 |
| 1.2.1 | Research Questions | 17 |
| 1.2.2 | Research methodology | 17 |
| 2 | THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF EURASIA AMONG EURASIAN NATIONS 20 | |
| 2.1 | Contemporary Political and Security Concerns of Great Powers in Eurasia | 20 |
| 2.2 | The Theoretical, Historical and Practical Eurasianisms..... | 23 |
| 2.3 | The Standpoint of the United States in Eurasia | 26 |
| 2.4 | The Strategic Path of Russia in Eurasia | 29 |
| 2.4.1 | The Eurasianist Foreign Policy Strategy of Russia..... | 30 |
| 2.4.2 | The Complexity of Regional Structuralization..... | 36 |
| 2.4.3 | The Structure of the World Order in Russian Eurasianism | 41 |
| 2.5 | The Strategic view of Turkey on Eurasia | 45 |
| 2.6 | China's standpoint on Eurasia..... | 49 |
| 2.7 | India from Indo-Pacific to Eurasia | 52 |
| 2.8 | Summary | 53 |
| 3 | ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EURASIAN POWERS..... | 54 |
| 3.1 | Russia, India, China, Turkey and the EU..... | 54 |
| 3.1.1 | An Overview on Intra-RIC+T Investment and Trade Relations | 54 |
| 3.1.2 | India-China Trade Relations: | 62 |
| 3.1.3 | India-Russia Trade and Economic Relations: | 63 |
| 3.1.4 | Russia-China Relations | 66 |
| 3.1.5 | Russia-German and Russia-EU trade and investment relations: | 74 |
| 3.1.6 | Geopolitical and Geo-economic interest | 75 |
| 3.2 | The BRICS | 77 |
| 3.2.1 | Overview | 77 |
| 3.2.2 | Historical Review of RIC-cooperation Within Framework of BRICS..... | 79 |

| | | |
|--------|--|-----|
| 3.2.3. | The Influence and Contribution of B(RIC)S in World politics and Economy | 83 |
| 3.2.4. | Intra-B(RIC)S Achievements and failures | 86 |
| 3.2.5. | Summary | 89 |
| 4 | EURASIAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION | 92 |
| 4.1 | The Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union..... | 92 |
| 4.2 | Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union | 94 |
| 4.3 | The first step towards a closer relationship..... | 111 |
| 4.3.1 | The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): | 111 |
| 4.3.2 | The CIS Members between Collective Security Treaty Organization and Military-to-Military Ties with Russia..... | 114 |
| 4.3.3 | Free Trade area | 120 |
| 4.3.4 | Increased Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields..... | 121 |
| 4.3.5 | Eurasian Economic Community | 121 |
| 4.3.6 | Eurasian Customs Union | 123 |
| 4.4 | Results and questions of the Eurasian Economic Union..... | 123 |
| 5 | Conclusion | 134 |
| | BIBLIOGRAPHY | 144 |

LIST OF FIGURES:

| | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Figure: China's top export partners, 2019 | 55 |
| 2. Figure: China's top 10 import partner 2019..... | 56 |
| 3. Figure: China trade with the EU 2018 | 56 |
| 4. Figure: Russia's top 10 export partners 2019 | 57 |
| 5. Figure: Russia's top 10 import partners 2019 | 58 |
| 6. Figure: Russia-EU trade in goods 2019 | 59 |
| 7. Figure: Russia-EU trade in services 2018..... | 59 |
| 8. Figure: India's top 10 export partners 2019..... | 60 |
| 9. Figure: India's top 10 import partners 2019 | 60 |
| 10. Figure: Turkey's top 10 export partners 2019 | 61 |
| 11. Figure: Turkey's top 10 import partners 2019 | 61 |
| 12. Figure: Turkey's trade to the EU and World 2018 | 62 |
| 13. Figure: BRICS vs world GDP 2019..... | 78 |
| 14. Figure | 79 |
| 15. Figure | 84 |
| 16. Figure: The relative size of the EAEU's GDP 2017 | 95 |
| 17. Figure: GDP per capita 2017 | 95 |
| 18. Figure: The relative size of the population in the EAEU | 96 |
| 19. Figure: Russia's trade to the EAEU 2018 | 96 |
| 20. Figure: Kazakhstan trade to the EAEU 2018..... | 97 |
| 21. Figure: Belarus's trade to the EAEU 2018 | 97 |
| 22. Figure: Kyrgyzstan's trade to the EAEU 2018 | 98 |
| 23. Figure: Armenia's trade to the EAEU 2018..... | 98 |
| 24. Figure: Russia's trade to EAEU and world 2018..... | 99 |
| 25. Figure: Kazakhstan's trade to EAEU and world 2018..... | 99 |
| 26. Figure: Belarus's trade to EAEU and world 2018 | 100 |
| 27. Figure: Kyrgyzstan's trade to EAEU and world 2018..... | 100 |
| 28. Figure: Armenia's trade to EAEU and world 2018 | 101 |
| 29. Figure: Russia's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018 | 101 |
| 30. Figure: Kazakhstan's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018..... | 102 |
| 31. Figure: Belarus's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018..... | 102 |
| 32. Figure: Kyrgyzstan's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018..... | 103 |
| 33. Figure: Armenia's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018 | 103 |
| 34. Figure: Intra-EAEU, EAEU-world and world trade 2018 | 104 |
| 35. Figure: Total trade percentage 2018 | 104 |
| 36. Figure: The CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces | 115 |
| 37. Figure: The CSTO Structure | 116 |
| 38. Figure | 117 |

PREFACE

From 1978 until today, more than 1.5 million Afghans, including my father, lost their lives, and more than one million people became incapacitated. The numbers are increasing drastically day by day. According to United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), more than 100 thousand people have lost their lives from 2009 to 2019 and according to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), every 10 thousand become incapacitated in ongoing wars in the country. All these casualties and wars have been and are the byproduct of internal, regional, and international political reasons. For a country like Afghanistan (having around 30 million inhabitants), 1.5 million deaths and 100 thousand incapacitated is huge. Almost every family has lost a beloved member, and this results in a phenomenon exerting deep psychological pressure on society. I can surely claim that the forty years' endless war has totally changed the mentality of the people.

I remember the early 1990s. I was around 5 years old and we were living in Kabul. Until the collapse of Dr. Najibullah's regime (the government that ruled the country upon the withdrawal of the Soviets) in 1992, Kabul was a relatively safe and secure city. People were still hopeful for their future and the end of the war because Dr. Najibullah and his regime were ready to transfer the power to Mujahedin based on the Peshawar Accord. Dr. Najibullah, the president of Afghanistan between 1988 and 1992, had been trying to defeat Mujahidin and show an Islamic face of his government. He, his government and the military had made huge efforts, yet after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia stopped its support and at the same time its attempts at reaching out new supporters in the West had proven futile. For the Western powers, the Dr. Najibullah regime was still an establishment embodying communist values and concepts. Pakistan was responsible for the anti-communist jihad project and was still actively supporting Mujahidin against Kabul. Mujahidin were becoming more powerful day by day and in the process capturing more territories and cities. The regime had only one option: to surrender and to transfer the power to Islamic State of Afghanistan (An Interim government as set in the Peshawar Accord). This was the turning point in Afghan war history. Once Dr. Najibullah's regime collapsed, the situation became more perilous. Afghan political parties started an all-out war of attrition and the country was technically split into four or five parts.

Since that, everyone was hopeless about the future of our country. From 1992 to 1996, the death toll was approximately 70 thousand civilians in Kabul only. The rockets and

bullets were flying in all possible directions as the mujahidin political parties wanted a larger slice of the power cake in the newly established government. About nine mujahidin political parties fought successfully against the Soviet Union. All of them had been established in Pakistan and Iran to fight in the late 1970s. The mujahid political parties enjoyed support from the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. Russia also built its relations with some of them and actively supported them after the Soviet withdrawal. In the aftermath of the victory, even the relatives of mujahedin felt themselves as the winners of the cold war and national heroes. This feeling led them to reject other parties' supremacy in power dividing debates. They could not manage to solve it at the negotiation table and the efforts faded to war. No place was secure; heavy rockets and missiles would find people at their homes and to the streets. It was the bloodiest war of everyone against everyone. People were starving; the only way to remain alive was to escape from the country. This was the time when we lost our beloved father. Right after that, we left the country to spend a couple of years to Pakistan. Our father went to help a friend of his in need and did not come back alive. The bloody war was going on without any reason and in the middle of that in 1994, the Taliban movement emerged in Kandahar. I was quite young back then, but the fear of war and its consequences forced me to seek and follow the political and war news and related discussions first in Kabul, beside my father, and afterwards between among big brother and uncles in Pakistan. I remember that my father was listening to the radio. The news would regularly be drowned in words like mujahedin, Jihad and mobariza (مبارزه). Once I asked my father about the meaning of these words. He explained that Jihad means meritorious war, mujahid is the person who fights on behalf of God and mobariza means struggle. My next questions was why they were fighting against our president and why they were attacking our city with heavy rockets. According to his answer, the reason was that we were not fighting for our country, but we were conducting orders of outsiders instead.

To conclude, after the collapse of the regime in 1992, there were about nine to eleven mujahid political parties or non-state armed groups (Including the Junbesh political Party in the North and the Taliban Movement in the South) weaving a ruthless war of attrition in Afghanistan. All of the sides had captured a part of the country and ruled it without providing any kind of services to the people. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban successfully captured more than 80 per cent territory of the country. In this period, the Mujahid parties established a new front under the name of Moqawemat (Resistance) and collectively

fought against the Taliban in the Northern part of the country. The USA, Russia and the Central Asian countries, China, Pakistan, Iran, India, and Saudi Arabia were all actively involved as supporters of one of another of these armed groups in the ongoing civil war until 9/11. I was about 10 or 11 years old when the Taliban captured our city (Baghlan province, Pul-e-Khumri city). Then the Taliban arrested my eldest brother (who was the only responsible man in our family after my father). His life was in mortal peril, but luckily managed to escape. After he left us, I became responsible for our family. It was quite difficult for me at first to deal with such challenges and secure a better life for my family. The difficulties led me to pondering on questions concerning my country and finding out the reasons of all those endless wars and conflicts in Afghanistan. I remember my father said, "Because we are not fighting for our country, we are conducting orders of outsiders". His words raised a question in my mind: why are we conducting orders of outsiders and why we are not fighting for our country?

Afghanistan has been a flash point ever since the Cold War. In the recent forty years, the country experienced military interventions of significant impact by both the Soviet Union and later the US-NATO. The West conducted a proxy war against Soviet intervention in late 20th century and it seems that Russia is taking a similar stance against NATO's intervention in order to undermine the position of the US and NATO in the region. Geopolitically, the country is important for both sides now as it was during the Cold War era. Beside the US and Russia, other major and minor powers in the region like China, India, Pakistan and Iran are also actively interested and even involved in Afghanistan's securitization and destabilization process. Therefore, it remains a flash point and source of order conflict between Russia, US and other regional actors mentioned above.

It seems the Cold War has not finished for Afghanistan, or at least the collapse of the bipolar world order and the establishment of the unipolar world order has not affected Afghanistan's situation. The Eastern and Western frontier has remained almost unchanged for Afghanistan. The West is still trying to install its order on post-Soviet Eurasia. On the other hand, Russia acts as a great power in the region and refuses to accept the United States as a leading political and economic actor in its zone of influence.

In this research, we will attempt to draw a clear picture of the international order established by the United States and its allies after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We will also try to shed light on Russia's strategy and the order it seeks to establish in the world as an alternative, an order which would be a system different from the Western one. Beyond that, we will attempt at highlighting the geopolitical, geographical and

geostrategic importance of the great powers during the Cold War and post-Cold War era and the practical effects of their struggle for influence on Afghanistan. I believe that the endless war and conflict in Afghanistan is deeply rooted in the outside influences. The only possible way to put an end to the conflict in my country is a comprehensive Eurasian, trans-regional and international cooperation between involved and interested players.

The economic and geopolitical interdependency between regions and large powers will force the countries to reconsider their attitudes and policy instruments towards ongoing war and conflict in Afghanistan. The regional demand for common development will change Afghanistan's position from an international conflict and buffer zone to a peaceful and dynamic economic transit area.

This serves as my primary motivation for conducting this research, as well as for working on exploring the possible security, political and economic cooperation areas in Eurasia. I am deeply convinced only Eurasian comprehensive cooperation and global partnership will put an end to the ceaseless wars and atrocities in my country, sometimes dubbed the heart of Asia.

In my thesis, I examine Eurasian security, political and economic aspects from the collapse of Soviet Union until 2020. I consider these 30 years a transition period from bipolar world order to multipolar global partnership. The crisis of world economy posed by outbreak of Covid-19 is not a partial debate of my research in this paper.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Concepts:

The Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation and the realization of a comprehensive framework is one of the most important issues of the current world order. Sustainable economic development, political stability and security need powerful regions, shared values and common goals to construct balance of power for a better global security and peace. Our current security, political and economic problems stem from lack of comprehensive interdependence among countries of the macro-regions. The new security, political and economic world order needs fundamental changes and reorganization such as moving from unilateralism towards multilateralism and global partnership.

The transformation of the bipolar world order to a unilateral or American globalization started after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the bipolar world order proved it was not stable as well. Since that, the regions, countries and markets of the world are in a strange interconnectedness with the American economy and political sphere. In this model, the United States of America become the center of the world security, political and economic affairs.

The US, EU, EAEU, China, Russia, India, Turkey, Iran, and Central Asian countries are the active sides of the Eurasian security and politics. Each of them has its strategic view what comes from different aspects, norms and interests. From this point of view, Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation initiative is a very significant project for trans-regional stabilization and structuralisation process across Eurasian. It puts Eurasia in between and raises its geopolitical and geo-economic values as a meeting point for East, West, and rest of the world. In terms of natural and human resources, Eurasia is one of the richest areas or regions of the world. Some geopolitical experts claim Eurasia is in the center of the globe. On the other hand, geographically the World-Island or Heartland is in the center of the Eurasian continent. Based on Halford Mackinder claiming: *“Whoever rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; whoever rules the World-Island commands the World”* (Mackinder J. Halford , 1904).

Beside the above mentioned potential terms, the Eurasian countries are still weak to solve and reduce their national and regional problems such as followings:

- Lack of trans-regional cooperation in security, political and economic areas
- Huge number of the poverties, starvation and inequalities
- Lack of basic economic infrastructure

- Literacy rate deficit
- Human rights and democracy deficit
- Differences in security, political and economic and market structure, system, and interests

A snap process of economic, political, political economic, institutional building and security policy cooperation has already started between the countries in the region to reduce abovementioned challenges. However, according to Anita Sengupta, referring to Milan Haunner, “*we have no choice but to continue the heartland debate*” (Anita Sengupta, 2009, p. 15). On the other hand, as we consider to the process, we suggest naming this process Eurasian comprehensive security, political, economic, and technology cooperation. Our aim is to find and address those security, political, economic, cultural, historical, productive and technological factors which show the positive and negative outcomes of the process and form a regional integration model instead of continuing the heartland debate or repeat the history once again. We try to find those mutual factors and interest areas that suggest a common grow-up and catch-up process to the initiative. To make a difference between the approach of macro-regions and a more normative viewpoint where basic values can prevail, we call this theory global partnership. Global partnership might help the US and other regional powers to shape the order that approached by Brzezinski, Z. as follows: “*geniun strategic partnerships in the key regions of Eurasia*” and “*shape a more cooperative trans-Eurasian security system*” (Brzezinski, Z., 1997).

Most Eurasian great, middle and small powers resist supremacy of one nation above others. The most important demand of Eurasian powers is the one for partnership and shared interests in global affairs. The Eurasian powers launched several political strategies to find a new regional security, political and economic structure. One of them is the Russian Eurasianism provided by Moscow. Russian Eurasianism considers reducing the lack of international harmony and consistency by providing “macro-regions” (Bassin, M, 2008) as a platform of partnership. This approach principally claims powerful regions could actively recognize regional economic and political demands, find regional solutions, avoid regional and international conflicts, defend, and secure international order beyond the region.

We argue in this dissertation that the Eurasianist views of the Eurasian powers differ from global partnership. However, we believe the differences in mindset are eliminable through a comprehensive cooperation and a reliable framework. This goal can be

achieved in an era of “*a global core of genuinely shared political responsibility*” and in a “*politically defined Europe*” (Brzezinski, Z., 1997) enhancing to Eurasia. According to Brzezinski Z, “*a politically defined Europe is also essential to the progressive assimilation of Russia into a system of global cooperation*” (Brzezinski, Z., 1997). For us, 21st century should be the era of total interdependency and partnership. Because of this, without global partnership, no common development can be imagined in the regions mainly in Eurasia. In order to enhance economic development, multipolar political consensus, and international security and stability in the world, the active and cooperative role of all countries is highly required. Global partnership is a cooperation of every country with every country instead of war of every country against others. The basis of this form of order are the trans-Eurasian and trans-regional economic and transportation routes, regional security, political and economic organizations and institutions, energy (electricity, oil and gas) and cooperation, economic and military technology cooperation among Eurasian powers.

The research examines and compares the Russian classical and neo-Eurasianism by studying its historical evolution, which dates back to the second decade of the 20th century. At the same time, China’s standpoint and historical background to Eurasia, Turkey’s Eurasianism with its new strategic shift and geopolitical approach, Central Asia’s position in Eurasia and Eurasianism, India’s, European Union’s and United States’ stand point to the Russian Eurasianism and Eurasian security, political, economic and technology initiative will be discussed. The main goal of the study is to describe the Eurasian cooperation process from a political economic point of view.

Since Russia, China, India, Turkey and Iran are the main players and powers seeking to build up a Eurasian macro-region, we will deeply discuss their Eurasianist efforts and strategies. To make it clearer, we will shape a longitudinal analysis on transformation of Russian, Chinese, Indian, Turkish and Iranian foreign policy doctrine’s different aspects and dimensions like in the Cold War period, post-cold war era, and post-financial crisis era and its impact on the whole region and sub-region like Central-Asia, Asia-Pacific, South-Asia and Middle East. In addition, we will try to examine how Eurasian security, political, economic and technological cooperation helps the countries to consolidate their regional great power position beyond the above mentioned sub-regions.

In the current world order, the term of distribution of global political and economic power is a central debate that led the global and regional great powers to a dynamic

political awakening. This awakening is because of modern economic, military and security technology development. It means that the national security, political and economic interests of the countries should be in line or cooperative with regional and global interests. In this model, even the small powers or countries can seek their own ways or strategies and conduct their responsibilities. Such a political awakening will lead the powers to some source of miscalculations in their policies and conflicts. Brzezinski Z. points out *“As China’s influence grows and as other emerging powers – Russia or India or Brazil for example – compete with each other for resources, security, and economic advantage, the potential for miscalculation and conflict increases. Accordingly, the United States must seek to shape a broader geopolitical foundation for constrictive cooperation in the global arena, while accommodating the rising aspirations of an increasingly restless global population”* (Brzezinski, Z., 1997). These miscalculations increase competitions and conflicts among the players, but at the same time it leads the world to a new cooperation level, too.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Eurasian Free Trade Area, BRICS, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the whole Eurasia are the practical outcomes of the term Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation initiative. These common, regional and trans-regional institutions, organizations, cross-border and trans-Eurasian economic and trade belts, corridors and connectivity building processes bring more dynamic, common market, and interdependent relations to the nations. The process of building a political and economic union and collective defense organization system between Post-Soviet States has already occurred under the EAEU and CSTO.

These initiatives could be the potential positive approaches to challenge the Eurasian security, political and economic development process. There are also cross border initiatives and efforts to connect South-Asia with central Asia through Afghanistan by implementing several energy projects such as Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI)¹, Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP)², Central Asia-South Asia power project (CASA-1000) and Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM), too. The economic and geopolitical interdependency between these two regions will force the countries to reconsider their

¹ Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline

² Afghanistan: Afghanistan Energy Supply Improvement Investment Program

attitudes and policy instruments towards ongoing war and conflict in Afghanistan. The demand for a common regional development will change Afghanistan's position from an international conflict and buffer zone to a peaceful and dynamic economic transit area. In addition, we will mention the significance and strategic influence of economic and trade connectivity initiatives like China's One Belt and One Road (OBOR), India, Iran Russia's International North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC), and Lapis Lazuli Corridor. The Lapis Lazuli Corridor starts from Afghanistan and connects central Asian countries through the Black Sea region to Europe. Therefore, we believe Eurasia will witness a new, common and multidimensional economic, political and security institutional framework in its upcoming future. In this dissertation, we will analyze oil and gas pipelines between Russia and China, Turkey, Germany and India and their economic, political, strategic, weaponry and military cooperation.

The most important issue is to inject a new process of regional economic and market projects into the region. The new process would be the economic interdependency building between Central-Asia and South-Asia by energy markets. For instance Central-Asia South-Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM), which has two subprojects under work: Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Afghanistan and Pakistan (TUTAP) Electrification program and CASA-1000, and also Tajikistan Afghanistan Pakistan and India (TAPI) gas pipeline major project. This project will bring close the two regions. The economic interdependency between these two regions will force the countries in the region to reconsider their attitudes and policy instruments to shape and design a dynamic and peaceful Afghanistan and use it as a transit center and sub-meeting point instead of as a buffer zone. Therefore, In Eurasia there will be a new and multidimensional institutional framework in several fields.

In order to draw a reliable picture of the future of Eurasia, the following economic topics and subtopics are important issues for debate in the current paper:

- political and cultural relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States
- Eurasia's position in the world economy
- Natural resources with their allocation and accumulation policies and processes
- The production potential based on comparative and competitive advantages theory
- The situation and level of industry and industrialization in the 20th and current century
- Industry as a basis for the economy
- Its export and import market structure
- The issue of single market in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union

- Regional economic integration, geographic structure of foreign trade, macroeconomic policies, and microeconomic basis of reforms.

Russia is the main actor and important factor in our research. Our next step is to study how Russia deals with its own economy and where it is heading for, and how Russia deals with its social organization of the industrial enterprise in the period of economic transition confronting crisis. In this regard, the following points will be in the focus point in our methodology:

- the political economy and economic stabilization in Russia
- Role of banks in the financing economic growth in Russia and Eurasian Economic Union
- The economic system and the new shape and its influence on the region
- The future of the Russian economy
- Finally, the impact of the Russian economic crisis on the world economy, mainly on Central Asia, China, India, Turkey, Iran, and even Central and Eastern European countries.

Turn to Russian Eurasianism, the relations between Russia and Middle East countries would be another sensitive and considerable issue in the coming decades. Russia and the United States will remain in a long competitive, rivalry and cooperative standpoints. The key issue is in the Middle East where no great power has the dominant position. The dominating position will be an outcome of the European Union and China providing support to one of them. It will highly affect Russia-Europe, Russia-China and Russia-Turkey's political and economic relations. Obviously, the ability and geopolitical position of both would be the main factor for Europe and China and the meeting of interest will put an end to the term. However, how it happens and how the United States could defend its position or how Russia could build her position strong and make a trust-worthy step is a partial discussion in this research.

Russian economy and governmental system highly need European support. The Eurasian Economic Union was and is a Russian project to attract the European Union's attention for further and deeper cooperation with the whole region instead of countries. Europe is the strategic region in Russian economic and world politics. Europe can provide Russians technology and "know how", experiences for making Eurasian Economic integration more productive, development policies for their infrastructures and regional governance building policies and so on. Russia will knock on any door to rebuild its cooperative relationship with Europe and America because long-term isolation will destroy Russia again and obviously, Russians do not want this. This research will also

monitor the reemerge of Russia in the European politics as considered rather in a positive way, a partner.

In this regard, China's strategic position is also significant to the Russian Eurasiansim. China is the biggest and strongest power of Eurasia. No sustainable Eurasia is imaginable without China. Therefore, significant cooperation and coordination are under way between Russia and China. These cooperation and common political steps circle out into Central-Asia, Middle East and other numerous regions and issues. The term we follow here is the sustainability of these relations between the parties. China has a greater and more comfortable position than Russia. Russian Economy is experiencing difficulties and uncertainties but China is getting better day by day.

For us, the rise of China's economic impact on the above mentioned regions is important. The Chinese transnational entrepreneurship, transformation in social organization as changing corporate governance and strategic management and the outspreading of it into Russia and its zone of influence, and the future of Chinese capitalism policies will shape the Sino-Russia entente in the future.

In this research, Turkey, mainly the redefinition of its foreign policy strategy, is also one of the key elements. Turkey is seeking a new political view and foreign and security policy shift. Turkey wants a regional great power status that can help its opening to the world strategy. In our view, Turkey's new shift is a balance of power between great powers and adaptation of global partnership.

Finally, a few words about Afghanistan, my mother country. Geographically, the external borders of Eurasia demarcated where the Soviet Union or today's independent countries meet Afghanistan. Afghanistan was and still is a buffer zone between Eastern and Western powers in its whole history. The border of Eurasia experiences lots of threats and uncertainty from Afghanistan because of the presence of the terrorist groups, mass production of certain type of drugs and the existence of countless irresponsible armed groups inherited from the times of the civil war, being engaged in organized crimes. The terrorist groups fighting in Afghanistan are not just the insiders; there are numerous activists and subgroups operated by Central-Asian and Russian Muslim citizens too. According to basics of security policy, Eurasia needs a preemptive strategy against these terrorist and other radical groups hoping to destroy the strong secular states in the Central-Asia and Russia and to build an Islamic system, state or at least network there. Therefore, Afghanistan could be an important country for cooperation in the foreign policy of all world and regional powers such as the US, the EU, China, India, Turkey, Iran and

Pakistan. It is a country where different and common interests of the above-mentioned powers including Russia meet one another. The cooperation of the world's great powers in Afghanistan would have an effect on their relations in other international issues too. In this area, the foreign and security policy of Afghans in order to act as a good meeting and transit point or bridge for the great and regional powers is very important.

At the end, I will try to conceive my own interpretation and understanding of the main research questions listed in this research paper.

1.2 Hypothesis and Methodology

Considering the all above-mentioned issues, my hypothesizes are:

1. Russian neo-Eurasianist foreign policy strategy contains some appropriate regional comprehensive security, political, and economic cooperation initiatives by applying global partnership theory instead of heartland and rime land theory.
2. The Eurasianist view of Turkey means a new foreign and security policy shift, which can guarantee a regional great power status and help its opening to the world strategy. To achieve this goal, Turkey will put an end to its Cold War era's commitment and balances its relations with other political, economic and military powers like Russia, China and Iran.
3. China wants to build a bridge of friendship and cooperation across the Eurasian continent and seek a comprehensive strategic partnership with the European Union through building of four bridges for peace, growth, reform and progress of civilization. China represents a dynamic economic and industrial model: smart technology and regional and trans-regional connectivity. To achieve these goals, China needs to cooperate with other Eurasian powers. Without China, no Eurasian Initiative can develop and without Russia, India, Turkey and other Eurasian powers, no Chinese dream can come true.
4. India balances its foreign policy and relations to two different directions: the Indo-Pacific (maritime conception) and Eurasia (a continental strategic shift). In the "Great Eurasian" concept alongside Russia and China, India can reach out to the Central Asian market, limit the possibilities of its historical conflict with China, and can find a common ground with other powers to pacify the conflict zone in Afghanistan and counter terrorism in Pakistan.
5. The comprehensive security, political, economic and technology cooperation model we apply as a regional integration procedure is the only way towards common development.

In order to launch a successful initiative, the Eurasian powers must coordinate their policies and combine their power.

1.2.1 Research Questions

1. In order to establish a comprehensive regional cooperation initiative, what security, political and economic, technological and structural elements of Eurasian great, middle and small powers are and are not adaptable?
2. How does Russia find and achieve a position to act as a sustainable and reliable meeting and transit point between West and East?
3. How can Russia shape such a multi-vector diplomacy to convince the Eurasian great, middle and small powers to cooperate and coordinate their policies?
4. The Russian Eurasianism provides a system of macro-economic regions and multilateral globalization. According to some Russian nationalists, the world can be divided into several macro regions and one of the macro-regions would be the Russo-centric Eurasia, which reduces American Atlanticism and applies Russian supremacy toward others. Is there any rationality or possibility to apply a Russo-centric Eurasian order to enhance global partnership?
5. What institutions, organizations, frameworks, foreign, defense, economic and political system and approaches can help Eurasian great, middle and small powers in catch up and regional development process?

1.2.2 Research methodology

My research is based on a theoretical, historical and political economy approach. It is related to fundamental geo-political and geo-economic changes in Eurasia. As Eurasia is one of the most important and sensitive regions in international affairs, changes in Eurasia will require a new shape and design for global or world order. It means a direction from unipolar security, political and economic globalization to multipolar and multidimensional global partnership.

I shall build my study on explanatory, descriptive, comparative, observational mixed qualitative-quantitative methods to conduct a highly analytic research on the topic.

I have applied explanatory research method for two main reasons:

Firstly, this method helps me explain those Eurasianist policies of the Eurasian powers, which seek Eurasian comprehensive and multidimensional cooperation.

Implementing this method will also help me discuss on possibilities of some regional organizations and actors like EAEU, BRICS, CIS, Russia, India, and China (RIC) etc.

Comparative and observational research methods help me compare Russian Eurasianism and other Eurasian powers' standpoints, strategies and principal lessons of their past towards the region and beyond.

On the other hand, I use empirical method for all present and practical aspects of my research area. It may help me to draft a clear picture of the appearance and existence of Eurasian powers' role and position in the future.

Additionally, I will introduce some short case studies, economic and trade relations from the given countries and institutions. In this research, I also argue and highlight the different and actual positions, positive-negative and critical standpoints of related experts and observers. The geopolitical interests of the politically and economically important parties like the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, India, Turkey etc. are among the important topics of debate in my research. The study raises the question why Russian Eurasianism is an internationally discussed issue and what kind of new approach it could be for the future in the global partnership and what are the factors that pose challenges to the unipolar globalization.

From an epistemological perspective, my thesis is a deductive or top-down approach. This approach evolves from general into more specific, contains theoretical part followed by hypothesis, and ends with my analysis.

I try to be comparative when using different sources. The Western perspectives and the Russian or Eurasian perspectives are very important. I try to find my position in between and prove that the term I research is an actual security, political and economic issue of global and regional affairs.

My research will be a theoretical and practical analysis. The characteristics of my study primarily lay on theoretical and practical terms. For data collection, I have drawn on OECD, World Bank, IMF, Eurostat, ITC and some national statistical dates. To sum up, in all methods I relied on literature published since the collapse of the Soviet Union tackling all points by which Russia could re-emerge as a rebuilder of the idea of Eurasianism and act as a meeting point between other regional powers conducting its new foreign policy strategy doctrine.

The dissertation has four main chapters. I begin with the discussion of The Philosophical and historical concept of Eurasia among Eurasian Nations (Chapter No 2.). This contains an overview on contemporary political and security concerns of the great

powers in Eurasia and a deep analytical study of philosophy and history of the terms Eurasianism(s), followed by subchapters such as: The standpoint of the United States in Eurasia, The Strategic Path of Russia in Eurasia, The Strategic View of Turkey to Eurasia, China's standpoint on Eurasia and India from Indo-Pacific to Eurasia.

