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The influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states
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The influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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1. Introduction

Part and parcel of the history and development of the EU has been an opposition to that very institution or development – in the form of European integration in areas like fiscal and monetary policy, agricultural policy, foreign and defence policy, or on issues like a common understanding of the rule of law and democracy. Therefore, Euroscepticism is an inherent part of the EU project. When the idea of a United States of Europe was envisioned by people like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, an intergovernmental Europe was a vision for Europe by others, notably President Charles de Gaulle. From the 1960s onwards, Euroscepticism moved more towards the political margins. The silent acceptance that the EU integration is the only logical step forward for Europe is today all but an inevitability – the era of permissive consensus has come to an end, where European integration is no longer taken for granted (Hooghe and Marks, 2008).

What is more, Eurosceptic parties, some with a radical right ideology, have at times taken prominent positions in the politics of their respective countries. Some examples are: (1) the Danish People’s Party, a Eurosceptic party in Denmark that served as parliamentary supporter of the government (Christiansen, 2016), (2) the Austrian Freedom Party, a radical right party that ended up in the government in 2000 in Austria (Akkerman, 2012), (3) Front National in France, where Marine Le Pen made it to the second round of the presidential elections of 2017 (Mayer, 2018); to name just a few. It has been established that the presence of Eurosceptic parties on the political landscape has an impact on the political agenda, where parties can put forward previously untapped issues. For instance, Topaloff argues that Euroscepticism “has become a fundamental component of the political portfolios of the marginal parties”, which are tapping into the increased politicisation of the EU and “the ensuing death of permissive consensus”, thereby “carving out of a niche for themselves in the political spectrum” (Topaloff, 2012: 74). Euroscepticism has rather become the mainstream than the exception, reflected by a process of politicisation and polarisation of parties on issues related to the EU (Leconte, 2015; Meijers and Rauh, 2016). As Hooghe and Marks put it: the “giant has awakened in an era of constraining dissensus” (2017: 23).

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1 Any translations from Dutch or Hungarian to English were done by the author and meant to represent the original intention to closely as possible.
While a lot is by known about what Euroscepticism can mean (for an overview, see Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2018), and how it shapes public opinion (Abbarno and Zapryanova, 2013, Fuchs et al. 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2007; Williams and Spoon, 2015; Verney, 2015), is divided between Eastern and Western Europe (Kopecký and Mudde 2002, Pytlas, 2016), what typologies there are of party-based Euroscepticism (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Flood, 2002; Leconte, 2010; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; Topaloff, 2012; Vollaard and Voerman, 2015 etc.) or the drivers of partisan Euroscepticism are (see for instance Leconte, 2010; Skinner, 2013; Vasilopoulou, 2011), how parties like the Danish People’s Party, the Austrian Freedom Party or Front National in France influence EU policies in those countries is largely unknown.

Since much less is known about the consequences of Eurosceptic actors on policy, this research aims to contribute to narrowing the knowledge gap on the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policies. More specifically, it looks at how Eurosceptic parties influence government policies related to the EU. The research question therefore is: What is the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states? Two case studies will be conducted to help answer this question.

The three answers to that question are derived from three kinds of literature, namely the literature on the contagion effect, on coalition bargaining and lastly on parliamentary oversight. These kinds of literature deal with different elements of the question. The contagion effect looks at the policy convergence from the niche party towards the mainstream party. Party strategic considerations for mainstream parties are the focal point here, and Meguid’s 2005 Policy Salience and Ownership theory is used to do so. If parties converge their policy position towards the Eurosceptic party, then the aim is to transfer the ownership from the niche (Eurosceptic) party to the mainstream party to take away voters’ incentives to vote for the niche party instead of the mainstream party.

Secondly, coalition bargaining looks at the bargaining strength of coalition parties, or in the case of minority governments also parliamentary supporters of the government, in their capacity to shape the positions that the government stands for.

---

2 While the focus of this research is on party politics that does not mean that political parties are considered the only Eurosceptic actors that might play a role in shaping the EU policy of member states in one form or another. Saalfeld (2000) depicted the interaction between the different actors of the parliamentary delegation process, whereby influence is exerted by voters on parties, members of parliament, the (coalition) cabinet and vice versa, and parties, members of parliament and the prime minister and cabinet also exert influence upon each other. However, he also adds the role of courts, interest groups, sub-national government, executive agencies, and international actors to the equation (2000: 355). This complex network of actors – with the addition of the media – should also be considered as the Eurosceptic actors in the political process.
Bolleyer’s concepts of *formation weight* and *coalition weight* (2007) are used to operationalise the influence parties have in the policy drafting and policy-shaping process. *Formation weight* takes place during the writing of the coalition agreement, and measures how many party-specific positions of that party end up as part of the coalition agreement. *Coalition weight* then looks at how many party-specific positions become legislation.

For the third political stream, parliamentary oversight, the agent-principal theory (Strøm, 2000; Laver and Shepsle, 1999) will be used to explain the behaviour of parliament as principal and government as an agent in the influence parliamentary parties have on the legislative process. Parties in parliament might set the political agenda during question time (Müller and Sieberer, 2014) or try to influence government policy by proposing legislation or submitting motions that would add clauses to existing legislation, which the government can choose to respond to or not. While a lot is known about the role of national parliaments in terms of parliamentary scrutiny over the EU affairs of member states, Rozenberg and Hefftler highlighted (2015) that there is a gap in the literature as to whether and how parliament actually influences EU policy – a question the current research seeks to contribute in answering.

Hungary and the Netherlands both had interesting episodes where the influence of Eurosceptic parties on government policy was likely. Furthermore, these two member states are different on a variety of dimensions – consensus-based government versus majoritarian government, founding member states versus joining in 2004, West Europe versus Central Europe, with widely diverging historical trajectories – which will contribute to their generalisability. The Dutch case study will look at the influence of the PVV and SGP on the government’s – composed of the CDA and VVD – EU migration policy in the period when the PVV was the parliamentary supporter of the Rutte I coalition (2010-2012). For the Hungarian case study, the government’s migration policy from 2015 to 2020 will be the period of analysis. During that period, the Fidesz-KDNP³ government has maintained a (close to) 2/3 majority in parliament, and during the 2015 migration crisis, the Hungarian government took a Eurosceptic and nationalist turn when dealing with migration policy. In this case study, the influence of Jobbik on the government’s policy will be analysed in detail.

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³ Here considered as one party, since Fidesz and KDNP has been in a permanent coalition since 2006.
The Netherlands and Hungary are selected as case studies following Beach and Pedersen’s logic for theory-testing process-tracing: “when there are well-developed theoretical conjectures but we are unsure whether they have empirical support” (2013: 146). However, since both case studies also are strong candidates following George and Bennett’s most-likely case study logic (2005) – in the period under consideration in both countries, there was a strong right-wing Eurosceptic presence at times when migration was a salient issue. Migration policy will serve as the EU policy area on which both case studies will focus. One of the reasons for this is that the (radical) right in Europe tends to have both an anti-immigration and anti-EU position, often combining, or reinforcing, one position with the other (Fennema, 1997; Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; De Vries, 2018). While migration policy is a domestic policy area, it has strong European dimensionality to it, which is the topic of analysis here.

In terms of the formal role of the parties under consideration, this research takes the government (parties) as the base, i.e. whose policies are influenced. That means that the Eurosceptic parties that are looked at can be either be in the government themselves or the opposition, which each have their own means and channels for influence to take place. Alternatively, a party may be a parliamentary supporter of the government, like the PVV in the case of the Netherlands. In that case, the party was part of the government formation process, but without ministerial responsibilities. As we will see, that might have its benefits. For the Dutch case, the VVD and CDA are the government parties, those to be influenced. PVV and SGP are then the influencers. For the Hungarian case, Fidesz-KDNP is the government party, which is Eurosceptic itself but is still that to be influenced, while Jobbik is the influencer.

As for the empirical part of this research, Euroscepticism in the Netherlands and Hungary is mapped. The Dutch case study will look at the Rutte I coalition government, with the hard Eurosceptic PVV as the permanent supporter in the period 2010 to 2012. The specific policy items under investigation are derived from the Roadmap that the Dutch government drafted late 2010, which lists the six pieces of EU legislation which the Dutch government could imagine changing in the foreseeable future (Leers, 2010). Three of these items were open for negotiation in the short to medium term, namely the Dublin Regulation, and the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives.

In Hungary, the two policy developments are selected with a different logic. At the height of the migration crisis in the EU in 2015, the European Commission proposed a migrant quota scheme, which the European Council voted in favour of with a qualified
majority in September 2015 (EUR-Lex, 2015). However, the Hungarian government rejected the migrant quota scheme and developed an extensive anti-immigration campaign following this Council decision. In relation to the anti-immigration policies of the Hungarian government, the 2018 Stop Soros legislative bills, criminalising the aid to asylum seekers in Hungary will be the second policy item under investigation.

Lastly, the structure of the research is as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on party-based Euroscepticism and puts forward a policy-level approach to the concept that will be used throughout the rest of the study. As mentioned above, chapter 3 summarises the literature on the coalition effect, coalition bargaining, parliamentary oversight, and policy change. Chapter 4 deals with methodological issues, like the logic behind the case selection and the development of the causal mechanisms based on the literature in chapter 3. Chapters 5 and 6 zoom into party-based Euroscepticism in the Netherlands and the Dutch case study, respectively. Similarly, chapter 7 and 8 deal with party-based Euroscepticism and the Hungarian case study. Chapter 9 concludes the research and compares the results of the case studies and looks at the differences and similarities in the conditions that facilitated Eurosceptic parties to influence the domestic EU policies in those countries.
2. Party-based Euroscepticism

The EU has become a politicised issue in the domestic political debate, although there is no consensus on this matter in the academic debate. According to Hooghe and Marks (2008), the EU has become more politicised since the Maastricht Treaty because of its increasing salience on the political agenda and the mobilisation of political entrepreneurs. Contrarily, Green-Pedersen argues that there is instead an incentive for mainstream parties to keep the European Union off the political agenda, because the EU is not salient enough to be put on the agenda. Therefore, two factors would facilitate the politicisation of the EU, namely in cases when that would lead to the prospect of electoral gains and when the issue can be integrated “into the left-right structure of party competition” (2012: 126). However, Hooghe and Marks argue rather that the “giant has awakened in an era of constraining dissensus”, where the politicisation of the EU “escape[s] mainstream party control” (2017: 23). Note that these authors also argue that the positioning on the European Union does not fit into the traditional left-right distinction of political competition.

A definition of politicisation helps to clarify both the term means and how it conceptually links to Euroscepticism⁴. In its simplest form, De Wilde and Zürn define politicisation as “making a matter a subject of public regulation and/or a subject of public discussion” (2012: 139). Hutter and Grande (2014), Milkin (2014) and De Wilde (2011) also add polarisation as a necessary component of politicisation, where polarisation can refer to “the intensity of conflict related to an issue among the different actors”, which is maximised when two camps have entirely opposing views on a matter (Hutter and Grande, 2014: 1004). Of course, Eurosceptic parties will be on one side of this conflict related to the EU. These groups are not homogenous, and individual actors within those groups can have widely reasons for supporting or opposing the EU, be them economic, political, or cultural. However, to get a better grip as to what an opposition to the EU or European integration means, this chapter reviews the literature on party-based Euroscepticism.

⁴ The concept politicisation will be discussed in somewhat more detail in chapter 3.
2.1. Defining party-based Euroscepticism

In the academic literature, the term Euroscepticism was first coined by Taggart\(^5\), who was referring to political parties as the primary unit of analysis: “Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (1998: 366). Paul Taggart refined the concept in cooperation with Aleks Szczerbiak followed in 2002, where they decided to differentiate between soft and hard Euroscepticism; whereby hard Euroscepticism refers to “a principled opposition to the EU and European integration”, implying that parties wish to “withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.” Soft Euroscepticism does not refer to principled opposition to European integration or membership, but opposition “where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.” (2002: 4)

In the same year (2002) of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s publication on the differentiation between soft and hard Euroscepticism, Kopecký and Mudde criticised the authors on three fronts. They offered their categorisation of Euroscepticism (2002): The nature of their criticism referred to the loose definition of soft Euroscepticism and the conceptual vagueness of distinguishing between soft and hard Euroscepticism (Mudde, 2012). Kopecký and Mudde (2002) differentiate between two dimensions, namely the support for European integration and the general support for the EU. They argue that their categorisation enables the ideological differentiation between parties that support or reject the EU project as a whole while taking a pragmatic approach to European integration.

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<td>EU-optimist</td>
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<td>EU-pessimist</td>
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*Source: Kopecký and Mudde, 2002.*

\(^5\) This is not the very first use of the term Euroscepticism, which was first used in 1985 in a political and journalistic context in the United Kingdom (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004).
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) then shot back with three critical points of their own on Kopecký and Mudde’s classification. Firstly, the authors use a more restricted definition of Euroscepticism which, according to Szczerbiak and Taggart, would only include Eurosceptic attitudes, and not opposition to the EU/European integration that is both principled and contingent. Secondly, the category Europragmatists (opposition to European integration, support of the EU’s current trajectory and further extension of sovereignty to the EU) is illogical, because it only fits parties that are very hard to categorise in the first place. Thirdly, the Euroenthusiast category is too inclusive, and “just as opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU can be both principled and contingent so can support for it” (244).

Flood proposed his own six categories of support for the European Union in 2002, ranging from rejectionist to maximalist strategies. There are four categories of support between those categories, namely revisionist, minimalist, gradualist and reformist, each encapsulating an attitude towards the EU. While the differentiation between policy area or the EU as a whole has merit, it fails to make a classification of support for the EU based on policy areas. Responding to Kopecký and Mudde’s differentiation between support for the EU and European integration, Flood argues that their approach treats “ideology in a rather reductive way, as if it could be encapsulated in a binary opposition between Europhile commitment to, or Europhobic antagonism towards, an ideal of European integration” (5).

Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) have their criticism of Flood’s categorisation, claiming that, like Kopecký and Mudde, some parties would fit into multiple categories and that operationalisation becomes more complicated, the more categories you have.

Similar to Flood (2002), Conti (2003) also reflects on Kopecký and Mudde’s differentiation between parties that support/reject the EU ideologically and that support/reject European integration, highlights that their categorisation does not fully apply to Western Europe – Kopecký and Mudde developed their categorisation based on the attitudes of Central and East European countries to the EU. Therefore, Conti suggests distinguishing between the approach that parties have to the EU, and whether the attitudes of parties will be positive or negative towards the EU (21).

A more gradualist approach was taken by Rovny in 2004, where he conceptualises Euroscepticism on a spatial map, where the magnitude of Euroscepticism is based on the classic soft/hard distinction of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002), and the other axis is a continuum between the extent of strategic or ideological motivations. While the idea of a
continuum of Euroscepticism or “Eurosupport” makes sense, the problem is that the fluidity of the notion complicates calling a party, or any other political actor for that matter, Eurosceptic, Europhile or anything else.

All these categorisations have their strengths and weaknesses. However, the added value of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s categorisation lies in its elasticity in the sense that the soft-hard distinction leaves room for horizontal and vertical expanding and fine-tuning, for instance by adding support for the EU as categories. This is what Vollaard and Voerman did. In their typology, Vollaard and Voerman (2015) use Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2008) differentiation between hard and soft Euroscepticism and add two other categories that refer to non-Eurosceptic parties, Europragmatic parties and Europhile parties. Europragmatic parties see the nation-state as the primary political actors and want to maintain this balance. They see European integration as an instrument to serve the domestic public interest and the national interests. As the term implies, Europhile parties envision a further development of a supranational union with European citizens. This does not necessarily exclude any criticism towards the EU though (2015: 101). These two additional categories offer a more holistic view of party-support for the EU.

2.2. Dimensions of Euroscepticism

Having established what Euroscepticism has come to mean in the academic literature, the next question is what drives or motivates political actors to be Eurosceptic and who are the actors to which these ‘flavours’ of Euroscepticism correspond? Leconte (2010) identifies four varieties of Euroscepticism. Firstly, utilitarian Euroscepticism refers to doubt as to what the gains of being part of the EU are. Secondly, political Euroscepticism is directed at the threat of European integration on national sovereignty and identity. Thirdly, value-based Euroscepticism “denounces EU ‘interference’ in normative issues; and cultural anti-Europeanism, which is rooted in a broader hostility towards Europe as a continent and distrust towards the societal models and institutions of European countries” (2010: 43).

Leconte’s typology of the drivers of Euroscepticism is not the only one. Instance, Skinner (2013) uses the typologies of Sørensen (2008), Leconte (2010) and Skinner (2012) for the definitions of the motivators of Euroscepticism. Sørensen (2008), however, focuses on public Euroscepticism, and her typology is based on survey data and
operationalises the manifestation of Euroscepticism among the public on how respondents replied to questions. She differentiates between four types of public Euroscepticism, namely economic, sovereignty-based, democratic and social dimensions. These differ somewhat from Leconte’s categorisation.

Thirdly, Skinner (2012) uses Norway as a case study to develop a theory to explain Euroscepticism, which differentiates between postmaterialist value-systems, political culture and rural society as the sources of Euroscepticism in Norway. She also considers the economy and national identity as part of the causes for Euroscepticism, but they fail to explain Euroscepticism in Norway.

Taking a slightly different approach, Vasilopoulou (2011) looks at three patterns of Euroscepticism, which correspond to varying degrees of opposition to European integration and that include variations of the drivers mentioned above. In its most restrictive form, rejecting Euroscepticism supports the notion of common history and culture in Europe, but is against the principle of cooperation within the EU’s institutional framework, and disagrees with the EU’s “institutional and policy status quo and resistance to the future building of a European polity” (2011: 232). Actors that are conditionally Eurosceptic similarly recognise that there is a common history and culture in Europe, and support the principle of European cooperation, but are hostile to the way policies are conducted within the EU and how the European polity is developing. Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) is one such party; while the party claims to be pro-European, it initially finds the bureaucratic burden and the questionable democratic accountability core problems of the EU (Fortuyn, 1997). Thirdly, comprising Euroscepticism is “acceptance of a common European culture, support for the principle and the practice of integration but opposition to the future building of a European polity.” (Ibid.:232). Compromising Eurosceptics see contingent, pragmatic benefits of membership to the EU, though would argue that it is not an inherently good thing.

These dimensions of Euroscepticism appeal will more and less to a party, depending on the political ideology behind the party. For instance, Skinner (2013) found that left-wing and right-wing parties have different reasons to be Eurosceptic. These motivations of Euroscepticism are categorised along six dimensions: economic, political, left-wing values, cultural, right-wing values and rural values (2013: 128). Left-wing Euroscepticism is often linked to postmaterialist issues, like climate change, while wing parties are rather Eurosceptic based on economic concerns of membership to the EU.
Startin (2018) focuses on the logic of how radical right-wing parties use the EU as a criticism for the reinforcement of migration flows, but also develop Eurosceptic arguments that are about the principled functioning of the EU. On the one hand, the socio-economic consequences of EU membership, manifested in the economic crisis and the perceived failings of the Euro. On the other hand, radical right parties direct their attention to the matters of security, thereby invoking the migration crisis and the open borders of the EU (2018: 82). Following Taggart and Szczerbiak’s categorisation, hard Eurosceptic parties tend to fit into this category. The radical left has quite different reasons to be Eurosceptic though; whereby the radical right is more driven by identity and the radical left is instead driven by the consequences of membership on economic and social justice (Meijers, 2017).

While most political issues are viewed in terms of the traditional left-right spectrum of party competition, Hooghe and Marks’ seminal article from 2008 makes a distinction beyond that classical approach, and argue that, when it comes to the EU, party conflict does not always fit the left-right scale. They inferred that support for European integration fits a different scale, which is ranging from a green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) ideology to a traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN) (Hooghe and Marks, 2008).

The authors also found that party conflict manifests itself along different lines in Western as compared to Eastern Europe. The division in Eastern Europe is along left-right lines and is reinforced with gal-tan ideology - with parties that have a GAL ideology are more pro-European, and the traditionalist-nationalist parties are more inclined to be critical of the EU. “The axis of party competition that emerged after the collapse of communism runs from left-tan to right-gal, pitting market and cultural liberals against social protectionists and nationalists,” they argue (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 18). Come the 2010s, dominant contemporary Euroscepticism parties in Eastern Europe are rather nationalist and right-wing, like the ruling Fidesz party in Hungary and the PiS party in Poland.

Other authors also looked at party positioning across geographical lines. Like Kopecký and Mudde (2002) above, Riishøj (2007) looks at the party-based Euroscepticism in Central Eastern Europe. He extracts three types of party-based Euroscepticism in the region in the mid-2000s, namely neo-liberal, traditionalistic conservative and left-populist. The Euroscepticism in CEE gradually became “more practice- and policy related and less symbolic and abstract” before and after the acceding
to the EU. Rohrschneider and Whitefield find, in a comparative study between parties in Western and Eastern European regarding the deepening and widening of European integration and the effectiveness of democracy in the EU, that East European parties tend to have an overall more positive perception of European integration and democracy in the EU (2016).

Furthermore, the financial crisis has made mainstream parties in Western Europe more Eurosceptic, while this did not happen in Central Eastern Europe (2016: 158). In terms of changes in the salience of the EU in the two regions, European integration plays a slightly larger role in the East as compared to Western Europe, though in both regions, the increased salience of the EU is mainly a product of communist and nationalist parties (Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015). A slightly different but related issue is the effects of crises are starker in terms of a party’s position on the EU as a regime than the effects on specific policy positions or European integration in general, with the countries most affected by the financial crisis seeing the most considerable shift towards Euroscepticism (Schäfer and Gross, 2020).

Leconte (2010) distinguishes between three classifications of Eurosceptic orientations of parties: “parties of government versus protest-based, anti-establishment parties; incumbent parties versus opposition parties; and office-seeking parties versus vote-seeking and policy-seeking parties” (107). She argues that government parties are going to be less Eurosceptic than protest or opposition parties. Recent electoral results, and sizeable Eurosceptic parties taking office in several European countries, however, weakens this argument. In the case of hard Euroscepticism (or soft Euroscepticism in a party system where there are no Eurosceptic parties yet), a party might use it as a strategy for voter maximisation, in that the party sees an opportunity to tap into an existing gap in the party competition.

Furthermore, Topaloff argues that marginal parties use Euroscepticism as a strategy because it allows them to politicise European integration, and this provides them with the tools for contestation (2012: 74). Noteworthy is the strategic usage of a pro-European/Eurosceptic agenda by parties like the Labour and Conservative parties in the UK. Based on the Euromanifestos in the UK, Benedetto and Varela found that in 1979 the Conservative Party was pro-EU and the Labour Party was Eurosceptic, which by 2009 was reversed (2014: 62). The Front National softened her critical position towards the EU as well during the 1979 and 1984 election campaigns, in the hope that a strengthened European Communities would weaken national political forces (Topaloff, 2018). The
policy repositioning on European integration of parties towards the more extreme positions of Eurosceptic parties can be a strategic move to chip away votes from those parties (Meguid, 2005 and 2008; more on this in section 3.1).

Having established the what Euroscepticism amongst parties means and what motivates parties, section 2.3 shortly deals with the concept as an independent variable.

### 2.3. Euroscepticism as an independent variable

Lastly, contrary to most studies, some authors have looked at the consequences of Euroscepticism by treating it as the ‘independent’ and not as the ‘dependent’ variable (see Vasilopoulou, 2018 for a review of the literature). In her exploratory work, Vasilopoulou (2013) emphasises the need to look beyond the public and parties to understand where and how Euroscepticism manifests itself elsewhere, and secondly, calls for moving beyond definitional and the causal aspects of Euroscepticism to test “the precise ways in which Euroscepticism has shaped and continues to shape domestic politics and European integration over time” (163). By 2018, she takes note of the welcome change that “[s]cholars are increasingly employing Euroscepticism in order to understand a number of other phenomena, which suggests that the study of Euroscepticism is increasingly becoming integrated into the study of European integration and national European politics” (2018: 74).

Meijers (2015) appears to be one of the first in line to be dealing directly with the ways that party-based Euroscepticism shapes domestic politics. He studied how the Euroscepticism of one party influences the position of mainstream parties on European integration. By looking at the contagion effect, Meijers found that the presence of Eurosceptic niche parties has shaped the policy position of mainstream parties as well. Elsewhere, Meijers and Williams (2019) note that converging towards the Eurosceptic position of niche parties will not always pay off electorally for mainstream parties. However, Meijers does not directly look at the effects of Eurosceptic parties on the policy position of the government, which is the independent variable of the current research, i.e. Euroscepticism is treated here as an independent variable, whereby the presence of Eurosceptic parties is taking to be the point of departure which influences the policy outcome of the government.
Now that party-based Euroscepticism has been discussed in detail, chapter 3 reviews three distinct literatures that can be used for the explanation of how Eurosceptic parties can influence EU policies of member states.
3. How influence can be measured

After having established in chapter 2, the Eurosceptic dimension of the research question *What is the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states?*, is it now in place to delve into the literature that reflects on the impact and influence dimensions of parties on policy. The word *influence* easily allows people to allocate intuitive meanings to it. Dahl coined a clear definition of influence: “a relation among actors such as that the wants, desires, preferences, or intentions on one or more actors affect the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more other actors” (Dahl, 1991: 32). This definition may describe what influence comprises, yet tells nothing about how one can observe influence, therefore making its operationalisation important. In the below literature review, three research areas within the political sciences are covered. While all fields are related to political parties and policy change, their operationalisation of influence is quite different. Since it depends on whether one is talking about the relation between actors and policy change within the study of party competition – specifically spatial theories – or coalition negotiations or legislative studies, the elaboration of *influence* is encapsulated in the causal mechanisms that close the reviews of these fields. The literature on the contagion effect, and the strategic considerations of policy convergence, will be discussed in section 3.1. Secondly, coalition bargaining is the process where coalition partners can shape the government agreement and policy. This process is discussed in section 3.2. Thirdly, the formal and informal tools available for parties in their national parliaments to influence the EU policy of a member state is discussed in section 3.3. These sections precede the discussion of how policy change is measure, necessary for establishing when spotting policy change when we see it.

The three concepts cover the influence of Eurosceptic parties in overlapping phases of the government/policy cycle. In the first phase of the government cycle, during the coalition formation, the literature of coalition bargaining explains the bargaining success of parties (Thomson, 2001; Leinaweaver and Thomson, 2016; Bolleyer, 2007). If a Eurosceptic party is part of the coalition negotiations, it will be enabled to impact the policy formulations of the new cabinet. Once the coalition agreement has been drafted, and policy goals are formulated, the government will start policy implementation. During this post-formation phase, parties will be able to challenge and try to shape government policy as coalition partners (e.g. Kaarbo, 2008; Moury and Timmermans, 2013), or in parliament (e.g. Saarfeld, 2000; Auel, 2007; Rozenberg and Hefftler, 2015), or via other
extra-parliamentary activities. Inside parliament, oversight mechanisms will be used, mainly via written or oral questions, or the use of motions. The literature on parliamentary oversight helps explain attempts of policy shaping in parliament. Finally, Eurosceptic parties may influence by tapping into issue areas that were previously outside of the party competition (Topaloff, 2012; 2018), which may trigger government parties towards strategies of policy convergence (Meguid, 2005; Meguid, 2008). These strategic considerations most clearly be identifiable after election cycles, as a reaction to the electoral success of the Eurosceptic (niche) party (Meguid, 2008). This indicates a time lag in the repositioning by parties. It is contingent upon the success of the Eurosceptic party’s policy position and electoral gains whether other parties will converge their policy position – the topic of discussion of the next section.

3.1. Contagion effect

3.1.1. Party competition

The contagion effect refers to a policy repositioning of one party to that of an electorally-successful party. The point of departure of the contagion effect is party competition, and the motivations of political parties to seek voters or office or policy outcomes (Strøm, 1990). Müller and Strøm (2000) distinguish between party motivations that are policy seeking, office-seeking and vote-seeking, though recognise the overlap. However, “[p]arty leaders rarely have the opportunity to realize all of their goals simultaneously. The same behavior that maximizes one of their objectives may not lead to the best possible outcome with respect to the others” (9). Beyond vote, office of policy seeking motivations, Sitter argues that parties consider a fourth element when developing their political strategy, namely ideology and party identity, and how ideology and identity may have implications on policy, voters, and office (2003, 249). That would imply that the strategic recalculation of policy positions is within the realm of what parties might consider their possibilities to maximise votes.

Other groups of studies – more relevant for the current discussion – have looked at party competition from the policy positioning point of view (Adams et al., 2011) and the issue ownership and salience points of view (Petrocik, 1996; Sheets et al., 2016). While there is little evidence that policy change by political parties changes citizens’ perceptions of these parties (see Adams et al., 2011), there is increasing support for
mainstream parties moving towards, the policy position of electorally successful niche parties, described here as the ‘contagion effect’ (Van Spanje, 2010; Ivaldi, 2011; Meijers, 2015; Abou-Tarik and Krause, 2018). The contagion effect is reviewed here.

Rooduijn et al. (2014) find that no effect of populist parties on the amount of populist rhetoric in the party manifestos of mainstream parties, and that mainstream parties do not increase their populist rhetoric in the face of electoral losses. However, in several policy areas, a shift in the policy position of mainstream parties towards fringe parties has been identified. Most of these studies focused on immigration policy. For instance, Van der Brug et al. (2009) find that parties across the full political spectrum in the Netherlands have adopted more restrictive immigration policies from 1998 to 2009, and there has been more emphasis on the integration of migrants in the Netherlands. Van Spanje (2010) similarly shows, by conducting a large comparative study of expert surveys that parties across the political spectrum – and thus contrary to popular belief that this would be manifest only among right-wing parties – are susceptible to the contagion of a restrictive immigration policy. However, opposition parties tend to be more prone to contagion effects than government parties. Thirdly, Ivaldi has looked at the contagion effects in immigration policy, focusing on Front National in France, and found that central-right parties have moved towards the very restrictive immigration position of FN (2012). Similar contagion in migration policy in France was found by Meguid (2008).

Empirical support for the contagion effect is also identified beyond immigration policy. Environmental policy is the second most common studied policy area of the contagion effect, mainly focusing on Green parties’ impact of the policy space (Abou-Chadi, 2014). Meguid shows that the Green Party in the UK threatened the electoral success of the both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in the late 1980s. The party did so by tapping into an issue considered important for many voters but which previously had not been not considered relevant by the Tories and the Labour Party. Meanwhile, the Green Party was becoming the issue owner of environmental policy, but the Conservative Party and the Labour Party adopted strategies that successfully managed to fend off that electoral threat (2008: 124-133). These specific strategies will be discussed below.

While in the year 2003 Nick Sitter did not consider Euroscepticism to become a strategic tactic for mainstream parties to increase voter share, Meijers (2015) finds support for the presence of Eurosceptic contagion, albeit conditioned on a high salience of the EU for the contagious radical parties. This contagion led to lower levels of support
for European integration among mainstream parties. Elsewhere, Meijers and Rauh (2016) look at whether the contagion effect is also present among parties in the European Parliament and whether there were any notable changes in the Netherlands and France between 2009 and 2014. They found that the radical right successfully mobilised the EU as a political issue, which has a strong contagion effect for mainstream parties – mainstream parties often reacted the next day to claims of radical right parties (Ibid.: 91). Unlike the above cases, this variation of contagion does not relate to policy positions but to agenda-setting or political mobilisation. Interestingly, in both France and the Netherlands, the contagion effect was more significant in 2009 than in 2014, though politicisation increased over that period.

For his analysis, Meijers conducts a quantitative analysis using Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. Other authors that conducted quantitative studies on the positioning of parties similarly use a scale that varies from 1 – denoting strong opposition – to 7 – denoting strong support (Ezrow et al., 2010; Somer-Topcu, 2009; Van Spanje, 2010; Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015), which are either from coded datasets of party manifestos or expert surveys. This approach, however, does not help to understand the strategic considerations of parties towards such policy convergence, whereby convergence refers to a converging towards a policy position, not necessarily as adoption of the same standpoints.

The contribution of Salo and Rydgren (2018) is a qualitative analysis of Eurosceptic contagion of the radical right Finn Party on mainstream parties in Finland during the Eurozone crisis in 2010. They find that the Finn Party successfully polarised the political debate in Finland concerning the Greek and Irish financial instability by not favouring financial support for these countries, in contrast to the mainstream parties who did. Subsequent, the mainstream parties repositioned towards the position of the Finn Party, who had a more anti-establishment solution to Greece and Ireland financial difficulties in the EU context: “it was the strict constraints imposed on policymakers by the necessity of acting in a certain manner, lest the EMU and its constituent economies face an existential crisis, that brought on the punitive political climate where the national interest appeared as the guiding principle of all policymaking” (254).
3.1.2. Policies strategies niche parties and mainstream parties

What theoretical framework might help explain the strategic motivations of Eurosceptic parties in influencing government parties’ policy positions and in addition to that also influence government policy? Conceptually, the contagion effect, in the case of policy positions, does not refer to the specific party strategy that a party employs but refers instead to the manifestation of policy convergence towards the position of another party (mostly a far-right/far-left party) in some policy area. However, one should be aware that other contextual elements might as well lead to a repositioning by a mainstream or government parties (Van Heerden et al., 2014: 134); think of unforeseen crises or a Treaty change in the EU that is expected to affect a country adversely. Nonetheless, the parliamentary representation and political mobilisation of niche parties will often speed up policy changes (Ibid.).

