CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST

WEAVING THE TAPESTRY OF LIFE

The United Nations and Global Governmentality

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Supervisor: Anita Szűcs, PhD
Associate Professor

Dorottya Mendly

Budapest, 2019

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Table of Contents

List of tables, diagrams and illustrations

Abbreviations

AC	Agency Construction
AR	Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization
CGG	Commission on Global Governance
CISS	Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
DA	Discourse Analysis
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations *(Department of Peace Operations, or DPO since 1 January 2019)*
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EOSG	Executive Office of the Secretary-General
GA	General Assembly
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IGS	International Governmentality Studies
IO	International Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SC	Security Council
SG	Secretary-General
SD	Self-definition
ORCI	Office for Research and the Collection of Information
PCUN	Preparatory Commission of the United Nations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UN	United Nations
UNU	United Nations University

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Changes in perception and attitudes, of which we have had pronounced signs since the last session of the General Assembly suggest that we may be witnessing a transition, however slow or occasionally uncertain, towards a new pattern of relationships at the global level. The transition has the logic of necessity behind it. It is certainly justified by the insupportable cost and the incalculable dangers of a self-perpetuating arms race. It could derive support from the realization that security cannot be viewed in military terms alone nor does the application of military power resolve situations in traditionally expected ways. It is, or can be, propelled by the need for greater attention to the problems of economic modernization or to the social problems that economic growth has left untouched. It is evidenced by trends towards horizontal co-operation between States adhering to different social systems without prejudice to their political alignments. It would seem to respond to the multi-polarity of the world's economic power. All these factors, combined with the technological revolution and the sense of global interdependence, seem to call for radical adjustments of outlook on the part of the world's leadership. There is, of course, no guarantee against temporary reverses, or setbacks in the process, nor can ambivalence in the relationships of power blocs be excluded. However, the direction appears to be better set and helped by weightier factors now than at any time in recent years. How this transition will affect the United Nations and how it has been affected by the United Nations are questions of practical import that merit the most serious reflection on our part.

(Javier Pérez de Cuéllar: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1988: 3)

I. INTRODUCTION

People tend to look for comprehensive answers to their big questions, for definite frameworks through which they can make sense of chaos and bring regularity to irregular reality. Global governance is held to be a tool for such quests in the field of International Relations (IR), a lens through which one can look at global relations and decode the actors and mechanisms in play, implying that there is a strong regularity (strong enough to refer to it as 'governance') in how public affairs are handled on this level. The view that something important changed in in the logic of world politics grew to be a widespread conviction, especially following the end of the Cold War. In a similar vein as in the above introductory quote, the United Nations (UN) has often been identified as not only being affected by, but also as affecting the directions of change. 'Change' in the logic of world politics and the UN as a subject in this have been brought together in how people think and talk about global governance ever since.

How come that these dots seem so prone to be connected? How exactly should they be connected to make sense? Why do existing explanations – about change, about the UN, about global governance, and especially about their interrelations – seem so often misplaced?[1] Many such questions have remained obscure so far, which realization led me to do my own research on the matter. In the early 21st century, making sense of a changing world seems to be an increasingly intriguing, although challenging task which many addressed before me. As demonstrated by some symbolic attempts: Ruggie asked what made the world hang together in the end of the 20th century (Ruggie, 1998a), and a good ten years later, scholars were still concerned with similar questions, asking who governed the globe (Avant et al., 2010; Sell, 2013). With a concept as broad and flexible as global governance, saying either too little or too much is hard to avoid. In the followings, I will try to avoid it anyway, by mapping the exact relationship the world organization has with

[1] A main line in the literature see the UN as a playground of (powerful) nation states, which thus has a say in how global governance looks like. The third part of the problem – change in the logic of world politics – is way underrated in such accounts. Others stress this aspect by focusing on norms and normative processes in global governance, the UN's (and other international organizations') role in creating and diffusing norms – emphasizing change, but they tend to say less about power as a factor to count with (see explained Neumann and Sending, 2007). Another influential approach shares this latter shortcoming by neutralizing the concept of global governance and treating the UN as a 'manager' in its complex networks, and thus asking questions, which are hollow in this sense (Weiss and Thakur, 2010). The list of problematic approaches could go on – they will be discussed in detail in chapters II/2 and 3.

the changing logic of world politics, organized around the discourse of global governance. I am interested first and foremost in its cognitive structure and how the UN sits in it and informs it in the same time.

These elements are argued to be entangled in a set of complex relationships, the unravelling of which is the primary goal of my project. The terms which I use to describe the parts of the puzzle are: the UN's subjectivity, the discourse of global governance, and the modern political rationalities, which latter accounts for the changing 'logic' of world politics. I assume that it is the discourse of global governance which integrates the other parts under its 'order of knowledge', and has the capacity to embed the research question in a broader debate on the changing character of world politics. The below figure helps in visualizing the research problem and its interrelated parts:



Figure 1. Main operational parts of the puzzle

It is essential to elaborate on each of these elements carefully and separately, but it should be stressed already at this point that the analytical focus is on the arrows, symbolizing their interrelations: the global governance discourse affecting the UN's subjectivity and the political rationalities, the UN's subjectivity construction affecting the global governance discourse and the political rationalities, and political rationalities affecting the UN's subjectivity construction and the global governance discourse. While each of these constitutive parts is discussed on the following pages, the most interesting points are where these discussions link to each other, forming an understanding of how the UN,

along with the shifts in political rationality structure the discourse of global governance, and *vice versa*.

After this brief sketch, rightful questions might start to take shape in the reader: What do these abstract formulations really mean? Is the claim that I link the UN so tightly to change and to global governance justified? What is the new perspective one might gain from combining these elements for understanding? The elaboration of these questions is essentially what this research is set out to accomplish, but for the sake of clarity, the key points are summarized here, divided by the three main concepts:

UN's subjectivity: Very briefly, subjectivity is understood here as a relational Self with the capacity of political action. It is not something pre-existing, but is formed in discourses, where the subject accepts or modifies the possible positions offered to it in a certain discourse (Williams, 2005; Leipold and Winkel, 2017). It links to political rationality and the discourse of global governance through the *kind* of subject the UN is claimed to be by its Secretaries-General throughout its years of existence. It is argued that, as a peculiar international organization, it is 'a perfect governing subject', functioning by the logic of a compound rationality, which is comprehensible only if world politics is thought of in terms of global governance.

Political rationalities: They refer to the broad cognitive frames in which politics might be thought of (Merlingen, 2003; Neumann and Sending, 2010). The kind of subject the UN is, for instance, is only possible in a global governance system. It does not mean that the UN (or international organizations) are the only relevant subjects to consider. But the multiplicity of actors and the multiplicity of forms of interactions that constitute this historically specific order of knowledge (which is global governance), is only imaginable in terms of specific political rationality, a *governmental rationality* on a global level. The plural form of rationality is justified because it is not the only one to consider (see further below).

Discourse of global governance: A discourse is a system of statements organized around an order of knowledge (Foucault, 1972). In this case, statements about global governance are claimed to be organized around an order of knowledge allowing for a certain form of subjectivity (the governing subject) and political rationality (structure of knowledge about 'the international' imagined in terms of government). Outside of this order, the system of

statements simply would not hold. That world politics is imagined according to this combination of structure and agency, was nothing new around the end of the Cold War, but it certainly gained momentum, thanks in large part to the collective efforts put in elaborating the discourse of global governance (see in detail in chapter II). The creation of the UN after the Second World War is, of course, not the only relevant development enabling this outcome, but a significant and indeed symbolic one, which makes it an intriguing object of research.

When it comes to the UN, why the 'self-proclaimed' subjectivity and not, say, the actions of the Organization are analysed? What makes its subjectivity constitutive of the discourse of global governance, when there are so much more which 'come more easily' – from the acts of the Security Council or the International Court of Justice to the forum the General Assembly provides the Member States, or the immensely diverse activities the specialized agencies are engaged in? This approach, again, starts and ends in global governance itself, an idea that is possible only if we imagine a diverse set of actors acting with a certain autonomy on the global scene. What they 'really' do is not as interesting – at least not for this project – as how they can be *thought of as doing*. Subjectivity is put in the centre, for it is usually employed in relation to political action, thanks primarily to the context in which the term became popular around the end of 60s (Henriques et al., 1984). It is the basic condition of political action: referring to a Self, engaging in action. Constructing this 'acting Self' is the first relevant question that one might have in unravelling the puzzle. If world politics was still dominantly imagined as the doing of states (which, importantly, does not mean that it ever *really was*), the question would not arise in the first place. This perceived 'change' is what made this research question possible, as well as relevant: this contiguity has never been addressed before, and thus world politics as global governance has never been interrogated in this light.

The question is, thus, to put it more simply: how has the subjectivity of the UN been constructed in relation to the (discursive and knowledge) structures of global governance? The United Nations is the object in the empirical analysis, since the knowledge/power structure of global governance is argued to be in tight connection with how the Organization – and especially its Secretaries-General – have been constructing, through their narratives, the UN's subjectivity in the past 70 years. The discourse of world politics

as global governance and the UN's subjectivity intertwine in various ways: a link to highlight, according to my argument, are the political rationalities that enabled and informed both on a cognitive level. In a less abstract formulation, I argue that it requires a specific form of rationality to make the construction of subjectivity thinkable in a certain context, and to provide the bases for theoretical innovations such as global governance (while the relationship, one should not forget, is not unidirectional in either sense). I attempt to unfold these phenomena in relation with each other, and argue that they facilitate one another through discursive mechanisms.

As I elaborate my arguments, I clarify these relationships to understand how the UN has acquired its specific subjectivity in its relations with global governance, and how can both (the UN and global governance) be understood in a 'governmentality' framework, a term I summarize briefly further below. What makes this task even more intriguing and challenging is to show that political rationalities (structures of knowledge and power) are not all-determining: importantly, they are also sensitive to certain forms of agency. This relationship can be traced in discourses, and will be analysed here, building on the concept of 'discursive agency', or "an actor's ability to make him/herself a relevant agent in a particular discourse by constantly making choices about whether, where, when, and how to identify with a particular subject position in specific story lines within this discourse" (Leipold and Winkel 2017: 524).

For the broader discipline, the problem presented above remains to be outlined by a mixture of 'what makes the world hang together' and 'who governs the globe'. 'What' refers to the structural side – be them structures of cooperation, interdependence, capitalism or norms – while 'who' interrogates agency – is it the doing of powerful states, international organizations, norm entrepreneurs, the transnational capitalist class or bourgeoning civil networks? The way I formulated my simplified question (how has the subjectivity of the UN been constructed in relation to the structures of global governance) addresses similar problems, but from a definite point of view. It stands on a long and diverse tradition of scholarship when it hypothesises the UN's role (see in detail in chapters II/2 and 3), and a more specific one, when it asks about structures of knowledge (see in chapter III. outlining the methodology). My point is that the two cannot be treated

separately if the above questions are to be answered, and that a promising entry point is to analyse discursive mechanisms.

This already hints that the orientation, approach and methods are somewhat 'irregular', if 'regular' is what is used the most in International Relations. As I elaborate in more detail in chapters II. and III., I build on what is generally described as the post-structuralist approach to IR. A specific branch of this, which specializes in knowledge/power and global governance is called 'global governmentality theory', which is introduced briefly in this Introduction, and in more detail in chapter III. I use this framework because my interpretation of the research problem simply could not be comprehended in more 'traditional' ones. Structures of knowledge and discourses are typical tools for post-structuralist analyses, which have the capacity to reveal very different facets of the puzzle, 'what makes the world hang together so that it looks like someone is governing'. I could not formulate, interpret, or analyse the question focused on knowledge and discourses with realist, liberal, or other 'problem solving' theories' methodologies, and even some of the 'critical theories' (Cox, 1981) tend to have epistemological limitations, which make me not to rely on them too much in my discussions.

The fact that the research builds on a well-defined theoretical framework does not mean, however, that other views are not discussed. The relevance of neo-Gramscian perspectives is, for instance, pointed out on many occasions – be it the shortcomings of the governmentality approach, or building the historical overview. A softer version of constructivism also proved useful in discussing the study of international organizations (IO) as a theoretical antecedent of global governance studies. Prominent constructivist scholars' perspectives of IOs as bureaucratic organizations are also integrated in the empirical chapter, where I analyse interviews. Mainstream approaches – and especially (neo)liberal ones – are present as important elements of the cognitive structure of world politics, and thus they are regularly and critically revisited throughout the chapters. They are not used in the empirical analysis – which could have meant an analytical control in this highly interpretive investigation – because they do not offer any tools or concepts for this, thanks to their different focus and epistemological frame.

What consequences this inquiry might have for the broader discipline, still? For those who do not 'believe in' the post-structuralist assumptions on which this entire work

stands? Reading through this prism, my research after some tedious theoretical discussions, finally arrives at a story of how the UN (more specifically how the Secretary-General) assessed its own relevance, role, and possibilities in the first 70 years of its existence, using the means of the Annual Reports of the Secretaries-General on the Work of the Organization. This work has never been done before. Even the 'epistemologically sceptical' readers can see this process evolving hand in hand with the one in which the scholarly community and policy makers talk more and more about global governance. In these discussions, my sceptical readers might see their assumptions about the role of the UN in global governance justified or not justified, depending on their beliefs. Necessarily, it could give the most to those who are open to see some connection.

They could also ponder on the kinds of categories I used in the analysis, and on the quantitative results I had, showing some interesting trends even without the theoretically loaded interpretation. Finally, they can use these results to try and continue to locate the Secretary-General in international politics, to decipher what exactly he can and should do, and out of this, what he has done so far in the history of the Organization. I would still warn them that this research will not pin down definitively 'what the UN is'. It rather analyses the continuous discursive construction, and is focused on the rules which organize it. In terms of global governance, unfortunately, I cannot offer them anything estimable, as already my working definition would simply be nonsense to them, as I demonstrate below.

To conclude these introductory pages, my questions clearly evolve around how our knowledge of international relations/world politics is shaped in complex processes, infused with power, and how these can be studied with existing analytical tools. It inevitably puts the research in a definite interpretive frame, which draws the limits of validity for the results. This, while it should be declared, does not necessarily have to be a problem: refusing the possibility of doing 'objective' analysis is part of my epistemology. With the necessary steps taken (declaring position in philosophy of science, self-reflection in relation to the analytical steps and results, and a meticulous description of the research method), my research satisfies the requirements of post-positivist social scientific research.

In order to clarify the research problem further at this point, I briefly present what I understand by the term political rationality. In a Foucauldian approach, which serves as the theoretical framework for my study, it is what "delimits the discursive field within which activities are made thinkable" (Merlingen, 2003: 368), "the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualized" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). When political rationalities (and especially the governmental rationality) are claimed to structure the discourse of world politics as global governance, it is important to see what Foucault understood by this. He basically saw two political rationalities characterising the modern era: the 'reason of the state' is more familiar to students of IR, while the 'rationality of government' – a concept he used in various ways, the most common forms being 'governmentality', and the 'liberal art of government' – is somewhat less known. This new form, appearing in the 18th century, shifted the aim of politics within the state to be less about the exercise of sovereign rights, and more about acquiring the 'right disposition of things' to govern societies effectively, cautiously and delicately (Barry et al., 1996).

Foucault saw this as the new norm of politics, and according to his followers, this new norm, as it was internalized by key actors, also started to appear beyond the state, reforming how 'the international' as an abstract space operated (Larner and Walters, 2004; Merlingen, 2006; Neumann and Sending, 2007 and 2010; Dean, 2010 and 2013; Guzzini and Neumann, 2012; Turan, 2016; Glenn, 2019). Governmentality usually includes both "the political rationalities and techniques of the organization and exercise of power" (Merlingen, 2003: 361). In this research, however, I do not elaborate in detail on the political technologies that governmentality entails. I only address the political rationalities, central to my analysis both regarding global governance and the UN's place and role. They are not discussed with equal emphasis: the focus is on the governmental rationality on the one hand, and its 'dynamics' with the *raison d'état*, as explained further below.

If it has not become evident so far, it is important to lay down here that this research is not 'about the UN'. The fact that the empirical case is built around the Organization is not intended to suggest that the primary goal is to say something new about it, as a distinct actor in world politics (although the research will evidently make such contributions too).

Even the empirical analysis is not about *what* the UN is, rather *how* it has been forming, and how does this process (subjectivization) fits into the one that let governmentality 'go global'. The empirical steps support this work: in chapter IV., I analyse a selected segment of what I term the UN's subjectivization narrative, speaking of which is of course not unproblematic: in an admittedly non-exhaustive – but analytically focused and well-justified – manner, I only consider sources that I deemed essential to show the intertwining processes suggested above: introductory chapters from the Annual Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (AR) from 1946 to 2016. I chose them, because they are basic documents for subjectivization. This latter is operationalized in this study as the ensemble of self-definition (meaning in practical terms how the UN appears in the Annual Reports) and agency construction (meaning what it does according to them). Two interlinking research questions can be formulated, based on the above considerations:

> How has the UN's subjectivity been formed in relation to the shifting rationality of world politics?
>
> How has the discourse of global governance organized this interplay of subjectivity and political rationalities?

The concept of 'dynamics' is the final essential part in outlining the research problem. Not only the political rationalities have 'dynamics', as suggested above: I use the term to unravel all three elements' inherent mechanisms, which are pictured on Figure 1. I argue that each has its main intrinsic dynamics which should be addressed to get an adequate understanding of the research problem. In the case of the global governance discourse, it shows in its dual origins, as an analytical *and* normative-political term. I discuss this in detail in chapter II., reviewing the academic literature on global governance, and its practical history, arguing that the emphasis should be put on the dynamics between the joint efforts of scholars and practitioners in constructing the idea. In the case of political rationality, the specific duality of modern political rationalities constitutes the core of the dynamics. This line of thought follows Michel Foucault, who identified the reason of the state and the rationality of government as its two main forms, as suggested above. I elaborate on these terms and the Foucauldian approach in chapter III., outlining the methodology, and arguing that, while both are present in our conception of world politics,

we have seen a shift towards governmental rationality in the recent decades – a shift that one can also trace in dynamics of the UN's subjectivization. Finally, the empirical analysis is built around the dynamics of self-definition and agency construction in the construction of the UN's subjectivity, in constant connection with the other two main elements, as explained above.

1. Outline

Answering the research questions resembles putting together a puzzle with multiple pieces. Theoretical pieces are as important in this project as the empirical analysis, and form an integral part of my work. Therefore, in what follows, the reader will get a longer-than-average theoretical discussion, which is then followed by the empirical analysis of the Secretary-Generals' reports. The rest of this Introduction outlines the structure of the research and summarizes, very briefly, some of the key empirical results to give a clearer idea about the concept of this project. In chapter II., a historical overview interprets the evolution of global governance as a practice, in close connection to how scholars and practitioners of global governance have been thinking about it. This line is elaborated further in the subsequent chapters: first, through contextualizing the project by looking at some theoretical antecedents of the global governance approach, embedding it in the relevant developments in IR. This longer-than-average discussion of the study of IR – with its characteristic 'great debates', its constant contestation, the much collective confusion and less near-to-collective consensuses around the millennium – is important, as the field has a lot to say about political rationality. As a subfield of political sciences, it lies at the clearest possible intersection of power and knowledge, so touching upon them is necessary to understand it in its entirety.

After these introductory ones, the next step is a rather focused review of global governance literature within IR, unfolding around the binary of knowledge/power: first, it develops the argumentation around the dualism mentioned in the previous section, and second, it separates the review into two major parts, into 'mainstream' and 'critical' understandings. The governmentality approach is elaborated in chapter III.: here it is only discussed in its relations to the other possible approaches. The more detailed discussions about post-structuralist IR, the relevant parts of discourse theory, subjectivity, rationalities and agency comes after all this. The methodological chapter elaborates on all

the relevant concepts, answers the critiques of the global governmentality approach, and outlines the exact steps for the empirical analysis. The case is presented in chapter IV.: it starts with a lengthier description of the sources to provide the necessary justification for the subsequent analyses: why the Secretary-General, why his Annual Reports, why the Introductions of these reports were chosen? The points made here are also supported by a discreet interview-based original research, the results of which are used in two ways: first, to describe accurately the process of producing the Annual Reports in the Secretariat, which is, surprisingly, not at all a well-documented process at the moment. Second, the interviewees'[2] stories are analysed from the point of view of the knowledge structures they are grounded in, linking these discussions to the subsequent analyses.

While several discourse analytical tools are used throughout this research, the bulk of the work is done following Jäger and Maier's 'Foucauldian approach' (2016:109-136). In line with this, chapter IV. carries on with a detailed description of the material selection process, an overview of the sources and a summary of the dataset. The actual analysis shows how the UN has become what it is today (although this formulation is inaccurate for many reasons, see in detail in chapter III.), and how this process of subjectivization unfolded hand in hand with the evolution of what we understand by global governance, and how a governmentality framework might be helpful in understanding these. The Conclusions in chapter V. start with some self-reflective remarks, which are an essential ingredient in all discourse analyses. The findings are then summarized, stressing why global governance today is usefully interpreted by many as global governmentality, and why is it worth it to look at it from the point of view of the relationships illustrated with figure 1. A separate section lists the key contributions of my research to the different fields touched upon, and the relevant parts of literature. Finally, the chapter pronounces a critical take on Foucault and his views on the dynamics of political rationalities, and helps to grasp the UN's role, offering a way to understand the Organization also in more practical terms, and briefly assessing contemporary trends and future possibilities.

[2] The interviewees are officers of the UN Secretariat on different levels and in different units. See the full description in chapter IV/3.

Figure 2. visualizes the above outlined logic: the relations between political rationalities as a structure of knowledge, in which, and in relation with which different subjects and discourses operate. The colour of the arrows shows that not every potentially relevant subject and relationship are taken into account. The ones which are considered here, are coloured grey. Apart from the elements pictured on figure 1., this illustration shows that from the variety of relevant actors in global governance (only) that broad group (consisting of academics and practitioners of global governance) is discussed, which took



Figure 2. Relationships in the focus of this study

an active part in anchoring the term. This study, thus, leaves a lot untouched. Nevertheless, as this figure shows, it still takes on a lot to discover in terms of the complex relationships and discursive mechanisms shaping our thinking about world politics.

1.1 Outline of a holistic approach

As suggested on the first pages, however strictly the frames of this analysis are to be set, they should equally be pushed as wide as possible. This is not at all an evident conviction: the separation of fields of study into neat disciplines, preferably highly specialized, is a scholarly practice with a long tradition, but also one that has been being increasingly challenged in favour of more holistic approaches in natural and social sciences alike.

Holism and multidisciplinarity are almost ‘a must’ when the main drive is basically to understand how the world functions: the present study uses global governance as its analytical framework exactly because it is broad and flexible enough to satisfy criteria of holism, while it also narrows down the object of analysis.

The clear focus on politics should not mean that only the logic of politics and the analytical tools of political sciences are relied on. IR, the main disciplinary frame of this study is said to be multidisciplinary in itself, standing on several pillars of social and political sciences. Still, it has evolved to have specific constraints, limiting understanding as well as results, a situation that has been softening in the past decades, but is still apparent in many ways. Waever shows this nicely on the example of one of its most basic axioms: “The distinction between domestic and international has broken down, we hear. But the only way talking about this is to say – the distinction between domestic and international has broken down. So we can get to the current complex situation from the distinction by adding complexity, but not from the complex situation and build the reality of the play around that (broken?) distinction?” (2004:16).

This idea summarizes fairly the seemingly unreadable complexity of contemporary world politics: changing structures, shifting understandings, faltering certainties signal that we are living in an era of deep transformations – as suggested in the introductory quote from Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar’s Annual Report. Old structures coexist with the new circumstances, warily trying to adapt, but hopelessly remaining ‘locked in the box’. In fact, most of the recent ‘think outside the box’ urges have been doing the same, although at least with the effect of starting a discussion. Global governance as a problem, an idea and an analytical tool emerged out of such discussions in the early 90s, reflecting on change, but unable to fully enable it. The current study approaches in line with Weaver’s thoughts: to understand contemporary historical developments starting from the present, ‘building the play around broken distinctions’ of the past, attempting to avoid the same traps and thinking about the evolution of international political thought and its effect on ‘reality’ in a reflective manner. What we see as reality has of course serious consequences in terms of analysis, and depends on things as diverse as life experiences, worldview, access to information, social status and the like. Such factors in my case are faced and

made explicit in chapter V/1, fulfilling rightful requirements of self-reflexivity. At this point, only their result should be put forward, as far as a global imaginary is concerned.

Talking about 'the global' does not equal to talking about the entire globe in geographical terms. Rather, it refers to "a new conceptualization of practices within a global imaginary" (Darian-Smith and McCarty, 2017:5; also: Hardt and Negri, 2000 and 2004; Sassen, 2008; Steger, 2006 and 2009). Naturally, such a slippery definition makes it ambiguous as an analytical concept. Making an argument in this vein, a critique claims that 'the global' "highlights a lack rather than a presence", namely the lack of clarity in many respects (Chandler, 2009: 531). Acknowledging this fact, however, does not necessarily have to translate to dropping the concept, on the contrary. Embracing complexity as the rule – as in the case of the concept of global governance itself – might be the key to a better understanding, as it allows multiple possibilities to be explored. Thus, the present research works within this imaginary, a perspective in which the global is the rule by which the world should be understood and not an exception or an intriguing development. Is 'the global' constructed as Chandler suggests it (2009: 532)? Of course it is, the same way as every other concept and framework by which we make sense of the world around us. The point that it does not make it less 'real' is probably one of the simplest and biggest advances in 20th century social theory, and an assumption on which this entire study rests. Any criticism that addresses this assumption, is therefore ignored here. I stay open, however, to constructive arguments, which bring us closer to understanding global governance in such an imaginary. I attempt it in this research through synthetizing theoretical work on the one hand, and a well-grounded empirical case study on the other.

2. Intended contributions in the light of a few general results

One could ask what the relevance of this work is, considering that both global governance and the UN have been frequently and thoroughly discussed objects of analysis, and the global governmentality approach has already proven its worth in interpreting the functioning and transformation of the international system? What is it that has not been said so far, and why is it important to say it? As the following chapters will elaborate in more detail, theoretical work on global governance, concurring largely with the approach taken by global policy makers, and having been institutionalized on many levels, have so

far been dominated by (neo)liberal understandings[3]. Such interpretations picture global governance as a complex mechanism that has rather naturally or *automatically* came to be and operation, as a reaction to 'new' challenges of the era of globalization (which most commonly stands for the decades since the 90s), enforcing "a functionalist understanding of international politics as existing in order to be able to deal with problems" (Brand, 2005: 166; also Bernstein and Van der Ven, 2017). This mechanism of automation – that might be hauntingly familiar from classic liberal economics – is the basis for the main point of critique, as it enforces the sense of naturalness that has the capacity to fix not only meanings, but also power relations, especially on the long run. 'Mainstream' approaches to global governance thus visibly neutralize the concept, stripping it from its connections to power, and (mostly implicitly) describe it as a necessity, a new chapter in the straight line of humankind's progress – making it the next grand project of modernity.

This taking of complex social, political or economic processes for granted, and not problematizing core questions contribute not only to faulty theory, but also to faulty practice on a (global) policy level. In a broader perspective, thus, what is at stake is the future of global governance – both as a discourse and as a set of practices. Elaborating in detail on its embeddedness in our political imagination and the limits of this imagination is crucial for a progressive approach. Equally, the UN, ever since its establishment, has been frequently and harshly criticized for various actions or inactions. The majority of the critiques, however, are misplaced, since they are not rooted in a nuanced understanding of the structures and orders of knowledge in world politics. In this sense, my research also addresses the ongoing debates about the role and place of the UN, and more general, the role and place of international organizations in a transformed world politics (Bröckling et al., 2011; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2013; Busch and Liese, 2017; Weiss and Daws, 2018). Thus, while it does not aim to offer practical advices, it does offer an understanding of global governance, as well as the role and possibilities of the UN, standing on a post-structuralist approach to IR.

[3] This of course does not mean that no other understandings are out there. Here I am talking about those approaches which have become institutionalized or mainstreamed in, among others, global decision making (or in education, or in media, and the list could go on). Tim Dunne makes a similar and pertinent observation when he says: "At the risk of generalisation, the global-governance literature tends to be infused with a singular kind of liberalism, one that is unreflective about the cultural and historical genealogy of liberal values" (2005: 80).

In more practical terms, this work is offering a framework in which the UN can be understood as complex, colourful and ambiguous as it is: not simply as a norm setter, a facilitator, a peace-keeper, a hegemonic instrument, an abuser, a benevolent giant or a martyr, but all of these together. Importantly, this is not to say that the goal would be the elaboration of a new truth, a fixed reality that claims universal validity for itself and limitless possibilities for generalization. The goal is to facilitate the understanding of the gigantic transformations in the world underway, and filling some of the gaps in the discipline of IR, using the UN as a well-placed case, one that can be turned into a channel of communication. Last but not least, my work is intended to be an empirical contribution to the debates in post-structuralist (and, on a more general note, constructivist) IR. Its added value is that it shows how (cognitive) structures and actors' agency interact with each other, in this sense opening up Foucauldian IR more towards agency. As opposed to a large part of the existing literature following this spirit, my work evidently asks questions about influential actors, instead of addressing subaltern agency, which often tends to be the case in these circles (McNay, 2010; Zanotti, 2013; Pyysiäinen et al., 2017).