The next (No 3.) chapter focuses on the economic, trade, and geopolitical relations between Eurasian powers, and has two main parts. The first part contains an overview on Intra-RIC+T (Russia, India, China + Turkey) investment and trade relations providing data about India-China, India-Russia, Russia-China, Russia-German and Russia-Europe trade and economic relations and the discusses the case of geopolitical and geostrategical interests of given countries. The second part of the chapter discusses the complexity of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The Influence and Contribution of BRICS in world politics and economics, intra-BRICS achievements and failures, the case of BRICS New Development Bank and the case of intra-BRICS investment and trade are the main terms of this part. I will also try to make a theoretical background for the process to find what kind of cooperation BRICS is primarily involved in, whether it is a new occurrence in the global partnership era and what mechanisms and projections could raise a better and deeper economic cooperation and integration between these nations by applying theories of global and regional economic integration in the conclusion.

The next (No 4.) chapter focuses on the Eurasian Economic Union. The subchapters in this part of my dissertation are: The Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia and the EAEU, The Historical and Evolutional Background of the EAEU, and The Economic Situation and the Results of the EAEU in Present. The last chapter is the conclusion section which contains an analytical outcome of the dissertation.

For data collection to conduct my study, I used secondary sources such as books, journal and online articles related to the topic and official statistics and indicators from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and International Trade Centre etc.

2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF EURASIA AMONG EURASIAN NATIONS

2.1 Contemporary Political and Security Concerns of Great Powers in Eurasia

In the contemporary interdependent and interconnected world, the security, political and economic situation is hardly predictable. The great powers of the world are involved in bilateral, regional and international conflicts and confrontation over international political and economic issues. The Eurasian comprehensive security, political, economic and technology cooperation grew systematically by a very clear and strategic view between Eurasian great, middle and small powers. For some Eurasian powers, an alternative structuralization process of the world order is in the core of their policy. However, according to various experts, and from my point of view, globalization has no alternative. The globalization in this context means the preservation of peace all over the world. More precisely to avoid a new world war or a clash of political, economic, technological and geopolitical interest among large powers. The structure of globalization is moving to a new form. We call it global partnership. The endless political, economic, military and technological wars and conflicts proved that no power has the capacity to lead and manage the world, world part and world regions unilaterally. The collapse of the Soviet Union as super power showed that even a super power could not manage to keep its legacy and power in Eurasia. The ongoing conflicts and flashpoints like Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, the Balkans, North Korea, South China Sea and Venezuela has raised the need for global partnership and deep cooperation of great powers. Currently, Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran clearly reduce the unipolar world order or supremacy of a unique power over others and practically develop multilateral cooperation models to challenge the United States and unipolar world order. At the same time, all Eurasian powers seek some degree of nationalism in their internal, regional and international politics. The nationalist regional settlement is an instrument of primacy for the large powers over small ones. The small powers have the fear of falling under influence of large powers. This phenomenon is a source of conflict and a factor of weakness in regional or Eurasian cooperation.

Some of the regions of the world like Middle-East is in a transformational stage from previous authoritarian political structures to new ones. Methodologically we cannot draft internal political systems for the countries in the Middle East, but a new balance of power between great powers has already established in the region. The West with its

leading position has four failed or struggling missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Including these four failures of western humanitarian and military interventions, the fear of new stage of radicalization in the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa is increasingly rising. The Islamic State has become an issue in the entire world by its emerging in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan. Due to lack of trust and absence of structural framework, no joint action has been taken yet by the world's great powers. The US with its allies is in a conflict zone with Russia, Iran, and China in the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, Asia Pacific and Africa in the above mentioned flashpoints. At the same time the relations between these are constantly in tatter because of the European Union security concerns over Ukraine and Syria. The economic sanctions posed by the US and the EU over Russia's move in Ukraine crippled Russian economy. After Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, there is another fear of Russian further annexation of Transnistria, a breakaway state of Moldova. Transnistria expressed its interest in joining the Russian Federation in March 2014. So far, the President of the Russian Federation has not answered to Transnistria's interest (Hallet, 2014). There was also an observation that America is pushing Russia and the European Union towards a European conflict by arming Ukraine against Russia and starting a heavy war between the parties in the territory. (Alex Lantier, 2015)

In 2017, The United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) six-nation agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. In 2019, the President of the United States canceled the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. On November 2020, the U.S officially withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty signed in 1992. The treaty allows for aerial reconnaissance of the territory of 35 countries in Europe and North America. The Trump administration was not preparing to extend the New START Treaty. These steps show the U.S. is abolishing its international security commitments. In this regard, Russia and other Eurasian powers are highly concerned. (Dmitri Trenin, 2020) Russian nationalist leader Zhirinovsky pointed out "*A plan for three world wars is being carried out to destroy Russia*" (Zhirinovsky, 2015) and further called on Russian parliament and government to return to Soviet exchange rates and stop using US dollar in its international trade. He suggested that the economic crisis battering is important to keep Russia away from the Third World War orchestrated by Washington. (Zhirinovsky, 2015)

Russia as the key power in Eurasia is defending and supporting Bashar al-Assad regime against the US-supported and Turkish-backed irresponsible armed groups in

Syria. In this regard, two regional middle powers, Iran and Turkey, cooperate with Russia. Iran is sharing Russian views and Turkey is trying to find its own position between Russia, China and the West. China is also defending Assad regime at the international level. The situation in Ukraine is almost identical and the parties could not find a common ground to de-escalate the conflict. Russia, China, India, Pakistan are also concerned about security situation in Afghanistan due to decreasing American interest for remaining boots on the ground and state failure in the country. No alternative solution is under consideration yet for the aftermath of the US withdrawal. The situation in Iran and Venezuela is similar Russia and China are teaming with Venezuela and Iran and the US exerts pressure to change the political and economic regimes in both countries. Beside these conflicts, The U.S.-China relation has been experiencing a deeper decreasing tendency since the beginning of the trade war and over Hong Kong, Taiwan, South China Sea and etc. The U.S. is preparing to beat Chinese companies and banks with sanctions. This act has increased tensions in China. Fang Xinghai, a vice-Chairman at the China Security Regulatory Commission has warned that China needs to be prepared for the risks of being cut off the US dollar system. (Tang, 2020)

These problems do not let the parties reach a comprehensive strategic agreement or a common ground on fighting Islamic State and terrorism, de-escalating conflicts and building a stable security, political and economic world order based on global partnership and mutual recognition. Each of the actors unilaterally, bilaterally or now regionally is trying to address the problems. For example, Russia moved to strengthen its military bases near Afghanistan's borders in central Asian countries Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Russia and its Central Asian allies are taking measures to defend and secure Central Asia and the external borders of Eurasian Economic Union because of their security concerns in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in a wider view, the great, middle, and small powers of Eurasian continent in recent years have enhanced cooperation in security, political, economic and technological fields under the initiative or vision of Greater Eurasia. In our model, we name these multi-dimension Eurasian strategic shifts Eurasian comprehensive cooperation.

2.2 The Theoretical, Historical and Practical Eurasianisms

In his article, *“The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications”* Golam Mostafa highlights the various forms of Eurasianism such as:

- The Turkish Eurasianism which concerns the territories and regions where Turkic peoples live including the modern-day Turkey, Balkans, part of the former USSR, Central Asia, the region of Volga and Afghanistan. The term is used by Turkish intellectuals as a policy option, but never in Turkish Foreign policy.
- Another form of Eurasianism is the Muslim Eurasia, which was developed by south Caucasian and Turkish authors, and comprises Central Asian and South Caucasian territories.
- Another significantly important type of Eurasianism is the Central Asian Eurasianism, raises Caspian zone importance where the world's three great civilizations: Turkic, Slavic and Aryan-Iranian and two world religions; Islam and Christianity meet.
- Russian Classical and neo-Eurasianism, which constitutes the domestic, bilateral, regional and international attitude of Russia in recent two decades and is one of the most practical and balanced type of the term, relied on Russia's multi-vector diplomacy and good ties with other Eurasian powers. (Mostafa, 2013)
- Lastly, there are countries like China and India that have their clear strategic aims in Eurasia, and also the U.S. and EU are deeply involved and interested in Eurasian power politics and economic interactions.

In a historical perspective, Eurasia was the home of about nine Eurasian empires from the 4th to 20th century. These historical empires are: Hun Empire (4th – 5th cc.), Turkic/Khazar khaganates (6th-10th cc.), Arabian Caliphate (7th-13th cc.), Empire of the Seljuks (11th-12th cc.), Mongolian Empire (13th-14th cc.), Timur's Empire (14th-15th cc.), Ottoman Empire (15th-20th cc.), Safavid Empire (16th-18th cc.) and the Russian/Soviet Empire (18th-20th cc.). (Ismailov, E., & Papava, V., 2010)

The above mentioned Eurasian historical Empires has struggled to rise and maintain their power, but rise of one posed a decline and collapse for previous one. The Empires followed one another row by row by waving wars and clashes. The only aim of the empires and nations in the entire history of Eurasia was the struggle for political power. Eurasian history is full of expansionism, annexationist moves, protectionism and clashes, but the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the nature of the history. The Soviet Union superpower failed to maintain its power and supremacy in Eurasia and its collapse was a

dividing line between traditional and modern state political nature. However, according to Vladimir Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe for the century, but, by other meaning, it was the foundation stone of a Eurasian and global partnership era as well. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of post-Soviet nation states with demarcated borders have totally changed the political and power traditions in Eurasia. However, for Eurasian great, middle and small powers, the political power is still the only instrument to keep or gain independence, development, security and wellbeing. But, relations between nations are balanced by their statehoods. Eurasia is one of the integrated and interdependent parts of world. Since this, the security, political and economic relations and complexities are considerable matters of international relations, political economy and power politics.

Halford Mackinder had addressed the geopolitical significance of the Heartland under the era of historical empires from a classical realistic point of view. The implementation of such a political order or returning to the 20th century political settlement in the current international political, economic, and security structure is impossible. At the same time the Eurasian great powers failed to establish the western type liberal and neo-liberal political order. Alexander Dugin in his book *“The Fourth Political Theory”* writes, *“The majority of Russian people suffer their integration into global society as a loss of their own identity. The Russian population had almost entirely rejected Liberal ideology in the 1990s. But is also apparent that a return to the illiberal political ideologies of the 20th century, such as communism or fascism, is unlikely, as these ideologies have already failed and historically proven themselves to be incapable of opposing liberalism, to say nothing of the moral costs of totalitarianism”* (Dugin, 2017, p. 5).

Alexander Dugin offers *“The Fourth Political Theory”* as a united formulation of marginalized conservatism, monarchism, traditionalism, fascism, socialism and communism to all those countries that oppose liberalism referring to Alain de Benoist’s *“periphery against the center”*. (Dugin, 2017)

Since Eurasia is placed between Europe and Asia, and their collective development can solve their shared problems, difficulties and structural differences, the comprehensive security, political and economic cooperation or initiative would be also important. In this regard, I apply regionalism and trans-regional integration theories as well. According to Tamás Szentes, *“Regionalization, i.e. the tendency of the rise of regional economic blocs and the establishment of regional integration organizations, is not a new phenomenon,*

either. It has always been the aim of the political and economic leadership, in general, to get an access to (and, if possible, to control) larger territorial and economic units, to enlarge the domain of its activity and influence” (Tamás, 2003, p. 355).

Regionalism and trans-regional integration direly need “*a certain intensity of cooperation and transactions, which can be interpreted both quantitatively and qualitatively*” (Palánkai, 2014, p. 40). Professor Tibor Palánkai describes integration from economic and political science and security point of view by citing Kozma, Lindberg, and Karl Deutsch. According to Kozma “*An important criterion of integration is certain fairly significant intensity of relations between producers of goods in the different domestic economies*”. According to Lindberg, “*Integration means a process, when conflicts are solved without application of force*”. And according to Deutsch, “*international integration is defined as being about the achievement of security within a region or among a group of states. Successful integration is about the radical reduction in the likelihood of states using violent means to resolve their differences*”. In a broader view, the regional integration and transnationalism considerably can happen by formation of “*security community*”. (Palánkai, 2014, pp. 40-41)

As for now, the Eurasian continent is divided between several nations and sovereign countries in three different levels: great, middle, and small powers. No unique power has the real capacity to shape or reassert an empire in order to rule the Heartland, World-Island to command the world. The bilateral and multilateral relations between Eurasian countries or powers are based on mutual recognition and equality. The only issue that involve Eurasian powers outside their territory or borders are their inherited historical, cultural, and geopolitical frontiers. In the current geopolitical structure of world politics, the case of influence over international or regional initiatives is the issue of interest among countries seeking global or regional hegemony. The Heartland and the World Island in Eurasia are places where the frontiers and interests of all Eurasian powers meet or even encircle into one other. Because of this complex structure, regionalism or regional integration is a considerable part of their foreign policies. According to Mikhail A. Molcsanov, “*the geometry of regional integration in Eurasia changes with a gradual movement away from Russia’s hegemony and towards a bipolar Russia-Kazakhstan and Russia-China models*” (Molchanov, 2015, p. 13).

2.3 The Standpoint of the United States in Eurasia

According to a 1990 document for National Security Strategy, the first Bush Administration pointed out that “*for most of the century, the United States has deemed it a vital interest to prevent any or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian landmass*” (Fettweis, 2003). According to Margaret Scott and Westernley Alcenat, United States’ long-term strategy towards Central Asia and Eurasia contains three broad perceptions of analysis (SCOTT, Margaret; ALCENAT, Westernley, 2008):

1. U.S policy is geopolitical and is motivated by a geostrategic effort to contain terrorism and the rise of a regional hegemon like Russia or China.
2. U.S policy is guided by geo-economic in an effort to access the region’s natural resources and decrease the political clout of Russia.
3. Alternatively, the former and latter perceptions are both instrumental in U.S foreign policy making.

The United States acts sensitively towards rising of other powers, mainly in Eurasia. The return of Russia as a great political and military power and the rise of China as a great economic and technological power has increased a fear of declinism in the United States. The rise and growth of Soviet Union from 1945 to 1980s was the case of declinism for the United States. The United States feared that the Soviet growth can develop the communist East better than the capitalist West. From 1980s, Japanophobia constituted the fear of declinism in America. In 1990s, a huge number of scholars and universities urged that the Japanese economy had overtaken the United States. According to Lester Thurow and others, the Japanese GDP per year was growing twice faster and the U.S. GDP and its GNP per capita stated 22 percent higher. Back to the declinism, Paul Kennedy also wrote about this in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. According to Glenn Hubbard and Tim Kane, Kennedy’s book “*was much more than a declinist manifesto*” in which he asks the readers “*to think about history in economic term*”. (Hubbard, Glenn, and Tim Kane, 2014, pp. 16-34) Regarding the declinism, Glenn Hubbard and Tim Kane writes, “*Here the Theory predicts that follower nations will approach but not surpass the leader, or the frontier*” (Hubbard, Glenn, and Tim Kane, 2014, p. 19).

The United States has been concerned about the recent rise of Chinese Economic power and Russian political and military influence. This has led it to keep fears alive, act sensitively towards the Eurasian great powers and practice measures and pressure like

sanctions and trade war against Russia and China. Its aim is to limit and avoid the possible rise of a new nationalist or communist superpowers in Eurasia. It seems that the Mackinder's Heartland theory has become influential in the long-term foreign policy of the world and regional great powers in a significant geopolitical extend to keep their influence in the region, share their interests and cooperate to balance their power towards each other including the United States. The process applies a projection of regional integration based on global partnership. The regional and global partnership will avoid the Eurasian and non-Eurasian powers to create new shifts for dominating whole region against controverting others.

Discussing the meaning of political power, Hans J. Morgenthau writes, *"International politics, like all politics, is struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through driven intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. They may also try to further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical cooperation with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goals by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power"* (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 29).

International politics among sovereign nations can work through partnership. Global partnership will share the primary values to the world and regional orders. According to Henry Kissinger, *"World Order describes the concept held by a region or civilization about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to the entire world"* (Kissinger, 2014, pp. 8-9). In this vein, one of the important and idealistic terms in the value-based world order is the principle of balance between legitimacy and power. The principle of balance between legitimacy and power is the most significant factor of global or regional integration. According to Tibor Palánkai, *"integration is a process of unification, the merging of parts into whole, becoming a unit, fitting together, melting into one another, linking up"* (Palánkai, 2014). In international politics, the real integration primarily needs mutual understanding and equality among partners. More clearly, a real integration process between countries could happen based on two distinct logics: Westphalian logic and liberal logic. These two logics provide fundamental rules like sovereignty, territoriality, mutual recognition and non-intervention morality, while meanwhile nullify the possibility of wars and conflicts.

At the same time, the United States, a non-Eurasian great power is also involved in the region with its long-term balance of power strategies and military presence in numerous countries of the region. The United States has built significant ties and strategic partnerships in Eurasia in order to deal with growing China and resurgent Russia. Recently, the structure of the relations between the countries in the region has lost its previous meaning. The Cold War and post-Cold-war era mostly replaced with Eurasian cooperation in a global partnership manner. Recent Eurasian security, political and economic initiatives applied by Eurasian nations are the main reason of America's new balance of power policy towards the whole region.

As far as military presence for the United States in Eurasia goes, Afghanistan has become an important and strategic place, similarly to Poland in Europe. According to George Friedman, "*the fundamental American interest is always the balance of power*" (Friedman, 2011, p. 125). Poland is a geopolitical dividing line between Russia and Germany. In Eurasian context, it represents a great power of Eastern Europe. The United States prefers to balance its power between Russia and Germany and among other Eastern European nations by maintaining military presence in Poland. Afghanistan is also a dividing and potential transit area between Central-Asia and South-Asia. Recently the countries and great powers of the two regions are working on organizing a common and trans-regional economic and energy market. A new era of trans-regional security, political, and economic cooperation is rising. The case of military presence in Afghanistan for the United States, in order to control regional initiatives, maintain the balance of power, and influence between these two regions of Eurasia is highly significant. According to George Friedman:

"The United States must continue to do everything it can to block a German-Russian entente and to limit the effect that Russia's sphere of influence might have on Europe, because the very presence of a militarily powerful Russia changes the Way Europe Behaves". Exposed on either side, Poland will have little choice but to go along with whatever the German and Russia decide, which would be disastrous for the United States. It is therefore in the American interest to guarantee Poland's independence from Russia and Germany, not only formally but by creating a viable and vibrant Polish economy and military that can serve as the model and driver for the rest of Eastern Europe" (Friedman, 2011, pp. 132-134).

Applying Friedman's concept to Central Asia would mean Afghanistan becoming the most important geopolitical dividing line between South Asia and Central Asia in

American foreign policy to keep its global great power position in Eurasian security, political, and economic cooperation. According to the facts, the US presence in the region will remain for an unlimited period. According to Brian Becker, Afghanistan's strategic position is like a "cash cow" (RT, 2017) in the current US foreign policy. According to Robert D. Kaplan, *"All in this complexity, keep in mind that empire remains the organizing principle of world affairs, given that the imperial experiences of Turkey, Iran, Russia and China explains the geopolitical strategy of each country to this day"* (Kaplan, 2019, p. 13).

This kind of interactions and interest interdependency has led the Eurasian countries to bypass their regional and historical conflicts and work shoulder by shoulder. These facts let us point out that Eurasia coheres, but still the regional and international interactions between Eurasian powers and nations need to be based on and address functionalist principles. In functionalism, the cooperation between a variety of actors across national boundaries, caused by common interests and needs within an interdependent global system is on the focus point. At the same time, functionalism follows the conceptualization of politics as an outcome of the struggle to satisfy individual and societal needs in a given and specific issue or area. (Diez, T., Bode, I., & Da Costa, A. F., 2011, pp. 63-65)

2.4 The Strategic Path of Russia in Eurasia

The concept of Eurasianism is one of the most complicated issues between the nations of Eurasia. According to numerous writers and experts, there are so many types of Eurasianism. Russian Eurasianism is also one of the most debated and familiar type, which is divided into classical and neo-Eurasianism. Eurasianist view is the baseline of Russia's foreign policy strategy, geopolitics, geo-economics, and geo-philosophical interpretations. Russia's Eurasianist shift is significantly important for the EAEU, China, India, Turkey, Iran and other Middle Eastern and Asian countries.

The re-emerging of Russia in the early 21st century raised the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the entire Eurasian continent. This opened a new study era for experts and researchers to study the structuralization principles of the entire Eurasian supercontinent. In this regard, the re-emerging of Russia as a great geopolitical and military power in Eurasia is a considerable challenge to the current Western-centric world order. Russia with its central role in the Soviet Union and the last great power in recent decades of power politics of Eurasia has more historical, geopolitical, security capacity

and economic resources to influence the Heartland and the world Island again. According to Rutland, “*Russia has deployed political, military and economic tools in order to keep influence and advance its interests*” (Peter, 2000). As for now, despite United States long-term preventive balance of power strategy and deep concerns in the region, China, India, Turkey, and Iran have coordinated some parts of their interests with Russia. These Eurasian powers are likely to create a common or shared geopolitical and geo-economic dominance in the region. The very meaning of strategic shifts and policy cooperation among Eurasian nations is balance of power and challenging US-led globalization. These common and shared geopolitical and geo-economic efforts will constitute a Eurasian powers’ club that will lay a better ground for Eurasian security, political, economic and technological initiatives. In this regard, Russian foreign policy strategy can play a crucial role and push the emergence of a knowledge-based global partnership in the current globalized world.

2.4.1 The Eurasianist Foreign Policy Strategy of Russia

According to all evidence, Russian state leaders seek international law and universal norms by respecting and defending other’s sovereignty and independency.

One of the main points in Russia’s Eurasianist foreign policy strategy is to build trust and show Russia as non-aggressive country. Russia is looking to build a new political environment in the region. It seeks to achieve its regional and international influence by installing new perspectives and norms in Eurasia. Enjoying bigger influence and letting others have their voice on policy and decision-making processes seem to be the new model of regional integration in Eurasia. Russia’s foreign and security policy has developed step by step from different directions to this point. These directions meant stability in its zone of influence in early 1990s, Pan-Slavism in late 1990s and early 2000s, opening to the West or Western modernization in the first decade of 21th century, and currently Eurasian integration and regional and international security, political and economic cooperation.

The Eurasian view in Russian regional and international politics is a policy of prestige. According to Hans J. Morgenthau, “*Prestige, in contrast to the maintenance and acquisition of power, is but rarely an end in itself. More frequently, the policy of prestige is one of the instrumentalities through which the policies of the status quo and of imperialism try to achieve their ends*” (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 83).

Russia is not interested in integrating with the West anymore. This could work for a while until all sides become ready to reach the level they can cooperate with one another as peers while having their own meanings and interests. Russia needs to prove itself as a great, sustainable and reliable regional and international power. This is the reason why Russia appears to the places where the US or the West in general is involved or interested. Paul M. Carter Jr. Argues, *“during the past decade, Russia’s foreign policy ambitions have steadily increased, including in areas of conflicts or instability in the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere”* (Paul M. Carter, 2020). It means the new international and foreign policy of Russia is looking to make conflict zones in certain regions or countries where the US intervened. Russia follows this policy towards nations to provide them alternative options and make them ready to join Russia’s Eurasian and regional security, political and economic cooperation strategy. The reason Russia is confronting western powers alone and do not request its friends and powerful strategic partners to stand by it or at least act as mediator between Russia and the West is that the former seeks to demonstrate great power status.

The case of reemerging as a great regional and international power for Russia is the matter of to be or not to be. Confronting most developed and economically better structured Western countries would not bring good times for Russia. Russia may fail and face a series of problems, including threats. It is a hard political and historic decision. Related to basic rules for taking hard political steps Robert D. Kaplan refers to Darius, *“if you think yourself stronger, stand and fight, if not, submit”* (Kaplan, 2019, p. 46), and according to Sun Tzu *“the side that knows when to fight and when not will take the victory”* (Tzu, 2014, pp. 86-110). Russia’s main goal is to create a new world order. A world order, which refuses the primacy of one over others. Once Amir Timor (Tamerlane) told to his soldiers, *“A knight dies once but a coward dies repeatedly”* (Brion, 1984, p. 180).

One of the most outstanding points in the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation in 2016 was the use of force and power projection outside the country and outside its zone of influence. In this regard, Vladimir Frolov writes, *“On the surface, Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept is a low key technical document. But if you read between the lines, it contains significant changes to Russia’s approach to international affairs and emphasizes a growing willingness to use force to achieve the Kremlin’s goals”* (Frolov, 2016).

The term use of force or more clearly hybrid warfare as the new Russian way of war in its foreign policy concept originates from the so called Gerasimov doctrine (2013). The author of the doctrine is General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Gerasimov doctrine applied hybrid warfare that transcends boundaries between peace and war. General Valery Gerasimov argues, *“The very “rules of war” have changed. The rule of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of forces of weapons in their effectiveness”* (Gerasimov, 2013). It is a model of all-of-government warfare and related to achievement of political goals. As he writes, *“The use of political, diplomatic, economic and other nonmilitary measures in combination with the use of military forces”* (Gerasimov, 2013). In other words, the Gerasimov doctrine can be described as the development of an operational concept to increase the confrontation capacity of Russia with the West.

According to Eugene Rumer, the main points of the Gerasimov doctrine are:

1. Whole-of-government warfare
2. Fusion of elements of hard and soft power across various domains
3. Permanent conflict transcending the boundaries between peace and war (Rumer, 2019, p. 5)

In this doctrine, General Valery Gerasimov applies the following new operational forms and methods:

- Initiations of military operations by groupings of line-units (forces) in peacetime
- Highly maneuverable, non-contact combat operations of inter-branch groupings of line-units.
- Reducing of the military-economic potential of the state by the destruction of critically important facilities of its military and civilian infrastructure in short time
- The mass use of high-precision weaponry, the large-scale use of special operations forces, as well as robotic systems and weapons based on new physical principles and the participation of a civil-military component in combat operations
- Simultaneous effect on line-units and enemy facilities through-out the entire depth of its territories

- Warfare simultaneously in all physical environment and the information space
- The use of asymmetric and indirect operations
- Command-and-control of forces and assets in a unified information space. (Gerasimov, 2013)

The aim the Gerasimov doctrine wants to achieve is the powerful return or re-emerging of Russia into the world affairs as a partner among other major powers. The Gerasimov doctrine increased the practical value of Russian military in the Russian foreign and national security policy. The use of force drastically increased the capacity and activity of Russian foreign policy in the current international politics and conflicts. Some of the experts believe the Gerasimov doctrine is the implementer of Russian foreign policy strategy and national security interests. However, in accordance with our findings, the driver of Russian foreign policy strategy and national security policy is still the Primakov doctrine. The military in its old and new form has always been its implementer. The Gerasimov doctrine can be recognized as the classical “*getting around strategy*” of Amir Timor (Tamerlane). When Amir Timor mobilized his army to conquer Baghdad, he was aware of his enemy’s strength. He used “*getting around strategy*” to takeover on his enemy.

“In my left side, when my riders attacked the enemy’s army, in respond, my riders come under a heavy arrowing attack. The heavy arrowing attack destroyed some of my riders and warhorses. The lesson I learned from that attack showed that the enemy is strong and well prepared for defense and if I conduct a direct attack, possibly my army might be destroyed. Therefore, I decided to get around the enemy’s army” (Brion, 1984).

According to the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation in 2016, one of the strategic national priorities for Russia is “*facilitate the development of constructive dialogue and partnership with a view to promote harmony and mutual enrichment among various cultures and civilizations*” (The MoFA of the Russian Federation, 2016). The document highlights, “*the world is currently going through fundamental changes related to the emergence of a multipolar international system*” (The MoFA of the Russian Federation, 2016). Enhancing a multipolar international system in Russian foreign policy strategy can be traced back to 1990s. In other words, it stems from the Primakov doctrine.

Russia’s contemporary security, defense and foreign policy strategy was conceived by Yevgeni Primakov in 1996. The Primakov doctrine named after him and is the actual

theoretical background and defining concept of Russian security, military and foreign policies for more than two decades. The most outstanding principles for Russian foreign and security policy in Primakov doctrine (1996) are:

1. View of Russia as an indispensable actor with an independent foreign policy
2. Vision of a multipolar world managed by a concert of major powers
3. Insistence on Russia's primacy in the post-Soviet space and the pursuit of Eurasian integration
4. Opposition to NATO expansion

Partnership with China and India (Rumer, 2019, p. 5)

The doctrine suggested that it would be beneficial for Russia to be in a good weather of ties with Eastern powers. Based on its Eastern roots, Russia should consider the gape of technology, economy and social development between Russia and Western powers. This gap will make different interests for both. That is why it is very important for Russia to keep its Eastern mentality and relations towards the West. Based on this perspective, Russia as a key geopolitical and military power in Eurasia is not in a position to work in the same team as developed Western countries. The West wants Russia to behave like Western countries do and follow Western norms and values. However, according to its geographical and geopolitical position, Russia could not act this way because it is not a fully European country, nor an Asian one. The geographical and geopolitical position of Russia is deeply rooted to its history. It lay the ground for Russian political elite to represent Russia as a Eurasian country and act in between. According to numerous experts, Primakov was the one who injected the Idea of multilateralism into the post-Soviet Russia and drafted the concept of Russia, India, China strategic triangle to counterbalance the western alliance and the US-led unipolar globalization (SIMHA, 2015).

We believe that the emergence of a multipolar international system in the current globalized world will lay the ground for a knowledge-based and more stable global partnership. The term Eurasia can help Russia to re-emerge as a regional and international great power and build a reliable partnership with other major powers. In this regard according to Pihla Barnier, after becoming Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Primakov said, *“despites the current difficulties, Russia has been and remains a great power, and its policy toward the outside world should correspond to that status ... In advocating partnership relations with our former cold war adversaries, we proceed*

from the need for an equitable – and I want to put special emphasis here on this- equitable and mutually advantageous partnership that takes each other's interests into account” (Bernier, 2018, p. 47).

This is a desire for post-Soviet Russia to position itself in the center and act in between of East and West or Europe and Asia as a major power instead of invading eastward and westward. Today geo-strategically Russia turned to China to redefine its foreign policy and position in between of East and West. Eurasia needs a “technological update” including know-how and economic resources to build its infrastructure which has been expected from Western partners but after the confrontation with the West over Ukraine, the term became clear that there was no chance for such expectations in the near future.

Confrontations with the West in Syria, Ukraine, and potentially in Yemen and Venezuela posed numerous difficulties to Russia's economy and household. The average monthly salary across Russia has shrunk. Decrease in oil prices, devaluation of the Ruble, looming recession, inflation, and worsening investment climate are the main factors leading to Russia's economic misfortunes. These misfortunes result in exerting social, economic and political pressure on Russia's government and causes serious concerns to political leaders. Nevertheless, from the balance of power point of view, it is very essential for Russia that it withstand the strongest one and ensure no outsider can dominate the political and economic system of Russia. In this account, such states used to create a new equilibrium or balance of power for the regional and international political relations. The new equilibrium or balance of power in Russian politics is the neo-Eurasianist regional and trans-regional settlement instead of installing neoliberal norms and US-led unipolar globalization. Related to Russia's new balance of power act, Dimitry Trenin's argues about “*Sino-Russian and greater Asian cooperation*” (Trenin, 2015) as shown below:

1. Russia's confrontation with the United States will help mitigate Sino-Russian rivalries, mostly to China's advantage. However, this does not mean Russia will be dominated by China. Moscow is likely to find a way to craft a special relationship with its partner.
2. Through its enhanced relations with non-Western countries, Russia will actively promote a concept of world order that seeks to reduce U.S. global dominance and replace it with a broader great-power consensus.

3. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), due to include India and Pakistan this year (2015), is on its way to becoming the principal development and security forum for continental Asia.