Bonnie Meguid (2008) developed a spatial theory of party strategies, where one of those strategies involves policy convergence by the mainstream parties towards the niche party. As shown in table 2, the strategies for mainstream parties to deal with the electoral threat of niche parties are composed of 3 factors, namely: issue salience, issue position and issue ownership. The above-mentioned accommodative and dismissive strategies are strategies that have the same effect (if successful), but with contrary mechanisms that lead to the decrease in the electoral support of niche parties. The most straightforward approach is the dismissive strategy, which focuses on ignoring the efforts of upcoming niche parties to claim issue ownership. If successful, ignoring the niche party will decrease the salience of an issue and further marginalise the niche party. When a mainstream party adopts an adversarial strategy, it polarises the political debate about the issue that the niche party has raised, with the aim of winning the debate by persuading voters of the weaknesses of the niche party’s position. The party thereby increases the issue salience of the policy and diverges from the position of the niche party.

As for the party strategy involving policy convergence, Meguid (2008: 27-30) finds that an “accommodative strategy” which “is typically employed by parties hoping to draw voters away from a threatening competitor” (Meguid, 2005: 348). Such a strategy leads to a convergence of issue position, increased issue salience and transfers the issue ownership to the mainstream party (away from the niche parties) and thus decreases the electoral support of the niche party. The combination of dismissive and accommodating
strategies for the same policy issue by the same party at different points in time also happens.

There are several factors on which the likelihood of parties adopting an accommodative strategy is contingent. The primary point of departure is that mainstream parties will adopt an active, and more costly, strategy in the face of the threat of losing vote share to a niche party. The risk of a mainstream party to suffer electoral losses will depend on the electoral system in which they function: “Where parties react to threats, any factor that alters the perceived significance of those threats naturally affects party behavior” (Meguid, 2008: 97). Firstly, the electoral threshold impacts party sensitivity negatively, for the lower the threshold for a small party to get into parliament, the higher the risk of loss of a party’s governmental strength. Secondly, the proportionality of the electoral rules also impacts the threat of niche party influence, where the risk of losing seats is directly connected to the number of votes a party received. In a completely proportional system, the threat of electoral losses for the mainstream party is the greatest, since the relative weight of a vote for a big party is relatively smaller as compared to the weight of a vote in a system where big parties receive disproportionally more seats in relation to the votes they receive.

Since Meguid’s spatial theory looks at the strategic response of mainstream parties to niche parties, a conceptual note on what is understood as a niche party is appropriate here. Both Meguid (2008) and Adams et al. (2006) label Communist, Green, and extreme nationalist parties as niche parties. Meguid (2008) argues that niche parties share three characteristics that differentiate them from other parties. Firstly, the traditional class-based orientation of politics is rejected. Secondly, niche parties put novel issues on

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Niche party electoral support</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dismissive</td>
<td>Decreases</td>
<td>No movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accommodative</td>
<td>Increases</td>
<td>Converges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adversarial</td>
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Source: Meguid, 2005: 350
the agenda that mostly do not coincide with the traditional left-right political spectrum. Third, niche parties focus on a smaller scope of issues than mainstream parties.

Meguid’s spatial theory has been applied in numerous studies, covering varying policy areas, and leading to mixed results. For instance, Dahlström and Esaiasson (2013) found that in Sweden, parties mostly applied a dismissive strategy to impede the electoral success of anti-immigration parties. However, during the 2002 election campaign, the Liberals in Sweden adopted an accommodative strategy by passing a language test a requirement for naturalisation, which was rewarded by voters.

Abou-Chadi (2014) found that on the issue of multiculturalism mainstream parties adopted an accommodative strategy, but that a similar policy shift was not identified on environmental issues and the emergence of green parties. These findings come with some conditions. Firstly, while there is a stronger tendency for centre-of-right parties to adopt radical right positions, even centre-of-left parties were inclined to choose an accommodative strategy (2014). Secondly, in the case of a niche green party putting the environment on the agenda, all mainstream parties de-emphasised the environment when the green party won more votes and owned the issue (Ibid.). The latter result is in line with Meguid’s finding that the mainstream parties in the UK used dismissive strategies when the Green Party entered the political arena in the 1980s.

Perhaps the most directly relevant study using Meguid’s POS theory is by Meijers and Williams. They found that mainstream parties adopting an accommodative strategy towards Eurosceptic right-wing parties suffer electorally from doing so when niche parties can claim issue ownership of European integration (2019). Therefore, it seems more advantageous for those mainstream parties to resist the temptation of adopting a more Eurosceptic policy position and resort to different strategies.

All in all, Meguid’s POS theory is excellent for the analysis of how Eurosceptic (niche) parties influence the EU policy of the government, through the government parties.

3.2. Coalition bargaining

Coalition bargaining is the second avenue that offers a theoretical toolbox of the study of influence by Eurosceptic parties on government. The starting point is, however, that the Eurosceptic party plays a role in the government coalition. Political parties that are a partner in a government coalition will be able to shape the policy process in a relatively
Coalition agreements play an important role in coalition governance, for the institutionalised nature of the agreement aims to decrease the sources of tension between coalition partners and also build trust between the same actors (Timmermans, 2006; Moury and Timmermans, 2013; Timmermans and Breeman, 2014), increase the stability of coalition cabinets by lowering the probability of intra-cabinet conflict (Krauss, 2018), and increase the stability of the legislative agenda, since the likelihood of majority support is higher (Timmermans and Breeman, 2014). However, the tension between coalition parties is part of the dynamics of party competition⁶, and therefore coalition agreements are mechanisms of conflict prevention and increase the efficiency of coalition policymaking (Müller and Strøm, 2000; Timmermans, 2006; Strøm et al., 2010). Formalised institutional arrangements and balanced agenda management by the head of government are ways of enforcing the coalition agreement (Timmermans, 2006).

Artes and Bustos studied the role of parliamentary support of minority cabinets in Spain. They found that the permanent parliamentary supporters of governments were successful in bargaining during the coalition formation phase which led to a fulfilment of a large amount of campaign pledges by these parliamentary supports (2008: 323). The authors thus conclude that the electoral programmes of parties are reasonable indicators of future government action (Idem.: 329). Moury and Fernandes (2016) found that minority governments in Portugal offer more possibilities for opposition parties to deliver on their campaign promises, that minority governments are not less likely to fulfil pledges than majority governments and that good economic conditions play a facilitating role in pledge fulfilment.

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⁶ This tension is a consequence of the delegation process. The first chain of delegation in the coalition government is intra-party delegation, described as the process that happens within parties, where party leaders and candidates for public office are appointed. Furthermore, there is delegation within coalitions, which is the connection between the coalition partners and the cabinet and the individual ministers (Müller and Meyer, 2010: 1070-1072). However, to deal with the agency losses that can occur due to delegation, control mechanisms exist; and these exist prior to the coalition government taking office (ex-ante) and in the post-formation phase as well (ex-post). When referring to government politics, ex-ante mechanisms are used to reduce the information asymmetry between the cabinet minister and the other coalition partners. Similarly, ex-post mechanisms are in place to reduce the potential of “hidden action” (Strøm et al., 2010). In the case of the coalition parties, the ex-ante mechanism concerns the coalition agreement that the parties draft before taking office. This way the coalition parties will negotiate on the clauses of conduct before taking office and thereby maximise the compatibility of the coalition partners, often by constraining the actions and policies that can be pursued after the government is formed” (Strøm et al., 2010: 521). Ex post mechanisms that coalition partners use are via mutual control of the cabinet (junior) ministers.
After the government formation phase, coalition parties will have the role of governing together. Whereas most literature on coalition theory deals with the formation phase of coalition, Andeweg and Timmermans (2008) and Moury and Timmermans (2013) focus on the stages of coalition governance post-formation. Inter-party conflicts are the points where parties might shape policy. Junior government parties have disproportionately more bargaining power in the post-formation phase because they are often indispensable for the cabinet to stay in power. They also tend to control more ministries in the cabinet relative to their size (Kaarbo, 2008). Furthermore, Oppermann and Brummer argue that the influence of junior coalition partners on foreign policy to mean that policy “can at least partly be ascribed to the preferences of a junior partner”, but is not restricted to the substance of policy distance, for it includes the process and agenda of the decision-making process (2014: 558).

Moury and Timmermans (2013) operationalise a “major inter-party conflict as an instance of explicit dispute that involves the mobilization of party branches—ministerial, parliamentary, extra-parliamentary—or even entire parties acting *en bloc* in confrontation with one or more other parties in the coalition” (121, emphasis in original). Furthermore, the authors found that coalition agreements increase the incentives of coalition partners to resolve issues that arise from inter-party conflicts (Idem.: 129). Furthermore, Vercesi writes about inter-party conflict management in coalitions, and argues that “[p]arty unity can originate from either an actual sharing of political viewpoints or effective party discipline” (2016: 173).

Martin and Vanberg (2008) found that coalition partners use parliamentary debates as the way through which they differentiate their party’s position and the compromise policy that the coalition partners have negotiated (513). It has further been found that the parliamentary arena can be an important platform for coalition partners to overcome intracoalition policy disagreements (Martin and Vanberg, 2004).

Turning to the theoretical applications of coalition bargaining, pledge or mandate theory relates to the fulfilment of campaign pledges by parties, and can be used for the operationalisation of influence of coalition partners on coalition agreements, for it gives the possibility of measuring the negotiation success of the coalition partners. Thomson (2001) applied mandate theory to coalition formation in the Netherlands in the period 1986-1998, and tests for the “effects of the distribution of ministerial portfolios and the formulation of coalition agreements between prospective governing parties on the likelihood of pledge fulfilment” (172). He found that pledge fulfilment is more likely
when parties hold the ministerial post of the policy area in which the pledge was made, a finding echoed by Oppermann and Brummer (2014), underlining the importance of portfolio allocation in a coalition system. Furthermore, that pledges that maintain the status quo are more likely to be fulfilled than those aimed at policy change. In terms of pledge fulfilment, there was a significant difference between the pledges that were supported by more than one of the prospective coalition parties and those pledges made by only one prospective coalition party (Thomson, 2001; Costello and Thomson, 2008; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). Leinaweaver and Thomson (2016) used mandate theory but investigated under which conditions pro-environment policy positions of the government parties of the 27 EU member states is translated into actual government policy. When drafting a coalition agreement, the party delivering the prime minister is generally in the position that she can influence the policy pledges more than other coalition partners, since that party typically is the biggest, has initiated the government formation process, and has relatively more leverage in the allocation and distribution of ministerial portfolios (Leinaweaver and Thomson, 2016: 638).

Deriving from pledge theory, Bolleyer’s (2007) developed a way to operationalise the strength of party influence on the formation phase and the post-formation (governance) phase, by using the conceptualisations of formation weight and coalition weight. Formation weight refers to the influence that a party has during the coalition formation. It is operationalised as the party pledges that end up in the coalition agreement, but which have not been supported by the other coalition parties. By excluding the pledges which have broader partisan support, one can isolate the strength of individual parties in the coalition bargaining game. Coalition weight, on the other hand, captures the influence of a coalition party when inter-party conflict arises in the post-formation phase, the phase after forming the coalition and writing the coalition agreement. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2010) also use these concepts to show Lega Nord’s strong position in the formation of the coalition with PDL in Italy in 2008. Besides, they argue that Lega Nord was able to shape the government’s policy on federal reform and security by negotiating useful ministries, despite the number of ministries being limited. Section 4.2.5 will return to Bolleyer’s work for the mechanism to be used in the case study.

Pledge fulfilment during coalition bargaining increases with consensual and majority-supported pledges, accounting for 28% and 22% increases in the probability of fulfilling a pledge (i.e. being contained in the coalition agreement). The likelihood of pledge fulfilment also increases when the pledge keeps the status quo (from 37% to 50%) and when the pledge is made if the party who made the pledge takes ministerial responsibilities for fulfilment. (from 29% to 37%) (Ibid.: 14).
3.3. Parliamentary oversight

This third section of the literature, the role of parliament(ary oversight) as a platform for Eurosceptic parties to influence the EU policies of member states is reviewed. This chapter reviews the formal parliamentary oversight mechanisms in general and then zooms into the EU-specific instruments and procedures and closes with a section on the scrutiny ladder of Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) which will be applied to the principal-agent theory.

In their introductory book ‘Representative Government in Modern Europe’, Gallagher, Laver and Mair argue that the role of parliaments has been declining since the nineteenth century, and that since the middle of the twentieth century “it was generally agreed that governments acted while parliaments just talked” (2006: 62). However, they also noted that the role of parliament cannot be generalised and needs to be distinguished according to a Lijphartian differentiation whether the system of government is majoritarian or consensus-oriented.

According to Lijphart, three institutional features of parliaments contribute to the power of parliament in law-making, distinguished between the majoritarian and consensus systems of government. In consensus systems this means that (1) parliament sets the agenda in consultation with party groups, (2) the most important work is done in committees and (3) legislative acts first pass the committees before the whole parliament debates them. Conversely, in majoritarian systems (1) the agenda is controlled by the government, (2) the most important work is done in the plenary debates and (3) bills first passes parliament as a whole before being sent to the committees. Given these differences, consensus systems facilitate coordination amongst parliamentary stakeholders while majoritarian systems facilitate a confrontational attitude between parliament and government. (Gallagher et al., 2006: 62)

Those distinctions have important implications for the ways that Eurosceptic parties in parliament will be able to shape the government’s EU policies. In consensus-building systems of government, parliamentary parties that are outside of government are more likely to be able to influence the government, while in majoritarian systems that influence is much less likely. The section will start with a discussion of delegation, as the principal-agent model serves as a basis of the study of Eurosceptic parties’ influencing capabilities where parliament is the political arena, followed by a discussion of the key government oversight tools at the parliament’s disposal in European affairs.
3.3.1. Delegation in the legislature and oversight

The logic of parliamentary oversight can conveniently be framed in terms of a chain of delegation. But what is delegation? In the principal-agent model, *delegation* explains the interaction between principal and agent, and is defined as “an act where one person or group, called a principal, relies on another person or group, called an agent, to act on the principal’s behalf” (Lupia, 2003: 33). As such, delegation necessarily involves a risk in that the agent does not do what the principal would want it to do. There are significant agency problems involved in the delegation of power, which translate into “agency loss” for the principal. In case there is a divergence of interests between the principal and the agent, the agent might be inclined to pursue its own interests at the cost of the principal’s interests, leading to agency loss (Auel, 2007: 496). Under perfect delegation, the agent would do “what the principal would have done if the principal had unlimited information and resources to do the job herself” (Lupia, 2006: 35). Potential information asymmetries could amplify the agency losses for the principal, for it might increase the incentive for the agent to pursue her own interests if those interests were to diverge from those of the principal. The agent then either shirks – it does not act in the interest of the principal – or commits sabotage by acting against the interests of the principal (Auel, 2007: 496; also see Lupia, 2006: 43).

Parliament is both an agent and a principal, depending on the perspective that the delegation chain is looked at. Firstly, parliament functions as the representative of the citizenry, and is given the power to act on their behalf. Here, the citizenry is the principal and parliament the agent. In the second chain of delegation, the government is mandated by parliament to act on its behalf (and thus indirectly on behalf of the citizenry) in the EU institutions. Now national parliament is the principal and government the agent. Where the agent is granted the authority to act on behalf of the principal, the agent will be held accountable for its actions (Strøm, 2000: 267). An important prerequisite for the functioning of government is the endowment of trust by parliament onto the government, for without the confidence of parliament, the government will not have the mandate to govern. As Laver and Shepsle argue, a “government is said to be accountable to parliament when parliament has no reason to replace it with an alternative” (1999: 290).

The delegation process is summarised in figure 1 and shows the interrelations between the different political actors involved in the national policy decision-making process. Saarfeld (2000) illustrates the parliamentary delegation process, where point $b$ is
the delegation process which this section looks at, since the parliament is the principal and the government is the agent in EU parliamentary oversight.

Figure 1: A simplified model of the parliamentary delegation process.

Parliament is granted several powers to oversee the activities of the government, both before and after the cabinet take office. Strøm et al. (2010: 526) refer to a so-called investiture vote as an ex-ante control mechanism for parliament. This is a vote in parliament that grants parties with the competence to form a coalition, though not all parliaments have this competence at their disposal. Ex post-government oversight tools for parliament are most in the form of parliamentary questions and interpellations. “Question time” is the primary tool for parliamentary scrutiny, and questions are posed either in written or oral form (Müller and Sieberer, 2014: 322). Particularly in single-party government, opposition parties often use parliamentary questions as a form of extracting information from the government or when seeking to “embarrass the governing party” (Strøm et al., 2010: 526). A further tool used for control purposes is the organisation of parliamentary committees that have the power to demand progress or policy reports from government, use the know-how of specialised committee members and hear witnesses (Müller and Sieberer, 2014: 323). The third, and most potent, yet relative rarely used, means of parliamentary control is the establishment of non-permanent investigative committees (Ibid.: 323).

Depending on their place in parliament, the aims of MPs will vary when they are members of oversight or legislative committees. In the latter case, MPs more actively
seek to advocate policies, whereas in oversight committees the focus is more on controlling the administration (Bundi, 2017: 2).

On a different note, Finkel and Herbel find that a leading motive of opposition parties to engage in scrutiny activities of the government policy is over policy disagreements. Scrutiny is primarily used by opposition parties when the chances of successfully influencing the government’s policy position is large, which is more likely in the case of a thin majority of government parties in parliament (2015: 508).

3.3.2. National parliaments and EU policy

The next step is to focus on the instruments at the disposal of parliament to scrutinise the EU policies of government. Parliamentary scrutiny on matters concerning EU is the primary institutional source for the government to hear from opposition parties (Holzhacker, 2008: 144). There are competing arguments regarding the powers of parliaments to conduct oversight on the government in the face of increased penetration of EU laws and regulations in national legislation. On the one hand, the deparlamentisation thesis argues that national legislation has suffered from increased erosion of parliamentary oversight over legislation. On the other hand, the opponents of the deparlamentisation thesis argue that it is necessary to go beyond the formal institutional powers of parliament and assess the behaviour of national parliaments, since that defines the scope of its oversight opportunities (Auel and Benz, 2005; Auel, 2007).

The provisions stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty provide national parliaments with increased access to information of Commission and Council documents and allow nationals parliaments to check whether legislative proposals do not exceed the scope of subsidiarity principle (see Rozenberg and Heffler, 2015; Rozenberg, 2017). Furthermore, interparliamentary cooperation and cooperation between national parliaments and the

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8 The argument goes that, since most issues do not require unanimity, the national legislature’s reach in shaping EU affairs is mostly limited to scrutinising the policy initiatives of the European Commission, and to influence government (Raunio, 2014: 553; De Ruiter, 2013). Also, most EU directives are by government decree, and EU directives and decisions do not need parliamentary approval (Raunio and Wiber, 2010: 78). A further limitation to parliament’s scope is the increased use of QMV (qualified majority voting) in the European Council and the Council of the European Union which, coupled with the complex bargaining process in the Council, “make it difficult for national parliaments to force governments to make detailed ex-ante commitments before taking decisions at the European level” (Raunio, 2014: 553).

9 The emphasis on parliamentary scrutiny in the different member states has led to the development of more adept scrutiny mechanisms, which caused an EU-wide convergence of these institutional mechanisms (Raunio, 2014: 555). The function of parliament in the EU decision-making process lies in part in the enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and its influence is mostly through the informal or private cooperation with the government (Auel, 2007). The Europeanisation of national parliaments has made these parliaments more capable of becoming involved in EU affairs.
European Parliament increases their ability to scrutinise the executive (Finke and Herbel, 2015: 492).

Winzen (2013) distinguishes between two categories of oversight institutions national parliaments have at their disposal. Firstly, those rules and structures that help to overcome the information asymmetry between the government and parliament; like rules that grant parliament rights to access EU legislative documents and oblige governments to inform parliament about negotiations. The creation of a European Affairs Committee and sectoral committees, either ad hoc or obligatory, also increased the scope of oversight capabilities. Sectoral committees, either ad hoc or obligatory, also contribute to decreasing information asymmetries (Winzen, 2017: 30). Secondly, there are those rules that address parliamentary authority losses via scrutiny mechanisms “that prohibit governmental commitments at the EU level before domestic scrutiny finishes” (300).

Summarising, the general dimensions of parliamentary control are “(a) the access to information on both EU policy proposals and developments (such as EU documents) as well as on the government’s negotiation position; (b) the parliamentary infrastructure to deal with EU issues; and (c) the binding character of parliamentary positions (resolutions or mandates)” (Auel et al., 2015: 62).

Within the parliamentary setting, plenary debates are the most important means for political parties to raise issues on the political agenda (Auel et al., 2016: 156). Strategies for parliament seeking to exercise control over EU policy is by holding closed committee sessions, instead of plenary debates, informal cooperation with a minister without a binding mandate, or through cooperation with other actors from other member states (Auel and Benz, 2006 in Holzhacker, 2008).

However, the (perception of) policy influence of parliamentarians on domestic EU policy is not the same across countries, nor necessarily similar when national parliaments both score on institutional strength, like Sweden and Finland (Öberg and Jungar, 2009). Öberg and Jungar found that the internal organisation of parliamentary work on EU matters is relevant for the role of parliamentarians in EU decision-making. Sweden’s parliament has few parliamentarians that deal with EU affairs through the Committee of EU Affairs, while in Finland parliamentarians have the chance to engage with EU affairs through other standing committees as well. The more decentralised organisation of EU decision making affairs in Finland’s parliament increases the perception of parliamentary of the role they play in shaping policy (378).
In terms of the role of Eurosceptic parties, the presence and strength of Eurosceptic parties is found to increase parliamentary oversight only marginally (Winzen, 2013: 317), and the amount of questions asked and debates organised due to the presence of Eurosceptic parties is also marginal (Auel et al. 2016: 161). Furthermore, the length of floor debates increases a bit with an increased presence of Eurosceptic parties in parliament (Auel et al., 2015: 298). In the case of the Netherlands, Unlike Auel and Raunio (2014), Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) do find that the Eurosceptic parties in parliament engage in oversight activities like asking questions. However, these parties do not engage in more ‘rigorous’ scrutiny activities like presenting alternative policy positions or instructing government.

While a lot is known about the role of national parliaments in terms of parliamentary scrutiny over the EU affairs of member states, Rozenberg and Hefftler highlighted (2015) that there is a gap in the literature as to whether and how parliament actually influences EU policy – a question the current research seeks to contribute in answering. They note that binding mandates are an efficient way of influencing government policy, whether direct or indirect, yet, given their rare occurrence, so far “studies have failed to demonstrate that reducing the information gap through detailed scrutiny offers greater influence for MPs” (Rozenberg and Hefftler, 2015: 26). The five “ideal types of parliamentary involvement” outlined by Rozenberg and Hefftler are (2015): policy shaper, government watchdog, public forum, EU expert and European player.

Building on the literature of parliamentary scrutiny and legislative control mechanisms, Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) developed the *scrutiny ladder*, named after the metaphorical idea that climbing on the scrutiny ladder by MPs represents more challenging levels of scrutiny towards the government. There are four types of scrutiny, as shown in Table 3. As the level of scrutiny increases, the demands – both in terms of knowledge and expertise, and terms of the access to information on the matter – on the members of parliament engaging in the scrutiny process also increase.

| Table 3: Overview of the ex-ante steps on the scrutiny ladder and related demands for the MP |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Type of scrutiny (→)                      | Monitoring scrutiny             | Political scrutiny               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |
| Scrutiny level →                         | Demands for MP ↓                | Step 1: expressing support/disagreement | Step 2: asking questions       | Step 3: taking up an            | Step 4: providing instructions |                                 |                                 |
This relatively simple framework offers a very useful complement to using the principal-agent theory to get closer to an answer to this gap in the literature. This theoretical integration will be discussed in section 4.2.6.

### 3.4. Policy change

In sections 3.1 through 3.3, three theoretical frameworks were identified as avenues for Eurosceptic parties to influence EU policies of governments. This section will discuss the ways that policy change can be identified and measures when it occurs.

When political parties refer to the European Union in their party manifestos, statements tend to refer to the EU in general terms, such as: “As the Netherlands, we need a strong and effective Europe to protect our interests and strengthen our position” (CDA 2017: 34), or “Europe is struggling with itself and its ideals” (CU 2017: 87). Similar statements are made in domestic State of the European Union debates. These are cases where there is an explicit reference to the European Union, yet without a specific policy position. Ideological statements like these do not lend themselves for the analysis of substantive policy positions.

Peter Hall, in his seminal work “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain” (1993), offers a systemic approach to identifying policy change, based on the theories of social learning in state-centric approaches. He argues that policy change is a consequence of a social learning process, whereby how a policy problem is conceptualised plays a role in the policymaking process. Hall distinguishes between three different degrees of policy changes that can occur, and that differ in their impact. These are “the overarching goals that guide policy in a
particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, and the precise settings of these instruments” (278), yielding different magnitudes of change. Table 4 summarises the three degrees of policy change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Dimension of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-order change</td>
<td>Goals and instruments remain the same, but the level of the instruments change (policy adjustments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-order change</td>
<td>Goals remain the same, but the instruments and the level of the instruments change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-order change</td>
<td>The hierarchy of goals, the instruments themselves and the level of the instruments all change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


First-order change refers to incremental and routine decision making that is part of the normal policy process. It is considered a social learning process, whereby the policymaker adjusts policies in point t=1 based on what was decided in t=0 and traced the change that occurs over the period t=0 to t=1. As such, the goals and instruments remain the same, but the level of the instruments is adjusted. While Hall does not explicitly state so, the adjustments are modest in the case of first-order change, for large changes in the level of expenditures would rather be a second-order change or even third-order policy change, whereby the adjustment falls outside the scope of “normalcy”. Examples of first-order change are changes in the interest rate or incremental increases in the annual budget of a department (Greener, 2001: 135), small adjustments to the eligibility criteria for social security (Blomberg and Kroll, 2004:21), the level of payment fees for physicians in health policy (Bryant, 2002: 91) or modest adjustments to the level of allocations of the EU budget to the Common Agricultural Policy. If one were to look at migration policy, it could be incremental increases or decreases in the number of refugees that a country takes in.

Second-order change corresponds to more far-reaching changes, “like the development of new policy instruments [that] may move one step beyond in the direction of strategic action” (Hall, 1993: 280). By adapting to past experiences (Kettell and Cairney, 2010), not only do the level (setting) of the instruments change, but the
instruments themselves are subject to change, while maintaining the same hierarchy of goals. The techniques to achieve the goals are re-evaluated based on past experiences. According to Ian Greener, second-order changes are of more importance than Hall suggests. Greener argues that policy instruments flow from the ideological considerations of those shaping the policy change (2001: 139). Therefore, changes in policy instruments are not part of the normal policymaking process but have more profound consequences.

Examples of second-order change are the “establishment of community health centres to complement existing primary care” (Bryant, 2002: 91), or the abandonment of strict targets of monetary growth that was implemented by Thatcher’s government (Hall, 1993: 278-279). Blomberg and Kroll looked at the social security policies in Sweden and Finland, and they operationalised a second-order policy change as the share of state-funded contributions for financing social insurance programmes exceeding a 20 per cent increase or decrease (2004: 20).

Third-order changes, the most radical form of change, are inspired by the concept of paradigm shift, a derivative of Kuhn’s scientific paradigm shift. It is the hierarchy of policy goals that are subject to change in third-order policy changes, thereby affecting the types of instruments used to achieve these goals and leading to a complete overhaul of the previous policy framework. Such paradigm shifts can manifest themselves in three ways (Hall, 1993: 280). Firstly, paradigm shifts instead originate in sociological processes than scientific ones and are based on predominantly political motivations. Secondly, those actors which the policy community deems authoritative will be guiding in the process of change, leading to a competition for policy authority. Thirdly, “instances of policy experimentation and policy failure are likely to play a key role in the movement from one paradigm to another,” and the government will then try to deal with policy problems via “experiments to adjust existing lines of policy”, which may result in a policy failure if there an incapability “of dealing with anomalous developments” (Ibid.: 280).

Unfortunately, Peter Hall does not further elaborate on the implications of these order changes, and his article then goes on to illustrate his theory with an empirical case study of the macroeconomic policy of the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the article has received much scholarly attention, while being criticised for its lack of clarity on the

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10 Policy instruments are understood to be those “tools used by governments to pursue a desired outcome. Examples include economic tools (taxes, spending, incentives), and regulations (voluntary, legal)” (Cairney, 2013). The European Union has four categories of policy instruments at its disposal, namely “hard” legally binding rules, “soft” regulation, education and information, and economic instruments (European Commission, n.d.).
concept of “policy paradigm” (Cairney and Weible, 2015: 83-85). Cairney and Weible picked up on that lack of conceptual clarify and argue that significant policy change might rather be a continual and gradual process instead of a one-time “big bang” change. Paradigms shift are considered to be rare, though there can be major variation in the speed of change depending on the policy area (Ibid: 89-92). Furthermore, paradigm shifts are a construct of the prior ideas of policy actors, which can signify the persistence of rigid belief systems that might even be maintained in the face of policy failures (Jacobs, 2015). Political actors will resort to existing paradigms by default, even when policies have failed; but “when failures sufficiently accumulate – and if they are inexplicable in terms of the old paradigm – then social learning may occur” (2015: 59).

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the theoretical underpinnings of three literature reviews, used to understand the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states. Firstly, we found that the mainstream parties will have vote-seeking motivations to repositioning themselves towards the policy positions of niche parties, by what Meguid calls an “accommodative strategy”. Secondly, in terms of coalition bargaining, Bolleyer’s concepts of “formation weight” and “coalition weight” help to identify the influence of Eurosceptic coalition parties on the EU policy of the government. Thirdly, Smeets and Ruiters “scrutiny ladder” and the principal-agent theory serve as the basis of the strength in which Eurosceptic parties will be able to pressure the government to modify their (EU) policies.

These three literature reviews lead to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis C1**: Mainstream parties will use an *accommodative* party strategy in reaction to the electoral success of Eurosceptic niche parties.

**Hypothesis B1**: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on policy is a product of the formation weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition bargaining process.

11 Policy failure can catalyze policy change. Peter Hall identifies different levels of policy change in the case of the United Kingdom’s economic policy, that were the consequence of policy experiments and policy failures (Hall, 1993). In quite a different context, a recent collection of case studies tries to understand the policy successes and failures in Central and Eastern Europe (Batory et al. 2018).
**Hypothesis B2**: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on policy is a product of the coalition weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition bargaining process.

**Hypothesis P1**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party asks parliamentary questions as a way to modestly shape policy.

**Hypothesis P2**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party takes up an alternative position as a way to moderately shape policy.

**Hypothesis P3**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party provides the government party with instructions as a way to significantly shape policy.
4. Methods and techniques

That is the question we have been building towards answering. In chapter 2, the concept of party-based Euroscepticism was discussed in detail, to know what is meant by this widely-used term. Chapter 3 then went on to find ways in which the idea of influence can be understood in the context of the research question. Eventually, three research fields were identified that could answer our question, each with their theoretical frameworks: the literature on party strategies, coalition bargaining and parliamentary oversight. The discussion of those research areas was followed by the question of how influence can be measured. In the end, Peter Hall’s differentiation between first, second and third-order policy change serves the purpose in this journey.

Before moving on to the empirical part of the research, we still need to establish how that what we already know (chapter 3) can be utilised to answer the case studies. In order words, how do we recognise policy change under policy convergence, coalition bargaining and parliamentary oversight when it actually happens? For that, we need to identify the causal mechanisms of how the theories can explain the research question in the context of the case studies and what observable manifestations of policy change can be expected. Therefore, this chapter discusses issues that relate to how the present research is conducted and how the research question will be answered. It describes the research design and research methods and is separated into two subchapters. The first subchapter delves into the logic of case study research and explains which cases have been selected and why. In the second subchapter, the research methods are introduced in the context of the selected case studies. From this follow the causal mechanisms and then the hypotheses that will be tested, to test the explanatory power of the contagion effect, coalition bargaining and parliamentary oversight as frameworks for the analysis of the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policies.