In sum, the three distinct, but intertwining elements of the research object outlines the place of this study within IR. Hopefully it will make original contributions to debates over global governance (by linking it this tightly to the other two main elements), the UN and integrational organizations in more general terms (by integrating a sociological/bureaucratic approach with governmentality theory), and the relationship of structure and agency in post-structuralist IR (both through synthetizing theoretical work, and an empirical case, composed of an interview research and a discourse analysis). The interviews reveal and interpret how the institutional-bureaucratic mechanisms play a role in producing the Annual Reports; reviewing the Secretaries-General's vocabulary, inventory of ideas and the interlinkages of ideas in these documents (their continuity and change for instance) point at the persistent knowledge structures, defined by modern political rationalities; an analysis of conceptions of self and agency shows how Secretaries-General understood their office and interpreted their and the Organization's political role in light of the factors usually identified as important in the relevant literature; the strategic combinations of ideas, seen in a longer term perspective enable us to explore the UN's intimate relationship with the expanding system of global governance; finally, such analyses are telling not only in terms of how the construction of the UN's

subjectivity is unfolding, but also in terms of how the logic of 'the international' has been changing in the past decades, as a result of a dynamic combination of the 'reason of the state' and the 'rationality of government'. It is based on such prospects that I argue that the Secretary-General's Annual Reports are significant contributions to the discourse of world politics as global governance. As one of my interviewees formulated it, when I asked about this ambiguous and hard-to-grasp term, that is global governance:

> *We're all part of a rich tapestry of life at that global level. And I think the SG is really a linchpin in there. (I02)*

II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STUDY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

1. A genealogy of global governance

The current historical review goes back until the 19th century, for the sake of concision, and settling also with the majority of the relevant literature. It assesses the evolution, components and possibilities of global governance, with a special focus on international organizations (and the UN's) place in it. The peculiar developments in certain historical periods (be it a stabile interstate governance system or a globalizing economy) all have relevance in the evolution of global governance – and more importantly, in how it is thought of and discussed. As a conclusion, the history of the past centuries is seen as a multiplicity of contingencies which enabled the 'thinkability' of global governance, as a hegemonic discourse of world politics.

1.1 The long 19th century: the prehistory of global governance?

The imagination of global governance follows the project of modernity[4] in many respects: seeing it as systems and subsystems, aggregating in a global structure which needs to be governed by the scientifically approved, rational and universally acceptable means are core elements. The logic of this rule (of nature and people alike) and its expansion, have been taking their current shape throughout the past centuries, thanks in large part to capitalist expansion: modern forms of social organization have been taken to a global level and managed in line with the liberal ethos of government, providing legitimacy to the project.

[4] See further in chapter III.

From the point of view of global governance, the 19th century was a stirring period. It saw the first international public associations emerging, driven by a need of standardization and international governance following the rise of industrial capitalism and its globalization under the system of colonialism. The hectic beginning of the century in Europe also fostered the first European attempt of creating an international system, based on Westphalian principles and the absolute necessity (from the point of view of great European powers) to preserve the (to them) beneficial *status quo*. For these reasons, many find it reasonable to start their analyses of global governance here. This section does not repeat historical accounts of Great Power rivalries, balance of power and early international associations: these stories have been told many times. It rather attempts to follow the previously devised intellectual pathways further, carrying on with the aim of making sense of a long process, engendering the most widely shared understandings of present day global governance.

Arguably, the most important highlight of the century is the changes in socio-economic conditions introduced with the rise of industrial capitalism. Again, the issue in point is a long and complex process, the entirety of which cannot be grasped here, but building on meticulous work done by students of capitalism, some aspects can be outlined. A key for understanding would be to see capitalism as a process, instead of a static system: evolving through time, having multiple forms (Kocka, 2016). For Hobsbawm, the Age of Capital followed the Age of Revolution (during which its immediate social, political and technological preconditions were created), starting in 1848 and giving way to the Age of Empire from the 1870s onward. The forceful wave in which the English Industrial Revolution swallowed the French political revolution (Hobsbawm, 1995:13-18) put liberalism in practice both in political economic and in a socio-political sense. Beyond the domestic implications, first of all it meant the expansion of capitalist world economy, in other words: economic globalization.

"Capitalism is the first and only historical social system that has become truly global in scale and scope" (Arrighi, 2006:201). Mindful of it being characteristically global from the outset[5], what can surely be said is that a surge of globalization characterized the period

[5] As it could not have developed and flourished without the extraction of overseas resources, both in human and material terms. See among others in Pomeranz, 2000; Harvey, 2003; Böröcz, 2010.

in question. It is important to see how misleading it would be to describe this process as being self-propelling and autonomous, confined neatly to the field of economy. Social- and especially political sciences abound in understandings that centre on distinguishing fields/subsystems/spheres of social life, based on their inherent logic and system of norms[6]. Such approaches have been especially accented when it came to economy and politics. This strong tradition has been obscuring, among others, the dynamics shaped by intimate links and alliances between public and private enterprises, states and non-state actors throughout Western history and similarly throughout the history of global governance (Tilly, 1985; Böröcz, 2010).

The implications for the study of global governance are clear. In historical accounts, while the economic aspect is not neglected, most often it is treated separately, as a process following a distinct logic, as 'preparing the field' for the following century's excess globalization. In this logic, the Vienna Congress, the balance of power system and the appearance of the first international public associations happened to take place in the same period, but relatively independently from the above developments. It follows that the then appearing new model of international governance has always been one step behind, struggling to keep up with the pace of change in political terms. The distinction, however, proves not to be a useful one. It is important to see, as Murphy argues that "despite the focus of the nineteenth-century great-power conferences on the high politics of potential armed conflict, most of the staff and the resources of the public international unions were dedicated to supporting what we would now call 'economic globalization'" (2015:192). He also adds that the League and the UN carried this practice forward in their own times. Others also argue for a more nuanced and integrated perspective: "What is new with the involvement of private actors in transnational governance issues is not so much the extent and intensity of their influence as how some of them have managed to develop a new relationship with the polity" (Graz and Nölke, 2012:126).

Global governance is a phenomenon defined by complexity: a better strategy of understanding would be, thus to try and integrate its constitutive processes. In the case of 19th century global governance it means bringing together processes of a globalizing

[6] A practice that George Lukács famously saw as tied to liberalism and a liberal social system. See for example Tütő, 2010.

capitalism with an internationalizing political system. As touched upon earlier in this article, what defined the normative substance of this hegemonic project was liberalism. It does not mean that the Powers of the Congress of Vienna or the Holy Alliance were professed liberals – nor that ideas of the French revolution came to be the norm in Europe in the 19th century. To see what 19th century liberalism meant for global governance, we have to reach back to the work of Michel Foucault. He did not use the term to denote an ideology (meaning the value- and belief-system, the basis of which has traditionally been less state intervention and more freedom), rather an *ethos* of government, "to apply an economy at the entire level of the state" (Foucault, 1991:92). This entails many repercussions within, and also without the state: 'government' appeared as a benevolent enterprise, now targeting not only the individual subject, but also the entirety of the population. The aim is general betterment, increase of well-being and a docile society, capable of internalizing liberal norms.

1.2 The post-war order and the institutionalization of global governance

It was this normative system that got formally institutionalized after the Second World War (Latham, 1997). Organization-wise, it only had some faint foundations and precedents before the War, such as the League in the case of the UN. 1945 is a year which is traditionally assigned great significance: in IR, it represents a mental caesura that marks the beginning of a new hegemonic cycle (the transition from '*Pax' Britannica* to '*Pax' Americana*), a new international order (the bipolar one), the beginning of the end for colonialism – or even modernity, gradually transforming into what we know as the 'postmodern' era. Of course, historical, social or political change does not happen abruptly in the majority of the cases, still it might be useful to hold on to such handles that provide orientation. So much the more, as a large part of literature effectively pictures global governance as taking shape around this time, owing primarily to the establishment of the pillars of what is called the 'post-war world order'. Accordingly, no matter how vigorously it is emphasized that global governance does not equal to the activity of IOs, they – and especially the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions – tend to occupy a central place in these analyses (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2013).

The Organization, of course, did not come out of thin air, as a result of the above described self-construction: its conception was preceded by classic liberal international thought

(Kant, 2003; DiNunzio, 2006), an increasing number of arrangements managing globalizing capitalism, and a few concrete precedents of IOs, established from the end of the 19th century onward. After the failure of its immediate predecessor, the League of Nations, in line with the hypothetical *Zeitgeist* (Jaeger, 2008), decision-makers were striving to make the new institutional system better equipped for its roles, although conceptions of the exact roles showed a great variety. The idea, however, that organizations should be created for the purposes of regulating/governing certain issue areas – distancing world politics form the logic of state sovereignty – was a unifying one, which makes it reasonable to talk about governmentality as realizing on a global level after the War. Until this time, the reason of the state was a dominating political rationality structuring the conception of 'the international', "concerned with the preservation and perfection of the order of the state itself" (Dean, 2009: 231).

From the 1941 Atlantic Charter, through the 1942 Declaration of The United Nations, the Moscow and Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta Conferences, to the 1945 San Francisco Conference, the contours of a new world order were taking form, with the participation of the Allied countries and with the leadership of the four major powers of the era. The actual Organization mirrored a consensus, but, in line with the current structure of hegemony, also Roosevelt's Grand Design. The ultimate goal, as set out in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, was "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" (Charter: Preamble) and "to maintain international peace and security" (Charter: I/1.). After a total war, what was about to born, was total peace: "like war, peace had to be woven into every aspect of the social fabric" (Jaeger, 2008: 598). This endeavour, as the empirical analysis will show, is present in the Introductions, and has a special significance in the interpretation of the analysed discursive processes as certifying to governmentality, and even more to governmental *rationality*, which could not be discussed as such without the given strong references to such widely truths. As Jaeger fascinatingly shows, 'world public opinion' was strategically employed at these early stages as a justification for the nascent buildup, „as a medium of international governance" (ibid).

IOs are important in the current framework first of all because of such normative functions. According to the literature they occupy an important place in the normative

process, or norm 'life cycles' (Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Park 2006). This is especially true in the case of the UN, which deserves credits for the creation and diffusion of many norms around the world, from human rights to the responsibility to protect[7]. Barnett and Finnemore (2018) say that, since the end of the Cold War, the UN is typically discussed either as: a tool of Great Powers, a facilitator of interstate cooperation, a governor of the society of states, a constructor of the social world, or a structure of legitimation. The current projects fits into the fourth group, as it argues that a significant chunk of what global governance itself means – and how the idea took root in political thinking – can one way or another be attributed to the UN and its self-positioning throughout the years. The UN, however, has not created and diffused norms, or managed knowledge on its own. Such tasks have often been handled in different expert committees and panels, the Commission on Global Governance (CGG), being a prime example, which is discussed in more detail in chapter II/3.

What is important to stress at this point, is that the CGG's was a synthetizing project, connecting the dots based on the work of several preceding committees operating in the 80s, in a single report, making a lasting contribution to how global governance is imagined today. Instead of dealing with particular problems, it was "concerned with conveying the argument that pervasive global changes have altered the terrain on which global problem solving was to take place" (Hewson and Sinclair, 1999a:13-14). The rethinking mechanism it launched was the result of a belated and slow realization about the unsustainability of global systems, finally and reluctantly faced by global decision makers and those networks which generally support their work. In this sense, global governance as a discourse is about crisis management (Calhoun and Derluguian, 2011; Held and Young, 2013), and reflects the 'organic crisis' of the world order, which seriously undermined "the social wellbeing of a majority of people, on a planet characterized by increasing health, food and energy crises linked to wider crises of accumulation, exploitation of human beings and nature, dispossession of livelihoods and the commons, amid widespread ecological destruction" (Gill, 2015a:2-3).

Awarding a special role to neoliberal political economic solutions in the rapidly deteriorating situation is, by today, widespread. Brand argues that the global governance

[7] The latter is discussed in some detail in chapter IV/8.

discourse did not counter neoliberal social transformations but had a legitimizing and orienting function. It served, and still serves "as a framework to deal with crises and make their management more effective" (2005:158). Such critiques are not unfamiliar to proponents of global governance. The difference lies between those who see inherent structural antagonisms in global governance as such, and those who hold that the system could and should be ameliorated. What most analysts agree on (and what is shared also by governmentality scholars) is that in the past decades the world has been facing challenges of different nature because of the restructuring of global economy and the related excess globalization, following from the post-1970s transformations.

Looking through the globalization debate in IR, virtually the only agreement lies in the acknowledgement that "there is hardly a modern political institution which is not allegedly challenged, transformed, or undermined by globalization" (Zürn, 2013: 408). The transformations were thus not confined to political economy and its effects on (social) life, but importantly included what is usually called the Digital Revolution of the Third Industrial revolution, culminating in the appearance of the internet in the 90s. Such technologies are not merely important for their own sake – meaning facilitating communication, registration, administration and various transactions, connecting even remote parts of the world, etc. – but also for their implications on governance (Murphy, 2015:194-195).

Still, while the infrastructural side is not ignored, dominant understandings of globalization still cluster around economic and cultural readings (Sklair, 2002:36). The first one refers to the emerging systems of production and finance, the spurt of transnational corporations and the related governance systems (forms of cooperation, regimes and institutions), having a central role in the transformative processes described above. The second one is a more ambiguous approach as it includes tendencies and counter-tendencies such as homogenization and differentiation, integration and fragmentation (or *fragmegration*), or globalization and localization (again neologized as *glocalization*) (Rosenau, 2003: 4-5).

Certainly, such processes were not new in the 1970s. The reason why this period can still be highlighted is a scale shift on the one hand, and not unrelated, the global turn to market fundamentalism following the 70s'crises. Neoliberalism has not been a new system in

terms of its logic, nature or institutions: but arguably it has taken the logic, and institutions of capitalism to their limits. Modifying Murphy's observation in this sense (that fostering the globalization of industrial capitalism was the biggest success of global governance), we could say that the most important task of global governance from the 70s onward has been fostering neoliberalism on a global level. That the project proved successful only from the point of view of its convenors became clear especially from the 90s onward, where the public witnessed serious failures in global neoliberal management (Strange, 1999; Higgot and Phillips, 2000; Slobodian, 2018), along with some forceful reactions to those failures from the part of a globally conceived civil society.

Seeing the contiguity between the evolution of substance and the successful combined attempts to root the term in the vocabulary of a wide audience is especially relevant. As argued in chapter II/3., the CGG and the preceding committees, aiming to stretch "the mind of global governance" (Cooper and English, 2005), pondering on and offering solutions to global problems should be seen in their particular context, in a forming consensus around the millennium that international cooperation and governance needs fresh insight: it simply cannot be meaningfully discussed in old frames, with the same old concepts, actors and processes. In IR, apart from the tendencies of changing spatiality (with globalization), it was the shock of the end of the Cold War, (later followed by a comparably influential shock with 9/11) which triggered the quest for new understandings and conceptual tools to make sense of a rapidly changing world (Kiss J., 2006). Similar shifts influenced (global) policy debates also, where core principles of global governance were gaining increasing influence as transformations on a global level and the related stringency of masses necessitated some kind of a response or resolution.

Whether the idea, and more importantly the practice of global governance measured up to the task is not the real question here (the majority of commentators, counting in myself as well, agree that it fell flat): the emphasis is on global governance as a discourse. Elements of the discourse have already been put together in various ways (Steffek, 2003; Davis, 2012). A particularly relevant interpretation is that of Brand, who argues that global governance is a possibly hegemonic discourse of world politics (2005). Elements of this discourse (like claiming that the globalization of many processes create 'world problems', to be dealt with on a global level, in cooperation and dialogue, emphasizing

the multi-actor nature of global governance, etc.) will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. The next one prepares for these discussions by interpreting the evolution of IR as an evolution in the limits of our political imagination (Walker, 1993), and by reviewing the theoretical antecedents of global governance. It will thus link the subsequent literature review to this brief historical deliberation.

2. The changing context of International Relations

This chapter is necessary to develop an understanding of how and why global governance meant an innovation in the study of IR. It summarizes key points from the development of the discipline to contextualize the literature review presented in the next chapter. It also serves the important purpose to show how IR as a scientific discipline and the different schools in it define the forms of validated knowledge that serve as truths, and inform the basic understandings of world politics. In a separate section, I outline here the direct antecedents of global governance analyses, emphasizing the neo-neo consensus in relation to international organizations and regimes, as its main contributions, and offering valuable perspectives for the study of IOs. The chapter concludes by highlighting the importance of the concept of 'change' for the study (and indeed the whole discourse) of global governance.

IR theories are "interesting less for the substantive explanations they offer about political conditions in the modern world than as expressions of the limits of the contemporary political imagination when confronted with persistent claims about and evidence of fundamental historical and structural transformation" (Walker, 1993: 5). Rob Walker – author of a ground-breaking book deconstructing IR – reads them "as expressions of an historically specific understanding of the character and location of political life in general", and "as a crucial site in which attempts to think otherwise about political possibilities are constrained by categories and assumptions that contemporary political analysis is encouraged to take for granted" (ibid).

IR is often imagined as a theoretical moving back-and-forth on a continuum between conflict and cooperation, topics represented by the two mainstream approaches, realism and liberalism. Its specific disciplinary 'blinders' – among others, its insistence of 'the international' as an anarchical space – "mask the possibility of authority between and over states. Shedding these blinders is an important step in seeing global governance for

what it is, a set of authority relationships", argues Lake (2010: 591). The list of blinders could go on: selecting and isolating questions of interstate conflict and cooperation have been the life-blood of the nascent discipline in the early 20th century, when these seemed to constitute the most pressing slice of reality. A need for explanation was met by a group of scholars who elaborated the frames of a separate discipline within the field of political sciences. This *differentia specifica* was of course contingent upon that of politics, famously defined by Carl Schmitt as the distinction between friend and enemy (2002), popularly barring the imagination of politics (also) beyond the domestic realm in a strictly delimited field, excluding a host of relevant factors, questions and problems, which bear heavily on the life of people and the commons across states.

The fact that this differentiation (conflict/cooperation) might not be the most important one became clear at least the 70s, where the 'neo' versions of the two mainstream schools started to converge, forming the 80s' so called neo-neo synthesis (Waever, 1996). This convergence has, since then, been claimed to define the modern contours of the discipline, with the effect of ruling out or side-lining alternative approaches. This latter issue was formulated by Robert Cox as an opposition between problem-solving and critical theories, the first category supporting the *status quo* by accepting it as a necessary starting point for any analysis, focusing at its maximum on reforms and adjustments aiming at a smoother functioning of the given system, while the second approaching it with genuinely critical intentions, questioning even its core features if necessary, evidently broadening the field itself (Cox, 1981). The way in which the label 'critical' is applied in this study is close to this Coxian definition, incorporating approaches that are widely called as such for their normative-emancipatory motives, but also those whose emancipatory ideals are focused on methodology[8].

Critical orientations have fruitfully widened the scope of IR, drawing heavily in terms of methodology and premises on other social scientific disciplines and humanities (such as sociology, political economy, anthropology or linguistics). If, however, we look for a genesis of anti-*status quo* (critical) thinking in IR, we find at its heart Marxism and, most notably, Lenin's theory of imperialism – although at that time the discipline as a separate

[8] Marysia Zalewski called this latter bunch 'theory as everyday practice', distinguishing it from 'theory as critique' (the previous one) and 'theory as a tool' (encompassing the mainstream approaches) (1996).

field of study did not exist. He took Marx's most important concepts and applied it to what he saw as a higher – and indeed the highest – stage of capitalism, compared to the one Marx wrote his seminal *Das Kapital* (Lenin, 1917). The line of thought that the combination of monopolization and finance capital fosters the exploitation of the peripheries by the dominant core, was developed further later on, in the various dependency-theories (Prebisch, 1950; Gunder-Frank, 1967; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979), flourishing in the first decades of decolonization, but also provided the basis for the world-systems research in political economy (Wallerstein, 1974; Amin, 1976), and in IR as well (Wallerstein, 1996).

These approaches originating in Marx's and Lenin's work take the starting point of classic Marxist political-economy by saying that economics and politics should be analysed together, as these structures are in fusion, with elites (the bourgeoisie) supporting each other to the expense of the weak and oppressed, with well-pronounced and fixed relations between the two. Thus, apart from broadening the object of analysis, these scholars also brought a strong critical-normative tone into the discipline (Rosenberg, 1994; Linklater, 1998; Teschke, 2003).

Another important development in the evolution of IR was triggered by the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy in the 1920s. During the century, this paradigm shift rippled into all social sciences, affecting them enormously, and giving way to different social constructivisms from the middle of the century. The main thread in this new epistemological direction is that reality is not knowable through language, as language is an 'opaque medium', tainted by „grammatical, rhetorical, narrative structures that create value, bestow meaning, and constitute (in the sense of imposing form upon) the subjects and objects that emerge in the process of inquiry" (Shapiro, 1985:192). This realization has gained momentum and widespread backing by the end of the 60s, evolving in relation with the social movements attacking modernity and its systems of hierarchies worldwide (not unrelated to the critical-Marxist approaches mentioned above), but was especially popular in France, thanks to personalities such as Michel Foucault or Jacques Derrida, participating in, and intellectually providing for the movement.

The common points of all (and indeed very diverse) constructivist approaches can be summed up in four points (Jørgensen–Phillips 2002:5-6): first, a critical approach to

taken-for-granted knowledge, in accordance with the logic of the shifting understanding of language. Second, a historical and cultural specificity, stressing the strong contingencies in our ways of thinking and talking about problems. This point is in particularly clear opposition to realist thinking, its 'timeless wisdom' argued to be its clearest strength (Buzan, 1996), but also to liberalism, the universalizing claims and attitude of which is also widely known and criticized. The third and fourth common points touch upon the links between knowledge and social processes on the one hand, and between knowledge and social action on the other, elaborating on the bidirectional mechanisms that tie them to each other: knowledge is constructed in social interactions, while these interactions are informed by knowledge. The question need not be of a 'chicken or egg' type (as exemplified by the current study), instead it should be directed at the complexities of these mechanisms to deepen understanding. The strong drive that have been pushing social scientists in the opposite direction (establishing causal links, reducing the infinite complexity of social life into knowable and quantifiable factors, approximating social scientific research to the methods of natural sciences) have been prevalent in IR research as well, especially since the 'second debate', which took place in the 50s and 60s (Egedy, 2010:4-5) and 'decided' that IR should be a positivist and empiricist science, examining social reality as a naturally given object.

Social constructivist approaches have been in stark opposition to this. It also means that their research is usually not explanatory, striving to find causal relationships or to answer why-type questions: it is focused on understanding the 'hows', de- and reconstructing knowledge systems and discursive mechanisms, basic notions of our thinking and social behaviour. This challenging of taken-for-granted truths of problem-solving theory is also present in the various other schools of IR, which, to a greater or lesser extent, have been building on the philosophical and methodological advances of constructivism. Many of these alternative approaches are organized around certain specific themes, which involve some kind of material or cognitive repression by 'official' thinking: these directions were also given a huge impetus during the 60s and 70s, where more and more issues came to the forefront as the deconstruction of modernity has been advancing. Feminist IR, green IR, and postcolonial thought have been the prime examples of scholarship developing on an issue-basis, together with the respective movements, and relying on a critical methodological apparatus.

To sum it up, by the 80s and 90s, new approaches and schools in IR sprang up like mushrooms, renewing IR both in scope and methodology (Gill, 1993; Smith et al., 1996; Checkel, 1998). The oft stated 'backwardness' of IR (Frost, 1986) thus does not mean that there are no alternatives to mainstream thinking, rather that new and progressive approaches have not, still, been able to break through the walls of accepted truths, erected by mainstream international relations[9/10]. These walls trembled significantly on two occasions in the past decades: first, at the end of the Cold War, which was not seen coming by either mainstream schools of IR. The reputation was further eroded with 9/11, where it was perceived that the most influential schools lack the tools to answer the questions raised by the events. It made especially clear that world politics cannot be understood from one single standpoint. Employing multiple perspectives, and preferably also multiple disciplines, is a must. David Lake formulates this engagement in relation to global governance in the following way: "international politics is like a Gestalt picture, the best known of which depicts a goblet or vase that, when we switch our cognitive frame, becomes two faces in profile. In IR, scholars have focused too long on the goblet - anarchy and the state of nature. But if we alter our focus only slightly, we can see the faces - hierarchy and global governance" (2010:589).

Before moving on, an important note should be made with regards to International Relations as a concept and how I use it in this study. Up until this point, this phrase has been used in this text without making reference to an emerging consensus, that IR is perhaps not the most appropriate way of describe our field: the rather significant changes which have been identified as shaping the character of 'the international' have pressed scholars (even in the theoretical mainstream) to drop the classic self-help-, and state-centric conception of IR (even IR as a name itself), and to start to talk about global affairs, world politics, or a similarly inclusive formulation that does not restrict the (West-centric) field of analysis to relations between (nation)states (Acharya, 2014; Allen, 2016). This renewal is particularly relevant in the study of global governance: one could even say that

[9] With the exception of a so called 'conventional constructivism', followers of which apply nonconventional methods to conventional research problems. See Adler, 1997; Hopf, 1998; Reus-Smit, 2009.

[10] Such a claim is formulated also by Sterling-Folker, a professed realist, against liberal IR. She is arguing that the plurality of thought is merely virtual in IR, and by reaffirming 'liberal hegemony' the rest of us are simply stabilizing the *status quo* (2014).

it is the study of change (Hewson and Sinclair, 1999), and as such, an attempt of IR scholars to catch up with the world that has rushed past them and left the field locked in the past, with its Western- and Eurocentric perspectives, obsession with states, universal and ahistorical explanations, and focus on isolated questions instead of agglomerates of entangled problems. Shifting away from these patterns has already been underway, and this study intends to follow this shift: 'IR' is only kept as a reference to the discipline, but 'the international' as an abstract space where the relevant interactions take place will be termed 'the global', while the level of analysis 'world-' instead of international level.

2.1 Theoretical antecedents for the study of global governance

The study of different international, and later global governance arrangements has been – if seen as a legitimate subfield within IR (Hofferberth, 2016)[11] – situated primarily in the broadly understood liberal tradition, distinguished for seeking the possibility of peace through the study of cooperation. From the earliest, highly normative theories of world federalism or world government, through ideas of institutionalism and collective security, to neo-liberal theories of institutions, interdependence, and transnational social cooperation, liberal IR has always fostered the idea of regulating and tempering international relations through cooperation (Doyle, 1983 and 2012, Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1989; Keohane and Martin, 1995; Rosenau, 1997; Ikenberry, 2009; Mazower, 2012; Szűcs, 2017). Its main opponent in common knowledge has been the realist school of IR, the one which has problematized conflict and has built its understanding on a rather restrictive notion of power, emphasizing its material forms like military, or economic aspects, imagining it in an authoritive, coercive frame (Waltz,1979 and 1999a; Snyder, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001; Romsics, 2009; Glaser, 2010). (Neo)realists, given the different focus (conflict rather than cooperation), when it comes to global governance, are most of all sceptical, as exemplified by Kenneth Waltz's article: the most influential scholar in neorealism even questions the existence of global governance as it is imagined by liberals. He denies the significance of globalization and interdependence, while he emphasizes the role of powerful states in the management of global processes (Waltz, 1999b). The debate between the main IR approaches in the 70s

[11] Hofferberth suggests that it is usually regarded either as a distraction for, an addition to, or a new field beyond IR. Being a legitimate subfield is a fourth possibility.

and 80s (described in the Introduction as the 'neo-neo debate') reflected on phenomena that form the various subfields of what is generally understood by global governance today, most importantly the activity of international organizations and the idea and practice of international regimes (Krasner, 1983; Ruggie, 1982; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; Hasenclever et al., 1997).

The impressive proliferation of IOs after the Second World War had a lasting effect. The fact that the bulk of the discipline's debates (and even its few consensuses) developed around research on IOs does not mean, however, that discussions went very deep in asking what these organizations were, apart from being a function of states: not very long ago, when an editorial of the Journal of International Organization Studies assessed the state of art in international organizations research, it found important gaps (Koch and Stetter, 2013). The main point resonated with the ones made a few years prior to this, in the same journal, arguing for the inclusion of organization theory's insights (Ellis, 2010), and also those made decades ago, integrating views from sociology (Ness and Brechin, 1988), namely: the study of IOs is still retained by the basic disciplinary constraints of IR. This means, first of all, as many commiserated before, a strong focus on states and interstate politics.

According to the editorial, IOs are still typically discussed in terms of their relations and relevance to states. Therefore, IR still has a "naive view of organizations" (Ness and Brechin, 1988), seen as "incapacitated actors" which are rarely studied "on their own right" (Koch and Stetter, 2013). This is problematic in two ways: more generally, because it reflects that no matter how wide the boundaries of the discipline have been pushed in the past decades, discussions still seem to largely reproduce old patterns. Here, the view that IOs should be studied "on their own right" is advanced. I argue from the following standpoints: 1. IOs are distinct actors in world politics, which function independently from states, and thus form an essential and autonomous pillar of the global governance system 2. While the traditional focus and assumptions of IR are still important, if one aims to understand their functioning under contemporary circumstances, one has to analyse them as distinct units, with a certain degree of autonomy, and even authority 3. In such analyses, one has to rely on the results (as well as methods) of sociology and organization theory, among others.

The first person to turn to in this case is of course Max Weber (1991), the scholar who took a central part the birth of both disciplines. What we call modern social order – not the least thanks to Weber – is in large part understandable through the study of (bureaucratic) organizations, which is an essential observation when discussing modern political rationalities in relation to IOs. His views on bureaucracies are revived, among others, in the most significant constructivist IR contributions to the study of IOs recently: Barnett and Finnemore (1999 and 2004) engage in a courageous debate with the majority of IR when defining IOs as bureaucracies and derive their authority from this characteristic. They represent what Bauer calls "the sociological approach" which "conceives of 'bureaucratization' as a form of organizational 'autonomization' – in other words, the tendency towards ever greater insulation of the bureaucracy from political control" (Bauer and Ege, 2016: 1023).

Why such observations – claiming autonomy and/or authority for organizations – became relevant in the first place, was because scholars had to take note of the fact that IOs tend to venture (sometimes far) beyond their initial mandates. No case illustrates this better than the UN's. Still, in IR, literature on IOs evolve more around the question why states create them, how they are under their creators' influence, and what consequences this might have to their interactions (Abbott and Snidal, 1998 and 2010; Foot et al., 2003; Gstöhl, 2007; Reynaud and Vauday, 2009; Stone, 2011; Hardt, 2016; Novosad and Werker, 2019), also acknowledging that international institutions (a broader term than IO) "have a moderating influence on the plans and actions" of states and their sovereigns (Holsti, 2004). This path thus seems to conclude that self-interest is the answer. Two directions are available from this point, according to Barnett and Duvall (2013): IOs are meant either to have the lasting effect of strengthening, stabilizing and eventually fixing existing power relations[12], or they 'pluralize' it, thus levelling the playing field for the weak. Both directions are interesting for the present case.