Russia or Russian political leaders are providing Eurasianism to change their undisclosed geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic, political and economic sphere to a disclosed and cooperative sphere. The Eurasianist thinking way provides and supports common and long-term Eurasian connectivity, sustainability and reliability. One of the central debates about Russia is the term of its claiming to be a great power among other Eurasian powers. Most scholars and historians also accept Russia as a historical great power or even as a super power during the Soviet era. According to Paul T. Christensen *“Russia’s claim to great-power status, whether before, during and after the Soviet period, was based primarily on its military might geopolitical centrality in Eurasia rather than on its overall level of development in economic, technology, or social terms”* (Christensen, 2013, pp. 169-189). In comparison to the core of the international system, Russia has always been a *“semiperipheral state”*. Russia belongs to the core and peripheral areas of the world. The semiperipheral status refers to the countries or areas partly acting as a peripheral zone for core countries and partly as a core country for some peripheral areas. (Christensen, 2013, pp. 169-189)

2.4.2 The Complexity of Regional Structuralization

The Russian political mentality is manifested in automatically countering unipolar globalization and multilateralism. Reality demonstrates that Russian political leadership’s view towards multilateralism and rules-based order is complicated and sceptic. In this regard, Russia’s significant consideration is about who is actually writing the rules. (Chernenko, Alexander Gabaev and ELENA, 2019)

Various political scientists and international relations experts believe that no world order has been fully implemented and no world order exists. Compared to 20th century multi-lateral and bilateral world order, we are in a transition period to another or new paradigm. The new world order is yet to be defined because its global or regional tendency is still unsolved.

In this complexity of order, Russia is on the path to build the Eurasian security, political and economic system with other Eurasian powers. Russia is still trying to find a position in between of every direction to be an active part of the world while keeping

sovereignty and independence. Russian applies neo-Eurasianism in its bilateral, regional and international relations as a rule of recognition. In practice, the neo-Eurasianism concept has two directions in Russian politics. A Russo-centric nationalist direction represented by Alexander Dugin (2017) and other Russian nationalists and a regional integrationist direction represented by Russian security and foreign policy experts and state leaders like Vladimir Putin, Dimitri Medvedev, and Sergei Lavrov etc.

In other words, Russo-centric and regional integrationist points of view or directions depends on different generations of political leaders. There are old generations of leaders who learned from Soviet Union defeats and collapse and act carefully. On the other hand, there is a new generation of political leaders who grew in modern Russia and act offensively. In this regard, Eugene Rumer points, *“The key question for the Kremlin is whether to push for greater capabilities and take additional risks in pursuit of more ambitious set of global aspirations, or to continue to follow the Primakov doctrine and the careful practice of calculating the risks and benefits of a given course. New generations of Russian leaders less mindful of the Soviet experience of overextension than the current generation of leaders may be more influenced by the successes of Crimea and Syria, more inclined to take risks, and more ambitious in their vision for Russia. How they address these ambitions and exercises Russian hard power will have major consequences for the future of Russia, Eurasia and the World”* (Rumer, 2019).

To put it in another way, neo-Eurasianism is a concept of regional and social integration and regional order for Russian leaders. According to theoretical definition, *“Regional integration is the process of establishing a degree of supranational authority beyond the nation-state within a particular geographical region – that is, where the governments of nation-states decide to hand over some decision-making capacity to a new, higher level of governance”* (Diez, T., Bode, I., & Da Costa, A. F., 2011, pp. 187-191). Social integration means the formation of a new identity beyond national boundaries by intensifying positive interactions between citizens of different countries. The successful social integration can be a guarantee and possible condition for a successful political, economic, military and technology integration. (Diez, T., Bode, I., & Da Costa, A. F., 2011, pp. 187-191)

All types of the Eurasianisms are important principles of regional structuralization of entire Eurasian continent. Nevertheless, in this part, the focus is on so-called Russian Eurasianism and its transformation dynamics and possibilities into Eurasian comprehensive cooperation. The concept of Russian Eurasianism is close to the Central

Asian Eurasianism enjoying a common historical landscape and identical background.³ It also contains similar figures with Turkish Eurasianism. The similarities in their view led them to cooperate more closely in regional security, politics, economic, energy, geopolitics, and military technology.

The regional integrationist Eurasian direction of Russia is welcomed by China, India, Turkey and Iran for taking their historical relations, involvement, experiences, interests, future views, contemporary practical strategies, policy options, and their economic relations and geo-economic interests into consideration. Russia seeks to work together with other regional powers in all aspects to projectile Eurasian security, political and economic initiatives.

In case of Eurasian cooperation, Russian foreign policy strategy has the possibility to play a central role in making all other powers align with each other. The practical transformation process of Eurasian unity started after relations between the US-Russia, US-China, US-Turkey, US-India and US-Iran have deteriorated over ongoing conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, South China Sea conflict, S-400 deals and other types of military and strategic partnership. The rise of Russian Eurasianist foreign policy direction and its role in regional security, political and economic initiatives is considered as an alarming threat by American and Western point of view.

Currently, Russia is a post-imperial and post-Soviet great and strategic power in Eurasia. Russia's involvement in Eurasian integration process is depend on its internal politics and its relations with other Eurasian and non-Eurasian powers.

The intensity of cooperation among Eurasian powers like Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran in security, political, economic and technological areas can be considered as a degree of integration. Their policy cooperation, coordination, harmonization, and integration can help regional and international securitization, too. The alignment of the Eurasian great, middle and small powers can intensify transforming regional and inter-regional initiatives like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CSI), SCO, BRICS Cooperation, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The institutional frameworks can put the heartland theory of Mackinder to an end. Regarding Sino-Russian and greater Asian cooperation, Dimitry Trenin argued, "*The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, due to include India*

³ It refers to Post- Soviet countries where the Russian language is the lingua franca between populations of each country.

and Pakistan this year (2015), is on its way to becoming the principal development and security forum for continental Asia” (Trenin, 2015).

Eurasianism in Russia is a term that exists as a high-level interest among post-Soviet countries’ leaders. According to Mark Bassin, Eurasianism is an “*ideological arsenal of post-Soviet politics*”. (Bassin, M, 2008) From this point of view, there is a comprehensive security, political, economic, technology and social cooperation between countries in Eurasian territory, mainly between Russia, Central Asian and Caucasian countries, Belarus, China, India, and Turkey. The security, political, economic, social structures and mentalities in post-Soviet countries are almost similar or close to one another. However, from Russian Eurasianist point of view, common Eurasian multidimensional development process is an overall political and strategic interest. From this point of view, China, India and recently Turkey and Iran are great and strategic partners with their complimentary potentials for Russia.

The central debate in Eurasian security, political, and economic initiative is the reconnection of the Eurasian supercontinent.

The rise of Russia, China, India as great powers and the emergence of middle powers like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and others in the Eurasian region and the trans-border, trans-regional security, political, economic, and technology cooperation has laid a better ground for common regional development process. Russia plays a central role in policy cooperation and policy coordination processes among Eurasian great, middle and small powers.

On the other hand, the U.S. and the European Union is also significantly involved to the development process of Eurasian initiatives. According to Andrew C. Kuchins, “*the baseline for U.S. policy was established in 1992, the prevention of a peer competitor emerging in Eurasia*” (Kuchins, 2018). The most important and long-term aim of U.S. is promoting Russia’s transition to become a neoliberal market democracy. To the end of avoiding the return of a revanchist Russia, the U.S. simultaneously promoted the expansion of NATO and the European Union close to Russia’s borders. At the same time, the U.S. strategy focused on promoting the same market democracy and sovereignty to the Russia’s neighboring states. By this shift, the U.S. wanted to become the only dominant power in terms of promoting democracy, economic openness, and sovereignty in the region. (Kuchins, 2018)

Mark Bassin argues there is an ideological landscape of Eurasianism, which roots back to the 1920s, and 1930s of Soviet era. He refers to Aleksander Dugin who divided

the concept into classical Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism. According to him, “*the political-intellectual legacy of classical Eurasianism is a fundamental element of the overall message*” (Bassin, M, 2008). The organization of political movement and formation of a Eurasian party are the most required steps towards reunification of Eurasia as a security, political and economic initiative and entity. In Russian nationalist perspective, Eurasia is a single cohesive civilizational entity that comes from a common history of the Soviet Union and belongs to the diverse people who occupy the broad space of the Eurasian landmass. Russian nationalists argue that both classical and neo-Eurasianism define Russian-Eurasia or Russo-centric view of the nineteenth century. The Eurasian civilization is a result of historical coexistence and interactions that shaped by social, political, and cultural forces coming from Europe and Asia in an equal measure. Indeed, for Russia’s current state leaders Eurasia is a specific civilization zone with demarcated geographical regions. The collective and common characteristics are the most important values. These characteristics marked them as Eurasians or set them logically in contrast with other people and civilizations outside the zone. Mark Bassin uses Dugin’s ideas that the legacy of Russian empire and the *gosudarstvennost’* is in the center of Eurasia; the political and ideological principles are directly in the focus point for Eurasianists. The principle is the opposition to grant global project of the United States after the Cold War. The global domination for the U.S was to build the unipolar new world order. Today’s challenge is to keep it alive and avoid other regions developing different security, political, economic systems. (Bassin, M, 2008)

The meaning of Eurasian opposition from Russian nationalist’s point of view is the re-emerging of Soviet Union’s foreign policy toward the west with a new cap of non-interventionist strategic shape. The basic principle of this new strategic idea is including those regions and nations who are struggling against American atlanticism and hegemony. The central message of this principle is supporting countries to have their own and different political system instead of adapting western values. This is Eurasianism for Russia and its allies but with different meanings.

According to G. John Ikenberry, “*the irregular and episodic pattern of international order formation is itself an important observation about the nature of change*” (Ikenberry, 2019). At the same time, in his book “*After Victory*” he also refers to the fact that still a complete version of balancing power to guarantee a real sustainability for international order is missing. He refers to the neorealism and liberal world order theories but shows the weakness and lacking factors of them too. The central

debate in his book is “*How to create and maintain order in a world of sovereign states*” (Ikenberry, 2019).

In Eurasia, the national welfare and geopolitical unity is a strategic shape for Russia that refers to a single Eurasian identity. Mark Bassin refers to Nikolai Trubetskoi who divided Russia-Eurasia into two parts. One is the “upper level” and other is the “lower level. According to him, the identity affinity is the issue that separates these two levels. The upper level of Russia-Eurasia relies on shared historical experience, interethnic complementarities, and mutually acknowledged geopolitical benefits while the lower level relies on group identities and ethno-national affinities. The most important issue is the equally legitimating of the personal identification and social belongings of the different levels of people that have to be under support by the framework of the envisioned Eurasian state. (Bassin, M, 2008)

2.4.3 The Structure of the World Order in Russian Eurasianism

Natural-geographical unity of classical Russian-Eurasia: on the one hand, this meant that it differed in a variety of fundamental ways from all other regions of the globe, particularly from Europe to Asia. On the other hand, the organic coherence of Russian-Eurasian space means that it represents a closed geographical universe, completely self-contained with all the physical and spiritual resources necessary to maintain a wholly autonomous and self-sufficient existence. All these ideas, which are coming from the classical Eurasianism, form a radical isolationist doctrine known as a significant political principle in the process. To achieve these goals Russian nationalists have developed some core ideas for reemerging of it. The most important project is the integrating of the far-flung territories of Eurasia into consolidated national market for which the imperial political leaders of each country will be motivated. According to Mark Bassin and Dugin, modern Russia’s path is not to rebuild the classical Eurasia. Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism advocates a very different vision of Russia’s position to the world. Russia’s international position is beginning with a genuinely global perspective, which has Eurasian new world order in its center. This is a complex model for the reorganization of the entire world. In this imagination model, the world is divided into four Macro-Regions Dugin calls them as “*geo-economic belts*” or “*zones*”. These would be Euro-Africa, Asia-Pacific, America, and Eurasia. (Bassin, M, 2008)

In a slightly different view presented by Anita Sengupta in her book *“Asiatic Russia”*, the author focuses on Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who raises the importance of the “belt of anticipation”. In Anita Sengupta’s words *“there is a consecutive vertical row of countries of Eurasia from Russia in north to India in south (Central Asian countries, Iran, Pakistan) that does not yet link either with the east or with the west. Despite all the differences among these countries they constitute a relatively solid group from the point of view of potential resources and possibilities of influencing not only the balance of power in Asia or Eurasia but even the geopolitical balance of the world”* (Sengupta, 2009, p. 24).

The most important term is since Russia is not a full member or ally of the European or the East Asian Sphere, it may choose a third option to build a new security system uniting the countries of *“belt of anticipation”*. (Sengupta, 2009, p. 24) However, according to Mackinder’s comment, *“Every country had has its own geographical perspective”*. (Mackinder J. Halford , 1904) The emerging of a “zone of anticipating” could improve the trans-Eurasian meaning of the heartland uniting Russia, India, Central Asia, and Iran in one line.

In a general context, Eurasia is the Earth’s largest continent covering and connecting Europe and Asia. It borders the Arctic, Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Oceans, as well as their seas. In terms of population, Eurasia is the most populated continent in the Earth. Hosting world’s most populated countries (like China, India, Russia, and other CIS and South Asian and Asia Pacific nations). Its population is over 3 billion. Russian as the central power of Eurasia has borders with seas of three oceans. Russia is washed by the Baltic, Arctic (Barents, White, Karsk, Laptevs, East-Siberian, Chukotsk) and Pacific (Bering, Okhotsk, Japan) seas. Russia is also a significant power in the Black Sea, Azov Sea, and Caspian Sea. Considering Eurasia’s geographical importance, human potential, natural resources, production and industrialization potentials, and their relations and positions in the world economy, we can state Russia and Eurasia are located at the crossroads of the world economy, politics and security. (Egor S. Stroeve, 1999, pp. 5-37) According to Robert D. Kaplan, *“Eurasia become a comprehensible unite, because of interactions of globalization, technology and geopolitics”* (Kaplan, 2019).

According to our findings, the association of the four geo-economic belts (Euro-Africa, Asia-Pacific, America, and Eurasia) may happen as a result of the establishment of international principles of equality and mutual recognition. In this theory, what remains

unchanged from its classical form to neo-one is the eliminating, destroying or at least derailment of American global hegemony or American Atlanticism. Such targets would could only be met through an alliance of three macro-regions against the North America superpower. For this step as Dugin points out, the first direction is the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, the second direction of Russian Eurasianism is Central Asia, with the creation of a Tehran-Moscow axis and the third one would be the Tokyo-Moscow axis. (Bassin, M, 2008)

The CSI, the EAEU, the CSTO, the SCO, the BRICS and other bilateral and multilateral cooperation platforms are parts of influence transition strategies for the Russia and other Eurasian powers. These strategies are built on the alignment of first and foremost the Russian, Chinese, Indian, Iranian and Turkish side aimed at keeping their influence across the whole of Eurasia and balance with none-Eurasian powers by providing a source of help, cooperation, coordination, and common security, political and economic infrastructure. According to realist explanations, the alignment theory is a *“systemic explanations identify a state’s relative position in the structure of the international system as the primary determinant of alignment outcomes”* (Miller, 2006, p. 12); at this stage, the power balancing theory is the main interest of states wishing to move and shape their strategic orders. Balancing power for a state or states means moving against the strongest power and potential hegemony to ensure no state will dominate the system. In this account, the states create a new equilibrium or balance for the international political order. (Miller, 2006, p. 12)

According to our findings, the regional and even international strategic shifts against American Atlanticism or American globalization can be summarized as follows:

- De-dollarization process in international trade, monetary and finance system.
- Supporting Anti-American or even non-democratic states and non-state political and military groups all over the globe.
- Turning countries and regions where the US has some strategic interests and its soldiers have boots on the ground into conflict zones. Notable examples include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
- Practicing international power and influence transaction policies by providing economic, investment, technology, infrastructure, military, security and even intelligence facilities to certain government and political or military groups.

- Practicing policy cooperation, coordination, harmonization and integration based on mutual equality and recognizing each other's interests within CIS, SCO, BRICS, EAEU, CSTO, and other bilateral forms.

To achieve the above-mentioned goals, Russia builds its foreign policy strategy in three different aspects: *“Bilateralism, Globalization and Regionalism”* (Molchanov, 2015, pp. 72-79).

The three-level foreign policy strategy helps Russia seek a game-changer position by conducting multi-vector diplomacy with its partners bilaterally, globally and regionally. The three-level foreign policy strategy laid the ground for Russia to act as a strong partner for small and weak states through bilateral ties, as a regional great power in regional institutions, organizations and as a global great and strong actor in international conflicts and initiatives. This enabled Russia to rise again and exert political influence upon other great powers in the region and the world by reshaping Eurasianism, transforming it into neo-Eurasianism and gathering the countries around itself. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the disappearance of the classical form of the Eurasianism. The collapse of the Soviet Union followed by the breakdown of its political structure, geopolitical breakup of its territory, declaration of new sovereign states with many type of fragmentation in the region and posed security, economic, social and political disputes and conflicts among post-Soviet states mainly for Russia. Nevertheless, the one factor that has helped Russia to gather itself and reemerge as a great power in the region was the geo-philosophical concept of the neo-Eurasianism. For Russia, this was and still is the only way to rebuild the legacy of classical Eurasianism in order to be in the center of Europe and Asia or West and East. This is what lay the ground for Russia to rise again and create its political influence among other great powers in the region and world by reshaping Eurasianism to neo-Eurasianism and gathering the countries around itself.

Related to Russia's foreign policy strategy and economic relations with the East and West, the press secretary for the president of Russia, Dmitry Peskov during an interview with the RT Chanel points as following:

“China is not our partner of number one yet. Still the EU and EU countries are trade partners number one for us and I cannot agree with those who say that Russia is turning eastward. No, I hope Russia will never turn eastwards. The Russian Eagle looks to both side – westward and eastward, that is the nature of every dimension of policy of Russia let it be a political and diplomatic activities or economic ones” (Peskov, 2019).

This process began with the collapse of the Soviet Union by the establishment of the CIS, which known as the base of the EAEU. The Union was created based on new orders and norms, which pass the meaning of neo-Eurasianism. The EAEU seeks a multipolar world order in which the Eurasian great powers act as significantly important players in the framework of global partnership as well. This is one of the most exciting segments of today's world politics. The Eurasian great, middle and small powers are trying to grow as large and effective economic, political and security body in the region, drawing on political economic theories and regionalism. Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation is the manifestation/embodiment of bilateralism, regionalism and globalization in Russian foreign policy strategy. Russia applies this strategy in order to change unilateralism to global partnership.

To conclude, the neo-Eurasianism as a regional integration and cooperation idea with its Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation views is a recognition-based principle within a functionalist international relations framework. The main aim and focus point of it is to keep and defend Eurasian security, political and cultural values, and alter and balance the western-type democracy or liberalism. In other words, the whole concept of neo-Eurasianism is to keep differences and avoid civilizational clashes during cooperation and integration. Since globalization caused clash of civilizations, the Eurasian concept seeks global partnership as a new world order. As we pointed out above, the Western liberal values are not acceptable for Russia. Alexander Dugin describes Eurasianism as formulation of fourth political theory. He believes it is a “*matter of life*” and dissolving into the liberal world order means death for Russia. In this regards, he writes, “*If Russia Choose “to be”, then it automatically signifies the creation of the Fourth Political Theory. Otherwise, for Russia there remains only the choice “not to be”, then quietly to leave the historical and world stage, and dissolve into the global world that neither created nor governed by us*” (Dugin, 2017, p. 8).

2.5 The Strategic view of Turkey on Eurasia

In Turkey, the ideology of Eurasianism roots back in late 1990s, linked to nationalist political parties like the so called Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi). The most prominent political figure representing the idea in Turkey is Dogu Perincek, the leader of the Patriotic Party. In modern day Turkey, the Eurasian oriented foreign policy strategy is one of the critical areas because it is based on an anti-Western approach and an

ultranationalist sentiment in domestic politics. The fundamental meanings of Turkish Eurasianism for Turkey are leaving NATO, ending the bid for European Union membership, shifting to the East by joining the Russia-China-led anti-imperialist camp.

According to Emre Erşen, the idea of Eurasianism entered the Turkish political era and became especially popular and attractive among the Turkish national-patriots with the translation of Alexander Dugin's seminal book "*Foundation of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia*" to Turkish in 2003. Ever since, the number of publications and articles that focus on introduction and implementation of Eurasianism in Turkish domestic politics and regional and international relations has dramatically increased. Additionally, Alexander Dugin has been invited on several occasions to participate in debates, lectures, and conferences in Turkey where high-level Turkish officials and military leaders were also present. (Erşen, 2017, p. 266)

Turkey, in the post-Cold War period era had achieved the possibility to redefine its Foreign policy strategy and act in between of Europe and Eurasia. The collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the structure and interests of global security and power politics. For Turkey, it was the main stream to rethink its regional and global policy. In the post-Cold War period, Turkey moved from Cold War interests to regional security and global cooperation by partnering with non-Western powers like Russia, China and Iran and choosing an activist foreign policy towards Eurasia mainly in the Middle East and Central Asia. (Özdemir, 2010) The considerable element regarding redefinition of Turkey's foreign policy strategy is the return of Russia with a cooperative regional Eurasianist Foreign policy strategy that lay the ground for Turkish leaders to act and decide without considering the interest of its NATO allies.

Selcuk Colakoglu refers to Erol Manisalı, one of the prominent Eurasianists who states, "*Turkey is acting in accordance with the United States, Israel, and the EU. However, Turkey has common strategic interests with Russia, China and Iran. Turkey's improving relations with prominent Asian powers such as Russia, China, and Iran are, all things being equal, a natural outcome of the local dynamics of the region*". In addition, according to Dogu Perincek in the Selcuk Colakoglu's article, "*The Turkish nationalists would befriend China and Russia in order to get rid of the United States. Turkey will inevitably be at the forefront of the emerging 'Eurasian civilization'. Ankara is a servant in Atlantic, but an equal partner in Eurasia*" (Colakoğlu, 2019).

The most important consideration of the Turkish Eurasianism is to develop its defense and military technology cooperation with Russia and China. Due to its limited

capacity, the Eurasianist movement could not affect Turkey's foreign and security policy until 2014 because the liberal Turkish governments wanted to minimize Eurasianist influences in Turkish politics. The year 2014 was a turning point for Eurasianists in Turkey. Due to some challenges in domestic affairs, the AKP was forced to build a de-facto coalition on Eurasianist and Islamist ideologies. The first sign of the new Eurasianist shift appeared in 2013, when Prime Minister Erdogan discussed with Russia's president the possibility of Turkey's withdrawing EU candidacy and becoming a full member in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Since then, the Eurasian oriented domestic, foreign and security policies have drastically increased in Turkey. According to Selcuk Colakoglu's conclusion, in a realistic view Turkey's Eurasianist shift is still a rhetorical approach and lacks a well-structured and sustainable strategy. It is a policy option – not a practical policy priority. Turkey is a member of NATO. Its military and economy are structurally dependent on the West and deeply integrated into Western institutions. (Colakoglu, 2019)

According to William Armstrong, *“Eurasianism broadly encompassing the idea that Turkey should reorient away from the West in favor of an Eastern and Central Asian hinterland”* (Armstrong, 2016). In this regard, Alexander Murinson describes the strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy from a traditional and historical experience point of view as shown below:

“The main sources of the traditional foreign policy of the Turkish Republic are the historical experience of the Ottoman empire (the tradition of the balance of power); the nationalist kemalist revolution and creation of the republic itself (hence, isolationism); Western orientation experienced in the policy of Europeanization and modernization; the suspicion of foreign powers and interests (the Sévres Syndrome). There were two other ideological sources of this traditional foreign doctrine, which surfaced in the pre-First World War years: pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism. Pan-Turkism was a movement to unify the eastern (Central Asia and Caucasus) and the western (Anatolian) Turks. Following Russian expansionism in the Balkans under the banner of pan-Slavism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, pan-Turanism arose as a romantic idea to unify Turkic, Mongol and Finish-Ugorian peoples. It later served for a short time as a basis for the Turkish-Hungarian collaboration during the first two decade of the twentieth century to stem the Russian threat” (Murinson, 2006).

In his book ‘Strategic Depth’, Ahmed Davudoglu focuses on Turkey's international position. According to him, Turkey's geopolitical position highly

undermines its political, economic and security position. Turkey has to rethink and redefine its foreign policy strategy's fundamental parameters for the next one hundred years, accordingly. For its long-term foreign policy strategy based on re-settlement of geopolitical and geo-strategic positions towards other great powers and power centers, the build-up of the “*hinterland*” through an increased cultural, economic, and political relations is one of the most outstanding factors. The redefinition of Turkey's foreign policy strategy improves Turkey's position in opening towards the international environment and sphere in the current world order. The country has to gain on three geopolitically important areas:

1. The surrounding land area: the Balkans, the Middle East, and Caucasus
2. The surrounding sea area: Black Sea, Adriatic Sea, the Eastern Basin of the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea.
3. The surrounding continental area: Europe, North Africa, South Asia, Central Asia and Eastern Asia. (Davutoğlu, 2016, pp. 57-118)

In Turkey's Foreign policy strategy, the hinterland means its zone of influence. The increasing regional influence over its hinterland helps Turkey develop its international influence over the global situation. The unilateral move or interventions of Turkish Military into Syria, Libya and Iraq are the move towards establishing the hinterland and raising Turkey's influence as a regional power. In relation to rising influence of Turkey, George Friedman writes, “*Historically, when a major Islamic empire has emerged, it has been dominated by the Turks. The Ottomans collapsed at the end of World War I, leaving modern Turkey in its wake. But Turkey is a stable platform in the midst of chaos. The Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Arab world to the south are all unstable. As Turkey's power grows—and its economy and military are already the most powerful in the region—so will Turkish influence*” (Friedman, 2010, p. 7).

Turkey is seeking a new political view and foreign and security policy shift, which can guarantee a regional great power status and help its opening to the world strategy. The practical meaning of Turkey's redefined foreign policy strategy is ending with its Cold War era's commitment and shaping balance of power with all other great political, economic and military powers in the region and in the world. In our view, Turkey's new strategic shift is a shift towards a global partnership in which every country seeks its own way without being committed to or under influence of other powers. As far as its power status is concerned, Turkey is a middle regional power and has to work and coordinate with one of the great or large powers when comes to regional shifts. It can play a

significant role in creating regional stability in Eurasia mainly in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. Turkey's geopolitical location makes it one of the geo-strategic players, pivots and partners towards East and West at the same time. Nonetheless, Turkey's economic relations will remain interdependent from the West and this can lead to some difficulties in its shifts against NATO and Western powers.

Turkey's economic relations are deeply dependent on the West, mainly on the European Union. Due to its big and balanced trade outcome, the European Union is the most important trade partner of Turkey. However, its trade relations with Russia, China, Iran, and India are yet to be balanced. The large part of Turkey's trade deficit is coming from its Eurasian partners. According to Turkey's top export partners, Russian Federation is partner 12th, China is partner 16th, Iran is 19th and India is partner 37th. At the same time, these countries are between its top 10 import partners according to the International Trade Center and European Commission trade statistics as show in the next chapter.

To conclude, Turkey needs to cooperate and coordinate some parts of its foreign and security policies and military technology with other Eurasian great and middle powers by refreshing and reshaping its regional and international partnerships and alliances. At the same time, Turkey can play a balancing and connecting role between the West and the East by retaining a good rapport with its Western partners and alliances. Additionally, in the new shape of its foreign policy strategy, Turkey's geopolitical value can increase considerably in both the East and the West.

2.6 China's standpoint on Eurasia

China is one of the oldest, historical, great economic, military and political powers in Eurasia. China plays a fundamental and crucial role in Eurasian comprehensive security, political, economic, military, and technology cooperation among other Eurasian great, middle and small powers like Russia, India, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Central Asian nations, Central and Eastern European states and Middle Eastern nations. In trans-Eurasian cooperation initiatives, China represents a dynamic economic and industrial model, modern and smart technology and regional and trans-regional connectivity model. We can even state that without China no Eurasian Initiative can be developed and become reliable. The Chinese role in our Eurasian comprehensive cooperation model is crucial and inevitable. As far as the regional and trans-regional or Eurasian initiatives are concerned, China's role and cooperation in Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russian

Economic forums, Eurasian Economic Union and Eurasian Free-trade area, Commonwealth of Independent States and other security and economic projects is outstanding. Regarding to China's role in Eurasia, we should take Shanghai cooperation Organization into significant consideration. The China-led SCO is an effort to consolidate a security and political coalition across Eurasian continent. The SCO is one of those major regional initiatives in which the US is not a member. (Rober E. Bedeski and Nikolas Swanström, 2012, pp. 179-181)

Discussing China's important role as a great economic, political and geopolitical power in Eurasia towards United States, Emil Avdaliani writes, *"Today, China, with its powerful economic incentive, represents a much bigger threat to the US-led Eurasian order. China, Iran, and Russia are the pivotal countries in the Eurasian landmass and Washington has largely tense relations with all of them, which limits American power to prevent an alliance of convenience among anti-American countries"* (Avdaliani, 2018).

China wants to build a bridge of friendship and cooperation across the Eurasian continent and seeks a comprehensive strategic partnership with the European Union by building four bridges for the peace, growth, reform and progress of civilization. China needs these bridges and partnerships to promote peace, multilateralism and dialogue, communication and coordination on global issues, at the expense of war, unilateralism and confrontation. China wants to build the abovementioned bridges in order to link markets, growth, prosperity, reforms, progresses, cultural prosperities, and civilizations of China and Europe. (Jinping, 2014, pp. 173-175) The other part of China's shift towards Eurasia is constituted by its relations with Russia. It seems that Russia and China understand the potential of their cooperation and its safe limits. Moscow and Beijing shaped a new model of partnership and close friendship based on equality so-called *"major country relationship"*. It provides ease and flexibility for relations while both counties are different in many measurements of power. The dynamics of their economic, geopolitical and geo-economic relations are positive with an increasing tendency. Russia committed itself to harmonize China's Belt and Road Initiative with Eurasian Economic Union integration project under the vision of Grand Eurasian Partnership. China seeks to cooperate with Russia in the field of energy, agricultural trade, military and defense industry cooperation and transit of Chinese goods to Europe as well. (Trenin, 2019)

China is one of the historical powers in Eurasia and throughout history, it has tried to unify the large parts of the Eurasian landmass and take it under its political and hegemonic control like the Achaemenid Empire in Antiquity, the Mongols and Tamerlane

in the middle ages, and others. In a deep consideration, the success of the empires in Eurasia has always been rooted in their military power and equipment, but due to lack of providing a reliable and sustainable economic and cultural development to other Eurasian nations, they faced their decline and disintegration one by one.

According to Glen Hubbard and Tim Kane, in their book *Balance, the Decline of the Ming Dynasty in China* occurred because of the following factors:

- Economic imbalance like severe contraction in foreign trade
- Political roots like centralized governance, autocratic policy-making system, and factionalized bureaucracy
- Behavioral dysfunctions like loss aversion by zero-sum thinking bureaucrats; identity heuristics hostile to merchants, profit, and foreign ideas; ignorance about importance of trade for growth.

Writing about Chinese economic, political and governmental system, Hubbard and Kane conclude, *“China’s economy today has shrugged off many of the habits and institutions of its imperial past, many of which were discarded by Mao Zedong and the much wiser Deng Xiaoping. The modern one-party state cherishes stability, perhaps to a fault, but with great effect. There is administrative balance in Beijing, absent in the fifteenth century, which diminishes the vulnerability to abrupt and doctrinaire policy swings. And yet the Chinese economy remains centrally organized rather than federally, a future that makes institutional progress less likely”* (Hubbard, Glenn, and Tim Kane, 2014, pp. 108-125).