4.1. Case selection and logic

Two case studies were selected for answering the research question. The first case study focuses on the Netherlands from 2010 to 2012, more specifically the influence of the PVV and SGP – two Eurosceptic niche parties – on the EU policy of the Rutte I cabinet, consisting of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and conservative-liberal People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy (VVD). In the second case study, the Eurosceptic Jobbik is the niche party, and Fidesz is the Eurosceptic government party.

From 2010 to 2012, the Dutch had a minority government of the VVD and the CDA, with the parliamentary support of the PVV. For the Netherlands, this was a unique arrangement, since minority governments are relatively uncommon, and it was the first time an outspoken hard Eurosceptic party (PVV) played a significant role in government, albeit without ministerial responsibilities. After the fall of the government, Minister of Immigration, Gerd Leers, argued that the bargaining power of PVV had been particularly strong during Rutte I (Leers, 2012b).

The position of the PVV appears to have been particularly beneficial for shaping policy, as Geert Wilders, party leader of PVV, took part in the weekly meetings of the prime minister and key ministers. Therefore, without ministerial and governing responsibilities whilst nonetheless participating in cabinet meetings, the PVV had the power to play a decisive role in shaping the government’s policies. The threat of pulling the plug if things were moving in an undesirable direction was present. Furthermore, the Eurosceptic conservative Reformed Political Party (SGP) also played an important role in parliament during the Rutte I coalition, since it became the ‘silent supporter’ of the government after the coalition lost its majority in the Senate (De Jong, 2012). After the coalition lost its majority in the Eerste Kamer (Senate) in 2011, the SGP supported the coalition in the Senate. In return, the party wanted the government to refrain from extending the possibilities of shopping on Sundays, from imposing any restrictions on the freedom of (religious) education and desired the coalition to fare a conservative course in the field of medical ethics (Trouw, 2011).

In Hungary, the Fidesz-KDNP government won the general elections three times in a row with an overwhelming majority in parliament, holding around 2/3 of the seats since 2010. While the position of Fidesz concerning European integration is at times ambiguous (see section 7.2), its position on the EU-related dimensions of migration after 2014 have been Eurosceptic. The case study will look at the 2015 to 2020 period, and analyse the role of Jobbik, a (hard) Eurosceptic niche party in Hungary, that has influenced the EU policies of the Hungarian government. Jobbik won 16.7% of the votes in the 2010 elections and has since had a notable influence on Fidesz’s policies (Krekó and Enyedi, 2015; Enyedi and Róna, 2018). In fact, the policy positions of Jobbik have, on several occasions, served as the instigators of future policies of the Fidesz government.
Case selection is based on the logic of Beach and Pedersen’s (2013) for theory-testing process-tracing. They argue that theory-test process-tracing strategies may be used “when there are well-developed theoretical conjectures but we are unsure whether they have empirical support” (146). Chapter 3 focused on developing these “well-developed theoretical conjectures”. With those established, the necessary criteria for case selection will be the presence of the cause and effect – the presence of Eurosceptic niche parties and EU policy change, respectively. In both of the case studies, these criteria are met.

Furthermore, the two case studies are selected because I command both languages rather well, which avoids a language gap. However, the cases are also interesting because they offer insights into the workings of a founding member with typical consensus-based government system (the Netherlands) versus a newer member states with a majoritarian government system (Hungary). However, both have a relatively strong party-based Euroscepticism.

Besides, the Dutch case study is an excellent example of what influence a party might have that functions as a parliamentary supporter for the government, but without any ministerial responsibilities, thereby contributing to the study of the dynamics of minority governments. The Hungarian case study, on the other hand, is a prime example of how a self-proclaimed illiberal regime, with an overwhelming parliamentary majority, may be influenced by other parties in its political arena. Therefore, the case studies may be considered as likely cases where the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy can be expected. Consider this as a softer version of the most-likely case study logic of George and Bennett (2005): “[i]n a most-likely case, the independent variables posited by a theory are at values that strongly posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome. ... Most-likely cases ... are tailored to cast strong doubt on theories that do not fit” (121).

4.1.1. Migration policy

In both case studies, the EU-related dimensions of migration policy as the subject of discussion. To be able to trace policy change and the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the government’s migration policy, specific policy items are reviewed. For the Dutch case, two directives (Qualification Directive (2004/83) and Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) and one regulation (Dublin Regulation (343/2003) are discussed. These are selected based on the policy document that Minister of Immigration and Asylum Leers presented in December 2010, shortly after taking office in the VVD-CDA(-
PVV) coalition, and which were included in the coalition negotiations. This document is guiding since it offers very concrete policy aims for the immigration policy of this right-wing government. For the Hungarian case study, the government’s response to Council Decision 2015/1601 and the Stop Soros legislative package of 2018 are analysed.

Migration policy makes for an appropriate policy area to examine here, since the main Eurosceptic niche parties under examination in the Dutch and Hungarian cases, namely the PVV in the Netherlands and Jobbik in Hungary have an outspoken anti-immigration position, and both parties use immigration policy as a central motivation to be Eurosceptic.

Furthermore, in both the Netherlands and Hungary, immigration policy was one of the most salient dimensions of their EU politics and policy. The agreement between the government parties and the PVV in the Netherlands, appending the coalition agreement, dedicated the most attention to curbing immigration (CDA-VVD, 2010). Similarly, in Hungary, “[m]igration was without a doubt, the key theme in Hungarian politics during the 2014-2018 parliamentary cycle” (Bíró-Nagy, 2018: 269).

4.2. Research process

After having established which case studies will be analysed and why, the next step is to explain with which research method, these case studies will be tackled. Since the academic literature has not yet dealt elaborately with the effects of Euroscepticism on policy, as the three literature reviews in the previous chapter testify, the two case studies described above are going to be within-case analyses. Both will be subject to an in-depth analysis and are treated as stand-alone cases of Eurosceptic parties (attempting to) influencing the EU policies of a member state. Following the logic of within-case analyses, which according to the Encyclopedia of Case Study Research involves “an intimate familiarity with a particular case to discern how the processes or patterns that are revealed in that case support, refute, or expand (a) a theory that the researcher has selected or (b) the propositions that the researcher has derived from a review of the literature and/or experience with the phenomenon under study” (Paterson, 2012: 971-972). The case studies are developed with that in mind, namely that case studies are the most suitable for the analysis of causal relationships between cause and outcome.

---

12 It is common for radical right parties to couple anti-immigration to anti-EU (e.g. Fennema, 1997; Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Akkerman, 2018).
Figure 2 illustrates the research problem, where the big question mark refers to the causal mechanisms that are described below.\(^\text{13}\)

\[
\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
\text{Cause} \\
\hline
\text{The presence of Euro sceptic parties in the domestic political arena} \\
\hline
\text{?} \\
\hline
\text{Outcome} \\
\hline
\text{Change of EU policy/policies} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

4.2.1. Methods of within-case analysis: process tracing and the congruence method

Within the qualitative research methods, process tracing is most suitable for studying causal mechanisms by linking causes to outcomes, whereby the aim is to make stronger inferences about how causes contribute to bringing about an outcome.

Process tracing is a within-case method that seeks to trace the causal process from a cause to an outcome, whereby it opens the “black box” (the causal mechanism) and not only identifies the parts of the causal process but explains their logical sequence (Beach and Pedersen, 2016: 323). Three variants of process tracing have been identified, each to be used for a distinct research purpose. The purpose of theory-testing process tracing is to test whether the causal mechanism, based on the theoretical framework, is present “a population of cases of a phenomenon” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 11). Theory-building process tracing ‘builds’ a causal mechanism from rich empirical evidence, and explaining outcome process tracing looks at a unique case and traces what case-specific mechanism (Ibid.). Of the three variants of process tracing, theory-testing process tracing, since the three theoretical frameworks outlined in chapter 3 should be tested for their explanatory power.

\(^{13}\) Note that this research adopts the terminology used by Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen when talking about research methods. Rather than using the terms “independent variable” and “dependent variable”, cause and outcome are used to denote the starting and endpoint of causal mechanisms. The reason is that I will use Beach and Pedersen’s interpretation of causality and causal mechanisms, and they rightly point out that “symmetric theoretical claims would claim that an independent variable (X) has an impact across values of the dependent variable (Y)” (2016:24), while process tracing is “tracing mechanisms only between a given cause and outcome, meaning that we are making no presumptions about mechanisms in cases where the cause and outcome are not present” (Ibid: 24).
Theory-test process tracing involves three steps that the researcher needs to work out. Firstly, one needs to conceptualise the causal mechanism based on the theory, thereby explaining the parts of the causal mechanism from the cause to the outcome, depicted as P1, P2, P3 in figure 3. Secondly, after having distilled the causal mechanism from the theory, the theorised mechanism needs to be operationalised, i.e. translated into observable pieces. Those observable manifestations will serve the answer to the question: how will I recognise the parts of the causal mechanism if I see them? Thirdly, the theorised causal mechanism is tested against the evidence of the case, to see whether the causal mechanism is empirically present as well. (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 14-16; Beach and Pedersen, 2016: 322-325).

*Figure 3: Causal mechanism and black-boxing*

Conversely, the starting point for the use of the congruence method are the expectations of the independent and the dependent variables as they were derived from a theory: “The investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case” (George and Bennett, 2005: 181). Beach and Pedersen (2016) argue that this would be a weak test of causality, since selecting an appropriate case to test your theory already establishes causality between the cause and outcome (270). According to Blatter and Haverland (2012), the congruence method is used to make inferences about the explanatory power of competing theories, which are tested based on a set of empirical observations14. They differentiate between a “competing theories approach” and a “complementary theories approach” (Ibid.: 145). On the other hand, Beach and Pedersen (2016) differentiate between four types of congruence methods: explaining outcome congruence case studies, theory-building and

14 A classic case study with the congruence method is Tannenwald’s article on “The nuclear taboo” (1999). She had four case studies and tested whether “taboo talk” was present in the non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether that explained changes in the outcome.
theory-testing congruence case studies, and lastly, congruence case studies that refine causal theories (271).

In the end, the key difference between the congruence method and process tracing is how these methods try to ‘solve’ the causal mechanism. “Congruence investigates correlations between X and Y, whereas process-tracing investigates the workings of the mechanism(s) that contribute to producing an outcome” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 4-5). The subtle but important difference between the congruence method and process tracing thus lies in the degree that they explain the causal mechanism. Process tracing explains the full sequence of the parts that constitute the causal mechanism and how the parts logically follow one another, while the congruence method establishes that there is a causal mechanism but does not give insights into the sequential logic of the parts of the mechanism.

Also, while the aim is to illuminate as much as possible the steps in the causal mechanism and how the parts of the causal mechanism might be sequential, it would be an overstatement to claim that full-fledged process tracing takes place. Therefore, the more modest aim here is to establish the explanatory power of the theoretical frameworks as developed in sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, and thus whether the theoretical expectations match with the empirical findings in the case studies. In the empirical chapters, the goodness of fit of each causal mechanism is extensively analysed.

4.2.2. Operationalising Euroscepticism

The definition of soft and hard Euroscepticism by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) serves as the basis of the working definition for this research. Of the Eurosceptic parties that are part of the case studies, the classification is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party (country)</th>
<th>Hard of soft Eurosceptic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVV (Netherlands)</td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP (Netherlands)</td>
<td>Soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik (Hungary)</td>
<td>Hard until 2017 (approximately), then soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz (Hungary)</td>
<td>Soft, especially from 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Hard Euroscepticism refers to “a principled opposition to the EU and European integration”, implying that parties wish to “withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.” Soft Euroscepticism does not refer to principled opposition to European integration or membership, but opposition “where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 4)
4.2.3. Contagion effect

For the application of the literature on the contagion effect, the theoretical framework elaborated by Bonnie Meguid will be used to test its applicability to the research question of this work. This section first presents the causal mechanism that is distilled from Meguid’s PSO theory and then makes the case which within-case study method will be applied.

Table 5 summarises the different strategies that mainstream parties are theories to resort to as a consequence of the electoral success of a niche party. Upon considering the contagion effect, the accommodative strategy is the party strategy that mainstream parties are expected to be used in the face of a growing Eurosceptic party, since policy convergence is the phenomenon to look at when talking about the contagion effect. Figure 3 is the graphical representation of the causal mechanism derived from Meguid’s accommodative strategy. Part 1 is the cause, and part 5 is the outcome (using Beach and Pedersen’s (2016) denotations, as mentioned in section 4.2.1), whereas parts 2, 3 and 4 are the different elements of the causal mechanism that mirror the mechanism of the accommodative strategy. The electoral success of a Eurosceptic niche party triggers the mainstream party to react to this success. In doing so, they (part 2) increase the amount of attention to migration policy (thereby increase issue salience) and (part 3) converge their position on migration towards that of the niche party, which then (part 4) leads to a decrease issue ownership of migration policy by the Eurosceptic niche party. The so-called black box is unpacked, whereby the steps of the accommodative strategy are the black box that is the causal mechanism.

One of the important things to do is to identify the observable manifestations, .e.g. the operationalisation of the parts of the causal mechanism so that it is possible to identify the presence of the part when one sees it. Firstly, Meguid considers salience to be “the importance of an issue dimension … subject to manipulation” (2008: 25). Secondly, policy convergence or divergence is operationalised through policy changes along the categorisation of Peter Hall (first, second and third-order change, also see section 3.4 and section 4.2.6). Thirdly, issue ownership can be identified according to survey data and what previous scholars have identified the issue ownership of migration policy to be. However, this last factor is the least directly measurable and will be contingent upon a more qualitative argumentation.
Based on the discussion of niche and mainstream parties in section 3.1.2, niche parties can be distinguished on three grounds: (1) the traditional class-based orientation of politics is rejected, (2) novel issues are put on the agenda that mostly do not coincide with the traditional left-right political spectrum, (3) a smaller scope of issues is focused on (Meguid, 2008: 3-4). With that in mind, it is clear that the PVV in the Netherlands and Jobbik in Hungary are, or at the very least started as, niche parties, with their anti-EU, anti-immigration policies. As Jobbik matured, one might argue that the party is no longer a niche party and uses different party strategies (Meyer and Wagner, 2013), like the Green Party in Ireland developed (Bolleyer, 2010). Another relevant actor in the Dutch case is the SGP, which is an orthodox Christian party that represents a conservative Protestant community. Van Ditmars and De Lange (2014) categorise this party as a niche party, and this research will follow their logic. While the party would not fall within the category of niche party according to Meguid’s definition, Wagner’s 2011 study on defining and measuring niche parties finds that expert surveys do put SGP into the niche party category (856).

In the case studies, the steps of the causal mechanisms will be tested. Has the issue salience of migration policy increased from t=0 to t=1? Has the position of the mainstream party converged towards the position of the niche party? Has the issue ownership of migration policy shifted from the niche party to the mainstream party? If these questions can be answered in the affirmative, then the strategy was successful for the mainstream party, conditioned that it did gain, or at least did not lose, votes in the election at t=1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Electoral support of PVV/SGP (NL) and Jobbik (HU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dismissive</td>
<td>Decreases</td>
<td>No movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodative</td>
<td>Increases</td>
<td>Converges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>Increases</td>
<td>Diverges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Meguid, 2005: 350
Figures 4 and 5 show the causal mechanisms for the Dutch and Hungarian case studies, respectively. In the Dutch case study, the PVV is the contagious Eurosceptic niche party that the two government parties (VVD and CDA) are changing their position on migration policy. If both parties would follow an accommodative party strategy, they would both end up with a more restrictive position on migration policy, to weaken the influence of the PVV in the political arena. Similarly, in the Hungarian case study, Jobbik is the Eurosceptic niche party which Fidesz is trying to weaken, by shifting their policy position towards that of Jobbik. Though these strategies of the government parties, the PVV and Jobbik exert influence on the EU policies of the governments, since these parties, by “carving out of a niche for themselves in the political spectrum” (Topaloff, 2012: 74), politicised previously untapped issues that appeared to be electorally advantageous (Salo and Rydgren, 2018).

After explaining the causal mechanism of the contagion effect, the next section will look at coalition bargaining.

*Figure 4: Causal mechanism accommodative strategy in Dutch case study*
4.2.4. Coalition bargaining

Coalition bargaining is the second literature that is used to test for the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states. It studies how parties in government can shape coalition agreements and negotiate when inter-party conflicts arise.

In order to identify the influence of individual parties on government policy, Bolleyer’s concepts of formation weight and coalition weight are guiding, for they allow for a straightforward operationalisation of how parties might influence policy. Bolleyer (2007) assessed the negotiation capacity of small parties and distinguished between two dimensions upon which negotiation capacity depends. Firstly, formation weight refers to the influence that a party has during the coalition formation. This factor is operationalised as the number of party pledges that make it into the coalition agreement, but which have not been supported by the other coalition parties. Secondly, coalition weight captures the influence of a coalition party when inter-party conflict arises during the post-formation phase, and is operationalised as the share of commitments that end up in the coalition agreement and which are subsequently translated into legislation, and which are not states by other coalition partners.
Figure 6: Causal mechanism coalition bargaining

Figure 6 illustrates the causal mechanism of coalition bargaining in the Netherlands. The mechanism starts from the point that the PVV, as a parliamentary supporter, plays a role in the coalition bargaining process, and thereby helped shape the coalition agreement of the Rutte I cabinet. Steps 2a and 2b refer to the formation weight and coalition weight of the PVV in the Rutte I cabinet. In the coalition formation phase, formation weight measures the party pledges that the PVV made, but that neither the VVD nor the CDA made, and which ended up in the coalition agreement. Formation weight can then be seen as a measurement of the bargaining strength of the PVV in the coalition formation. Secondly, during the post-formation phase, when the Rutte I cabinet is governing, the PVV’s policy positions which made it into legislation, and which had not been stated by the VVD and CDA, are the measurement of the coalition weight. If any ‘exclusive’ pledges of the PVV made it into the coalition agreement, and, in particular, were implemented by the Rutte I government, this will be considered a successful influence of the PVV on the government’s migration policy.

Regrettably, the Hungarian case study goes not lend itself to the study of its coalition politics, since (1) Fidesz-KDNP have been in a permanent coalition since 2006 and are considered to be one party, and (2) in 2010, 2014 and 2018 Fidesz-KDNP ended up with a 2/3 majority in parliament16, so no coalition negotiations were necessary.

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16 Fidesz received 53% of the votes in 2010, 44% in 2014 and 49% in 2018 (Hungarian National Election Office, 2020). The redrawing the electoral districts and the reform of the electoral system in 2011 led to the supermajority, despite significantly lower votes in 2014 (Tóka, 2014).
4.2.5. Parliamentary oversight

The causal mechanism that is partially derived from the literature of parliamentary oversight over EU policy is based on the principal-agent theory. As a recap of the main points of the principal-agent theory for our case studies: the government is the agent and is bestowed the authority to represent parliament, the principal, in the European Union. That means that parliament will not have full control over the government and will lack complete information. Parliament, however, has numerous tools to decrease the information asymmetry that follows from this delegation, like the ability to ask questions to government representatives about Council meetings. Beyond control mechanisms, the principal might aim to shape the actions of the agent.

The remainder of the causal mechanism is derived from Smeets and De Ruiter (2018), who identified four steps on a so-called “scrutiny ladder”, which shows how different types of scrutiny correspond with levels of scrutiny, represented in table 6. Steps 1 and 2, expressing support or disagreement of a government policy and asking parliamentary question respectively, require relatively little effort from MPs, even though asking informative questions are more demanding than the simple task of expressing agreement or dissatisfaction. These steps do not directly challenge the government’s policy or position and are thus rather elements of monitoring government activities. A more demanding scrutiny intervention is taking up an alternative position from that of the government’s; this step can only be taken after having informed oneself about the government’s position through the use of questioning time (step 2), increasing the investment for both the MP and the (prime) minister. Lastly, the fourth step in the scrutiny ladder ex-ante EU meetings is when an MP provides instructions to the government representative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of scrutiny →</th>
<th>Monitoring scrutiny</th>
<th>Political scrutiny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scrutiny level →</td>
<td>Step 1: expressing</td>
<td>Step 3: taking up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands for MP ↓</td>
<td>support/disagreement</td>
<td>an alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of gov.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>position on issue</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Overview of the ex-ante steps on the scrutiny ladder and related demands for the MP
Analysis of gov. position and argumentation & X & X & X

Own information or expertise on issue & & X & X

Overview state of play in negotiations & & & X

Source: Smeets and De Ruiter, 2018: 5

Based on this table, the causal mechanisms of the parliamentary oversight for the Dutch and Hungarian case studies are expressed in figure 7 and 8, respectively. Steps 1 through 3 in both cases are part of the principal-agent model, where the respectively Rutte I cabinet and the Fidesz government are mandated by parliament to govern (step 1), and then develop and implement their respective (migration) policies (step 2). In step 3, we focus on the Eurosceptic niche parties and their attitude towards the migration policies of their governments. Within the parliamentary setting, the members of parliament (MPs) of these parties are expected to exercise their right to scrutinise the government’s migration policy. According to Smeets and De Ruiter’s (2018) scrutiny ladder, the impact of their scrutiny is contingent on the effort they put into it, i.e. the more energy they put into an issue – their expertise and (inside) knowledge – the more these Eurosceptic MPs will be able to influence the migration policies of their governments.

*Figure 7: Causal mechanism parliamentary oversight Dutch case study*

Parliamentary oversight in Dutch case study

1. Dutch Parliament delegates to Rutte I

2. Rutte I formulates migration policy and starts policy execution

3. PVV MPs identify discrepancy of preferences in migration policy of Rutte I and their own

4. In reaction to the migration policy of the Rutte I cabinet, PVV MPs decide to:
   - Express support/disagreement
   - Ask parliamentary questions
   - Take up alternative position
   - Provide instructions

5. PVV MPs influence the migration policy of the Rutte I cabinet

Adopted from Smeets and De Ruiter, 2018

More specifically, it is assumed here that expressing support or disagreement of policy preferences of the government by the Eurosceptic MP does not effectively impact the
policy preferences/choices of the government. When an MP of PVV /Jobbik asks questions to Rutte I/Fidesz, it thereby shows an interest in the policy developments of migration policy and triggers the respective government to account for its actions. When the Eurosceptic MP takes up an alternative position, it offers the government policy alternatives, which might indirectly affect the government policy preferences/actions. Lastly, when an MP of the PVV or Jobbik providing instructions to the VVD-CDA coalition or the Fidesz government, respectively, that MP allocates significant resources to know what their government is doing on the international level, which decreases the information asymmetry they have, and which paves the way for actual and direct policy influence.

**Figure 8: Causal mechanism parliamentary oversight Hungarian case study**

1. Hungarian Parliament delegates to Fidesz
2. Fidesz formulates migration policy and starts policy execution
3. Jobbik MPs identify discrepancy of preferences in migration policy of Fidesz and their own
4. In reaction to the migration policy of the Fidesz government, Jobbik MPs decide to:
   - Express support/disagreement
   - Ask parliamentary questions
   - Take up alternative position
   - Provide instructions
5. Jobbik MPs influence the migration policy of the Fidesz government

Adopted from Smeets and De Ruijer, 2018

### 4.2.6. Operationalising policy change

Lastly, the measurement of policy change as a consequence of the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policies is shortly discussed. In order to understand the degree of change, Peter Hall’s (1993) categorisation of first, second and third-order change is used. The following policy items will be looked at: the Qualification Directive, the Family Reunification Directive and the Dublin Regulation for the Netherlands, and the consequences of Council Decision 2015/1601 and the Stop Soros legislative package of 2018 for Hungary. While tracing the developments of these policy issues, did the level of
the instruments, the instruments themselves and/or the hierarchy of goals change? If yes, how? These two questions will be asked for all policy items, to establish whether first, second or third-order change occurred. That will then represent the gravity of the policy change, whereby first-order change is part of the ‘normal’ decision-making process, and second-order change is already influenced by ideological considerations of the political actors (Greener, 2001). Third-order change falls under what Peter Hall calls paradigm shifts. In the face of significant policy failure, political actors might refer to such paradigm shifts, and policy learning would occur (Peter, 1993).

Table 7 summarises the dimensions of change for each order of change. If only the level of the instruments of the policy issues of migration policy (Qualification Directive, Family Reunification Directive, etc.) was altered, for instance through a change in the age requirement for immigrants seeking family reunification in the Netherlands, then a first-order change occurred, since the instruments and goals of the policy issue remain the same. When the policy instruments are subject to change as well, but the goals of the policy are unaltered, Hall’s speaks of second-order change. An example would be altering the requirements for family reunification. In third-order change, the goals of the policy themselves are altered. Sticking with family reunification, an example of third-order change could be the complete abandonment of the possibility for family reunification, whereby the very goal of allowing family the reunify is off the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Dimension of change</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-order change</td>
<td>Goals and instruments remain the same, but the level of the instruments change (policy adjustments)</td>
<td>Age requirement for family reunification is altered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-order change</td>
<td>Goals remain the same, but the instruments and the level of the instruments change</td>
<td>Next to an age requirement, an income requirement and minimum age also become criteria for family reunification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-order change</td>
<td>The hierarchy of goals, the instruments themselves and the level of the instruments all change</td>
<td>Banning family reunification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The explanation of the classification of the order changes of the five policy items that are discussed across the two cases studies will be part of the analysis in the empirical chapters.
4.3. Sources

The previous sections discussed the logic behind the choice to use qualitative case studies to answer the research question, that process tracing is used to establish the causal link between the presence of Eurosceptic parties and EU policy change, and what these causal mechanisms look like. The sources used for this dissertation serve to determine that parties are indeed Eurosceptic, whether the above-described causal mechanisms are present and whether they have led to policy change. They can be grouped into the following categories:

- **Academic output**: academic books, journal articles, survey data.
- **Media output**: NOS (Dutch), Telegraaf (Dutch), NRC (Dutch), NPORadio 1 (Dutch), Nieuwsuur (Dutch), Trouw (Dutch), 24.hu (Hungarian), 444 (Hungarian), AboutHungary.hu (Hungarian), BBC (UK), BBJ (Hungarian), HungaryToday (Hungarian), De Volkskrant (Dutch), Index (Hungarian), Joop.nl (Dutch opinion website), Mandiner (Hungarian), NOL (Hungarian), Origo (Hungarian), Irish Times (Irish), Project Syndicate (International), Reuters (International), De Hofvijver (Dutch).
- **Journalistic accounts**: For the Dutch case study, several journalistic accounts of the political events unfolding in the period 2010-2012 were used.
- **Interviews**: I conducted six interviews with leading scholars in the field and one interview with a Dutch EU representative.

When using non-academic or official sources, I always sought an objective interpretation of events, and deliberately avoided speculative analyses on blogs or other information portals. Alfahir.hu was not put in the list of media output since it is rather the opinion page of the political party Jobbik. The journalistic accounts of events and the interviews serve as tools for triangulation, whereby the claims or statements made by political actors are cross-verified.
4.4. Conclusion

This concludes the theoretical and methodologic parts of the research. In this chapter, we argued that within-case studies, using process tracing, are the most appropriate way to understand better whether and how Eurosceptic parties might influence the EU policies of member states. By developing three explanations of influence from three literature reviews, the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy can now be tested in the Dutch and Hungarian case studies. These case studies focus on migration policy because the Eurosceptic niche parties examined below have a radical right orientation and couple an anti-immigration agenda to an anti-EU approach. Preliminary research showed that both the Netherlands and Hungary had Eurosceptic niche parties that were electorally successful and where influence was likely. Furthermore, the two case studies are insightful in that they cover different government systems (consensus-seeking in the Netherlands versus majoritarian in Hungary) (Gallagher et al., 2006), geographical areas with diverging political cultures and heritage (Western versus Central Eastern) (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2016) and where the Eurosceptic niche parties have different roles vis a vis the government (parliamentary supporter in the Netherlands versus opposition party in Hungary).

Chapter 5 will discuss Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, and chapter 6 will describe and analyse the Dutch case study, chapter 7 and 8 have the same logic, but then for Hungary.
5. Party-based Euroscepticism in the Netherlands

Until the early 2000s, the Dutch parliament\(^\text{17}\) was supportive of European integration. Besides manifestations of Euroscepticism, it was not until the early 1990s that a critical attitude towards the EU became more rooted in the Dutch parliament. Frits Bolkestein, former party leader of the VVD and European Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services (1999-2004), was vocal in his criticism towards the EU. Bolkestein (VVD) called for more emphasis on national interests in foreign policy-making, for a strict implementation of the EMU criteria, for a decrease in the Dutch contributions to the EU and was against extensive European competences, particularly regarding security policy (Bolkestein, 2011). However, despite his hawkish rhetoric, his party had voted in favour of the all European treaties. Whether Bolkestein can be considered a Eurosceptic politician is thus not entirely clear.

However, Euroscepticism was rooted in the political programme of the Socialistische Partij (SP), which first took a seat in the national parliament in 1994 (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013: 193). The SP, as a Marxist-Leninist party, had very different ideological motivations to be critical towards the EU that the conservative-liberal VVD. It used a Maoist-like populist rhetoric to mobilise “the people” (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012). In 1992 the party campaigned for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, was vocally against introducing the Euro and saw the Maastricht Treaty as a further step toward an “undemocratic superstate” (Ibid.: 53).

It was not until the early 2000s that criticism against the European Union became more prominent in the Netherlands. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, a stagnating economy and the rise to prominence of the charismatic Pim Fortuyn fuelled opposition to the EU in the Netherlands (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013). Fortuyn called the EU a “done deal” (Ibid.: 294).

Pim Fortuyn’s quick ascent to prominence in Dutch politics came to a sudden and tragic end with his assassination on 6 May 2002. Only nine days later, the Netherlands held general elections, which was largely overshadowed by the assassination. Despite having lost its leader, the LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) won 17% of the votes, making it the second-largest party only after CDA. The LPF entered government after their electoral

\(^\text{17}\) The Dutch parliament is bicameral, with a house of representatives (Tweede Kamer) and a senate (Eerste Kamer).
success, but this cabinet could hold office for only 87 days, after a period of massive internal unrest in the party and the cabinet (Akkerman and de Lange, 2012).

Where Bolkestein’s critical attitude towards the EU remained mostly within the realm of parliament and did not resonate beyond the political elite, it was Fortuyn’s criticism of the European Union that found a wide footing among the public (Mudde, 2007). Pim Fortuyn introduced populism on a large scale into Dutch politics (Lucardie, 2008: 164). However, Fortuyn was not principally against the EU. It was instead the EU’s rigid bureaucratic structure, with its apparent lack of democratic accountability that he opposed. LPF’s party program for the 2004 EP elections closed with a quote from Fortuyn’s 1997 book Soulless Europe: “I love Europe, I love its multitude of people, cultures, landscapes, weather conditions, languages and human beings. I sometimes hate the euro-elite [sic] in its arrogant negligence. In short, I want a Europe of the people, of the human scale. A Europe for you and me!” (as quoted in Mudde 2007).

On 1 June 2005, the Netherlands held a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. No less than 61% of the Dutch population voted against the Treaty. This rejection of the Treaty was in marked contrast to the parliamentary vote several days earlier, where the 87% voted in favour of the Treaty. According to Aarts and Van der Kolk (2005), the failure of the Yes campaign lay in their inability to campaign together. Furthermore, the Yes campaign lacked ‘credibility’, since those parties in favour of the Treaty continued to criticise the (functioning of the) EU. The media picked up on this ambiguous attitude and discussed it extensively (Ibid.).

On the other hand, the SP and the PVV, as key parties of the No campaign, celebrated their success. Geert Wilders declared in the Tweede Kamer one day after the Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 that “It was a wonderful day yesterday! The Dutch voter spoke out. A large majority said no. I am proud of the Dutch voter, because he said no to the European constitution of the elite in Brussels, who are light years away from the regular man and woman” (Wilders, 2005).

During the parliamentary elections in 2012, the European Union became much more politicised than during the 2010 elections. On average, around twice as much attention was attributed to the EU in the party programmes in the Netherlands in 2012 compared to 2010 (Van Dorp and Hoekstra, 2012). Harryvan and Hoekstra found that during the 2012 parliamentary elections the key debates on the European Union were not about “being in favour or against Dutch membership of the European Union, despite the PVV’s intentions, but much more about the specific choices that had to be made in the
framework of Europe, such as the tasks and size of the ESM debt rescue fund and whether and how a maximum government debt of 3% ought to be realised” (2013: 53).

Harryvan and Van der Harst identify three “manifestations of Eurocriticism” in the Netherlands that played out on the government level (2017: 4-6). The first wave took place after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when the Netherlands, as net-contributor, campaigned for a decrease in the national contributions to the EU during every budget negotiation. From the early 2000s onwards, the principle of subsidiarity more prominently features in policy debates, which have led towards a more critical position on the transfer of competences from the domestic level to the European level. Third, the Rutte-I cabinet (a coalition of VVD and CDA with the parliamentary support of the far-right PVV, 2010-2012) pushed for a further curbing of the transfer of competences.