If we take a critical stance on the first one, we see that the expanding institutional system after the War, and especially the UN, indeed featured all the requirements Cox memorably listed as expressing the hegemonic role of IOs (1983:138): it embodied the rules which

[12] Importantly, the meaning of power relations should not be restricted to those between states: following the previously described hegemony approach, it might also refer to relations of other actors, beneficiaries of the global hierarchy, be it the elite, globalizing bureaucrats or different advocacy groups.

facilitate the expansion of the hegemonic order (as the rule of international organization for instance); it was a product of a hegemonic world order (as a look on the Security Council composition would immediately show); it legitimized norms of the world order (illustrated by the decade-long unconditional support for free trade policy globally), co-opted the elites of peripheral areas (with both symbolic and financial means) and absorbed counter-hegemonic ideas (like in the case of decolonization). This would be especially interesting if the goal was to develop a critical understanding of the structural bases of global governance from the point of view of the UN. The second direction, however, is more relevant for the current case. Barnett and Duvall argue that liberalism and rationality (defining characteristics of IOs) "are supposed to dilute power and politics", so "they potentially help diffuse power" (2013: 57). By rationality, they mean the rule of reason and rational organization as a key feature of modern bureaucracies.

In the present case it is all the more interesting because of the common points in bureaucratic and governmental rationality. The following quote from the authors makes it especially clear. According to them, IOs aspire to have: "control on the basis of expert knowledge; the division of the organization into spheres of competence and specialization; the establishment of procedures that standardize its responses to the environment, and the creation of a decision process that is driven not by politics but rather by the objective application of rules in a fair-minded way" (2013: 51). These aspirations are "the best features of bureaucracy", but they also neatly fit in a governmentality agenda: claiming and acting based on 'value-free' expertise, the professional categorization of issues and activities, and a logic moving away from the 'traditional' logic of politics are all key features in governmentality. Thus, a valuable connection can be made between bureaucratic and governmental rationalities with regards to IOs, one that has already been started to be explored (Neumann and Sending, 2010: 132-156) which connection is put into use here, especially in the part analysing the production of the Secretary-General's reports in the Secretariat.

Turning back to the approaches to international organizations in IR, the question seems to be if IOs function autonomously, or they are bound by their creators' interests. Here, the first option is more relevant, so it should be discussed in some detail. Probably the most influential direction among the different explanations has been 'Principal-Agent

Theory', which, rooted in the idea of rational choice, claims that IOs are 'agents', with a delegated authority from 'principals', which are states. The logic behind this delegation is utility maximization, as states intend to reap the most benefit, while minimize the costs of this transaction (Tamm and Snidal, 2013: 134; see further: Hawkins et al., 2006; Vaubel, 2006). What seems to serve better the purposes of this project is a more ambitious answer, given by Barnett and Finnemore in their seminal work (2004): they found that they have their 'own' authority, which stands on their socially valued, 'progressive' missions, which they carry out in their rational, technocratic, impartial and nonviolent ways (2004: 5). These latter qualities, as suggested above, could and should be fruitfully integrated with the governmentality approach, a key contribution of which is its capacity to but such observations in broader social and historical context.

Barnett and Finnemore had another crucial insight, answering the question why do IOs expand in their agency. As they explain, IOs are often created with vague mission statements and mandates, and it is the bureaucracy that translates these into actual policies. They engender what they judge as 'good policies', often competing with state interests (2004: 5). This formulation offers another intellectual passage to global governmentality studies, so it seems to fit well into this study's argumentation. According to Foucault, to govern is to bring about 'the right disposition of things' (1991). This activity obviously requires a knowledge of what is this 'right' disposition or, in other words, what are good policies (or governance). Bureaucracies do this by transforming information into knowledge, by giving it meaning, value and purpose (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 7). It is as much a discursive as it is a bureaucratic construction, which makes both perspectives handy in the subsequent analyses (especially with the interviews).

Drawing a conclusion from the study of IOs as a precedent to the study of global governance, the question is not really what happens to states' sovereignty when they create IOs, how is it transposed to a supranational level, or how one could explain the actual authority and agency of IOs with their untidy acquisition of elements of state sovereignty. The point is that theirs is a different form of authority, based on a political rationality which is not related to sovereignty in any way – at least not in the case of IOs. While the reason of the state and the rationality of government coexist in the modern

state, it might be a well-placed question if IOs in global governance function entirely according to the latter rationality. David Lake risks to say that "global governance is not delegated from states, but is as real as the authority possessed by any state" (2010: 599). What if we took up and take his bold approach further, and saw IOs' authority in global governance not as supplementary or auxiliary, but instead as one that is rooted in their agency – the mere fact that they are governing? After all, this is indeed the reason why they were created in the first place (and certainly not to attain falling pieces of state sovereignty in obscure ways). In this sense, IOs are the perfect governing subjects, better fitted for the role than states themselves, since they do not have to endure the potential tensions originating in the coexistence of the two political rationalities[13]. Using this as a point of departure, thus, seems to offer more than imagining IOs in different state-analogies.

Regimes, along with other elements of neoliberal IR theory – such as institutions, international law, or different forms of transnational cooperation and networks – are equally often discussed under the more encompassing label of global governance today, which suggests on the one hand that the latter is imagined predominantly in and with liberal terms, and on the other hand, that it might indeed be read as being simply 'old wine in new bottles' (Kacowicz, 2012). This latter assessment is accurate and inaccurate at the same time: indeed, the phenomena that are covered by the term reach back to centuries, so the wine is indeed very old. The fact that they came to be in the spotlight of mainstream scholarly interest in the second half of the 20th century is interesting only from the point of view of the production and reproduction of knowledge, as explained below. Kratochwil and Ruggie provide an excellent illustration in their 1986 article, showing how different, but indeed deeply related international phenomena got theorized on the pages of the most influential journal in the discipline, *International Organization* (Reference 1. in Appendix 4.).

It is also argued, however, that framing such (and various other) topics under global governance signals a qualitative shift, which accounts for the transformations in world politics perceived to be cumulating in the 90s – meaning that not only the bottle is new,

[13] Importantly, this is not to say that IOs have sovereign powers, as advanced, for example, by Sarooshi (2005), quite the contrary. I argue that such analogies merely evidence our limits of imagination, as touched upon already on the previous pages.

but so is the wine. Recalling the central aim of this study, this question will be elaborated on repeatedly throughout the following pages. What is important to see at this point, is the catch-all nature of global governance as an idea in IR, growing out of the core issues problematized in the neo-neo debate and developed further by a variety of scholars standing on the grounds of other theoretical traditions. While it can be considered as the strength, it is also claimed to be the core weakness of global governance studies. One of Rosenau's definitions, for example, sheds light on its extreme flexibility, as well as its inherent limitations: it is "a summary term for highly complex and widely disparate activities that may culminate in a modicum of worldwide coherence or that may collapse into pervasive disarray. In the event of either outcome, it would still be global governance in the sense that the sum of efforts by widely disaggregated goal-seeking entities will have supplemented, perhaps even supplanted, states as the primary sources of governance on a global scale" (1999: 294). This might be a consequence of the fact that the single most important contextual feature of the period which engendered[14] the concept is change.

Change, while being a desperately general term, can still serve as a useful starting point for understanding the emergence of the idea of global governance. Even if one only takes into account the post WW2 period, it has been perceived to be unfolding in various locations, fields and on various levels of life giving many the impression of its acceleration – as the introductory quote from Cuéllar's report powerfully illustrated. Most often this experience is understood as connected to the contemporary wave of globalization, following the crises of the late 60s and early 70s. This turn, as argued by many, introduced the era of global (neoliberal) capitalism, entailing numerous structural shifts, economic reforms, and resulting social transformations on both structural and cognitive grounds. These developments might be approached from various directions ranging from positions on post-industrial societies, a third industrial revolution, the rise of global movements, changes in state sovereignty, cultural homogenization and its counter-tendencies, cycles of capitalism or the sense of a growing collective uncertainty. Here, what is interesting is the convergence around the idea of recent and profound change.

[14] The question here is, again, not when actual international/global governance arrangements were made for the first time, neither when this phrase was first used. The interesting thing is that the idea of a global governance complex and its necessity dispersed significantly in the early 90s.

Of course no system is fixed or static; change has been (the only) constant throughout centuries of human history, and social theory (broadly speaking) has been interested in large part in its study and interpretations. Still, the experience of an accelerating globalization has visibly pressed scholars and decision-makers to interpret how most structures – material and immaterial alike – have been transforming in the past decades. Such experiences have unfolded, as we have seen above, hand in hand with scholarly approaches to change, spreading from the late 70s onward and culminating around the end of the millennium. The emergence and invigoration of the concept of global governance can also be seen as such a reaction. It is now common sense to discuss it in terms of change (Simai, 1994; Kiss J., 2009; Weiss and Daws, 2018), but the exact conception of change is not indifferent. It will thus be discussed in some detail in chapter III/3., which introduces the term 'sublation' for interpreting change in the political rationality of 'the international'.

3. The 'overlapping contexts of emergence': knowledge/power in global governance

The chapter revises how IR scholars have been theorizing global governance from the early 90s onward. As this study builds around the essentiality of knowledge/power relations in social analyses, the review of 'mainstream' contributions is complemented with what I call 'practical contributions', presenting how a diverse set of practitioners, and especially IOs play a role in the semantic construction of global governance. The key insight is that neither the academic mainstream, nor practitioners award the prominence to either knowledge or power that they would deserve, which calls for the examination of alternative approaches. After having screened IR for these, I point out the differences, gaps, and possible points for integration between the most promising ones (the governmentality approach itself is discussed in full detail in the methodological chapter).

As it has been argued earlier, in the case of global governance, it is not enough to look at scholarly contributions, as there is a clear duality in how the term emerged and got popularized. This duality is acknowledged by the majority of the literature, which tends to see the publication of *Governance without Government* by Rosenau and Czempiel in 1992 and that of the CGG's report *Our Global Neighbourhood* in 1995, along with the first issue of the journal *Global Governance* as a 'holy trinity' in the conception of the term. The 'overlapping contexts of emergence' (Hofferberth, 2016) in terms of 'real-world context' and 'disciplinary context', however, should only be separated provisionally, for analytical purposes as the point is exactly to see global governance in its complexity: its peculiarity is that we are not facing a mere theoretical innovation, but

an idea which has, for long been deeply embedded in the structures of global decision-making.

As Horkheimer put it, "the intervention of reason in the processes whereby knowledge and its object are constituted, or the subordination of these processes to conscious control, does not take place ... in a purely intellectual world, but coincides with the struggle for certain real ways of life" (1972: 245). The concept of global governance is an excellent case in point of this argument as scholarly formulations usually coincide with the practical use, advanced primarily by different policy networks/organizations – ranging from the United Nations to NGOs and various ad-hoc panels. The two types of usage of the term (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006: 189-194), denoting on the one hand observable phenomena in world politics (the advance of global social movements, civil society and international organizations, changing role of states, private organizations, public-private networks, transnational rule making, and forms of private authority, etc.) and a respective political agenda on the other (as defined for example by the advisory groups such as the CGG, and later the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance)[15] often causes misunderstandings and provides opportunity for criticism: as suggested above, it is often claimed that the term lacks clarity and is too flexible in its meaning which makes it neatly fashionable for whatever research goals (Finkelstein 1995; Latham 1999; Murphy 2000; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014).

As opposed to this, I aim to show how "attempts to reduce the concept to a particular meaning does not appear to be the most preferable strategy for sharpening its analytical value" (Hofferberth, 2016). An immediate cause for this lies in the interconnectedness of knowledge and power, an issue that is absolutely central to this study and will be elaborated in detail later on. Here the question is summarized to the extent that it is needed to formulate a stance from which mainstream global governance literature can be surveyed. Since Michel Foucault, the mutually constitutive relationship between power and knowledge has been meticulously elaborated on many occasions: we know how knowledge determines what is thinkable and unthinkable, advisable and damaging, rewardable and punishable on the level of both polity and policy, and in the same time,

[15] The list can of course have different emphases. Hoffmann and Ba, for example, identify it as: the management of global problems, the growth of (liberal) world order, a new analytic approach (2005).

how power enables (and enforces) certain patterns of knowledge and certain truths to dominate over the alternatives in a given historical context[16].

Perhaps it can be said without exaggeration that the identification of this link and its elaboration has been one of the biggest advances in recent social theory, which has been determining in large part the development of many old disciplines – as well as inducing the appearance of many new. As argued earlier, the mainstream of IR has not been affected significantly by such advances. Analyses of power remained unreflective of how it is embedded in historically specific structures of knowledge, while structures of knowledge remained largely unproblematized. Unsurprisingly, it entails that most often power and knowledge appear separately in mainstream literature on global governance – if they appear at all.

3.1 Academic contributions from the mainstream

While every literature review starts from what realists have to say about the issue in point, the discussion on (neo)realists' contribution to the idea and theory of global governance will be rather short here. As suggested above, they contributed mostly by being the sceptical opposition, the audience which needs to be convinced that the unimaginable has just happened, and something altered the eternal logic of conflict in the anarchical system. What should not be neglected, however, are neorealism's aforementioned debates with neoliberalism, forming some of the fragile consensuses that exist in mainstream IR today. These debates often unfolded around issues like possibilities of cooperation, or the apparent promise of institutionalism, discussing elements of global governance without necessarily referring to it (Jervis, 1978 and 1999; Mearsheimer, 1994; Glaser, 1994). Some still argue that realists are too easily dismissed, as they did study cooperation, international organizations, and most of all the nature of the international system, which many claim to still constitute the core of what we understand by global governance (Charrette and Sterling-Folker, 2013).

Still, Charrette and Sterling-Folker admit that realists struggle with most of the claims made in global governance literature, primarily because of bolder ones about the changing

[16] As this is a basic assumption in Foucault's thought, it appears in many of his writings. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings* is a volume organized around this topic (Edited and translated by Colin Gordon, 1980).

role of states and the international system. As they put it, "the term global governance misdirects attention from deeper structures of power that shape patterns of global management by implying that these activities occur independently of states" (2013:95). As the following review of liberal contributions also show, realists are correct to criticize a recurrent motive of the most popular understandings, namely implying that the processes of global governance are autonomous or even automatic, and thereby these accounts obfuscate relations and mechanisms of power in the story. Their understandings of power (and knowledge) are, however, rather simple, a characteristic that makes most IR analyses start by criticizing realism.

This latter claim holds also when it comes to the other end of the mainstream: in liberal IR scholarship, sound analyses of power are rather rare, especially when it comes to discussions about global governance. By soundness I mean an integrated and integrative approach, going beyond the traditional power-as-property (complemented by power-as-relation) approaches (Baldwin, 2002). Of course, this is not to say that there is no mention of power of any kind in liberal accounts, merely that they remain segmented in scope and – affected also by widespread positivist exigencies in the discipline – mostly approach the question from a rational, and instrumental position, limiting understanding. The most important contributions to power literature probably come from Joseph Nye and his co-author, Robert Keohane, introducing concepts, among others, like 'soft power' and 'complex interdependence' (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Nye, 1990), influenced by the rapprochement with neorealism. Approaching global governance more specifically, the focus on rational actors and their choices, as well as the consequential instrumental views about global governance remain (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Nye, 2000; Zürn, 2000; Cooper et al., 2008; Abbott and Snidal, 2010, Alois, 2018).

As Levi-Faur argues, much of (global) governance literature follow the spirit of Karl Deutsch's classic and agree that "it might be profitable to look upon government somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem of steering" (Deutsch in Levi-Faur, 2012: 3; Peters, 2012). As the example of Weiss and Thakur (two of the most influential theorists of global governance) also shows, this result in the avoidance of the concept of power in relation to global governance, and the fact that even when used, it is being neutralized. According to their definition, global governance refers

to “existing collective arrangements to solve problems” or “the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, society, markets, and the state in the international arena” (2010: 6). Notwithstanding these subjects are admittedly “wielders and objects of international public power” (ibid), actual relations of power between them are generally ignored, as are the nuanced insights about the nature of power, pioneered by different critical approaches in the past decades. Other authors typically produce similar definitions – and reproduce similar problems: Keohane and Nye, for example, see governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group” (2000:13); and when it is imagined globally, they suggest to see it as a network, “rather than as a set of hierarchies” (2000:14).

When it comes to knowledge, neoliberal accounts might acknowledge its functions in global governance, however, not as being explicitly in relation with power. While major works have been published on the growing importance of knowledge to and in the UN, for example (Thakur et al., 2005; Weiss and Thakur 2010; Svenson 2016; Gordenker and Jönsson 2018), they seem to be untouched by recent epistemological and methodological revolutions, the ones on which this study is building. Weiss and Thakur talk about producing knowledge, defining norms and standards, providing guidance in policy-formulation, creating institutions, etc. when they describe the role of the United Nations, and very importantly civil actors in global governance (2010), and sum these crucial activities under the title of an ‘ideational role’, similar to that elaborated by Rosenau in his seminal essay: governance, according to him, is “as dependent on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters” (1992:4). This slippery layer thus encompasses everything “what people dimly sense, incisively perceive, or otherwise understand are the arrangements through which their affairs are handled” (1992:14). The analysis, however, stops at denoting the role: its sound relationship to power, as well as to other factors, stay uncovered, leaving the account at a descriptive state (which is, as we have seen deeply prescriptive).

Defining actors in global governance falls under similar treatment: they are collected and described rigorously, but without scrutinizing power relations among them. If, however, one can hardly talk about innocent or neutral description, this practice already seems

problematic. Also, if it is acknowledged that actors never act in a power vacuum[17], "the co-constitutive, internal relations of structural positions that define what kinds of social beings actors are" need to be taken into account, as they produce "the very social capacities of structural, or subject positions in direct relation to one another, and the associated interests, that underlie and dispose action" (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 18). Barnett and Duvall called this structural power in global governance, basis for another important type, which they call productive power (an idea strongly associated with knowledge/power in a Foucauldian understanding), elaborated in detail in different constructivist frameworks (further below).

These latter characteristics are among the most important reasons why another, potentially relevant, classical IR approach are not useful in my project. The English School is often thought to occupy a place on the frontiers between realism, liberalism and constructivism. One of its unifying features is that it sees the present form of 'the international' as a society of states, in which its constituents operate as sovereign equals, based on the institutions that guide their conduct. While this approach has its merits compared to the above discussed ones, I argue that it is not the best avenue to get closer to the questions I have. A first, and rather simple reason would be its frequently problematized state-centrism, which, as in the case of realists, does not mean that it refuses the idea of multiple actors in 'the international', rather that it regards states as the ones 'pulling the strings', which applies, among others, also to the role of IOs. This leaves, among others, its understanding of power rather underdeveloped, at least from the perspective of this study.

Furthermore, as it develops its norm-oriented approach from very different philosophy of science ground then constructivism – primarily from international law and history – it makes it a real 'pragmatic' approach, as Barry Buzan explains in an interview (2013). It is an admittedly 'rationalist' approach to study interstate relations (Wight, 1960), so the fact that it is – and especially around the 90s it was – often described as a constructivist one (Dunne, 2005), does not change that scholars writing in this tradition have very

[17] It might be enough to consider a couple of evident examples: the petition of a small, local NGO does not resonate in the global space with the same force as a report by a UN body – if it resonates at all. Similarly, business decisions of a medium-sized company do not alter the character of an industry, or affect consumption patterns in entire continents, as do that of transnational corporations.

different questions, focus, and also conclusions. While English School scholars have made valuable contributions to the study of international/world society, the norms and institutions that 'make the world hang together' in their view, have no explicit links to structures of knowledge/power, discourses, or any other objects that I try to focus on.

An interesting point, however, as one of its proponents stress, is that the school has the capacity to transcend the realist-liberal controversy over power/norms in global governance, as it does not grant absolute validity neither to the legal-normative aspects, nor to the power aspect (Dunne, 2005:76). This in-between position is, however, insufficient in itself. While their attention to history and the historical embeddedness of orders is welcome, their approach tends to focus more on institutions, a 'meso-level', and thus says less about how these are informed by structures of knowledge, or power, different from state power, known too well from realisms. What makes it interesting still is that the above claim is, in fact, a similar one to what Neumann and Sending formulated in relation to the governmentality approach (2007). Directions in which English School can possibly be integrated with governmentality theory is explored further by Alexander Astrov in an edited volume (2011). As these directions lead to questions like how states manage their affairs in high politics, it is not explored further here.

3.2 Practical contributions from the mainstream

The review, at this point, should be complemented with those contributions which channel these ideas into global decision making. As said above, the idea of global governance was made possible in the specific historical context after the end of the Cold War, where an advent of scholarly attempts to reformulate their understanding of the international system – securing the status quo – came together with a process of historical realizations (of 'new' challenges) on a global policy level. A recent book examining the UN as a knowledge system[18] draws attention to a further interesting concurrence: it describes the 90s as the dawn of an era where international organizations "have begun to view knowledge as *the* primary asset with which they must achieve their operational objectives" (Svenson, 2016: 9)[19]. This era was introduced by the World Bank's 1998-99

[18] The title and content are promising, but the approach is not particularly useful in this project, so it is not discussed in much detail.
[19] Italics in the original.

report, *Knowledge for Development* and followed by similar ones from other organizations, such as the UNESCO and UNDP.

What is even better-suited here is another event the book mentions, from the same period, as an event among the first ones linking knowledge to an important field of UN action, development: the conference entitled *Global Knowledge '97*, where Kofi Annan, then-UN Secretary-General made the following remarks: "Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family" (Annan in Svenson, 2016: 231). The 90s thus, once again, seem to be the period in which the fusion of theoretical and practical knowledge can be examined. This is, of course, not a power-neutral coincidence. Diane Stone approaches these relationships with the term 'international knowledge networks', where knowledge actors "exchange resources (knowledge and expertise) with other actors (decision-makers, opinion-formers, producers) to pursue shared interests", reproducing the existing, asymmetrical power relations (2004: 125; also: 2012).

As the CGG's report is granted such a distinguished place in reviews about global governance, it is reasonable to discuss it in more detail, as suggested earlier. A first step should be to understand the context in which the structural power of the Commission and its Commissioners can then be assessed. The panel grew out of the so called Stockholm Initiative, launched by leading politicians[20] in 1991. It followed in the footsteps of a series of initiatives in the 80s, all of them dealing with global problems[21]. These bodies did not only share a common goal or language: importantly, there were also a "myriad of [personal] connections" between them which makes it no wonder that they have been "tagged as series of exercises driven by a global managerial class" (Cooper and English, 2005: 11). Evidence for this is mounted in Cooper and English's referenced chapter, which is part of an essay collection that analyses the work of global commissions (and which is far from being critical toward the global governance project itself).

[20] Ali Alatas, Patricio Aylwin Azocar, Benazir Bhutto, Willy Brandt, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Manuel Camacho Solis, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Ingvar Carlsson, Jimmy Carter and Bernard Chidzero

[21] The Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance enlists the Brandt Commission (North-South Commission), the Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development), the Nyerere Commission (South Commission) as forerunners.

Among other important points, it poses the question of 'systemic ownership' of the ideas which are mirrored by the work of global commissions and lists among possible candidates the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations system (2005: 12-14), which is in itself telling in terms of structural power. As for ideological ownership, the authors seem to agree with the assessment elaborated above: they also found that "these projects fit comfortably into a liberal reformist framework", which view "is especially pronounced in the Report of the Commission on Global Governance" (2005: 13). As shown in an analysis of the role of such knowledge networks in global governance, power and authority of groups of experts "when interacting in policy networks lies in knowing how to locate and juxtapose critical pieces of information and being able to organise certain modes of understanding that others will demand" (Stone, 2004: 140).

As it has been explained, in the context of the 90s, demand for 'global solutions for global problems' in a liberal framework was growing large and the Commission did not fall short of such expectations: according to their Declaration (The Stockholm Initiative, 1991) the common point around which they built the Initiative was a consensus that action on global problems needed to be taken collectively (a perpetual point in the discourse of world politics as global governance) with the aim of reforming the current system under the ethos of efficiency. Governance as defined in the report "is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest" (CGG, 1995).

Globally speaking, understood as such, it should be more than the sum of intergovernmental relationships: "it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence" (ibid). This definition is clearly parallel with the ones offered by liberal theorists. It can be understood as analytical, referring to observable phenomena in world politics, even though it was developed by a commission of policy-makers. The duality, however, appears as the chapter continues with some core

assumptions about how global governance should look like. Acknowledging that "there is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures", the authors also state that "governance must take an integrated approach to questions of human survival and prosperity" (ibid), and in the rest of their report, they carefully sketch the contours of such an approach, which result in a more or less concrete model.

In the subsequent chapters the report discusses the core values on which the system should stand, a renewed conception of security for the 21st century, the nature and challenges of economic interdependence, the salutary reforms of the UN system, and instruments to achieve a global rule of law. As a critique argues, however, the report's propositions stay in line with problem solvers' usual conservativism (Schechter, 1999: 244): proposed solutions do not (attempt to) look beyond the limits of their own logic, leaving the report often in contradiction between ideals and proposals, which might, instead of contributing to a better system, only ensure better consciousness for global policy-makers. If the initial premises of this review regarding the relations between power and knowledge are accepted, the pitfall of practical formulations are clear: "The supposed evidence of the world problems entails the danger that the political controversies over the hegemonic definition of problems will be underestimated" (Brand, 2005: 166).

3.3 Critical contributions

As explained in the Introduction, 'critical' might mean endeavours both in a methodological and a normative sense. This chapter groups together diverse approaches to global governance, ranging from different constructivisms, all the way to feminist understandings. They have in common a subtler understanding of power and/or knowledge, and therefore the capacity to go beyond the aforementioned deadlocks of mainstream ideas. In the past decades, some intellectual bridges have successfully been built by scholars following a 'softer' critical agenda, most notably by 'conventional constructivists', who, to a certain extent, opened the field from an epistemological point of view and popularized important notions and frameworks, such as how the field of IR is interlaced with structures of knowledge, identities, norms and ideas, and how one should switch perspective to see them (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992 and 1999; Lapid and

Kratochwil, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Ruggie, 1998a and 1998b; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Guzzini, 2005; Checkel and Katzenstein, 1996 and 2009).

”The point is” – as Jim George once put it – “that the ‘descriptive’ knowledge of mainstream social theory is always inherently and powerfully prescriptive, in that it is the knowledge form that gives (rational-scientific) meaning to the decision making procedures, policy formulations, and general rules of thought and behaviour in the modern world” (George, 1994: 157). This realization, lacking so badly from the approaches summarized in the previous section, has increasing relevance in how global governance is understood. Contrary to the role that (neo)liberal scholars usually assign to it, its so-called ideational role enables “the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope…discursive processes and practices produce social identities and capacities as they give meaning to them” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 20). Producing subjects, delimiting meanings all have the too often neglected (side)effects of omitting, silencing and ignoring, and thus creating a world which is then being stated as objective reality.

An important interpretation of the above problems and generally how knowledge/power functions in global governance is found in the essay collection edited by Barnett and Duvall (which is, in itself among the most important attempts to understand power in global governance). It also brings us very close to the approach of this study, inquiring into the ‘epistemic construction’ of global governance (Adler and Bernstein, 2005). The authors use Foucault’s *épisteme* to point at the ‘background knowledge’ that is implied in the idea, which, similarly to rationality, limits the scope of categories in which we think, discuss, define and address problems, our understanding of who is friend and who is foe, and what counts as legitimate power (2005:297). They thus look beyond the above criticized imaginations of power, without ‘missing reality’, which is often brought up against such critical understandings by problem-solvers on the other end of the epistemological continuum.

As they elegantly show, the US for example, might be an important force in global governance, but to understand the basis on which its power stands should perhaps be given priority over simply assessing it: “American power begins with social science

discourse and knowledge generated in an American epistemic context, and continues with its application in practice, mainly through economics and business administration and their embeddedness in international organizations, and tacit acceptance by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other nonstate actors. Thus, US power depends on the diffusion of a global governance episteme, which, to be effective, must take the appearance of being scientific, technical, and universal" (2005:299). They summarize the epistemic requirements of global governance in a table (Reference 2. In Appendix 4.), offering also an analytical matrix to do research with such an abstract notion. While this model has many important insights, it does not reflect on the core issue of this study – how *épistemes* (or rationalities) change over time – so its utility to the present research is limited. It stays, however an outstanding example of how knowledge/power is reflected upon in an integrated manner in the critical literature on global governance.

Similarly nuanced ideas are to be found in further critical approaches, working with post-positivist epistemologies. Feminist IR is an important example, aiming "not only to understand how global governance is gendered, but also to investigate the ways in which global governance can be transformed" (Rai and Waylen, 2008:1). As in the case of other fields of feminist/gender studies, the two faces of criticism (methodological and normative) fuses in feminist global governance scholarship. They problematize various issues ranging from women's place and role in global institutions of governance, the dynamics of social movements, to challenging the language and norms of global governance (Meyer and Prügl, 1999; Caglar et al., 2013; Bakker, 2015). Gendered global governance analyses often work with mixed methodologies, often aiming to integrate discursive and materialist structures (Rai and Waylen, 2008:6-7). These characteristics suggest that the current research could rely on these voices at various points, such as the deconstruction of paradigmatic truths in IR, or the discussions about subjectivity and agency.

Another branch of alternative readings of world politics with great relevance is what is generally referred to as 'green' IR. Its relevance does not necessarily derive from the oft-noted fact that the ecological crisis constitutes the textbook case for a 'truly' global challenge, and the analysis of how it has been met by global action on part of IGOs, NGOs

and various other actors from the 60s onward, providing *the* case for global governance. While this 'practical' side of the issue is also noteworthy, for the current research, the relevance of green and environmentalist IR lies more in their profoundly critical approach, seceding from some core assumptions and truths of modern political thinking, thus shedding some light on the knowledge/power nexus explained above. As one of the key green scholars summarizes, "green political theorists have called into question anthropocentrism or human chauvinism – the idea that humans are the apex of evolution, the centre of value and meaning in the world, and the only beings that possess moral worth" (Eckersley, 2007:251).

By this, they do not only formulate a critique towards what we termed 'mainstream' thinking, but also towards many 'critical' approaches, being uncritical about how modern knowledge structures inform their theories: "the modern concept of nature", for instance, "is based on Cartesian dualism and the assumption that the natural and the social are ontologically different" (Dingler, 2005: 210). On these bases, throughout centuries, a knowledge system was built which separated humans from the ecosystem, imagining the relationship only in terms of hierarchy and exploitation – which knowledge structures are transposed also to how global governance is imagined. It is enough to glance at what CGG's report has to say about 'the environment': the Earth is systematically regarded as a repository of resources, serving economic growth as the only legitimate aim for human population[22]. Pointing at such problems is a genuinely critical endeavour, an attempt to depart from modern rationalities, as understood by this study.