As far as China’s centrally organized economy is concerned, we should know that the leaders of Chinese Communist Party would not change China’s political and economic system to a federal or liberal one. For China, the reform and opening up process is a long-term and arduous cause on what the people should work generation after generation. The main idea of the reform and opening up is to improve the socialist market economy of China. In this reform and opening up process, the relations with the outside world would be under-managed by state policy. The Chinese Communist Party believes that reform and opening up is always ongoing and will never end, stop and finish. According to Xi Jinping, the past, the present and the future are all interconnected and the history is about the past, and the present is the history of the future. In this regard, Xi Jinping says, *“Reform and opening up is an in-depth revolution, and we must follow the correct direction and stay on the correct path. Our direction is to continuously promote*

the self-improvement and development of the socialist system, and stride forward with resolve on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Jinping, 2014, pp. 73-75)

In Eurasia, China is a model of technological development, economic growth and regional and trans-regional connectivity. In one word, China plays a crucial role in our Eurasian comprehensive cooperation model.

2.7 India from Indo-Pacific to Eurasia

India seeks positive neutrality and balance of power in its foreign policy strategy. In this account, the question about its balancing among US, EU, Russia and China is clear. India balances its foreign relations with its strategic partners in two different directions: Indo-Pacific and Eurasian. For India, Indo-Pacific is a maritime concept while Eurasia means a continental strategic shift. The practical Eurasian direction in India's foreign policy started with its strategic partnership with Russia in 20th century and recently has developed with its accession in the SCO. Since then, India is one of the great powers of the “Great Eurasian” concept alongside Russia and China. Furthermore, India can limit the possibilities of conflict with China through greater regional cooperation and can find a common ground with the other members on countering terrorism and religious extremism, as well pacify conflict zones in Afghanistan and Pakistan and connecting with Central Asia. (Mohan, 2018)

India's shift to Eurasia is not only limited within SCO because India has a developed and multi-dimensional strategic partnership with Russia as well. Indian prime minister was the chief guest in fifth Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) of Russia in the Eastern city of Vladivostok where President Putin and Prime Minister Modi attended the 20th India-Russia annual summit and announced a slew of bilateral deals that we will discuss widely later. The most important term in their meeting in EEF was that India and Russia agreed to intensify consultations on complementarities between their respective Indo-Pacific and Eurasian integration initiatives. (Rajiv, 2019)

To conclude, in our Eurasian comprehensive cooperation model, the existence of India in the SCO is a crucial factor. At the same time, India's bilateral strategic partnership with Russia means its key role in other regional security, political and economic initiatives in the region is positive sign of sustainable Eurasian comprehensive.

2.8 Summary

Today, the great powers of the world confront each other; some of them, typically Western powers are in an era of power survival, while the Eurasian powers, such as Russia, China, India, Turkey and Iran are in the era of power transition. Eurasian powers are shifting towards a new form of cooperation with the West. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union the large powers of Eurasia have successfully resisted for their political and economic systems. These countries have chosen to enhance their regional cooperation in security, political, economic and technology fields to defend their interests. Eurasia is a powerful region that can develop its own path and find regional solution to address regional conflicts. Within a global partnership model, powerful regions, comprehensive regional cooperation and regional institutional building process are the most significant. Regional cooperation increases the geopolitical and geo-economic values of the region and helps promote inter-regional ties and interactions. Regional powerfulness is the appropriate phenomenon that secures and stabilizes the world order. History has proved all multipolar, bipolar and unipolar world orders to be failed models as they lacked the means for successfully handling challenges and threats. The Russian Eurasianist regional-international view that contains global partnership could work as an enhanced version or supplementary instrument of globalization developed in post-Soviet Eurasia through mutual understanding and recognizing one another's interests, influence and demands.


3 ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EURASIAN POWERS

3.1 Russia, India, China, Turkey and the EU

3.1.1 An Overview on Intra-RIC+T Investment and Trade Relations

According to intra-Russia, India and China trade statistics based on their top 10 export-import partners, we can realize that these three countries are not large trade partners to each other. Each of them still makes their significant trade surplus via trade with non-Eurasian or non-BRICS countries or organizations. The Eurasian economies are highly dependent on The North-American and European export markets. Being dependent to external markets means the regional financial stability is in danger mainly in the countries that struggle with balance of payment and budget deficit. Geoeconomically, Russia, India and China are as far from each other as geopolitically they show closeness. Most of their economic relations and projects are planned to be conducted in the future. There is a huge trade deficit and domestic currency outflow from India towards China. The Russian-Chinese trade is not a huge one but it is very dynamic and balanced. Russia-India trade is not a big amount. In this part, we are going to show their economic, trade, and geopolitical relations according to numbers and practical examples in the below charts. The charts below show trade and economic relations of Eurasian large powers. In these charts, we see how and what amount each country trades bilaterally, within the bloc and which countries are the top 10 export and important partner of them. Based on these charts and statistics we can realize and find the real economic dependency and interdependency of the large powers in Eurasia.


1. Figure: China's top export partners, 2019



Source: (IMF: DOTS), Own Editing

The chart above concentrates on China's top 10 export partners. It clearly demonstrates on which country and on which market Chinese economy depends highly with respect to export. For China the top 10 largest and most export partners are: the United States, Hong Kong (China), Japan, North Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan (China) (located in the Far East and Asia-Pacific region, respectively) Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (located in Europe), and India (located in South Asia).


2. Figure: China's top 10 import partner 2019



Source: (IMF: DOTS) Own Editing

The chart above concentrates on China's top 10 import partners. It clearly demonstrates on which country and on which market Chinese economy depends highly with respect to import. Largest and most important import partners are: North Korea, Taipei (China), Japan, Vietnam in the Far East and Asia-Pacific region, the United States and Brazil in North and Latin America, Australia, Germany and Malaysia.

3. Figure: China trade with the EU 2018



Source: (European Commission), Own Editing

In 2018 bilateral trade between China and the European Union amounted to 605 billion Euros. China's exports to the European Union reached 371 billion Euros and its

imports from the block reached 234 billion. The chart shows that China made 137 billion Euros in surplus via trade with the European Union. According to the European Commission, for the European Union China is the largest source of imports and its second biggest export partner. Their bilateral trade average is more than 1 billion euros a day.

4. Figure: Russia's top 10 export partners 2019



Source: (IMF: DOTS) Own Editing

For the Russian economy, China, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Belarus, South Korea, Italy, Kazakhstan, the United States and the United Kingdom were the top 10 export partners. The chart above clearly demonstrates that not only big economies are important economic partners for Russia since economies such as Belarus and Kazakhstan are also among the top 10. The chart also shows that the Russian export sector is interested in Europe, Eurasia and the Far East.

5. Figure: Russia's top 10 import partners 2019



Source: (IMF: DOTS) Own Editing


The largest import partners for the Russian economy are China and South Korea from the Far East region, Germany, Italy, France and Poland from the European Union, as well as Belarus and Kazakhstan from the Eurasian Economic Union.

6. Figure: Russia-EU trade in goods 2019



Source: (European Commission) Own Editing

7. Figure: Russia-EU trade in services 2018



Source: (European Commission) Own Editing

The European Union plays an important role in the Russian economy, too. The Russian Economy accumulates more than 45 billion Euros surplus via trade with the European Union. Russian export to the European Union is three time higher than its export to China.


8. Figure: India's top 10 export partners 2019



Source: (IMF: DOTS) Own Editing

India's top 10 export partners are somewhat different compared to those of China and Russia. For India the United Arab Emirates follows the United States, China and Hong Kong (China) are the third and fourth biggest export partners for the Indian economy. From the European Union countries like the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany and from South Asia countries like Singapore, Bangladesh, and Nepal are also among the top 10 partners of the Indian economy.

9. Figure: India's top 10 import partners 2019




Source: (IMF: DOTS) Own Editing

According to the chart above, India imports mostly from China, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The republic of South Korea in the Far

East and Indonesia and Singapore in South Asia are also among the top import partners for India.


10. Figure: Turkey's top 10 export partners 2019



Source: (IMF: DOTS) Own Editing

In Turkey's economy, European markets like Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, France and The Netherlands are among the top 10 export partners. In the Middle East Iraq and Israel, in Eurasia only Russia and in America only the United States are on the top 10 list. For the Turkey's export sector this means that the European market or the European Union market plays a really important role.

11. Figure: Turkey's top 10 import partners 2019




Source: (IMF: DOTS) Own Editing

The Russian Federation is the 10th biggest export partner of Turkey but as far as import goes, it is the first biggest one. Germany is the second and China is the third on

the top 10 list. At the same time, countries like Italy, France and UK in Europe, India in South Asia, and South Korea are the most important import partners of Turkey.

12. Figure: Turkey's trade to the EU and World 2018



Source: (European Commission) Own Editing

The chart above shows Turkey's total trade volume with world market and with the European Union as well. Turkey's trade with the European Union is almost balanced, but it struggles by 55 billion dollar deficit in its total trade with the world.

In comparison to the geopolitical standpoints of these Eurasian powers, the geo-economic relations and interests among them show a different landscape. As we mentioned above, each of these countries are economically interested and interdependent in other parts, countries or organizations than doing more business and economic cooperation within Eurasia. Each of the Eurasian large powers earn their trade surplus from the West but as we showed in the charts above, almost all of trade deficit they have is originated in Eurasia. We believe that political and geopolitical relations cannot work sustainably without a dynamic and powerful economic and trade ties. Since Eurasian economies are interested to do more business with Western markets than in Eurasia, their governments' politics could be more influenced by their economic ties than following geopolitical interests without economic benefits.

3.1.2 India-China Trade Relations:

The bilateral trade between India and China is estimated at about \$115⁴ billion in 2019. India's exports to China are, slag or ash, iron and steel, tin raw hides, leather, plastics and cotton. Its major imports from China are telecom instruments, computer

⁴ Including Hong Kong

hardware and peripherals, fertilizers, electronic component, projects goods, chemicals and drug intermediaries. While their trade and economic relations in compare of previous years has increased, but India's trade deficit with china has increase from \$52 billion in 2016 to \$56 billion in 2019. (The Economic Times, 2016) India's deficit has increased twice since Nrenadra Modi is in power. Indian nationalists and protectionist trade experts are looking to ban Chinese goods on the Indian market and people comments on social networks that Chinese goods are destroying India's industrial class and culture.

China is one of the largest import partners for India, but according to their political relation and border disputes, such huge trade deficit or economic inter-connectedness would bring India under the influence of China over the long haul. This is why the trade and economic relations between India and China will not be the best model that could provide a reliable common ground for them and for the member countries to increase Intra-BRICS investment and trade initiatives.

3.1.3 India-Russia Trade and Economic Relations:

At the same time, trade level between Russia and India is very low in comparison to their close relations and strategic partnership. Russia is India's 32th export partner and 23th import partner while India is Russia's 15th export partner and 15th import partner. In 2019, India's total export to Russia was about \$4 billion and its total import from Russia was around \$7 billion. In the whole India-Russia, trade process. Russia had a \$3 billion surplus, which is a very small number in comparison to the size of its economy and those surpluses it makes in trade with the European Union and its other large partners. India's top export goods and products to Russia are pharmaceutical products, machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers and parts thereof, coffee, tea, mate and spices, aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof, organic chemicals, electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof, vehicle other than railway or train way rolling stock, and parts thereof, fish and crustaceans, iron and steel, tobacco. Its top import goods and products from Russia are: natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals and metals clad, mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; fertilizers, iron and steel, paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or paperboard, edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers etc. (International Trade Center-Trade Map, n.d.)

India and Russia will try to increase their level of bilateral trade and investment in the future. During a round table at the economic forum in St. Petersburg in 2011, India's

Commerce and Industry minister Anand Sharma stated India and Russia were planning to boost trade to \$20 billion annually by 2015. At this round table, he announced, “*the countries are stepping up trade relations and have formed six working groups to map out further areas of cooperation*”. (Sharma, 2011) But according to the real numbers we used in above mentioned charts, the bilateral trade between India and Russia is not matching their expectations. The two countries are yet to boost their trade and economic relations if they really want to increase their trade to \$20 billion per year.

To lay a more efficient and simplified trade, India and Russia inked 15 agreements during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow in December 2015 as part of the 16th Annual Bilateral Summit. In this Meeting, Prime Minister Modi said, “*Russia is our most loyal partner, particularly in the fields of defense and security, that’s why I’ve come here to welcome our partner to participate in our country’s economic progress*”. Furtheron, he pointed out that Russia is holding a leading position in many areas such as space, information technologies and heavy industry. India’s prime minister also announced a large-scale development program for the country’s armed forces. The program announced by Modi could be worth \$150 billion in total. According to India’s Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, mutual investment in 2015 averaged around \$11 billion and both sides want to increase it to \$30-50 billion by 2025. He called it a “*very big priority*” for both sides. (Russia Today, 2015)

According to Modi’s 2015 visit to Moscow, the two countries reached agreements to cooperate in various areas. (Russia Today, 2015) Russia-India planned actions include:

- In the framework of the agreement between Rosneft and Esser group, Russia will supply India with 10 million tons of oil in the next decade.
- India and Russia reaffirmed military-technical cooperation as a significant objective in their partnership.
- Russia plans to build at least six new nuclear power units in India in the next 20 years.
- Cooperation in the production of BrahMos short-range supersonic missiles
- India and Russia planned to jointly develop a new type of jet fighter and transport aircraft.
- Russia and India Affirmed their commitment to further collaborate in the field of space exploration, rocket and engine manufacturing.
- Modi and Putin inked documents simplifying the approval of business and tourist visas, while the PM urged Russian businesses to more actively invest in India.

Furthermore, the DST Global Investment Fund controlled by Russian tech billionaire Yuri Milner had conducted successful investments totalling around \$500 million in India's different sectors like social networking sites Facebook and Twitter, real estate platform Housing.com, and food delivery start up Swiggy, Ola, India's largest online taxi service and Flipkart, India's largest e-commerce entity. (Pandey, 2017)

During the 2016 BRICS Summit, Russia announced a \$500 million investment program concerning India's Infrastructure sector. The Russian based 'Infrastructure Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Indian Fund I.e. National Infrastructure Investment Fund (NIIF) are to invest \$500 million each to form a \$1 billion worth joint fund. The fund will support any attractive investment opportunity and growth of Russian business activity in sectors like energy, petrochemicals, and transport infrastructure in India. The fund will provide equity capital to all Russian-Indian projects in the country. The Russians also intend to create a platform of BRICS Bank for building multiple small-scale hydro projects in India by putting the usage of Russian technologies in prime. Recently, Russia's Rosneft invested about \$12 to \$13 billion in India's Essar Oil. The investment can be considered Russia's largest one in India. For now, Essar Oil is under control of Rosneft enjoying a 49 % stake, two per cent stake will remain under the control of Ruia family, the current owner of the company and the other 49 per cent, would be equally divided between other two investors. (Pandey, 2017)

Beside the above mentioned projects and trade initiatives, Russia has also invested in providing high-speed rails and modernizing the Indian Railways, and has also provided its support in constructing solar plants in India.

According to all facts and realities, relations between India and Russia are still to be perfected. The two countries' relations have always been referred to as a strategic partnership but without any specific details. As we saw, the bilateral trade and economic relations between them are on the one hand too scarce and on the other hand, they face decreasing tendencies. It seems that there is a deep strategic partnership referring to their geopolitical interests but only based on policy options without practical outcomes or the whole process is going through India's interconnectedness to Russia rather than bilateral interdependency. In the past 70 years' diplomatic relations, Russia has supported India's growth in numerous sectors. Because of this, India owes a lot to Russia but still we should be aware that such type of relationship based on interconnectedness hasn't been known as stable, sustainable and reliable.

The main retentive factor in the trade relation between India and Russia trade is the lack of direct and indirect trade routes and economic corridors. This is why these countries' relations have always been limited in geo-strategic interest rather than practicing trade and economic connections. In this regard, India has initiated the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) with Russia in order to reduce its interconnectedness to Russia, to provide easy access for Indian goods to Eurasian Markets, and to be potentially active in trans-Eurasian economic cooperation via connectivity. The INSTC has been known as a very significant milestone in India–Russia strategic partnership and relations. The INSTC is about 7,200 kilometers long and connects the Indian Ocean (even South-Asian region) and the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea via Iran from where it connects St Petersburg and Northern Europe by rail, road and sea routes. It also helps India to easily reach Central Asia and Europe. After Chabahar Port⁵ the INSTC is India's greatest trans-Eurasian economic and trade Initiative. The INSTC reduces journey times between Mumbai and Moscow from forty to fourteen days. On the other hand, India is vehemently opposing China's One Belt One Road or Silk Road initiative and the INSTC is India's answer to that.

3.1.4 Russia-China Relations

Judging by objective elements, we can state China is the most important partner of the trans-Eurasian economic cooperation thanks to its geographical place between Russia and India. China is the country which could provide technology update, economic investment, and system supports to all member countries of the group. The whole Eurasia, mainly Russia is deeply dependent on China. According to numerous experts China is the alternative of the European Union for Russia in terms of energy import which is the significant “luck maker good” for Russian economy to export to the international market. In this regard the relation of Russia as the very key-member of the BRICS Group, Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO, Commonwealth of the Independent States CIS, and Eurasian Economic Union with China will be the most highlighted issue in the future of trans-Eurasian economic cooperation. China is the ally number one for Russia in all abovementioned regional and international organizations mainly after the relations

⁵ Chabahar Port is in southeastern on the Gulf of Oman and connects India with Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan, known as an alternate route for India instead of using Pakistan as transit area to reach Afghanistan.

between the West and Russia deteriorated over Syria and Ukraine conflict. China is also a Eurasian country according to its geographical location. The whole idea of Eurasia in Russia is to be between or in the center of the eastern and western parts of the world, which could raise Russia's influence all over the region, and world in all economic, politics and security debates. China and Russia have relations in numerous stages like China – Russia bilateral strategic security, military, and economic relations, China – Russia relation in the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, China – Russia in BRICS cooperation. The two countries' interests meet also in the Middle East, mainly in Iran, and in Africa because of energy policy, in Afghanistan over the securitization of their borders because Islamic State is an objective element in Afghanistan's security and peace process.

The relations of two countries are constantly developing. According to president Putin, *"Russia-China relations are an example to others"* and he also praised Russia's ties with China. His words have improved as a result of the West's restrictive policies towards Moscow. But in respect to China-Russia relations he adds *"It's crucial that the Russian-Chinese friendship isn't directed against anybody whatsoever. We do not create any military alliances. On the contrary, it's an example of equal, respectful and productive cooperation between the two states in the 21st century"*. (Russia Today, 2014) In his book *"The Governance of China"*, Xi Jinping writes that in the past two decades the two country have established a *"comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, and a relationship that fully accommodates each other's interests and concerns, and delivers tangible benefits to the two people"*. According to President Xi Jinping, China-Russia relationship is *"one of the most important bilateral relationship in the world and also the best relationship between major countries"* (Jinping, 2014, pp. 301-305). He adds that in maintaining the international strategic balance, peace and stability in the world, such kind of relationship could play a crucial role. It seems that in real politics a common strategic interest in international, regional and bilateral security, politics, economy, and technology has resulted in a close and mutual relationship between China and Russia.

To be objective, some of the economically important relations need to be considered in order to shape a reliable view on Russia-China future.

One of the most significant strategies which can geopolitically and geoeconomically help Eurasia in the field of trans-Eurasian economic cooperation, is the corridor building strategy. Among several programs on making corridors, the Moscow to

Beijing high-speed railway and the economic corridor between China, Russia and Mongolia are the most considerable projects. The Moscow to China railway project is to cut the journey time from five to two days. The goal is to build a Moscow-Beijing Eurasian transport corridor. This railway is about 7,000 kilometers long. It will pass through Kazakhstan and will make travel between Europe and Asia easier and faster. For China, Russia is a particularly attractive market mainly because of its politically strained relations with the Western countries over Ukraine. (Russia Today, 2015) The second corridor, which would be built between China, Russia and Mongolia, is a revival project of the Great Silk Road that once linked China, Central Asia, and Europe. Therefore, this project will be a new platform for economic development among the concerned countries. The project will help China get closer to the European and African markets using Russia's transportation ways and Russia will benefit from it by becoming the center of economic belts between China and Europe. On the other hand, Russia-China trading settlements in Yuan increased by 800 per cent by the end of 2014. By 2015, the share of the US dollar in China-Russia trade was around 90 percent. Since then, the plan has been worked out between the two countries to reduce the role of the US dollar in their business relations and build a more balanced world finance situation. According to Central Bank of and Federal Customs Service of Russia, the share of US dollar in trade between China and Russia for the first quarter of 2020 fell below 50 percent which was an unprecedented record. The share of US dollar in this period was 46 percent, the Euro's share increased to 30 percent and the use of their national currency made up 24 percent. (China Banking News, 2020) Regarding to "de-dollarization" process, Alexey Maslov⁶ stated in an interview with the Nikkei Asian Review, *"The collaboration between Russia and China in the financial sphere tells us that they are finally finding the parameters for a new alliance with each other. Many expected that this would be a military alliance or a trading alliance, but now the alliance is moving more in the banking and financial direction, and that is what can guarantee independence for both countries"*. (SIMES, 2020) (SIMES, 2020) Related to monetary and financial cooperation and circulation President Xi Jinping also raised his consideration as followings: *"We need to enhance monetary circulation. China and Russia already have sound cooperation on settling trade in local currencies, and have made good progress and yielded rich experience in this respect. This good*

⁶ Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences.

practice can be shared with others in the region” (Jinping, 2014, p. 318). The president of China provides local monetary settlement as a safeguard that could decrease circulation cost, improves regional ability to fend off financial shakes and be more competitive internationally.

At present, more than 100 Russian commercial banks are opening corresponding accounts for settlements in yuans. Both countries have planned to have trade turnover of \$200 billion dollars. They are establishing new rules and strategies to trade in national currencies or even in gold. China has already started loaning to its partner countries in Yuan (Instead of USD) and Russia has also started substituting national currencies for the US dollar and has switched to gold with its partners like Iran, Central Asian countries and China. In other words, under this policy, the hydrocarbons will no longer be traded in US (petro) dollar, but in Russian rubles and Chinese Yuan. (Koenig, 2015)

In recent years, considerable progress has been achieved in streamlining trade in local currencies which led Moscow and Beijing to create a new model of financial architecture that could facilitate transactions in gold. China and Russia have become the world’s most active buyers of the latter in recent years. The process of trading in national currencies and gold among BRICS member countries, mainly China and Russia, is called de-dollarization. In this regard, Moscow and Beijing have taken further steps towards opening of a Yuan clearing bank in Russia right after Russia’s Central Bank opened its first-ever foreign branch in Beijing. This movement was conducted in favor of laying ground for a better communication and deeper cooperation between Russian and Chinese financial institutions. According to the first deputy governor of the Russian Central Bank Sergey Shvetsov, *“BRICS countries are large economies with large reserves of gold and an impressive volume of production and consumption of this precious metal. In China, the gold trade is conducted in Shanghai, in Russia it is in Moscow. Our idea is to create a link between the two cities in order to increase trade between the two markets”*. However, BRICS states have already moved to create a new financial architecture that tackles the “dominance” of the U.S. dollar in global finance. The gold marketplace could also be a way of bypassing the dollar besides using national currencies for trade with other member nations and nonmember nations. (Kaiser, 2017)

The other significant deal between the two countries is the new and historical \$400-billion-dollar gas pipeline deal. The project is the biggest contract of Gazprom in history. The above-mentioned projects were just a sign of economic and political relation in the framework of trans-Eurasian economic cooperation among Russia, China and other

countries in the whole region. However, there is no possibility to list all relations of the countries, so we decided to just have a glance at the new stage of their relations in the near future.

China and Russia have seen each other as new allies since the collapse of the Soviet Union because after the Cold War there was no point for China to keep a frozen relation with Russia. In the post-cold war era, China has been endangered by the unipolar new world order led by the United States in the same way as Russia has been. That is why both countries contemplate constructing a multipolar international system, which would be based on global partnership instead of a unipolar American globalization and athleticism.

China and Russia are also always concerned about the security issues of East Asian countries. For reaching the goal of tackling the security issues in the region, they created Shanghai Cooperative Organization in 1996, which became the organizational center for countries like China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. China and Russia have also expressed their concerns over the presence of terrorist groups in the region and the U.S. military presence around the world, particularly in Afghanistan and in the Middle East. Indeed, in August 2003, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan held joint antiterrorist exercises on the Chinese border. For the Chinese military, it was the first multilateral joint military manoeuvre. China and Russia also signed a five-year military cooperation agreement on November 1993. According to this agreement, Russia will provide military equipment and technology to China. U.S. department of defense states Beijing reportedly purchases approximately \$1.0 billion worth of Russian weaponry a year, amounting to about one quarter of total Russian arms sales. These sales have increased starting in the late 1990s. Beside the security cooperation with Central Asia, China and Russia hope to increase trade within the territory. These countries can provide natural resources that are significantly needed in China. On the other side the desire for building a successful economic model is a primary element in the post-Soviet states' policy, which may also be a force driving China to intensify economic interactions; indeed, Russian economic reformers have visited China's economic zones to use their model and experiences. In 1990s, these were debates over the post-Soviet countries and China. (Faust, 2005, pp. 112-115)

Actually, China-Russia relations were still considerably strong during the era of Yeltsin, but the relations changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000. China and Russia found themselves in one line after the considerable appearance

of US military presence in Central Asia that was not welcomed by Beijing and also sparked widespread criticism in Russia. Between 2003 and 2004, Russian foreign policy became more China-focused and less Western-oriented. It was at that time that Russia chose to shift its attention to a Russo-Chinese balance instead of following the lead of the US. The main common point between Russia and China was countering US expansion in the region by building new political and economic bloc or group. The reason for this strategic shift of Moscow was likely the fact that Russia gained no tangible benefits from the engagement with Washington. Besides that, a closer Russia-US relation could increase a huge unrest in Russian political era. By this strategic shift China and Russia succeeded to settle most of their outstanding border disputes, enjoy a booming bilateral trade, and carry out large-scale military cooperation actions such as a peace mission in 2005 and 2007. In 2007, bilateral trade topped \$48 billion⁷. According to Niklas Swanström, relations between China and Russia are only stable and strong in formal speeches and official communications. He believes that the reality is much different, and the future looks more bleak than bright; the military, economy and political power shift will increase the problems between the two states. In this deal, Russia will act as a spoiler in order to delay their decline. The problem for Russia is it cannot go too far to obstruct China on the one hand, and on the other hand it will lose its international support mainly if the domestic situation becomes worse. The factor which holds both states together, is the problematic relation they have with the outside world. In the short run, it appears well but this will continue to be an important binding factor over the long run. (Swanström, 2012, pp. 2-11)

The relations between the countries are based on many factors mainly in Russia, where the policies are usually formed in function of complicated combinations of interests, calculations, and concerns of individual players, and groups. Both countries enjoy flexibility while dealing with political, security and even economic matters. The main point of the flexibility of relations between Russia and China is the position of supreme leaders related to decision-making process in different areas, which drives China closer to Russia than US. In a comprehensive view, Russian president plays a much better and broader role in forming Moscow's course towards China than that of US president in shaping the US policy on China. On the one hand, the president of the US is not the in

⁷ The bilateral trade between two countries in 2012 was around \$88 billion, and for 2014 it was expected to hit \$100 billion.

charge of the states and on the other hand he cannot control the economic activities of American companies, vis-a-vis China and his executive branch role is also limited by other state agencies. In Russia, the situation is different. Putin has almost full control over other players, be it civil bureaucracy, regions, army, state-owned-enterprises, and even private oligarchs. He sets strategic priorities for them and can also micro-manage particular China-related projects. There are many other factors which are beneficial for China. Among them we can name Putin's extreme Eurocentrism, Russia's status of a great power dominating neighboring CIS countries, the growing anti-Americanism, and the cooperation of Russia in the UN Security Council to protect regimes in many regions of the world. (Gabuev, 2015) In all senses, According to Alexander Gabuev, Putin has a worldview to create a triangle of powerful countries with China and the United States, in which Russia will be in center. Russia recognizes China as a partner in fending the US. After the confrontation of Russia with the West over Ukraine, China is increasingly becoming a personal priority for Putin. Point to be noted is the crucial element of the relation between China and Russia is based on Putin's friendship with Xi Jinping. The major feature is that Putin used to personalize Russia's international relations by establishing personal bonds, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia does not play a central role in shaping policy mainly towards China and is merely a technical body. (Gabuev, 2015) In his first two presidency terms, his relations were special with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, President Jacques Chirac, and Prime-Minister Silvio Berlusconi. He had relations with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, too, but in Xi Jinping, Putin has found a real "buddy". They met in 2010 when Putin was Pprime minister and Xi was vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China, but the dimension of their personal relation became clearly visible on October 7 2013, when Putin celebrated his birthday at the APEC summit in I Bali and Xi was the only foreign guest to his party and the two got drunk together. Currently, Xi is most trustable for Putin than any Chinese leader before him and any Western leader. This relation has helped the Kremlin adjust many of its policies to China. (Gabuev, 2015)

One of the crucial questions in the two countries' relation is Russia's Far East, the region that used to be under the Qing's nominal sovereignty until the second half of the 19th century contains with just over 6 million Russian residents. On the other side, the number of residents is estimated at more than 120 million. The Russian Far East is a huge area of Northeastern Eurasia stretching from Lake Baikal to the Pacific

Ocean. Before the deterioration of the relations between Russia and the West, there were some informal limits on Chinese investments, but now Russia's policy towards China related to the Far East has been reversed.

Russian Far East belongs to China's long-term geopolitical game of creating zones of influence along its continental frontiers in Eurasia. For China, Russian Far East is as important as South East Asia and Central Asia, which are called "strategic rear areas". Beijing policy is to bind them up to China: Southwestern China to Southeast Asia, western China to Central Asia, and northeast China to the Russian Far East. At the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum May 2014, Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao called for "turning the two regions into a big market – a new economic bloc in Asia". In the Russian Far East China considers two outstanding goals: first, China can have secure and peaceful Northeast borders with Russia. It helps China concentrate its military policies on other strategic areas mainly in the West Pacific. Second, China can use Russian Far East's natural resources, which are of vital importance to China's voracious economy. Russian Far East holds many treasures in the form of natural resources – oil and natural gas, iron ore and copper, diamonds and gold, pristine freshwater, timber, and fish stocks, to name a few. The rising of Chinese companies in the Russian Far East would be a source of unhappiness for other foreign competitors. It could even begin to squeeze Russian companies out of the region, which can be a negative factor for the economic relations between the two countries. (Lukin, 2015)

In terms of global governance, China and Russia are also interested to work together in non-Western international institutions. The relevant organizations are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Eurasian economic, political and security organization, and the BRICS group developing economies. Russia is deeply interested in an Asian great powers' triangle with China and India through SCO. Russia has the potential to be in the center of this triumvirate by keeping a balance on supply of arms and military equipment between them. Theoretically, the triumvirate between Asia's three great continental powers is going to be created. After China and India, Russia wants to make a new economic shift towards the South Asian countries, mainly Thailand and Vietnam. This would be also one of the major areas of Russia's commercial and military interest in Asia, as Russia desires to be seen again as a major military power in the Pacific. (Trenin, 2015)

Finally, the above-mentioned evidence has the sole purpose of proving the key actors in the post-Soviet region and Eurasia are Russia and China. There would be no opposite voice within the Eurasian region if the two or three (including India) countries were working shoulder by shoulder to change the entire world system from unilateral globalization to a multilateral globalization.