The Euro crisis boosted the politicisation of the EU in the Netherlands, just like it did in France (Hutter and Kerscher, 2014). Adam et al. (2017) find that the political debate on the EU has highly polarised in the Netherlands, with an increasing gap between the positions of Eurosceptic and pro-European parties. This polarisation is amplified by the fact that catch-all parties in the Netherlands are inclined to silence the Eurosceptic parties by not joining the debates on EU-related issues that Eurosceptic parties put on the agenda (Ibid.).

After this short review of the contemporary state of the political debate concerning the EU in the Netherlands, the remainder of this chapter looks at party-based Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, particularly since the 2000s, and will give more detailed explanations of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties.

5.1. Party support/scepticism for the EU

In chapter 2, several definitions of party-based Euroscepticism were presented, and eventually, Taggart and Szczepanik’s 2002 (2008) classification was considered the most practical for our purposes here. The attitudes towards the EU of all the political parties that made it into the Tweede Kamer since 2002 will shortly be discussed before delving into the motivations of Eurosceptic parties to oppose (part of) the EU.

First, table 8 summarises the political parties in the Netherlands according to their support for the EU. The categorisation by Vollaard and Voerman (2015) serves this purpose well, since it is complete and uses Taggart and Szczepanik’s categorisations of Euroscepticism, complemented with two categories of non-Eurosceptic party positions.
The table looks at three periods, the periods after 2005, 2010 and 2017. As mentioned above, in 2005 the Netherlands held a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected by 61% of the Dutch population. A “numbing silence” which lasted for about a year followed in Dutch parliament, where no party was keen to emphasise the benefits of European integration (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013: 251). In 2010 the Geert Wilders’ PVV became a parliamentary supporter of the Rutte I cabinet, and in 2017 the Netherlands held its most recent parliamentary elections at the time of writing.

Table 8: Categorisations of party support for the EU in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>post-2005</th>
<th>post-2010</th>
<th>2017*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FvD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Hard Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
<td>Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
<td>‘Soft’ Europhile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdD</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Hard Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Hard Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Hard Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
<td>Soft Eurosceptic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
<td>Europragmatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vollaard & Voerman, 2015 * author’s calculation based on the Vollaard and Voerman categorisation

Of the 13 parties that are represented in the Dutch parliament since the last general election in 2017, six parties classify as Eurosceptic, four of which are considered soft Eurosceptic and two are hard Eurosceptic, amounting to approximately 32% of the votes. Since the early 2000s, the share of Eurosceptic parties in the Dutch parliament has hovered around 30%, making it part of the political mainstream. As for the specific parties, D66 and GroenLinks have historically been Europhile parties. Early on, D66 (established in 1966) sought to deepen and widen European integration and continued to

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18 The Netherlands have a completely proportional election system. With 32% of the votes in the 2017 elections, those parties received 32% of the seats in the Tweede Kamer.
support a Federal Union in the general elections of 2017. GroenLinks similarly seeks
deeper and broader integration, and both parties support an EU army, and are in favour of cooperation or common policies in most fields. The mainstream parties CDA, PvdA and VVD, may not find a Federal Union desirable, but all recognise the Dutch dependence on the EU for safety and welfare. Cooperation and common policies are desirable to tackle common issues like crime, climate change, mass migration, energy dependence, economic and financial instability, and to spur economic development by investing in infrastructure and innovation/research. They also remain open to, yet reserved about, further enlargement of the EU, but CDA and VVD state that an EU army is not desirable. The Labour Party (PvdA) has been a Europhile party since the 1940s, embracing federalism, but has been critical of the overemphasis on the market and the negative consequences this might have for social wellbeing (Vollaard and Voerman 2015, 137). PvdA was one of the three parties that initiated the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty as a proponent of the treaty – just like almost every other party in the Dutch parliament. The crushing vote against the treaty thus came as a blow to the party and its Europe policy. Its 2006 party manifesto focused on winning back the confidence in the European integration project, emphasising that policy areas should become an EU competence only when a national approach is not suitable (PvdA 2006). Nevertheless, the emphasis is also on solidarity between countries, “in order to offer everything chances for a better future - whether that is by supporting the poorest regions in Europe, or via a foreign policy that focuses more on human rights, international development cooperation and conflict prevention - is an essential part of European cooperation” (PvdA 2006).

Based on the categorisation by Vollaard and Voerman, the following parties are considered Eurosceptic and will thus be discussed below: SP, ChristenUnie/SGP, PVV, PvdD, and FvD. This overview will set the stage for the first case study, that will be discussed in chapter 6.

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19. These positions are based on a content analysis of the party manifestos of the parties, performed by the author in 2017.
20. Own translation
5.2. SP

As mentioned in the introduction, the SP was founded in the 1970s, and initially followed a Marxist-Leninist ideology that used populist rhetoric to mobilise its constituency (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012), and has been a long-term critic of the EU. The SP voted against all recent Treaties – from the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. It aimed its opposition towards the Lisbon Treaty at the weak role of the national parliaments in the EU’s decision making and the continuous process of state-building within the EU (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2008).

In their 2017 election programme, the SP continued to emphasise the democratic deficit of the EU. To tackle that democratic deficit, national parliaments should play a more prominent role in the EU decision-making process, the European Commission’s political function should be suspended, and there should be a halt to the transfer of competences to the European Parliament. The SP’s opposition to the EU is directed at the power balances within the EU, which calls for a realignment of the powers and competences towards the national parliaments, and away from the European Commission and European Parliament.

On substantive matters, the EU should focus on concerted efforts to tackle global issues like international crime and climate change, and to deal with financial shocks, by reforming the Stability and Growth Pact. They do not support the TTIP and CETA and underscore the importance of global and European fair trade. While the SP does not outright reject further enlargement of the EU, it does not see enlargement desirable for the foreseeable future. In case of a prospect of new countries joining the EU, a referendum should decide on whether that country may accede. (SP, 2017)

Two quotes from the 2006 and 2012 party programmes summarise the main objections of the SP to the EU: “In the last twenty years the EU has focused on becoming a powerful superstate that mostly wants to compete with other world powers” (SP, 2012), but where its “neoliberal course ... [since the 1980s] threatens the social relations and disturbs the public services in the member states” (SP, 2006). It was the financial crisis that clearly showed the SP’s opposition to the economic and financial policies of the Union, since it was those policies that caused much of the crisis (Vollaard and Voerman, 2015: 151).
5.3. ChristenUnie and SGP

The two conservative Christian parties – ChristenUnie (Christian Union) and SGP (Reformist Political Party) – are both critical of the EU and its functioning, though to different degrees. These parties are discussed together, since they are small and have had a joint list for EP elections since the 1980s. Both parties favour the transfer of competences back to the national governments and would want to condition any further transfers of competences to the European Commission or European Parliament on at least two-thirds of the Tweede Kamer supporting it. Furthermore, both the ChristenUnie and SGP argue that preparatory work should be done in case there would be a Dutch exit out of the EU or the Eurozone in their 2017 election programmes.

Nevertheless, there are also differences between the SGP and the ChristenUnie. The SGP appears to be the only party against an EU-level border protection. The party also supports the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in its current form, while all other parties call for reforms of the CAP that would decrease the share of CAP of the EU budget and make the European agricultural more sustainable. In a nutshell, the SGP’s vision of the EU would make it “simpler and more flexible. Power needs to be given to the national parliaments. On issues like the internal market, clear agreements are needed between member states, but it is good if on some terrains, some states do cooperate while other states do not do so, or less. More freedom, less uniformity” (SGP, 2017: 86).

Conversely, the ChristenUnie is a party that has a more ambiguous and pragmatic approach to the EU. On various issues, it is particularly sceptical, while on others it is not. For instance, the party was in favour of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, but against Turkey’s candidacy, and it was fiercely against the Constitutional Treaty but supported the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, the ChristenUnie voted against the Constitutional Treaty, because the title of the Treaty implied a move towards the EU becoming a state, as did an official European flag and anthem. However, the party voted for the Lisbon Treaty, since those issues were no longer present in that Treaty21 (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2008). Also, it is in favour of close cooperation within the EU but against a political union and had a mixed position on the financial bailout of Greece (Vollaard and Voerman, 2015). Again, there are push and pull forces within the party that fostered an ambiguous attitude towards European integration. One example of this was how party

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21 It is likely that the ChristenUnie’s role as junior party in the Balkenende IV government also played a role in the vote in favour of the Lisbon Treaty.
leader Arie Slob in 2012 stated that “a monetary union may very well work without a political union”, while in the same year MP Gert-Jan Segers stated that he “has absolutely no principle objection to a United States of Europe” as long as it an organic process built on values (Vollaard and Voerman, 2015: 126-127).

In terms of specific policy issues, the ChristenUnie believes that the EU has gone too far in its integration process, though recognises the necessity to work together on cross-border issues like climate change, mass migration, international crime and terrorism. The party also supports a deep regulation of the financial markets and a Banking Union (ChristenUnie, 2017).

Until 2019 the ChristenUnie and SGP had a common list during the EP elections. Their collaboration ended after the 2019 elections, and the parties ended up in different political factions within the European Parliament. One of the key reasons for the split was the ChristenUnie’s principal opposition to be in a fraction with the far-right Forum for Democracy (FvD) – FvD’s call for a “Nexit” (Dutch exit out of the EU) was irreconcilable with the ChristenUnie’s position (Radio 1, 2019). On the other hand, the SGP did not object to cooperation with the FvD and ended up in the same Eurogroup as the FvD. Eventually the ChristenUnie joined the European People’s Party (EPP), and the SGP joined the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).

5.4. PVV

After the no vote on the Constitutional Treaty in June 2005, Geert Wilders, leader of the PVV, enthusiastically proclaimed: “It was a wonderful day yesterday! The Dutch voter spoke out. A large majority said no. I am proud of the Dutch voter, because he said no to the European constitution of the elite in Brussels, who are light years away from the regular man and woman” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2005).

In 2004, Geert Wilders left the VVD with the aim of founding his own party, of which the PVV (Party for Freedom), established in 2006, is the product. Wilders may be considered Pim Fortuyn’s successor as the populist leader in the Netherlands. However, there is ambiguity about how well Wilders fits in the populist frame. Vossen argues that while Wilders focused on conflict, “the main conflict he perceives appears not to be a national conflict between the people and the elite, which is the core of populism, but an

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22 Own translation
international conflict between the Islam and Western society that is weakened by left-wing relativism” (2010, 30). In fact, it is a left-wing economic policy blended with a strong anti-immigration and anti-EU vision that led to the growth of the PVV, from around 6% of the votes in 2006 with a high point in 2010 with 15.45%, that made the PVV the second biggest party in 2010.

After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, it was unsurprising that the parliamentary approval of the Lisbon Treaty three years later was called the “biggest political disaster of the year” by PVV MP De Roon (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2008). Illustrative of the PVV’s position towards the EU are other parts of De Roon’s statement in parliament during the debate on the Lisbon Treaty back in 2008: “The PVV faction wants a smaller Europe with fewer member states, so that less rather than more euros are paid [into the EU]. We don’t want more but less competences for Europe, not more but less bureaucracy, not more but more immigration” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2008). That points towards a strictly intergovernmental relationship with other countries in the EU.

For the PVV, the salience of the EU grew in particular after the 2010 general elections. Its 2012 programme centred around an anti-EU rhetoric, carrying the title Our Netherlands, their Brussels. The aim was a Dutch exit out of the EU, with a full transfer of competences back to the national parliament.

The PVV has adopted a consistent approach towards the EU, though they have become less elaborate in their anti-EU criticism. In the 2017 party programme (a single page in total), the only reference to the EU was: “The Netherlands regains independence. So out of the EU” (PVV, 2017). The 2019 EP programme provided six bullet points, namely that the Netherlands should come first, regain its sovereignty, have control over its own borders, have control over its own money, should de-Islamise and that the Netherlands should leave the “European Super State” and not get lost in its “climate hysteria” (PVV, 2019). These points echo its ambition to leave the Union.

5.5. PvdD

The Animal Rights Party (PvdD) first entered the Tweede Kamer in 2006. As the name implies, it is instead a single-issue party. Nevertheless, the party has a position on most salient policy areas. Regarding the EU, the PvdD’s main criticism is directed at the EU’s overemphasis on the capital system and its lack of democratic accountability (PvdD,
In its party manifesto of 2012, the party stated the need for international and European cooperation in cooperating on global issues like climate change and maintaining peace, but also stressed that the EU and the decision-making process on the EU level need to democratise. More competences need to go to the EP, and this democratisation process is a condition for further enlargement (PvdD, 2012). The PvdD devoted more attention to the EU during the 2017 general elections, and was more uncompromising regarding the EU: (1) no new competencies should go to the EU without at least a referendum, (2) member states will have full authority over their budgets, and (3) exit strategies out of the Eurozone should be drafted.

5.6. FvD

The most recent addition (in 2016) to the group of Eurosceptic parties in the Netherlands is the Forum for Democracy (FvD). Its party leader, Thierry Baudet, successfully initiated a civil initiative that called for a referendum on the EU, basing his justification for a referendum on the continuous transfer of competences from the Netherlands to the EU (NOS.nl, 2014). The Tweede Kamer was therefore obliged to vote on the call for a referendum but voted it down. Baudet and others nonetheless managed to initiate a referendum related to the EU in 2016 – this time on the Dutch position regarding the EU’s Association Agreement with Ukraine (NOS, 2016). Voters were overwhelmingly against the Association Agreement, forcing Prime Minister Mark Rutte to renegotiate parts of the agreement with Ukraine. Eventually the Association Agreement was signed, with a delay of several months.

In the general elections of 2017, the FvD won 2 seats in the Tweede Kamer. In terms of specific policies, the party calls for an immediate stop to the enlargement of the EU and wants the Netherlands to leave the Euro, the Schengen Treaty and in due time to leave the EU as well (Forum voor Democratie, n.d.). The party proposes to call referendums on membership to the Euro, the Schengen Treaty, and the EU (Ibid.). These proposals make the FvD the second hard Eurosceptic party of the Netherlands, after the PVV.

5.7. Conclusion

Chapter 5 discussed party-based Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, focusing on the period 2002-2019. Six Eurosceptic parties – the PVV and FvD as hard Eurosceptic and
SP, ChristenUnie, SGP and PvdD as soft Eurosceptic – were identified, and their motivations to be critical towards the EU were discussed. While the PVV and FvD are both anti-immigration and anti-EU parties, the soft Eurosceptic parties direct their objections mostly to the undemocratic nature of the EU, albeit with different solutions to this problem – from more competences for the national parliaments (SP, ChristenUnie, SGP) to a more prominent role for the European Parliament (PvdD).

In the next chapter, we will look at the EU-related dimensions of migration policy in the Netherlands in the period 2010-2012. Of the 6 Eurosceptic parties that were discussed, the PVV will play a prominent role, and the SGP will play a minor role. As for the SP, ChristenUnie and PvdD, these parties do not have an anti-immigration policy like the PVV and SGP do. Forum for Democracy, on the other hand, did not yet exist in the period 2010-2012.
6. Case study: NL migration policy 2010-2012

In October 2010, the Netherlands witnessed the first time the government parties – VVD and CDA – signed a separate parliamentary support agreement with a party that is not formally governing – PVV (Parlement.com, 2020). This chapter will focus on the Rutte I Cabinet (October 2010-April 2012), and analyse how the PVV and SGP (as niche parties) influenced the EU-related dimensions of the migration policy of Rutte I. The time frame is relatively short, but the policy proposals of the Rutte I government on migration policy were substantial. The policy output of the governments preceding and succeeding Rutte I (i.e. Balkenende IV and Rutte II, respectively) will be touched upon to put into perspective the policy change under Rutte I.

The two Eurosceptic and right-wing niche parties in the Netherlands (PVV and SGP), each played an essential role for the governability of the Rutte I cabinet. First, by being the parliamentary supporter of the coalition23, the PVV was able to attend ministerial meetings, while not having the ministerial responsibilities or being accountable in case of crises or contested policy decisions. It was the second-largest party in parliament, with an anti-immigration and anti-EU programme. These two factors are expected to have strengthened the bargaining position of the PVV vis-à-vis the government. Another Eurosceptic party is likely to play a role in shaping the government’s migration policy, albeit to a lesser extent, is the SGP. This conservative Christian party expressed compassion with the plight of migrants, though was one of the few parties reluctant to embrace a coordinated EU effort to tackle immigration. Also, after Rutte I lost their majority in the Eerste Kamer (Senate) in March 2011, SGP became the ‘silent supporter’ of the government, which also put the SGP in a strong bargaining position (De Jong, 2012).

The chapter starts with a section on the general direction of migration policy under Rutte I. In section 6.2, three specific EU-related policy proposals will be discussed in detail. Based on the collected empirical data, the three causal mechanisms will be used for the analysis of the policy proposals. Section 6.4 closes the chapter and presents the main findings of the Dutch case study.

23 In the agreement, there is an explicit reference to the disagreement which the CDA and VVD on the one hand, and the PVV on the other hand, with regards to the nature of Islam. The PVV treats it as a political ideology, while the other parties see it as a religion (Coalition Agreement VVD-CDA 2010, 4).
6.1. General direction migration policy under Rutte I

Shortly after taking office in October 2010, Minister of Immigration and Asylum Gerd Leers presented a Roadmap for migration policy, which summarised the agenda points for migration and asylum policy that the Dutch government was going to work on within the EU. The minister got the mandate to work on the following specific issues in terms of the EU dimension of migration policy. First, the amendment of the Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC). Second, the Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation 343/2003), where immediate (re)negotiation would be possible. Third, Council Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification was similarly deemed suitable for revision; the Commission had a green paper scheduled for publication in 2011. A fourth policy item which might be renegotiated in the medium to long term, namely Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. In this case, negotiations were pending, and cooperation was sought with other member states. Furthermore, there were two directives where at the time no adjustments were expected but where the Netherlands would try to bargain: (1) Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of EU citizens to move freely within the EU, (2) Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, and the Association Agreement with Turkey. (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 30 December 2010). Therefore, here the focus is on the first three policy items, since immediate or short term action by the Dutch government expected on these issues.

In a letter in March 2011, Minister Leers discussed the negotiation process at the Council of the European Union and claimed that the Dutch approach—to have a list of concrete issue proposals—was “very positively” received: “I was able to explain that the measures that I proposed are meant to prevent newcomers from ending up on the periphery of society and will rather fully participate in society. Of course, this does not mean that the member states with whom we talked endorsed fully and without reservations the Dutch proposals” (Letter of government to Tweede Kamer, 16 March 2011).

A more general formulation of the position of the Rutte I cabinet on the EU-related dimensions of migration is in the updated publication of the annual State of the European Union by Minister of Foreign Affairs Uri Rosenthal and Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs Ben Knapen. In it, the Dutch government put on the developments in the EU into
perspective and interpret those events and address what the course of action the government will take. In the letter to the Tweede Kamer supplementary to the State of the European Union, the government’s position was put as follows: “The cabinet will invest considerably in domestic and international measures to curb, control and decrease immigration in the Netherlands, answering to societal problems. We strive towards a selective immigration policy that gives priority to immigrants that can contribute to society (for instance, high-skilled migrants) and which is restrictive for other migrants. Since European legislation is in place, the government will invest in the modification of the relevant European guidelines” (Rosenthal and Knapen, 2011). For Rutte I, immigration was considered a pressing problem that needs to be addressed. The focus on bringing in high-skilled labour migrants and thwarting lower-skilled immigrants from entering the Netherlands points towards a somewhat restrictive policy.

The efforts of the Dutch government to shape European migration policy on issues like stricter rules for family reunification was met with scepticism by the European Commission. During a visit to the Netherlands in May 2011, Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, highlighted that other member states do not share the need to make family reunification more trying, and she expressed reservations regarding the Dutch position on immigration and asylum (De Koning, 2011).

How did the PVV’s position on immigration align with that of the coalition parties? In terms of the more specific policy items, one of the most important points of disagreement on EU-related immigration policy is that the PVV and the cabinet had diverging views on the Common Asylum Policy, which was rejected by the PVV but considered essential by the CDA and VVD. In a Senate debate, the cabinet underlined the relevance of a common migration (and asylum) policy, for two reasons in particular. First, it prevents asylum seekers and migrants from cherry-picking in which member state they will apply for asylum. Since some member states might have more favourable conditions, these countries receive disproportionately more asylum applications. Second, too many migrants fail to participate in the labour market and society, and therefore European legislation on these matters is urgently needed to overcome these problems (Eerste Kamer, 2011). During the same debate, Ministers Leers pointed out that the Netherlands needs to approach the migration question with a ‘practical realism’, since the attitude as a moral know-it-all ended up in failed integration projects.

Surprisingly, the PVV did support increasing Frontex’s capacity to be able to hold back incoming migrants. Even though MP De Roon (PVV) stated that the PVV supports
only a very limited EU (economic cooperation), this was an “exceptional situation” that “tens of thousands of Tunisians” are “roaming freely through Europe”, and thus Frontex needs to be a “serious protector of Europe’s outer borders”. PVV’s support for the increased capacity of Frontex appears to be as a conciliatory move from PVV towards the coalition partners, which both saw a concerted European handling of the migration crisis as essential. However, De Roon stressed that the PVV “has always been a warm supporter of shelter in the region,” a position that has since become the mainstream. (Tweede Kamer, 26 April 2011)

The plenary debate in the days following the fall of the Rutte I in April 2012\(^\text{24}\) is the last point where the Rutte I cabinet’s migration policy was articulated. Minister Leers emphasised that he supported many of the policy proposals he had been negotiating since took office as minister of immigration and asylum, although these policies were considerably more restrictive than those under Prime Minister Balkenende (2003-2010), when Leer’s own party (the CDA) was the biggest and delivered the prime minister (Mipex.eu). Several MPs expected a sigh of relief from Ministers Leers, not to have to support the policies which were mostly part of the PVV’s agenda, Leers went on to say that the “content [of the proposals made by the Netherlands] was convincing, and I still support it” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012: 19). Nonetheless, the minister and the government remained in favour of a Common Asylum Policy to control migration flows.

\(^{24}\) On 1 March 2012 the Dutch Central Planning Agency calculated that between 9 and 16 billion euro would have to be cut from the government budget for 2013 in order to meet the European requirement of keeping government spending under the 3% mark, which was denounced by the PVV. On 5 March the negotiations started between the government parties and the PVV on how to overcome these austerity measures. Eventually, these negotiations lasted for a long 7 weeks and ended in an impasse, when Geert Wilders decided to reject the austerity plans on 21 April. For the PVV, the austerity measures necessary for staying within the limits of the EU Stability and Growth Pact, coupled with the negative effects of austerity on basic state pensions, were deemed unacceptable. (Parlement.com, 2019c)

However, two other reasons have been attributed to the fall of the Rutte I cabinet. According to De Volkskrant, which in 2014 reconstructed the fall of Rutte I, there was a misunderstanding among the top decision-makers of the Christian Democrats as to whether or not there could be significant cuts in development aid, which was a demand of the PVV to continue the negotiations. State Secretary Knapen (CDA) was fiercely opposed to cutting development aid threatened with resignation if the government would decide to cut aid, which allegedly shocked Prime Minister Rutte and vice PM Verhagen (CDA) (Hoedeman and Meijer, 2014a). According to Gert Leers, Minister of Immigration and Asylum, both the VVD and CDA were held “hostage” by the PVV for the duration of the Rutte I Cabinet (Hoedeman and Meijer, 2014b). Elsewhere, former members of the PVV claim that Wilders felt the influence of the PVV wither due to the resignation of prominent PVV politician Hero Brinkman, who had left the party weeks before over disagreements with Wilders on Muslims and Eastern European labour migrants (ANP, 2014). Other members of the party were shocked that Wilders let the cabinet fall without consultation on the 21st of April 2012 (Ibid.).
The next section discusses the three main policy proposals which the Rutte I cabinet, and Minister Leers in particular, brought to the negotiating table in the European Union.

6.2. 2 Directives and 1 Convention

How did the PVV and SGP influence the Dutch migration policy, specifically (1) the Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation 343/2003), (2) the Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC), and (3) the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC)? Detailed descriptions of these three policy items follow, which will then be operationalised according to Hall’s conceptualisation of policy change and then analysed via the causal mechanisms presented in chapter 4.

6.2.1. Dublin Regulation (343/2003) and (604/2013)

In 2003 the Dublin Regulation replaced the Dublin Convention from 1990, to establish “criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national” (EUR-Lex, 2003). The regulation meant to clarify which member state would be responsible for examining any incoming asylum application. It was assumed that by the time of the adoption of the regulation, a harmonised asylum procedure across the EU would be in place. This harmonisation practically never materialised, and thus the lack of harmonisation called for an amendment. Consequently, in late 2008 the European Commission proposed an amendment of the Dublin Regulation, “to enhance the system's efficiency and, on the other, to ensure that the needs of applicants for international protection are comprehensively addressed under the responsibility determination procedure” (European Commission, 2008). This proposal addressed those cases where member states faced unprecedented pressures on their asylum system and their capacity to cope with the incoming applications, as well as cover the situations where applications might face an inadequate level of protection.

The Balkenende IV government supported the Commission’s proposed amendment to the Dublin Regulation, while emphasising, as it had done before, the need to first put in place a Common European Asylum System prior to re-evaluating the burden-sharing agreement in the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a). Furthermore, the Balkenende IV did not support temporary waiving the Dublin Regulation for member
states that face high migratory pressure, since this would lead to “asylum shopping”, whereby the asylum seeker calculates into his/her decision where to apply how he could get into the host country of his preference.

Under Rutte I, there was no substantive change in the position of the Dutch government. The Roadmap presented by Minister Leers emphasised the need for an effective implementation of the Dublin Regulation. The Dutch government negotiation position was that the responsibility of processing the asylum application should be for the member state where the asylum seeker first entered the EU. Beyond the issue of member state responsibility, Leers stressed the need for operational support from the European Asylum Support Office in cases where member states face very high migratory pressures. Exceptions to this rule at the time related to the protection of nuclear and other family ties (Eerste Kamer, 2011).

During a session of the Eerste Kamer’s Commission for Immigration and Asylum in the summer of 2011, Minister Leers explained in detail the Dutch government’s position on immigration policy in the EU, in particular the emergency mechanism of the Dublin Regulation. The government clarified that in the case of exceptional pressure in a country, the Regulation might be temporarily waived. However, Leers expressed that this might come at the risk of freeriding by member states, since member states might be tempted to claim to be in an exceptional situation for the sake of not having to comply with the Dublin Regulation. Therefore, the Dutch position in the negotiation was that the introduction of an emergency mechanism, i.e. if a member state wishes to declare an exceptional situation, should be conditioned on the compliance to the EU acquis communautaire (Eerste Kamer, 2011).

By 2012, Minister Leers argued that the EU negotiations regarding the Dublin Regulation’s potentially new suspension mechanism were moving in a direction favourable to the Dutch position (Leers, 2012). After the fall of Rutte I, the suspension mechanism was however abandoned during the negotiation process in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2012).

When the Commission proposed another amendment to the Dublin Regulation in 2014 (on the rules determining the Member State responsible for examining the application for international protection of unaccompanied minors with no family member) (European Commission, 2014), the Rutte II cabinet (consisting of VVD and PvdA) opposed that part of the Commission’s proposal that put the responsibility of the asylum application on the host country. The Dutch government argued that the
responsibility of processing the application should be on the country where the asylum application was first submitted, echoing the position of the Rutte I cabinet. The Dutch government did highlight the importance of ensuring that unaccompanied minors are informed about its asylum status as quickly as possible, while ensuring the primary objective of the amendment to the Dublin Regulation, namely to combat asylum shopping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

6.2.2. Qualification Directive (2004/83) and (2011/95)

The Qualification Directive from 2004 pertains to the “minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted” (EUR-Lex Document 32004L0083). In 2009, the European Commission proposed an amendment of this Directive that would broaden the scope of the minimum norms for recognising a person as an asylum seeker, and the kinds of subsidiary protection accompanying those norms (European Commission, 2009). The Balkenende IV cabinet fully endorsed this amendment and highlighted that the Common European Asylum System needs to be develop to be better able to execute the identification and protection of asylum seekers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b). The Rutte I cabinet, however, sought to put the burden of proof – that the asylum seeker rightly applies for asylum – in the hands of the applicant rather than the state. At the time it was the member state’s responsibility to ensure that applicants qualify for asylum. This reversal of the burden of proof to the applicant would alleviate the administrative and legal burden on the state, because “the asylum seeker would have to show that the threat also applied to other parts of the country of origin before a member state would have to investigate whether the asylum seeker could avail himself of protection in those parts” (Leers, 2011).

On 13 December 2011, an update to the Qualification Directive (2011/95) was approved via the ordinary legislative procedure by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. According to the government communication in January 2012, this update to the Qualification Directive covered the Dutch position, as stipulated in the 2010 Roadmap, since member states would no longer be required to prove that the asylum applicant can reside in other parts of their home country (Leers, 2012). In chapter II, article 4 of that Directive, the government’s position, that the asylum seeker should deliver the burden of proof, is captured. The article reads: “Member States may consider
it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all the elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant, it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application” (Directive 2011/95/EU). Subsequently, Rutte II transposed the amendment of the Qualification Directive in 2013 (Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011) and with that concluded the negotiation on the Qualification Directive.

6.2.3. Family Reunification Directive (2003/86)

The third and last piece of European legislation related to migration policy covered here is the Family Reunification Directive of 2003. The motivation behind the development of a family reunification directive was expressed during the European Council session in Tampere in October 1999, and the Commission released a proposed in December of 1999. After more than two years of negotiations in the European Parliament and Council of the EU, the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) finally entering into force in October 2003. According to Groenendijk et al. (2007), there was little public debate in the Netherlands around the transposition of this legislation, which took place in 2006. However, academicians did send a letter to parliament, arguing that the requirements for family reunification should be stricter (7).

The Dutch government did the Directive not considered final, but rather a step in the right direction. In 2009 the Balkenende IV cabinet drafted proposals for a more effective regulation of family migration (EMN, 2010; Tweede Kamer, 2009). The proposals specifically aimed to improve the measures to combat fraud and abuse of marriage migration. Secondly, the government’s goal was to increase the successful integration of migrants and to improve training requirements. Thirdly, the cabinet proposed measures to combat the undesirable aspects of marriage migration; including prohibiting marriage between nephews and nieces, increasing the recognition of marriages that were concluded abroad from 15 to 18 years, abolishing the acceptance of prior polygamous marriages and “setting the requirement of an independent accommodation for the person bringing a marriage partner to the Netherlands from abroad (EMN, 2010: 30).

However, in 2010 the Balkenende IV cabinet suffered a setback in this policy area. On 4 March 2010, the European Court of Justice established that the Dutch government
made legal distinctions between the requirements for family formation and family reunification, which is in contravention with EU law (see EMN, 2011: 68). The Court’s decision forced the government to amend Dutch legislation to be in line with Directive 2003/86. Specifically, the Dutch income requirement of 120% of the minimum wage had to be reversed back to 100% for family formation. Furthermore, the Dutch policy of distinguishing “between the minimum age of the partners/marriage partners for family reunification (18 years of age) and family formation (21 years of age) was abandoned as well. From then on, the principal person as well as the family member requesting entry to the Netherlands must at least be 21 years of age, irrespective of whether it concerns family reunification or family formation” (EMN, 2011: 68).

Under Rutte I, reducing the number of family-related immigrants became one of the key policy proposals (Goudappel and Hoevenaars, 2012). Concretely, the new government called for an increase in the age requirement for reunification to the age of 24, tightening the income requirement, imposing educational requirements on sponsors in the case of family migration, and the introduction of an assessment that proves that the ties to the host country are more substantial than those to the country of origin, amongst other things (Leers, 2011). In defence of the strict family reunion policy, the government proposal stated that the measures aim to maximise the chances that immigrants successfully integrate into the host state and that the stricter rules, like the educational and age requirement, will allow the incoming persons to be more independent from each other and their families (Ibid.). The proposal faced legal restrictions because, in August 2011, the Administrative High Court of the Netherlands deemed the requirement for Turkish citizens to be obliged to fulfil a civic integration examination to be contrary to clauses in existing agreements between the EU and Turkey (EMN, 2012: 30).