The other main direction of being 'critical' is found in different Marxist and post-Marxist theories. Neo-Gramsciananism is highlighted among these as the one that has the most potential to be integrated with the current study's approach[23]. A potential need for such a combination arises from particular weaknesses of both, as argued below. This project will not take this step, as it would burden the methodology too much and distract the focus. On certain points of the study, however, some Gramscian viewpoints are (and have already been) added, to reflect on the further possibilities for research. Starting from

[22] The report only steps out of its anthropocentrism on rare occasions, in most part talking about the *planet's basic life- support systems* (which can be understood as a representation of a more holistic view of the ecosystem and humans' place within), and much less about *other forms of life* (Ch. 3. and 7.).
[23] Such a combination is more advanced outside of IR, strictly speaking. See Smart, 1983; Jessop, 1990; Woodiwiss, 1990; Fraser, 2003; Joseph, 2004; Melegh, 2006)

Robert Cox's classic assertion, it should be clear that theories are always 'for someone for some purpose' (1981: 128). While this simple but essential thesis is also acknowledged in global governmentality theory, my main critique is that scholars studying such arrangements have not been particularly interested in knowing more about that 'someone' and that 'purpose'. Their interest stays methodological and directed at mechanisms instead of the composition of material structures which are hypothetically behind the mechanisms.

Marxists on the other hand have never fallen short of such tasks. When it comes to the study of global governance, they do not stop at identifying actors, naturally treating them as given (as mainstream theorists do), or scrutinizing how shaping the agenda should also be seen as setting meanings and constructing subjects, appropriate means to achieve goals, or forming norms (as governmentality scholars do). They point at the structural positions of those actors and the (structural) power embedded in their positions in a globally understood capitalist system (Gill, 1995a; Cox and Sinclair, 1996; Cammack, 2003; Stephen, 2014; Taylor, 2017). What global governance has been extremely successful in so far, according to neo-Gramscians, has been "fostering…the internationalization (now, the globalization) of industrial capitalism" (Murphy, 2013: 24). Neo-Gramscians do not necessarily trouble with the meaning of governance: they are much more interested in actual global practices producing and reproducing hierarchies and inequalities, social unrest and environmental degradation worldwide. They do not fail to make the structures of global capitalism accountable for massive global problems and occasionally they even offer strategies for resistance and meaningful social change.

The hierarchical nature of this system have primarily been problematized and studied by historians, economists and sociologists from the broadly defined Marxist tradition. While they are located 'outside' of strictly understood IR, their results have infiltrated into debates on world order and global governance: gaining prominence during the 80s and owing primarily to the work of Robert Cox, neo-Gramscians gave a renewed relevance to Marxist analysis in IR. They have written extensively on questions of world order as being embedded in the structures of global capitalism using and revitalizing Gramscian concepts, most notably that of hegemony to represent the collective of elements that uphold the contemporary order (Gill, 1991, 1993 and 2015; Murphy, 1994; Robinson,

2005). Out of these roots emerged a strand of critical global governance analysis, offering also various orientations. Stephen Gill's summary of approaches includes directions which emphasize how "the outlook and interests of the most powerful states" are reflected by global governance, which understand it in terms of (neo)imperialism, or other forms of domination mediated through international organizations and, importantly, also analyses which focus on social and political forces enabled by globalization (2015: 7-9).

Looking critically at the origins of global governance is of utmost importance. This, however, cannot be done without exploring and exposing complex relations of power within such a system. Critical approaches (in a Coxian sense), very importantly, share an interest in power, understood as a complex phenomenon with both cognitive and material elements. Governmentality scholars elaborate in most part on cognitive ones and the meaning of governance. They argue for the applicability of Foucault's concept even in the absence of a world state, based on naturalized/neutralized ideas and norms, practices and policies advanced by a range of internationally (globally) conceivable actors. Their motives are less emancipatory in the classic sense: they are not blind to the structural nature of power but they do not put it in the middle of their analyses nor do they offer ways out for the global multitude. The strive for emancipation targets great truths of modernity, merely claiming the right to think and analyse differently, and to engage critically some of the paradoxes of global politics, based on outworn claims of Enlightenment reason. Dean even argues for the avoidance of 'global or radical' positions in governmentality analysis (2010:46-50), rooting his argumentation in Foucault's own work.

While Foucault's relation to Marxism and structuralism in general remains controversial from many aspects, it is important to note that he acknowledged the interdependence of the two strands of critique, as the accumulation of power and capital were parallel processes: "each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other" (Foucault, 1995:221). It is true, however that the relationship between the two processes "remains to be specified" in his *oeuvre* (Rabinow, 1984:18), which probably explains the relatively low number of works combining structural and post-structural analysis in this sense (Gill, 1995a and 1995b; Lemke, 2002; Brand, 2005; Weidner, 2009;

Joseph, 2012 and 2017)[24]. Jonathan Joseph's 2017 article is especially important, as it is aimed at setting a research agenda for the combination of hegemony and governmentality.

Selby, in his reflective critique of global governmentality theory also argues for a perspective of complementarity by stressing that "Foucault was an analyst of the 'how' of power, Marxist theory focuses above all on the central 'why' of power within capitalist systems" (2007:340). In spite of their shortcomings, such critical understandings – being themselves drives of change – have so far been more successful in comprehending the nature of change and in pointing at core discrepancies in global governance than the ones I grouped under the 'mainstream' label. The need for such intellectual work seems more and more urgent as the state of change is increasingly becoming a constant.

III. METHODOLOGY: KEY CONCEPTS AND GENERAL APPROACH

In this chapter, after the conclusions of the literature review, I propose a governmentality approach for the study of the research question, for its capacity to integrate thinking about knowledge, power and the study of international organizations. As argued in the Introduction, global governance and the way it has been studied within IR is in tight connection with the way Secretaries-General have been constructing, through their discourses a subjectivity for the Organization in the past 70+ years. Examining this connection, we find an ultimate form of knowledge in play, described in a Foucauldian framework as (political) rationality. Having this triad as a research problem promises, first of all, a constructivist epistemology and an interpretive agenda (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006), with a focus on meaning and understanding, driven by the realization that social reality is only comprehensible through language and interpretation. As George put it: "the critical tasks are to illustrate how the textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe (…) the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world" (1994:191). From all the variety of interpretive methodologies out there, I take a radical position by relying primarily on post-

[24] An important antecedent to such synthetizing endeavours is to be found in Pierre Bourdieu's work, often referred to as constructivist structuralism or structuralist constructivism, illuminating the complex relationship between structures and agency (Bourdieu, 1987). See in more detail in chapter IV/1.2.

structuralist (IR) theory and Foucauldian discourse analytical methods. This chapter gives a general introduction into both.

Post-structuralism, as a more-or-less confinable branch of IR (Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Doty, 1993 and 1996; Campbell, 1998; Milliken, 1999; Demendy, 2002; Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Epstein, 2008 and 2011; Calkivik, 2017) should be understood in the wider context of the post-modern movement and its intellectual currents. As touched upon in chapter II/2., this tradition gained prominence in the 60s and 70s, primarily in France, through the work of such authors as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, and had an enormous effect on the whole of social sciences. Throughout the past decades, it has been defined in many ways, but all assessments seem to agree on the motive of motion playing a role: a shift in thought and expression, a "slowly emerging cultural, transformation in Western societies, a change in sensibility" (Huyssens in Harvey, 1991:39), which has been successfully deconstructing the intellectual achievements and certitudes of the Enlightenment. Harvey states "its total acceptance of the ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic" (1991: 44) as its most startling feature, claiming that "postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all there is" (ibid). The nature of this change is yet unknown, but most probably it should neither be under-, nor overrated. What is sure, however, is that this theme (change) reappears over and over again in the study of global governance, and thus in this research as well.

To understand the gist of these matters, it might also be important to try the impossible, and summarize briefly 'what is modernity'. The question has probably an infinite number of answers, so what seems reasonable is to extract an essence out of the main contributions, showing that while authors' views vary in emphases, they agree more or less on the content (Turner, 1990). Elements like the rule of reason, transformation of time and space, rational organization, universality, objectivity and an emancipatory agenda appear in most accounts, along with observations on the centrality of 'the great transformation' to capitalism, industrialism, evolving individualism and historically specific forms of rule and domination. A central theme – and indeed the main point of postmodern critique – is the insistence on linear historiographies and 'grand narratives' about truth, progress, purpose and means available for mankind to reach an ideal, yet

uncrystallised state in the future. The next section discusses global governance in the modern/postmodern context and provides the working definitions for this project.

1. Global governance in the context of the modern-postmodern debate

The present chapter is the first one to introduce the key concepts of this study. It starts with a working definition of global governance, which is used in the subsequent discussions. I show how global governance as a discourse relate to the debate over modernity and postmodernity, contextualizing also the subsequent discussions about Foucauldian concepts. I argue that both modernity and postmodernity are important contexts for understanding the global governance discourse.

Out of the hundreds of possible conceptualizations (which are discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter), this research relies on Ulrich Brand's, who uses global governance as a hegemonic discourse of world politics (2005). His inventory includes core elements of this discourse which stress 1. the globalization of many social, economic and political processes which makes it impossible for states to deal with them on their own, 2. along with picturing (often particular) problems as 'world problems', 3. which thus could and should be dealt with effectively on a global level (instead of a national one). This happens, as the discourse suggests, in a neutral, 'purely managerial' manner, ensuring 'proficiency' and avoiding charges of power implications. As in the process of globalization states have arguably lost (from) their ability to deal with problems, the global governance discourse generally advises that 4. they should engage in cooperation and dialogue with each other – and other actors as well. Brand finds that 5. emphasizing the multi-actor nature of global governance and 6. this being problematic from the point of view of democracy are also constituents of this discourse.

Here I am trying to show how these ideas fit in the question of modernity versus postmodernity, to contextualize the subsequent discussions about Foucauldian concepts, and bring forth their relevance. As it was suggested in the Introduction, the idea of global governance can be accommodated in the 'project of modernity', but is also representative of a form of social organization which is often characterized with the ambiguous term 'postmodern'. We do not necessarily have to choose, rather try and integrate the different currents to get a complex understanding. While it is better to talk about long transitory periods instead of clearly separable eras, for the sake of concision, the starting point in the discussion of modernity should be the Enlightenment. "Modernity refers to modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century

onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence" (Giddens, 1990:1). Giddens's book on modernity starts with this working definition which designates temporal and spatial origins, offers an understanding (modes of social organization) and devises a dynamism in terms of space and effect. It might prove useful to complement this approach with another influential understanding, which suggests that we should see modernity as a philanthropic project which, sadly, adopted a course the evaluation of which moves between ambiguous and disastrous (Habermas, 1981:3-14)[25].

The main point here is not so much to evaluate the project of modernity, rather to reveal if it is this project that now manifests in the idea of global governance. Such an examination should start from the rationality and structure of domestic governance, the embodiment of which came to be the modern state in Europe. Since the formation of early modern states, and especially since the Treaties of Westphalia, territoriality had been a characteristic of states and politics of utmost importance. The principle of sovereignty (embedded in territoriality) had been the core of the *raison d'état,* the political rationality that had defined political life for centuries (Foucault, 1991; Bartelson, 1995, Weber, 1994). There are a few things to note here: first, deterritorialization and the transformation of sovereignty are now widely acknowledged phenomena, that are, in most accounts, attributed in one way or another to the headway of global capitalism. Second, there is a persistent discourse on long-term tendencies in the political organization of human communities in geographic terms (Jacobson, 1984): "beliefs that we inhabit closed entities accompanied the rise of the nation-state in the nineteenth-century Europe. Such beliefs have not disappeared. Instead they are being refocused, in part by global governance thinking, upon the imaginary of the consumer" (Palan, 1999:68). This narrative suggests that the underlying *ethos* of rationality, the call of efficiency has, for long, drifted people in bigger and bigger communities. Once it was the rationale for empires, other times, for a world state.

[25] This idea – the philanthropic motivation of modernity – is an especially contested one. From critical thinkers to postcolonial scholars it has been rejected over and over again, claiming that violent practices were not malfunctions but logical consequences of modern reason. See for more detail in Guha, 1998; Dussel, 2000 and 2004; Ashcroft et al., 2007; Chakrabarty, 2008.

With time, both aspirations dried up and became discredited either as naïve and idealist – in the case of the world state[26] – or as oppressive and undemocratic (in the case of empires)[27]. Global governance comes as the logical innovation, as a substitute for a global authority, the best we may have in a world composed of states (Weiss and Thakur, 2010; Weiss and Daws, 2018) – coinciding comfortably also with tendencies toward deterritorialization. Turning back to the core features of modernity, the question is, to what extent these are embodied in the idea of global governance? "Modernity is inherently globalising" – says Giddens – "this is evident in some of the most basic characteristics of modern institutions" (1991:63). Perhaps the most obvious example is the rational organization of social life: any conventional definition stresses a management-like governance, effectuated by a complex set of (professional) actors, acting for the common cause.

The management of common affairs in the era of globalization necessarily means "reorganising social relations across large time-space distances" (Giddens, 1991:53), pushing another core feature of modernity to its absolute extremes, meaning also an extreme disembedding of these social relations, another central observation from Giddens for the case of modernity. These developments, praised for their efficiency, parsimony and professionalism (both then and now), have been apprehended very early, by such intellectuals as Max Weber, and unmasked as the triumph of an impassable, instrumental rationality, the growth of which "does not lead to the concrete realization of universal freedom but to the creation of an 'iron cage' (…) from which there is no escape" (Bernstein, 1985:5).

The question if Enlightenment reason and the resulting forms of social organization create the conditions (one way or another) for human emancipation or they do the opposite and crush them, seems to return once again. "A good law must be good for everyone" – Harvey quotes Condorcet – "in exactly the same way that a true proposition is true for all" (Condorcet in Harvey, 1992:13). 'Truth' and 'good' seem to remain as fixed in the idea of global governance as they used to be in the midst of the French revolution, even

[26] Exemplified by Wendell Willkie's *One World* (1943) or the work of the World Federalist Movement and its predecessors.
[27] The arguments pushed spectacularly to the limits by classic German geopolitics, used as an intellectual support for constant expansion (Ratzel, 1898).

if they appear out of a collective effort of multiple actors. Claims of universality (in idea, in scope, in application, etc.) in global governance build on its ostensible neutrality, its cooperative nature and importantly, its often supposed distinctness from power[28], although we should rather talk about transformations in the rationality and exercise of power. Global governance is certainly not an unavoidable outcome of historical development, nor it is (at least in its current form) the currently best option that humanity disposes in its march toward the idealized end of history. The fact that we tend to think about it in these terms seems to be rooted in modernity and its political rationalities.

2. Political rationalities in the context of the modern-postmodern debate

This chapter elaborates on the Foucauldian concept, political rationality, and introduces its main modern forms, with a special focus on governmentality. It also presents the Foucauldian definition of discourse. With this in mind, I update the working definition of global governance, as a historically specific order of knowledge.

Foucault ultimately saw two directions in which political rationality in Europe turned in the modern era, following the formation of modern states. The 'reason of the state', is in a way (just as the rationality of government), an age-old idea, "the type of rationality that will allow the maintenance and preservation of the state once it has been founded, in its daily functioning, in its everyday management" – Foucault quotes Botero in explaining the notion (2009: 238). Separating it from the rationality of government might seem too harsh, as advancing the *ratio status* indeed requires the perfection of governmental techniques. The following, longer quote, however, shows where the two rationalities diverge: "if you take a look, this art of government that you claim exists [in the early modern era – *D. M.*], that must be found, that is rational, organized for the good of all (…), in actual fact does not exist, it has no substance. At the most it can only define the Prince's whims or interests. However thoroughly you examine your idea of a specific art of government, you will only ever find Machiavelli (…), that is to say, the whims or laws of the Prince" (2009: 243).

[28] This draws attention to the thus far neglected fact that modernity, as understood here, stands essentially on European reason and political thought, which was exported to the rest of the world through colonization. Many claim that European political violence was not an aberration, but a logical consequence of the project of modernity is, in large part, thanks to the accumulative logic of capitalism (see largely all Marxist imperialism theories, summarized in Brewer, 1990). Since this logic remained intact even while the process of production went through significant changes in the transition to post-Fordism, it is argued that, mindful of the differences, the contemporary system can equally be depicted as a form of imperialism (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Harvey, 2003).

It is, thus, truly an underlying logic of the exercise of power that we are talking about when using the term political rationality. The reason of the state is a characteristic of the early modern, an archaic rationality that survived the turbulent centuries, albeit followed/complemented by 'the governmentalization of the state'. Foucault introduced the 'art of government' as a different form, the political rationality characteristic of the 18th and 19th centuries, that is to say, the era of mature modernity (1991: 103). Governmentality (a neologism merging government and rationality[29]) is the product of the latter, genealogical period of his work; he elaborated it especially in the 1978-79 lecture series given at *Collège de France*. As it is the case with many other Foucauldian concepts, this one also carries a wide set of meanings, and takes different forms, which Foucault himself used variedly. In this research, it will be employed in two of the three main senses Foucault used it in:

1. As "the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security" and
2. As "the tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of *savoirs*" (Foucault, 1991:102-3)

'Liberal art of government' was used by Foucault as a synonym for governmentality, which suggests important references also to what he understood by liberalism. He did not use it to denote an ideology (the basis of which has traditionally been less state intervention and more freedom), rather an *ethos* of government: it is not "about governing less but about the continual injunction that politicians and rulers should govern cautiously, delicately, economically, modestly" (Barry et al., 1996: 8). This means the

[29] There seems to be evidence that the expression was first used by Roland Barthes in 1957, to link government with efficiency. For more detail, see McKinlay et al. 2012.

gradual emergence of a new logic in the exercise of power. Along with many innovations in political and power techniques that had been emerging from the 18th century onwards, it brought, as Foucault observed, "the introduction of economy into political practice. (…) To govern a state will therefore mean to apply an economy at the entire level of the state" (Foucault, 1991:92). As the above definition also demonstrated, population as the focus of governmental activity is also a characteristic that separates it from the reason of the state: the latter's goal is the "felicity of the state" and never "felicity of the population", he quotes Chemnitz. "It is not men who must be happy or prosperous, and ultimately it is not men who must be rich; it is the state itself. (…) Raison d'État is a relationship of the state to itself, a self-manifestation in which the element of population is hinted at but not present, sketched out but not reflected (2009: 277). As soon as power is focused on the population, its body and soul, we can say that the shift happened. Among the effects of this shift were the obfuscation of power's locus, functioning, nature and means. As government seems to serve the welfare and well-being of the population, it gets harder to analyse it in terms of power.

The ultimate question is how these political rationalities be analysed? Based on the insights of postmodern (and Foucauldian discourse) theory, what seems important is to see certain regularities in the way language is used and show how this contributes to the construction of contemporary world politics (in the case of governmentality, the seemingly neutral and supposedly rational discourses of efficiency provide excellent examples). Analysing how the world is represented by language is thus a core question, primarily because it can get us closer to what made that representation possible, thinkable, imaginable. In the beginning, I briefly cited a definition that described rationality as what "delimits the discursive field within which activities are made thinkable". At the core of the idea is that at any given moment in history there are certain premises, mental/cognitive models/structures, or *a priori*s accepted as truths that underlie any form of knowledge. With slightly different meanings, Gadamer called them horizons, Kuhn paradigms, and Foucault, in his earlier work, *épistème*s (Szabó, 2016:671-2).

This, in itself, was thus not Foucault's original idea. What he added to it was a robust focus on how knowledge, at a given historical moment, is interrelated with power, creating and upholding the knowledge/power structures – a phrase which he has been so

famous about ever since. The notion of rationality is preferred here as an umbrella term that is widely used in Foucauldian literature and especially in the literature on governmentality. In meaning, it is also close to how Foucault saw discourses or discursive formations (Foucault, 1972:38). Attila Melegh summarizes his idea, also making some important points: "in a discourse there is some kind of an order of knowledge, which creates and absorbs 'statements' or systems of statements. These orders by way of the web of objects or styles are the grids and acts of power. Such (…) discourses are also truly historical as they come into existence at a certain point in time and then disappear. It is important to note that these changes are linked to social and political relations and institutional arrangements but are not explained by them" (2006:22).

Global governance as a (hegemonic) discourse should thus be seen as a historically specific order of knowledge and act of power, tied to but not fully explained by social, political and institutional arrangements. Its system of statements corresponds largely to Brand's inventory, summarized in the previous section, and is intrinsically tied to a historically specific combination of political rationalities, clarified further in the next section.

3. Global governance as governmentality

After the conceptual clarifications, in this chapter I present the main points of global governmentality theory. After this, I embed these discussions in the previous chapters' conclusions. I argue that governmentality as a rationality of international politics signals a 'sublation' in terms of rationality, the confusion around which the debates on global governance evolve. In the end of the chapter, I also assess the main lines of criticism usually brought up against the global governmentality approach.

While "governmentalist projects did not begin and end with the state" (McKinlay et al., 2012), the process was, for long, visible (and analysed) only on the state level (Burchell et al., 1991; Rose and Miller, 1992; Barry et al., 1996; Rose et al., 2006; Jessop, 2007; Collier, 2009; Bröckling et al., 2011), as this is where Foucault saw the shift in the exercise of power: as soon as 'the people' replaced the sovereign in the minds of the collective, the art of government supplanted sovereignty as a guiding logic of the exercise of political power[30] (Balke, 2011). Talking about the exercise of power, however should

[30] Sovereignty itself is not a monolithic notion either. At least, we should distinguish between classical and modern sovereignty, separating the old, transcendental understanding from the one that pertains to the modern state, elaborated in Enlightenment thought as a subject itself (Bartelson, 1995).

not mask the fact that, in a Foucauldian framework, power is not something to be possessed and exercised on subjects. It should be imagined as a constant, ever changing relation, dispersed among members and institutions of the society, exercised also by the subject upon itself. In relation with knowledge, rationality and discourses, it appears as constitutive or productive, creating subjects, objects and their various relations (Foucault, 1982; Rose and Miller, 1992; Kiss, 1994; Kiersey, 2008; Collier, 2009; Dean, 2010).

What is especially important at this point in the study, however, is to see that the 'governmental' political rationality existed side by side with *raison d'état* throughout the past centuries. This dynamism is rather poorly elaborated in Foucault's work, a point famously made by Giorgio Agamben, who on the other hand, invested precisely in developing this duality (1998, 2005, 2011)[31]. While Foucault did not say that governmentality replaced the *raison d'état* following the innovation of refocusing state control on the 'population' rather than the territory, indeed, "the point at which these two faces of power converge remains strangely unclear" in his work (Agamben, 1998:11).

According to Dean, for Foucault, governmentality represented the tool to 'banish the ghost of sovereignty' for good, as he saw it as an archaic model of power, inadequate in the modern framework of politics. This framework, however, allowed for different models of power at the same time (acknowledged, and developed in detail also by Foucault, including disciplinary and biopower) summarized under 'power over life', departing from the idea of sovereign power (Dean, 2013; Aalberts, 2012). The critique of sovereignty and the state in his work, thus, becomes "a feature of the art of government itself, that is, of liberalism" (2013:67). Dean's account suggests a kind of 'wishful thinking' on the part of Foucault, who has often been criticized for overgeneralizing in his theories and sacrificing accuracy for neat applicability.

He indeed remained indebted with a clear explanation, which generates some theoretical puzzles in the current research as well, since this blind spot (the exact dynamics between a sovereignty-centred *raison d'état* and governmental reason) on the level of the state is also reproduced in global analyses. As argued in chapter II/1.2, with the rapid

[31] In Agamben's work, inspired by Foucault, the two logics of the exercise of power are sovereign power and governmental power. He elaborates on these – and on the failures of Foucault – in great detail in the referenced book series.

institutionalization of global governance arrangements from 1945 onward (among others), many see the logic of governmentality expanding in its scope, exemplified by the UN's and other IOs contributions throughout the decades in question (Jaeger, 2008 and 2010; Zanotti, 2005 and 2015; Fougner, 2008; Joseph, 2010). Since the 1970s' appearance of neoliberalism, global governance has increasingly been associated with the management of global capitalism and its effects in various fields and spaces (Murphy, 1994; Cammack, 2003; Gill, 2015), placing governmentality once again in a new context. As the 'London governmentalists' (or Anglo-Foucauldians) observe, neoliberalism "should be seen as a re-organization of political rationalities that brings them into a kind of alignment with contemporary technologies of government" (Rose and Miller, 1992:199). It was also them who insisted that, as power in a Foucauldian analysis does not have a specific location, governmentality-analyses should not be confined to the state.

Neoliberal governmentality, as a postmodern and post-sovereign form of exercising power on the widest possible scale disperses power in the global space, engendering an ensemble of norms, rules of conduct, truths, and thinkable or unthinkable understandings, practices and technologies of power. These are studied by scholars from the widely understood branch of 'International Governmentality Studies', or IGS (Walters, 2012:83.) encompassing, among many others, such diverse issue areas as power and normativity (Neumann and Sending, 2007 and 2010; Dean, 2010 and 2013), trade (Traub-Werner, 2007), peace-keeping (Zanotti, 2011), biopolitics, war and humanitarianism (Dillon and Reid, 2001), world order (Dillon, 1995; Dean, 2006; Busse, 2015), global civil society (Bartelson, 2006), integration and the role of IGOs and NGOs (Walters and Haar, 2005; Merlingen, 2003 and 2006, Joseph, 2009; Neumann and Sending, 2010), or the management of refugees and migrants (Friedmann, 2016). Dealing with such issues, analyses include investigations into the nature of globalization, the management and governance of populations, strategies of certain political rationalities, and the construction of broadly accepted truth regimes (Larner, 2000; Larner and Walters, 2004; Bröckling et al., 2011; Guzzini and Neumann, 2012; Vrasti, 2013).

So what change did the 'postmodern turn' bring in terms of political rationality? This question is all the more relevant here, as the proliferation of IOs and other actors in world politics is often interpreted as contributing to an often hypothesised faltering of state

sovereignty (Zacher, 1992). The above section introduced the dynamics of sovereignty and governmentality as political rationalities on the state level. The former, however, until most recently, has held its exclusive position as the rationality of inter-national politics, according to the overwhelming consensus in the discipline of IR. While there are strong examples of analyses (rightly) stressing the existence of governmentality beyond the state, already in colonial practices (Mitchell 1988; Scott 1995; Kendall 1997; Kalpagam 2000), until the institutionalization of global governance from 1945 onward (marked symbolically by the foundation of the UN), it certainly has not been a solid rationality in world affairs, professed in the same way as the statist one. The postmodern turn in this sense signals the point (or rather the period) where this shift unfolded, enabling governmentality as a rationality operating beside the old, order of states-centred one.

This point has important implications for the present study if the 'thinkability' of the UN (at its minimum as a normative force, placing immaterial constraints on state sovereignty) is considered. All the restructuring that have been taking place on the level of world politics since at least WW2, seem to have been reflecting an important shift, occurring also on an intellectual level: old concepts, patterns, theories have not seemed to be adequate for the analysis of global social and political processes anymore. This deficiency, as shown earlier, was apprehended in large part by social constructivist theories, with a peak in postmodern scholarship, the explicit endeavour of which has been to reformulate "basic questions of modernist understanding in emphasizing not the sovereign subject (e.g., author/independent state) or the object (e.g., independent world/text) but instead the historical, cultural, and linguistic practices in which subjects and objects (and theory and practice, facts and values) are constructed" (George, 1994:92).

Understanding 'the change' itself, as touched upon earlier, is essential here. In his influential book, Holsti sets out to categorize its different types. How exactly this 'shift' in political rationality should be imagined with these terms? He distinguishes between the following types: novelty or replacement, addition or subtraction, increased or decreased complexity, transformation, reversion and obsolescence (2004: 12-13). The first one and the last ones could be easily excluded: novelty/replacement is 'a discontinuous idea of change', and therefore does not apply in the current case, which problematizes long term,

subtle mechanisms. The rationality of government, while it can be traced back to the government of different things (the soul, children, oneself) is definitely not a reversal to something old – neither does it make the reason of the state obsolete (enough to consider its recent coming back, as touched upon in the Conclusion). The remaining three options are more promising. Addition/subtraction is definitely a better option (not to mention that Holsti himself mentions global governance under this type), since it has the capacity to express the simplified case: that *raison d'état* existed and the governmental rationality 'joined in', when time was ripe. It does not express, however, that the 'initial' condition was not simply left untouched by the addition of something new.

Thus, a combination of the last two possibilities (increased/decreased complexity and transformation) remain as a possible solution. Significant elements of global governance might be comprehended through understanding change as increased complexity: the increase of actors and their forms of interactions are pertinent examples. The meaning of transformation, however, is also needed, as it describes "changes which, when accumulated over a period of time, bring new forms to life", only partly replacing old forms, but including, by definition legacies of the old, as "one cannot transform from nothing" (2004: 16). There is a term which has the capacity to integrate these two change-conceptions: "the German 'aufheben' has a twofold meaning: it equally means 'to keep', 'to preserve', and 'to cause to cease', 'to put an end to'" (Hegel, 2010:81-82). If its inherent Hegelian 'progressivist inclination' is cast aside, I could argue that a it was 'sublation' what happened with political rationality.

While the institutionalization of 'post-sovereignty' have been accelerating since the end of WW2 – made explicit with the theoretical innovation of global governance in the 90s – no genuinely new system could take form, the basic structures of modernity (meaning, first and foremost the state system and capitalism as a socio-economic system) were essentially preserved: industrial capitalism found its appropriate political form in the nation state; then, when capital outgrew the national boundaries, the world had to suffer excess imperialism; as this latter became discredited and political life consolidated in the global North, it took an organized form; and as that consensus broke, it entered its neoliberal form, resistant to the parallelly evolving moderate attempts of international governance (Kocka, 2016). Indeed, political reason has been mutating (Barry et al., 1996:

2-3). The transformation that started in the statist, sovereignty-based pillar of the modern rationality at least after WW2, eventually globalizing governmentality under the title of global governance, has accelerated (largely parallelly with the most recent developments of capitalism and the related social change). What constitutes the essence, the political core of this shifting rationality is still, however, the preservation of hierarchical political systems, adaptive to the ever-changing circumstances. Even though we have been experiencing the 'end of modern' in these terms for at least half a century, we do not yet see a genuinely new system emerging[32].