3.1.5. Russia-German and Russia-EU trade and investment relations:

One of the core areas between Russia and Germany, on one hand, and Russia and European Union, on the other, is the economic and trade relations that has recently shown a tendency of intensifying. Official documents issued by the Kremlin's press service showed in the first eight months of 2018 that the volume of trade between Russia and Germany had grown by 24 percent (adding \$7.5 billion) in comparison with the same period in 2017 and reached US\$39 billion. According to the Trade Map published by the International Trade Center, the product related export turnover of Russia to Germany reached US\$34 billion in 2018 adding around US\$9 billion in comparison with 2017. However, in 2019, the amount had decreased to US\$28 billion. In return, Germany's exports to Russia increased to US\$25 billion in 2018 from US\$24 billion and for 2019 remained almost unchanged, adding only US\$1 billion. (International Trade Center-Trade Map, n.d.) Also, trade turnover between Russia and the European Union has increased by about 22 percent in 2018 compared with the same period of 2017.

The second part of the economic relations between Russia and Germany is the growing investment. Currently, the total amount of German accumulated investments in Russian economy has exceeded US\$18 billion, while Russia's investments in German economy amount to about \$8 billion. The net amount of German companies' direct investment in Russian economy was more than €1.6 billion in 2017, and in the first three quarters of 2018, it exceeded €2 billion. By the end of the 2019, the total number of German companies registered in Russia was 4661. Most of them invested in car manufacturing and medium-sized businesses. According to the chairman of the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce Matthias Schepp "*the foundations of German and Russian economic relations are solid even in the time of sanctions*". (Schepp, 2018)

In addition, the third part of geopolitically important economic relations between Russia and Germany is the construction of Nord Stream 2 pipeline to deliver natural gas from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea. Currently, Russia supplies 55 billion cubic meters natural gas to Germany by Nord Stream 1 (completed in 2011). The

development of the Nord Stream 2 completing in 2021 would allow Russia's Gazprom to supply an additional 55 billion cubic meters using the same route. The project may render the movement of Russian gas to the European Union via Ukraine unnecessary. The Nord Stream 2 bypasses Ukraine, depriving it of about \$2 billion a year in transit fees, and further making it more vulnerable to Russian gas cutoff. The U.S. has expressed its consideration on Nord Stream 2 calling it a project conceived to serve Russia's geopolitical goals rather than energy needs in the European Union. Poland has also called that Nord Stream 2 is a "hybrid weapon" designed by Moscow to divide the European Union and NATO.

As mentioned before, Poland is a geopolitical dividing line between Russia and Germany or Eurasia and the entire Eastern Europe in which the US balanced its power. According to George Friedman, "*the fundamental American interest is always the balance of power*" (Friedman, 2011, p. 125). The Nord Stream 2 means a practical challenge or even a geopolitical and geo-economic game changer to the regional balance of power that brings Russia and Germany closer than ever and increases Russia's influence in Europe.

In the post-Soviet era, The West expected Russia to adapt western values and be westernized without the prospect of integration. In respond, Russia chosen to remain Eurasian and act between East and West rather than following the West. The Eurasianist strategy resulted in a revolutionary change in Russian relations with the West and East. Russia balanced its economic development and connectivity between Europe and Asia. It helped Russia not to look only towards Europe and act by Western rules and values. The security, political and economic rise of Asia was a historical opportunity to put an end t its long-time western-centric foreign policy focus. The Eurasianist foreign policy strategy consolidated and strengthened Russia's geopolitical and geo-economic position.

3.1.6. Geopolitical and Geo-economic interest

In recent years, Russia has seriously considered Eurasian economic integration. The Eurasian Union was established by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia in a strategic treaty signed on May 29, 2014 which officially went into effect on 1 January 2015. This treaty was set to build a common market across the Post-Soviet States to pose a challenge to the European Union, United States, China, India and Turkey according to its signatories. Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev noted the treaty represented "a bridge between the East and the West." As a first step, the new treaty united three

countries' nations, or about 170 million people with their gross domestic product of 2.7 trillion dollars. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia also joined the bloc in the early days after the treaty was signed by its founding members. Other important factor between these countries are that two of them, Kazakhstan and Russia, are oil producers and the deal is going to guarantee free transit of goods, services, capital and workers to the entire populations of the countries. (Tasch, 2014) The development of economic and trade relations in the mainland of the Eurasian super continent could increase cooperation dynamics across the region and create a sustainable meeting and connecting point for China, India, Turkey, Iran and the EU in the mainland.

In the Eurasian economic integration process, China plays a key role and has a supportive position and Russia is also actively supporting China-led One Build and One Road (OBOR) initiative. In case of OBOR, Russia can play a central role to connect the West and East as a transit point. At the same time, India could not image itself to this process where China and Russia are working together. To be more precise, India is not comfortable with the China-led OBOR initiative. The OBOR is connecting the region until Pakistan, but does not include India. All countries in South-Asia cooperate with China in this initiative, but India has not found common ground to cooperate with China in this process. India's answer to the OBOR is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), set to raise its regional position as the key transit area between South-Asia and Eurasia.

One of the most significant problems in Eurasian cooperation is India-China stands and confrontations related to their trade relations, border disputes, competition in western markets and relations with Pakistan. India is seeking to replace China in western markets, host American companies looking to leave China and ban Chinese goods and services in the Indian market. Russia is trying to develop more integrated regional models by inviting all Eurasian powers to create more harmony and friendship.

However, due to political and military conflicts with Pakistan and China over border disputes, India does not fulfill the expectations and tries to keep its bilateral ties with Russia instead of partnering in regional international platforms. India pulled out of Russia's Kavkaz-2020 multinational military drills, citing the fact that China and Pakistan participated in it as a reason for its decision. The Kavkaz multinational military drills were held in Astrakhan from September 15 to September 27 between fellow SCO members Russia, China, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan

including other foreign nations like Mongolia, Syria, Iran, Egypt, Belarus, Turkey, Armenia, Turkmenistan and even Myanmar. (Daly, 2020)

India seeks an isolationist shift towards Kavkaz-2020 while Pakistan is eyes to use it as golden opportunity and build deeper relations with Russia and Central Asian nations. Another important issue for India is that Russia and China are not comfortable with the US-Western dominated international financial landscape. India does not really want to be the part of initiatives against the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other Western-led international financial and economic institutions. At the same time, it supports the Idea of multilateral world order. However, China and Russia are trying to change the international financing and monetary regime or at least build a new model instead of using only U.S. dollar in their international trade.

China and India are developing economies and will be the economic superpowers of the future. China is leading with its own economic model and India's economy is developing dynamically as well. Beside of China and India, Russia is developing as a key political, security and military power in the region. Russia, China and India can play match important and outstanding role in Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation. The unity, cooperation, coordination and integration among these three large powers in Eurasia can build a sustainable development model in the region. The Eurasian multinational security, political and economic cooperation is now a reality in both regional and global politics. Boycotting multinational platforms may slow the process but could not stop it. By seeking an isolationist strategy, India could lose the opportunity to be an active, effective and influential partner of the Eurasian cooperation in the long-run.

3.2 The BRICS


3.2.1 Overview

The term BRIC (known as BRICS since 2010 when South Africa joined the group) was coined by then-chairman of Goldman Sachs asset management, Jim O'Neill, in his publication *Building Better Global Economic BRICs*, in 2001. BRICS means Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. All of its members are leading, developing or newly industrialized countries and emerging economies. BRICS has two main streams for work as coordination in meetings and international organizations, and the development and building of a multi-sectorial cooperation agenda among its members, which focuses on the economic, financial and political governance sphere. The BRICS agenda prioritized issues such as the G-20 cooperation, including the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank reform, the reform of the United Nations and of its Security Council for more inclusive representation and more democratic international governance.


Currently BRICS represents 43 per cent of the world population and 26 per cent of the planet's land mass. In 2001 (South Africa not included) regarding to economic growth, BRICS had 18 per cent of the world's GDP, but in 2019 according to the World Bank that contribution is about 24 per cent which means over \$21 trillion. The contribution of BRICS to global exports between 2001 and 2011 has increased more than two times from 8 per cent to 16 percent, and currently according to statistics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) they contribute 17 per cent of the total world trade. In the abovementioned years, BRICS's total export has grown more than 500 per cent, while according to indexes; global exports has grown 195 per cent in the same period of time. The intra-BRICS trade increased about 922 per cent between 2002 and 2012, from \$27 to \$276 billion, i.e. about 5 per cent of the total world trade, while between 2010 and 2012 their international trade rose 29 per cent from \$4,7 to \$6,1 trillion dollars. Last but not least, BRICS has half of the world foreign exchange and gold reserves. (BRICS Brasil 2019)

13. Figure: BRICS vs world GDP 2019



Source: (World Bank) Own Editing

14. Figure



Source: (World Bank, 2020) Own Editing

3.2.2. Historical Review of RIC-cooperation Within Framework of BRICS

For the first time, the BRICS leaders informally met at the margins of the G-8 Summit in Hokkaido, 9 July 2008. On that occasion, the leaders of the BRIC countries reached an agreement to request their foreign ministers to organize the I BRIC Summit. Since the First Summit, the heads of the state have met annually for eight times. At the end of each summit, they announced a Declaration or Plans of Action for the further steps. In order to make a clear picture about the main streams and significant points of BRICS, we need to study their declarations in brief, which are the following.

At the first time, the BRICS Summit was held in June 16, 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia. This was the first high-level and official meeting under the BRIC mark. In this summit, the leaders of the Federative republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the republic of India and the People's Republic of China met and discussed issues about global economy and other related topics such as global development and prospects for further constructive cooperation within the BRICS.

During this summit, the BRICS member countries focused on international financial crisis, the role and policies of the G20 regarding international economic and

financial matters while calling on other states and relevant international bodies to implement the decision adopted at the G20 Summit in London on 2 April 2009. The member countries also stressed the fact they had to focus on close cooperation among one another and other partners to shape a framework for further progressive and collective actions at the next G20 Summit which was going to be held in Pittsburgh in September 2009 as a successful outcome of the United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its impact on development held in New York on 24-26 June 2009.

The BRICS member countries held their first summit in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which was the era in which the whole international community was working on new steps to decrease the possibility of further crisis in the field. The key point for the BRICS countries in their first Summit (Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders, 2009) was to focus on financial issues and make critical announcements on Western-led financial and economic institutions and systems.

For the second Summit, which held in April 16, 2010 in Brazil, the BRICS group directly, pointed out that the Bretton Woods institutions had to be reformed. The BRICS countries wanted to reform the voting power of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in favor of emerging market economies and developing countries. They claim that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had legitimacy deficits, which should be reformed in order to lay a more solid ground for the participation of developing countries in line with their respective weight in the world economy.

During this Summit, the member countries announced that for the purpose of promoting international economic stability, they had asked their Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to look into regional monetary arrangements and discuss new possible models and types of cooperation among the BRICS countries in this era. In order to build a facilitated trade, investment and a sustainable development process they pointed out the monetary cooperation including local currency settlement arrangement in trade among their countries. This step was the very first practical measure, which was expected to design technical models and solution in the financial landscape. The use of local or national currencies in bilateral and multilateral trade process was initiated by Russia and China and there are some efforts to change the whole process, which means instead of USD, the BRICS countries use other types of currency or payment methods.

In the second BRICS Summit, the member countries agreed on the Meeting of Agriculture and Agrarian Development in Moscow. The main points of this meeting were

to discuss ways of promoting quadripartite cooperation with attention to family farming. The member countries were convinced that this would be a constructive movement towards global food production and food security, which lay the ground for a successful fight against poverty. The movement would also provide sufficient food to vulnerable populations of the world such as Africa. Further expectations towards the meeting of cooperation in this era were creating an agricultural information base system for the BRICS countries, developing policy for guaranteeing access to food for vulnerable population, reducing the negative impact of climate change on food security, and upgrading efforts for agricultural technology cooperation and innovation. (Declaration, II BRIC Summit - Joined, 2010)

In relation to the economic growth with equity and social inclusion and for improving the standard of living of their peoples, BRICS countries found that energy and access to energy were significantly important. To achieve a considerable result, the countries aimed to develop cleaner, more affordable and sustainable energy system by providing environmentally friendly technologies and diversifying energy mix and the creation of jobs.

During this summit, the BRICS member countries also focused on the question of terrorism. They stressed that the fight against international terrorism had to be conducted in accordance with the United Nation Charter, international conventions and protocols, the United Nations General Assembly and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

At the III BRICS Summit held in Sanya, China at 14 April 2011 (Sanya Declaration, 2011), at the IV BRICS Summit held in New Delhi, India at 28-29 March 2012 (IV BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration, 2012), and at the V BRICS Summit held in Durban, South Africa at 27 March 2013 (V BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration, 2013) the member countries discussed the same issues and questions such as partnership for development, integration, industrialization, multilateral global governance, New World Order and reforming of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Since the economic-financial sphere is one of the significant issues of the intra-BRICS activity, by the following of the VI Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil at 15-16 July 2014, the member countries had reached an agreement on establishing of a New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement (CRA). At this summit, the member countries sought to build alternative organizations, which would help them reduce the influence of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund

(IMF) in their economic and political systems. (Sixth BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration, 2014) The ratification of the constitutive agreements for the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement was marked one year later in the VII BRICS Summit in Ufa, Russia in July of 2015. (VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration , 2015) On the margins of this event, the first meetings of the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors were held. During this summit, the “Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership” approved by the leaders of the countries. This strategy provided a roadmap for the intensification, diversification, upgrading of trade exchange between the five countries.

Until the eighth BRICS Summit and except for the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank, the whole process was struggled with lack of practical and objective steps. In the end of all summits, they announced a declaration and launched a degree of action plan to achieve, but most of those action plans has been implemented in a practical form. To be realistic, it is because most of the points and issues addressed at the first five summits and BRICS Declarations contain criticism on international issues, organizations and global frameworks. It seems that in beginnings, BRICS was an occasional process for the member countries where they could enhance their national and individual interests and aims beside one another. Nevertheless, in case of common BRICS goals and steps, nothing has happened. But, the situation from the 7th BRICS Summit has totally changed and a high level of common policy implementation process was installed between the member countries. At the eighth BRICS Summit (8th BRICS Summit - GOA DECLARATION, 2016) held from 15 to 16 October 2016 in Benaulim, Goa, India finally announced and projected more practical action plans to the Group. At this Summit, India proposed a new relation building process in order to link other regional economic, political and geopolitical groups to the BRICS Cooperation Process. The most important and positive point during this summit was the invitation of the BIMSTEC states and BBIN states. The BIMSTEC states are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. From the BIMSTEC countries, high-level officials like Prime ministers or Foreign ministers and delegations participated. The BBIN states are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. (The Indian Express, 2016) The appearance of these other countries was the positive and productive event, which was the best idea from the Indian side.

There is also the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) organization in South Asia. In SAARC organization the decision, making process is a total and common voice majority as all or none. India could not reach any common


standpoint with Pakistan. In case of India, SAARC is a failure and does not make sense. Recently India has not been presented at SAARC meetings because of Pakistan. At the same time, India in accordance to its economic and geopolitical relations is deeply interested to keep ties tight with other member states of the SAARC Organization. Five out of eight members of the SAARC Organization are in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sector Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), too. Only Afghanistan is not in the BIMSTEC but it has a multidimensional strategic partnership treaty with India.

The member countries also agreed to put consistency and continuity at the center of their diplomacy. The meeting ended with announcing the following sentence: “Big talks to make big steps”.

3.2.3. The Influence and Contribution of B(RIC)S in World politics and Economy

According to IPSOS Mori poll of 18,000 respondents across 25 nations, the United States’ approval rating has dropped by 24 percentage points since previous year’s surveys. The survey shows that only 40 per cent think the United States has a positive influence on the world stage. The three of B(RIC)S member countries are also listed as countries having positive influence on world affairs. India at 53 per cent ranked as seventh, China is at 49 per cent ranked as eighth. Both are in a higher position than United States. The US is at 40 per cent, which is not much ahead of Russia at 35 percent. Point to be noted that the top two spots are occupied by Canada and Australia, Three of the European states (Germany, France, United Kingdom) and the European Union closely follow. This means the majority of the countries, which have strongly/somewhat-positive influence on.

15. Figure



Source: (Breene, 2017) Own Editing

However, if we turn our attention to the economic and production terms, the numbers regarding the state of the world economy show the United States still dominates the global economy. The United States has 24, 42 per cent of the world's GDP which is about \$21.43 Trillion in total by 2019 according to the World Bank estimations. At the same time, China, India and Russia's contribution as the large Eurasian economies of the BRICS cooperation to the world GDP is about 21.56 in total by 2019, and if we count with Brazil's and South Africa's contribution to the world GDP, the number will reach more than 24 per cent of the world GDP.

Moreover, the three Eurasian member countries (RIC) of the BRICS achieved significant improvements in the "Doing Business" among 190 countries based on World Bank's annual report. According to the World Bank's latest Doing Business rankings, China ranked at 31th by climbing 15 spots since previous estimation, Russia jumped 3 spots to 28th while India moved to 66th by climbing 11 spots since 2019. (The World Bank, 2020)

According to Andras Horvai⁸, "there has been a demonstration of a sustained and clear commitment in Russia to improve the business climate for domestic small and medium enterprises" (Horvai, 2017). Today Russia is ahead of many Western countries

⁸ World Banks country director and resident representative for Russia.

like France and Italy and Netherlands, all BRICS countries, neighboring countries. It has also become the best country and economy within the Eurasian Economic Union. In this area, as for now, Russia is in direct competition with Spain. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development initiated reforms in starting business in 2012 after President Putin signed a decree to improve the country's Doing Business ranking from 118th that year to 20th by 2018.

India improved its steady shift towards best practicing in business regulation in 2016. According to the report, since 2003, 37 reforms have been adopted by India and half of them have been implemented in the last four years. According to Annette Dixon⁹, *“having embarked on a strong reform agenda and Indian government's consistent effort over the past years”* (Dixon, 2017) are the main factors of the India's jump in the year in question. The new reform policies in this area helped India to be one of the preferred places to do business globally.

However, the BRICS is still yet to act as a common or unique political and economic international entity. But considering their common, factors, views, policies and economic system similarities and reforms Russia, India and China are the only sideways or possible trinity of the Eurasian cooperation in the region. No economic cooperation, coordination, and integration development in the bloc and region could be implemented without positive contribution and deep cooperation among these three Eurasian large powers.

Tibor Palánkai summarizes that the main parameters and dimensions of the regional and international real-economic integration (integratedness) profile and other factors of cooperation and integration (Palánkai, 2014, pp. 42-115) as:

- Trade integration: flows, stocks, intensities;
- Structure of trade relations, intra-sector trade;
- Sub-regional concentration and interconnectedness;
- Factor integration: flows, stocks, intensity and structures;
- State and characteristics of financial integration, performance, efficiency, successes and failures;
- Dependencies and interdependence;

⁹ Vice President, South Asia Region, World Bank.

Interdependence is a new quality of relationship between countries and regions. The bases of interdependence are in the size of proportion of the transactions between actors like states or groups of states. So, in order to build a sustainable Eurasian (RIC) cooperation within BRICS, Russia, India and China have to work together and raise their economic, trade, finance, labor and technology transactions. For instance, the process of economic belt and road building is significantly positive act among region, but lack of trust and lack of policy cooperation, policy coordination and policy harmonization are the negative factors, which slow down their real-integration.

Moreover, the large Eurasian economies of the BRICS need to pay special attention to create and support transnational companies or economic organizations across the region. In integrated regions, large part of international or intra-regional trade is conducted between transnational companies. Transnational economic or business entities are act as representatives of division of labor, because it is an internal affair of these companies. Beside of transnational companies, the facilities of worldwide transport and communication infrastructures, development of global trade liberalization, internalization of production, and the development of intra-sector trade are the main factors that lead the countries to a real-integration process. (Palánkai, 2014, pp. 42-115)

3.2.4. Intra-B(RIC)S Achievements and failures

According to Oliver Stuenkel's article "The Goa Declaration: An analysis" in which he refers to a study (the report measures actions taken between 10 July 2015 and 19 September 2016) published by the University of Toronto, BRICS achieved 78 per cent compliance with the seventh BRICS Summit Commitments. It shows a high rate of compliance compared to previous summits. In the field of tax transparency, competition policy the BRICS member countries conducted considerably well. The members of the group were successful at 90 per cent of their commitments on information and communication technology, international cooperation in the field of fight against terrorism, and cooperation on agriculture and food for vulnerable population. Only their regional security commitment on Iraq scored low - at about 30 per cent. The Goa Declaration is the longest BRICS Declaration since 2009. The main focus of it is on intra-BRICS activities and cooperation. (Stuenkel, 2016)

The most considerable achievement of the BRICS Cooperation group is the New Development Bank. According to BRICS announcements and rhetoric, the New Development Bank has three major different features compared to the existing

multilateral development banks and organizations such as „south-south” cooperation, equity in power-sharing and sustainable development. The decision-making process is fully equal. Unlike the World Bank and International Monetary Fund where decision-making power is under influence and control of specific members, BRICS governments have ownership of one-fifth of the shares of the bank.

The BRICS New Development Bank was established to meet the particular development demands and needs of the global south, first and foremost those of infrastructure. According to BRICS government’s stands, development funding which is provided by their New Development Bank is free of political conditionalities and is disbursed without delay.

Among the important areas in terms of financing in BRICS New Development Bank are the particular kinds of infrastructure projects such as green or renewable energy initiatives. In terms of sustainability of these projects in practice it is still not clear how to proceed with their implementation, not even for the New Development Bank. Also, the question of linkage of these initiatives, policies and steps to the internationally accepted Sustainable Development Goals is unclear. The BRICS governments and the directors of the New Development Bank present their strategy and action plans in this bank are a fresh thinking into development process and practices, but considering above-mentioned unclear terms, the bank has faced a wave of international criticism from the other international actors in the relevant field. (Stuenkel, 2016)

Currently the most crucial question for the BRICS New Development Bank is whether BRICS should create its own credit rating agency to reduce the monopoly of the US dominated three agencies – Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. Since the BRICS New Development Bank was founded, the topic of the credit rating agency is one of the significant debates among member countries; therefore, they discussed it during the Goa Summit. The idea of BRICS own credit rating agency has been fully accepted in Brazil. Russia and India also expressed their interest in the plan, but China has not made clear its stand yet. In the BRICS Declaration paragraph 44 is focusing on BRICS Rating Agency as follows:

“We welcome experts exploring the possibilities of setting up an independent BRICS Rating Agency based on market-oriented principles, in order to further strengthen the global governance architecture.”

The modalities of cooperation between the BRICS New Development Bank and the national banks of the member countries are also unclear. BRICS has established a new

development bank, but they could not shape a clear and practical framework yet for their cooperation. Russia, in some cases China and Brazil are interested to boost a high-level cooperation with this bank then being involved with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, but in the case of India, all of the development projects and loans are coming from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank. No clear framework yet has been established for the BRICS's New Development Bank and member countries' national banks and monetary institutions. (Roychoudhury, 2016)

The other important problem or even weakness of the BRICS New Development Bank is its total amount of investment is \$100 Billion, which does not match the same facilities and funds of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international development institutions. Beside India and China's concerns about each other's geopolitical concepts because of their historical border dispute and regional conflicts, China has contributed the highest amount in the New Development Bank. As a result, the chances for real and deep cooperation between these member countries are lower than expected. But, since the idea of the BRICS Rating Agency has been written in the final declaration, this fact shows a real demand in the group for more technical and practical cooperation to nullify the disagreements among member countries. (New Development Bank, 2017)

Another outstanding issue in the field of intra-BRICS investment process, In terms of investment, India is interested in the USA and in the UK. China is investing in Africa and Eurasia to hunt oil and gas and connect the regions by its One Build and One Road initiative, Brazil invests in South America, Russia politically and economically is involved in Central Asia, Central Europe and Middle Eastern countries, and South Africa is yet to show results in this area. There are only bilateral investment activities between the countries, which are based on their unilateral and bilateral interests. The common BRICS investment process has not become a significant initiative yet.

Around 17 per cent of the world trade pass through these countries, but the intra-BRICS trade rate was only 5 per cent of the world trade in 2017 that was about \$291 billion. In 2016, they announced that by 2020 the BRICS trade process must be doubled. According to official numbers, the trade process between BRICS member economies increased to \$353 billion. But, for the purposed number they should have free trade agreement, Tax and Customs cooperation or framework neither of which exists either. At the same time, bilateral trade between China and Japan is estimated at about \$350 billion worth of goods and services annually, which also qualifies them as one of the largest

trading partnerships in the world. According to the International Trade Center, China's total exports in product to Japan estimated at about \$143 billion and its import from Japan reached about \$171 billion. (ITC- Trade Map, 2019) Furthermore, the bilateral trade between China and the European Union for 2016, 2017 and 2018 was about \$521, \$572, and \$605 billion with a surplus of \$182, \$177, and 185 billion (Eurostat, 2019) and between China and the United States was about \$520, \$584 and \$635 billion for the same period with a \$250, \$275 and \$323 billion surplus. (ITC - Trade Map, 2019)

On the other hand, the total trade between Russia, India and China in 2016 was about \$141 billion and for 2018, it increased to \$212 billion.

3.2.5. Summary

In comparison to the geopolitical standpoints of the BRICS member countries, the geo-economic relations and interests among them, mainly between Russia, India and China show a different landscape. As we mentioned in chapter 3, each of these countries is economically interested and interdependent in other parts, countries or organizations than doing more business and economic cooperation within BRICS.

In my view, the BRICS cooperation is divided into three periods:

The first period is the era when BRIC was coined or invented by then-chairman of Goldman Sachs asset management, Jim O'Neill, in his publication *Building Better Global Economic BRICs*, in 2001. This period was closed by the first BRICS Summit in 2009.

The second period of BRICS can be tracked from the first summit all the way to the 6th summit. In this period BRICS member countries worked together to find some common ground for their real and objective cooperation. In this period the BRICS member countries declared action plans such as the reform of international financial institutions and strengthening risk management and supervisory practices, a greater voice and representation of the emerging and developing economies in the international financial institutions and organizations for a democratic and transparent decision-making and implementation process, the meeting of High Representatives for security issues, as well as meetings of development banks and the establishment of a Business Forum. In all of these encounters, the BRICS member states stressed their joint commitment to the United Nations Declaration, international peace and security, global development and human rights protection.

The beginning of the third period started was marked by the 7th BRICS summit in which the member countries finally found common ground to step up for a practical

cooperation such as the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank, as well as the process of building institutions necessary for deeper and sustainable BRICS cooperation. Implementation of the decisions taken during previous summits, integrating the existing cooperation mechanisms, innovation, new cooperation mechanisms and continuity of mutually agreed existing BRICS cooperation mechanisms were also among the topics tackled at the summit in question.

Russia, India and China are the most important members of the BRICS group. Unlike the other two members, they are located in Eurasia. Besides that, Russia, India and China are known to be economic, trade, geopolitical and historically influential large powers of the Eurasia, South Asia, and the Asia Pacific regions, too. Their economic, trade and political standpoints are to shape a multi-speed economic cooperation or even integration in the long run. Their bilateral strategic partnerships in numerous areas such as trade, regional and trans-regional economic connectivity, military and security policy cooperation and coordination are the real, objective and significant bases of the term Eurasian cooperation.

Currently each of them is struggling to be the main or key actor in Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation because of their unilateral or bilateral policies and strategies. Their real politics and interests are yet to be coordinated and harmonized. Their individual geopolitical and geo-economic strategies are impeding common, multi-lateral and multi-speed regional economic and trade development. There is no BRICS and at the same time no Eurasian cooperation without Russia, India and China. Cooperation in BRICS is a policy option which lays the ground for achieving the goals set in their current individual interest and stepping up for a real common initiative putting aside their rivalries and disputes. In brief, the BRICS cooperation is a common initiative representing a compound of the individual goals and interests. The member countries must answer two essential questions: how to work to achieve common goals and satisfy joint interest and how to create a common and comprehensive identity.

Based on facts and different points of view of the BRICS member countries, we found a huge gap between the real politics and interests of Russia, India and China towards BRICS common issues like cooperation between the New Development Bank and national banks and financial sectors, intra-BRICS trade, investment and financial policies, fight against terrorism, and their involvement in important geopolitical and geo-economic affairs.

First, the three Eurasian large powers are supposed to make serious efforts if they seek to take practical steps towards shaping an integration profile for their national markets. The better they are connected economically, the more possibilities they enjoy for their high political, military and security cooperation across the region.

To meet these abovementioned real and positive integration requirements, the given countries are required to reduce the weakness and deficiency of their un-developed institutional and regulatory frameworks. A real and positive cooperation and integration is impossible without institutional framework. International or regional institutions play an effective role in harmonization and coordination of economic policies, because this is the regulatory function of institutions.

The BRICS New Development Bank, Commonwealth of Independent States, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Union, and Eurasian Free Trade Zone are the institutional, functional, positive bases of the Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation and integration across the region. As of now, the China led OBOR, India led INSTC and other trans-regional economic and trade belts and routes can be regarded the basis of positive, practical and infrastructural side of the BRICS and Eurasian cooperation. But, in order to build a more intensified, sustained and stable trans-regional cooperation, the three Eurasian large powers need to put their special attention on knowledge-based society building, technology update, know-how cooperation, free trade agreements, market integration, and harmonization of their customs system.

4 EURASIAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION

4.1 The Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was established by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia in a strategic treaty. The treaty has signed on 29 May 2014 by the three countries. The organization come into effect on 1 January 2015. This treaty was established in order to build a common market across the Post-Soviet States to represent a meeting point for the European Union, the United States and even China. When the heads of state for the key countries of the Eurasian Economic Union gathered to sign the treaty, they shortly named several strategic points. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that their meeting was of “*epoch/making significance*,” that it was no attempt to recreate the Soviet Union. In this regard, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev noted the treaty represented “*a bridge between the East and the West*”. As a first step the new treaty united three countries’ nations, or about 170 million people with a gross domestic product of 2.7 trillion dollars. Other important points between these countries were that two of them, Kazakhstan and Russia, are oil producers and the deal was intended to guarantee a free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, implementation of coordinated policy in the energy, industrial, agricultural and transport sectors and the establishment of the Currency Union within the organization. In its early days, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Tajikistan were also expected by the member countries of the union to join the treaty. However, Ukraine has refused to join the Eurasian Economic Union over the conflict shaking the country and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan have joined the bloc in the early days after its founding members signed the treaty, and Tajikistan has only expressed interest for accession to the bloc. (Tasch, 2014)

Armenia was the first country started accession steps to join Eurasian Economic Union. During his visit to the budgetary control committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent State (IPA CIS) in the Armenian Parliament, Sergey Avetisyan, deputy economy minister of Armenia said that “*joining the Eurasian Economic Union will open up new perspectives for the Armenian economy*” (Avetisyan, 2014). The deputy minister also expressed that new perspectives for the economic development of Armenia will appear because of the forthcoming membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. He stated upcoming positive outlooks on October 9, 2014 after Russian president Vladimir Putin said that the process of Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was about to be complemented.