As of January 2012, Minister of Immigration and Asylum Leers could not indicate whether any substantive progress had been made during the EU negotiations that aimed to modify the Family Reunification Directive, except that there appeared to a broad agreement among his counterparts that the directive needs to be updated to be able to face the new challenges that immigration brings (Leers, 2012). In terms of actual policy output, Rutte I had managed to make family reunification only possible for persons who are married or that have a registered partnership. For those who were not able to marry

25 The income requirement did not change for family reunification, since the Dutch requirement was already at 100% of the minimum wage, in line with the Qualification Directive.
due to conditions in their home country, they would be given a temporary marriage permit to then get married in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the eligibility of an independent residence permit has extended from 3 to 5 years (EMN, 2012).

Did the restrictive migration policy of Rutte I last into the Rutte II cabinet? The government Rutte II relaxed family reunification policy in several ways. During Rutte I, family reunification and family formation were only possible for partners who were either married or in a registered partnership. However, this piece of legislation was relaxed afterwards, so that it was no longer necessary for the partners in question to be married or to have a registered partnership, and it sufficed for the partners to prove their long-lasting relationship (EMN 2012; EMN, 2015). Shortly after Rutte II took office, the requirements for applying for family reunification were effectively reversed, because the government wanted to give partners a choice whether or not to get married (Staatscourant 2013 nr. 15593). Nevertheless, Rutte II emphasised strict oversight over sham marriages and relationships.

6.3. Analysis

After an overview of the three policy items of the EU-related migration policy that the Dutch government decided to focus on in the Council of the European Union, it is time to analyse in detail whether and how the PVV and SGP, as Eurosceptic niche parties, influenced the migration policy of the Rutte I government (2010-2012).

6.3.1. Policy change

The Nativist Immigration and Integration Policy Index (NIIP index), developed by Akkerman and De Lange (2012), is a good starting point for the measurement of legislative changes in the field of migration policy. The index measures the degree of restrictiveness of migration and integration policy by accumulating policy output based on 25 policy items. If a policy is restrictive, then a positive score of 0.5 or 1.0 will be added to the index; conversely, policies which are not in line with the agenda of radical parties will receive negative scores (Ibid.). Therefore, a higher score in the NIIP index is assumed to correspond to the electoral or governing success of the respective anti-immigration party in government. Van Beijsterveldt (2018) measured the migration policy output and position for the Rutte I government and found that the output of this administration was more restrictive than the Balkenende IV and Rutte II cabinets. But
what were the policy proposals and actual policy outputs of the Dublin Regulation and the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives?

The policy position on migration policy of the VVD-CDA(-PVV) government did not change substantially during their time in office, and the government’s policy results in migration policy were mixed as well (Goudappel and Hoevenaars, 2012). Table 9 summarises the proposed and actual policy output of the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC, and the Dublin Regulation 343/2003, and Family Reunification Directive 2003/86 that were described in section 6.2.

In the case of the Dublin Regulation, the position of the governments did not change substantially. All three of the Dutch governments that were analysed were in favour of a Common Asylum Policy. Likewise, the issue of “asylum shopping” found resonance across all three governments. In the case of waiving the Dublin Regulation under exceptional circumstances, Rutte I was more lenient on the matter compared to Balkenende IV. While Balkenende IV was not in favour of temporarily suspending the Agreement when a country was facing very high migration pressures, Rutte I did support a temporary suspension in cases of exceptional migratory pressures. With the introduction of the Dublin Convention III in 2013, the policy positions of the Balkenende IV and Rutte I cabinets, namely that asylum applications should be processed by the member state where the asylum seeker first enters the EU, was realised.

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<th>Table 9: Proposed and actual changes of migration policy</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Balkenende IV</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dublin Regulation</strong></td>
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<td>(343/2003 and 604/2013)</td>
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<th>Proposed but forced to amend: “A prohibition on marriages between nephews and nieces; an increase in the minimum age for the recognition of marriages concluded abroad from 15 to 18 years of age; the abolishment of the Dutch recognition of polygamous marriages concluded abroad; setting the requirement of an independent accommodation for the person bringing a marriage partner to the Netherlands from abroad.”</th>
<th>Proposed: • Increasing the age requirement for both partners to 24; • Tightening the income requirement; • requiring the deposit of a bond; • Admitting a maximum of one partner every ten years; • Introducing an assessment to prove that ties with the proposed host country are stronger than those with the country of origin; • Excluding sponsors convicted of certain violent crimes (e.g. domestic violence); • imposing educational requirements on sponsors in the case of family migration; • revoking temporary residence permits if holders do not fulfil the civic integration conditions that apply in the member state.</th>
<th>Actual: 1. Requirements for applying for family reunification reversed, to give partners a choice whether or not to be married. 2. Decrease fees of application family formation and reunification from 1250EUR to 225EUR, extension validity application from 375EUR to 225EUR.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Family Reunification Directive (2003/86)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actual:</strong> For family formation, the income requirement reduced from 120% to 100%. Distinction minimum age between family formation and reunification abandoned. Must be at least 21 years to request.</td>
<td><strong>Sources:</strong> Collection of official documentation.</td>
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| **Actual:** | **Actual:** Family reunification only for persons who are married or that have a registered partnership. | **Regarding the Qualification Directive, Balkenende IV recognised the need to harmonise migration and asylum policy, and thus considered the directive an essential step in that direction. Rutte I elaborated a specific position on the Directive. Concretely, Rutte I put forward the requirement for the asylum seeker to justify his application for international protection, rather than the state needing to investigate that. Moreover, it was in December 2011, under Rutte I, that the Council and the EP approved the Directive. The Rutte II cabinet eventually did not have a role in the bargaining process surrounding the Qualification Directive, but transposed the Directive into law on 1 October 2013 (EMN, 2014).**

Lastly, the Rutte I cabinet put more emphasis on the Family Reunification Directive (Goudappel and Hoevenaars, 2012). The proposed measures of Balkenende IV were focused on the prohibition of family reunification and formation in the case of polyamorous marriages and increasing the requirements for family formation and reunification. However, Balkenende IV also suffered a setback when the ECJ found that Dutch legislation dating back to 2004 was not in compliance with Family Reunification Directive (2003/86), and so the income requirements for family formation were reduced from 120% to 100% of the minimum wage. Furthermore, the distinction of minimum age...** |
between family formation and reunification was abandoned, and the minimum age for both was put at 21 years.

Rutte I proposed far-reaching measures to curb family reunification and family formation, for instance by increasing the minimum age to 24 years, again increasing the income requirement, and admitting only one family member every ten years (see table 9). The government was able to achieve that family reunification would only be granted for persons who are married or that have a registered partnership. This piece of legislation entered into force in October 2012 (EMN, 2013). However, it was already in early 2013, in the first months of the Rutte II government, that this law was amended. These restrictions were eased such that people would be able to choose to get married or commit through a different form of partnership. Similarly, the application fees for family formation and reunification were significantly decreased (Ibid.).

First, second or third-order change

At first sight, the changes in the policy items of the three governments did not constitute very significant changes. From the NIIP index, it becomes clear that the Rutte I cabinet adopted a stricter migration and integration policy. The same holds for the Dublin Regulation and the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives. However, like the NIIP index above, Peter Hall’s categorisation of policy change helps to standardise the measurement of policy change26.

| Table 10: Policy changes of Dutch migration policy according to Peter Hall’s categorisation |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
|                                | Balkenende IV | Rutte I | Rutte II |
| Dublin Regulation (343/2003) and (604/2013) | No change | Second-order change: the instrument changed (responsibility of application from the host country to point-of-entry country); goal remains the same. | No change |
| Qualification Directive (2004/83) and | No change | Second-order change: the instrument changed (burden of proof in the absence of protection) | No change |

26 The NIIP index developed by Akkerman and De Lange (2012) is not used for the operationalisation of policy change, because this research analyses the impact of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy, and while the case studies are both related to migration policy, also non-EU related issues like integration policy is compounded in this index. Secondly, the aim is to offer a more standardised measurement that can only be used for the analysis of other policy areas.
Table 10 summarises how the three policy items changed across the Balkenende IV, Rutte I and Rutte II governments. Under the Balkenende IV cabinet, there were no policy changes regarding the Dublin Regulation and Qualification Directive that can be attributed to the government. In terms of the Family Reunification Directive, there was a first-level change under Balkenende IV, specifically a relaxation of the income requirement for family formation. Second, the Rutte II cabinet saw several changes on these policy items. In the case of the Dublin Regulation, the policy change occurred during the Rutte II cabinet, but should be attributed to the negotiations of the Rutte I cabinet, given the time lag that legislative procedures bring. As for the Qualification Directive, the Rutte II cabinet transposed this directive. As under Balkenende IV, Rutte II relaxed the Family Reunification Directive; this time in response to strict policies of the Rutte I government. The levels of fees for applying to family reunification or family formation which reduced, marking a first-level policy change, which the instrument (fees) remained the same. However, a second-level policy change also occurred, since requirements for applying for family reunification were reversed.

The VVD-CDA(-PVV) government (Rutte I) saw a second-order change on all three policy items. In all three cases, policy goals were unchanged, but the instruments were altered, from a transfer of responsibility in the Dublin Regulation, a transfer in the burden of proof in the Qualification Directive to a change in the requirements for family reunification. Even if Rutte I had wanted to alter the goals of any of these policy items, they were bound by their EU membership and their colleagues in the Council of the European Union to achieve more profound changes. Third-order change would have

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<th>First-order change: levels of instruments (income requirement) were relaxed, instruments remain the same.</th>
<th>Second-order change: the instruments changed (family reunification only for persons who are married or that have a registered partnership); goal remains the same.</th>
<th>First-order change: levels of instruments (fees to apply to family reunification/formation) were relaxed, instruments remain the same.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Family Reunification Directive (2003/86)</td>
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Sources: Collection of official documentation.
meant scrapping a whole directive or rejecting the transposition of a directive. Important to note is that in all three cases, the Rutte I government shifted towards a more restrictive migration policy, with one exception: it was more willing to temporarily suspend the enforcement of the Dublin Regulation in the case of exceptional migratory pressures on specific member states.

It should be clear that member states are very restricted in the development of their own immigration policy and are bound by the regular Ordinary legislative procedure, whereby the European Commission proposes legislation and the Council of the European Union and European Parliament give readings and then adopt the Commission’s proposal, once the Council and EP approve it of course (Hampshire, 2016).

However, the proposals of the government set the policy agenda and shape much of the perception of parties and public actors on policy (see for instance Kingdon, 2014). It was the prioritisation of immigration and asylum policy in the coalition agreement by VVD and CDA in 2010, and the policy roadmap of Minister Leers, that put migration high on the public agenda during the Rutte I cabinet. Therefore, the approach of the government was to “invest in the modification of the relevant European guidelines” to curb immigration into the EU, which has destabilising effects on society in Europe (Rosenthal and Knapen, 2011: 11). How did Eurosceptic parties play a role in bringing about these second-order policy changes under the Rutte I cabinet? The following sections test how the Freedom Party (PVV) and the Reformed Political Party (SGP) in particular shaped the government’s attitude towards the above-described policy items.

6.3.2. Contagion effect

Earlier research has taught us that in the Netherlands niche parties have affected the migration policy and the EU policy of the government (see Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Van Heerden et al., 2014; Akkerman, 2018). In the early 2000s, Pim Fortuyn and his party LPF contributed to the changing discourse on the European Union. Many political parties in the Netherlands now share the positions that were earlier echoed by Pim Fortuyn on issues like the decrease in the Dutch contributions to the EU budget, a strict subsidiary test on proposed legislation and an increased role of national parliaments (Schout et al., 2012: 417).

The immigration policy of mainstream parties like the VVD and CDA was influenced by the LPF in the early 2000s (and less markedly of the populist CD which
did not win seats in parliament in 2002), which led towards a much more restrictive immigration policy than these parties embraced before (Van Heerden et al., 2014). Pim Fortuyn (from Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) introduced populism on a large scale to Dutch politics, and Geert Wilders (PVV) may be considered his populist successor (Lucardie, 2008). When the PVV presented its first party programme for the 2006 elections, the CDA and VVD had moderated their positions on immigration during those elections, though their immigration policies converged towards the PVV’s position in the 2010 elections (Van Heerden et al. 2014: 132). During the 2012 and 2017 general election campaigns, the policy convergence of the CDA and VVD towards the PVV’s position on immigration continued. National identity became a focal point, and both parties “even proposed policies that were in tension with or, at times, in contravention of the Dutch constitution” (Akkerman, 2018: 14).

How does Meguid’s spatial theory explain the policy convergence of the mainstream parties (CDA, VVD) towards the niche parties (PVV, SGP)? This theoretical framework looks at three dimensions related to the strategies of mainstream parties that impact the electoral success of niche parties, namely issue salience, issue ownership and policy convergence or divergence. The niche parties are both proponents of a strict immigration policy. The SGP’s relevance in the party competition on immigration policy appears to be marginal. While the party is known for its outspoken position on opening’s hours of businesses on Sunday, the freedom of religious education and abortion or euthanasia (De Jong, 2012), it does not own the issue of immigration – issue ownership is one of the three dimensions of Meguid’s spatial theory. Where applicable, the SGP’s potential role is highlighted, though the emphasis is on the PVV.

As described in the causal mechanism of section 4.2.3, if a party adopts an accommodative strategy, that should lead to a (1) increased issue salience of the niche parties, (2) a convergence of policy positions, (3) a transfer of issue ownership away from the niche party to the mainstream party, and subsequently would compromise the electoral support of the niche party. For this case study, this means explicitly whether issue ownership of immigration policy was transferred from the PVV to the CDA or VVD, whether the salience of immigration policy changed, whether there was a convergence of the policy positions of the CDA and VVD towards the position of the PVV, and how those issues related and help explain the electoral losses or successes of the PVV. The following sections review these dimension individually.
Issue salience

Since the early 2000s immigration and multiculturalism have been an essential part of the political and public debate in the Netherlands (Tillie et al., 2016). A report by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office observes that immigration was one of the most oft-mentioned societal problems among Dutch voters in 2010. Interestingly, immigration no longer made it into the top 6 of the most pressing issues by the end of 2012 (Den Ridder et al., 2010; Den Ridder et al., 2012). However, in the 2018 report of the SCP, the data for 2010-2012 showed that more than 25% of the respondents considered immigration to be a major societal problem (Den Ridder et al., 2018). Eurobarometer data – the survey data conducted by the European Commission – shows a similar picture. When asked “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the Netherlands at the moment?” the answer “immigration” hovers between 10% and 20% from 2005 to 2010, and then dropped to 1% in November 2012, only to rise steeply in 2015 to more than 50% of the answers, a consequence of the mass migration flows into the EU. After the peak in 2015, immigration continued to be one of the two most important issues for the Netherlands for more than 20% of the respondents. As for political parties in the Netherlands, the salience of immigration policy has grown to become an issue that every party addressed, though the majority of the parties dedicate relatively little attention to it (Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2019). When comparing the coalition agreements of 2007, 2010 and 2012, it is clear that the coalition agreement of the Rutte I Cabinet (2010) dedicates far more attention to immigration and integration policy than the preceding and following coalition agreements. In 2007 around 7%, in 2010 around 16% and 2012 around 8%.

All in all, immigration has become a prominent issue in the Netherlands, though its relevance has fluctuated over time. Between 2010 and 2012, immigration policy had lost much of its salience among the public. Irrespective of the renewed importance of immigration in 2015, the drop in salience in 2012 as compared to 2010 is not in line with the expectations of Meguid’s spatial theory for accommodative strategies.

Issue ownership

The second dimension of Meguid’s PSO (Position, Salience and Ownership) theory is issue ownership. The PVV was the apparent issue owner of immigration from 2010 to 2012, and probably before as well. Bos et al. (2017) conducted an experiment in 2014 and found that 48% of the 600 participants associated immigration policy to the PVV,
while 26.50% - also the most significant share of participants – claim that the PVV was “best able to effectuate its program” on immigration27 (Bos et al., 2017: 5-6). Electoral support for the PVV increased when immigration is covered in the media (Bos et al., 2017; Burscher et al., 2015). The PVV can be considered the successor of the LPF policy in terms of issue ownership of immigration, and the VVD or CDA did not manage to take over this ownership. In the same study by Bos et al. (2017), the VVD and CDA score 3.83% and 2% respectively in the frequency that they are associated with immigration. Therefore, even without data on issue ownership of immigration policy in 2012, the PVV can be assumed to claim ownership of the issue comfortably.

Some of the statements and actions of the VVD and CDA were considered “PVV moves” by the other opposition parties, which accentuated the perception of the PVV owning immigration policy. One such instance took place in November 2010, when Minister of Immigration and Asylum Leers decided to heed the call of the European Court of Human Right not to deport a group of asylum seekers to Iraq who had exhausted all legal remedies. Nevertheless, Leers insisted that all cases where the ECHR might object to deportation should be evaluated on a per-case basis, and that deportation remained an option despite the Court’s decision. The opposition parties considered this position to be particularly courteous towards the PVV (Ramakers, 2011).

Concluding, the issue ownership of migration was not transferred from the niche party to the mainstream parties, as the theoretical expectations of adopting an accommodative strategy would predict.

Electoral gains/losses and policy convergence

During the 2012 elections, the PVV suffered its first electoral loss in the Tweede Kamer since its establishment in 2006, ending up with 15 seats as compared to 24 seats in 2010. Whether that electoral loss is attributable to the party strategies of the mainstream parties is debatable. Previous research on the contagion effect of PVV’s immigration policy shows that the positions of the CDA and VVD on immigration policy converged towards that of the PVV. Akkerman (2015) notes that the VVD took substantial steps towards a more restrictive immigration policy following the 2002 electoral success of LPF, and again in 2010, following the PVV’s electoral success in 2006. As the above analysis

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27 While the article did not explicitly state the date of conducting the experiments, email correspondence with one of the authors confirmed that the experiments were conducted after 2012, namely in 2014.
shows, also in the case of the Dublin Convention, Qualification Directive and the Family Reunification Directive, the proposals of Rutte I were more restrictive than those of the previous and next governments (see section 6.3.1). Whether this can be attributed entirely to the role of the PVV in Rutte I remains questionable.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dublin Regulation</th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>VVD</th>
<th>PVV</th>
<th>SGP</th>
<th>Gedoogakkoord</th>
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<tr>
<td>2006: No mention 2010: Partner should live at least 5 years in NL, at least 24 years 2012: “The (language) requirements for (marriage) migrants will be made stricter.”</td>
<td>2006: Requirements for family migrants got stricter in order to ensure participation. 2010: 24 years to be the minimum age for the partners of migrants living in the Netherlands, income requirement of 120% 2012: 24 years to be the minimum age for the partners of migrants living in the Netherlands, income requirement of 120%</td>
<td>2006: “5-year immigration freeze for non-Western migrants (Moroccan and Turks)” 2010: “Complete stop immigration for people from Islamic countries.” 2012: “Immigration stop for people from Islamic countries.”</td>
<td>2006: No mention 2010: Set an absolute income requirement, for family formation only based on marriage or registered partnership possible 2012: Set stricter age and income requirement, for family formation only based on marriage or registered partnership possible</td>
<td>Set an absolute income requirement, for family formation only based on marriage or registered partnership possible age requirement: 24 years income requirement: 120%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Reunification</td>
<td>2006: “5-year immigration freeze for non-Western migrants (Moroccan and Turks)” 2010: “Complete stop immigration for people from Islamic countries.” 2012: “Immigration stop for people from Islamic countries.”</td>
<td>2006: “5-year immigration freeze for non-Western migrants (Moroccan and Turks)” 2010: “Complete stop immigration for people from Islamic countries.” 2012: “Immigration stop for people from Islamic countries.”</td>
<td>2006: “5-year immigration freeze for non-Western migrants (Moroccan and Turks)” 2010: “Complete stop immigration for people from Islamic countries.” 2012: “Immigration stop for people from Islamic countries.”</td>
<td>2006: No mention 2010: Set an absolute income requirement, for family formation only based on marriage or registered partnership possible 2012: Set stricter age and income requirement, for family formation only based on marriage or registered partnership possible</td>
<td>Set an absolute income requirement, for family formation only based on marriage or registered partnership possible age requirement: 24 years income requirement: 120%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 11 shows the policy positions of the two mainstream parties and the two niche parties related to the Dublin Regulation and the Family Reunification Directive before (2006-2010), during (2010-2012) and after (2012-2017) the Rutte I cabinet. In terms of the Dublin Regulation, the CDA pledged in all election cycles for a common
approach to immigration and asylum policy that would harmonise the regulations in these policies areas across the EU. The VVD and SGP also supported a unified European approach to the migration question, though the VVD further specified its position in 2012 by stating that a common approach should ensure a decrease in asylum applications. In the absence of a decrease in application, the asylum policy of the Netherlands should become stricter.

As for the issues related to the Family Reunification Directive, all parties call for further restrictions on the acceptance of family reunification and family formation. Interestingly, the only party which advocated limiting family reunification to married couples or those in a registered partnership, which the Rutte I cabinet advocated, was the SGP, not a party to the government coalition. On the other hand, the PVV was, and continues to be, principally opposed to migration for Islamic countries or labour migrants.

One might argue that the PVV was the driving force behind the more restrictive approach to family reunification – though also the CDA and VVD called for stricter rules on the topic – and that the SGP’s position was a suitable compromise for Minister Leers to reinforce. At the same time, it could be that the SGP’s new strengthened bargaining position as ‘silent’ supporter of the coalition since March 2011 allowed it to put pressure on the immigration policy of the government. While that might not help in assigning influence to either one of the parties, it would strengthen the argument that either of these niche parties shaped the government’s policy towards immigration policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Issue salience</th>
<th>Issue position</th>
<th>Issue ownership</th>
<th>Niche party electoral support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Decreases</td>
<td>Converges</td>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>Decreases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodative</td>
<td>Increases</td>
<td>Converges</td>
<td>Transfers to mainstream party</td>
<td>Decreases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Meguid, 2008 and own calculations.

To summarise the results of this part of the analysis so far, table 12 shows the developments in terms of the issue salience, issue ownership, policy convergence and electoral consequences on the niche party. The above analysis shows a decrease in the issue salience of immigration policy, a convergence of the policy position, no effect on issue ownership, but a decrease in the electoral support of the PVV. However, the VVD’s and CDA’s decision to converge their policies towards the more restrictive position of the PVV indicates that these mainstream parties might have indeed attempted to utilise one of the key policy areas of the PVV – the niche party – the marginalise that party.
Therefore, hypothesis C1 – Mainstream parties will use an *accommodative* party strategy in reaction to the electoral success of Eurosceptic niche parties – is *partially supported*, since the actual developments do not coincide with the theoretical expectations of the POS theory of Bonnie Meguid, which suggests an increase in the issue salience of the policy area and increase issue ownership. However, the PVV is the absolute issue owner of immigration policy, plus there was a drop in the issue salience of immigration policy in public opinion in the period 2010-2012. Does this disqualify the theory as a whole or instead means that the theory’s explanatory power is contingent on certain conditions?

**Alternative explanations**

An alternative explanation for the repositioning of the CDA and VVD towards a more restrictive policy could be that there is an annual net increase in migration (immigration - emigration), which puts pressure on Dutch society. However, the presence of the PVV, and the LPF earlier (Van Heerden et al., 2014), facilitate mainstream parties to move to the right on the issue of immigration (Davis, 2012). The PVV’s electoral success in the 2009 European Parliament elections is likely to have contributed to a shift to the right of the CDA and VVD.

Akkerman (2016) identifies the party strategy of the PVV to be primarily vote-seeking\(^{28}\). However, during its role as parliamentary supporter of the Rutte I cabinet, the PVV took on a more cooperative role. Akkerman attributes this to the PVV’s self-promotion as a reliable supporting partner for the government. After the fall of the Rutte I government; however, the PVV returned to its adversarial politics and radicalised further. In addition, far-right parties like the PVV and LPF tap into new policy items that also increase the policy options of parties, i.e. in the absence of these parties, these positions might not have been considered.

In 2007, when the Balkenende IV cabinet took office with a milder asylum and immigration policy than its predecessors, the PVV’s position became more extreme against Islam (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012: 166), thereby increasing the polarisation of the issue. Wilders’ move to film a short movie entitled Fitna that illustrates his interpretation of Islam – bombings, the execution of homosexuals, and condoning the physical abuse of women that cheat – are manifestations of the PVV’s radical views.

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\(^{28}\) The original idea of a vote-seeking party strategy is that the ultimate aim of parties is to seek office for the sake of power and prestige that come with it
Nonetheless, during the EP elections of 2009 and the general elections of 2010, PVV made considerable electoral gains by capitalising on the worries of many voters that multiculturalism failed.

In line with that argument, Dennison et al. (2017) find that there is a strong positive correlation between the number of incoming immigrants and the support for the PVV, a trend which was valid from the PVV’s inception in 2006 until the 2017 general elections. The authors conclude that this correlation highlights the salience of immigration as a public issue. Therefore, the previous indicator of salience (i.e. whether the public considered immigration one of the main societal threats) might not have been the appropriate measurement of salience. At the same time, the electoral losses of the PVV are likely not a consequence of the VVD’s and CDA’s political calculations on immigration policy, but instead followed from the unwillingness across the political spectrum parties to govern with the PVV, with the notable exception of the VVD (Joop.nl, 2012b). This ‘cordon sanitaire’ might have discouraged voters from voting for the PVV. Secondly, voters might punish parties that shirk responsibility in times of critical political events, like the budgetary negotiations that led to the fall of the Rutte I cabinet. However, according to an opinion poll some months after the coalition fell, the majority of the PVV voters expressed their loyalty to the party (Joop.nl, 2012a), weakening the explanatory power of the voter resentment hypothesis. It, therefore, seems more likely that the political pressure from other parties to boycott the PVV shaped voter behaviour.

Conclusion

How well does the POS theory explain the policy convergence of the VVD and CDA towards the immigration policy of the PVV and SGP? Neither the issue salience of migration policy for public or issue ownership fit the theoretical predictions of the accommodative strategy.

When looking at the three policy items, the PVV does not offer a workable alternative position that a government can take to the European Union. Most political parties in the Netherlands remained dedicated to common asylum and migration policy through the EU. In contrast, the PVV’s position was that the Netherlands should (1) leave the EU, (2) opt-out from immigration policy, (3) stop immigration (from Islamic countries). These were not considered reasonable policy alternatives for the mainstream parties. While the VVD-CDA cabinet, and the VVD and CDA individually, moved
towards stricter immigration policies, the Netherlands leaving the EU or a complete halt to immigration were not considered reasonable and negotiable policy positions.

Furthermore, the VVD and CDA might have decided not to invest heavily in increasing the issue salience of immigration policy, anticipating that they will not be able to take ownership of the populist PVV. A full-fledged accommodative strategy would have been too costly. Instead, the parties adapted to the changing public sentiments regarding immigration, which were not costly for the either the VVD or CDA, since their position towards immigration was already restrictive compared to other parties in parliament, like the PvdA, SP, D66 or GroenLinks. The mass migratory waves into the EU in 2015 caused the VVD to prefer a more restrictive immigration policy during the 2017 general elections. For instance, with regards to family reunification, in addition to an income and age requirement, a language requirement and completing an integration exam was added to the restrictions for family reunification (VVD, 2017). Also, the VVD aims to stop asylum applications in the EU and promotes sheltering asylum seekers in the region (Ibid.). Therefore, there is partial support for the hypothesis (C1) that mainstream parties will use an accommodative party strategy in reaction to the electoral success of Eurosceptic niche parties.

6.3.3. Coalition bargaining
Secondly, did the PVV and SGP influence the EU-related migration policy of the Rutte I according to the literature of coalition bargaining? As described in section 4.2.4, for the analysis of coalition bargaining, Bolleyer’s concepts of formation and coalition weight (2007) are practical and simple tools to measure the bargaining power of parties as part of a coalition29. Formation weight looks those pledges that are in the coalition agreement but not supported by the other coalition parties, while coalition weight looks at the share of commitments from the coalition agreement that are translated into legislation and are not shared by the other coalition partners. Only immigration policy of the Rutte I government is analysed here, so immigration policy is treated in isolation, and no other cabinets are considered.

Coalition agreements play an important role in Dutch cabinet politics (Timmermans and Andeweg, 2003: 357). While coalition agreements are not binding,

29 The PVV is also considered a coalition party here, because it took part in the drafting of the immigration policy of the government.
they give the coalition parties as sense of responsibility to implement the policy proposals suggested in these agreements: “legislative adventures with opposition parties are not tolerated, at least not if these are on politically important issues” (Ibid.: 384). In the period 1989-2002, inter-party conflict among coalition partners in the Netherlands in most cases were resolved by committing parties to the government agreement (Moury and Timmermans, 2013: 129). A key characteristic of decision-making in Dutch cabinets “is that all members are collectively bound by the final outcome” (Keman 2008, 230).

On 14 October 2010, the minority cabinet of Mark Rutte (Rutte I) was formed with the parliamentary supporter of the PVV. Two weeks later, on 28 October 2010, the government presented the usual coalition agreement, but also a separate agreement that was negotiated between the PVV and the government parties VVD and CDA, with a separate section about the permanent support of the PVV in the VVD-CDA cabinet. The coalition agreement also contained a separate section dedicated to this special agreement, explaining that:

“Minority governments are a rarity in the Netherlands. This coalition agreement is the result of consultations between the VVD and the CDA. Also, the VVD, PVV and CDA have concluded a parliamentary support agreement on immigration, integration, asylum, public safety, care for the elderly and the agreed package of cuts. The far-reaching decisions included in the support agreement have the support of the parliamentary parties of the VVD, PVV and CDA. The PVV may vote against proposals from the coalition agreement in parliament. However, it will not support motions of no confidence or censure that relating to measures in the coalition agreement.” (Coalition Agreement VVD-CDA 2010, 5)

This agreement includes an explicit reference to the disagreement between the CDA and VVD and the PVV regarding the nature of Islam. Whereas the PVV treats Islam as a political ideology, the other parties see it as a religion (Coalition Agreement VVD-CDA 2010, 4). During the presentation of the minority agreement, Mark Rutte (VVD) and Maxime Verhagen (CDA) focused on the success coming to an agreement (Heymans, 2010), while Geert Wilders (PVV) considered the agreement to be historical: “We will significantly decrease the inflow of asylum seekers and immigrants, 50 per cent fewer incoming non-Western immigrants” (Wilders in Heymans, 2010). Vermeend and Bode
analysed the formation process and argued that the agreement is favourable to the preferences of the PVV\(^{30}\), amongst other things, through its restrictive immigration policy (2010: 107-108).

Formation weight

As per Bolleyer (2007), the PVV’s formation weight is measured by counting those pledges regarding immigration policy that ended up in the coalition agreement but that were not mentioned/supporter by the VVD and CDA. While the concept might be meant to review all of the party pledges that end up in the coalition agreement, and not only the ones referring to immigration policy, the aim here is more modest than Bolleyer’s analysis of small party government participation on policy (2007).

The coalition agreement (with the same text copied into the support agreement between the cabinet VVD-CDA and the PVV as a parliamentary supporter), dedicates more attention to immigration policy than to any other issues. Around 16% of the coalition agreement discusses Rutte I’s policy proposals on migration policy, while the support agreement even dedicated 43% (3022 of a total of 6989 words) to immigration and integration policy. This emphasis in immigration policy in itself is a success for the PVV, since immigration is among the most important issue for the PVV.

When comparing the positions of the CDA and VVD to the coalition agreement, one finds that several policy items in the agreement are more restrictive than the positions of these parties. Even though the PVV did not explicitly formulate a position on these items in its party programme, it is very plausible that the coalition parties would not have adopted such restrictive positions in the absence of the PVV as a coalition partner. One of these issues is the plan that welfare benefits should be conditional on the way one dresses, i.e. people should dress in a way it does not compromise one’s chances of employment. Moreover, the input of the cabinet to renegotiate the EU’s Association Agreement with Turkey appears to be inspired by the PVV. The proposal in the coalition agreement was to make it possible to condition the admittance of Turks to the Netherlands on successfully fulfilling an integration exam/process. The CDA and VVD did express

\[^{30}\text{In social media the coalition agreement, which in Dutch is “regeerakkoord” is jokingly called the “reGeertakkoord”, after PVV’s frontman Geert Wilders.}\]
great scepticism to Turkey joining the European Union but had not expressed the intent to change the requirements for Turkish people coming to the Netherlands\textsuperscript{31}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In programme of:</th>
<th>Policy proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Formation and unification only for married partners or registered partnerships, and minors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Condition that referent at least one year in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Requirement for family migration: housing and insurance arranged by partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Independent permanent residence status for family migrants from 3 to 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Increase application fees to cover costs as much as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Forced marriage is prohibited and punishable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[VVD implied]</td>
<td>Marriage between cousins in principle prohibited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Polygamy not recognised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Exam requirements in Law integration abroad are increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA/VVD</td>
<td>Age requirement 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>One partner per 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Income requirement 120% of the minimum wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Implementation of a deposit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Implementation of a test whether ties with NL &gt; home country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[VVD implied]</td>
<td>Family migration can be rejected if the incoming person has a record of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA/[VVD]</td>
<td>(language) Education requirement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Coalition Agreement VVD-CDA, 2010

More specifically, a good measurement of formation weight are the specific measures stipulated in the coalition agreement on family reunification and formation. Table 13 lists the proposals that were included in the coalition agreement and whether these positions were listed in the party programmes of either the VVD or CDA. Of the 16

\textsuperscript{31} Perhaps these parties knew that this proposal was going against the existing legislation, as mentioned in section 6.2.3.: The proposal faced some legal boundaries, because in August 2011, the Administrative High Court of the Netherlands deemed that the requirement for Turkish citizens to be obliged to fulfil a civic integration examination to be contrary to some existing agreements between the EU and Turkey (EMN, 2012: 30).
items that are dedicated to family formation and reunification, only seven items are either in the party programmes of the CDA, of the VVD, or both. The other nine items do not come back in any of the party programmes. These are issues like requiring family migrants to have housing and insurance arranged by their partners, increasing the application fees to cover the costs of bringing a family member/partner as much as possible, or implementing a test that would prove that the person who is arranging to come to the Netherlands has more ties in the Netherlands than in the home country. These proposed measures put further restrictions on the number of incoming migrants and their chances of successfully entering the Netherlands. Since the ultimate aim of the PVV was to stop immigration from Islamic countries completely and to curb the inflow of migrants and asylum seekers as much as possible, any proposals in the coalition agreement that are more restrictive than the position of the CDA and VVD were welcomed and point towards the PVV’s influence during the coalition negotiations.