Therefore, many talk, instead of a new 'postmodern' era, about a radicalized form of late modernity, ripe for, but unable to transform (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1997; Bauman, 2000). Indeed, it seems that we are, immersed in the 21st century, historically well placed to perform such analyses, as we are 'at the frontiers', an appropriate place according to Foucault to move beyond the 'inside-outside alternative' (Foucault, 1984:45). The approach of this study, thus, lies somewhere between the sceptics and those who have been welcoming the new age for decades now. As the new sensations and experiences embodied by postmodern and interpreted by post-structuralists has seemed bewildering and confusing, it has been widely and wildly attacked ever since for turning the world upside-down, for relativizing reality, for crushing norms and values of modernity, for refusing responsibility and for abusing science (Callinicos, 1989; Bricmont and Sokal, 1998; Osterud, 1996). This is not the place to answers such critiques in detail, first of all, because they are usually normative in nature and thus would require lengthier discussions about the philosophy of science and the responsibility of scholars (Smith, 1997). In the next section, however, I enter into discussion with critics of global governmentality.

3.1 Critics of global governmentality

Before moving on to the part in which I attempt to embed the later empirical analysis in the past 70+ years' (and also longer term) historical developments it is important to reflect on some of the criticisms formulated in relation to global governmentality theory – apart from the one put forward in the above paragraphs. Otherwise being a renowned critic of

[32] Many, of course, see a systemic transformation underway. Worlds systems school, for instance, has been talking about the end of not just a normal cycle of capitalism, but that of the 500 years-long trend, bringing the possibility of a brand new system, with the possibility to realize a veritable human emancipation for the first time in history (Wallerstein, 2010).

the application of governmentality theory beyond the state, Joseph agrees that its application "works best when it is attempting to explain the mechanisms of global governance" (2012: 71). Beyond those who are sceptical about the postmodern project in general, as Vrasti (2013) sums up, critics of global governmentality approaches either 1. problematize the 'scaling up' of Foucault's explicitly state-bound terms to a supra-state level, 2. question its genuinely 'global' nature, or 3. claim that it generalizes too much and therefore declines importance of such 'traditional' features of international politics as violence and interest-driven behaviour.

Selby argues that the problem with applying governmentality theory to 'the international' is twofold: first, this position seems to accept a "paradigmatically liberal internationalist" interpretation of the world order by subjecting it to a double reading, and thus ends up merely reworking and rewording the same order, instead of working out a genuine critique (2007:334). Moreover, he argues, "the 'scaling up' of Foucault necessarily generates accounts which overstate its [governmentality's] unity, evenness and indivisibility" (2007:336), turning a blind eye on those cases where it simply does not apply. While the first one seems to be more like a strategic methodological question, the second one formulates a substantive critique. The latter can also be linked to questioning the abstract unity of 'the global', while reinvigorating the distinction between the domestic and the international, denying the usefulness of too much analogy. As Vrasti sees it, "the level of analysis problem raised by Selby says more about IR's own ontological purism than about the impossibility of using Foucault for the study of global politics" (2011:53), an assessment I can fully support, given the mission I outlined in the Introduction, the necessity of broadening the field of IR.

The other issue raised by Selby – but also Joseph (2009, 2010a and 2010b), Chandler (2009) and others – questions a truly 'global' applicability. To see the full picture, it is important to point out that Foucault's writings are indeed heavily Eurocentric, problematizing developments of European modernity and dealing with their 'internal' effects without an outlook on Europe's global relations or global affairs in general. Claiming that governmentality – the development of which is seen by him as probably the most important development in modern European (or Western) political thought and practice – manifests equally in different contexts, and even more when it is claimed to be

global (understood here for the sake of the argument simply as a level of analysis) can be problematized as the same kind of universalizing practice that has been under attack, notably in postcolonial scholarship in the past few decades.

This refusal, however, misses two essential and interlinking things about global governmentality theory: first, that it, in most of the cases, examines a political rationality that has been represented and globalized by dominant actors embedded in Western traditions in the past centuries through colonialism. It does not mean that its practices were equally applied everywhere, but that it became 'the model' or the norm. Norms are, of course not norms because they are always respected and followed, but because they provide (contestable, though rarely contested) standards at a given time, in a given place. Related to this and second, the 'global', as pointed out also in the Introduction, does not equal 'worldwide': it has a much subtler meaning, expressing a novel form of imaginary, an abstract space in the state of a constant flux, merging various localities, levels and fields of analysis.

Global governmentality theory – at least in my reading – therefore does not claim that the same kind of governmental techniques are applied in every single corner of the globe; it claims that its rationality has, in a long process, manifested in a sum of a globally conceived standards and models, to be "followed by all good members of the international community" (Neumann and Sending, 2007:699). A crucial role in this is, following Foucault, accorded to liberalism, which brings us back to the strategic question raised by Selby – and also other determined (Chandler, 2010) and constructive (Joseph, 2010b; Hamilton, 2014) critics –, namely that double reading structures of global liberalism does not do much but reinforces these structures. As Vrasti (2011:58-64) and others (Kiersey et al., 2014) point out, however, this evidences a serious misreading of Foucault's own stance on liberalism, which has always been heavily critical – although not in a normative sense, as he preferred to distance himself from such attitudes. While I do not have any intention whatsoever to underestimate the consequences of accepting certain ontologies, problematizations or discourses, indeed, scrutinizing something critically is very difficult without evoking it at least for the time of analysis[33]. A solution might be strengthening

[33] This dilemma appears visibly in chapter II., where the genealogy of global governance follows the highlights and turning points that are almost consensual in global governance scholarship, to critically

and increasing even more the space global governmentality analyses grant self-reflective comments. This study will especially do so when it comes to deeper discussions on the nature of the 'global' and the intensifying discourse on globalization around the end of the Cold War (summary of chapter IV/7).

4. Relations of discursive structures, subjectivity and agency

This chapter lays down the basics of discourse theory and methodology, and the purposes I am using these in this study. It also contains the key points of subjectivity and subjectivization, discursive agency and its relations to structures. I refocus the discussions from an abstract methodological level to the concrete case.

After the above introduction to concepts of modern, postmodern and rationality, the focus should now return to post-structuralism in IR. What can be said about such a confusing and controversial approach? While authors in this tradition has been famous for avoiding categorization or any kind of generalization, one might say that post-structuralists "explore how the world comes to be represented as it is. They examine the changing social practices that make international politics so as to tease out the power relations they (re)produce." (Zehfuss, 2012:151). This quote contains some important points that will be elaborated in the following pages in more detail, to shed light on the significance of representation, language and power, coming together in a short summary of DA as theory and method, as well as its types that are relied on in this study. To start with a radical point, let us remember the warning of Ernesto Laclau: "By 'discursive' I do not mean that which refers to 'text' narrowly defined, but to the ensemble of the phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place, an ensemble which constitute society as such. The discursive is not, therefore, being conceived as a level nor even as a dimension of the social, but rather as being co-extensive with the social as such…History and society are an infinite text." (Laclau in Jäger and Maier, 2016:116-7).

As this point elegantly shows, DA should not be narrowed down to textual analysis. The whole idea – radicalized especially in Laclau's and Mouffe's work (1985) – is that "*il n'y a pas de hors-texte*", the whole social world could be read like a text. But we would be wrong to use this opportunity to confuse text with discourse: as shown above, discourse is a system of statements, texts, ideas, forms and orders of knowledge. A text is a piece

assess them and this interpretation of its history. The researcher, however, can hardly do anything else than emphasizing that her aim is not to reproduce the same truth but to challenge it.

of discourse: it derives from it, made possibly by it, but also affects it, to a varying extent. This curious link is especially important for the analysis done in this study, as it explicitly brings agency in the middle of the question, from various angles. It has, for long, been claimed as controversial in Foucault's work – and more generally in DA – that he, by granting discourses such a great role, did not allow any space for the subject and its agency (Giddens, 1984; Allen, 2000; McNay, 2000; Knights, 2004; Leipold and Winkel, 2017). From the point of view of this study, it would mean that subjects (such as the Secretary-General, representing the UN) are so constrained by the given political discourse that having the ability to shift it is out of question. It is also argued, however, that such claims against Foucault misunderstand his contribution, which simply approaches agency from a different perspective, outside of the individualistic modern tradition (Caldwell, 2007; Jäger and Maier, 2016).

If one considers the central assumptions of the present research, it can provide orientation in finding the proportions and relations between constraining discursive structures and possibilities of agency that first seem inextricable. Importantly, the role of the analyst should not be neglected either in deciphering these, as self-reflexivity is an absolute must in DA[34]. In their extremely insightful review of conceptions of discursive agency, Leipold and Winkel even grant it an equal place beside the dialectic of actors and structures, making agency essentially 'trialectic' (2017:518-520). With this in mind, the approach of this research is one that does not overemphasize agency in the face of the discursive structures of rationality, while it equally avoids a thick structuralist position, working with pre-given and unchangeable cognitive (and material) structures[35].

Turning to the original source in these matters is not too helpful, as Foucault has never been clear on "how he evaluates the interplay of intentional action, socioeconomic changes, particular interests, and accidents" (Rabinow, 1984:10) and while he obviously concerned himself with the subject, he never provided a consistent analytical approach. This, however triggered the elaboration of a host of different methodologies, which are summed up and contrasted by Leipold and Winkel in a study that is relied upon in

[34] An extremely strong example of such a motive is to be found in Erzsébet Strausz's recent 'experience book', *Writing the Self and Transforming Knowledge in International Relations* (2018).
[35] This position in the debate is in most of the cases called 'structuration', in line with the terminology of Anthony Giddens (1984). See most notably Wendt, 1987 and 1999.

devising the methodology of this research. The table in which they conclude their findings on the different conceptions of, and approaches to agency is replicated in Appendix 4. as a useful resource (Reference 3.).

Carrying on with the list of working definitions is necessary here, as the focus is on the crucial notion, 'the subject' and 'subjectivity'. The term got popularized in the 60s and 70s, intertwined with questions of political agency, thanks to the global revolutionary wave (Henriques et. al., 1984). In (interpretive) social analysis, principally, we talk about human subjects, which can be divided into individual and collective ones, different combinations of which can also fuse or collaborate in various coalitions (Hajer, 2005 and 2006; Schmidt, 2012). The subject, however, means more than a biological entity, or an *individuum* in a Cartesian sense. The denomination means that it disposes knowledge, skills, identities, experiences, dispositions, and various other things that are necessary for life in a society. It acquires its subjectivity through a process of social construction (or 'subjectivation'), effectuated either by ideology according to Althusser, by the psychological functions of language as argued for by Lacan, or by discourse as seen by Foucault (Ashcroft et al, 2007; Williams, 2005)[36]. So what discourse 'does' is that it provides subjects with different positions which they, on the other hand, assume (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:14-18).

At this point, what is important to make clear conceptually is that in this study, the UN as a whole is regarded as a subject, which is represented by the Secretary-General, as its unified voice (see this controversial claim elaborated in detail in chapter IV/1). What the empirical research is interested in is the process in which he occupies, uses and modifies this position by extending or restricting it with his narratives. It is argued that by doing so, the Secretaries-General as well-placed actors in the hegemonic structures of world politics, have also been 'feeding back' into the rationality in transition, putting it simply: the relationship is bidirectional, as pointed out above.

In post-structuralist theory, forming subjectivities are exposed to a whole variety of discourses, but essentially, they are produced by the one that dominates in a certain historical context. This principle is shown in what is interpreted here through the analysis

[36] Such views had a huge influence in various fields, from post-colonial to feminist scholarship. See for example Spivak, 1988; Fraser, 1995; Bhabha, 1994; Butler, 1997.

of the Secretaries-General's narratives, as marked by *and* contributing to a sublation of political rationality. In the previous section, we saw that the reason of the state is widely claimed to have been transforming as the prime order in world politics: the thus far dominating discourse of exclusive state sovereignty has been shifting, enabling a different form of acting subject (the international organization in this case) to step on the stage of world politics. Governmental rationality has also been in motion: especially since the advent of international organisations and the idea of international – and later global – governance, it appears more and more clearly on a global scale, as demonstrated in the literature on global governmentality.

These, however, should be imagined as mutually constitutive processes (in which the analyst herself occupies an important position), back-and-forths between rationality, discursive processes and subjects. The current study's importance from a methodological point of view lies on the one hand in its focus on the subject and its agency, which is a widely acknowledged, but often neglected aspect in DA: in the majority of the actual cases, authors care about agency as a function of discourse and not as its contributor (Leipold and Winkel, 2017). Another thing to highlight is that the subject in focus is not a state, as customary in IR (Wendt, 1999; Wight, 2004; Epstein, 2011), and not on material power, as a measure of agency (Buzan et al., 1993). This, I argue, allows us to entertain some possibilities in understanding how IOs relate to global governmentality and thus how they contribute to the governmentalization of 'the international'. As I suggested in the chapter II/2., discussing different understandings of IOs, their agency and even authority should be seen less as supplementary or auxiliary, and more as rooted in the mere fact that they are governing, which is basically the prime reason for which they were created, their existential purpose.

This, as I argued, makes IOs 'the perfect governing subjects', free from many burdening connotations that usually accompany the study of states' subjectivity and political agency, such as the usual heavy analogies to humans, their personalities, and even their biology, or being compelled to trace back agency to either a pre-social self, or social contracts (Epstein, 2011). IOs, compared to this, could not, evidently, be seen as essentially existent (as states are often claimed to be either explicitly or implicitly), so studying their subjectivity as discursive is easier than in the case of any other type of subject. Another

consequence, more directly related to governmentality would be that their missions, means, instruments – basically their entire rationality – are inseparably rooted, embedded and imagined in the context of 'the liberal art of government', as chapter II/2. also showed. As bureaucracies, they do not *own* power (which is comprehensible in the sovereigntist logic of the reason of the state) but *use* it to fulfil certain purposes that were deemed rational and beneficial for peace and prosperity within and among societies.

This is, thus, how subjectivity links to political rationality and the discourse of global governance. The kind of subjects IOs are ties them to the governmental rationality, comprehensible if world politics is thought of in terms of global governance. This assumption explains the focus on governmentality, while, admittedly, the reason of the state is still present in world politics. That the latter has important functions is shown by the analysis, the results of which can be linked to this assumption: when it is about defining the Self, the question is centred on owning power and/or sovereignty – in these cases the reason of the state dominates as a political rationality. When accent is placed on how the subject acts, the governmental rationality manifests in the analysed narratives.

A very similar, yet not identical approach concerning this was put forward by Neumann and Sending (2010) in their influential book on global governmentality. They get very close to the questions I explore here by inquiring about the episteme within which IOs operate: "What is the concrete content of the episteme from within which IOs seek to govern, and how does that episteme affect the governing and mode of operation of IOs? Does it differ from that of states – and if so, in what way?" (2010: 138). Yet, they turn in another direction when they (agreeing with Barnett and Finnemore and their bureaucratic approach as much as I do) grasp on "how states are conceptualized within IOs" in order to understand "the specific rationality by which IOs seek to govern and act on states" (2010: 149). The approach I take here clearly ventures further from states by proposing that the act of governing may prevail independently from states, while it agrees with the authors in seeing the principle of sovereignty as a tool of legitimation.

Turning back to the question of agency: the above paragraphs described a widespread focus on states and their agency in IR. Another way in which my analysis contributes to the literature is thanks to the fact that that much of the Foucault-inspired agency literature (including the ones that use the governmentality framework), which could potentially

offer ‘dissident’ ways, deals with subaltern agency, or the agency of the oppressed (Munck, 2007; Caldwell, 2007; McNay, 2010; Zanotti, 2013), investigating their possibilities for action as well as its limits. Here, clearly, something qualitatively different is at stake: how does a potentially powerful actor shape its own space to manoeuvre under the constraining cognitive circumstances? I claim that “people are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, by their discursively produced understanding of the world and their place in it” (Dunn, 2008:82). Can the Secretary-General really influence what is thought and said about the world and world politics? What are the discursive limits which constrain his actions? How can he satisfy or extend these limits (Jäger–Maier, 2016:121) and what consequences does it have to the governmental rationality of global governance?

Subjectivity thus means the position the subject assumes in the discursive space. Such narrating of the Self in the given context can be interpreted as building a ‘story line’, which then competes for institutionalization with rival story lines, as in Hajer’s (2006) approach. The narrative nature of identity was, among others, famously elaborated by Paul Ricoeur (1992), claiming that what constitutes the Self are the stories it tells about itself, informed by an interplay of sameness and change. In the current research, it is imperative to see and value these equally, which is why this work does not aim to be a ‘conventional’ identity analysis: as Melegh rightly suggested, using ‘identity’ as a concept of knowledge production can lead the analysts into different traps, such as reaffirming the boundaries set by identity, claiming ahistoricity in the relationships of Self and its Other(s), or simply affirming that these categories exist in ‘reality’, and what is more, they exist in a relationship that is suitable for negotiation in a dialogue based on equal terms – while such relationships are usually informed by structural hierarchies (2006:21-9).

I would add to this that ‘subjectivization’ is preferred as it does not refer to a condition or status, rather, to a process. Identity is a concept which tends to suggest stability over change, while the emphasis here is rather put on how the subject transforms in long discursive processes. “There is no such thing as a fully formed, cogent self to which the term ‘identity’ refers” (Epstein, 2011: 337). While talking about ‘identification’ would largely solve this problem, it is suggesting that there is an essential condition that the subject is aiming to reach in this process, not to mention that in this case the ‘bare’ Self

is in the centre, with or without its (political) agency. Thus, while the concept of identity, as well as the vast body of constructivist literature on identity formation (Conolly, 1991; Campbell, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Reus-Smit, 1999; Wendt, 1999; Neumann, 1999; Mitzen, 2006; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009) provide useful insights, in terms of concepts and theory, this analysis prefers not to rely on these too much. Rather, it elaborates on how the narrative processes of subjectivization are enabled by the ever-shifting political rationality, and how they themselves (as subjects with agential capacities) contribute to its formation.

Similarly to Leipold and Winkel's concept of 'discursive agency', in this research "agents are understood as actors who identify (and are identified) with specific subject positions offered by a particular story line (…) Agency is constituted through the process of subjectivation" (2017: 524). This approach is extremely useful, because it stresses that agents might have multiple and ever-changing identities "that might overlap, intersect, or be antagonistic to each other. Because discourses have to be constantly (re)produced, actors are forced to creatively adjust to new meanings and take up changing subject positions" (ibid). Initially, the UN was offered an ambiguous and inelaborate subject position; the challenge and indeed the interesting thing is the way it navigated around and in this position, also shaping its own subjectivity.

This enormously complex process – which has, very importantly, involved other actors as well – is not analysed in its entirety here. I only deal with the part of the story that is told by the UN – more specifically its 'unified voice', the Secretary-General, and even this is narrowed down to what I termed self-definition and agency-construction. It should be repeated, however, that behind the unified voice, we should see the functioning of the bureaucracy, which is more detached from contextual and personal factors than the Secretary-General. The impact of this is observable, for instance, in the stability of the vocabulary (categories) used in the reports.

5. Research methods and the methodological outline of this research

This chapter specifies further the available choices in terms of discourse analysis, and outlines the exact methodological steps of the empirical analysis. The steps are following what Jäger and Maier call a Foucauldian approach.

Reaching back to Zehfuss's definition of post-structuralist IR, answering such questions means, from a methodological point of view, that one is interested in *how* the world is

represented. The importance of how-type questions has already been touched upon: from a post-positivist epistemological standpoint, it would simply not be right to pose a why-type one, as the answer would necessarily establish a causal link, assuming the existence of unbiased measurability and identifiable, quasi-natural laws governing social interaction and phenomena. Asking 'how' rather promises an inquiry into the interplay of mechanisms that constitute social life, the direction of which is usually not one way or another, but at least bidirectional. For the current analysis, it means that no direct causal relationships between rationality and agency, discourse and material conditions, or meaning and interpretation is assumed or revealed. This premise, however, masks a huge variety within both discourse theory and methods. Among the many different categorizations, Philips and Hardy offer a model which separates approaches according to two main axes: when it comes to the analysis' focus, it can either be contextual or textual, and regarding its drives, the two possibilities are constructivist and critical (Phillips and Hardy, 2002:20). The current study – as the majority of works employing DA – resists a strict categorization: the research is firmly based on texts, but necessarily looks beyond them: as the analysis proceeds, it gets more and more contextual, as in the end, it aims to understand the 'context of contexts', political rationality. In terms of drives, the case is somewhat similar: it does develop a critical stance, based on the analysis of the construction process, and places the findings in a wider knowledge/power context. Overall, it starts from a textual-constructivist inquiry to develop into a contextual-critical analysis[37].

DA is an extremely flexible analytical method. Whatever textbook one relies on, they all warn of their inability to provide ever-usable techniques of analysis and suggest to select those – based on the researcher's prior knowledge – that are the most relevant for the respective purposes (Philips and Hardy, 2002; Jorgensen and Philips, 2002; Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Wodak and Meyer, 2016). In line with the above described theoretical and conceptual framework, I structure the analysis into two major parts, a narrative- and a discourse analysis. The first part focuses on the 'subjectivization narrative': it aims to

[37] Critical, however, is not understood in the classic sense as critical discourse analysis. As Fairclough (2016) explains, this approach would be motivated by „addressing social wrongs", which is not what my dissertation was initially set out to do. The main goal is understanding. Interpreting the story through this prism would distort the intentions or modify the emphases, putting the epistemological framework in tension. So interpretation in a critical framework remains to be a next step.

decipher how the story of the Self has been unfolding in the relevant parts of the Annual Reports from the earliest years until 2016, where the analysis ends. It is very much rooted in the texts and employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative tools to reconstruct the subjectivization narrative, putting it simply: what the UN is and what it does, according to the Secretary-General, and across time. The second part approaches more a Foucauldian discourse analysis: relying on the results of the narrative analysis, the focus shifts to political rationalities as organizing rules in the discourse, and links the findings to the ones of the narrative analysis. As a result, this combination of analytical tools and levels sheds light on the main question of this research, how the discourse of global governance has been structured by the dynamics of modern political rationalities and actors' agency.

The main practical steps are summarized here briefly to present the structure of the empirical research:

1. *Identifying "UN narrative":* the UN is an enormous net of organizations. The only voice that can be considered representative of the organization as a whole is that of the Secretary-General (see in detail, chapter IV/1.1).
2. *Identifying sources representative of the subjectivization narrative:* out of the many utterances that the Secretary-General performs, the annual reports are the most important. They are evaluatory, strategic and symbolic, therefore they fulfill the expectations one may have looking for sources on subjectivization (see in detail, chapter IV/1.3).
3. *Identifying the (relevant parts of) texts:* there are 71 texts at our disposition[38]. Each report consists of an introductory and a substantial part, out of which only the Introductions are analyzed (see in detail in chapter IV/2): they provide a relatively short summary of the given year's achievements, challenges, and most of all: the Organization's own perception of its subjectivity and place in world politics.

First what Jäger and Maier calls a structural analysis (2016:128) is completed:

1. *Listing the articles of relevance:* Providing bibliographical details, notes about the covered topics, genre, or any other characteristics.

[38] The current study stops at the end of Ban Ki-moon's mandate to keep analytical frames intact. Some references to Guterres's incumbency are added, however, in the Conclusion.

2. *A rough review:* Identifying special characteristics, typical vocabulary, tropes, argumentations, etc.
3. *Identification and summary of the different categories*: this step covers what is generally termed 'coding' in textual analysis. Categories are determined primarily by meaning (see in detail, chapter IV/4).
4. *Examination of frequency of appearance of the selected categories:* Which ones are highlighted and which are neglected? Is there anything that is conspicuously absent?
5. *Distribution of the categories over the course of time:* A diachronic analysis of the representations, as importantly, texts carry with them the 'memory' of their genesis.

The last step of Jäger and Maier's 'Foucauldian approach', which would be the analysis of *interdiscursive relationships* (an outlook on the discursive context of the chosen texts) is not well-elaborated in this study. While clearly "representations are historically produced within similar 'long conversations,' where multiple actors come together to contest the meanings of those identities and the terms in which they are expressed" (Dunn, 2008:83), the 70+ years' time frame means already a great empirical engagement that could not be matched here by a similar one, adequately focusing on parallel discourses. In the case of the UN, such 'long conversations' would indeed be extremely long, wide-ranging and diverse, making a focused analysis almost impossible. Of course, references to other texts will be made in the analysis (such as the reports of global commissions, or other reports produced by the Secretary-General), but the interdiscursive relationships of the texts are highlighted mostly among the Annual Reports and not beyond them. The only direction in which interdiscursivity is explored in some detail is that of international political thought: the way global governance – and also the role of IOs (and especially the UN), and that of Secretaries-General – has been studied within IR. This seems especially relevant from a knowledge/power perspective, as the previous chapter argued in some detail.

IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
SUBJECTIVIZATION IN THE INTRODUCTIONS OF TE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION

1. The selection of sources

This chapter identifies the Secretariat as the only main body that represents the UN as a unified whole. The Secretary-General is arguably the central actor to consider within its structure, being the unified voice of the Organization. The Annual Report on the Work of the Organization is the only document published in his name which is mentioned in the Charter, and which is available for study from the establishment of the UN to the present day. It is claimed to account not only for the work of the Organization in the given year, but also for the Secretary-General's strategic vision and conception of the Organization in world politics. In the final section, I argue that the Introductions of the reports are the parts which comprehend the relevant narratives, therefore those are the ones which I suggest for analysis.

1.1 Identifying a 'UN narrative'

This step is always of great importance, and arguably it is even more relevant in the case at hand, as (with a slight exaggeration), the Secretary-General hardly does anything else than talking, so the possibilities might seem endless at first sight. The main question of this research, however – namely, how do forms of modern political rationality appear and transform in the self-definition narrative of the UN –, solved in large part which selection strategy to follow. The first step was necessarily identifying something that can be called a 'UN narrative': at point is an enormous organization with numerous bodies, agencies, assemblies and leaders. How can, out of countless options, the most relevant source be chosen to represent the organization as a whole?

To make the first round of limitation, one can always turn to the Charter, as the 'holy text' of the UN family. It declares as principal organs, the core of the UN, the following: the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), (the Trusteeship Council), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat. Out of these, it is not difficult to bring three to prominence, each for different reasons: first, the GA, as the representative body reflects the whole diversity of the

membership, voicing in its resolutions (ideally) the shared opinion of every participating state. The SC is the one which is usually regarded as the most influential organ, with the most important mandate, guarding international peace and security, which is the utmost rationale for the organization, as per the Charter. Finally, the Secretariat is the body that bears the responsibility of the organization, administration, coordination, and direction of the work done by every UN body. The rest is either too specific in mandate (ICJ, ECOSOC), or inactive, as the Trusteeship Council has been, since 1994.

For further specification, it is necessary to lay down some core theses as starting points. Out of the aforementioned three possibilities, I chose the last one based on my previous research, in which I arrived to the conclusion that the all-time Secretary-General is the only voice that can be considered representative of the whole organization (Mendly, 2016). This conviction is partly the result of the unsatisfactory nature of the first two options, but also stands on firm grounds both in formative internal documents such as the 'Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations' (PCUN, 1946) the literature that examines the role of the Secretary-General in the UN structure and its external actions. These works discuss, among others his mandate in the field of peace and security (Boudreau, 1991; Newman, 1998; Fröhlich and Williams, 2018), good offices (Ramcharan, 1983), norm entrepreneurship (Rushton, 2008), power possibilities (Johnstone, 2003; Chesterman, 2007; Kille, 2007; Newman, 2018) and conceptions of the office (Rivlin and Gordenker, 1993; Kille and Skully, 2003; Gordenker, 2010; Ravndal, 2017). The variety in the 'most impossible job'[39] is, however, not the key point here. The key is his unique legitimacy, rooted in his representative position, which the other two entities visibly lack. It is especially important when one is examining IOs. As Barnett and Duvall put it, "in many respects, legitimacy is the IO's fuel and currency of power" (2013: 50).

Focusing on the GA/president of the GA, would have been in contradiction with the approach I am taking towards to the UN as such: without denying the GA's importance, conceptualizing the organization as a forum for its Member States is not helpful if a prerequisite for one's aim is to find unity in diversity. This conception of the UN, however, will not be neglected as it has always been supported by a strong narrative

[39] The first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie's anecdotic characterization of the job.

within and also outside of the Organization. Regarding the SC, my decision to prefer the Secretary-General might thus be even clearer. Even though it is generally said to be the most (according to some accounts the only) significant body in the UN, equipped with unique powers to interfere in international affairs, its lack of representability excludes the Council from this research. It is indeed – due primarily to its problematic composition, having, for long, been subjected to heavy and rightful criticism (Blahó and Prandler, 2014:241-243) – quite the opposite of what I need for such an analysis. It is thus not a question of importance or prominence, but legitimate representation. Having analysed the Secretary-General's mandate, role and functions, it can be assessed that he is a central figure both within and without the organization – especially when it comes to his representative and communicative functions, what makes the position especially relevant to my study.

1.2 Notes on the Secretaries-General and their role

It also seems important to discuss briefly the authority of the Secretaries-General in terms of sources, forms and fields, as it bears on the reception and effects of what they say about the Organization and generally about global governance. Bourdieu's 'structural constructivism' is a valuable starting point. He argues that "the categories used in a discourse can be analysed by examining the actors who reproduce authoritatively these categories and make them widely acceptable. The authority to author these discursive categories originates in the social, political, economical, and/or cultural status of the author within the wider social field she/he is addressing" (Bourdieu in Goetze, 2016:98). Clearly, one can hardly imagine a higher social, political, and cultural status than the one of the Secretary-General, and might suspect that he is also well off in economic terms. This translates, in the language of constructivist IR, to an ability to take the opportunity and "attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms" as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895; also Rushton, 2008). Embedded in and empowered by structures of hegemony, what the Secretaries-General say matters.