One thing that has to be considered which is deeply related to the Armenian Accession is the border conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. In this regard in May 2014, Nursultan Nazarbayev received a letter from Ilham Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan in which he stated that the provision of the Treaty related on the accession of Armenia to the Eurasian Economic Union should be limited to its international borders recognized by the United Nations.

The above mentioned conflict between the two countries and their future relations with the Eurasian Economic Union is still one of the outstanding political, security and political economic barriers that is yet to be solved methodologically and practically. In this regard, the significant question is whether Azerbaijan will be ready to show interest for joining or cooperating with the Eurasian Economic Union where it meets its national enemy. Anyway, Azerbaijan plays a significant role in the region because of its geographical and geopolitical position between Russia or Eurasian Economic Union, Iran, and Turkey. According to George Friedman, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is dangerous and he summarizes: “the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has been simmering since 1994. The area may seem of limited importance, but the Caucasus has strategic value to surrounding powers like Russia, Turkey and Iran” (Friedman, 2016)

Back to the fundamentals of the Eurasian Economic Union, beside its geopolitical and geostrategic importance, the Union has built on long-term economic agenda such as:

- Integrational economic ties
- National economy modernization
- Improving global competitiveness
- Establishing a single market for goods, services, capital and labor
- Integration infrastructure building like EAEU Court, the Eurasian Development Bank, the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development and a single currency or a coordinated monetary and financial policy.

Professor Palánkai Tibor summarizes, “*Integration means a process of unification, the merging of parts into a whole, becoming a unit, fitting together, melting into one another, and linking up*” (Palánkai, 2004, pp. 18-19). In other words, integration is a process of cooperation of parts, the harmonization of their operations, their reciprocal influence, and their becoming interconnected. (Palánkai, 2004, pp. 18-19) According to Professor Palánkai Tibor, theoretically, an economic and political integration focuses on five significant dimensions as followings:

- the content (or essence) of integration processes;

- the organizational forms and institutions of integration;
- regulation (policies) and governance of integration;
- advantages and disadvantages of integration (cost-benefit analysis);

And finally

- The problems of integration maturity (capacities or capabilities for integration).

4.2 Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union

The Eurasian Economic Space came into force in 1 January 2012. The next and final step of the strategic programs of the Post-Soviet States was the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has been followed by the disappearance of the classical type of Eurasianism, the breakdown of its political structure, the geopolitical breakup of its territory into a collection of new sovereign states and the process of territorial fragmentation. These all meant challenges for Russia. The neo-Eurasianism project is the only way for Russia to rebuild the legacy of the idea of Eurasianism and set Russia in the center to earn back its political and economic influence in the world political and economic system as an important part.


Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russian political elite and society has actively refused to recognize the leadership of the U.S. in the world political and economic order. For Russia, in order to reduce the dominance of the U.S. the great power status was an essential need at the beginning of the 2000s. Russia's balance of power motive forced the country to turn from a Greater Europe shift toward a Greater Eurasia shift. However, the Russia's new shift to Eurasia called as pivot to the east, specifically to China, but in fact, its current self-determination proves that the pivot was toward itself. As a major and great power in the North of the Eurasian continent (bordering East and Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America), Russia is no longer oriented towards and dependent on any one side, particularly to Europe, the U.S. or China. The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union helped Russia build its world part and be in the center of it again. (Trenin, 2019)

The most important factor that helped Russia conduct its successful strategic shift was its economic growth. Russia's GDP in the 10 years from 1999 to 2008 grew by 94 per cent and its GDP per capita doubled. The value of the Russian economy in 1999 was about 210 billion dollar, but in 2008, it rose to 1.8 trillion US dollar. This made Russia one of the fastest developing and growing economies in the first decade of 21th century.

(Ben Aris and Ivan Tkachev , 2019) Beside that and according to report of RBC news, the shadow economy and informal production of Russia totaled 175.6 billion US dollars in 2017, which accounted for 12.7 per cent of Russia's GDP at that year. (The Moscow Times, 2019)


From an economic and trade perspective, the Eurasian Economic Union is highly dominated by Russia. According to numbers and indicators, the Eurasian Economic Union is not a union of equals at all, because the 87 per cent of its GDP and around 80 per cent of its population is Russian.

16. Figure: The relative size of the EAEU's GDP 2017




Source: (IMF: DOTS), Own Editing

17. Figure: GDP per capita 2017



Source: (IMF: DOTS), Own Editing


18. Figure: The relative size of the population in the EAEU



Source: (World Bank), Own Editing


Member countries are small economies, highly interconnected with Russia in their intra-EAEU trade relations, while Russia conducts only eight per cent of its trade within EAEU. The economic relations among other member countries are on a very low level. In a trade and economic relations perspective, the Eurasian Economic Union means Russia for the other four member nations as shown in following charts according to the Trade Map of the International Trade Center:

19. Figure: Russia's trade to the EAEU 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

20. Figure: Kazakhstan trade to the EAEU 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

21. Figure: Belarus's trade to the EAEU 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

22. Figure: Kyrgyzstan's trade to the EAEU 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

23. Figure: Armenia's trade to the EAEU 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

24. Figure: Russia's trade to EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

25. Figure: Kazakhstan's trade to EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

26. Figure: Belarus's trade to EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

27. Figure: Kyrgyzstan's trade to EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

28. Figure: Armenia's trade to EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

29. Figure: Russia's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

30. Figure: Kazakhstan's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

31. Figure: Belarus's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018




Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

32. Figure: Kyrgyzstan's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018



Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing


33. Figure: Armenia's trade percentage with EAEU and world 2018



Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing


The total intra-EAEU trade in 2018 was about \$117 billion. The number is far from half of the total trade of the EAEU conducted in 2018, which was about \$866 billion, or, in other words only about 2 per cent of the world total trade. And again, Russia contributes 80 per cent of the EAEU-total trade annually as the following charts show.

34. Figure: Intra-EAEU, EAEU-world and world trade 2018



Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

35. Figure: Total trade percentage 2018



Source: (ITC - Trade Map), Own Editing

According to Paul T. Christensen, Russia is a “*Semiperiphery State*” Since the 18th century. One of the most and highly important aims of Russia/Soviet/Russia from its connecting to the world capitalist economy until today is to rise from semiperipheral to the core of the international system. All the time Russia’s policies were designed to address this problem, but its efforts have failed. The second period of Russian efforts to move out of semiperipheral status started in the post-communist period.

“The policies of the Russian state and those of the core countries of the system (including the international institutions representing the interest of the core states such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), in combination with some structural legacies of the Soviet political economy, have solidified Russia’s semiperipheral status. These policies have also weakened Russia among the semiperipheral states, and the real issue will be whether Russia move not to the core but farther down the ladder of countries within the semiperiphery. Third, the combination of structural legacies and conscious policies that have shaped Russia’s reintegration into the capitalist world system has had deleterious effect on most social groups within the country while at the same time creating some avenues for social organization and resistance” (Christensen, 2013, pp. 169-171).

For many developing countries, Europe and other western countries are the target countries of migration but for post-Soviet nations and even partly China, Russia is still the center where they could make money as guest workers and support their families at home. For example, most of the guest workers in Russia are from former Soviet states and China. (Roudik, 2013) According to the World Bank, about 12.3 million immigrants have moved to Russia. (The World Bank, 2011) According to a study in BBC World Agenda, there are around 10-12 million foreigner workers in Russia. More than seven million of them do not have a formal residence permit and work without employment permit. (Eke, n.d.) With respect to the post-Soviet countries, special rules have been established for the citizens of Kazakhstan and Belarus in 2011 by Russia. According to those acts, such workers do not need visas to enter the country. This rule was a step to solve the problems of workers’ movement among the member countries of Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). Since 2011, workers from these two countries were required to purchase their labor licenses independently from Russian government authorities. (Roudik, 2013) After establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union and creating a single market approach, the labor movement barriers within the Union changed as discussed in the following chapters.

Furthermore, thus Russia needed to establish a political and economic bloc or union with its allies in order to consolidate and defend their common interest among other blocs in the world. The reunification of the post-Soviet region has started for the second time as neo-Eurasianism following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Eurasian Economic Union is the most recent economic, political and institutional reunification and development of the Eurasian initiative. To be an influential “world part” Russia has

realized that the only way to move from semiperiphery status is establishing common and multilateral integrational initiatives beside cooperating bilaterally and multilaterally with other regional and international political, economic and security initiatives.

In this regard, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had a brief standpoint on 10 October 2011 in which he wrote about all treaties and strategic activities from the very beginning of the new period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The article was entitled “*A new Integration project for Eurasia: the future in the making*”. (Putin, 2011) The very meaning of establishing political and economic union was based on the idea of building a strong Russian-based integration process with the former Soviet republics. This was Vladimir Putin’s strategy for the third term in power as president of the Russian Federation. (Molchanov, 2015, pp. 65-69)

Vladimir Putin claimed that “*Moreover, the Commonwealth of Independent States experience enable us to launch a many-tired, multi-speed integration process in the post-Soviet space, and to set up much needed institutions such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union and finally the Common Economic Space*” (Putin, 2011).

According to Putin’s point of view this integration process helped countries to seek new resources for economic growth during the global financial crisis and they had reached a point at which it became necessary to modernize fundamentally the principle of their partnership both within the Commonwealth of Independent States and in other regional associations.

As second step, Vladimir Putin said, “*In fact, we are making integration a comprehensible, sustainable, and long-term project, attractive to both individual and businesses that operates independently from fluctuations in the current political environment or any other circumstances*” (Putin, 2011).

In this part, he stated that the Eurasian Economic Community up in 2000 was the reason to put the countries closer to each other. The Community created the understanding of the communality of their strategic national interests that led Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to form the Customs Union on 1 July 2011. After a full development in the common customs area with a clear prospect for implementing highly ambitious business initiatives, the Community helped member states move from the Customs Union to the Common Economic Space in order to create a common market for 165 million people. He also added that the Common Economic Space is rooted in coordinated action trough key institutional areas such as macroeconomics, ensuring competitions, technical

regulations, agricultural subsidies, transport, and natural monopolies tariffs. Later, all these steps help the member states include common visa and migration policies, thus no border control zone will be put into practice. In this area, he shows the European Union and the Schengen Agreement with all its benefits to the member states. It means Vladimir Putin desired/desires to build a Union which would be the same as European Union in Eurasian Context.

He also uses the European Union as an example worth following: *“It took Europe 40 years to move from the European Coal and Steel Community to the full European Union. The establishment of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space is the proceeding at a much faster pace because we could draw on the experience of the European Union and other regional associations. We see strengths and weaknesses. And this is our obvious advantage since it means we are in a position to avoid mistakes and unnecessary bureaucratic superstructure”* (Putin, 2011).

Vladimir Putin tries to inspire people to opt for a European Union type system where almost every young individual desires to live. He tries to activate the population of the targeted countries for supporting the project and help them work on their own better future. What is interesting is that Vladimir Putin is talking positively about the European Union and its experience without thinking of any kind of conflict in the future. Later we will discuss Putin’s steps thoroughly contradict his stance in the 2011 article cited above.

Vladimir Putin expressed that the Eurasian Court, that started its work on January 1, 2012 would be fully operational. He gives opportunity to both governments and economic entities to apply to the court in any case of discrimination or regarding the violation of competition or equitable business regulations. Comparing to the European Union Court, the important question is how the court can be independent on political intervention, especially today, when Russia is in a full scale conflict with its Western partners and faces a huge number of sanctions causing problems to the businesses and markets across the country from the West (?).

Vladimir Putin expresses that *“The Customs Union and the Common Economic Space are special in that they have supranational structures which will also be guided by the basic requirement to minimize bureaucracy and heed people’s actual interests”* (Putin, 2011). In this regard, he promises that the Customs Union Commission which is already a strong body and has power of action jurisdiction?, will be expanded from 40 items to over 100, including the authority to take decisions on competition policy, technological regulations and subsidies.

Again, here we have the question how the Customs Union Commission, which is Eurasian Economic Unions Commission since 2015, can act as an efficient decision maker in the territory where all political decisions are taken by one ruling strongman. From the collapse of Soviet Union up until today, the centralized political decision making regime has not changed, even the legislation bodies of these countries are under the hands of the presidents and the parliaments who vote in their favor.

From Putin's perspective, all above mentioned strategically important steps have led to building the Eurasian Economic Union in order to accelerate integration process. He adds, *"First none of this entails any kind of revival of the Soviet Union. It would be naive to try to revive or emulate something that has been consigned to history. But these items call for close integration based on new values and new political and economic foundations"* (Putin, 2011).

Related to this point Vladimir Putin adds that they suggest a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and a dynamic Asia-Pacific region. Beyond this, he mentions that this kind of project also implies transitioning to closer coordination in economic and monetary policies in the Customs Union and Common Economic Space and establishing a full-fledged economic union.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin says, *"Its natural resources, capital, and potent of human resources will combine to put the Eurasian Union in a strong competitive position in the industry and technology race, in the struggle for investors, for the creation of new jobs and the establishment of cutting-edge facilities. Alongside other key players and regional structures, such as the European Union, the United States, China and APEC, the Eurasian Union will help ensure global sustainable development"* (Putin, 2011) As a second point, he states, *"The Eurasian Union will become a focal point for further integration processes since it will be formed by the gradual merging of existing institutions, the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space"* (Putin, 2011) In addition, as a third point, *"It would be a mistake to view the Eurasian Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States as opposing forces. Each institution has its place and its role to play in the post-Soviet space. Russia, together with its partners, intends to work actively towards enhancing this Commonwealth and infusing it with the topical agenda"* (Putin, 2011)

In this regard, he called for launching specific, comprehensive and attractive initiatives and joint programs across the Commonwealth of Independent States, including

the energy sector, transport, high technology, and social development,. Based on their great deal from the Soviet Union including infrastructure, a development system of regional production specialization, and a common space of language, science and culture. In fact, Vladimir Putin's views are made clear in his article about the whole post-Soviet space. He talks as a fully responsible person to all the post-Soviet countries in relation to their development and social well-being. It seems that geopolitically, the region has not been divided, because Russian leaders always deal with it as a common territory. There is no possible room for unilateral actions to each of these countries even in case of Russia.

The fourth step declared by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is *"the Eurasian Union is an open project. We welcome other partners to it, practically Commonwealth of Independent States members. At the same time, we are not going to hurry up or nudge anyone. A state must only join on its sovereign decision based on its long-term national interest"* (Putin, 2011). He highlights that the Eurasian Union will be based on universal integration principles as an essential part of Greater Europe united by sharing values of freedom, democracy, and, market laws.

When the Eurasian Economic Union began to be a real existing entity the American politicians started a negative campaign to weaken the process inside and outside of Eurasia. On December 6, 2012 U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton made comments on Eurasian Economic Union while talking to lawyers and civil society advocates who came to attend an international conference in Dublin. She described efforts to promote greater economic integration in Eurasia as *"a move to re-Sovietize the region"*. In this period, the Russia-led efforts like Customs Union included Belarus and Kazakhstan constituted an effective step towards further integration to establish the Eurasian Economic Union. She also announced, *"We know what the goal is, and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it,"*. In response, Dmitry Peskov named Hillary Clinton's statements *"a completely wrong understanding"* of the situation. He added, *"What we see on the territory of the ex-Soviet Union is a new type of integration, based solely on economic integration, any other integration is totally impossible in this world."* (Clinton, 2012) According to all facts and realities there is no any kind of re-building a Soviet type system mainly in Putin's Russia. Pekka Sutela, the author of *The Political Economy of Putin's Russia* points out, *"in the case of Putin's Russia, there was return to the old regime, which had totally lost all credibility, but there were partial returns of various kinds"*. (Sutella, 2012, pp. 31-36) Pekka Sutela considers that these partial returns include the reconsolidation of political power in Moscow at the expense of the region, the mass

media related to popular opinion formation legally subjected to Kremlin control, the formation of political parties was also controlled somehow and attempts made to shape political life into a two-party direction in order to create a party of power plus a loyal quasi-opposition party. In return, in case of technological and economic changes the Putin's Russia has never attempted to control the internet and in economic terms limit the possibility of privatization to foreigners on political ground abandoned. (Sutella, 2012, pp. 31-36)

According to all evidence and objective elements, Russian leaders are trying to show a new Russia based on international law and universal norms mainly to those countries which were inside Soviet Union. The main policy of Russia in its foreign affairs is to build trust in Russia and prove is not an aggressive natured country anymore, but accepts and respects the other's sovereignty and independency. Russia is just looking to build a new political environment to achieve an influence similar to that of the Soviet Union by installing new type of perspectives and norms in the Eurasian Economic Union. Keeping on the influence and letting others to have their voice in policy and decision-making is the new model in Russian foreign policy. This is the reason why Russia challenges Western powers by appearing in conflict zones. Applying conflict generating policy helps Russia expand and develop Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation possibilities to those countries and regions that suffer from Western interventions. It also lays the ground for Russia to increase the values of global partnership by opening cooperation doors towards Western players. Paul M. Carter, Jr. says, *"Russia's activity in conflict zones usually directly or indirectly run counter to Western interests. Still it is sometimes possible for the United States and its allies to carve out space for cooperation with Russia on specific issues in conflict zones"* (Paul M. Carter, 2020). To further clarify Russia's above-mentioned conflict generating policy, what happened in the Middle East in the near past is a good and objective example of how Russia tries to blast the lack of success experienced by Western humanitarian intervention and democracy supporting policies. On the other hand, Russia adopted a protective policy with regard to states that are targeted by the US, including Syria, Egypt, and Libya. In this move, Russia defends them politically and strategically by providing military, economic and technological support. To make clear our standpoints, the Russia's interest and new relations and trust building policies have to be examined mainly after Arab Spring towards Middle East.

4.3 The first step towards a closer relationship

For the first time, the idea of building a way up for some sort of integration in Eurasia for the post-Soviet space in new circumstances was expressed by Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbayev. In his speech at Lomonosov Moscow State University on March 29, 1994 He proposed, *“How do I see the future of that space which used to be one country? Nowadays, in the conditions of sovereignty, recognizing equal rights of all, respecting the sovereignty and independence of each other state, we could create a completely new unity. I would call it the Eurasian Union.”* In addition, *“The basic principle is ensuring equality and respect for the sovereignty and independence of the states, for individual rights and the identity of each state. Only those states which recognize these principles should be accepted into the Eurasian Union. We would work on the basis of bilateral agreements with those which do not accept or are not yet ready to observe these principles. Naturally, for member states of such a union, special conditions will be created”*. (NURBEKOV, 2014)

4.3.1 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS):

The founding of the Commonwealth of Independent States Treaty in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union can be considered the first step towards the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union. The above-mentioned speech of Kazakhstan’s President in 1994 demonstrates a clear and comprehensive approach towards the real nature of the Eurasian Economic Union and all its possibilities and challenges discussed in this paper.

The Commonwealth of Independent States is the very beginning of the institutionalization of the Eurasian Economic Union integration process. In other terms, the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States can be understood as an influential survival strategy based on alignment theory. The leaders of the post-Soviet Russia wanted to maintain their influence over the post-Soviet states by providing all kinds of political and security support aimed at cooperation and coordination of the infrastructure building process. The alignment theory is a *“systemic explanation to identify a state’s relative position in the structure of the international system as the primary determinant of alignment outcomes”* (Miller, 2006, p. 12). The power-balancing

theory holds that the main interest of states is to move and shape their strategic orders. Balancing power means the move against the strongest power and a potential hegemony to ensure no state will dominate the system. In this account, states create a new equilibrium or balance for the international political order. (Miller, 2006, p. 12)

The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union created a huge number of mindboggling challenges for Russia and the other former republics. It was the time between August and December in 1991 when a single and historical state was replaced by 15 sovereign states. There were many serious problems which had to be solved by the successor states of the Soviet Union and mainly by Russia. These include the turning of Soviet citizens into citizens of 15 countries, the demarcation of new borders among newly independent countries and the concomitant border disputes and conflicts between some of them, the shared military of the once shared territory and the division process of a four million strong army with all its equipment including the disarmament of the nuclear weapons, the upcoming enormous challenges for all post-Soviet states, mostly in Russia, the inventory of the national economic assets or the control of them, the lack of sociopolitical knowledge among people of each state on how to adopt to the new system, the lack of administrative bodies to manage the social services system and obligations, and the division and management of the shared transportation and communication system from one to fifteen .

To cope with all these questions, the involved countries have found the solution of establishing a new stage of cooperation in the territory. The new stage of cooperation was named as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The establishment of the Commonwealth of the Independent States was not just a way of solving the problems posed by the breakup or so-called political divorce process of the Soviet Union. It was a much more complex initiative for long-term strategic steps in the field of security and defense policy. A new type of political and economic cooperation and integration emerged in some sense for the future of each post-Soviet states. The key topic that should be under scrutiny in relation to all kinds of cooperation and political alignments would be the position of Russia as a dominant power among other countries in the region. For policy makers in Moscow, the preeminence in the post-Soviet space was a foregone conclusion; even a clear process was not on the table to achieve this goal. On the other hand, the leaders of the new national capitals considered their countries as “little brothers” of Russia expecting that Russia would fully treat the economic and social problems of their countries. Nonetheless, Western policy makers believed that without involvement

of Russia there was no way to find a solution or to address the problems of post-Soviet States. The treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came into effect without Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and the three Baltic States. For the CIS member states, the main instruments of the organization were topics such as political, economic and security agreements that some of them signed bilaterally with Russia. All post-Soviet countries have remained intertwined; however, the members of the organization were not competitive in economic fields. . On the other hand, they are still interconnected, thus can suffer the consequences of economic crisis in their neighbors. For Russia, according to its foreign and security policy thinkers and state leaders, the newly independent states became foreign countries, but they call them “near abroad”: a term they assigned to the notion of zone of influence where Russia feels responsibility as well as for their neighbors mainly in terms of security. (Martha B. O, Anders A, and Sherman W. G, 1999, pp. 2-4)

Beside cooperation aimed at finding solutions to the above mentioned problems, the new understanding of sovereignty was another important question among the post-Soviet States. This perspective made foreign policy architecture for all the countries that are involved in the case to cooperate or not to cooperate with the policies in which Russia has the dominant position. As the term Commonwealth of Independent States was already known as an integrationist theory for the future, the countries shaped their views on the topic, to oppose it or to declare a positive neutrality to have the potential for being pragmatic in the future for some source of cooperation and integration.

Turkmenistan was an outspoken opponent of the integration. It was interested in bilateral relations rather than being committed to regional multilateral structures. After independence, it adopted its positive neutrality doctrine recognized by the UN resolution in 1995. For Ukraine, the CIS was a mechanism for the civilized divorce of the Soviet Union’s constituent republics. In reality, Ukraine was interested in getting closer to the European Union. This was why Ukraine opposed the greater integration of the CIS and its development towards becoming a functional organization. Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova created the so-called GUAM, which became later GUUAM after Uzbekistan joined them in 1999. Uzbekistan tried another policy by creating the Central Asian Economic Community with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and openly opposed the CIS in the region. All of the opponent countries had their own reasons related their geopolitical and interior problems due to which they did not feel themselves safe in a single organization with their opponent states. However, CIS, despite facing barriers and recognizing all the problems in the region, could develop towards the

Eurasian Economic Union. (Martha B. O, Anders A, and Sherman W. G, 1999, pp. 22-25)

4.3.2 The CIS Members between Collective Security Treaty Organization and Military-to-Military Ties with Russia

The post-Soviet Central Asian states are members of several military and security organizations. Their most important aim and expectation is promoting multilateral solutions to security, political and economic challenges. Some conceptual approaches have been developed and formed to address the question of security, military and collective defense policy of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members among Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The council of the Ministers of Defense works on coordinating military cooperation of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS). Additionally, the member states of the CIS have been actively involved in bilateral and multi-lateral military relations under the umbrella of Russia in the Collective Security Defense Organization (CSTO). The Eurasian Economic Community also establishes a similar process to group the states, but it focuses on economy, including the creation of a common or single market, border security standardizing and structuring, a customs union, stable and standardized currency exchange and joint programs or action plans on social and economic development. All of these organizations and bilateral military and securitizations ties are highly supported and even capitalized by Russia to prevent armed conflicts and their escalation in the area.

Not all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States could manage to accept and ratify the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security initiated by Moscow in May 1992. Finally, the Collective Security Treaty came into force on April 20, 1994 with the signatories and membership of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus joined it subsequently. Moscow wanted to militarize the member states through a political-military pact envisioned as a competitor to NATO and the European Union under the “regional security structure initiative within the CIS. Some of the member states were not interested in such an idea. The differences in interest resulted in the fact that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan did not sign the prolongation of the CST of the CIS in April 1999.

The Moscow-initiated Collective Security Treaty of the CIS transformed itself from a classical military-political bloc into a multifunctional regional organization and became the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) by the May 2002. Two years later,


on December 2, 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution granting the CSTO an observer status in the UN General Assembly. (MoFA - Belarus, n.d.) The CSTO established a joint command center in Moscow with collective rapid reaction forces in Central Asia by 2003. Rapid reaction forces were designed to operate throughout the territory of the Central Asian region under the aegis of the United Nations. At a summit on 4 February 2009, the CSTO member states signed an agreement to set up and create a new joint rapid-reaction force, which was to be based in Russia. The larger and more frequent military exercises among the bloc's members and the establishment of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force agreement in 2009 increased the organization's credibility and prestige on the global stage. The force acts in the interest of the member states and nations of the CSTO. Russia contributes an airborne division and an air assault division, Kazakhstan contributes an air assault division, and each of the remaining members contributes a battalion-size force. (Global Security)

36. Figure: The CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces

| | | |
|-------------------|---|---|
| Russia | 98th Guards Airborne Division (Ivanovo) | 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) |
| Kazakhstan | Marin Forces Battalion | 37th Air Assault Brigade (Taldykorgan) |
| Belarus | Spetsnaz Brigade | |
| Kyrgystan | Infantry Battalion | |
| Tajikistan | Infantry Battalion | |
| Armenia | Infantry Battalion | |

Source: (Global Security) Own Editing

37. Figure: The CSTO Structure



Source: (CSTO)

38. Figure

Collective Security Treaty Organization Member States

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) began in 1992 as the Collective Security Treaty, an agreement struck by the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union that, at the time, formed the Commonwealth of Independent States. The current members of the CSTO are displayed below.



Source: (Chausovsky, 2017) (Chausovsky, 2017)

The organization in its new shape focused on preserving territorial integrity and seeking closer cooperation with other multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and NATO. Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov introduced CSTO as a potential Eurasian Partner for NATO. He pointed out, “*The next logical step may be to work out a mechanism for cooperation between NATO and the CSTO with corresponding, clear defined sphere of responsibility*”. (Global Security, n.d.) (Global Security, n.d.)

According to the official documents (CSTO) published on its website, the fundamental objectives of the Organization are:

- To continue and strengthen the close and comprehensive relations in the foreign policy
- Military policy, military-technical sphere, coordinating the joint efforts in combating international terrorism and other security threats.

In addition, the key objectives of the Organization are:

- Provision of national and collective security
- Intensive military-political cooperation and integration

- Foreign policy coordination on international and regional security issues
- The establishment of multilateral cooperation mechanism, including a military component.
- The development of cooperation in the counteraction to modern challenges and security threats such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, transnational organized crime, information and cyber security, military-technical cooperation.

Despite all above-mentioned functionalities, institutions, and technical and military infrastructure the CSTO has, it still struggles with weaknesses and limitations. The fundamental objective of the CSTO is collective security and defense, but the absence of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia highly undermines article 4 of the CSTO's treaty, which states, "*The aggression against CSTO member states is considered by other participants as aggression against everyone*". For instance, the organization could not intervene on its behalf when ethnic violence broke out between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. However, Bishkek asked the CSTO to take joint action, but the secretary-general of the CSTO refused to take any action stating the conflict was a domestic affair. The secretary-general did not accept Belarusian President's request to intervene and take a course towards collective action on clashes between rebels and military forces in the eastern Tajik region of Gorno-Badakhshan. In this regard, the CSTO will have the same reaction towards any escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, too, because Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus maintain strong ties to Azerbaijan. Secondly, the involvement of Russia in conflicts with Ukraine and Georgia, the presence of Russian army in Syria and Venezuela is not coordinated with the CSTO, something which also displays a vulnerable future of the organization. Finally, there is an effective willingness on Russia's side to promoting military-to-military contacts via bilateral channels with the post-Soviet republics that can be recognized as a barrier for the development of the multilateral approaches that should characterize CSTO's role in the region. (Chausovsky, 2017)

In order to illustrate a practical bilateral cooperation on the securitization between the post-Soviet countries, we can mention bilateral agreements which enable the countries to be ready to defend their own selves and keep secure Russia's zone of influence and regional interest. The example of such an agreement is the new bilateral agreement between Russia and Tajikistan.

According to an agreement under the title of “Major program of joined modernization of Tajikistan’s Military”¹⁰ signed by Moscow and Dushanbe in 2014, Russia supplied about \$1.2 billion worth of weapons and military equipment to the Central Asian nation of Tajikistan. Tajikistan is under direct threat by the Islamic State (IS) from its area bordering Afghanistan. The weapons and equipment would include personal weapons and ammunitions, communication systems, aircraft, artillery systems, and missiles. The major objective of this program is securing the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. This task has become especially important after the Coalition Forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and the growing threat posed by the so-called Islamic State (IS). In early March 2015, Russian deputy defense minister Anatoly Antonov told that Russian intelligence had gathered information about increased activity of Islamic States’ cells near the Southern border of the Russian Federation, and particularly near the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. That is why Russia beefed up its military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to counter the threats. A point to be noted is Russia’s 7,000-strong military base near Tajikistan capital Dushanbe is the largest Russian military contingent in Central Asia and one of the strongest units in the region. Anatoly Antonov said, *“We received confirmation the Islamic State is making contacts with terrorists in Russia’s North Caucasus. We will bear this in mind when we make decisions aimed at strengthening Russia’s security and protection of its borders”*. (Mokrushin, 2015)

In this vein of thoughts, speaking about threats, Antanov outlines Russia’s security responsibly for the region in a precise manner. The head of Russia’s Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said that the Russian Federation was planning to coordinate additional steps in combating Islamic States with partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the Eurasian military-political bloc uniting China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and recently India and Pakistan). (Mokrushin, 2015) Currently Russia maintains its military bases in Armenia, Belarus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Transnistria (breakaway state of Moldova), Syria, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. There used to Russian military basis in Azerbaijan, Cuba, Georgia, and Uzbekistan, but they do not operate any longer. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Crimean military base is on Russian territory, but in Uzbekistan a Russian military

¹⁰ In 2013, Tajikistan agreed not to charge rent for the base, in return for major Russian aid to its military forces and drug enforcement agency, delivered in weapons and hardware.

base would be required in order to securitize its borders if security challenges become more considerable in North-Afghanistan which it borders.

4.3.3 Free Trade area

Another important vision of the Commonwealth of Independent States was to create a free trade system among their markets to develop their economies. The process started in 1994. Although, the member states tried to have such strategically significant shift.

The agreement was signed by the following CIS member states: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Ukraine has joined the agreement as an Associate Member, and Georgia and Turkmenistan withdrew to join the process. The agreement shaped economic integration to create customs union, monetary union, free trade area for goods and services and common market for capital and labor movement. It also commits the signatories to formulate a uniform foreign economic policy. According to the CIS Inter-State Statistics Committee, Russia used to be the most important and main trade partner of the CIS countries throughout 1997. The agreement has not come into force immediately in all CIS member states, but it enabled Russia to consolidate its position in CIS member states. This step of the post-Soviet states given a chance to Russia and other states to build some course of further action in their economic section establishing bilateral free-trade agreements with each other. (Michael Roberts and Peter Wehrheim, 2001)

The Bilateral Free Trade Agreements that has been signed within the CIS are the followings:

- Azerbaijan has signed bilateral free trade agreements with the Russian Federation (1992), Moldova (1995), Ukraine (1995), Turkmenistan (1996), Uzbekistan (1996), Georgia (1996) and Kazakhstan (1997).