Nevertheless, this ambiguity makes the direct measurement of the formation weight of the PVV difficult, but as mentioned above, these policy items can indirectly be attributed to the PVV’s role in the coalition. As figure 9 shows, albeit purely for illustrative purposes and not to represent the actual distance, that the immigration policy of the coalition agreement is more restrictive than the policy positions of both the CDA and VVD. Therefore, this supports the allocation of coalition bargaining strength to the PVV.

Figure 9: Representation of role PVV on coalition agreement

Coalition weight

After the government formation and the coalition negotiations, the Rutte I started working on the policy proposals that were outlined in the Roadmap of Minister Leers, released in December 2010. As detailed in section 6.3.1, in the case of the Dublin Convention, the Qualification Directive and the Family Reunification Directive, two changes ended up
being implemented during Rutte I (and one change happened with a time lag under Rutte II). In the case of the Qualification Directive, the burden of proof that there are no protection alternatives in the home country has become the responsibility of the asylum applicant. Secondly, Rutte I managed to make family reunification contingent on being married or having a registered partnership. These two measures cannot be found explicitly in any of the election programmes of the CDA, VVD or PVV, or in the Roadmap of Minister Leers. However, the SGP’s manifesto – the other ring-wing Eurosceptic niche party in the Dutch parliament – explicitly states conditioning family reunification on being married or having a registered partnership. Their precise wording is: “As long as registered partnerships are a recognised relational form, family reunification should only be made possible in the case of a marriage of a registered partnership” (SGP, 2010). It appears that this party was able to use its position as ‘silent supporter’ in order to shape the immigration policy of Rutte I.

The Orthodox Christian SGP began to play a role in the Rutte I cabinet when the coalition parties lost their majority in the Eerste Kamer (the Senate) in March 2011. While the SGP was not officially a parliamentary supporter of the coalition, there was a kind of “gentlemen’s agreement” between the SGP and the cabinet (De Jong, 2012: 15). In order to get legislation passed, the SGP would often support the cabinet. Party leader Van der Staaij formulated in his own words the difference in perception between any changes in the working method of the SGP and the strategic position in the 2010-2012 period:

“We have not changed. We do what we always did: we position ourselves in a constructive yet critical way against the government. However, the context has changed. Since we [the SGP] are regularly required for a majority [in parliament], people start looking at us differently and suddenly frame our behaviour differently. Just like with our attitude towards the Islam. That [attitude] was always critical. But since the ascent of the PVV, this attitude means we are getting cosy with Wilders. Nonsense, we are doing what we always did” (Ibid.: 113-114).

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Kees Van der Staaij, party leader of the SGP since 2010, wrote an article in the magazine of the research institute of the VVD in 2010 and stated that the SGP and VVD have a similar party position on issues like safety and immigration (Van der Staaij in De Jong, 2012). Given the special bargaining position of the conservative SGP, it appears that it could use its unique position to push through some policy preferences, like conditioning family migration on marriage or a registered partnership. This measure was however reversed in less than a year after the fall of Rutte I, when Mark Rutte formed a coalition of the VVD with the Labour Party (PvdA).

Unlike during the coalition formation phase and the drafting of the coalition agreement, the PVV was not able to push through policies that were in its party programme during the government of Rutte I. However, that requires one to look further to explain why the influence of the PVV during the governance phase is nevertheless convincing. The position of the PVV regarding immigration is extreme compared to the other parties in the Dutch parliament. Therefore, even if none of the policy preferences of the PVV made it into legislative bills, the closer actual policy output comes to what the PVV proposes, the more plausible the influence of that party is in shaping government policy.

Beyond substantive matters, the influence of the PVV was also noticeable in the political arena. The VVD and CDA were in constant communication with Wilders to make sure he will not give up his support of the government (Hoedeman and Meijer, 2014b). According to Minister of Immigration and Asylum Gerd Leers, the government’s task to push through legislation backfired on the European level, because the “intentions of the Netherlands were immediately considered to be suspicious due to the sharp tone of Wilders” (Van Gorp and Van der Laan, 2012). According to the minister, one of the main reasons for policy failures was the highly polarised political climate in the Netherlands, and the importance that was attached to the framing of policies as opposed to their content (Ibid.).

An illustrative case of how Minister Leers was put under pressure to modify the government’s position on immigration to appease the PVV took place in October 2011. In a publication of the scientific magazine of his party CDA, the minister called migration an enrichment for society. This statement was immediately condemned by Geert Wilders,

sinds de opkomst van de PVV heet het dat we tegen Wilders aanschurken. Onzin, wij doen wat we altijd deden” (emphasis in original).
who called the minister’s arguments “a bit stupid” and said he would judge the minister on the numbers (Van Keken, 2011a). Prime Minister Rutte called on Leers to mend ties with Wilders, and shortly after that Leers declared that his policy aims to “very substantially” decrease the number of migrants (Van Keken, 2011b). The role of the PVV, without ministerial responsibilities, was favourable in that it did not have to deal with tensions that come from being a coalition partner and having to satisfy voters and the “party on the ground” (Akkerman and De Lange, 2012: 595).

All in all, the formation and coalition weight of the PVV is relatively low in ‘absolute’ terms, though the indirect influence of the party on the government policy was significant. Secondly, also the SGP was able to benefit on immigration from its role as ‘silent supporter’ of Rutte I. Despite the difficulties of measurement, the below hypotheses are partially supported. Formation and coalition weight indeed serve as measurements of party influence on policy. However, from the Dutch case study, it becomes clear that the indirect influence of Eurosceptic parties, especially in the uncommon parliamentary supporter arrangement, is very significant.

Hypothesis B1: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on policy is a product of the formation weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition bargaining process.

Hypothesis B2: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on policy is a product of the coalition weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition bargaining process.

6.3.4. Parliamentary oversight

The third and final approach that is used to review the influence of the Eurosceptic PVV and SGP on the EU-related dimensions of migration policy in the Netherlands in the period 2010-2012 is through the literature of parliamentary oversight, specifically the application of the principal-agent theory on parliamentary scrutiny. Generally speaking, Högenauer (2015) found that the influence of the Dutch Parliament on EU policies strengthened during the Rutte I government. During this period the Eurosceptic PVV played a formative role as parliamentary supporter and sometimes opposed the coalition partners on EU issues – a policy area where the PVV and the coalition partners “agreed to disagree” (Tweede Kamer, 26 May 2011). Overall, the Dutch parliament is known to
be a policy shaper, actively seeking to control and shape the Dutch government’s position in the Council of Ministers. Ex-ante there are regular meetings with the ministers before the Council of the EU sessions, whereas ex-post “the government reports back, mostly in written form, on the outcome of the negotiations. On contested policies, resolutions are used to formalize the position of the Tweede Kamer” (Högenauer, 2015: 267).

From a different point of view, Steunenberg (2014: 6) argues that, when it comes to parliamentary influence over the EU decision-making process, the Dutch parliament can mostly be seen as fulfilling the functions of lobbyist and networker. Over the years, and with the introduction of the subsidiarity principle, the Tweede Kamer has begun to take a more active part in the policy preparation process. In the period 2010-2013, the Dutch Parliament filed 20 subsidiarity complaints (10 were filed by the Tweede Kamer, five by the Eerste Kamer and another five jointly by the two Chambers)33. One of these subsidiarity complaints referred to migration, namely the Seasonal Workers Directive, sent to the European Commission on the day the Rutte I government took office.

Elsewhere, Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) found that Eurosceptic parties in the Netherlands did not depoliticise EU issues in parliament. Eurosceptic parties were active in scrutiny activities during the debates about the Banking Union, but generally lacked the relevant information and expertise about the Dutch government’s negotiations on the EU level. This observation is contrary to what Auel and Raunio (2014) found, namely that Eurosceptic parties try to depoliticise EU matters in parliament by not asking parliamentary questions.

When looking at the activities of the Tweede Kamer during Rutte I, table 14 shows the parliamentary questions that were posed per member of parliament (party), thereby distinguishing between the total amount of questions asked and those focusing on migration policy. The average number of questions asked by the government parties CDA and VVD is relatively low, as expected. Also, the PVV’s number of questions are lower than the average of the other opposition parties. Of the questions that the PVV asked the

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33 Steunenberg notes that the Senate and the House tend to use very different arguments for their subsidiary complaints to the European Commission. The complaints are often used as ways to shape national elections, thereby making cross-national parliamentary cooperation more difficult than one would initially expect, since the domestic political context is the driving reason behind submitting complaints regarding subsidiarity (2014: 9). Increased cooperation between national parliaments would be necessary for a more effective control of the EU’s legislative process. There has been increased orientation of the Dutch parliament on the preparatory phase of the EU legislative process, and a relative underemphasis on transposition and the executive process, despite the fact that the role of parliament on the national dimensions of transposition could be the most fruitful when it comes to parliamentary control of EU decision making (Steunenberg 2014: 16).
government that related to migration, most referred to negative news concerning immigrants and crime. The party exploited news coverage on issues related to problems with immigrants in the Netherlands, like the question 27 October 2010 relating to violence against homosexual asylum seekers or of 12 January 2012 related to street crime in Utrecht and how expulsion of these “immigrants” would solve the problems of street crime in the city. By deliberately framing questions related to the news items, the party tried to shape the government reaction on these political developments.

Furthermore, the number of questions per MP of the SGP on migration and asylum was higher than for other parties. One explanation could be there are only two SGP MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Written questions per MP (party), total</th>
<th>Oral questions per MP (party), total</th>
<th>Written questions per MP (party), migration</th>
<th>Number of oral questions, migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>6.76 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>14.51 (296)</td>
<td>1.15 (23)</td>
<td>0.52 (11)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChristenUnie</td>
<td>35.59 (178)</td>
<td>2.39 (12)</td>
<td>6.8 (34)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>26.6 (270)</td>
<td>2.39 (15)</td>
<td>4.2 (42)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GroenLinks</td>
<td>27.53 (264)</td>
<td>2.35 (22)</td>
<td>4.7 (47)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>24.75 (758)</td>
<td>1.17 (36)</td>
<td>2.97 (89)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdD</td>
<td>71.04 (142)</td>
<td>1.91 (4)</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>17.14 (400)</td>
<td>0.90 (21)</td>
<td>1.54 (37)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP*</td>
<td>37.19 (77)</td>
<td>0.69 (1)</td>
<td>6.5 (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>40.50 (608)</td>
<td>2.14 (32)</td>
<td>3.8 (57)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>7.21 (229)</td>
<td>0.50 (16)</td>
<td>0.52 (16)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total questions submitted</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>231</td>
<td>16</td>
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Source: Own calculations, and Otjes et al., 2018:63 for the two right columns. Bold = coalition party or parliamentary supporter. *SGP became an unofficial parliamentary supporter of the cabinet from March 2011, when the cabinet lost its majority in the Senate.

in the Tweede Kamer. Their inquiries mostly related to the plight of persecuted Christians, which comes as no surprise given the devout character of the party. All in all, the PVV
and SGP used these news items as windows of opportunities to place the issues that are salient for their parties on the political (and public) agenda (see Kingdon, 2014).

Beyond parliamentary questions, parties could also make use of motions to try and shape government policy. In the case of immigration, none of the motions that were suggested received a parliamentary majority. One motion specifically referred to one of the policy items discussed in section 6.2. Motion Schouw 32317-62 (was tabled on 29 June 2011) called for a clarification of the societal problems stemming from the inflow of migrants to the Netherlands, what solutions the government would have to tackle these problems, and in which European context these societal problems are dealt with (Tweede Kamer Motion Schouw 32317-62, 2011). All the opposition parties voted in favour but the ruling parties and the parliamentary supporters PVV and SGP voted it down. The second motion (Motion Schouw 30573-60) that was directly related to the EU dimensions of migration policy and called for the government to actively and exhaustively inform the Tweede Kamer about the negotiations in the EU regarding the proposals of the Roadmap of minister Leers (Tweede Kamer Motion Schouw 30573-60, 2010). The motion refers explicitly to how such transparency is crucial for the Tweede Kamer to be able to perform its role as scrutiny body of the government. The motion was rejected after being voted down by the VVD, CDA, PVV and SGP. One of the explanations for the PVV voting down this motion is that it preferred to maintain the information asymmetry between the government and the parliament, since it had access to the government’s information.

Pressure from the PVV on the government also occurred during plenary debates. One such instance took place during a debate in April 2011 where the PVV raised concerns over the short period within which partners or family members of Turkish migrants can get a residency permit. Based on the Association Agreement with Turkey, this period was set to three years, but given the standstill provisions, a period of one year had to be maintained by the Netherlands. The PVV was pledging for five years, as expressed in the minority agreement. In reaction, Minister of Immigration and Asylum Leers stated that he would work to “prevent a wider interpretation of the Turkish association rights by actively interfering with Court cases”. At the same time, while he admitted “it is not going to be easy” and “that it is not sure we will manage,” he will not just stand by idly (Tweede Kamer, 26 April 2011). Leers thus felt the pressure of the PVV to push for stricter rules on residency permits, despite the knowledge that this proposal will most likely not make it on Council level.
Principal-agent theory

After the review of the parliamentary activities about the immigration policy under Rutte I, figure 10 shows how the PVV can influence the actions of the government (the agent). In step 4 of the causal mechanism, the four scrutiny types are shown, going from the lowest level of scrutiny (express support/disagreement) to the highest level of scrutiny (providing instructions), which represent gradually more influence from the principal on the agent. As table 6 showed, these types of scrutiny also come with increased costs for the principal, i.e. increased scrutiny comes at the price of an increased amount of resources (time) allocated to the scrutinising task. While providing instructions to the agent is the most far-reaching level of scrutiny by the principal, the demands on the principal are the highest as well.

When trying to influence the migration policy of the VVD-CDA cabinet, the PVV resorted to multiple types of scrutiny. The PVV posed 37 written questions on migration policy during Rutte I, where in most cases the PVV explicitly expressed support or disagreement of the position of the government. Furthermore, the PVV also provided the government with instructions through the parliamentary setting. As above example, which relates to forcing Turkish migrants to apply for a residency permit in the framework of the Family Reunification Directive, is a striking instance of how the PVV publicly pressured the government to negotiate a stricter eligibility regulation for immigrants.
As parliamentary supporter of the government, the PVV enjoyed the privilege of access to much more information than the other opposition parties in parliament, for instance by being present at the weekly ministerial meetings. The PVV appeared to have used that privilege to its advantage, to which the voting down of the motion calling for an increased transparency on migration policy attests (Motion Schouw 30573-60). Lastly, the PVV and SGP were agenda setters by posing parliamentary questions that related to issues salient for them.

The hypotheses listed below indicate the ways in which the PVV sought to influence the Dutch government in terms of migration policy. The written questions (P1) of the PVV were meant to provoke a reaction from the government, but mostly served as a means to put issues important for the PVV on the political agenda, i.e. high crime rates of Muslims and the radicalisation of Islam in the Netherlands. Secondly, the PVV openly provoked the government by expressing policy alternatives to the standpoint of the government. Lastly, as mentioned above, one of the moments when the PVV influenced the government expressly in parliament was when it publicly pressured the government to negotiate a stricter eligibility regulation for immigrants. However, especially the latter, and most extensive, influencing measure by parliament was at the PVV’s disposal mostly because it was the parliamentary supporter of the government and therefore played a formative role in the survival of the government.

**Hypothesis P1**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party asks parliamentary questions as a way to modestly shape policy.

**Hypothesis P2**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party takes up an alternative position as a way to moderately shape policy.

**Hypothesis P3**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party provides the government party with instructions as a way to significantly shape policy.

All in all, within the realm of parliamentary scrutiny, the PVV’s influence was pronounced. However, its unique role as parliamentary supporter gave it the additional information it needed to shape government policy, which is usually not at the disposal of opposition parties in parliament. In short, the PVV did not suffer from the problem of information asymmetry, which the principal-agent theory identifies as one of the central delegation problems.
6.4. Closing remarks

This chapter first described and then analysed how the Eurosceptic niche parties PVV and SGP influenced the migration policy of the VVD-CDA government (2010-2012). The three causal mechanisms that were employed to explain the influence of these parties on the government’s EU policies delivered mixed results. Firstly, the expectations of the POS theory did not materialise in the case of the Dublin Regulation, and the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives. It appears that the accommodative strategies of the VVD and CDA – as the mainstream government parties under consideration – were not successful or did not sufficiently explain the effects of the PVV on the government’s migration policy. While the POS theory expected an increase in the issue salience of migration and a transfer of issue ownership from the PVV to the mainstream parties, neither of these expectations materialised. On the other hand, the policies of the VVD and CDA did converge towards the PVV’s position on migration, and the PVV did suffer from electoral losses following the collapse of the coalition in 2012, as expected by Meguid’s POS theory. A more likely expectation of the electoral loss of the PVV in 2012 is instead the political boycott by most parliamentary parties on the PVV than an accommodative strategy by the VVD and CDA.

As for the expectations of coalition bargaining, the PVV appears to have weighed in heavily during the formation negotiations. About one-sixth of the coalition agreement is dedicated to immigration policy, while close to half of the agreement between the PVV as parliamentary supporter and the government is dedicated to immigration. Furthermore, while there is little evidence of direct influence of the PVV as measured through the concepts of formation and coalition weight, its indirect influence is palpable, in that the coalition agreement refers to 7 (of 16) restrictive policy items related to Family Reunification that are not in the party programmes of either the VVD or the CDA (see table 13).

Lastly, the unique role that the PVV played as parliamentary supporter without ministerial responsibilities, and that the SGP played as ‘silent supporter’ of the government in the Senate, allowed these parties to put much pressure on the VVD and CDA, who were reliant on both the PVV and SGP for a majority in parliament. Especially the PVV did not face the information asymmetry that opposition parties typically face.

As outlined in chapter 4, the conditions for Eurosceptic parties to successfully influence government policy were most favourable in this case study. Important
conditions for the success policy influence of the Eurosceptic policy in the case of the Rutte I government (2010-2012):

1. A hard Eurosceptic party as parliamentary supporter of the government, meaning with a prominent political position and in close contact with the government parties but without ministerial responsibilities and accountability.

2. The most salient policy issue for this Eurosceptic party, immigration policy, was also a relatively salient issue among the public, making it a policy area to invest in. Immigration policy is an omnibus issue for the European far-right which has a strong European dimension to it, and it often coupled with European integration (see Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Fennema, 1997).

3. The two government parties had a central-right agenda with a more-than-average restrictive immigration policy. Therefore, the mainstream parties were susceptible to the even more restrictive immigration policy of the far-right niche party.

4. Immigration flows showed a steady upward trend in the Netherlands, which directly benefitted the electoral support of the PVV (Dennison et al., 2017). Therefore, the PVV’s participation in the Rutte I cabinet also allowed parties like the VVD and CDA to experiment with stricter immigration policies, that would have been considered controversial otherwise.
7. Party Euroscepticism in Hungary

Hungary became a member of the European Union in 2004, 25 years after the fall of communism. From the 1990s, one of the leading foreign policy priorities of the first democratically elected government in Hungary (MDF-FKgP-KDNP) was the “reunification” of Hungary with the rest of Europe. Before accession to the EU, Hungarians were given a chance to vote in a referendum, whether they want Hungary to accede to the EU or not. Eventually, 83% of the voters supported the accession, though the voter turnout of the referendum was only 43% (Fowler, 2003).

The first hard-Eurosceptic party to appear in Hungary was the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), which entered parliament in 1998. For MIÉP, the EU is a “symbol of liberalism”, and it compared EU membership to a “Second Trianon Treaty” (Neumayer, 2008 and Csurka in Neumayer, 2008). The reference to a Second Trianon Treaty is weighty since the Trianon Treaty of 1920 is to this considered a national tragedy for many, where Hungary lost 70% of its territory (Várdy, 1997). For MIÉP Hungary’s membership of the EU would undermine its national interests and threaten the plight of the Hungarians living in Slovakia and Romania (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Batory, 2002). While the party did not manage to re-enter parliament after 1998, its ideological rhetoric did not disappear from the party competition in Hungary and was later used by both Jobbik and Fidesz. Before the Euroscepticism of Jobbik and Fidesz is discussed below, first a brief overview of the other non-Eurosceptic actors in the Hungarian parliament.

The EU was already part of the party competition during the 1990s, when Fidesz was competing with the SZDSZ for becoming the leading liberal party in the Hungarian political system. SZDSZ pursued a pro-integration policy from the beginning and accused Fidesz of being Eurosceptic (Neumayer, 2008: 148). Membership to the EU was one of its main political goals (Enyedi, 2007b).

As the historically most significant electoral contender of Fidesz, MSZP followed a pro-European course and was a firm supporter of a speedy accession of Hungary to the EU. It was the party in government when Hungary joined the EU in 2004. The MSZP adopted an even more favourable view of the EU between 2007 and 2014 (Göncz and

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34 The main reasons for not voting in the referendum were: (1) the result was inevitable (57%), (2) people were too busy to vote (57%), (3) while accession is good, it is not enough to vote for (51%) (Szonda Ipsos poll in Fowler, 2003).
Lengyel, 2016: 111), perhaps in reaction to the shift of the Fidesz towards a more Eurosceptic position over that same period. The MSZP’s 2006 party programme was clear on how it viewed the role of the EU for Hungary: “The European Union is a decisive framework for the successful reunification and security of the Hungarians and the nation” (MSZP, 2006: 37). Similar sentiments were reiterated in their 2018 party programme, when the party conditioned peace in Europe to EU membership. MSZP sees the EU as the guarantor of the rule of law in Hungary:

“Hungary will only be able to secure its national interests by converging towards the EU’s core countries, take part in further integration, and strengthen the public’s support for the EU. With the help of our EU membership, we can improve the situation of the Hungarians living outside of the Hungarian borders” (MSZP, 2018).

Several parties have entered the political scene in Hungary since 2010, the year Fidesz won the general elections and ended up with a 2/3 majority in parliament. Until the last general elections in 2018, its rule has remained unchallenged. However, this has not deterred new parties from challenging Fidesz’s rule. One of the most prominent parties trying to do so is Democratic Coalition (DK), founded by former MSZP Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2011. DK is an explicitly Europhile party. In its 2018 election programme, for instance, it declared that their long-term vision is a United States of Europe, with a common European constitution, government, a bicameral parliament, and a common foreign, defence, social, economic, fiscal and tax policy (DK, 2017). In the introduction of the 2013 programme, the Europhile character was evident as well: “We want to live in European Hungary. That is what we are fighting for. We know that the only way to get out of Orbán’s Hungary is via Europe.” (DK, 2013:3)

Párbeszéd is also a pro-European party, and the most prominent of its members is Mayor of Budapest Gergely Karácsony (since October 2019). The party was founded in 2014 by 8 MPs of the LMP (see below). In their “Europe Manifesto” in 2014, they criticise the government for its position on the EU: “Instead of a strong European state,

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35 Translation from Hungarian by the author.
36 In 2014, PárbeszédMagyarországért ran together with Együtt, and formed alliance Együtt-PM.
the government started to build a half-Asian dictatorship” (Párbeszéd, 2014). They seek a democratic and green Europe where Hungary protects its European rights.

The newly established Momentum started as a movement in 2017 against Hungary’s bid to host the Olympics. It did not win any seats during the 2018 general elections, just one year later secured 10% of the votes during the 2019 European Parliament elections. Their EP election program started with the statement that Hungary has been part of Europe since Saint Stephen37. Momentum has a populist communication style and uses the European Parliament as a platform to funnel its discontent towards the ruling party and the need for European integration to tackle the democratic backsliding of Hungary (Hargitai, 2019).

Lastly, a party with a less apparent pro-European position is the LMP (Politics Can Be Different). According to the LMP, Hungary’s place is inside the EU, but the party is critical of the current functioning of the EU. They argue that the EU has a democratic deficit, transparency problems, and that it should not be “to increase the central bureaucracy, but to ensure the transparent functioning of EU institutions and bodies, and strengthen participatory democracy and subsidiarity” (LMP, 2018). Nevertheless, LMP is in favour of more cross-border cooperation, a European minimum wage, the CFSP, cooperation to deal with migration and cooperation on environmental and energy policy and overcoming social differences. The party programme of 2018 also highlighted that the party would intend to use the EU as a platform for promoting the Hungarian national interest, favouring intergovernmentalism as the way to achieve those national interests (Göncz and Lengyel, 2016). Interestingly, the party voted against the Sargentini Report38 in 2018 on the grounds that issues related to the rule of law should be dealt with domestically (Halász-Szabó, 2018).

After this brief review of the state of the political debate concerning the EU in Hungary, the remainder of this chapter looks at party-based Euroscepticism in the Hungary and will give more detailed explanations of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties. However, the policy-level Euroscepticism offers a more systemic review of the positions of parties on European integration in Hungary.

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37 The first King of Hungary in the year 1000.
38 Its official title is the “Report on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded”. The report evaluates the state of the rule of law in Hungary and concludes that punitive actions ought to be initiated against Hungary.
7.1. Fidesz\textsuperscript{39}

Fidesz (The Hungarian Civic Alliance) was established shortly before the fall of communism in 1988, and its current political leader, Viktor Orbán, has been its political face for much of that time. Fidesz long held an ambiguous position towards the EU, though it flirted with Euroscepticism in the 1990s, when Viktor Orbán argued during the 1998 general election campaign that “there is life outside of the Union” (Bátory, 2008: 271). There is a lack of consensus regarding the Euroscepticism of government party Fidesz.\textsuperscript{40} Bátory (2008) classified Fidesz in 2002 as soft Eurosceptic, for it adopted a “‘yes, but’ stance … that characterized Fidesz politicians’ statements in the run-up to the referendum on EU membership” and positioned Fidesz “between the pronouncedly pro-EU governing parties and the Justice Party’s\textsuperscript{41} rejection of European integration” (Idem.: 272).

In the 2006 election programme of Fidesz, the party focused explicitly on economic convergence with Western Europe and emphasised the need to strengthen security and “the need to strengthen the representation of the interests of the Hungarians in all areas” (38). Furthermore, Fidesz emphasised that the “Hungarian people have made great sacrifices to become an EU member”, and so it is the government’s task to ensure they experience the benefits of membership (37). The party also called for introducing the Euro, a position it since then has distanced itself from. There is however no unambiguous Eurosceptic position the party took in 2006. Bátory nevertheless observes that Fidesz adopted a political strategy where it “made its support for EU-related constitutional amendments conditional upon the government’s acceptance of part of its own economic programme, which they saw as essential for Hungary’s preparation for accession” (2008: 271). This moderate position was also observed by Bíró Nagy et al. (2012), which compared the party positions of four parties – Fidesz, MSZP, Jobbik and LMP – in Hungary during the period 2010-2012. They observe that there were significant differences between the rhetoric these parties used in the media and the language used in

\textsuperscript{39}This section is in part based on Hargitai, T. (2020) How Eurosceptic is Fidesz actually? Politics in Central Europe, 16(1):189-209.

\textsuperscript{40} Fidesz-KDNP is considered to be one party, since the KDNP is in a permanent alliance with Fidesz since 2006, and KDNP did not make it into parliament the last time they ran on their own, receiving 3.9\% of the votes in 2002, below the 5\% threshold.

\textsuperscript{41} MIÉP
the more technical party manifestos. In the case of Fidesz, the party tends to formulate its written statements and positions carefully.

According to Enyedi (2006, in Várnagy, 2013), Fidesz uses a populist rhetoric towards the EU, while the party maintained a relatively pro-European Euromanifesto in 2004. Várnagy (2013) similarly finds that Fidesz was moderate in its criticism concerning the EU during the 2009 EP elections and directed its criticism mostly towards the national government, likely in anticipation of an electoral victory in 2010 (187). Similarly, Duró (2016) does not consider Fidesz to be Eurosceptic, because it continues to have a “clear pro-European policy in practice, i.e. it has always supported the deepening of the European integration” (44). He goes on to say that the confrontational rhetoric of Fidesz is a consequence of the sizeable share of Eurosceptic voters in Hungary. Lastly, Treib (2014) does not add Fidesz to the list of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament after the 2014 EP elections. However, in his analysis of Euroscepticism in the 2019 EP elections, Treib (2020) categorised Fidesz as a Eurosceptic party belonging to the radical-right of Europe.

Looking at Fidesz in office since 2010, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013) highlight that Fidesz continued to be a soft Eurosceptic party, and that its overwhelming electoral victory in 2010 made Fidesz immune to criticism on EU policy, although Jobbik was considered a competitor on (EU) policy. There has been a marked convergence of policy positions between far-right Jobbik and Fidesz, with Jobbik moderating its position on the EU since 2014 while Fidesz radicalised its position (Enyedi and Róna, 2018).

All in all, there is an ambiguity regarding the Euroscepticism of Fidesz. In the absence of party manifestos of Fidesz(-KDNP) for the 2014 and 2018 general elections, some other sources can provide insights into its position on European integration.

First, survey data by Göncz and Lengyel (2016) show that Fidesz has become more focused on intergovernmentalism between 2007 and 2014. However, already in 2007, Fidesz was much more inclined towards intergovernmentalism than the average in the Hungarian parliament (Ibid.). Furthermore, economic competitiveness is progressively considered to be the principal aim of the EU, as compared to the social dimension (Ibid.: 114). Despite these changes, the attachment to Europe has remained virtually unchanged (116).

In the beginning of 2019, and in the wake of the European Parliament elections of 2019, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán highlighted that Fidesz had two goals related to the EU. On the one hand, the aim was to make “anti-immigration forces” the biggest in the
European Parliament, and through their election in the EP also the biggest in the European Commission and then the Council. Furthermore, Fidesz should be the “most successful party in Europe; but at all events we want to be the most successful within the European People’s Party” (Orbán, 2019, *sic*). In this statement, Fidesz’s criticism is not directed towards the form but the content of the actors of the EU institutions.

The underlying logic of the Hungarian government’s attitude towards the EU becomes more apparent when looking at the national consultation entitled “Let’s Stop Brussels” of April 2017. In its English-language explanation, the government motivated the need for this national consultation as follows: “The title of the consultation perfectly expresses the position we represent: Let’s stop Brussels! Let’s stop the appropriation of national powers by Brussels! Let’s stop Brussels’ policy of continually seeking to exceed the powers given to it in the Treaties! And let’s stop efforts which – through the promotion of migration – seek to change the ethnic composition and cultural foundations of the European Union, and Hungary within it!” (Government of Hungary, 2017). Essential here is the transfer of competences to the EU, which Fidesz opposes in this case. Specific policy areas where the government wishes to prevent or revert competences back to the member state are migration policy, employment policy and fiscal policy; plus, the government is against the Energy Union.

However, the document goes on to argue that the Hungarian government is pro-European, even though the European Commission is accusing it of being anti-European. “Hungary is on the side of Europe, it works for a strong Europe, and wishes to reform the policies pursued in Brussels so that Europe can remain the best place in the world” (Ibid.). The party promotes close cooperation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework to promote security on the continent.

Based on these examples, one can see that Fidesz, as the government party, is in favour of a halt to the integration project on several issues. Expert survey data shows that the Hungarian government, of all the member states in the EU, is most in favour of a purely domestic approach to issues; particularly in the fields of immigration policy, energy policy, fiscal policy, social policy, justice and home affairs, and policies towards China, the US and Russia (ECFR, 2018).