As a last point for the later analysis, it is important to point at another dimension of the intersections between historically defined political rationality and the various social characteristics and embeddedness of the Secretaries-General: their personalities. Building

the analysis relying too much on the personalities of the incumbents would be a slippery approach, in contradiction also to key arguments in my methodology: my intention after all is not write what Cox called the "great-man theory of international organization" (Cox, 1996: 321 [1969]) to Besides, the extent to which this is autonomous or independent from the formers is a question that would open up hundreds of new, political-psychological dilemmas. As I would try to avoid this, what seems more reasonable to do is relying on others' work from this field and make some rather general assumptions about how personality of decision makers may interfere in politics. This step cannot be avoided entirely, as the largest part of the literature on the Secretaries-General place this in the centre of attention – so the question should be handled, but handled with care.

One assumption is that motivation, cognitive style, intelligence, childhood experience, age and attitude are important for the type and success of political leadership (Simonton, 1987). While political-psychological studies, considering such factors have been frequently written about national politicians, Krasno argues that they do not necessarily apply to the Secretary-General, who is 'a world leader without the state' (Krasno, 2015:6). As atypical as it is, the personalities of the different Secretaries-General have been extensively discussed by biographers as well as those who were interested more in the office of the Secretary-General (Lash, 1962; Cox, 1969; Bingham, 1970; Urquhart, 1973; Finger and Saltzman, 1990; Chesterman, 2007; Lipsay, 2013; Ravndal, 2017; Fröhlich and Williams, 2018).

It was probably Kent Kille who approached the field of political psychology the most, analysing six UN Secretaries-General from this point of view (Kille and Skully, 2003) and describing the Secretary-General's ethical frameworks as 'a combination of personal values' (Kille, 2007:20). This latter piece, while it does not engage with an explicitly political psychological perspective, it agrees with another of my basic assumptions, namely that "the personality of the individual decision maker interacts with situations, cultures, organizational structures, class, gender, and any number of other factors" (Krasno, 2015:4). Personalities of the respective Secretaries-General are, therefore at all times discussed together with the historical and political context in which they were acting. My assessments are based largely on others' original research in terms of substance and categorization as well. Schechter (1987 and 1988) made his distinctions

between ‘activist’ and ‘pragmatist’ heads of IGOs, while Kille and Skully (2003) developed a scale of ‘expansionism’. Here I rely on the terminology I used in an earlier phase of my research, making the basic distinction between ‘extensive’ and ‘restrictive’ views about the office and mandate on the part of the Secretaries-General (Mendly, 2016). Substantial observations are drawn from the rich literature on the possibilities and deeds of the respective Secretaries-General.

1.3 Identifying sources representative of the subjectivization narrative, and the relevant parts of texts for the analysis

The next step is to identify sources that can be representative of what I called the subjectivization narrative. This task might prove just as challenging as the previous one was, thanks to the overwhelming abundance of possibilities: as it is his/her duty to enounce strategy and orientation, policy and evaluation, the Secretary-General is constantly producing written and oral texts on the UN. Out of these numerous texts, it is preferable to settle with a narrow branch for the sake of analytical concision. Out of the many utterances that the Secretary-General performs, as hinted earlier, I chose the Annual Reports which, by default, are the most important, for two reasons: 1. their main goals are evaluatory, strategic and symbolic, therefore they fulfil the expectations if one is looking for sources of self-definition and context-evaluation; 2. they are mentioned in the Charter, among the main duties of the Secretary-General. Naturally, as every selection, this one is based on human decisions as well, and therefore may be questioned. Furthermore, a comprehensive study of ‘UN narratives’ would involve way more sources, not to mention the ways other actors talk about the Organization. The current research, however, does not aim to give a comprehensive overview, but a focused analysis of the discursive manifestations of a shifting political rationality, enabling the UN and global governance in their present forms.

As it was suggested in the Introduction, there are 71 texts at our disposition, each of them consisting of an introductory and a substantial part. The substantial parts, however interesting their content may be, deal with topics that way exceed my focus: they list and discuss in great detail topicalities of international affairs, from armed conflicts to social issues. Therefore, they may only be included in the current framework in so far as they problematize. As problematization is an important element of constructing knowledge

and accepted truth regimes, the topics covered in the reports will be listed and briefly interpreted. The introductions on the other hand, provide a relatively short summary of the given year's achievements, challenges, and most of all: the organization's own perception of its place and role in world politics.

2. Overview of the sources

The chapter provides a general overview of the Annual Reports, following the methodological steps outlined in chapter III/5. It describes their structure and the general trends according to which they changed over the past decades. The length, priorities and vocabulary seem to have changed along with the shifting political rationality, which is an important preliminary observation.

The actual analysis starts here with the structural analysis (Jäger and Maier, 2016:128). These reports, as their genre suggests evaluate the work, the past and future challenges of the organization. They should fulfil this task in a perspicuous manner: arranged in chapters and subchapters[40], with proper data and due referencing. The format, length, structuring of content and other technical solutions however, vary relatively a lot throughout the 70+ years. Beyond the content, such aspects are also worthy of analysis; partly because of their proper purport, partly because of the influence they have on the substance. An obvious example of this is the question of problematization, as it was mentioned before: by naming, listing and categorizing 'problems', problematic areas, and issues that need (UN) action, the report constructs the world itself. What is included, is worthy of mentioning and what is not, seems nonexistent. "Government is a problematising activity: it poses the obligations of rulers in terms of the problems they seek to address. The ideals of government are intrinsically linked to the problems around which it circulates, the failings it seeks to rectify, the ills it seeks to cure" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181) The UN, despite having been subject of heavy criticism since its foundation, is a quite special international organization in this regard: through its specialized agencies and various bodies, by today, it covers practically every aspect of global affairs. Therefore, it may also claim authority, expertise, and agency in any issue characterizing world politics.

[40] How the structure looks like is defined by a strategic document, accepted by the GA every two years. This document has had multiple names throughout the years, including Strategic Framework, or more recently Biennial Programme Plan and Priorities.

The substantial parts of the reports are based on these claims. Not only they denote the worthy issues, but they structure and categorize them, suggest solutions to them, and denounce deviations from the norms. It is for this reason that before moving on to the detailed analysis of the introductory chapters, a few preliminary observations should be made about the bodies of the reports themselves. One of the most apparent – and definitely one of the most significant – issues is the conformation of the topics covered. While the first, 1946 report starts with nine chapters[41], dealing with practical matters and issue areas derivable directly from the Charter, we can see how a clear tendency appears throughout the years to expand UN competence and activity to more and more fields of global politics.

By the 70s, the Secretary-General reports on the work of the organization arranged in more than 30 chapters, including topics from human rights to industrial development, UN research and training institutes and special assistance programs. One can also witness how accent shifts as the political and conceptual context changes on the long run: throughout the Cold War, 'political and security questions' were not simply included in the report: they were, every year given prominence by having been placed in the forefront, as the most important topics of the reports. From the early 90s, this principal has been changing, and one can see them being de-prioritized, put in subsequent chapters, under such titles as 'peace endeavours', or 'preventing, controlling, resolving conflict', and forerun by issues such as 'global partnership for development', 'coordinating a comprehensive strategy', or 'development, humanitarian action and human rights'. The reports also kept pace with the transforming historical-political context, forwarding new concepts such as climate change, sustainable development, good governance, or globalization. Such questions (structure, format, priorities, etc.) are regulated by the GA's strategic document, accepted by Member States, as explained above.

As the reports themselves, introductory chapters also vary greatly when it comes to form and length. Some are incorporated in the text of the report and some are separate documents. Their length moves between 1 and 43, with an average of 7 pages. A high

[41] Political and security questions, Economic and social questions, International trusteeship and non-self-governing territories, International Court of Justice, Legal affairs, Transfer of certain activities and assets of the League of Nations, Establishment of the temporary and permanent Headquarters of the UN in the USA, Public information, Administrative and financial services.

peak is identifiable during the second term of U Thant, while a strong decline unfolds after the 90s, thence settling at a 1-3 pages' length. Noting this is important also because it informs strongly the analysis of self-definition and agency: evidently, while in the longer reports, the number of representations is higher, it is lower in those which are only a couple of pages long. Some further interesting aspects might also be identified, like the one that some reports were even given title, expressing the message the Secretary-General intended to transfer, or the fact that until the end of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's mandate, they were also signed by the Secretary-General, making them more attached to the respective individuals.

Very importantly though, the reports are not written by the Secretaries-General themselves. They are the products of a complex bureaucratic exercise in the Secretariat, which is an oddly under-researched process[42]. In the following chapter I present the results of an original interview-based research I conducted in the UN Headquarters in May 2018. On this occasion I interviewed Secretariat officials who participate in drafting the Secretary-General's reports, focusing on the Annual Reports. Beyond the description of this process, this data is used also to show how bureaucratic knowledge-production constructs the frames of world politics, in line with a global governmental rationality.

3. The production of the Secretaries-General's reports

The chapter summarizes the results of 6 semi-structured interviews, building on the realization that the report is not only a product published in the Secretary-General's name, but importantly also a product of the Secretariat. The interviewees work in the Secretariat on different levels and in different positions, therefore their insight can be used to reconstruct how the document is drafted and assembled in the Secretariat. Apart from the description of this process, the chapter connects the analysis of the interviews to the theoretical framework by showing how bureaucratic knowledge-production constructs the frames of world politics, in line with a global governmental rationality.

This chapter builds first of all on the important work of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, who did an enormous job in advancing IO research in the past decades. In 2018, they rightly stated that there is still much to be done in "connecting the internal with the external effects" of the UN (2018: 72), outlining a research agenda in which the

[42] A comparable case was presented by Iver B. Neumann in 2007, regarding the production of speeches in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. His methods were primarily ethnographic (participant observation), and the findings focused on how the Ministry functions as a bureaucracy. He attributed the high level of continuity in the produced texts to the specificities of a bureaucratic organization (Neumann, 2007).

below discussions fit finely. This agenda features, among others the UN's autonomy, understanding the internal workings, and the staff – fields of research that are connected by the key question of the interview-research: how does the UN bureaucracy construct the world in the reports of the Secretary-General? Previous works of Barnett and Finnemore are also highly relevant in this endeavour. As summarized in chapter II/2., the primary questions of their 2004 seminal book were why IOs have authority and why they expand in their agency. IOs' authority was seen to stand on their socially valued missions, which they carry out with a bureaucratic logic that links these insights to the governmentality approach.

In their referenced work, they explain that it is the bureaucracy that translates the mandates into actual policies, thereby defining 'good policies', often competing with state interests. This activity, very importantly, transforms information into knowledge, by giving it meaning, value and purpose (2004: 5-7). This 'social construction power' (see also: Barnett and Duvall, 2005a and 2005b) is considered here as the key to understand how the world – meaning especially the changing framework of world politics, the immediate environment of the Organization, and the Organization itself – is constructed in the Secretary-General's reports. It is as much a discursive as it is a bureaucratic construction, this is why both perspectives need to be used is analysing the interviews, and reflected on in terms of the rationality of government. So, after the reconstruction of the drafting process, the focus will be on the interviewees' own grids of knowledge, through which they filter information that goes into the reports and formulate the texts themselves, and also see the Organization and act in a broader context. The Secretariat is argued to work as part of a strong epistemic community which reproduces largely the same hegemonic meanings, narratives and understandings each year in these important pieces of the Secretary-General's written communication, building strong foundations for global governance as governmentality.

Certain mechanisms are similar in case of all Secretary-General reports, which means space for a limited generalizability. The interview questions were designed to prepare for a broader perspective 1. to make the reconstruction of the drafting of reports possible, 2. to provide basic sociological information about the respondents, and 3. to encourage them to form their own opinions about the different aspects of the general functioning of the

UN and the role of the Secretary-General. The average length of the sessions was around 40 minutes. They took place either in the Secretariat' office buildings, or in a café nearby, frequented by UN staff. This circumstance, and the fact that the interviewees were approached as employees of the Organization might have borne an effect on the answers: they might have avoided certain issues or given answers in conformity with the UN's working language and policies. They might not have wanted to step out of this, representing their organization, which, in the current case, might have even helped the knowledge grid to prevail.

To provide some basic background information, the following should be noted: the interviews were conducted with three male and three female participants[43]. As for the age groups, three middle-aged and three younger colleagues were represented. All six interviewees were originally from the global North: four from Anglo-Saxon countries, one from a North-European and another from a Western European one. This information might be significant, but not from the point of view of the selection, which was largely random: I tried to reach as many people as I could who might have a role in producing the Secretary-General's reports, which proved to be a difficult task, as contact details are not accessible to the public. The people I got to in the end represent relatively well the different steps and levels of drafting, which might be enough to use this set of data for the initial purposes.

In terms of professional backgrounds, their education was predominantly in the field of law (international law and human rights especially) and social sciences, while their previous jobs included positions in diplomacy, international public service, journalism, or research, which has a relevance in terms of socialization and structures of knowledge they might build on in their current jobs. My interlocutors came from various levels of the organizational hierarchy and from two units, the Department of Political Affairs or DPA (4) and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General or EOSG (2). As a result, Peace and Security as an issue area is in focus, as this is the field about which they could share information directly. The process is, however, quite similar for the other thematic

[43] An additional phone interview was made with a former senior official of the Executive Office, prior to the other interviews and based on a slightly different set of questions. This person refused the recording of our discussion, which is partly the reason why it is not fitted into the following analytical frame. The valuable information I acquired here, however, is included in the analysis.

areas as well. From the point of view of producing the Annual Reports, the main information is that DPA officers provide and coordinate the provision of information that goes into the Peace and Security chapter, while the EOSG's role is to manage and oversee the process, including the work of all other departments.

As the Annual Report accounts for the work or the whole organization for one year, it requires contribution from across the UN system – and especially the Secretariat –, which means a very collaborative process in the end (Williams, 2010). The Secretary-General bears responsibility for the work in one person, but necessarily, he is not the one who drafts these documents. In fact, their personal involvement varied greatly throughout the years, depending, among others and importantly, on the personality, leadership style and conception of office of the incumbents: based on the interviews it seems that certain Secretaries-General barely read the material that was published in their names, while others were rather invested in the process. Mostly elements pertaining to management style, vision and political space were mentioned by the respondents as having an impact. Every report contains a part where their contributions can best be traced: for instance, in the Annual Report it is the Introduction chapter, while in reports to the Security Council, it is the Observation section. The rest of the report – meaning the substantial parts – is assembled from the contributions of various units in the Secretariat, and is supervised by the Secretary-General's immediate colleagues, working under the unit, which is currently called the Executive Office.

While it is indeed a very bureaucratic and seemingly juiceless exercise, it is imperative to see that choices are made, developments are linked, narratives are built, significances are attached and emphases are put, on basically every level of the process. It does not only involve a host of contributors with different backgrounds, social relations, predispositions and interests, but also covers a vast physical space. An extremely important step, deciding on the field what might be important to report to the Headquarters – constituting the material that is later used in the drafting of the Secretary-General's reports – starts already with the different missions' daily reports. An interviewee currently working as a desk officer but having experience from the field actually put the emphasis on this stage of the process by saying that when

You're on the ground – you kind of have a different grasp of the situation and you can really feel which are the important issues that need to be in the report, which is launched here. (I01)

Characterizing the identification of issues with 'feeling' them is an interesting point which comes back also later, when the same official talked about wording the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council:

It's important to go through every incident. But also we would have our kind of feel what would have been the main incidents and main developments in the past four months. So we kind of know how much emphasis we want to give them in the draft, in the report. (I01)

The difficulty in the consolidating work at the Headquarters stem from accommodating the text, keeping word limit, and "finding a common voice".

Field missions and further stakeholders work based on an outline that clarifies competences at the beginning and sets the timeline for the work. The drafting of a report issued every six months takes approximately three months[44]. During these months there are several rounds of consultations with various stakeholders as the documents take their final shape. The relevant specialized units in the Secretariat, and the Executive Office also review all of the Secretary-General's communications – including the reports – for political, legal, gender, etc. implications. Other bodies in the UN system and relevant NGOs are only involved in these procedures where necessary, and Member States are avoided as much as possible. As one of the interviewees put it:

We don't invite them in, because it's not their business. We don't want Member States telling us what to say, it's one of the Secretary-General's few reports, where he can kind of, you know… and specialized agencies – this is not their report. (I02)

The former point – the Secretariat's relation with the Member States – is crucial in the currents study's approach. As it was outlined in the previous sections, a central claim is that IOs tend to function autonomously from their founders and that their operating bureaucracy is the key to understand this. It also fits well in academic and public discussions about the Secretariat, as clashes over the independence of international civil

[44] This of course varies with the different types of reports.

service have been a constant throughout the Organization's history (Jonah and Hill, 2018)[45]. My interlocutors agreed unanimously on how they view their and the Organization's relations to Member States: they all depicted a "problematic" relationship: the fact that Member States make the staff's life difficult and complain regularly is seen as an obstacle in moving on with the different processes. This is also why they are largely avoided and handled with care while drafting the reports. Discretion is thus essential – as "we need to remember who we are as an organization" (I01), and it is "the Secretariat's report after all" (I02). Member States are, thus „external stakeholders" in the Secretariat's business (I03).

The challenging point in drafting the Secretary-General's reports seems to be to strike the "right balance to make the right points" (I01), given the political and practical limits, such as the strict word count, which is, according to the respondents, the trickiest limitation – apart from the rigid structure of the reports. These two together have the result that "some things we'll just choose not to highlight" for the very prosaic reason that not everything fits in (I04). This simple circumstance already hints at the implications for governmental rationality, a point that will be revisited in the next section in more detail. One should remember, for instance, what Rose and Miller said about government as a "problematising activity"[46]. While experts provide the content, as it is the case with other communications of the Secretaries-General, speechwriters are responsible for the style. Apart from their interventions, however, the Organization's formal stylistic requirements must be ensured on every level of the process. According to the interviews, these require a factual, accurate, impartial and clear language, which is as technical as possible and follows the official guidelines (UN Editorial Manual). The importance of language is also directly tied to political relations within the Organization: the way it is used in is the result of long and tiresome exchanges, and once a Member State detects a departure from the agreed-upon standard language,

[45] Recent studies attempted to assess this independence (Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Bauer and Ege, 2016; Busch and Liese, 2017; Dijkstra, 2017). Bauer and Ege, for example, found that the UN was occupying a middle ground among the analysed fifteen IGOs in terms of Secretariat autonomy, showing more autonomy in terms of action than in terms of will (2016).

[46] See referenced on page 71.

there would be like a big issue – what's happening, what is different this time? So sometimes it's just better to keep to the language that doesn't surprise anyone. (I01)

The language used by the Secretary-General is also important from the point of view of norm diffusion: as the interviewees noted, attention to "gender language" has recently been added to the guidelines, marking an important point in the normative process (or norm 'life cycles') that many have been writing about (Finnemore, 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Park, 2006).

It is also important to take note of that strategic document which provides – or rather fixes – the framework in which the report should fit. The document is accepted by the General Assembly on a biennial basis and has had multiple names throughout the years, including Strategic Framework, or more recently Biennial Programme Plan and Priorities. The structure of the reports – chapters and subchapters, main topics – are outlined by this, leaving very limited space to manoeuvre. As anything which depends on the willingness of Member States to innovate, this document also changes rather slowly, rarely and moderately. In the interviews, this was referred to as a rather cumbersome frame to keep in mind, making it difficult to squeeze things into, which therefore presents itself as one of the key challenges while drafting. Based on that document, the process of drafting the Annual Report starts every spring, around March-April.

The unit responsible for assembling the report is the EOSG, which launches it by sending out requests for inputs to all relevant departments. For the Peace and Security chapter it is two departments, DPA and DPKO (Department of Peace-Keeping Operations) who pulls together the inputs from their various desks. The chapters are built from these bullet points in the EOSG, but in constant collaboration with the departments. These back and forths were described by some interviewees as a rather simple process, a mere bureaucratic and drafting exercise, with "not much science to it" (I04). This point also has special relevance and will be discussed in more detail in the next section. The only difficulties thus seem to be the ones that are inherent office work in general: getting material on time, communicating within and between teams, acquiring the required several levels of clearances, or respecting the word count. Throughout the process, meetings are also held in the EOSG to agree on the primary messaging in the given year. Importantly, these are not regular brainstorming events, as one interviewee explained:

So I mean, it's not that we're really asking a question that we don't know the answer to. I mean, I sit here all the time thinking about what's the big issue. So, you know… we spend all of our year marinating in this. So when it comes time to write, it's not like we're saying – hm, what should we put in the Annual Report, you know? We already know. So the brainstorming is really to just confirm we're not missing anything. (I02)

It is also in the EOSG where the text is being edited and finalized, as explained above. The procedure involves many levels of clearances (which might or might not include the Secretary-General also, depending on his attitude)[47], ensuring that the coherence and continuity of communication is in place and all the information deemed relevant are included in the document.

3.1 Governmental and bureaucratic rationality in the production of the Secretaries-General's reports

These accounts say a lot about the UN as an independent actor in world politics, supporting the claim around which the general argumentation is built. The research question I put forward for the interviews, however, has not been explored in detail yet. So how is the world constructed in the reports of the Secretary-General? As this project's theoretical discussions have suggested so far, the answer is twofold. On the one hand, the grid of knowledge that we called governmental rationality – following Foucault and International Governmentality Studies – operates as a structure: it limits imagination, outlines the field of accepted truths, and thereby defines the space of action for the different agents – in this case, for those in the Secretariat bureaucracy who draft the Secretary-General's reports. On the other hand, this structure is not given, natural or eternal: it is constructed in an endless series of intersubjective exchanges.

These slowly evolving structures are shaped in the interactions of a diverse set of agents. What Haas and others called epistemic communities are especially relevant here, meaning "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular

[47] In the case of Kofi Annan, for instance, the process started with an initial meeting with him, and proceeded in line with that. The drafting team kept him up to date, sent him drafts, flagged sensitive parts, or parts where his judgement was required. Ban ki-moon, on the other hand did not have much to do with his reports, as he tended to rely on his bureaucracy a lot. António Guterres is also very invested, as all the interviewees confirmed.

domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-are" (Haas, 1992: 3). These interlinked professional groups "share intersubjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared values, shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices; and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge" (ibid).

The interviews necessarily cover only a tiny fraction of the relevant epistemic community here. I do this with the intention to illustrate the relevance of the central claims, mindful of the obvious limitations. Answering the question, now I link these theoretical claims to my material to show the dynamics of structuration through some conspicuous cases. One such case unfolded in the unmistakable links between theorists and practitioners of global governance, which has already been addressed in chapter II/3. The key insight was that scholars have identified these links as the result of a joint effort of academics and practitioners: defining the term as an analytical concept around the early 90s went hand in hand with developing a normative political agenda. This characteristic seems to endure and manifests in the interviews, supporting the link between the discourse of global governance and the Annual Reports. When asked about global governance (what it means to them, what role they see for the Secretary-General in it) respondents tended to summarize the key points made in mainstream academic literature on the subject. They did not only invoke key definition elements[48], but also sketched the main lines of critique regularly emerging in academic discussions[49], reproducing smoothly the contemporary

[48] Examples of this are personal definitions such as: "kind of like a global management of issues" (I01); "our bodies of norms, but also resolutions – binding and not binding, and the different intergovernmental bodies we have is the closest thing we have to global governance mechanisms" (I04); "the rules and norms that influence countries in their foreign policy decisions I would say. Especially multilateral decisions…. and it involves all the multilateral institutions and regional organizations, global organizations" (I05); „a very varied landscape of different organizations that – you know, some formal, some informal, some standing, some not, some global, some regional, some thematic ones, and that's fine (I02).

[49] One of these evolve around the sovereignty question: "I'm not sure it's a word or a phrase that we use very frequently here at the UN because many Member States I think may be put off by it (I04); „from the peace and security side it's a tricky concept (...) basically the organization is still based on or comprises national states" (I01). Another point at the analytical fluidity which is brought up against using global governance regularly: "it doesn't mean that much. Because it's such an open term that is not really descriptive or… I mean I'd have a hard time to see what would not be global governance" (I03).

frames of political imagination within the Secretariat. An interviewee, explaining the strategical messaging in the Secretary-General's report gave a very open case:

> *I mean, our messaging, it is the same basic messaging: multilateralism matters, collective solutions are better, you know, we're here for Members States to come together and forge solutions to the biggest problems that they share, you know, you can't solve your problem by yourself anymore, if you ever could, you know, bla-bla… international law matters and you should respect it, it's as much for the strong as for the weak, bla-bla-bla. It's the same messaging every year, kind of. Just slightly different nuances. (I02)*

These elements could be interpreted as 'bla-bla' clearly because they are so familiar, and form such an essential part of how world politics is thought of – so one should not even spend too much time on reciting them. This of course has a lot to do with questions of hegemony and especially hegemonic discourses. Brand, who understands global governance as the hegemonic discourse of world politics, actually gathered very similar elements as constitutive of this discourse. Reproduction of hegemonic understandings and enforcement of structures of knowledge is, however, but one side of the coin. Accounting more for the other side of structuration, the interviews provided numerous examples of how these Secretariat workers rely on extremely solid and basic structures of knowledge and how they see these validated in their everyday work. One great example is the frequent reference to 'political realities' which occurred in every interview and thus seemed to be a core belief, around which various ideas and strategies are being built. The question around which these views evolved was if working with the UN changed their initial conception about the Organization. The respondents overwhelmingly (5) expressed some sort of negative turn in their ideas, with a rather broad range: being "disappointed", facing a "down to Earth" or "scyzophrenic" experience, expressing that many are "discouraged" when confronting the above mentioned "political realities".

By these realities, however, I do not only mean the commonly and widely shared 'iron laws' of power politics, but also such simple personal conclusions like when someone is "interested in international things" it is evident that he/she should work for the UN (I05). This strategy necessarily builds on the knowledge that the UN is the place where 'international things' happen, in other words, it suggests that multilateralism and the UN's

central role form an important pillar of international political imagination. 'Realities' also stretched beyond history and the present: as one interviewee explained,

> *it's hard to be a big cheerleader of the UN sometimes but nonetheless I think it's the best organization that we've got – if we destroyed, we would have to probably rebuild something similar. (I04)*

From the understanding of relevant political subjects, 'we' (the peoples?) to the norm of international organization per se, this observation shows how deeply truths about politics in general, and international politics in particular are rooted in the hegemonic consciousness.

Another example of how the commonly held truths about the UN informed the interviewed individuals was clear from their answers when asked to tell about the Organization's most important fields of action. Interviewees lists were characteristically textbook answers, and they did not show particular willingness to step out of these ready-made understandings. It is also noteworthy that the main rule based on which they were admittedly weighing importance was utility: those areas where the UN 'has added value' or 'fills gaps' were the most appreciated by the most interviewees. Filling (governance) gaps in a utilitarian narrative is indeed an important part of sustaining the Organization, which allows scholars to interpret the activity of the UN – and also other IOs – as governmentality: the gaps are filled with professional expertise, divided and categorized according to different logics: issue areas (eg. peace-keeping), geographical areas (eg. Western Africa), horizontal perspectives (gender implications), all pertaining to separate offices, following the (bureaucratic) rationality of government. This, in itself offers analogies with national governments. The analogy, however is not entirely satisfactory, and to see the difference, it is necessary to specify the functioning of the governmental rationality in the case of IOs. The way in which an interviewee explained the difference with public service in states presents an interesting case, in terms of how power functions here:

> *In the Foreign Office if you have kind of a lever and if you pull on it, like something happens. And that's something that most people coming from the decision making level in a different organization, even a government, will expect, you know, if you pull the lever, something will happen. And what happens to people at the UN at a*

> *decision making level, even the Secretary General, is they come in and they pull the lever – and nothing happens. Because that's not how it works. The Secretary General has very little authority, even the most senior people in the system have very little authority. (I02)*

This of course does not mean that there is no power involved in how things function at the UN, on the contrary. In order to understand the functioning of these alternative forms of power, however, we should turn to alternative ideas of the exercise of power, such as the one formulated in the idea of governmentality: a dispersed, indirect form of power which permeates (among others) the very bureaucratic structures in which activities are carried out, and indeed in which they can be thought of.

As I did not say much about my project in advance, the interviewees sometimes seemed puzzled why I even took interest in the drafting of the reports, which is "a very bureaucratic process at the end of the day" (I04). Paradoxically, those parts were probably the most interesting, where my interlocutors shared how they understood this as a mere routine reporting exercise. As one of them explained, "we just sit down and try and write a few pages" but immediately added "where we cannot be exhaustive necessarily, so some things we'll just choose not to highlight and we'll write the big highlights of the year" (I04). This is of course not unproblematic in the current framework – considering the selection or the identification of relevant issues. It was also explained that, while there are many levels of consultations and clearances, the first draft "doesn't change that much" (I01) in the end – demonstrating that the process is based on mutual trust and reliance on information from the different parts of the bureaucratic machine:

> *I mean the important purpose of the report is not so much what is in it at the end, but it's really the work process that has led to its finalization that has the added value. So each time we write a report, the fight to produce it is an extremely valuable work process for the organization because since we know no one will read all the reports (…) you really have to trust in the bureaucracy and the consultation within the bureaucracy. (I03)*

More than one interviewees shared how they saw the drafting of the Secretary-General's reports in a broader context: "drafting it's kind of… it's not just about writing the report.

It's about how you communicate with your colleagues and different offices" (I01). This important idea also came up in another case:

> *It's products like this report that really make us communicate. It's the substance of why I interact with my bosses or my colleagues, because we have to discuss. So it's really a living document that creates the conversation on of course strategy. (I03)*

These insights confirm, first of all, that focusing on the Secretary-General's reports is relevant in the context of approaching the UN through organization theory, and placing them in the centre of attention as bureaucracies. Drafting these documents is not merely a routine reporting exercise, but an exercise that keeps the Organization together and functioning: governing. Building the reports also build the different teams into a complex whole: it maintains intra-organizational relations, keeps the staff trained, and nurtures a common language that facilitates work. It keeps the machine going and strengthens it from within, making them real blueprints of bureaucracy and its own governing rationality. This do not mean that the same interviewees would step out of the 'drafting as a simple exercise' approach. This is all the more remarkable when their accounts speak clearly about narrative building:

> *So this is the most important thing for this report. Is to try and accurately sort of pick out things to highlight that are representative of a broader trend. (I04)*

> *In the first place, you have the details right and then you can kind of make it you know become a more broader text (…) also being able to kind of link the incidents on the ground to a broader context of the mandate and of the report. (I01)*

> *The added value of the annual report is not really just to provide an update on everything that happened in the world and everything the UN did, but I think the more interesting part of it is sort of to try to show larger trends, also follow up on items or observations that the Secretary General has made in the previous year, and create sort of a continuum, and so really try to minimize actually the reporting in terms of listing events. (I03)*

Even from these accounts it is clear that these reports are certainly not a pile of information, but a carefully formulated set of knowledge, wrapped around a specific narrative, constructed by relatively autonomous Secretariat bureaucrats. Their explicit

goal is to, first, build a narrative in the texts, and second, to weave it into a broader narrative of world politics.