- Georgia has agreements with the Russian Federation (1994), Uzbekistan (1995), Ukraine (1996), Armenia (1998), Kazakhstan (1999), Turkmenistan (2000) and Moldova. However, it is on Feb 11, 2000 that the Georgian Parliament ratified the 1994 agreement with Russia.

- Kyrgyzstan has also freed its trade with the Russian Federation (1993), Armenia (1995), Kazakhstan (1995), Moldova (1996), Ukraine and Uzbekistan (1998).

- Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have concluded free trade agreements with Uzbekistan in 1996; Uzbekistan has also come up with Belarus, Moldova and Russian

Federation. Ukraine has signed free trade agreements with each of the former Soviet republics except Tajikistan.

Point to be noted is that just 13 of the above-mentioned free trade agreements have been notified by the GATT/WTO and are still in force.

4.3.4 Increased Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields

Since 1996, the Post-Soviet Countries have made another step in favour of their strategy to be closer to one other socially and economically, namely the Treaty on Increased Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields.

4.3.5 Eurasian Economic Community

The other big and strategic step towards the deepening of the cooperation between the post-soviet states is the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). The Eurasian Economic Community has originated from the Commonwealth of Independent States and Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia on 29 March 1996. The treaty to establish Eurasian Economic Community was signed on 10 October 2000 in Kazakhstan's capital Astana by presidents Alexander Lukashenko (Belarus), Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan), Askar Akayev (Kyrgyzstan), Vladimir Putin (Russia) and Emomali Rakhmonov (Tajikistan). Uzbekistan has been accepted by the member states on 7 October 2005. Freedom of movement without visa requirements has been implemented among the members. A decade later, on 1 January 2010, the Common Economic Space (CES) was launched by the member states of the CIS. Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine were the Observers to the EEC.

Eurasian Economic Community acted as an effective promotion that helped member states to create the Eurasian Customs Union. The Member states in the Single Economic Space have coordinated their approaches in order to integrate into the world economy and trade system. The dynamic evaluation of the community states was a better coordinating in their economic and social reforms and the using of their economic abilities to bring positive changes in the life standards of their peoples. Among the principal tasks of the Community are: (Center, Eurasian Economic, n.d.)

- Completing the formalization of a free trade regime in all respects, creating a unified customs union and a unified system of nontariff regulation measures;
- Laying down the common rules for trade in goods and services and their access to internal markets;

- Ensuring the free movement of capital;
- Introducing a unified procedure for foreign exchange controls;
- Creating a common and unified system of customs regulation;
- Harmonization of economies for the transition to a future single currency
- building up and implementing joint programs of economic and social development;
- Creating equal conditions for production and entrepreneurial activities;
- Forming a common market for transportation services and a unified transporting system;
- Forming a common energy market;
- Creating equal conditions for access by foreign investment to the sides' markets;
- Giving the citizens of the Community states equal rights in receiving education and medical assistance throughout its territory;
- Converging and harmonizing national legislation;
- Ensuring the coordination of the legal systems of the Eurasian Economic Community states with a view to creating a common legal space within the Community.

The Eurasian Economic Community has its international partners. It seemed to be a serious body of world economy and politics in the future. Its partners are: (Eurasian Economic commission)

- United Nation
- WTO
- European Union
- Parliamentary assembly of the Black Sea Economic Community (PABSEC)
- United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
- International Centre of Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)
- The Economic Commission for Europe
- Chamber of International Commerce (ICC) in EurAsEC
- Interparliamentary Assembly of the EurAsEC
- Foundation of Russian Federation Federal and Regional programs
- National Centre of legal information of the Republic of Belarus

- National departments and ministries
- Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the EurAsEC Member States in Switzerland
- Swiss Import Promotion Programme (SIPPO), Zurich, Switzerland
- State Economy Secretary (SECO), Bern, Switzerland
- Geneva International, Switzerland
- Department of Economy, Labor and International affairs (DEEE), Geneva, Switzerland
- Geneva Junior Chamber of Economy (JCEG), Switzerland

4.3.6 Eurasian Customs Union

This treaty came into force from 1 July 2010 between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Related to the Customs Union, Nursultan Nazarbayev after a Eurasian Economic Community summit in Minsk, Belarus said, *“All the decisions were approved on the basis of equality, of respect for the sovereignty of all the members, and of the benefit of all of them”*. He also added, *“Clear the way to the next stage of integration, a unified economic space”*. (Turkish Weekly, 2009)

According to Yaroslav Lissovolik, the chief economist at Deutsche Bank in Moscow, *“this is a very positive paradigm shift in how Russia deals with the near abroad”*. Previously, it was a one-way street where Russia was giving out economic favors in exchange for political favors” (Kramer, 2010).

The Customs Union expected to create a more attractive market for investment than its three-member countries can have individually. As Kazakh president Nazarbayev claimed, *“There will be higher competition in the markets of all the three countries, which should affect the quality of goods produced there.”* Russian president Dmitry Medvedev added *“The EurAsEC is the only post-Soviet organization which rapidly develops integration, and Moscow is interested in the soonest formation of a common economic space with Belarus and Kazakhstan”*. (Turkish Weekly, 2009)

4.4 Results and questions of the Eurasian Economic Union

Now we are going to see the evolution of the Eurasian Economic Union from the beginning of 2015 until late 2018. As it used to be before the main question for the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union is still sustainability: will the Eurasian

Economic Union reduce technical, economic, legislative and institutional barriers to become a real entity and regional institution?

The most important actor in the realization of Eurasian Economic Union is the Russian Federation, which gives most of the Union's population and economy. All norms and values of the Union are influenced by Russia and Russian geopolitics. The small countries follow Russia to gain and guarantee their economic and political regimes security and sustainability. This kind of asymmetric interdependence in a union can decelerate and undermine its functionality of multi-level governance process. If one of the members gives 80 percent of the resources, the integration contents like *"merging of parts in to a whole, fitting together and melting into one another"* could lose its functionality and meaning. According to Tibor Palánkai, *"Multi-level governance, in fact, means the emergence of a new structure, where the constitutional foundations of sovereignty may remain largely unchanged, leaving national member states as basic entities, but at the same time, it challenges the functional or operational autonomy of states by sharing decisions and perusing certain policies in a shared way"* (Palánkai, 2004, p. 39).

One problem is that the expectations for the achievements of the Eurasian Economic Union are set too high when compared to the European Union. In reality, the EAEU is more comparable with NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), South African Customs Union (SACU). (Vinokurov, 2017)

First, we can say that as for now the Eurasian Economic Union's institutions are complete such as:

1. The Eurasian Economic Council (EC): The EAEU successfully managed to establish the EC comprising the heads of the member states. The EC focuses on critical issues which influence the Union, and approves its strategy, key operation and development areas and protective.
2. The Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EIC): The EIC comprises the heads of the governments of the member states and can practice its power in 10 areas including enforcement of the EAEU Treaty and approval of a draft EAEU budget.
3. The Eurasian Economic Commission: It has remained in its previous design and acting as the Union's regulatory body and motive force for integration.

4. The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union: It is shaped to be a specialized judicial body. It enjoys authority to resolve disputes related to the conduction of the international treaties signed and within the framework of the EAEU.

5. The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB): The EDB appears as a regional international financial institute. Its priorities are promoting development projects, mutual trade and mutual investments. As far as its profile is concerned, “*the Bank’s charter capital totals US \$7 billion, including US \$1.5 billion of paid-in capital and US \$5.5 billion of callable capital*”. (Eurasian Development Bank, n.d.)

6. The Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD): The fund works as a regional financial arrangement (RFA) and focusing on programs and projects on macroeconomic and financial stabilization, long-term sustainable development and regional integration. The total capital of the EFSD is US \$8.5 billion. The EFSD is essentially a regional alternative to IMF. (Bank, Eurasian Development, n.d.)

7. Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union: The Treaty on the Customs Code of the EAEU came into force by July 1, 2017. The Treaty enhanced a unified customs regulation, exercises and operations in the Union’s territory and determined the procedure for, and the terms of, movement of goods across the customs border of the Union. (Eurasian Economic Commission, n.d.)

At the same time, there are essential areas which are going to be completed accordingly. The areas with their completion schedules are the following:

1. Creation of EAEU’s Single Power Market by 2019¹¹
2. Creation of the EAEU’s Single Market for oil, gas, and petroleum production by 2025
3. Gradual Elimination and unification of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in mutual trade in goods and services in near future
4. Creation of an EAEU financial regulator by 2022-2025, a supranational responsible financial institution for enforcing common standards in EAEU’s financial market, providing regulation and supervision. The term is one of the most complex matters of the EAEU’s future and requires a well-structured work and policy coordination between the member states.

¹¹ The work on the formation of the Union’s common electricity market is in progress.

5. Coordination and unification of the EAEU's member states' macroeconomic policies and primarily monetary policy. This is also one of the most complex areas of the EAEU in the future.

Another historical step that has not been taken yet by the member states of the union is the establishment of the single central bank or single currency. The leaders of the union approached the term Currency Union for the first time during their meeting in March 2015 in Astana. In 2015, they believed that the existence of different national currencies leads to risks in economic, political and social areas of the members. President Vladimir Putin pointed at the fact that it was time to think about the prospects of creating a currency union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in the future. This was the first time that Putin called on his counterparts Nursultan Nazarbayev and Aleksandr Lukashenko to start talking of such approach. The currency union would be useful for protecting the common financial market, avoiding their macroeconomic uncertainties and lessening the risks of financial crises. This topic was a part of the meeting where the heads of states of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan discussed a joint plan for tackling the slowdown of the global economy and challenges posed in the energy market by the plunging of oil prices by more than 70 percent from 2014 to 2015. It is important because the economies of all member states of the Eurasian Economic Union are almost dependent on oil and gas mainly Russia and Kazakhstan.

Talking about the currency union, we can say that despite the wide range of benefits, trade within the Eurasian Economic Union may face certain risks. The absence of borders and the common market for services made extremely dependent on fluctuation in currency exchange rates. That may keep trade barriers and create huge trade imbalances between the countries in the same enclosed economic space where goods, services, capital and labor is moving constantly. At the same time, the usage of national currencies can help member states and economies strengthen their macroeconomic and develop local financial market. According to various studies and indexes, 70 per cent of the payments for exports in the EAEU are conducted in national currencies.

In case of payments in national currencies, we have to consider the domination of Russia as shown in our diagrams already. The Eurasian Development Bank Center for Integration Studies reported that the share of the Russian ruble in the currency structure of payments in the EAEU has increased to 75 per cent from 56 per cent in last six years. At the same time, the share of dollar in same period has decreased to 19 per cent from 35.

The settlements in rubles between the countries amount to more than \$69 billion. The share of dollars is about \$18 billion and Euro's is about 5 billion.

Thus, the establishment of the Currency Union between EAEU member countries means the member countries will give up their sovereignty on fiscal, financial and monetary policy to Russia. The estimations show the member countries can be totally switched to rubbles in their trade settlements from 2022 to 2025. On the other hand, Russia also desires to increase the regional settlements in ruble and introduce its national currency as a regional currency rather establishing a regional one. (Eurasian Development Bank, 2019)

Since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, Russia has been isolated by the European Union and the United States. Before that the western countries was expected to be the key partners of the Eurasian Economic Union according to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's article (2011). Since the annexation (re-unification by Russian point of view) of Crimea, Russia or President Putin's political and economic relations developed to an opposite direction.

Currently there is no sign yet of any negative standpoints of member states of the Eurasian Economic Union on what Russia is doing or where Russia wants to lead the Union. On the other hand, the post-Soviet countries consider the Eurasian Economic Union a potential source for boosting better regional cooperation and integration.

In numerous areas Russia is becoming weaker and losing the opportunities to have the best future in its economic area. The foreign businesses are just leaving or have left Russia since the sanctions were implemented by the Western block to force Russia to be and act as a modern European country instead of maneuvering as a great power or an empire. The Ukrainian conflict and the annexation of Crimea was the cause for the West to draw a line and limit Russia's further territorial expansion.

Nevertheless, the future of the Eurasian Economic Union is also linked to the economic and political relations between Belarus, Kazakhstan Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In relation with their position in the initiative, we should have a glance what policies they have adopted successfully and what steps are yet to be done for a sustainable future of the Eurasian Economic Union.

In the EAEU Kazakhstan is the second most important country after Russia. It has developed a well-structured economy and social security system in recent years. Its oil production is one of the most significant term of the country's economy and sustainable development.

Nursultan Nazarbayev delivered a major speech to his people on November 11, 2014 talking about his countries “new economic policy” that he dubbed “*The Pathway of the Future*”. (Nazarbayev, 2014)

Kazakhstan is a key member of the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community, and joined World Trade Organization in November 2015. Kazakhstan is the country in the entire post-Soviet landmass which has attracted more foreign direct investment per capita than any other country in the Commonwealth of Independent States, even twice as much as Russia and four times more than Ukraine. Kazakh population also enjoys good economic conditions and life expectancy. According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business” report in 2019, Kazakhstan ranked in 28th place, Belarus in 37th, Russia in 31th, Armenia in 41th, and Kyrgyzstan in 70th. In addition, since 2005 Kazakhstan has outpaced Belarus and Russia in the rate at which its business environment has improved.

Kazakhstan is attractive to investors for three main reasons: its macroeconomic stability, political and social stability, and low taxes. Kazakhstan has some weak areas as well: its transport and logistics infrastructure, its labor law, its lack of openness in all aspects of trade policy, corruption, bureaucracy and inflexible labor laws. Nazarbayev's economic plan is going to energetically correct those shortcomings starting in January 2015.

Nazarbayev announced his decision to open access to Kazakhstan's National Reserve Fund and allocate additional \$3 billion annually to priority projects, especially in infrastructure such as highways, airports, seaports and housing and public utilities. Asian and European banks will help provide outlays totaling \$25 billion on roadwork alone. Kazakhstan seeks to position itself as a key transit center in Eurasia.

Among Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus there are two kinds of competition: one is the competition between different models of states and national economy and society. All three of them are authoritarian states. Nursultan Nazarbayev has been the president of Kazakhstan for more than 25 years, Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko for more than 20 years, and president Putin has been in power for almost 20 years. At the same time each has privatized a different economic and political model. Russia is still an example of classic state capitalism with its huge monopolies. Writing about Putin’s Russia, Pekka Sutela concludes Russia’s economy will remain resource oriented at least for the first half of the coming century, perhaps for the whole century. It means that that in case of foreign direct investment, the most attractive realm is Russia’s mineral wealth. As for now, Russia has a special but weak position among core industrial countries. The

post-hydrocarbon future in Russia may have had to start by 2020 and the Russia must be prepared for. (Sutella, 2012, pp. 37-38)

The Belarusian economy survives by selling mid-level engineering products on the Russian market and coasting along on Russian loans and non-repayable subsidies, and Kazakhstan bases its economy on raw material exports and developing its agricultural sector, actively attracting foreign investment in all economic sectors and developing its potential as a transit center.

Kazakhstan and Belarus make their benefits from the current state of Russia's economy. In the wake of sanctions and business difficulties between Russia and its Western Partners, Belarus and Kazakhstan have received an opportunity to find a better market in Russia for their businesses and productions. The other point is that neither country has such geopolitical ambitions as Russia has and so they are not forced to spend their money in such area. They seek to do business in all aspect and condition. (Ryzhkov, 2014)

This means Kazakhstan enjoys more possibilities to keep its relationship with the rest of the world, mainly with the Western partners, while being an active member of the Eurasian Economic Union providing dynamic economic and technological development. On the one hand, Kazakhstan is benefiting from Russia's misfortune and on the other hand, it is using out its western relations very rationally to be an important actor of the world economy, too. There is no Russian influence on Kazakhstan's political and economic relations with its Western partners.

To have an objective example about Kazakh economic and political relations with international partners, we must consider that Kazakhstan has received \$260 million in financing jointly arranged by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Unicredit Group for Voskhod Chromium, a mining operation in western Kazakhstan. The loan agreement was signed in London on February 23, 2015 in the presence of EBRD President Sir Chakrabarti, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Massimov and senior representatives of Unicredit Group. This is not the only investment of the EBRD in Kazakhstan. EBRD has invested about \$7 billion in to various sectors of Kazakhstan's economy in 2014, it reached a record level of \$700 million. (Krowchenko, 2015)

However, from other points of view, the economic recession and isolation in Russia are not really fruitful for the member states of the Customs Union, Eurasian Economic community and Eurasian Economic Union and for all post-Soviet states because of their

economic interdependency with Russian economy and social system. All the economic problems in which Russia was struggling over the conflict in Ukraine has loomed on the above mentioned countries.

The difficult times in Kazakhstan began in 2014. The president of the country Nursultan Nazarbayev has repeatedly warned local citizens that they would need to be ready for the times in which the country will be in economic recessions. In a country like Kazakhstan where 20 – 30 percent of the GDP comes from oil, also making up over 50 percent of the national budget and 60 percent of the export, the low and fluctuating oil price definitely promises hard times. That is why over the last years, Kazakhstan's national currency, the tenge has devaluated drastically and reacted to some very negative events in the country's economy. It means that the ongoing standoff between Russia and the West has indirect effects on Kazakhstan's economic situation. Kazakh oil export goes through Russian territory, on Russian pipelines and Russian ports. In addition, Kazakhstan hugely depends on Russian raw materials for its interior market. The problem is that decline of the Russian ruble made Russian raw materials more competitive on Kazakhstan's market. In some cases, the Kazakh businessmen requested the government to ban imports of certain Russian raw materials due to the fall of ruble rate. Nevertheless, the conditions of the joint economic space and the membership in the Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Union do not give any chance to ban imports from Russia. It means that Kazakhstan has to struggle with this situation because of Russia and should be prepared for a new paradigm in its economy system. (Snyktova, 2015) As for now, a sustainable increase in oil price could be the only fortune maker instrument in Kazakhstan's economy.

Here, we should know that economic difficulties in Russia and Kazakhstan could damage the future of Eurasian Economic Union. According to Ivan Ippolitov¹² talking in Pravda, *"Economic difficulties in Russia and Kazakhstan may affect the development of the Eurasian Economic integration. Both, Russian and Kazakh economies depend on foreign trade and exports of natural resources. Yet, one should not be dramatic about it. One should understand that economic times could vary from easy to hard periods. One will have to look for options to overcome these problems"*. (Sudakov, 2015) On the other

¹² A spokesman for the department of Central Asia of the Center for the Studies of Problems of near-foreign. Countries, an employee of the Russian Institute for Strategic Research

hand, there was an optimistic view from Aza Migranyan¹³ in the same paper issued by Pravda.Ru. According to the expert, the customs union was not going to see considerable economic difficulties in the future because the physical production volumes are remained as the same as they were, it is only economic indicators, which have declined recently, and these kinds of factors do not change in the majority of countries. The growth of the inflation rate and the decline of the purchasing capacity of the population are reducing the volume of the mutual trade means the level of consuming foreign products is declining and the domestic production is developing dynamically. In this situation, economic difficulties effects on government planes prepared for the modernization of economy. Finally, she adds, *“if the government of Kazakhstan could indeed limit the imports of goods from the Russian Federation, it would have contained the development of the Eurasian Economic Union”*. (Sudakov, 2015)

On the other hand, Howard Amos listed Russia’s economic difficulties on the Moscow Times under the title of 5 Forces Battering Russia’s Economy as Putin Faces Nation in 2014. The five major areas listed by Howard Amos were the looming recession, Ruble depreciation and fluctuation, oil price, inflation, and investment climate. (Amos, 2014) Except of oil price, the situation on other four areas has not changed yet.

Russia’s economy is struggling with sanctions. Rising inflation, spiraling capital flight and a plunging currency resulted in Russia's economy being headed for a recession and the problems are rising day by day. President Putin During his state of nation in 2012, president Putin pointed that the Russian economy needed economic growth of 5 or 6 percent a year for a decade. After the annexation of Crimea, Russian economy came under heavy sanctions by the West and lost its growth. According to announcement and prediction of the Economic Development Ministry of Russia, the country's GDP growth rate could be 1-2 per cent annually up to 2030. According to IMF real GDP growth, Russia’s GDP growth in 2015 was -2.5 per cent, 0.3 per cent in 2016, 1.6 per cent in 2017, 2.3 per cent in 2018 and 1.6 per cent in 2019. In his article The Looming Russian Recession, Vladislav Inozemtsov wrote that¹⁴ the average of Russia’s salary at the end of 2018 was 42,800 rubles (\$630) compared to 17,300 rubles (\$695) in 2008. (Inozemtsov, 2019) According to official data, at the end of 2021, the average salary in Russia was around 54600 rubles (\$730). Russian ruble has depreciated by almost 40 percent in year

¹³ Chairwoman of the department for economics at the Institute of CIS countries.

¹⁴ Director of the Center for post-Industrial Studies in Moscow.

2014 against the U.S. dollar. However, the Central Bank has spent \$70 billion defending the currency so far that year but to no avail. The Russian Ruble is still in fluctuation because it is highly under influence of the oil prices and ongoing sanctions. Moreover, according to official operations of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), in the first seven months of 2019 the net capital outflow increased by 1.6 times to \$28 billion from \$17.4 billion in the same period of 2018. (The Moscow Times, 2019) Deteriorating political relations with the U.S. and the EU have not been the only body blow to Russia's already vulnerable business climate. The foreign direct investment to which Putin refers in his article is an option impossible to count on since the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict. The only source for Russia in this regard is China. (Amos, 2014)

In December 2014, Vladimir Putin ordered a one-year freeze on civil servants' pay in various state offices, reacting to the sharp fall of the Russian national currency, which was the effect of the plunge in oil price. In addition, in March 2015, another announcement was made by Russian president about salary cuts of 10 percent for all members of his administration. This was a requisition of State Duma speaker Sergey Naryshkin told fellow lawmakers that he intended to address the president with a request to cut their recently increased salaries as part of the Russian government's budget optimization what has been accepted by president Putin. In April 2015, Russian President announced that Russia's economic difficulties could not be named a crisis as Russia had overcome the difficulties of 2014. At the time he pointed the result as "*one of the greatest achievements*" in recent years. At All-Russian popular front media conference in St. Petersburg, he said "*The fundamentals of the Russian economy have strengthened and the stability cannot be destroyed completely*" (Putin, 2015) *áú*. However, in fact there are still difficulties in Russian economy to be fought by Russian government. The Russian economy faced difficulties and recessions in the past 30 years. Vladimir Putin 20 year's era has had its successes and failures and still struggling with the damages of the crises in 2008 and 2014 sanctions and is very far from reliable stability and GDP and economic growth. (Ben Aris and Ivan Tkachev , 2019)

Beside the real economic difficulties, the economies of the member countries of the EAEU are faced with a structural disfunctionality. The economic structure of the EAEU member state is close to classical economics then to neo-classical. Albeit the concept of international economic integration dates back to the classics (Adam Smith and David Ricardo),, their theoretical and methodological interpretation, their practical settlement and the method of analysis are largely based on neo-classical and welfare international

economics, and benefits of international trade, according to Tibor Palánkai. (Palánkai, 2004, pp. 13-17)

The second structural disfunctionality in the economies of the EAEU member states is the lack of knowledge-based economy and social market economy. According to Pál Gervai and Professor László Trautmann, “*A knowledge-based economy means knowing how to assert moral and community values, how to translate them to the language of individual interest*”. Additionally, the “*knowledge-based economy*” helps and gives a professional knowledge to a nation, country, and individual for explaining the value of security, freedom, democracy, welfare in practice and harmonizing values between economic culture and economic policy. The constitutional factors of the social market economy are freedom of access to the market, mass production, new price calculation methods, and in general, a more active participation. The social market economy requires that the market should be a part of the democratic system of institutions. In social market economy, democracy works as a source of effectiveness. (Gervai P. & László Trautmann, 2015)

So, here we can realize that Eurasian Economic Union member states are suffering from a kind of hopelessness about their economic future; the question is how the populations of these countries will act towards all these difficulties. What will be the position of businesspersons in each country? How important the Russian position is for non-Russians in the member countries? Finally, will the member states of the Eurasian Union exert some source of pressure on Russia to change its attitude toward the West and if it happens what would be the reaction from Russia? To these important questions there are no methodological answers yet.

To summarize, the problems of Russia’s economy are caused by the Western sanctions, the confrontation of US and Russia over Syria, Ukraine, and other potential conflict regions of the world where both powers feel their responsibility. The rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the securitization of Central Asian states, the involvement of Iran-Russia in the Saudi-Yemen conflict and the new stage of relations between the West and Iran, respectively Russia and Iran were the most significant problems, which slowed down the process of the Eurasian Economic Union integration. Although Russia was involved unilaterally in these conflicts, was involved owing to its position of the largest power and economy in the Eurasian Economic Union, its economic slowdown has deeply influenced the Union.

5 Conclusion

As we know, every change requires some course of action and every action creates reactions and even confrontations. More often than not, confrontations create winners and losers. The winner is always the one who serves justice and according to classical realism, “*justice is the advantage of the stronger*”. Today, the great powers of the world are in confrontation; some of them as Western powers are in an era of power survival and some of them as Russia, China, India, Turkey and Iran are in the era of power transaction. Both theories require conflicts or even war. We all know that according to Clausewitzian theory, “*War is a continuation of policy by other means*”. That is why both sides of the world are involved in conflicts over many issues and inflaming wars against each other's partners in small countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine. The people of Afghanistan has been bearing the brunt of this international conflict for more than fourthly years. All these confrontations, indirect armed conflicts and threats are the signs of change in the world order. The global partnership world order is set to be very different from its post-cold war unipolar globalization was dominated by the United States.

Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran are contemplating a new form of cooperation with the West. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the large powers of Eurasia successfully resisted for their political and economic systems. They have chosen to enhance their regional cooperation in security, political, economic and technology fields to defend their interests. Eurasia is a powerful region that can develop its own path and find regional solutions to address regional conflicts. In global partnership models powerful regions, comprehensive regional cooperation and regional institutional building process are the most significant. Regional cooperation increases geopolitical and geo-economic values and helps inter-regional ties and interactions. Regional powerfulness is the appropriate phenomenon that secures and stabilizes the world order. As history has proved, all multipolar, bipolar and unipolar world orders have failed and lost the path to surviving challenges and threats. The global partnership is a completed version of globalization developed in post-Soviet Eurasia through mutual understanding and recognizing one another's interest, influence and demands. By this, the era of Mackinder has gone, and as he stated, “*Whoever rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; whoever rules the World-Island commands the World*” (Mackinder J. Halford, 1904). No Eurasian power seeks to rule the Heartland, command the World-Island and govern the world unilaterally.

Eurasian powers want to develop a global partnership model at the inter-regional and international level by challenging post-Soviet unipolar world order. This step generates conflicts and misunderstandings in high-level politics between Eurasian powers and the West, represented by organizations like NATO and the European Union. I believe that the era of misunderstanding will concede its place to “*geniun strategic partnership and trans-Eurasian security system*” applied by Brzezinski, Z. (Brzezinski, Z., 1997) between Eurasia and Europe, on the one hand, and Eurasian powers and the US, on the other.

The conflicts or misunderstandings in high-level politics could remain until all sides or powers grow poised to cooperate with one another while sometimes having competing in meanings and interests. This is what global partnership means. China and Russia have presented the model of major country relationship without interfering into each other's internal affairs and have not tried to dominate each other's interests in regional and international affairs. Currently, the model of major country relationship is the most important factor of bilateral and multilateral relationships between Eurasian powers like Russia-India, Russia-Iran, Russia-Turkey, China-India, China-Iran, China-Turkey etc. In recent years, Russia and Turkey played a significant positive role in the Libyan peace process which led to a ceasefire and end of civil war within a year following the Berlin Conference on January 2020. Russian, Iranian and Turkish armies are cooperating and coordinating their movements in Syria thanks to high-level political understanding of their leaders. Russia and Turkey also managed to cooperate closely and de-escalate the long-standing regional conflict (flash point) of Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Caucasus. Russia and China work shoulder to shoulder in Central Asia, Middle East, Africa and numerous international initiatives and organizations while pursuing different goals and interests. It seems that the era of war of every country against others has finished and the era of cooperation of every country with every country has started in Eurasia. At the same time, almost all Eurasian powers are under political pressure and economic sanctions imposed by the United States and its NATO allies due to misunderstandings in high-level politics and over different points of view or interest. In Eurasia, such cope and struggle required strong and functional security, political, economic and technology initiatives and framework that would have the capacity to manage and survive all aspects of conflicts and achieve the targets set. The resistance over regional affairs and comprehensive cooperation among Great powers in Eurasia represents a new era characterized by awareness of regionalism and partnership. The

comprehensive platform of partnership will lead the countries to form a “*macro-region*” (Bassin, M, 2008) provided by Alexander Dugin.

As we mentioned in the second chapter, one of the most outstanding points in the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation in 2016 was the use of force and power projection outside the country and outside its zone of influence. The policy adopted by China, India, Turkey and Iran is not different. Each of these countries is involved in military and political conflicts with the West. The conflicts and misunderstandings between Western and Eurasian powers are rooted in the central debate of global political and economic power distribution. Such a debate led/leads global and regional great powers to a dynamic political awakening. Brzezinski raised the term “politically defined Europe” can help Russia to assimilate into the global cooperation. Yet he missed to point that a politically redefined Eurasia drawing on different values and moral was also essential for a meaningful and balanced global cooperation.

These confrontations with powerful countries bring hard times to countries and like Russia, China, India, Turkey and Iran. They will experience difficulties in their internal and external affairs, hence should be very careful what future to choose. This is a hard decision for the leaders and nations of Eurasia and requires common or coordinated comprehensive and well-structured foreign and security policy. The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could count as one of the most important evolutions of the new regionalization in which the United States has been kept outside by the member states; instead, Russia, China, India and Pakistan are the key actors of the initiative. However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been ignored by Bush II and Obama Administrations, while with regard to China-led One Belt and One Road (OBOR), Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), and Eurasian Economic Union, U.S. has shown a much more critical posture.

On the other hand, the above-mentioned Russian neo-Eurasianism with its new point of view openly cooperates with other powers towards providing security, political, economic and technology initiatives to Central-Asia, Asia-Pacific, South-Asia, Africa and Middle East. The emerging of Russia-China, Russia-Turkey and Russia-Iran with a harmonized and coordinated policy and strategy in Africa, Central Asia, and Middle East and in international organizations shows a deep recognition among Eurasian powers. These signs guarantee a paradigm change. The world is witnessing a transformation process from unipolar globalization to a so-called multipolar globalization or global partnership. The process for establishing or shaping macro-regions or geo-economic belts

has already started in Eurasia and the idea is spreading to other parts of the world. As we mentioned, the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis might guarantee important ground for establishing the Eurasian macro-region. The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis would be the key factor of the European Union's security, economic, energy and technology transfer initiative. The very essential strategy from the part of Russia is to transform the European security architecture. Russia wants European Union to practice its sovereignty while making decisions on their economic, foreign, security, and defense issues. Russia tries to build trust and a degree of cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union. China, India, Turkey and Iran have a similar view to the term and expect the European Union not to follow The US in its ties. The relationship between the European Union and Eurasian powers is developing positively in economical, connectivity and technology fields. Currently Eurasia, and within it Russia, China and Turkey are the most important partners for the European Union but their relationship has not reached the real security cooperation level. The Western security structure has a strong evolutionary background. Dramatic changes are impossible. This means that the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis will not become an existing process in this field. However, in upcoming years and decades the relationship between Eurasia and the European Union will develop in economic, connectivity and technology fields. The military and security fields will remain unaffected by this development.