In terms of the motivation for being Eurosceptic, Fidesz invokes a rhetoric that can be associated with Leconte’s *political* Euroscepticism (2010), which considers European integration a threat to national sovereignty and identity. Furthermore, Fidesz’s Euroscepticism is profoundly *value-based and cultural*, since the party defies the
principles of liberal democracy both in word and in deed and claims that Hungary is defending Europe’s Christian roots while other governments are working against those cultural traditions by allowing refugees into the EU. However, the fourth dimension, *utilitarian* Euroscepticism is absent in Fidesz’s policy towards the EU.

All in all, Fidesz, as the only government party in Hungary, challenges the way that the majority of parties in the EU member states approach the EU, and its nativist-conservative ideology is at odds with the values of the EU. The country’s democratic backsliding is thus a form of inverted soft Euroscepticism (Hargitai, 2020). When applying Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 2002 definition of soft Euroscepticism, which includes the ‘current EU trajectory being at odds with the national interest’, Fidesz’s overall attitude towards the EU is somewhat at odds with the interests of the majority of the member states, which makes for a kind of inverted soft Euroscepticism. That similarly holds for the democratic developments in Hungary, to which the overwhelming vote in favour of the Sargentini Report would attest⁴².

7.2. Jobbik

Jobbik has been described as a far-right and anti-European party. It historically had a xenophobic agenda that led the French far-right party Front National, and Geert Wilders of the Dutch PVV go so far as to state that they would never work together with Jobbik (Hebel and Schmitz, 2013). Jobbik first entered Hungary’s parliament in 2010 and became the second-largest party in the 2018 elections (with 19.06% of the votes, 13.06% of seats). In the words of Styczyńska (2018): “Jobbik is anti-European and subscribes to an identity- and economy-based Euroscepticism, rejecting the very idea of European integration and the European project” (146). Treib (2014) also categorised Jobbik as a hard-Eurosceptic party, according to the categorisation of Taggart and Szczerbiak, when looking at the 2014 EP elections. When Jobbik first entered parliament, its party programme was very critical of the functioning of the EU and emphasised how Hungary’s EU membership had detrimental effects on Hungary and Hungarians (Jobbik, 2010).

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⁴² In September 2018, the majority of the European Parliament voted in favour of the Sargentini Report – the report evaluates the state of the rule of law in Hungary and concludes that punitive actions are to be initiated against Hungary. The Hungarian Government offered a 109-paged rebuttal, where it offers their position on the different issues of the report. The report is a European document that focuses on the democratic developments in a member state. However, the motivation for the European Parliament to draft a report on the developments concerning the rule of law in Hungary was ‘the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded’ (Sargentini 2018).
The critical position of Jobbik in terms of the EU was expressed symbolically as well; in particular on two occasions. In 2010 the party burned an EU flag publicly, and in 2014, on the eve of the EP elections, a Jobbik MP and a former member of Jobbik threw the EU flag out of the windows of their office in Parliament (Nyyssönen, 2019: 117-118). These acts of discontent left little to the imagination what the party feels of the EU.

However, Jobbik moderated its position on the EU, and in 2014 its party leader Vona stated that Jobbik would no longer burn the EU flag or push for a Hungarian exit from the EU (Enyedi and Róna, 2018: 264). After the 2014 general elections and EP elections, the party has been trying to rebrand itself and has been changing its strategy towards European integration. The outright rejection of the EU was replaced with a strategy that used the EU as a means to diminish Fidesz’s hold on the domestic arena.

Jobbik’s new approach towards the EU is nicely captured in its English-language election pamphlet for the EP elections of 2019. The party even recognised the need for a common response to immigration. “Jobbik believes that the concept of Hungary and some other states protecting the EU’s border on their own is unsustainable - ensuring border integrity and setting up a deployable Hungarian border guard force requires contributions from all EU member states, while the countries that are unable or unwilling to protect their external borders must be helped through Frontex” (Jobbik, 2019). Beyond that, Jobbik is suggesting a Wage Union to tackle income inequality between Western and Eastern Europe, favours increased accountability of the spending of EU funding, Hungary’s voluntary joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and a common environmental policy.

In conclusion, Jobbik has developed from a hard Eurosceptic party into a Europragmatic party that emphasises the benefits of membership to compete on the national arena, particularly against Fidesz.

7.3. Conclusion

Before Hungary acceded to the EU, MIÉP was the force behind party-based Euroscepticism in the Hungarian parliament. Until 2010, most parties in parliament were pro-European, though Fidesz had a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the EU, for instance, by emphasising that there is also life outside of the EU. After elected into office, the Fidesz government became more critical towards the European Union. Fidesz gradually diverged from an approach to the European Union (see ECFR, 2018) and
increasingly estranged itself from the fundamental values of the European Union, as enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (Kelemen, 2020), making it a soft Eurosceptic party. At the same time, Jobbik has been moderating its criticism of the EU and by 2019, based on their programme for the European Parliament elections, may be considered a Europragmatic party.

Chapter 8 will discuss the influence that Jobbik had on the EU-related dimensions of the migration policy of the Fidesz government.

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43 Mos (2020) argues that the ambiguity and unenforceability of the fundamental values of the EU, “Any assessment of norm (non-)compliance requires a degree of norm clarity as well as the presence of an arbiter with the authority to determine whether prescribed and actual behaviour correspond” (14).

This chapter will follow the same structure as chapter 6 on the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU-related dimensions of immigration policy in the Netherlands. Firstly, the policy items (the migrant quota system and the Stop Soros Act of 2018) are described in detail. Secondly, the degree of policy change is measured. Thirdly, the causal mechanisms from the literatures of the contagion effect, coalition bargaining, and parliamentary oversight applied to the Hungarian case study. Lastly, section 8.4 summarises the results of the case study. However, we first need to shortly introduce the political context in which the quota system and the Stop Soros Act took place. Therefore, the international dimensions of Hungary’s migration policy under the Orbán II, III and IV administrations are outlined here.

The previous chapter outlined the attitude of government party Fidesz towards the EU. While migration policy is mentioned, it might not have been immediately evident that migration policy became the most salient issue in Hungarian politics from the beginning of 2015. According to Nyyssönen, Fidesz’s migration policy has been defining the EU policy of the government from then on (2019). The trigger for Fidesz to start a permanent campaign against migration into Hungary came with the terror attack on the offices of French magazine Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 (Bíró-Nagy, 2018). In connection to the attacks, Prime Minister Orbán stated that under his rule, and that of Fidesz, “Hungary will not become a destination for immigrants” (Index.hu, 2015).

A contributing factor for Fidesz to politicise migration was a steep drop in public support for the party in 2014, following corruption scandals, and the very unpopular proposal for an internet tax that mobilised many Hungarians to demonstrate against an internet tax (Bíró-Nagy, 2018). European Social Survey data shows that the Hungarian government permanent campaign against immigration has borne fruits, for the public’s perception towards immigration changed profoundly in Hungary since 2015. In 2016 45.6% of the Hungarians claimed that they would not accept any immigrant from a different ethnic group to the majority population, followed by the Czech Republic with 36.4% and Israel at 31.2% (Simonovits and Szeitl, 2019: 302)\textsuperscript{44}.

\textsuperscript{44} The average of the 20 mostly European countries was 10.5% in 2016.
In terms of border protection, Hungary’s 2019 strategy on border protection captures the general policy of the government: “Hungary will continue to have the safest external borders for the internal security of our country and the EU Member States, as well as for the sustainability of free movement within the Schengen area. A high level of performance is assured by reliable, well-trained professional staff, specialized border management organizations, extensive coordination and cooperation, and state-of-the-art technologies” (Government of Hungary, 2019: 5).

This chapter will focus on two policy issues in the area of migration. The first policy item is the migrant quota system, which has a distinctly European character, since it was a Council decision that obliged Hungary to be part of a European resettlement schema. Hungary’s Stop Soros Act of 2018 has a more implicit European dimension, since the European Commission considers it to be at odds with EU law.

8.1. Migrant quota system

“Economic migrants cross our borders illegally, and while they present themselves as asylum-seekers, in fact they are coming to enjoy our welfare systems and the employment opportunities our countries have to offer. In the last few months alone, in Hungary the number of economic migrants has increased approximately twentyfold. This represents a new type of threat – a threat which we must stop in its tracks. ... As Brussels has failed to address immigration appropriately, Hungary must follow its own path. We shall not allow economic migrants to jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. ... We must make a decision on how Hungary should defend itself against illegal immigrants. We must make a decision on how to limit rapidly rising economic immigration” (Orbán, 2015a, sic).

The above quote is from April 2015, from the letter accompanying the national consultation on immigration, in reaction to that the European Commission proposed in February 2015. It directly links the Hungarian government’s approach to the EU through its migration policy for the years after 2015.
Meanwhile, the European Commission published the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 in response to the steep increase of migrants entering the Schengen Area through Greece, Italy and Hungary. As an immediate response, it called for increased capacities of Frontex, and the resettlement of asylum seekers throughout Europe, in order to decrease the pressure on the countries that faced the consequences of the incoming migrants most directly. Following a meeting of the Council of the European Union, the proposal was accepted in June 2015.

Later that year, the European Commission put forward a follow-up package of proposals to address the migrant crisis more systematically. These proposals, published on 9 September 2015, focused first and foremost on the relocation of 120,000 refugees: “following the sharp increase in illegal border crossings in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, but also on the Western Balkans route, over the last few months, urgent action is needed”. The Commission proposed to relocate 160,000 people “in clear need of international protection from Italy (15,600), Greece (50,400) and Hungary (54,000). The relocation would be done according to a mandatory distribution key using objective and quantifiable criteria (40% of the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average number of past asylum applications, 10% of the unemployment rate)” (European Commission, 2015). Furthermore, a Permanent Relocation Mechanism would be put in place, whereby member states would take in migrants “to help any EU-Member State experiencing a crisis situation and extreme pressure on its asylum system as a result of a large and disproportionate inflow of third country nationals” (Ibid.).

On 22 September 2015, the Council of the EU voted in favour of the Commission’s package (Council Decision 2015/1601), but the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia rejected the package. Hungary was requested to take in 1,294 refugees from Greece and Italy, based on the May 2015 proposal. Furthermore, the 54,000 asylum seekers in Hungary would be spread across other member states. However, during the Council meeting, Hungary denounced a classification of being a “frontline Member State” and benefiting from relocation (ECJ, 2017a, paragraph 10). Therefore, the 54,000 refugees in Hungary were no longer part of the relocation deal.

Several weeks later, during a parliamentary debate on 5 October 2015, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó summarised the government’s position. Having a debate about the mandatory quota system was detrimental for Hungary, because “[i]t could give the impression that the European Union was doing something while it was an entirely useless act. We also consider this debate to be detrimental because it
clearly created political tensions between the EU Member States and was interpreted as an invitation, not only to immigrants but also to those rogue human smugglers which further elevated the immigration pressure on the European Union” (Szijjártó, 2015: 16715). Prime Minister Orbán spoke of the EU’s migration policy as a “left-wing conspiracy against Europe”, whereby the daily inflow of thousands of migrants into Europe was a deliberate move that requires the Hungarian government to turn to “the people” in order to stop it (Orbán, 2015b). Orbán referred to the Hungarian people, as a homogenous group, to legitimise any policies needed to block immigration into Hungary.

An extensive media campaign followed from late 2015 and into 2016, condemning the European Commission’s relocation package. One of the government’s advertisements stated that: “The compulsory settlement quota increases the danger of terror” (Thorpe, 2015) and “Did you know that since the beginning of the migrant crisis, more than 300 people have died in Europe of terror attacks?” (BBJ, 2016). Furthermore, in November 2015 the government passed legislation in Parliament that made it possible for Hungary to sue the Council of the European Union over the plan to redistribute migrants in the EU (DW.com, 2015a). Several weeks after that bill passed, the government referred their case to the European Court of Justice (DW.com, 2015b).

The case brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by Hungary declares that Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 on the mandatory resettlement scheme for migrants infringes upon the principles of legal certainty and legislative clarity, necessity and proportionality. The main argument was that the Council overstepped its competences by adopting a legislative act that bounded Hungary to the mandatory quota system. Slovakia and Hungary lost the case in 2017 (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017a). Regarding Hungary’s claim that the Decision should have been treated as a legislative procedure, and that the Directive overstepped the competences of the Council of the EU concerning the Ordinary Procedure, the Court “notes in this regard that a legislative procedure can be followed only where a provision of the Treaties expressly refers to it. As Article 78(3) TFEU does not contain any express reference to a legislative procedure, the contested decision could be adopted in a non-legislative procedure and is consequently a non-legislative act.” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017b). On the matter of proportionality of the Council Decision, the Court goes on to argue that the

“mechanism actually contributes to enabling Greece and Italy to deal with the impact of the 2015 migration crisis and is proportionate” (Ibid.).

In a reaction to the court ruling, Prime Minister Orbán said that “We must take note of the ruling as we cannot erode the foundation of the EU - and respect of law is the foundation of the EU - but at the same time this court ruling is no reason for us to change our policy, which rejects migrants” (Than, 2017). Foreign Minister Szijjártó put it more bluntly by saying that “[t]his decision jeopardises the security and future of all of Europe. Politics has raped European law and values” (Rankins, 2017).

Subsequently, the European Commission filed a case on 21 December 2017 against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for not complying with the above-mentioned relocation scheme and for failing to fulfil their obligations (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017c). The European Court of Justice published its judgement on 2 April 2020, declaring that these member states have indeed failed to fulfil their obligations, and that: “[t]hose Member States can rely neither on their responsibilities concerning the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, nor on the alleged malfunctioning of the relocation mechanism to avoid implementing that mechanism.” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020a). This explicit reference to responsibilities under EU law was made, because these member states previously invoked arguments referring to maintaining law and order and security to justify their non-compliance of the Council Decision.

Prior the September 2017 ruling of the European Court of Justice, the Hungarian government also announced a referendum on the quota system in February 2016. On 9 May 2016, parliament debated the planned referendum. Jobbik voted together with Fidesz in favour of the 2016 referendum on the mandatory resettlement schema (NOL.hu, 2016). However, Jobbik party leader Gábor Vona told Prime Minister Orbán that Jobbik had already proposed a referendum back in 2015, and criticised this referendum for being slow, expensive, and risking a negative or invalid outcome (Vona, 2016). The opposition parties MSZP and LMP abstained, and five independent MPs voted against initiation of the referendum. At the time Jobbik tabled the idea of a referendum on the quota system in 2015, Fidesz caucus leader Lajos Kósa rejected this idea, saying that such an issue is not suitable for a referendum and that Hungary is bounded by international treaty obligations (Mandiner, 2016a).

To be able to put the government’s position on the quota system and the referendum into context, the position of the other parliamentary parties in Hungary on
these matters are essential to understand. The radical right-wing (previously) Jobbik supported a fierce anti-immigration policy (as shown above) and emphasised that Hungary should focus on the protection Hungary’s borders, not on Europe’s borders (Jobbik, 2015). While immigration was high on Jobbik’s agenda, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) considered the issue of immigration a “created problem” and that the real problem for Hungary is instead emigration (Medvegy, 2015). In terms of the quota system and the referendum on the issue, MP Gyula Molnár sees the referendum as a distraction away from domestic topics like education, health care and corruption, which are the real problems that need to be tackled (Origo.hu, 2016). He called on voters to stay at home and boycott the referendum. Democratic Coalition (DK) and Együtt supported the European Commission’s resettlement plan to relocate 1,300 migrants to Hungary (Mandiner.hu, 2015). These parties decided to collect signatures in order to show their support for a common European solution. DK is in favour of a common European border protection, the extension of the competences of Frontex and a European approach to migration and asylum seekers (DK, 2017). LMP was not principally against the migration quota either but did argue that the migration problem and border protection need a domestic solution (24.hu, 2016).

The referendum was eventually held on 2 October 2016, and asked Hungarians citizens the following question: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?” (Daily News Hungary, 2016; National Election Office, 2016). The overwhelming majority - 98% - of those who voted answered the question in the negative, though less than 42% of the people ended up submitting their vote. The result was thus officially invalid, since the official threshold for a referendum to be valid in Hungary is 50% (National Election Office, 2016). Regardless of whether or not the referendum was valid or not, the Fidesz leadership declared the result of the referendum to be a victory, stating that it was a success that more people voted on this referendum than the one that was held on Hungary’s membership to the EU (SZBF, 2016).

In reaction to the quota system, the Hungarian Parliament passed legislation that widened the scope of action that the government could/can use to pursue its policy preferences. The most important of these changes on 15 September 2015 regarded the criminalisation of illegal passage through border barriers, which became punishable by
detention or expulsion (Legislative Act No. CXL of 2015; Temesi, 2018). Furthermore, on the same day, the government issued a decree that declared the state of crisis caused by mass migration for six months. The state of crisis has been extended every six months since 2015 and was still in force on 31 August 2020 (Vass, 2020). Another modification of the law relates to the determination procedure of the refugee status and shortens of deadlines for decisions of asylum applications. For the duration of up to 15 calendar days, the asylum seeker must stay in a transit zone, and will have three days to appeal the case. The asylum seeker must submit their request for asylum in person (Temesi, 2018; Nagy, 2016).

Hungary continues its non-compliance of the migrant quota scheme. Another policy issue, related to the quota system, the Stop Soros Bills of 2018, is discussed below.

8.2. Stop Soros Act

The second issue of the Fidesz government related to migration policy are the Stop Soros Package Bills from February 2018. The Stop Soros legislative package is directed at persons or organisations that assist refugees in Hungary. The package follows from the national consultation entitled Stop Soros, and criminalises those individuals and organisations that provide any form of assistance to undocumented immigrants (Bills-T19776-T19774-T19775, translated by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee). Fidesz’s justification of the legislative bills is that in “order to create common social responsibility”, therefore organisations supporting migration are “obliged to pay an immigration financing duty if it receives any financial or property benefit either directly or indirectly from abroad” (Ibid.).

This legislative package requires the necessary historical context. Back in 2016, Jobbik-backed mayor of Ásotthalom, László Toroczkai, pressed charges against organisations aiding migrants illegally, accusing them of human trafficking (Jobbik, 2016). Toroczkai’s argument is that “[migration] is supported, assisted and organized by NGOs operating illegally in Hungary while receiving billions of HUFs from abroad,” and

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46 The increased use of criminal law on matters related to immigrants, yet with a non-criminal component is known as “crimmigration” (Stumpf, 2006).
47 The reasoning for Bill T19776: “During the national consultation related to the Soros Plan, an unmatched number of Hungarian citizens, more than 2.3 million expressed their opinion. Based on the results of the consultation, the Hungarians want strong border protection and decisive action against those organising and facilitating illegal immigration. Hungarian citizens unanimously reject all plans facilitating and encouraging immigration. Hungarians do not wish Hungary to become an immigration country”
that “these organizations operated with a complete lack of transparency last year, deceiving the Hungarian authorities” (Ibid.). He added that the Open Society Foundations is one such organisation that supports immigrants illegally (Alfahír, 2016).

The legal basis for the legislative bills were the results of the 2017 national consultation on the Soros Plan. In the consultation citizens were asked whether they supported George Soros’ plans on seven issues, primarily referring to an article that George Soros wrote in September 2015 (National Consultation, 2017; Soros, 2015). On some items the national consultation refers to an action plan developed by George Soros, which the Hungarian government claims to be that of the EU as well. One such example by the Hungarian government is that “[t]ogether with officials in Brussels, George Soros is planning to dismantle border fences in EU Member States, including in Hungary, to open the borders for immigrants”.

What ensued were back and forth accusations and rebuttals between George Soros and the Hungarian government. Soros reacted to the content of the national consultation by saying that the Hungarian government was spreading lies (Soros, 2017). Minister Szijjártó shot back that “George Soros’s attack on Hungary has gained new momentum with the onset of Hungary’s parliamentary elections” (Szijjártó, 2017).

In July 2018, the European Commission started an infringement procedure over the Stop Soros legislative packages, over concerns regarding its compatibility with EU law (European Commission, 2018). Specifically, the criminalisation of supporting asylum seekers violates the Asylum Procedure Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive, which safeguard an asylum applicant’s right to communicate with relevant organisations that could support them in the application process. The second issue refers to additional grounds of non-admissibility, meaning that asylum seekers are only eligible to apply for refugee status if they directly arrived in Hungary from a place where their life was at risk. The Commission finds the laws to be in violation of the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Asylum Qualifications Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It should remain possible for an asylum seeker to apply for asylum even when they arrive from a country which is not deemed a safe third country.

Also, the Open Society Foundations decided to sue the Hungarian government based on the violation of the “rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly that are guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, and a case was also filed to Hungary’s Constitutional Court (Open Society Foundations, 2018).
The Hungarian government stated in September 2018 that the European Commission’s infringement proceedings are a continuation of the “openly pro-immigration position” of the Commission, “instead of performing its role as protector of the law” (AboutHungary.hu, 2018). Furthermore, the government was critical of the Commission acting “in a political way and attacking immigration policy measures that facilitate border protection” (AboutHungary.hu, 2018). On those grounds, the Hungarian government decided to keep the Stop Soros bills in effect. The government’s position was given extra weight on February 2019 by the Constitutional Court rejected the petition of Amnesty International to invalidate the Stop Soros legislative package, claiming that the new law and the constitution offered enough guarantees for the right interpretation of the “new crime”, i.e. the criminalisation of supporting asylum seekers with legal proceedings (Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2019a).

The Constitutional Court of Hungary was also requested by the Minister of Justice to interpret whether the “Fundamental Law, as the basis of Hungary's legal system, is at the same time the legitimizing source of all sources of law – including the law of the European Union,” and how the rights of asylum seekers as in the seventh amendment to the Fundamental Law (the Stop Soros legislative package) can be interpreted. On 25 February 2019, the Court found the Fundamental Law indeed to be “the foundation of the legal system of Hungary” and the “Constitutional Court shall be the principal organ for the protection of the Fundamental Law”. Therefore, a different interpretation by the European Commission would be “deemed to break the Constitutional Court's monopoly of interpretation when it examines ... the Fundamental Law in the course of an infringement proceeding with regard to its compliance with the secondary Union law” (Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2019b). It is in the end up to the Hungarian Parliament to decide to grant an asylum seeker asylum or protection, granted that the applicant comes from a country where they are not directly threatened with persecution (Ibid.). The European Commission’s referral to the European Court of Justice took place after this decision by the Constitutional Court.

The status of the Court proceedings is not public as per early September 2020, and the Hungarian government and the Stop Soros legislative package is in effect.
8.3. Analysis

After the discussion of the two policy items, the analysis will start with an indication of the degree of policy change following the mandatory quota system and the Stop Soros legislative package, before discussing the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy in Hungary.

8.3.1. Policy change

In terms of the policy change following Hungary’s rejection of the migrant quota system and the Stop Soros legislative package, the Hungarian government has brought about a profoundly different approach toward immigration. Table 15 outlines the degree of policy change, according to Peter Hall’s framework.

The European Commission’s proposal for a mandatory quota system for the resettlement of migrants from member states facing particularly high migratory in order to relieve those pressures is considered a second-order policy change, in terms of Hall’s 1993 categorisation. The goal of the European Commission and the majority of the member states is to develop a common migration and asylum policy, in order to better deal with immigration. Improving and the harmonisation of legislation is a crucial element of this Common European Asylum System (European Commission, n.d.c). With the introduction of the mandatory quota system, this goal did not change. However, the system became a new instrument in order to achieve better protection of asylum seekers – the goal of the CEAS. Therefore, the Commission’s proposal would constitute a second-order change.
However, the Hungarian government rejected the Commission’s proposal and the European Council’s decision.\(^{48}\) The move is a third-order policy change, since neither the instrument nor the goal of the policy area is preserved. We can actually speak of a paradigm shift in that the hierarchy of policy goals changed (Hall, 1993: 280). For the policy issue in question, the Hungarian government went from a more European approach to migration (i.e. the common asylum policy), to a strictly national approach. As the quote at the beginning of this chapter also shows: “As Brussels has failed to address immigration appropriately, Hungary must follow its own path … make a decision on how Hungary should defend itself against illegal immigrants. We must make a decision on how to limit rapidly rising economic immigration.” (Orbán, 2015a). The Hungarian government thereby changed its goal from tackling immigration together to tackling immigration alone. It can be argued that the underlying goal of tackling immigration stayed the same and the instrument only changed, but in this case, we do speak of a complete overhaul of the previous policy framework, one of the characteristics of third-order change.

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\(^{48}\) The decision of the Hungarian government to reject the mandatory quota system that the European Council voted in favour of (Czechia, Romania, Slovakia also voted against), can be seen as a manifestation of *inverted* soft Euroscepticism, whereby a move is aimed to derail or halt European cooperation (Hargitai, 2020).

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### Table 15: Proposed and actual changes of migration policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandatory Quota System (Council Decision 2015/1601)</th>
<th><strong>Orbán III</strong></th>
<th>European Commission/Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third-order change:</strong> Complete rejection of the quota system: “As Brussels has failed to address immigration appropriately, Hungary must follow its own path. We shall not allow economic migrants to jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians, ... We must make a decision on how Hungary should defend itself against illegal immigrants. We must make a decision on how to limit rapidly rising economic immigration.” (Orbán, 2015a)</td>
<td><strong>Second-order change:</strong> The goal of the European Commission and the majority of the member states is to develop a common migration and asylum policy, in order to better deal with immigration. Improving and the harmonisation of legislation is an important element of this Common European Asylum System. With the introduction of the mandatory quota system, this goal did not change. However, the system became a new instrument in order to achieve a better protection of asylum seekers, the goal of the CEAS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop Soros Legislative Package</td>
<td>In “order to create common social responsibility” ... organisations supporting migrants are “obliged to pay an immigration financing duty if it receives any financial or property benefit either directly or indirectly from abroad.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Collection of official documentation.
Regarding the Stop Soros legislative package, which was introduced in 2018, this is considered by the European Commission a legislative package that violates the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The bills should be seen in conjuncture with the first policy item, i.e. under the umbrella of a national approach to immigration. Therefore, it makes sense to bundle the two policy items as a single manifestation of third-policy change. If the bills are seen separately as an extra legislative instrument, then it can be seen as a second-order change. The goal stays the same, but an additional instrument is put in place.

Having established the degrees of policy change following the rejection of the migrant quota system and the Stop Soros Act, how do the causal mechanisms explain Jobbik’s influence on the Hungarian government?

8.3.2. Contagion effect

The main policy contender of the Fidesz-KDNP government was far-right party Jobbik. The government’s strategy was thus to reposition itself towards the right of the political spectrum (Enyedi and Róna, 2018). It did so by adopting some policies of Jobbik, since it saw a considerable growth potential for the far-right in Hungary. Therefore, the focus of this section will be on the influence of Jobbik on the EU-related dimensions of Fidesz’s immigration policy, as outlined in the case study above.

Fidesz has been converging its policy positions on numerous issues which Jobbik tabled first, such as building the nuclear plant in Paks, the “turn to the East” (Russia) and a media act meant to preserve traditional values (Enyedi and Róna, 2018; Buzogány, 2017). On the issue of European integration, the positions of Fidesz and Jobbik have been converging as well. Both favoured a trimming down of the competences of the EU institutions and took a particularly restrictive approach to tackle the migration crisis. Fidesz has tied the unfolding migration crisis to the incapacity of the EU to deal with the crisis, by claiming that “Brussels” wants to allow large numbers of migrants to enter Hungary. At the same time, the European Parliament and Commission criticised the Hungarian government for breaches of the rule of law (see e.g. Sargentini, 2018). On the other hand, Jobbik has moderated its position on the EU, and then party leader Vona stated in 2014 that Jobbik would no longer burn the EU flag or push for a Hungarian exit from the EU (Enyedi and Róna, 2018).
However, Enyedi and Róna (2018) also propose alternative explanations for the policy convergence of Jobbik and Fidesz. Firstly, Fidesz had already planned to use far-right positions for a short time, as shocks, but these became more permanent in form, since their core electorate perceiving this shift favourably. Another explanation is that the ideological positions of the parties were close for longer, but Fidesz concealed its actual positions until after the 2010 electoral victory; whereby Jobbik’s policy proposals served as a testing ground for policies on which Fidesz would then aim to take issue ownership of (Ibid.). In the words of Krekó and Enyedi, “Fidesz could consciously use Jobbik as an instrument to reach its transformative political goals. Jobbik served Fidesz as a ‘pioneer’ to mark out new pathways in the ideological and political sense that Orbán could then follow afterwards” (2015: 201).

Did similar contagion also take place in the case of the Hungarian government’s migration policy since 2015? If Bonnie Meguid’s POS theory accurately explains the political strategy of the mainstream party (Fidesz) in the face of a rising niche party (Jobbik) which taps into new issues, then against we should expect the following four steps to happen.

1. A policy convergence of Fidesz towards Jobbik on immigration.
2. An increase in the salience of migration policy in Hungary since 2015.
3. A transfer of ownership of migration policy from Jobbik to Fidesz.

After the discussion of each of these points, this section will examine the explanatory power of the Meguid’s theory.

Policy convergence

Regarding the migrant quota scheme, the Hungarian government decided to hold a referendum on the mandatory quota scheme that the Council of the European Union accepted on 22 September 2015. The referendum eventually took place in September 2016 and asked Hungarian citizens their opinion on the following the question: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?”. In May 2015, before the Council decision and a year before the Hungarian parliament (Fidesz-KDNP had around 2/3 of the seats in parliament) voted in favour of the referendum, Jobbik proposed a referendum on the quota system (Vona, 2015a). Later that year, Jobbik started a petition against migration and corruption. Their question related to migration
was: “Do you agree that foreign nationals should not be resettled in Hungary through quotas or repatriation?” (Alfahír, 2015). Jobbik’s proposal for a referendum on the issue of a migration quota was rejected by Fidesz caucus leader Lajos Kósa in October 2015, by arguing that such a topic is not suitable for a referendum, since Hungary is bound by international treaties (Mandiner, 2016a). In reaction to that statement, Jobbik proposed a change to the Fundamental Law that would make a referendum on issues to which Hungary has international obligations possible (Parlament.hu, 2016). A day later, Prime Minister Orbán declared that a referendum would take place (Mandiner, 2016b).

Jobbik thus played an important role in the government’s decision to organise a referendum on the mandatory quota scheme for migrants. Jobbik put the issue on the public and political agenda, and Fidesz picked up on it. Fidesz might have initiated a referendum on the issue eventually, but it seems that Jobbik’s presence and the threat of the petition on migration and corruption might have encouraged Fidesz to take ownership of the issue as quickly as possible.

Regarding the Stop Soros bills, also in this case Jobbik had taken the initiative. As section 8.2 shows, in January 2016, Jobbik-backed Mayor László Toroczkai of Ásotthalom pressed charges against organisations that are assisting asylum seekers “illegally”. A bit more than two years later, the Hungarian government passed the Stop Soros bill that does exactly that: criminalise those individuals and organisations that provide any assistance to undocumented immigrants. Already in 2016, Toroczkai expressly referred to George Soros and the Open Society Foundations, which were the main targets of Stop Soros Legislative Bills T19774, T19775 and T19776.

In both cases, Jobbik proposed policies that were later adopted by Fidesz. Policy convergence thus did take place. In sum, Krekó and Enyedi (2015) capture the role of Jobbik on Fidesz’s strategy as “as an instrument to reach its transformative political goals. Jobbik served Fidesz as a ‘pioneer’ to mark out new pathways in the ideological and political sense that Orbán could then follow afterwards” (201).

**Issue salience**

In terms of the issue salience, since 2015, immigration policy has developed into by far the most salient issue for the Hungarian government. The 2019 campaign for the European Parliament elections was similarly overshadowed by immigration, whereby Fidesz dichotomised the EU in groups of pro-immigration and anti-immigration parties (Orbán, 2019). In public opinion, the salience of migration also increased, becoming the
second most important issue in Hungary in 2015, after unemployment (European Commission, n.d.b). However, by 2019 immigration had lost some of its momentum was only the third most frequently mentioned item (shared third with pension at 17%) amongst what Hungarians considered the most important issues facing Hungary. All in all, and despite the relative drop in salience, issue salience of immigration remained high compared to most policy areas.

Issue ownership

Jobbik took issue ownership of nationalist issues when it entered politics in the late 2000s and continued to defend that ownership since then (Pytlas, 2016). Their electoral success in 2010, 2014 and 2018 can be partially attributed to that ownership. At the same time, Fidesz was highly successful at campaigning with the threat of mass migration into Hungary and took at least partial issue ownership. During the 2016 referendum on the quota system, Jobbik had to give in and vote for the referendum that Fidesz proposed and successfully claimed the referendum as a Fidesz initiative (Bíró-Nagy, 2018). Another more indirect manifestation of issue ownership is how government campaigns inspired fear among the Hungarian population. 22% of respondents to a survey research –26% Fidesz voters and 19% Jobbik voters – expressed very serious fears from the idea that more migrants would move to Hungary (Bíró-Nagy, 2018).