The interview analysis and the interpretation of the production of the Secretary-General's reports indeed provided some interesting results. An essential lesson was how unproblematic identification of problems, the treatment of information and its transformation to knowledge, the construction and combination of narratives seemed to Secretariat workers. The key insights of interpretive organizational theory, as summarized by Szabó, are useful to make a point. These are: the reality of organizations is a constructed reality, which applies also to the environment of the organization, which we should see as the organization's active reaction to its perceptions; among the general characteristics of organizations are their uniqueness and locality; they are constructed through the interaction of human relations, meaning primarily discourses, defining mutual understandings (Szabó 2016, 240-245).

The reports are produced in a well-oiled machine: apart from some moderately constraining stylistic and editorial guidelines and the rigid framework fixed by the agreement of Member States, nothing really seem to influence drafters of the report on the different levels of the organizational hierarchy. It is according to the interviewees' perception, that appropriate formulations and frames are ensured by intersubjective mechanisms – and we should add, sets of knowledge that inform international public servants thinking and strategies in their own life as well as in their everyday work, perceived as obvious or evident 'realities'. Thus, hard realities, as they appear in the Secretary-General's reports are the result of the autonomous collective actions of these international public servants, who, by constructing the world, also construct the appropriate ways to manage it.

To sum up, the key point is that the organization is a "malleable reality" (Szabó 2016, 241), produced and reproduced constantly by the (discursive) actions of its constitutive agents (which goes also to the environment in which the organization is situated). Based on these considerations, it seems well-placed to discuss the UN: 1. As an organization that derives its authority primarily from its bureaucracy, 2. As an agent both constituted by and constituting the structural context of its existence, primarily through discursive

processes 3. And as an important part of 'the international' that we might arguably characterise today as the space for global governmentality.

4. Applying the method: building categories of subjectivization

This chapter explains in detail how I built my categories for analysing self-definition and agency construction. It exposes the dilemmas of operationalization in a self-reflexive way, and argues for the choices I made to solve them. The result is a three-level category system which is available for scrutiny in Appendix 1. and 2.

In the textual analysis, the goal was to map the process of 'subjectivization'[50] (composed of self-representations and elements of agency construction) in the Introductions of the Annual Reports, or in other words, to see the line of historical representations, signifying sequences "that constitute more or less coherent frameworks for what can be said and done" (Dunn, 2008:79). The first step was necessarily to define what counts as self-representation and agency construction: which keywords should be used to build the analysis on? In the case of self-definition, an ideal choice seemed to be to filter out substantive verbs in relation to the 'United Nations', and 'the UN', but also 'the Organization' or 'the UN family' – every subject that refers to the Organization as a distinct unit, as a unified actor (as compared to one or more of the main organs, certain specialized agencies, the sum of Member States or similar formulations). To show the temporal dynamics in the texts, the occurrences were grouped according to the modalities they were used in. The result was first a database which contains, for every year, how the Secretary-General saw the Organization: the UN is, is not, was, was not, has been, has not been, will be, will not be, should be, can/could be, may/might be, also including an 'other' label for those descriptions that are relevant, but hard to categorize. The aim was not only to collect words, but meanings, which necessitated that the collection included the immediate textual context of the representations.

The same was done with agency construction: in this case, verbs describing direct activities of the above subjects were collected and grouped first according to their modalities: the UN does, does not, did, did not, has done, has not done, will do, will not do, can do, cannot do, could do, could not do, should do, should not do, may do, would do, does in passive tense, and including also an 'other' category (referring in this case mostly to indirect structures formulated with using 'to'). It is important to highlight that

[50] Also termed subjectivation or subjectification.

when collecting the data for self-definition and agency construction, the followed rule excluded from the analysis occurrences which might otherwise have relevance to the topic. Substantial verbs and structures that indicate the modalities in each case (UN is, was, might be, etc. and UN does, has done, could do, etc.) significantly limited the number of occurrences.

For example, parts of texts describing indirectly the role or the goals of the Organization, but not compatible with either structure (for example: 'the role of the United Nations is the maintenance of peace') is not included because it is not formulated as 'the United Nations aims to maintain peace' or 'the United Nations is an instrument to maintain peace'. Even though both collections include an 'Other' category for difficult or ambiguous cases, the main rule of direct reference was consistently kept throughout the process of data collection. This limitation, however distorting it might seem at first sight, was important because it filters out all occurrences where the UN itself is not referred to as a primary subject or is not described as directly engaging in action. Feasibility was another important reason, which, at the end seemed justified considering the high number of occurrences in both cases, but especially in that of agency-construction.

The next step was operationalization: I went through the long list of representations (meaning 546 mentions in all of the sources in the case of self-definition and 1138 in the case of agency construction) and grouped them under categories, with open coding, meaning that I did not have any preliminary stand on the structure and content of the representations: I tried to cover the whole variety with as many categories as reasonably possible. This was a crucial part in putting together the method, the step which bore probably the most heavily on the structure of the results. This coding procedure was applied to keep the analysis as closely attached to the texts as possible, having the broadest possible grasp on the texts as a system of knowledge. After this, categories were amended, confronted and cross-checked, with the aim of building a structure out of them that cover the whole variety of representations, but remains manageable. The logic was largely semantic, with the restriction that it was the overall meaning of the representation and its immediate context that defined which representation goes into which category (eg. if the UN is described as a global institution, expressing 'global' character was deemed the core message, so it was categorized under 'global', but not 'institution') and not

simply the meaning of the representation itself. In case equally important elements were found in a structure, all of them were applied as a category.

Through this process, a three level-category-system was created for both themes, consisting of main categories, categories and sub-categories. Importantly, this system did not differentiate in itself between relevant and irrelevant, or significant and insignificant categories. These qualities came out of the number and combinations of the actual representations, again, staying as close to the original source as possible, avoiding 'reading certain things into' the texts. In the analysis I mostly work with the main categories, as combined with the modalities, they already made the dataset rather complex, and they represented the biggest trends and patterns fairly. Categories and sub-categories are only specified in the detailed descriptions, to the extent it is necessary for a better understanding. In the body of the analysis only those categories are described, discussed, and presented on the figures which proved to be the most – or, occasionally the least – significant. The full list of representations, their descriptions and main features are included in Appendix 1 and 2.

This primarily quantitative procedure might seem to deviate from the dominantly qualitative framework constructed in the first chapters, so it requires some explanation. Counting occurrences necessarily does not say much about how the overall narrative (not to mention the discourse) 'looks like', or more precisely, how it evolves through time. It is, therefore, not the only tool used in this study, but it should not be too easily dismissed as hollow: it constitutes a more or less solid base to revert to in the midst of subsequent interpretations. With the different types of groupings (within texts, within years pertaining to different Secretaries-General, within groups of Secretaries-General, across time, combined with modalities, etc.) the resulting dataset – which would otherwise be inaccessible to a DA, which is meticulous enough but focuses on the entire textual corpus as the object of analysis, due to its volume – becomes analysable.

One might find plenty of examples for quantitative discourse analyses in the literature (Wetherell et al., 2001; Potter, 2004). As Jäger and Meyer also point out, quantitative analyses (such as frequency) have the capacity to show focal issues in discourse strands, based on which further claims can be made regarding sustained patterns in particular knowledges, or if subjected to diachronic analysis, they can be used to identify important

trends (2016:126). The reluctance of discourse analysts to use quantitative methods is thus not due to their inutility, rather to "the ways in which they have been used until now" which have often not been "in line with the perspective of discourse analysis" (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002:122). The fact that the following analysis is anchored in numbers, thus does not intend to suggest that bare numbers are the gist of the matter here, or that the research results stand entirely on them. They rather have an orienting function, and they are referred to throughout the analyses to keep the analysis as close to the texts as possible.

5. Brief description of the main categories

The chapter is an extraction of Appendix 1. and 2. It provides an abridged description for the main categories, highlighting the information which is crucial in following the subsequent analytical steps.

5.1 Self-definition

For the analysis of self-definition, I constructed six main categories. Categories and sub-categories are not elaborated on here, unless such an exercise is deemed necessary for understanding, but the short descriptions of the main ones need to stand here to make sense of what follows. *'Agency'* covers those textual occurrences which touch upon the UN's agential capacity in global affairs. They talk about a variety of engagements from the part of the Organization and depict it as a unique institution in world politics. Being a front-runner in international diplomacy and politics, a champion for various issues, protector and promoter of rights, peace and other principles of the Charter are represented under this main category. Importantly, it includes occurrences with both positive and negative connotation, in the first case largely affirming agency, while in the second denying it or depicting it as being impeded. *'Influence'* as a main category groups together representations that depict the UN as a strong and influential institution, represented as central in world affairs. *Normativity'* covers those occurrences where the UN appears as a value and an achievement itself or is described with progressive terms as a unique entity. Values that are understood as progressive are largely those included in the Charter and in these instances the UN sees itself as a depository and guarantor of these. *'Criticism'* includes both external and self-criticism: the Organization is mostly criticized as imperfect, marginal and weak, while such criticism is often described as deriving from a misunderstanding of its role, going as far as picturing the UN as overcompetent and even an obstacle for states. Representations grouped together under *'Character'* are, not

surprisingly, important in the definition of the Organization's character – for example being political, global, dynamic, intergovernmental, or complex. It is based on important features, be them either positive, negative or neutral in the given context (some of these questions are discussed elsewhere in this study, as they are presumed to be important points of identification). Finally, '*Role'*, the strongest of all the main categories stands for the different functions of the United Nations. The texts discuss three main functions, grasping the role of the Organization: a mediator, an instrument, or a platform for Member States. Apart from these, this broad category includes representations of the UN as a basis and depository of knowledge or as being able/unable to function properly. Some deliberate questions regarding self-definition and accounts of the genesis of the Organization are also grouped under this category, talking about the true nature and functions of the UN.

5.2 Agency construction

The analysis of agency construction follows a similar model as self-definition. As explained in chapter IV/3, in this case, the focus was on verbs in relation with the UN as a unified actor, out of which, through an operationalization process, a threefold system of main categories, categories and sub-categories were formed. As in the case of self-definition, here also, I only give a brief description of the main categories, as well as some of the more important categories, while the rest of the descriptions are accessible in Appendix 2. There are four main categories for the analysis of agency construction: 'Positive action', 'Neutral action', 'Negative action' and 'Abstract action'. Importantly, the categories are not distinguished by normative considerations, but by the quality or nature of action – what is meant by this, will be clear from the descriptions that follow here. Starting with the absolute predominant type, in '*Positive action'*, those verbs are grouped, which express that the Organization is forcefully engaging in proactive actions, making actual efforts, either reacting or contributing to others', developing its own ways, acting with authority and independence, or successfully accomplishing tasks that are required of it. Occurrences in this main category point in a certain direction through action, have effects on world events, shape the agenda or respond to solicitation of other actors. It represents the action of an independent organization, with its own goals, means,

potentials and agenda, which makes this main category especially important from the point of view of agency construction.

As 'Positive action' in itself takes up two-thirds of all representations, its categories are also briefly described here: '*Action*' is a general one, grouping occurrences which describe action with no specific content or direction, merely assessing that they take place. '*Contribution*' represents those instances where the UN is an actor, but not the primary one. Its contribution is chiefly complementary, aiming to support, facilitate other actors or provide help in situations that occur. Mediation, or providing assistance to emerging and developing states are frequent examples of such activity. '*Harmonizing action*' as a category describes those cases, which aim at the orchestration of others' actions, enabling discussion and consensus, and playing an intermediary role. '*Targeted action*' have a definite direction, verbs grouped here point at an ideal thing (like universality), or express a movement toward a certain end. '*Reaction*' type of action brings together those instances, which express a positive, but reactive form of action on the part of the Organization. '*Strong action'*, the most frequent category in 'Positive action', groups together those cases where action is described in the most forceful way. In these cases, the UN seems to be a proactive, independent agent in world politics, shaping the agenda, acting with authority, taking on new responsibilities, initiating policies and acting as a champion for the rights of the oppressed. Finally, '*Successful action'* covers those cases where action is completed: issues are solved, conflicts ended, functions of the Organization fulfilled. This category is especially important from the point of view of the main goal of the Annual Reports, assessing accomplishments for the year in question.

With the help of the other main categories, different types of actions are operationalized: '*Abstract action'* includes representations describing indirect forms of action, expressed with verbs. They describe either capacities, acts of showing certain qualities, and similar actions effectuated by the Organization without positive action being made. These are, however, important parts of agency as they show those cases where the UN has already achieved a stage in its development where it can 'represent' or 'demonstrate' certain qualities, 'has power' or 'has capacities' to do something, or keeps its already existent integrity in its actions. Verbs under '*Negative action'* account for the UN's failures: when it falls back, depends on others, or lacks certain things required for action. The fact that

it is the weakest representation in terms of frequency shows that this is not something very often discussed in a direct form in the Introductions, however it is important to show that self-critique is also a part of self-definition. With '*Neutral action*', those instances are grouped which express the UN as engaging in action which seems value-free and neutral in intent. Of course, speaking, allowing things to happen, or considering certain issues are not power-neutral acts, but since it was principally the intended meaning which determined categorization, they were labelled as such. Here also, it was the context of the verbs which played a role in putting occurrences in this main category, as examples of more 'descriptive' textual parts. In the next section, some preliminary observations are outlined, relying on a largely numerical analysis of the data accumulated in the way described above.

5.3 Expectations: categories in the light of governmentality theory

Before starting the analysis, a final step should be taken: clarifying the expectations I have. This should be done keeping in mind that coding was a deliberately open procedure, followed in order not to have a theoretically-informed set of categories. This is of course not to suggest some false sense of objectivity or keeping distance from the texts. Formulating the categories inevitably implied some inclinations and factors based on personal choices and ideas of the subjectivization narrative. Actual objects of the analysed textual fragments came together with what I thought to be important in building such a narrative – like telling what kind of an organization is imagined generally, or what kinds of fields of activity should definitely be there. My endeavour to stay as close to the texts as possible, thus have obvious limitations. Yet, an approach I had in mind at an earlier stage might give an idea of how theory could have been applied more directly in constructing the system of categories. It is also useful to voice some of the expectations I had prior to doing the analysis, in a self-reflexive way.

After reading through the Introductions for the first time, I had the below broad categories in mind (not separating self-definition from agency), and the following expectations with regards to them:

- A kind of 'fundamentalism', strong especially in the first years, but staying visible throughout the whole period. A conspicuous feature was the forging of an apodictic link between the cataclysms of the 20th century and the establishment of the

organization. The most general – and ever since most popular – 'functionalist' formulations of 'what' the organization was could be summed up under this: a world organization for the maintenance of peace and security, the promotion of welfare and progress. It was expected, though, that these 'traditional' formulations give way to 'fresher' ones, as the Organization's subjectivity develops. Security discourses were expected to transform into discourses of exceptionality, enforcing the 'permanent state of exception' on a global level (in an Agambenian sense), and thus bringing a new tone in governmentality's logic of permanent danger.

The actual analytical categories which are the most relevant for this point: *contribution, harmonizing action, intergovernmental, mediator, platform, instrumental, genesis*

- 'Political agency' seemed to show in argumentations starting from the importance of global scale security, nevertheless, going beyond the classic understandings and promoting an "exploration of the possibilities for co-operation on a wider basis", by which the role of world organization was to necessarily gain new dimensions (AR, 1955: XI). The elaboration of this new dimension was expected to go beyond imagining the UN as a conference organizing machine or a platform of cooperation for nation-states. This 'progressivism' was expected to show rather clearly, getting stronger as time went by.

The actual analytical categories which are the most relevant for this point: *action, strong action, dispose, represent, agent, strong, influencer, central, dynamic, constructive, more than instrumental*

- 'Neutralization' seemed to be a strong 'governmentality feature'. As the years went by, accent tended to be placed more and more on the 'technical character' of the UN's actions and endeavours (AR 1965: 2). In the escalating political (and financial) situation, the Secretaries-General attempted more and more to differentiate "between what is political and what is not" (ibid), and to advance the 'non-political' issues. These strategies construct a different kind of agency, which was expected to become increasingly important as the years went by, building more and more on expert knowledge and representations of professionalism.

The actual analytical categories which are the most relevant for this point: *successful action, attract, represent, consider, research, speak, capable, central, professional, knowledge base, functional*

- A certain form of 'contextualization' was also expected to appear in the texts, constantly reconstructing the meaning of the Organization's direct environment, and integrating into the construction of the Self as well. "We face today a world of almost infinite promise which is also a world of potentially terminal danger. The choice between these alternatives is ours" (AR, 1985: 1). Formulations like this, seemed to illustrate the links between the elements of the research problem: forging rationality, and connecting subjectivization to this practice.

The actual analytical categories which are the most relevant for this point: *action, contribution, targeted action, reaction, strong action, attract, keep integrity, represent, depend, frustrated, strong, popular influencer, central, caring, political, global, dynamic*

- Finally, I was looking forward to see a highly 'normative' set of texts, in which the normative (and especially liberal) values, values of the bare existence of the Organization are stressed over and over again. This expectation was also based on the genre of the analysed texts, with a ceremonial flavour. These representations were imagined to form an integral part of the language of 'the liberal art of government'.

The actual analytical categories which are the most relevant for this point: *contribution, reaction, strong action, successful action, attract, represent, agent, normative value, unique, visionary*

After quite a bit of methodological considerations, I chose not to analyse the texts through such a given set of categories, building so heavily on my theory. As the governmentalized functioning of international organizations has been pointed out many times before, what I found more important was to show the variety of representations as they appear in the texts, and then subject these to an interpretation within such a framework. This made the identification of other forms of political rationality equally possible and was deemed to be more in line with my main motivation, which is more exploratory than aimed at justifying specific assumptions.

The above expectations, thus, do not show directly in the system of categories, as this system became much richer and diverse in the end. In the analysis, it is shown, however, that the research results, standing on such an open system of categories can still be well comprehended under a governmentality framework. If they could not, that would have meant that the initial theoretical framework was misplaced. It does not mean, however, that the simple expectations I had with regards to this framework were all that the research found, or that they were enough in making sense of the texts. The following analysis will thus elaborate on a more complex process of subjectivization, with less obvious trends and mixed results in terms of political rationalities.

6. Preliminary observations

This chapter presents a general overview of the results. It provides visualization and description for the main distributions in each analytical category, the modalities, and some large trends in a historical perspective. It does not analyse, merely describes the data.

6.1 Self-definition (SD)

The distribution of the main categories shows that representations of 'Role' are the most frequent, giving 39% of all the representations (215 mentions out of the total 546), followed by 22% of 'Agency' and 19% of 'Normativity' (Figure 3.).

Figure 3. Distribution of main categories in self-definition



The rest of the main categories (including the cases with no mention) together constitute the proportion of 'Agency' alone. The three main representations within the main category of 'Role' – the UN as an instrument, a platform, and a mediator[51] – together give 132 of the 215 mentions, 'instrumental' self-definition being in itself more frequent than the other two combined (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Distribution of 'Role' categories



This suggests that it is the instrumentality of the Organization which is by far the strongest motif in the self-understanding of the UN. This is also largely true if we look at it in a historical perspective: it stays prevalent until the 2016, although loses from its prominence to the 'UN being a platform' representation (Figure 5).

[51] These categories are singled out because they comprise representations which refer to substantive ideas. Being (or not being) a functional organization, although it belongs logically to this main category, does not formulate such a clear idea. Genesis accounts are numerous, but have a slightly different function as they outline the 'original role' of the UN.

Figure 5. The three main ‘Role’ categories through time



After 2010 only ‘Normativity’ and ‘Agency’ appear to a minimal extent, giving way to reports that completely lack representations of self-definition (‘None’ category, Figure 6). Interestingly, self-understanding as a ‘mediator’ dies away as early as the end of the Cold War. As for the temporal distribution of all representations, it is important to note a declining tendency throughout the years, thanks in part to the strong decline also in the length of the introductions.

Figure 6. Main categories of self-definition through time



It is equally important to look at modalities[52] themselves, as they bear greatly on the intention of the speaker, and therefore the meaning of representations. The distribution among modalities shows a predominance of 'is' – which includes all present tenses and also formulations using 'as' – with 60% (333) of the total (Figure 7). The second most frequent is present perfect with 9% (47) and those representations which describe what the UN should be with 7% (38). These details are interesting first and foremost because they show that the Secretary-General, when describing the organization, does not look into the past or the future as much as he evaluates the present state of affairs. This result is slightly surprising if we consider that the Annual Reports are supposed to account for the past year's developments, while it seems to justify the basic assumption of this study, namely that he uses this occasion more to designate the place and role of the Organization in the present.

Figure 7. Distribution of modalities in self-definition



[52] The attention to modalities has serious limitations, as they might be, among others, a question of personal linguistic style also. Facing such limitations is the reason why they are not awarded a more serious role in the analysis. The general observations in this chapter are, however, still considered as telling in terms of the aim of the reports (and their Introductions in particular).

From a strategic point of view, it is also telling that he clearly prefers to talk about the UN in positive terms: occurrences with negative modalities (is not, was not, has not been, will not be) amount to 28 altogether, out of which 'is not' takes up 19 instances, enforcing also the point made above. It is also worthy of stating that modalities referring to the future or future possibilities – of what the Organization will or will not be, could, should, or might be – also outweigh those referring to the past – including was, was not and also has and has not been – by 16, the former counting 100 while the latter 84 occurrences. From a substantial point of view, becoming an 'agent' dominates references to the future and possibilities, while giving account of the 'genesis' of the Organization is by far the most significant topic of the accounts of the past.

6.2 Agency construction (AC)



As Figure 8 shows, the distribution of main categories shows an even more dramatic picture than in the case of self-definition. Out of the 1148 occurrences in total, 858 (75%) falls into the category of 'Positive action', which is absolutely predominant throughout the whole period: while 'Role' in self-definition was the absolute top, from time to time, it was overtaken by other categories. In this case, 'Positive action' remains the strongest category for the analysed 70 years, as shown on Figure 9.



The distribution of the other three main categories is also interesting: the second strongest is Abstract action (11%), which represents already existing agencies instead of those in the making: the strongest sub-categories within it account for what the Organization 'disposes' (46) in terms of power, capacities, etc., or what it 'represents' (40), followed by instances where 'keeping integrity' (17) and the ability of 'attracting' (15) and inspiring attention, good will, hope, etc. is described with direct terms. 'Neutral action' follows closely with 10% of the distribution, and showing a much less balanced frequency than 'Abstract action'. The great majority of the occurrences in this category describe when the UN 'considers' (50) certain issues, actions, proposals, etc., while 'maintaining' (13), 'operating' (15) and 'researching' (14) are also relevant labels. While the majority of activities under this category are definitely not 'neutral' from, for instance, a knowledge/power perspective, they are presented in the texts as 'subsidiary', or routine activities, which do not 'fit' into the other categories. Finally, 'Negative action' (4%), counting altogether 46 mentions is the least frequent type of activity. It is, however, very important as it shows the constraints on action by the Organization, such as 'lacking' (10) resources or capacities, 'depending' (10) on external factors (such as Member subsidies), and occasionally 'failing' (11) in its attempts to accomplish its tasks. 'Negative action' – like 'Neutral action' – is stronger in roughly the middle of the period in question, while weaker at the beginning and at the end (Figures 10 and 11).

Figure 10. 'Neutral action' through time



Figure 11. 'Negative action' through time



When it comes to the different modalities, a rough look on Figure 12 shows that the distribution of modalities is rather varied: approximately one third of the verbs appear in either present or present perfect tense, affirming the finding of the self-definition analysis, namely, that Secretaries-General in the Introductions prefer to talk about the present instead of the past, and importantly, to talk about it in positive terms. The proportion of negative tenses is marginal, what the Organization 'cannot do' being the most frequently used negative modality with altogether 24 mentions.



Future and different conditional tenses constitute largely another third, signalling the presence of a visionary thinking the texts. The majority of the last third is taken up by two a 'passive' and an 'other' category, which might be a bit confusing, but were found necessary to use in the analysis. While passive tense does not mean actions as direct as in the case of other tenses, as it is especially frequently used in English language, I decided that excluding it from the analysis would miss more than it would gain (there are no separate categories within 'passive', so these might include references to present, past and future also). The 'other' category, as in the previous case, is used for those instances where categorization proved difficult, but in large part it contains structures using 'to', like in the following example: "the need to give to the United Nations a chance to develop its full potentialities".

7. Description of the data[53]

Although the above observations are informative, looking at self-definition and agency construction contextually is preferable if the goal is to understand the dynamics of the process and to relate it to the state of global governance. Here, only those examples are

[53] A longer summary of the key results is available in section 7.4.

highlighted and dealt with in detail which have some special significance from the perspective put forward in the Introduction. A first, general remark should concern the temporal dynamics, already touched upon, but not having been put in context so far. On Figure 13 and 14, we see the number of representations fluctuating throughout the 70 years, altogether showing a declining tendency, as mentioned above.

Figure 13. Self-definition through time



Figure 14. Agency construction through time



If, however, we look more closely, we might identify some patterns that shifts can be related to the ever-changing global historical-political context, in which the UN has been situated – in addition to those long-term cognitive trends which have been described earlier as shifts in the political rationality. Such topicalities bear on the short term strategies of all actors in the global political arena. It is not necessary to go too deeply into strategic or foreign policy analysis. The idea is merely that if a crisis erupts – be it a natural disaster, a political conflict or an economic collapse – actors need to react: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies considers to send a

team and organize relief, the SC holds a session, states negotiate and adjust their policies, and corporations do the same with their strategies.

What is important from the current point of view is that, if the respective event is considered significant enough, the Secretary-General also reacts: it might even be included in the Annual Report. Analysis could show which events are and are not talked about by the Secretary-General, which is in itself intriguing from the point of view of knowledge production and the construction of reality. This direct impact of events is, however, not discussed in this case: instead, I try to interpret the historical dynamics of the existing data to see those circumstances which might have had an impact on quality and quantity of self-definition representations throughout the reports. Another factor to consider, is of course the incumbent of the position. As discussed in chapter IV/1.2, personality, preferences, priorities, attitudes of the Secretaries-General inform not only how they run the Organization but also on how they talk about it. Thus, findings from the data are presented in line with the mandates of the different Secretaries-General, they themselves also categorized according to a primarily temporal logic. I also briefly reflect on the most influential events and other contextual elements that might play a role in how self-definition evolved through time. The detailed analysis of the accumulated data on agency construction is conducted from a similar perspective than in the case of self-definition. Data is interpreted according to the context and is broken down according to the terms of the respective Secretaries-General.

Figure 15. Weighted number of self-definition representations through time





For the sake of clearer comparison and temporal dynamics, the above figures also show the proportion of representations relative to the length of the Introductions throughout the years. They clearly show that there is no such rule that longer texts contain more representation, on the contrary. In case of self-definition it is perhaps clearer that the 'Middle Trio', while their reports were much longer than the others', they said less in terms of direct narratives. It is also in this case where a shift can be observed after the end of the Cold War: Boutros-Ghali was especially active in this sense, but all post-Cold War Secretaries-General employed more of these direct formulations on much less pages. The substantial side of these numbers are elaborated in the following chapter, and interpreted in the theoretical framework in chapter 8.

7.1 The founders

Trygve Lie (1946-1952)

Lie and Hammarskjöld were the Secretaries-General who defined and delimited the mandate for the first time. While the emphasis is usually put on Hammarskjöld's contribution, arguably the role of Lie should not be neglected either: Ellen Ravndal, for example, argues convincingly that it was him and not Hammarskjöld who worked out an activist conception of the office (2017). It was so much the more difficult, as the first few years, falling under Lie's term, passed in the immediately post-war atmosphere and the founding of a brand-new mammoth-organization, the real character and place of which was still undefined and unclear. The case was similar in the terms of the future role of Lie as an Secretary-General as well; as Ravndal argues, it developed "in the context of five

key events: the Iranian crisis of 1946, the Palestine problem of 1947−1948, the Berlin blockade of 1948−1949, Lie's suggested peace plan in the spring of 1950, and the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950" (2017: 448). The evolution of the office is highly important, as it can also shed light on the conception of the UN altogether, along with the period's main highlights and the actual climate in high politics.

In terms of self-representations, under Lie, we first of all see a close to average number. Narrating in positive terms the 'genesis' is by far the most significant form of representation (17), followed by the first occasions of stressing the 'instrumental' role of the Organization (9) along with its 'normative values' (9), while 'criticism', at this stage, does not feature at all. The sense of being 'acted upon', both in positive, negative and neutral sense (9) are also strongly present: this representation appears mostly in the first ten years and disappears completely with the end of the Cold War, being 'acted upon' in a negative sense outweighing (10) the positive (7) and neutral (2) ones throughout the whole interval. This is also the period in which the main category 'Role' appears at its all-time maximum with 13 mentions, owing in large part to the frequent accounts on the UN's 'genesis'. Further representations that deserve mention are firstly rating the 'merits' of the Organization (5) with an accent on negative terms, secondly stressing that it is and should be a 'platform' (5) and thirdly, a 'universal' organization (5). Altogether, in terms of main categories, self-definition attempts in Lie's tenure cluster mainly around categories of 'Role' (35) and to a lesser extent 'Normativity' (19), which is not surprising: he had to stress the functionality of the UN and that it is in itself a normative value, worthy of preservation and further development.