As mentioned in the introduction section, the process of the Eurasian political-economic consolidation, political institutionalism, security structuralization and technological and economic cooperation has already begun in the forms of the Eurasian Economic Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia-led economic forums and projects like China-led OBOR, India-led NSTC, and the regional initiatives like TAPI, TUTAP, CASA-1000 and CASA-REM. American politicians consider Eurasianism as an anti-Americanism process. They consider that Eurasianism emerges as a universal project to place Eurasia in the center of the world.

The Eurasian powers club provides global partnership views within a new political, economic, security, military, and technology order to other regions and countries. Eurasian powers try to consider and recognize other countries' choices and interests and defend their rights of being different instead of forcing them to accept rules and norms from abroad. The Eurasian powers condemn the United States' "*democracy exporting strategy*". Ongoing conflicts and flashpoints like Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Nagorno-

Karabakh, Ukraine, Balkan, North Korea, South China Sea and Venezuela has proved the inefficiency of the unipolar world order and raised the need for global partnership and deep cooperation of great powers. A primary need for cooperation is in the field of balance of power. The balance of power is developing in various regions like Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East, South Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. In this research I tried to stress that unipolar solutions intensify international conflicts and global partnership based on mutual recognition can nullify the possibility of conflicts and confrontations among great, middle and small powers. The foreign policy concept of Russia highlighted the need of “*constructive dialogue*” between different cultures and civilizations to usher an era of multipolar international system. It is a positive sign that the powers like Russia, China, India, Turkey and Iran represent cooperative views and policies instead of thinking of long-term confrontations.

The knowledge of cooperation and partnership in Eurasia is rooted in the unsuccessful struggle of historical empires like Hun Empire, Turkic/Khazar khaganates, the Arabian Caliphate, the Empire of the Seljuks, the Mongolian Empire, Timur’s Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Safavids Empire, and the Russian/Soviet Empires. Each of them struggled to maintain power and survive but the rise of one has put an end to other. No empire could succeed to lead and rule Eurasia. After experiencing expansionism, annexationist moves, and protectionism those powers came to the understanding that the only solution for sustainable peace, security, prosperity and development is cooperation and partnership in the framework of nation-states and mutual recognition. The result that the achieved is the great and historical powers of Eurasia will not return to the political order they experienced until the end of 20th century. The collapse of the Soviet Union superpower was the last station of the empires and expansionism era in Eurasia and a new age of regionalism and trans-regional integration has dawned, marked by establishing regional economic blocs and regional integration and connectivity organizations. In the era of regional integration and connectivity, Eurasian powers resolve their conflicts and misunderstandings without application of force.

The United States has shaped its Eurasian Strategy in the early 1990s to prevent the rise and domination of any country or group of countries in Eurasia. The rise of terrorism and the rise of regional and historical power like Russia and China was/is at the center of the United States’ attention. The economic and technological development of China and the return of Russia as a military and political great power has again increased the fear of declinism in the US. History repeats. The fear of declinism in the US has roots

to the rise of the Soviet Union in 1945 to 1980 and economic rise of Japan in 1980s. This is the reason why the US is highly sensitive to Eurasia and imposes sanctions on Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and India.

The rise of Eurasian powers does not mean the US will lose its power. The research highlighted that Eurasian powers and the US are in the era of struggle for political influence. The US will remain an important factor in Eurasian politics but cannot dominate the region like it did in the 1990s anymore. The research stressed that international politics among sovereign nations and large powers can be done through partnership. The US and its allies have no choice but to accept the realities of the region and start equal partnership with Eurasian powers. The United States has lost the war in Afghanistan. The Taliban have developed their ties with Russia, China and Iran and other countries in the region. The Islamic State and other terrorist networks are on the rise in the country. The US military was boots on the ground in the country but defeating terrorism needed a comprehensive regional strategy based on partnership with Eurasian powers. In the lack of comprehensive regional partnership the US might come out of solutions to manage the ongoing situation in the country.

Despite the United States long-term preventive balance of power strategy and deep concerns, Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran have coordinated some parts of their interests. One of their common interests is a shared geopolitical and geo-economic dominance in the region. The very meaning of strategic shifts and policy cooperation among Eurasian nations is balance of power and challenging US-led unilateral globalization. In the recent three decades, Russian leaders have developed Eurasianist political strategy and as an alternative regional cooperation process. They balanced their views and standpoints with Turkish, Muslim, and Central Asian Eurasianist views and provided a comprehensive form of the term. The model helped Russia to keep and increase its influence, advance its interests and work with China, India, Turkey and Iran shoulder by shoulder. In their Eurasianist views, Russian leaders follow international law and universal norms by respecting and defending other's sovereignty and independency towards Western intervention. For Russian leaders the Eurasianist view is a policy of prestige and a source of trust.

Russian political and military leaders developed hybrid warfare (Grasimov doctrine) that transcends boundaries between peace and war. The doctrine focuses on combination of nonmilitary means like political, diplomatic, economic and other measures with the application of military forces. A model of all-of-government warfare

for achieving political goals. The doctrine intensified Russia's powerful return to the world affairs. The Gerasimov doctrine played the role of conductor in the Russian foreign policy strategy and national security policy. As I mentioned before, the driver of Russian foreign policy strategy and national security policy is still the Primakov doctrine and military in its old and new form has always been its implementer. According to the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation in 2016, the use of force and diplomatic efforts is the primary instrument towards achieving goals and defending interests of Russia and its allies. The idea and desire of a multipolar international system in Russian foreign policy strategy dates back to the Primakov doctrine coined in the 1990s.

Yevgeni Primakov found Russia's security, defense and foreign policy strategy in 1996. Primakov has shaped the baselines of the Russian Foreign policy strategy including independency in making foreign policy decisions, vision of a multipolar world, primacy in post-Soviet space and Eurasian integration, opposing NATO and close partnership with China and India. Ever since the case of unipolarity or primacy of one state over others is a matter of concerns for Russian political leaders. During the past two decades, a Russo-centric ultra-nationalist direction has also been presented by Alexander Dugin and other Russian nationalists. But Russian political and state leaders like Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, and Sergi Lavrov have chosen a regional integrationist direction instead of promoting an expansionist and aggressive view. I found that political leaders actively support neo-Eurasianism views with a recognition concept towards other Eurasian powers seeking more cooperation and bypassing the conflicts and confrontations. In other words, the various types of Eurasianisms represent/embody important principles of regional structuralization of entire Eurasian continent for Russia. Russia has chosen the Eurasian view instead of accepting Western values. It developed as a different regional power positioning between Europe and Asia by balancing ties with both sides. The outcome is not what the West waited after three decades struggle to prevent the independent rise of Eurasian powers like Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran. The large powers of Eurasia has applied different aspects as ***Bilateralism, Globalization and Regionalism*** to develop a regional structuralization process. I see this result as nature of change. The rise of the Eurasianist regional view among Russia, China, India, Turkey and Iran based on alignment theory and balance of power shows a partial decline of the unipolar world order created after the failure of the bipolar world order in the early 1990s.

China is arguably the most important power of Eurasia. It plays a decisive role in Eurasian comprehensive security, political, economic, military, and technology

cooperation. The Eurasian great, middle and small powers need China's support. China represents dynamic economic and industrial, modern and smart technology and regional and trans-regional connectivity model. No Eurasian Initiative can develop successfully without China. China's role and cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russian economic forums, the Eurasian Economic Union and Eurasian Free-trade area, the Commonwealth of Independent States and other security and economic projects is significant. My research highlighted that China's Eurasianist view and teaming with Russia and Iran had challenged the Eurasian strategy of the US. China wants to build a comprehensive partnership and intensify its regional activity and engagement alongside other regional powers. China developed a model dubbed a "*major country relationship*" as a baseline to develop channels and fields with other Eurasian and European powers. Countries like Russia, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan cooperate and coordinate their policies with China.

In recent years a Eurasian oriented foreign policy strategy has also risen in Turkey. In real politics, Eurasianism is an anti-Western approach containing ideas like leaving NATO, shifting to the East and teaming with Russia and China or shaping the Eurasian power club. The idea of Eurasianism in Turkey is a copy of Russian Eurasianist theorist's views. In practice, Turkey has redefined its foreign policy strategy in the post-Cold War era by developing ties with non-Western powers like Russia, China and Iran. The move has laid the ground for Turkey to start an activist foreign policy towards Eurasia, mainly in the Middle East and Central Asia. As for now, Turkey acts independently as a regional middle power and balances power among other regional and non-regional great powers. In such a balanced structure, turkey does not need to follow the Eastern or Western views. Turkey in its Eurasianist view seeks to develop in three directions, notably land area, sea area and continental area.

India keeps positive neutrality and balance of power in its foreign policy strategy. With such policy settlement it seeks to balance its relationship between US, EU, Russia and China. At the same time India acts as great power in South Asia's politics competing with China and Pakistan. India's foreign policy strategy has focused on two directions Indo-Pacific (maritime conception) and Eurasia (continental strategic shift). The Indo-Pacific direction opened the path for India to develop ties with the US and balance its relation with China, while in the Eurasian direction India seeks to keep its strategic partnership with Russia, Iran and Central Asian nations. In 2015, India became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the same year Pakistan also joined

the bloc. India suffers from its border conflict with Pakistan and China. The India's cold relation with China and Pakistan has pushed the country to isolation. India needs to change its views towards China and Pakistan. A better relationship with other regional powers will increase India's value in Eurasia, the Indian-Pacific area, as well as the West.

During this research I found that relations between Eurasian powers are limited to a geopolitical, geostrategic and military cooperation level. The real economic, technology and connectivity fields have not even reached that stage yet. Countries like Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Iran are not important and considerable economic partners to one another. Geo-economically, Russia, China, India, Turkey and Iran are as far from each other as geopolitically they show their closeness. Their bilateral trade is not balanced. Russia-China trade is balanced but large in volume. India's export to China is four times lower in volume than its import from China. Turkey also displays a huge deficit from trade with Eurasian nations. On the other hand, each of these countries is economically dependent on the West. For Russia, China, Turkey, and India, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea are important markets. My findings show that in Eurasian cooperation, the large and significant economic interest is missing but as far as security, military and politics the Eurasian powers have developed meaningful cooperation and initiatives. China has launched the OBOR to intensify economic ties within the region through connectivity, and to reach Europe, Middle East and Africa. India has launched the INSTC to reach Eurasia, Europe, and the Middle East. Russia, India and China are the key members of the BRICS group. Russia established the Eurasian Economic Union to create a larger single market within the region and increase its economic capacity.

The most important members of the BRICS group are Eurasian countries. In addition, Russia, India and China are the economic, trade, geopolitical and historically influential large powers of the region. Their economic, trade and political policies and views are to shape a multi-speed economic cooperation or even integration in the long run. Their bilateral strategic partnerships in numerous areas such as trade, regional and trans-regional economic connectivity or belt and road infrastructure building process, military and security policy cooperation and coordination are the real, objective and significant elements of the term trans-Eurasian economic cooperation.

Currently each of them is struggling to be the main actor in Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation because of their unilateral or bilateral policies and strategies. This kind of individual geopolitical and geo-economic strategies keeps them

away from common, multi-lateral and multi-speed trans-regional economic and trade development. There is no BRICS and at the same time no Eurasian cooperation without Russia, India and China. Cooperation in BRICS is a policy option which lays the ground for achieving their current individual goals and helps the member countries to put aside their rivalries and disputes. In a word, the BRICS cooperation is a common initiative based on individual goals and interests. The member states must answer two essential questions: how to work in order to achieve common goals and how to create a common and comprehensive identity.

Judging from facts and different points of view of the BRICS member countries, we found that there is a huge gap between the real politics and interests of the member states, mainly Russia, India and China and BRICS joint and common initiatives like cooperation between New Development Bank and National Banks and financial sectors, intra-BRICS trade, investment and financial policies, the case of fight against terrorism, and their involvement in important geopolitical and geo-economic issues unilaterally instead of collectively or commonly.

The three Eurasian large powers are supposed to work hard if they really want to take practical actions in order to make an integration profile for their national markets. The more they are connected economically, the more possibilities they enjoy for their high political, military and security cooperation across the region.

To meet the real and positive integration requirements, the three Eurasian countries are required to reduce the weakness and deficiency of their undeveloped institutional and regulatory frameworks. Real and positive cooperation and integration can only be achieved via a well-developed institutional framework. International or regional institutions effectively play in harmonization and coordination of economic policies, because this is the regulatory function of institutions. The BRICS NDB, the CIS, the SCO, the CSTO, the EAEU, and the Eurasian Free Trade Zone are the institutional and functional possibilities of Eurasian security, political and economic cooperation and integration within the region. As for now, the China led OBOR, India led INSTC and other trans-regional economic and trade belts and routes are the basis of the positive, practical and infrastructural side of the BRICS and trans-Eurasian cooperation. However, in order to build a more intensive, sustainable and stable trans-regional cooperation, the three Eurasian large powers have to pay special attention to knowledge-based society building, technology upgrade, know-how cooperation, free trade agreements, market integration, and harmonization of their customs system.

To conclude, the EAEU is a new face of the Soviet Union that represents the neo-Eurasianism. The classical type of Eurasianism was embodied by the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the disappearance of its classical form. Its political structure and geopolitical meaning has come to an end. The declaration of new sovereign and independent states with many types of fragmentations in the region posed a huge number of security, economic, social and political challenges in the post-Soviet period. As the predecessor of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered economic, political and political difficulties. However, the geo-philosophical concept of the term Eurasia has helped Russia to re-emerge as a great power in Eurasia again. For Russia, this was (is) the only way to rebuild the legacy of classical Eurasianism and to be in the center of Europe and Asia with a new settlement. This has laid the ground for Russia to rise again and become an influential player among other great powers in the world. The process started following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its first step was establishment of the CIS, known as the base of the Eurasian Economic Union. The Union was created with orders and norms of neo-Eurasianism. In one sentence, the Eurasia is the most important parts of world politics in upcoming decades, which is growing as a large and effective economic and political part of our world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

8th BRICS Summit - GOA DECLARATION, 2016. *8th BRICS Summit - GOA DECLARATION*, Goa: s.n.

- Alex Lantier, 2015. The US arming of Ukraine and the danger of World War III. *INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL* , 03 02.
- Amos, H., 2014. 5 Forces Battering Russia's Economy as Putin Faces Nation. *The Moscow Times*, 03 12.
- Anita Sengupta, 2009. *Asiatic Russia, Partnership and Communities in Eurasia*. Delhi(Shakarpur): Shipra Publications.
- Anon., 2012. *Eurasia's Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics*. England: Routledge Publisher.
- Anon., n.d.
- Armstrong, W., 2016. Eurasianism in Modern Turkey. *Hurriyet Daily News*.
- Avdaliani, E., 2018. The Rise of Chinese Eurasianism. *Besa Center Perspectives*, 19 08.
- Avetisyan, S., 2014. Armenia Joining Eurasian Economic Union to Open New Perspectives for Economy. *Sputnik International*, 09 10.
- Bank, Eurasian Development, n.d. *Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and*. s.l., s.n.
- Bassin, M., n.d. Eurasianism "Classical" and "Neo".
- Bassin, M, 2008. Eurasianism "Classical" and "Neo": the lines of continuity.
- Ben Aris and Ivan Tkachev , 2019. Long Read: 20 Years of Russia's Economy under Putin, in Numbers. *The Moscow Times*, 08.
- Bernier, P., 2018. *YEVGENY PRIMAKOV'S OPERATIONAL CODE AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY*. Kalevantie 4: University of Tampere, Faculty of Management, Politics/International Relations.
- Breene, K., 2017. These countries have the most positive influence on world. 07 07.
- BRICS Brasil 2019, 2019. *What is BRICS?*, s.l.: s.n.
- Brion, M., 1984. *I am the World Occupier Timur*. Tehran : Mostofi Publication .
- Brzezinski, Z., 1997. *The grand chessboard*. New York: New York: Basic Books.
- Center, Eurasian Economic, n.d. *survices*, s.l.: s.n.
- Chausovsky, E., 2017. Why Russia's Military Alliance Is Not the Next NATO. *Stratfor - World View*, 10 01.
- Chernenko, Alexander Gabaev and ELENA, 2019. What Russia Thinks About Multilateralism. *Project Syndicate org*.
- China Banking News, 2020. Are China and Russia Pursuing a "Financial Alliance" to Achieve "Dedollarization?". *China Banking News*, 13 08.
- Christensen, P. T., 2013. Political Economy, the State, and Society in the Contemporary World System. In: *The Political Economy of Russia*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 169-189.
- Clinton, H., 2012. *Radio Liberty*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.rferl.org/content/clinton-calls-eurasian-integration-effort-to-resovietize/24791921.html>,
[Accessed 11 10 2019].
- Colakoğlu, S., 2019. The Rise of Eurasianism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Can Turkey Change its pro-Western Orientation?. *Middle East Institute*, 16 04.
- CSTO, n.d. From the Treaty to the Organization. *Collective Security Treaty Organization*.
- CSTO, n.d. The CSTO Structure. *Collective Security Treaty Organization*.

- Daly, J. C. K., 2020. Russia's Kavkaz 2020: International Participation and Regional Security Implications. *The Jamestown Foundation*, 14 09.17(126).
- Davutoğlu, A., 2016. *Stratégiai Mélység–Törökország nemzetközi helyzete*. Budapest: Antal József Tudásközpont.
- Declaration, II BRIC Summit - Joined, 2010. *II BRIC Summit - Joined Declaration*, Barasila: s.n.
- Diez, T., Bode, I., & Da Costa, A. F., 2011. *Key concepts in international relations*, California: Sage Publishing.
- Dixon, A., 2017. India Jumps Doing Business Rankings with sustained Reform Focus. *The World Bank*, 31 10.
- Dmitri Trenin, 2020. Skies Bolsters Case for New Strategic Regime. *Carnegie (Moscow Center)*, 22 05.
- Dugin, A., 2017. *A NEGYEDIK POLITIKAI ESZME*. Debrecen: KVINTESSZENCIA KIADÓ.
- Egor S. Stroeve, L. S. B. M. I. K., 1999. *Russia and Eurasia at the Crossroads: Experience and Problems of Economic Reforms in the Commonwealth of Independent States*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Eke, S., n.d. Russia: new rules hit foreign workers. *World Agenda (The BBC's international Journal)*.
- Elena Mazneva and Anna Shiryaevskaya, 2018. Why World Worries About Russia's Gas Pipeline. *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 27 08.
- Erşen, E., 2017. Geopolitical Traditions in Turkey: Turkish Eurasianism. In: *The politics of Eurasianism: identity, popular culture and Russia's foreign policy*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, p. 266.
- Eurasian Development Bank, 2019. *Eurasian Economic Integration 2019*, Moscow: Eurasian Development Bank.
- Eurasian Development Bank, n.d. Bank Profile. *Eurasian Development Bank*.
- Eurasian Economic commission, n.d. s.l.: s.n.
- Eurasian Economic Commission, n.d. *Treaty on the Customs Code of the EAEU*, s.l.: s.n.
- European Commission, 2020. *EU-Turkey: Trade in goods*, s.l.: European Commission.
- European Commission, 2020. *EU-Russia: Trade in goods*, s.l.: European Commission.
- European Commission, 2020. *Trade in good with China*, s.l.: European Commission.
- Eurstat, 2019. *EU-China-International trade in goods statistics*, s.l.: s.n.
- Faust, J. F. K. a. J. R., 2005. *China World Politics*. ST, Boulder (Colorado): Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Fettweis, C., 2003. Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The obsolescence of great power geopolitics. *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 22(2), 109-129.
- Friedman, G., 2010. *The Next 100 years: A forecast for the 21st Century*. Mary Land(Florida): Anchor Publication.
- Friedman, G., 2011. *The next decade: Where we've been... and where we're going*. New York: Doubleday.
- Friedman, G., 2016. Armenia, Azerbaijan and a Dangerous Conflict. *Geopolitical Futures*.
- Frolov, V., 2016. Russia's New Foreign Policy — A Show of Force and Power Projection. *The Moscow Times*, Issue OPINION.
- Gabuev, A., 2015. Russia's Policy towards China: Key Players and the Decision-Making Process. *The Asian Forum*, 05 03. Volume 9.

- Gerasimov, V., 2013. The Value of Science Is in the Foresight. *Military Review*.
- Gervai P. & László Trautmann, 2015. Teaching economics in Hungary after the crisis. *Society and Economy* , 37(3), pp. 357--378.
- Global Security, n.d. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). *Global Security Organization*.
- Hallet, N., 2014. After Crimea Vote, Moldova's Transnistria Region Asks to Join Russia. *Breitbart*, 18 March.
- Horvai, A., 2017. Doing Business in Russia easier than in Italy or Belgium. *Russia Today*, 01 11.
- howMuch.net, 2020. The World Economy in One Chart: GDP by Country. *howMuch.net*, 10 09.
- Hubbard, Glenn, and Tim Kane, 2014. *Balance: The economics of great powers from ancient Rome to modern America..* New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ikenberry, G. J., 2019. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. New Edition-New Edition ed. woodstock: Princeton University Press..
- IMF: DOTS, 2019. s.l.: s.n.
- Inozemtsov, V., 2019. The Looming Russian Recession. *The Moscow Times*, 01 29.
- International Trade Center-Trade Map, n.d. *Bilateral Trade Between India and Russian Federation*, s.l.: s.n.
- Ismailov, E., & Papava, V., 2010. *Rethinking Central Eurasia*. Washington, D.C(1619 Massachusetts Ave): Johns Hopkins University-SAIS.
- ITC - Trade Map, 2019. *Bilateral trade between United States of America and China*, s.l.: s.n.
- ITC - Trade Map, n.d. *Trade statistics for international business development*, s.l.: s.n.
- ITC- Trade Map, 2019. *Bilateral trade between China and Japan*, s.l.: s.n.
- IV BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration, 2012. *IV BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration*, New Delhi: s.n.
- Jinping, X., 2014. *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press Co. Ltd.
- Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders, 2009. *Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders*, Yekaterinburg: s.n.
- Kaiser, P., 2017. Russia, China Lay Groundwork for BRICS Transactions in Gold. *Russian Insider*.
- Kaplan, R. D., 2019. *The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-first Century*. London: Random House Trade Paperbacks.
- Kissinger, H., 2014. *World order*. New York: Penguin Group.
- Koenig, P., 2015. Russia and China: The Dawning of a New Monetary System?. *GlobalResearch*.
- Kramer, A. E., 2010. Russia and 2Neighbors Form Economic Union. *The New York Times*, 07.
- Krowchenko, L., 2015. EBRD, UniCredit Group Lend \$260 million to Kazakhstan's Voskhod Chromium,. *The Astana Times*, 02.
- Kuchins, A. C., 2018. What is Eurasia to US (the US)?. *Journal of Eurasian studies*., Volume 9 (2).
- Lukin, A., 2015. Why the Russian Far East Is So Important to China. *HuffPost (Huffingtonspost)*, 14 03.
- Mackinder J. Halford , 1904. The Geographical Pivot of History. *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 23.Mo.4.

- Martha B. O, Anders A, and Sherman W. G, 1999. *Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States*. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Michael Roberts and Peter Wehrheim, 2001. Regional Trading Agreement, Free Trade Agreements among CIS Countries. *Intereconomics*, 11/12. Volume 36.
- Miller, E. A., 2006. *TO BALANCE OR TO NOT BALANCE*. Vermont USA: Ashgate Publishing Company..
- MoFA - Belarus, n.d. *Collective Security Treaty Organization*, s.l.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus.
- Mohan, C. R., 2018. From Indo-Pacific to Eurasia. *The Indian Express*, 9 06.
- Mokrushin, M., 2015. *Russia to give Tajikistan multi-billion military aid to fight ISI*, s.l.: Russia Today.
- Molchanov, M. A., 2015. *Eurasia Regionalisms and Russian Foreign Policy*. Farnham(Wey Court East, 6 Union Rd): Ashgate Publishing.
- Molchanov, M. A., 2015. *Eurasia Regionalisms and Russian Foreign Policy*. Farnham - UK : Ashgate Publishing.
- Molchanov, M. A., 2015. *Eurasia Regionalisms and Russian Foreign Policy*. England: Ashgate Publishing.
- Morgenthau, H. J., 1978. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace*. seventh edition ed. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
- Mostafa, G., 2013. The concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 19 03. Volume 4 (2013) 160-170.
- Murinson, A., 2006. The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 42, pp. 945-964.
- Nazarbayev, N., 2014. The Path to the Future. The Address of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the people of Kazakhstan. *Генеральное консульство Республики Казахстан в Казани*, 11 11.
- New Development Bank, 2017. *New Development Bank*, s.l.: s.n.
- NURBEKOV, A., 2014. Eurasian Economic Integration 'Will Continue,' Nazarbayev Says. *The Astana Times*, 02 04.
- Özdemir, E., 2010. Turkey's Middle East Policy in the Post-Cold War Era. *History Studies* , 2(Special Issiu).
- Palánkai, T., 2004. *Economics of Enlarging European Union*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Palánkai, T., 2014. *Economics of Global and Regional Integration*. First ed. Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó.
- Pandey, A., 2017. Top Russian Investments In India. *IPleaders*, 16 05.
- Paul M. Carter, J., 2020. *Understanding Russia's Interest in Conflict Zones*, Washington, DC: UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE.
- Peskov, D., 2019. *Like in the Wild West, US tells Europe to buy American natural gas at gunpoint – Kremlin Spokesman*, s.l.: s.n.
- Peter, R., 2000. Paradigms for Russian Policy in the Caspian Region. *Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Volume 163.
- Putin, V., 2011. A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making. *Izvestia daily*.

- Putin, V., 2015. Russia's economic difficulties cannot be called Crisis – Putin (Apr 2015):. *Russia Today*, 28 04.
- Rajiv, S., 2019. India and Russia: Connecting Eurasia and The Indo-Pacific. *The Moscow Times*, 10 09.
- Rober E. Bedeski and Nikolas Swanström, 2012. *Eurasia's Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics*. England: Routledge Publisher.
- Roth, K., 2014. Russia's Human Rights Climate Worst in Decade – NGO. *The Moscow Times*, 12.
- Roudik, P., 2013. Guest Worker Program: Russian Federation. *Library of Congress*, 02.
- Roychoudhury, S., 2016. What is new about the BRICS-led New Development Bank?. *devex*, 09 05.
- RT, 2017. 'US doesn't want Afghanistan war to end – it's cash cow for Pentagon, contractors', s.l.: s.n.
- Rumer, E., 2019. The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action. *CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE*, 06.
- Russia Today, 2014. *Every state has right to be different': Top 10 takeaways from Putin's foreign policy speech*, s.l.: s.n.
- Russia Today, 2014. *Russia-China trading settlements in Yuan increases 800%*, s.l.: s.n.
- Russia Today, 2015. <http://rt.com/business/225131-russia-china-speed-railway/>, s.l.: s.n.
- Russia Today, 2015. *Russia to ship 10mn tons of oil annually to India in next 10 years – Putin*, s.l.: s.n.
- Ryzhkov, V., 2014. Kazakhstan Benefits from Russia's Misfortune. *The Moscow Times*, 17 11.
- Sanya Declaration, 2011. *Sanya Declaration*, Sanya: s.n.
- Schepp, M., 2018. 'Solid relations in time of sanctions': Germany's investments into Russia exceed €2 billion, s.l.: Russia Today.
- SCOTT, Margaret; ALCENAT, Westenley, 2008. Revisiting the Pivot: The influence of heartland theory in great power politics. *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 22: 109-129.
- Sengupta, A. C. S. & B. S. (., 2009. *Asiatic Russia: Partnerships and Communities in Eurasia*. New Delhi: Shipra.
- Sharma, A., 2011. Indian-Russian Trade to Reach \$20Bln by 2015. *The Moscow Time*, 16 06.
- SIMES, D., 2020. China and Russia ditch dollar in move toward 'financial alliance'. *Nikkei Asian Review*, 06 08.
- SIMHA, R. K., 2015. Primakov: The man who created multipolarity. *Russia Beyond*, 27 06.
- Sixth BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration, 2014. *Sixth BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration*, Fortaleza: s.n.
- Snyktova, M., 2015. Kazakhstan braces up for economic crises, holding hands with Russia. *Pravda*, 02.
- Stuenkel, O., 2016. The Goa Dclaration: An Analysis. *Post-Westren World*, 23 10.
- Sudakov, D., 2015. Kazakhstan braces up for economic crisis, holding hands with Russia. *Pravda*, 19 02.
- Sutella, P., 2012. *The Political Economy of Putin's Russia*. New York: Routledge Publisher.
- Swanström, R. E. B. a. N., 2012. *Eurasia's Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics*. England: Routledge Publisher.
- Tamás, S., 2003. *World Economics 2. The Political Economy of Development. Globalisation and System Transformation*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

- Tang, F., 2020. China warned to prepare for being cut off from US dollar payment system as part of sanctions like Russia. *South China Morning Post*, 22 06.
- Tasch, B., 2014. Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus sign Treaty creating huge Economic Bloc. *Time*, 29 05.
- The Economic Times, 2016. *India's trade deficit with china jumps to \$53 nillion in 2015-2016*, s.l.: s.n.
- The Indian Express, 2016. 8th BRICS Summit Goa Declaration: Here is the full text adapted by the member nations. *The Indian Express*, 10 10.
- The MoFA of the Russian Federation, 2016. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 01 12.
- The Moscow Times, 2019. Net Capital Outflow from Russia Increased by 1.6 times ti 28Bln. *The Moscow Times*, 12 08.
- The Moscow Times, 2019. *Russia's 'Shadow Economy' Is Nearly 13% of GDP, Reports Say*, s.l.: s.n.
- The World Bank, 2011. *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, s.l.: s.n.
- The World Bank, 2020. *Doing Business*, s.l.: s.n.
- Trenin, D., 2015. From greater Europe to greater Asia. The Sino-Russian Entente. *Carnegie Moscow Center*.
- Trenin, D., 2019. 20 Years of Vladimir Putin: How Russian Foreign Policy Has Changed. *The Moscow Times*, 08.
- Trenin, D., 2019. Russia, China Are Key and Close Partners. *Carnegie Moscow Center*.
- Turkish Weekly, 2009. russia, belarus and kazakhstan agree on customs union. *Turkish Weekly*, 12.
- Tzu, S., 2014. The art of war. In: *Strategic Studies*. Second ed. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 86-110.
- V BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration, 2013. *V BRICS Summit - Joined Declaration*, Durban: s.n.
- VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration, 2015. *VII BRICS Summit - Ufa Declaration*, Ufa: s.n.
- Vinokurov, E., 2017. Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results. *Russian Journal of Economics*, 3(1), pp. 54-70.
- World Bank, 2020. *Indicator*, s.l.: s.n.
- World Bank, 2020. *Population, Total*, s.l.: s.n.
- Zhirinovsky, 2015. Russian Nationalist Demands Soviet Exchange Rates to Solve Ruble Crisis. *The Moscow Times*, 30 01.