In the case of the Stop Soros legislative package, no reference was made to the earlier policy proposal of Jobbik, and so the government took ownership of this policy issue.

Electoral gains/losses

Issue salience increased, the issue positions converged, and issue ownership was at least partially moved to the Fidesz, while the electoral support for Jobbik continue to remain around 20% in both 2014 and 2018. At the same time, the support for Fidesz increased from 44% to 49% of the votes from 2014 to 2018. In terms of Fidesz’s and Jobbik’s attitude towards European integration between 2015 and 2019, the parties have which sides. While Jobbik was a hard Eurosceptic parties in the early 2010, Fidesz is now the more Eurosceptic party of the two (see chapter 7). However, it appears that Fidesz’s strategic calculations were not to its detriment. One of the explanations for the solid electoral support for both parties is that on numerous fronts, they were not directly competing with each other. Gessler et al. (2019) found that voting behaviour among ring-
wing voters was conditional on whether these voters had been exposed to the migration crisis of 2015: “[R]ight-wing voters in settlements exposed to the crisis punished the ruling party at the polls by voting for an alternative anti-refugee party, while elsewhere Fidesz expanded its support” (2019, 17).

Conclusion

Do the theoretical expectations of the accommodative strategy of the Policy Ownership Salience (POS) match the actual developments in Hungary’s migration policy since 2015? Differently put, does the Hungarian case study support Hypothesis C1 – Mainstream parties will use an accommodative party strategy in reaction to the electoral success of Eurosceptic niche parties?

As the case study shows, Fidesz’s party strategy was accommodative in that it took over the policy positions that Jobbik had put forward earlier. This accommodative strategy was largely successful. Table 16 shows that the predictions match the developments of all the dimensions. Nonetheless, in terms of the effects on salience, ownership and electoral support for the niche party, these effects are modest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Issue salience</th>
<th>Issue position</th>
<th>Issue ownership</th>
<th>Niche party electoral support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Increased, then decreased slightly</td>
<td>Converged</td>
<td>Transfer to mainstream party</td>
<td>Decreased slightly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodative</td>
<td>Increases</td>
<td>Converged</td>
<td>Transfers to mainstream party</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Meguid, 2008 and own calculations.

One of the reasons for the modest impact of Fidesz’s strategy on the electoral support for Jobbik could be that Jobbik voters were less fearful of migration than Fidesz voters. According to survey data, after the feeling of uncertainty Fidesz voters were most fearful of migration, while Jobbik voters were more concerned with an uncertain future, their financial situation and diseases, and fear of migration was the fourth most mentioned concern (Boros and Laki, 2018). Furthermore, Jobbik actively campaigned against Fidesz, attributing massive political corruption to the government party (Szabo, 2015). Therefore, those Jobbik voters who hold right-wing views on migration, Russia and the plight of the Hungarians living abroad will be deterred from voting on Fidesz, since Fidesz is considered corrupt.
8.3.3. Coalition bargaining

Since 2010, the Hungarian government is led by the permanent alliance of Fidesz and KDNP. KDNP is a party that is in a permanent alliance with Fidesz since 2006 and is therefore not considered a separate political party. Therefore, Fidesz and KDNP are not considered coalition parties, and coalition bargaining would become a manifestation of intra-party conflict and not inter-party conflict. However, the Fidesz-KDNP government has not been in need to seek coalition partners, since they won the elections in 2010, 2014 and 2018 receiving more than 60% of the seats in parliament.

However, there have been some studies on coalition bargaining in Hungary that focus on the pre-2010 period. For instance, Péter Horváth (2015) studied coalition formations in Hungary from 1998 to 2006, and finds that campaign pledges, irrespective of the party, do not come back in the coalition agreements in Hungary at all, save three pledges of 1711 that were made by all the coalitions partners of the three coalitions under investigation. Contrasting results are found by Dobos and Gyulai, who conducted a content analysis of the party manifestos of major political parties in Hungary for the 1998, 2002 and 2006 election cycles. According to their data, the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition fulfilled fewer pledges than opposition party Fidesz (39% versus 46%) (2015). As for the salience of the EU, about 7% of all pledges in 2006 were related to the European Union. In 2006 the amount of pledges referring to EU policies, categorised under adaptation, amounted to 16% of the total amount of EU pledges among the Fidesz, MSZP and SZDSZ.

Moury and Timmermans (2013) highlighted the relevance of inter-party conflicts as part of the coalition bargaining game. In terms of inter-party conflicts, these have occurred in Hungary, with the SZDSZ leaving the government in 2008 over economic policy, since then-Prime Minister Gyurcsány did not back economic reforms (Palonen, 2009: 328; Szakacs and Chance, 2008). However, SZDSZ stated that it would not call for elections, and continue to support the government, albeit in parliament and not in government.

49 While formally it is a political alliance, with the parties having their own fractions and are just different political entities (Ondré, 2012), there is almost a complete overlap in the voting behaviour in parliament (Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2018).
Since coalition bargaining did not take place in Hungary between 2015 and 2020, the period under investigation in the Hungarian case study, this section is therefore concluded, and the below hypotheses remain answered.

**Hypothesis B1**: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on policy is a product of the formation weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition bargaining process.

**Hypothesis B2**: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on policy is a product of the coalition weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition bargaining process.

### 8.3.4. Parliamentary oversight

In this last section of the analysis of the Hungarian case, we will look at the parliamentary oversight activities of the Hungarian parliament on the EU-related dimensions of migration policy. The principal-agent theory will be put to the test in the Hungarian case study. However, a more extensive overview of parliamentary scrutiny in Hungary in the 2010s will help to provide the context under which opposition parties can use parliament for scrutiny purposes.

**Formal parliamentary oversight tools**

Karlas compared the parliamentary control of EU affairs in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 2010s and finds that Hungary had among the strongest parliaments in terms of parliamentary power, legislative activities and participation rights, yet notes that differences between its institutional strength and the actual practical strength (2011: 268-269). However, since then, the role of the national parliament decreased, while the Hungarian Parliament has seen an increased dedication to the EU (Ilonszki, 2015: 531). The national executive has become more centralised, while the Hungarian government has been making more use of (exceptional) special procedures and omnibus package bills. With a 2/3 majority, the Hungarian government party can pass most legislative proposals through parliament. This overwhelming power has decreased the grip of parliament on Hungarian government activity and significantly diminished parliamentary oversight and control. Special procedures shorten the time between proposal and implementation by factor 7, while exceptional special procedures speed up the adoption of bills by factor 12 (Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2018). Despite these limitations, opposition parties have remained
active in parliament in terms of proposing legislation and using interpellations, despite the (very) limited policy impact the parties formally have in parliament (Idem.: 162-163).

In terms of the institutional dimension, EU affairs in the Hungarian parliament are by and large conducted by parliamentary committees, particularly in the European Affairs Committee (EAC). The EAC scrutinises government activity on EU matters and makes procedural decisions. An earlier dual-report system in the EAC, whereby both a government and opposition MP were assigned to report on given issues has been reserved (Ilonszki, 2015). In terms of the practical oversight activities and strength, whether the EAC will receive an explanation of the Hungarian government’s position on draft EU legislation will depend on the readiness of the latter to do so (Ibid). In case EAC members want to initiate a scrutiny procedure, a 40% threshold needs to be reached; something which is a rarity given the 2/3 majority of the government party and the degree of polarisation among the opposition parties (Ibid). Summarising, Ilonszki observes that while other standing committees are involved in scrutinising the government’s EU activities, “the EAC enjoys a particular place in establishing the official standpoint on the government’s proposals, and could do so without the opinion of the standing committee on the given policy area” (Ibid.: 537); making the EAC the most important platform for EU affairs in the Hungarian parliament.

A legislative change in November 2019 further consolidated the scrutinising capacity of parliament to the EAC. Until then the Prime Minister was obliged to inform the Hungarian Parliament of Hungary’s position following a European Council summit. When PM Orbán failed to do so in July 2019 (by not showing up) (Kálmán, 2019), members of Fidesz-KDNP proposed a legislative change which would oblige the prime minister to inform the “standing council of European affairs” instead of the whole parliament (Kocsis et al., 2019). This proposal entered into force on 10 December 2019.

Three factors have led to an increase in the salience of EU affairs in the Hungarian Parliament. Firstly, the economic crisis led to more dialogue at the EU level, which spilled over into the domestic arena. Secondly, the changing attitude of the government towards the EU made it the EU a more salient issue, since that polarised the EU on the Hungarian political scene. Thirdly, the electoral success of (then) hard Eurosceptic Jobbik also generated more debate about the EU (Ilonszki, 2015: 542-543).

However, Ilonszki did not consider the Hungarian Parliament to be a full-fledged policy shaper in 2015. Despite the formal institutions in place, these formal structures are often subordinated to informal and political practice. “After all, the Hungarian Parliament
is not a genuine forum for public scrutiny. Expert orientation and policy-shaping features seem still to feature in the scrutiny process. It is arguable that the Hungarian Parliament is a truncated policy shaper” (Idem: 545).

This overview was longer than for the Dutch Parliament because the actual formal oversight capabilities of opposition parties in the Hungarian Parliament are very limited. Since Fidesz-KDNP has a two-third majority, it can change the Hungarian Fundamental Law (Alaptörvény) when it sees fit, let alone pass legislation which requires a simple majority. Fidesz MPs failing to submit their vote are punished by the party. When a Fidesz MP voted against the party line in 2014 by abstaining on two proposals and voting against a third, János Bencsik was fined 1000 euros (Index.hu, 2014). Since then, no MP of the party voted against legislative proposals of the party.

Parliamentary pressure in Hungary 2015-2020

The one occasion where it is clear that Jobbik used parliament to shape the government’s migration policy was when it asked the government to call a referendum on the relocation scheme for migrants in September 2015 (Vona, 2015b), to which the government responded that such an issue is not referendable, since the Fundamental Law states that issues to which Hungary is bound by international treaties cannot be subject to a referendum (Mandiner, 2016a). In reaction to the government’s response, Jobbik proposed to change the constitution to enable a referendum on issues to which Hungary has international obligations on 23 February 2016 (Parlament.hu, 2016). The next day, Prime Minister Orbán declared that a referendum would take place on the relocation scheme (Mandiner, 2016b). One should take note of the fact that Fidesz had a favourable position towards the proposal of Jobbik. Fidesz did not have to give in to any demands or pressure of Jobbik to accept the proposal. Its parliamentary mandate allowed it to change the constitution when it saw fit.

Principal-agent theory

In terms of the principal-agent theory and Smeets and De Ruiter’s scrutiny ladder, it was Jobbik as principal that provided instructions to the Fidesz government on how to proceed with the migrant relocation scheme. According to Smeets and De Ruiter (2018), providing instructions is the most extensive scrutiny step with the highest demands on the MP/party in question. The agent, the government, initially dismissed the proposal but then declared the proposal as its own, presenting the referendum on a separate occasion, without
As mentioned in the previous section, Fidesz adopted Jobbik’s policy proposal because it deemed it an appropriate measure, not because it was dependent on Jobbik’s support in parliament.

All in all, the overwhelming majority of the government party made parliament particularly weak in putting pressure on the government. There were instances during the rule of the Fidesz that the government decided to drop legislative proposals, though those were more the result of Hungarian society taking to the streets. One such instance was the proposal to introduce an internet tax in October 2014, where tens of thousands of people took to the street after the government proposed this tax on the 21 October. The proposal was scrapped ten days later (BBC.com, 2014).

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the influence through parliamentary oversight in Hungary is marginal, which does not mean that opposition parties are not vocal within parliament (Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2018). In terms of Jobbik’s influence on the Hungarian government, this does not appear to be confined to the parliamentary setting. The overwhelming dominance of Fidesz in parliament, and the legal changes further curbing the parliamentary oversight capabilities (Ilonszki, 2015) makes the influence of opposition parties through parliament questionable. Nonetheless, the case study addressed Jobbik’s parliamentary questions directed at Hungary regarding its idea of holding a referendum on the migrant quota system, and Jobbik did instruct the government. The government subsequently took over Jobbik’s position. However, the motivation of Fidesz to take over Jobbik’s proposal is instead explained by the contagion effect.

**Hypothesis P1**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party asks parliamentary questions as a way to modestly shape policy.

**Hypothesis P2**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party takes up an alternative position as a way to moderately shape policy.

**Hypothesis P3**: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party provides the government party with instructions as a way to significantly shape policy.

Therefore, while the Hungarian case study finds support of parties in parliament asking parliamentary questions, taking up alternative positions and giving instructions, these appear to be motivated of setting the public and not as actually influence the Hungarian government, captured well by Várnagy and Ilonski: “After 2010 political deliberation lost its importance on the floor. While the new actors struggled to “use” the parliamentary floor as a forum for debate, for policy alternatives and/or a space for
scrutiny, the predominant government’s main aim, that is, a second regime change via fundamental institutional changes, did not allow room for these attempts. After 2010 the balance of power was not altered but abolished” (2018: 166).

8.4. Closing remarks

Chapter 8 described the second case study, meant to test the explanatory power of the three causal mechanisms in answering how Eurosceptic parties influence the EU policies of member states. The conditions for influence are rather different in the Hungarian and Dutch cases. First of all, the government party in Hungary developed an unambiguously Eurosceptic attitude since 2015 and became the most Eurosceptic party in the Hungarian parliament in 2018-2019. Jobbik moderated its attitude towards the European Union, since then, which became most pronounced during the EP elections of 2019.

As for the three causal mechanisms, coalition bargaining was not part of the analysis, since Fidesz and KDNP are considered a single party – they have been in a permanent coalition since 2006 – they were the only government party in Hungary since 2010. The accommodative strategy of Bonnie Meguid’s POS theory nicely explains the Fidesz’s actual behaviour, though the electoral loss of Jobbik not did happen. Lastly, the Hungarian parliament was the political arena through which Jobbik had instructed Fidesz to call a referendum, using the most demanding scrutiny tool (providing instructions) for that purpose.

Important conditions for the success policy influence of the Eurosceptic policy in the case of the Hungarian government’s EU policy:

1. As party with (close to) two-third majority in parliament since 2010, Fidesz was not constrained by domestic party competition, as long as the legislation did not lead to outrage among the Hungarian public or did not receive too much criticism from international actors, mainly the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Even proceedings against the Hungarian government did not always deter the government.

2. The government party had an anti-immigration agenda, therefore making it susceptible to the even more restrictive immigration policy of the far-right niche party. This offered Jobbik the opportunity to shape government policy, as Jobbik’s proposals could be seen as a kind of testing ground (Enyedi and Róna, 2018).
3. Like in the Dutch case, the most salient policy issue for this Eurosceptic party, immigration policy, was a relatively salient issue among the public, making it a policy area to invest in. Immigration policy is an omnibus issue for the European far-right which has a strong European dimension to it, and it often coupled with European integration (see Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Fennema, 1997).
9. Conclusions and conditions for successful influence

What is the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states? That is the question this dissertation started with, and it will end with an answer to this question. For the purpose, three policy items were analysed and discussed in the case of the Netherlands – the Dublin Agreement, and the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives – and two in the case of Hungary – the rejection of the migration quota system and the Stop Soros legislative bills. Table 17 summarises the support of the hypotheses for the Dutch and Hungarian case studies, as a measurement of how well the three theoretical frameworks explain the influence of the Eurosceptic parties on EU policies of Hungary and the Netherlands.

In the Netherlands, the government parties VVD and CDA used accommodative party strategies to counter the influence of the PVV, meaning these party converged their migration policies towards that of the more restrictive PVV. As for the success of the accommodative strategy, that success is more modest. Concretely, while the policy convergence took place, the VVD and CDA were not able to increase the issue salience of migration and did not transfer issue ownership over migration away from the PVV.
The latter maintained the overwhelming ownership over migration policy. While the PVV did experience a decrease in electoral support, this is more likely to have been a consequence of the fact that most parliamentary parties boycotted the PVV during the 2012 elections over the fall of the Rutte I cabinet.

As for Hungary, the Fidesz government similarly used an accommodative strategy, thereby taking over some of Jobbik’s policy proposals and increase the salience of immigration. At the same time, Fidesz was able to take ownership of the referendum on the migrant quota system and the criminalisation of supporting asylum seekers (the Stop Soros legislative bills). One of the reasons why Fidesz could claim ownership over these issues is the pro-government domination of the media landscape (Bátorfy and Urbán, 2020). However, in terms of the electoral losses expected for Jobbik, these did not materialise. It is likely that much of Jobbik’s constituency supports Jobbik and not Fidesz, because these voters consider Fidesz corrupt (Szabo, 2015).

Regarding the support for the formation and coalition weight in coalition bargaining, the Dutch case study offered mostly indirect evidence of the PVV shaping the coalition agreement of the Rutte I government. Regarding the formation phase, the proposals in the coalition agreement that focused on halting or strongly curbing the inflow of migrants and asylum seekers was much encouraged by the PVV. Also, the indirect influence of the PVV on the coalition agreement is the fact that 16% of the coalition agreement discusses migration policy, that is even 43% for the support agreement. As for the coalition phase, evidence was found for the influence of the SGP on the government’s policies, specifically regarding conditioning family reunification on being married or having a registered partnership. That ended up as a negotiated policy item, though it was not part of the programmes of either VVD, CDA or PVV, but only of the SGP. The SGP became the government’s silent supporter, after the government lost its majority in the Eerste Kamer (Senate) in March 2011.

As mentioned earlier, the Fidesz-KDNP is considered to be a single party and therefore not a coalition.

Lastly, the support of the hypotheses of parliamentary oversight is conditional in the case of the Netherlands and virtually absent in the case of Hungary. The PVV was in a unique arrangement as parliamentary supporter, which allowed it to take part in the weekly ministerial meetings with the prime minister without having ministerial responsibilities. This way, the PVV had disproportionately more information than the other parliamentary parties, allowing it to instruct the government on a course of action,
in line with the agreements between the itself and the government. On the other hand, in Hungary the opposition’s parliamentary oversight tools have been marginalised, and the overwhelming (super)majority of Fidesz in parliament incapacitates the opposition in parliament.

In terms of the causal mechanisms, these should be considered as complementary to one another, helping to explain the ways in which Eurosceptic parties can shape the EU policies of member states.

Table 18 summarises the main results of the empirical case studies, in terms of the policy changes that occurred and the strength and conditions of the value of the theories used. In several cases, there are conditions to the success policy influence of the Eurosceptic party on the EU policies in the Netherlands and Hungary. The main points are reproduced here.

| Table 18: Policy change and explanatory power of theories in the case studies |
|---|---|
| **Netherlands** | **Hungary** |
| **Policy change** | Second-order change: For all three policy items, the instruments change, while the goals remained the same. |
| | Third-order policy: since the goals and instruments changed. A paradigm shift from a common European approach to a national one. |
| **POS theory (contagion effect)** | Partial: Theoretical expectations of accommodative strategy do not explain actual developments. |
| | - Issue salience ↓ instead of ↑ |
| | - No effect on issue ownership |
| | - But electoral outcome correct, ↓ |
| | Strong: Mainstream party used accommodative strategy to transfer issue ownership from niche party and marginal niche party electorally. |
| **Formation and coalition weight (coalition bargaining)** | Strong, but indirect: Many immigration items of parliamentary supporters ended up as policy output. PVV held a very strong bargaining position towards Rutte I, SGP after March 2011 also had influence. |
| | None: One government party, no coalition. |
| **Principal-agent theory (parliamentary oversight)** | Strong, but conditional: For the parliamentary supporters, as principals, the delegation was successful and provided instructions to the agent. The disproportionate influence of the PVV as principal was conditioned on the limited information asymmetry, since it took part in weekly cabinet meetings. |
| | Hardly: Two-thirds majority government, power in parliament practically unchallenged. Only in the case of widespread demonstrations was the principal able to put significant pressure on the agent. |

In the case of the Netherlands, the coalition structure of the Rutte I government was particularly favourable for the Eurosceptic party influence on EU policies, for the following reasons:
1. The hard Eurosceptic PVV became a parliamentary supporter of the government, *with* a prominent political position and in close contact with the government parties – participating in the weekly meeting of the ministers and prime ministers – but *without* ministerial responsibilities and accountability.

2. Under Rutte I, and due to the role of the hard Eurosceptic PVV, one of the most salient policy issues for the PVV – immigration policy – was also relatively salient for the public. Therefore, immigration policy became a policy area to invest in. For the PVV immigration policy is often seen directly linked to the negative aspects of the EU, as it is an omnibus issue for the European far-right, and it often coupled with European integration (see Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Fennema, 1997).

3. The CDA and the VDD had been moving towards a more restrictive immigration policy during the early 2000s as well (Akkerman, 2018). Therefore, these mainstream parties were susceptible to the more restrictive immigration policy proposals of the PVV as well.

4. Earlier research found that immigration flows are positively correlated with the electoral support of the PVV (Dennison et al., 2017). Therefore, the PVV’s participation in the Rutte I cabinet also allowed parties like the VVD and CDA to experiment with stricter immigration policies, that would have been considered controversial otherwise.

These conditions and consequences created a more favourable climate for the hard Eurosceptic PVV to influence or shape the EU policies of the Netherlands regarding immigration. It is less likely that other salient EU policy dimensions, like the environmental policy of the EU, the PVV would become a major influence. The PVV lacks the issue ownership is that case. On the other hand, on based this research, it is likely that a Eurosceptic left-wing party like the SP, might be able to shape government policy on financial matters, conditioned it is somehow embedded into government. The PVV’s one foot in and one foot out of the government appeared to be a defining factor in its propensity to shape the government’s EU-related migration policy.

In the case of Hungary, important conditions and consequences for the success policy influence of Eurosceptic Jobbik on the Fidesz government were the following:

1. With a supermajority (most of the time) in parliament since 2010, Fidesz was weakly constrained by domestic party competition, conditioned that policies were not too controversial for too much of the Hungarian public. In the case of the
migrant quota system, the Hungarian government remained undeterred by the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union that Hungary violated EU law by not participating in the migrant quota system (Kormány.hu, 2020).

2. The Fidesz-KDNP government had an anti-immigration agenda, therefore making it susceptible to the even more restrictive immigration policy of the far-right niche party. This offered Jobbik the opportunity to shape government policy, as Jobbik’s proposals could be seen as a kind of testing ground (Enyedi and Róna, 2018).

3. Similar to the Dutch case study, immigration policy was a very salient for the Eurosceptic parties but also among the public. However, contrary to the Dutch case, Fidesz increased the salience of immigration (Bíró-Nagy, 2018).

Jobbik may be considered the only political competitor for voters on the right side of the political spectrum in Hungary under the period of investigation (Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2018). This potential competitor might have encouraged the Fidesz government to adopt an accommodative strategy to Jobbik’s immigration proposals, in to mitigate the risk of Jobbik’s electoral growth.

9.1. Generalisability

In terms of the generalisability of the results to order policy areas and member states, some considerations are in place. First, the fact that both case studies focused on immigration policy is not a coincidence. Immigration has been among the most salient issues in EU member states over the last decade or so (European Commission, n.d.b). Second, party competition on European integration manifests itself along GAL-TAN lines, where TAN parties cherish anti-immigration sentiments and are Eurosceptic on the grounds of national and cultural identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). Especially the most Eurosceptic parties tend to be on TAN parties. Third, on the EU level, numerous dossiers related to immigration policy are specific enough for tracing policy changes, while remaining a part of high politics. These factors have made immigration policy the obvious candidate for investigation.

Another policy issue that is starting to become salient in the EU is climate change. It also fits the GAL-TAN party competition and has the balance between high politics

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50 GAL stands for Green/ alternative/libertarian and “combines ecology (or Greenness), alternative politics (including participatory democracy), and libertarianism”; while its opposite is TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalism) and “combines support for traditional values, opposition to immigration, and defense of the national community” (Hooghe et al., 2008: 976).
and detail and has a clear European dimension which can be both Eurosceptic and Europhile. Again a Dutch example, the two hard Eurosceptic parties (FvD and PVV) in the Netherlands deny climate change, while the “greenest” Dutch party GroenLinks has a Europhile agenda. Therefore, migration policy is not per se sui generis, though few issue areas are salient enough for parties to invest significant resources.

A second dimension to consider when looking at the generalisability of the results pertain to the conditions described in the Dutch and Hungarian cases above. In the Netherlands, the arrangement for the hard Eurosceptic PVV as parliamentary supporter of the Rutte I government allowed it to benefit from (1) less information asymmetry than the other opposition parties and (2) the precarious situation of the government parties, where the PVV had the bargaining card of threatening to let the government fall, which it eventually did over disagreements in April 2012 (Van Keken, 2011b; Parlement.com, 2012c).

A similar coalition structure can be found in Denmark, where the Eurosceptic and far-right Danish People’s Party served as parliamentary supporter of three governments in Denmark, in 2001, 2011 and 2015 (Christiansen, 2016). Christiansen similarly stated that: “From that position [the DF] could seek policy influence through bargaining, perhaps from a strengthened position in number of seats and on more policy issues” (94). Therefore, Eurosceptic parties that are able to serve as parliamentary supporter are likely to play a larger role in influencing the EU policies of their respective governments.

The Hungarian case study shows that the overwhelming representation of one government party, and changes to the Constitution and of the electoral districts, and curbing the political opposition’s opportunities to represent themselves adequately in public – through the media – and in parliament, allows the government to maintain dominance in Hungary, thereby marginalising the possibilities of the opposition to influence the government’s EU policies. Nevertheless, the electoral successes of Jobbik in 2014 and 2018 are likely to have played a role in the government’s shift to the right. As Enyedi and Róna (2018) argue, Fidesz is likely to have used Jobbik’s policy proposals also as a way of experimenting with more radical nativist positions, which turned out to have been successful.

In no other country in the European Union have strong nationalist parties won with which a majority (68% of the votes) (BBC, 2019). However, the Law and Justice Party in Poland is a party that also challenges the interpretation of the EU’s values of the rule of law and departs from liberal democracy like the Fidesz government in Hungary
does (see e.g. Halmai, 2019). That might increase the likelihood of other Eurosceptic parties in Poland to shape the EU policies of Poland, in case the Law and Justice Party finds sees potentially electoral gains from doing so, and is thereby able to marginalise the opposition party.

Beyond these more specific considerations, two further distinctions should be made between the generalisability of the Dutch and Hungarian case studies across other cases. Firstly, the distinction between majoritarian and consensus systems of government is likely to have an important on the effects of opposition parties on government. Consensus systems facilitate coordination amongst parliamentary stakeholders while majoritarian systems facilitate a confrontational attitude between parliament and government (Gallagher et al., 2006: 62).

A final consideration for the generalisability of the results of this research relates to how party competition is played out differently in Western Europe and Central and Eastern European countries. The historical trajectory of the countries in CEE, the post-Communist era started a process of economic modernisation and democratisation, coupled with a parallel socio-cultural process that introduced a plurality of value-systems in society (Pytlas, 2016: 4-5). These processes led to much weaker party bonds and societal attachment in CEE, which “has forced parties to compete over a much bigger cohort of voters than would be the case with strong, traditionally separate loyalties” (Ibid.: 6).

9.2. European policies without Eurosceptic politics?

In this study, the focus has been on the policy implications of the presence of Eurosceptic parties in the domestic political arena. With the use of theories of party competition, coalition politics and parliamentary oversight to analyse the case studies, it has become clear that the policy impact of Eurosceptic parties is only possible when policy areas are politicised, and so when politics enters the equation (De Wilde, 2011). In the absence of high politics, the political benefits into an issue will not be able to outweigh the costs, as the interconnected nature of the vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking behaviour of political parties attests (Müller and Strøm, 1999).
Appendices

I. Policy-level Euroscepticism in 2019 in the Netherlands and Hungary

The Netherlands

Table 19: Policy-level Euroscepticism 2019 in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>CU/SGP</th>
<th>D66</th>
<th>DENK</th>
<th>PvdD</th>
<th>GL</th>
<th>PvdA</th>
<th>PvdD</th>
<th>PVV</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>VVD</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers proportionally (q11)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change (q26)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU army (q23)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enlargement (q10)</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development aid (q3)</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian sanctions (q9, -1)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>-1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimum wage (q14)</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stay in Euro (q15)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>-1</td>
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<td>Role European Public Prosecutor's Office (q20)</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = integration, 0 = neutral, -1 = less/no integration/cooperation

Source: [https://eu.stemwijzer.nl](https://eu.stemwijzer.nl)
Table A.1 lists the attitudes of political parties in 2019 towards ten specific salient policy issues related to the European Union. In terms of general trends, the Europhile parties (D66, GL and the PvdA) do support most of the issues for deeper and broader European integration, as expected from the classification by Vollaard and Voerman. Unexpectedly, the new party DENK has the most Europhile positions compared to the others. D66 is not in favour of a Wage Union, while GroenLinks and PvdA do not favour an EU army. On the other side of the spectrum, the hard Eurosceptic PVV and FvD positioning themselves against cooperation on all policy areas. The CDA, SP and VVD do not have an outspoken pro- or anti-European attitude but have more specific objections. The biggest government party is, and historically has been, against an EU army, is against a Wage Union and does not want an EU-level coordination of development aid.

Regarding further enlargement and the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, it has not developed a clear position. CDA has similar positions as the VVD but is against enlargement and the EPPO. The SP, with its social democratic character, does want a Wage Union, but is against the continued sanctions on Russia. PvdD, the Animal Rights Party, is critical of the proportional distribution of asylum seekers, and does not want further enlargement of the EU, is against an EU army and the EPPO, and prefers a national approach to development aid. Lastly, the senior party 50+ is only against an EU army and further enlargement.

All in all, the positioning of parties towards the EU is mostly in line with the expectations, though the categorisation of Europragmatism and soft Euroscepticism does not necessarily match in several policy areas. For instance, the SP scores higher than the CDA in terms of support for European integration on policy areas, but the CDA is categorised as a Europragmatic party, while the SP is categorised as a soft Eurosceptic party. However, the categorisations were not initially developed for that aim, the underlying logic of the Taggart and Szczerbiak categorisation, extended by Vollaard and Voerman, is the overall attitude towards the EU, whereas looking at the support for policy areas captures the concrete positions of parties towards those policy areas.

Hungary

Table A.2 shows the scores of the political parties competing during the 2019 EP elections on ten salient policy issues. First, it can be seen that the Europhile parties (MSZP, DK and Momentum) are in favour of cooperation and European integration on all the items
in the list. Note that Párbeszéd is not added to the table, since Volkskabin excluded the party from its analysis. However, the party would likely have a score similar to those of the other Europhile parties. Secondly, also as expected, LMP holds a slightly more critical view of European integration. It is against a European coordination of development aid, and they do not wish to introduce the Euro in the next ten years. Thirdly, Jobbik clearly did not pursue a hard Eurosceptic agenda in 2019, as opposed to the early 2010s. It

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fidesz</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>LMP</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Momentum</th>
<th>Jobbik</th>
<th>Mi-Hazánk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers proportionally (q10)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change (q3)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU army (q8)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement Balkans by ‘25 (q33)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development aid (q9)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>Russian sanctions</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage (q14)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro within 10y (q28)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty pressure (q38, -1)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rights (q26)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Public Prosecutor's Office (q29)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = integration, 0 = only cooperation, -1 = less/no integration/cooperation
* Párbeszéd was excluded from the survey and is thus not included here.

favours common approaches to climate change, development aid, social policy, setting a minimum wage, introducing the Euro within ten years, and joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. However, they are against EU enlargement with the West Balkans by 2025, oppose the sanctions on Russia and finds that Hungary’s sovereignty has been compromised too much. Fourthly, Mi-Hazánk is a truly hard Eurosceptic party, but favours the introduction of a country-specific minimum wage and supports that the EU should set stricter targets to reduce CO2 emissions. Lastly, the government party Fidesz has the most deviating positions on EU-related matters. It does not support the EU setting stricter targets for CO2 emission reductions and does not support the introduction of the Euro by 2029. It wants an enlargement of the Balkans by 2025 but is against the Russian sanctions. Fidesz favours a strengthening of the CFSP and supports a European army.

All in all, none of the results are particularly surprising, although the change in the attitude of Jobbik towards the EU is pronounced. The sections 7.2 and 7.3 will review the Euroscepticism of Jobbik and Fidesz, since Jobbik started as a hard-Eurosceptic party in the late 2000s. Mi-Hazánk is a party that was established in 2018 by former Jobbik politician László Toroczkai. Since it does not have any parliamentary representation and is so new, it will be excluded from a more detailed review.
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