What is conspicuous if we look at Lie's Introductions from the point of view of agency construction is that he only started to use 'Negative actions' in his second term, elaborating on the Organization's various dependencies. In his very first introduction, Lie emphasises how the UN struggles with capturing the imagination of peoples worldwide and to attract the best possible personnel. In terms of 'Positive action', he starts by accounting for the 'efforts the UN has made', the 'actions' it cannot take, and the need to 'assume and fulfil its responsibilities', in the face of the difficult world situation. In the following years, 'Strong action' (22) is the most frequently applied category, in various forms, out of which 'acting with authority', 'evolving', and 'championing' stand out with

4-5 mentions. ‘Successful action’ (11) is also fairly represented, meaning predominantly descriptions of ‘accomplishments’ (4) and ‘fulfilling the Organization’s functions’ (3). ‘Contribution’ (10) type of action gets stronger by the second half of his tenure, with mediatory action (4) in the focus. This shows the first Secretary-General as trying to emphasize with strong words the agility of the UN and its achievements and utility to Member States (the fact that ‘Negative action’ does not appear in the first years also enforce this understanding). And even though these occurrences were not particularly numerous – the number of agency-representations being lower than average –, Lie’s activism was met by strong opposition and as we know, led to his resignation in 1952.

Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961)

The tense years of the early Cold War saw the inauguration of Dag Hammarskjöld, the almost legendary Secretary-General who died in service, and was, according to the consensus, trying to procure a place for the UN among the players of world politics until the end. In these early years, the world economy turned into a steady expansive cycle, which lasted until the 70s’ crises. The political situation was, however, quite difficult, disturbed by the Soviet-American oppositions of interest primarily in Europe: the first Berlin crisis and the subsequent foundation of NATO, the sharpening of separation within the continent and the first wave of decolonization brought a lot of diplomatic uncertainty. After the death of Stalin, Hammarskjöld took the opportunity to engage in political activities which, as in the case of Lie, served as a model for his successors.

These endeavours show somewhat ambiguously in the number and distribution of representations: ‘Influence’, for example, appears only twice, half of that under Lie. ‘Role’ (38) and ‘Normativity’ (19) remain the strongest man categories, with, ‘instrumental’ (18) and ‘platform’ (8) being the most frequent ones within the main category of ‘Role’, and the UN being a ‘normative value’ (primarily citing the Charter values like peace, welfare, civilization and freedom and stressing its necessity) dominating in ‘Normativity’. Importantly, this is the period where, apart from being acted upon, being an ‘agent’ (14) appears, which might be interpreted as representative of the expansion of competencies and activities under Hammarskjöld. It was also him who introduced ‘criticism’ in self-definition, occasionally depicting the UN as an ‘imperfect’ and ‘weak’, but not ‘marginal’ or ‘overcompetent’ actor. As Figure 17 shows, ‘criticism’

surges only in those cases where representations of 'agency' are also relatively high throughout the 70+ years.

Figure 17. The dynamic of 'Agency' and 'Criticism' in self-definition



Hammarskjöld's often controversial engagements (as seen by the Member States) contributed substantially to the development of the UN's agency: what is referred to as the 'Peking formula', for example meant that, as the SC became paralyzed in face of a conflict, the Secretary-General, representing the Organization, was given a special mandate by the GA to get directly involved in political negotiations and "make, by the means most appropriate in his judgement, continuing and unremitting efforts" (GA, 1954: 906) to resolve the conflict. Such attempts at the expansion of the mandate often induced reproval from Member States. Emphasizing the 'instrumentality' and 'normative value' of the Organization can thus be interpreted as a self-defence mechanism of the UN, while allusions to 'agency' and 'influence' in self-definition show a careful political agency in the making.

While under Lie's tenure, the number of agency-representations in the texts was below average (16 for the full period), under Hammarskjöld, it began to rise to a level somewhat above that (19). The year 1960 was especially strong in terms of the number of occurrences (43). The proportion the main categories bear to each other stayed largely the same. An interesting difference is, however, that within 'Positive action', Hammarskjöld put less emphasis on 'Successful' (9), and equal on 'Strong action' (48) and 'Contribution' (47). Within the latter category, he focused predominantly on what the Organization can 'provide' (14) and how it can 'assist' (14) Member States, emphasizing the utility of UN action. 'Harmonizing action' (6) – generally the least frequent in the

‘Positive action’ category – is one of the strongest of all under his tenure, showing that he paid attention to ‘convening’ and ‘coordinating’ the efforts of different actors (not just states).

In ‘Strong action’ category, ‘confronting’ (8) the coming challenges was used the most (and in the most balanced way), followed by two categories, extremely important for agency construction, ‘evolving’ (5) and ‘shaping’ (5) – the first accounting for how the UN itself evolves with time, how it departs from what the founders had in mind, while the second meaning how it shapes the global agenda and the behaviour of other actors. ‘Preventing’ (3) is also a label that occurs the most under Hammarskjöld, hinting at ‘preventive diplomacy’, a practice of the Secretaries-General famously developed by him (Boudreau, 1991; Ramcharan, 1991) during the previously mentioned Chinese affair. He also employed verbs labelled as ‘Abstract action’ (24) more than his predecessor, stressing in large part how the Organization keeps, has kept and should ‘keep its integrity’ (9), and how it ‘represents’ (9) cooperation, equality, multilateralism and a changing world.

7.2 The ‘Middle Trio’

U Thant (1961–1971)

The ‘Middle Trio’ as a category is borrowed from Leon Gordenker, who claims that after Hammarskjöld’s death, Secretaries-General had to face a situation in which they had an ever-shrinking room to manoeuvre (2010: 85), which lasted up until the end of the Cold War. To understand the developments in how these Secretaries-General used their mandates and in self-definition, one must consider the specialties of this period. The early 60s is generally seen as the beginning of an era where disillusionment with the UN engulfed the Organization, leaving it, and especially the Secretary-General in a difficult situation politically as well as financially (Newman, 1998: 49). Following Hammarskjöld, with U Thant, a calmer and less activist Secretary-General took the office and held it until the early 70s. His different profile and attitude also shows in the decline in overall number of self-representations under his tenure, compared to his predecessors.

Apart from his modest, reserved, and contemplative personal character (Bingham, 1970; Boudreau, 1991), it was the emergence of serious conflicts in the resolution of which the

UN could not or did not take substantial part, that bore on his legacy and on the understanding of the context in which he led the Organization. He "certainly headed the Secretariat during numerous international crises over which the UN had little influence (…) and during a general deterioration of the Organization" (Newman, 1998:49). In case of political crises (such as the Vietnam and the Six Day Wars, Rhodesia, Nigeria, Cyprus, and the Indian-Pakistani conflict), the UN could not give an effective answer, while this period also witnessed the economic crises of the early 70s, notably the fall of the Bretton Woods financial system (and later the 1973 oil crisis). On the other hand, his positive involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis, or propagating decolonization represented that the Organization under his tenure was not completely marginalized. In terms of the distribution of representations, this translates into the complete lack of 'Influence' and 'Normativity' (4) losing from its previous significance. 'Role' (29) and 'Agency' (15) are the main categories that dominate, the distribution within 'Role' being rather balanced, while in 'Agency', it is being an 'agent' (12) that is more pronounced. It might also be important that within this category, being 'frustrated' in action appears for the first time around the end of this period. It is also under Thant that self-definition as a 'knowledge base' appears in the reports.

Apart from the various crises on the level of high politics (with an unbalanced involvement of the Organization), the factor that informed this interval was probably the ongoing process of decolonization – consistently being assured of support throughout the reports. Following a boom in membership, the UN became a platform to articulate dissent, as in the examples of the Group of 77 or ECLAC. The above mentioned disenchantment of major powers – in large part being imperialists themselves – is usually attributed to this fact. When talking about the 60s, however, one should not stay on the level of high politics, although levels are mostly intertwined: it is hard to see the diverse social movements starting in the 60s independently from the changing political rationality and decolonization – and *vice versa*, to talk about the Vietnam War without mentioning the growing popular dissent, which, on the other hand, blended with ideals of feminism, human rights, sexual revolution and a transformation of culture, production, norms and institutions in various societies worldwide. The social unrest of 1968 signalled a ripening of these shifts and forecasted the coming crisis – although apparently was not considered

significant enough (or, on the other hand, was considered too sensitive) to be discussed that year in the report's introduction.

This is even more interesting if we consider that during Thant's tenure, the length of the introductions is by far the highest throughout the 70 years (Figure 18). The fact that, in spite of this, the number of direct self-representations had declined, suggests that the Secretary-General either talked about the Organization in indirect forms, discussed issues in their relations to specific UN bodies, committees, etc. (which excluded them from the data selection process), or used the great majority of the frames to evaluate in detail the context around the Organization – but most probably all these factors together. Finally, it is noteworthy that Thant's last report from 1971 reached 43 pages, being the longest one in the history of Annual Reports by the Secretary-General. This extra-long commentary accounts for a large part of the representations (17) under his tenure, making the decline in numbers even more striking.



Under Thant, the average frequency of agency representations (28) stays high, actually being the highest among all Secretaries-General. It is also noteworthy that in the absolute longest, 1971 Introduction, the number reaches as much as 74, breaking another record. All this is relevant, as it suggests that, in his long Introduction (and indeed during his entire tenure), he engaged much more in agency-construction than in self-definition. He was famously not a man of words, instead, he preferred what Hammarskjöld named 'quiet diplomacy', and followed a 'quiet approach' (Pechota, 1972). Based on this data set, one could assume that he appreciated much more what the UN did, and cared less about slippery definitions. The proportion of the main categories changes the least because of

‘Abstract action’ (26), which stays relatively the same under Thant. He, however says less about representation and integrity: he rather talks about what the UN ‘disposes’ (12) in terms of ‘capacities’ (5) and ‘responsibilities’ (6). Giving a more nuanced picture, in terms of ‘Negative action’, he emphasized the most the ‘failures’ (3) of the Organization and also that it cannot ‘yield’ (3) its principles in the face of crises.

To put this in context, it should be pointed out that Thant is remembered the most for his failures in conflict resolution (the inability of the UN to get involved in the resolution of the Vietnam War and his actions in relation to the Six-Day War, often referred to by critics as ‘U Thant’s war’). When it comes to ‘Positive action’ in his texts, we see a predominance of ‘Strong action’ (69) on the one hand and ‘Contribution’ (57) on the other. The distribution of subcategories in ‘Strong action’ is rather balanced, while in the latter case, the strongest instances are those where the Secretary-General accounted for the ‘provisions’ (10) of the Organization and its efforts in ‘mediation’ (10) and different kinds of ‘assistance’ (14). In terms of ‘Neutral action’ (42) we see an all-time high peak, with a conspicuous elevation of ‘consideration’ (20) and ‘research’ (6), which are important categories from the point of view of knowledge management.

Kurt Waldheim (1972–1981)

While the number of representations were the lowest compared to the length of the introductions under Thant, under his successor, Kurt Waldheim, this number was the highest among all Secretaries-General (156). He was the Secretary-General whose legacy is the most controversial among scholars and commentators, thanks to his restrictive understanding of the office, the continuing existential crisis of the Organization and the general indifference and loss of public support due in part to the ambiguous account of the UN in conflict resolution (Boudreau, 1991: 21–22) – not to mention his former involvement with the Nazi regime, which was not revealed until the mid-80s. On the part of major powers, the apathy resulting from the increase in membership continued along with their preference to take matters of high politics outside of the Organization. Thus, the years of Waldheim’s tenure – despite of the fact that it coincided with what is referred to as a *détente* in interstate affairs – are not considered as those of particular success in the history of the UN, as much of the diplomatic activity reverted to bilateral fora

(Newman, 1998: 53). This, in itself is not surprising, as the UN has never been the one and only forum for diplomacy, still it can definitely be seen as a loss of prestige.

Waldheim's personality and views about his role did not contribute to an expansion in agency either: commentators often talk about a lack of vision and leadership, indifference or even opportunism (Urquhart, 1987; Finger-Saltzman, 1990). For instance, as he himself formulated it in relation to conflict resolution: "Nothing is worse, and nothing would be less wise than for him [the Secretary-General] to force himself upon a situation" (Waldheim, 1980: 5). With his precaution, his specific self-restraint and his conception of the office as strictly administrative, he gained the support of major powers, who would have even elected him for a third term if China did not veto it (not because of personal problems with Waldheim, but for reasons of equitable geographic representation in the Secretary-General's office). When it comes to his contributions to self-definition, we can observe that he placed an emphasis on direct formulations of the 'Character' of the Organization (21), a main category that had thus far been largely neglected. Within this, being 'complex' and having a 'political' character are stressed the most, accounting for the large majority of all these representations through time.

Apart from this visible shift, the distribution of the other main categories shows a picture rather similar to the one under his predecessors: 'Role' is once again the most frequent representation (63), the second being 'Agency' (33), and closely followed by 'Normativity' (27). In terms of 'Role', this is a period in which the three basic understandings (instrument, platform and mediator) are used in the most balanced way, although 'instrumentality' still goes ahead of the other two. Another interesting, but not surprising feature is a substantial increase in 'Criticism' (9) can also be observed, reaching its all-time peak in 1980 (when specified, depicting the UN primarily as 'weak'. 'Influence', on the other hand, is hardly mentioned (3) and even in those cases is discussed mostly in negative, or conditional terms, mirroring Waldheim's sceptical views, as suggested above.

The fact, however, that it was him out of all the better-acknowledged and –respected Secretaries-General who said the most in direct terms about self-definition is an interesting point indeed. On the one hand, it points to the fact that self-definition does not equal to pushing a progressive understanding of the Organization's role and place:

consolidation is as important as a continuous expansion of agency. Another thing to highlight here is that his tenure was also the occasion where self-definition with negative auxiliary verbs was the strongest (meaning what the UN is not, was not, should not be, etc.), which sheds some light on the importance of seeing the Self in negative terms. Finally, another interesting point is that the actual category of 'self-definition' (meaning mostly rhetorical questions about the role, preferable activities or place of the UN) sees a high-peak under Waldheim.

Waldheim started his tenure with a low-keyed Introduction from the point of view of agency construction. He only used verbs from two categories, 'Abstract' (4) and 'Positive action' (8), staying rather restrictive with his formulations of agency. The specialty of his period lies in a higher-than-average 'Negative action' (12) and an all-time high peak in 'Abstract action' (34). In the previous case, featured representations are the ones that account for 'failures' (5) of the UN and it 'lacking' (4) certain capacities and resources, while in terms of 'Abstract action', 'disposing' (14) capacities, responsibilities and power dominates, along with forms of 'representation' (14). The frequency of 'Positive action' (169) is as high as ever, featuring most of all, as usual, 'Contribution' (37) and 'Strong action' (67). In the latter category, we find that Waldheim talked the most about the UN 'playing a central role' (12), 'evolving' (12) with time and 'developing' (15) new structures and approaches, which contradicts his general image, as elaborated above. It is also noteworthy that, under his tenure, there is a high peak of 'Successful action' (9) in 1973, although the formulations are distributed among positive and negative modalities, and also contain much conditionality (like "if the United Nations system is to succeed in this Herculean task…"). It is, thus, also true, like in the case of self-definition, that the generally negative attitude often attributed to Waldheim does not prevail in his Introduction to the Annual Reports, not even as the years under his tenure were those of general turmoil and deep structural shifts.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982–1991)

Around the time of the inauguration of Cuéllar, there was no dramatic change in terms of context. The UN, for reasons described above, remained on the sidelines and an object of scepticism until the end of the 80s. Under his tenure, the major transformation which started with the 70s' crises continued, globalizing more and more the political economy

of neoliberalism, resulting, among others, in serious crises in Latin America at that time. Parallelly, alternative proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were waning and losing significance as in the late 70s-early 80s, leaders who strongly promoted neoliberal policies were elected in Great-Britain and the US, working towards making neoliberalism the new orthodoxy in global economic and political affairs. This shift, along with many other transformations dismantled step-by-step the post-war order and brought the end of the Cold War towards the end of Cuéllar's tenure. He himself was a calm and quiet person, enjoying a strong support in the membership, including the P5 and especially the Latin-American group in the UN. He was once suggestively described as "exactly the kind of Secretary-General that governments like and the media hates" for he worked quietly, and usually behind the scenes (Newman, 1998:63). Since the big shift in international order took place under his second term, the way he talked about self-definition is particularly interesting. The task was no less than carving out a place for the UN in the new era, by taking the opportunity to adjust the image to the renewed conditions. His overall approach to his office is perhaps best described as moderate, as it stayed in line with the limitations of the context: less possibilities to manoeuvre in the beginning and taking the opportunities as they emerged toward the end. Kille also had difficulties in coding his performance on his expansionism scale, saying that "his approach to leadership may have allowed him to take advantage of opportunities, but it did not encourage him to challenge environmental constraints" (Kille and Skully, 2003:187).

In terms of the length of introductions, nothing particularly salient can be observed. A peculiarity in this period might be that it is in his 1986 report that an all-time peak is reached in the frequency of self-representations (29). After this point, with a few exceptions the number of occurrences goes clearly below average, as demonstrated in Figure 13. From a substantial point of view, we see the previous pattern in terms of the strongest main categories, 'Role' leading (35), 'Agency' being the second (27) and 'Normativity' (18) being the third most frequent category of representations. In their proportions, we see that 'Role' and 'Agency' are very close to each other, and while references to 'Agency' are used in a balanced way throughout his two tenures, he talked less about 'Role' in his second term. It was also in his 1986 Introduction where 'Agency' appeared the most throughout the 70 years, with being an 'Agent' taking up the majority

of the occurrences. Another interesting point in the distribution of main categories is that the rest of them ('Influence', 'Criticism', and 'Character') appear more than in the other cases, in other words, the distribution of main categories is more balanced than usual. In terms of 'Influence' (7), Cuéllar talks mostly about the UN being a 'central' and a 'strong' player, while 'Character' (10) is rather balanced. Finally, 'Criticism' (8) is mostly, but not exclusively formulated as the perception of other actors.

During his final years in office (1989-1991), which coincided with the final years of the Cold War, we see that 'Role' and 'Agency' remained strong, while the other main categories were waning in significance. Being a 'mediator' was a particularly weak representation under his term, and after one mention in 1991, it disappeared from the introductions. Other categories, such as being 'strong', 'political', 'caring', 'criticized', 'frustrated' or being 'acted upon' had also faded away entirely with Cuéllar's term, importantly, along with references to 'genesis'. The question is, to what extent this complies with the expectations that one might have bearing in mind that an important change (and as many argue, the most important one in recent history) took place on the level of the world order? How could one make sense of the trends in self-definition up until the end of Cuéllar's term? The answers provided by this study are elaborated at the end of this chapter, where, after a detailed analysis of each period, the results are summarized and interpreted with the help of the previously elaborated theoretical framework.

We do not see enormous shifts under Cuéllar's term either in terms of agency construction. He, as his predecessor, started his tenure with an extremely low number of agency-representations, counting 6 in the first and 7 in the second Introduction altogether. He started talking more in direct terms about UN action around the mid-80s, and he kept this in 'positive' terms, with 179 occurrences in 'Positive action' in total. In this period, none of the other categories is especially strong, the only thing that is noteworthy is that 'Negative action' reaches 13, which breaks Waldheim's 'record', talking primarily about the UN's 'dependence' (7), especially towards the end of his second term, as the Cold War world order started to shift. Both in case of 'Negative' and 'Positive action', Figures 11 and 19 show a more or less steady elevation, reaching a maximum in his last Introduction, drawing a picture of a 'veritable' agency construction process.



As the emphasis under his tenure is clearly on 'Positive action', the details here should be further elaborated. 'Contribution' (34) shows that 'providing' for Member States (12) is an often cited action, but the distribution among the other types is also rather balanced, especially in the second term. Representations of 'Harmonizing action' (9), which is, in a sense similar to the above contributions, is also relatively high, but the highest one is, again, 'Strong action', counting altogether 78 occurrences. Here also, Cuéllar's second term shows a greater frequency in almost all of the sub-categories. What is emphasized the most is the ability of the UN to 'shape' (8), 'define' (8) and 'develop' (12), all of which point in the direction of a visionary policy, paired with capacities to effectuate ideas. This is also stressed by the equally high number of representations (8) claiming a 'central' role and place for the Organization.

7.3 Practitioners in global governance

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996)

The last group of Secretaries-General are discussed together following primarily a diachronic logic: as touched upon in the previous section, the order of the post-war era, often characterized with in line with its polarity and thus termed bipolar, transformed into a multipolar one. The most widely commented characteristics of this new setup is the diversification of actors in the global arena, the appearance of what is called a global civil society, the multiplying contradictions around state sovereignty, and the reappearance of many conflicts that had been, thus far, dormant under the umbrella of the major, great power rivalry. Neoliberal globalization was also being demonstratively under way,

causing increasing dissent and resistance in various parts of the world. When it comes to the UN and its functional context, the shift that started in the last years of Cuéllar's tenure matured and provided favourable circumstances and a widened room to manoeuvre for Boutros-Ghali. He – while he gave many opportunities for criticism – could never be charged with a lack of determination or vision, on the contrary: he pushed the understanding of his office to its apparent limits and demanded absolute devotion from his colleagues in the Secretariat – neither of which was awarded with unconditional support (Franda, 2006: 64). It is telling, for example that he repeatedly stressed that the quality that best characterizes a Secretary-General is independence (Boutros-Ghali, 1996; Press Release, 1996).

From the point of view of self-definition as being put forward in this analytical framework, a conspicuous feature that needs to be highlighted is a steep decline in both the length of the Introductions, and parallelly, in the number of representations in them. While these things most probably correlate, as it was demonstrated earlier, a longer text does not equal to more representations and *vice versa*. While the overall average length was 7 pages, after 1992, it went down to 2,5 (being approximately 10 before 1992). The number of representations show a similar trend: Out of the overall average around 8 mentions for self-definition, Introductions before 1992 contained an average of 10, while after it an average of 3 mentions (the patters also shows in the case of agency construction). If one looks at Figures 13 through 16, this seems to be the most conspicuous shift throughout the decades under review.

To interpret this trend, we should turn to the descriptions elaborated earlier, claiming that by the early 90s, the idea of global governance, the evolving norms of a new world order and the UN's central role in these have been so well-established that too much attention to self-definition was not required anymore. What seem to remain more significant still, are categories which sketch up a picture of the Organization as a capable agent in world politics, first and foremost contributing with its 'instrument'- and 'platform'-like structures, but also representing a 'normative value', primarily with its 'uniqueness', 'universality' and 'visionary' attitude. While it does not mean that the Role of the Organization has, by this time, become fixed or static, after 1992 it is clear that 'Role' is not the strongest main category anymore: it occupies a second place after 'Agency' and

'Normativity', signalling that the UN, by this time, has evolved into a powerful normative institution with its own agency, maintained by a close-to-universal membership and a host of agencies covering almost all relevant fields in world affairs ranging from war and peace to the preservation of cultural heritage. The frequency of the rest of the main categories show a strong decline, counting only 3 in 'Character' and 'Criticism' and 2 in 'Influence'.

Regarding Boutros-Ghali's term, what differs somewhat is that 'Role' still occupies its strong position, along with the other two main categories: he refers to the Organization primarily in 'instrumental' (3) and 'functional' (2) terms, mentioning also its 'platform'-like role. When he specifies the 'normative value', he stresses its 'necessity', and when he elaborates on questions of agency, he highlights the 'agential' capacity. He almost exclusively talks about the Organization in present tense, supporting also the above described interpretation: the UN does not need justifications for its existence from the past or future – what is important is the kind of actor it is in the present.

Entering the 90s also meant a steep decline in representations of agency: the pre-1992 average number of 22 went down to 6, being 8 in Boutros-Ghali's five years. Where the decline in the post-1992 period is felt the most is 'Negative action' (3), missing, for that matter, completely from Boutros-Ghali's Introductions. 'Abstract' (14) and 'Neutral action' (16) stay on approximately the same level, and 'Positive action' (125) keeps its advance, while it also declines in frequency. There are also many types that disappear with, or after Boutros-Ghali, such as 'keep integrity', 'represent' in the 'Abstract action' category, 'fail' in 'Negative action', 'assume responsibility', 'define', 'launch', 'supervise', or 'validate' in 'Strong action'. 'Confronting' (4) and 'developing' (4) seem to be the strongest ones in this category under Boutros-Ghali (counting 14), which is in line with his above described personality and ambitions for the Organization. 'Contribution' (5) and 'Successful action' (5) are the other two categories which seem to be used more than the others, which had been prime justifications for the UN, as they stress its utility to Member States. It might be interpreted as Boutros-Ghali's response, as during his tenure, the UN was – especially following the incidents in Rwanda and Yugoslavia – widely depicted as useless.

Kofi Annan (1997-2005)

While the 90s are often interpreted as an era of overflowing optimism and prosperity, conflict and popular dissent remained high on the agenda throughout the decade and even sharpened as the years went by. These are the years of, among others, the Yugoslav and Kosovo Wars, the Gulf War, as well as civil strife in Somalia, Afghanistan, Congo and Rwanda. Excess neoliberalism induced economic crises, most notably in Asia, as well as social resistance in various forms, exemplified most notably by the Zapatista movement and the Battle of Seattle. While this account does not mean a particularly significant shift – as conflicts and crises are basically a constant in world affairs –, this should be pointed out to get a more nuanced picture about the 90s and especially the end of the decade which saw the inauguration of the next Secretary-General, Kofi Annan.

Annan has, ever since, been portrayed as comparable to the big etalon Dag Hammarskjöld, and was equally awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with the UN in 2001. He is widely acknowledged for carrying out substantial reforms in the Organization (Müller, 2001), and for contributing to the process of redefining the UN, its place and role, as well as the contours of the international community in the 21st century. This latter contribution got an official form in the report he prepared for the Millennium Summit, entitled *We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*. This – similarly to Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* – is also an important document for self-definition, a text that drops out of the current analytical framework, although in many regards it shows features that are similar to the Introductions. He also elaborated on the conception of his office, as exemplified by his contribution to a high-profile scientific monography on the Secretaries-General (Annan, 2007).

Among his texts, only the 1999 Introduction stands out in terms of length with its 7 pages which is unusually long in the period following 1992. The fact that it is not paired with an unusually high number of representation might be due to the fact that it is written around a topical issue highlight (disaster and conflict-prevention). Apart from this, we, again do not encounter a large number of self-representations as could be expected in the case of an 'activist' Secretary-General. It might also be slightly surprising at first that the first two occasions where the Introductions do not contain self-definition representations that match the selection criteria at all, also occur under his term. By this time – another characteristic of the post-1992 period – the texts talk almost exclusively in present terms,

with only a few exceptions, using conditional tenses (could be, should be). In terms of substance, when it comes to 'Agency' it is only being an 'agent' that remains present, and regarding 'Role' only 'instrumentality' is featured. 'Normativity' in this case stands for a UN that is depicted almost as 'utopian', with the Organization's 'uniqueness', 'universality' and 'visionary' thinking emphasized.

From the point of view of agency, an interesting feature after the mandate of Boutros-Ghali ended, is that negative tenses fall out completely from the vocabulary of the Secretaries-General when they narrate the agency of the Organization. Along with this, past tenses also fade away almost completely, and what remains and dominate are present, present and perfect tenses, complemented occasionally by accounts of what the UN 'should' do. Annan did not overemphasize agency in direct forms: in 1999, for example, only one occurrence was found in his Introduction, meaning a negative record among all Secretaries-General. In his nine Introductions, the verbs that were used fall almost exclusively in the category of 'Positive action' (37). Within this category, the employed sub-categories vary, but 'Strong action' (12) is still the most frequent one, with 'confronting' the coming challenges being the most often used with 4 mentions. 'Coordinating' (5) also gets a bigger emphasis, especially under the first term, which is not surprising, if we consider that Annan was famous about his efforts aiming the involvement of NGOs and other forms of global partnerships. 'Targeted action' (5) is also a steadily present category, meaning mostly the emphasis of the UN's work as the promoter of certain ideas and forms of cooperation. In general, however, Annan relied on every category in 'Positive action', meaning that he accounted for – although to a moderate extent – the entirety of the UN's proactive work.

Ban Ki-moon (2006-2016)

The eighth Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon was given a difficult task matching his predecessor. He was selected to be the world's first diplomat as a "cure for Annan's dangerous charisma" (Traub, 2010): a man who is most often described as 'invisible' or 'faceless'. Under his tenure, the most significant development in global affairs was arguably the financial crisis of 2007/08 which has had lasting effects on many areas of

life, and (importantly also on rationality[54]). The crisis and the following recession – while they can arguably be understood as the culmination of antagonisms in neoliberal global governance, having been accumulating since the 70s (Brodie, 2015) – they, importantly, represent an identifiable point in history where "deep scepticism in the Global South and rising public unease about the uneven social impacts of globalization in the North" (Sinclair, 2015: 133) began to rise worldwide. By the end of Ban's term, scepticism and unease with neoliberal governance has manifested in rising public dissent, primarily harnessed by right-wing populism and recycled forms of fascism in many parts of the world. This, as argued earlier (chapter II/1), points to an emerging systemic, or 'organic crisis' on a global level.

Self-definition attempts under Ban should be seen in this context. He started cautiously with his first report in 2006, mentioning the UN directly only once, as an organization of 'intergovernmental' character. From 2007 to 2009 the number of occurrences show a moderate upsurge, thanks primarily to representations of 'Agency' and 'Normativity', which are the strongest main categories also throughout his two terms (with 12 mentions). Within 'Agency', a new element is a specification of being an 'Agent', termed 'Capable' (4), which describes the UN as being uniquely positioned to perform certain tasks in world politics (the emphasis is less on its agency and more on its unique position to act). Under the main category of 'Normativity', he emphasized mostly the 'uniqueness' (5) and 'visionary' (3) qualities of the Organization, which, along with the emphasis on agency, display the UN as a valuable institution in time of crisis. It is also important to note that, in his second term, representations became significantly less frequent, two years in a row passing twice (2011, 2012, 2014 and 2015) without any direct form of self-definition. This changes only in his last report, where he looks back on his tenure and evaluate the merits of the Organization in more detail.

If we look at Figure 9, it is visible that Ban Ki-moon's years were those where the different action categories moved the closest to each other. While 'Positive action' (55) still dominates, we see that all other types are present, in a fairly balanced form. This is also true for the distribution among 'Positive action' subcategories (Figure 20): while in the majority of the years 'Strong action' (21) dominated, in this period, while it is still the

[54] See in some length in the Conclusion chapter.

most frequently used category, the others also have their share. ‘Developing’ (6) and ‘evolving’ (4) are the most frequently used labels, referring, as ever, to a visionary and independent attitude in the discourse. The other noteworthy sub-category is ‘Reaction’ (9), one that has constantly been there in the texts, but was never strong enough to get highlighted.



Figure 20. ‘Positive action’ categories through time

Following the 90s, emphasis shifted from technical and humanitarian assistance to the 'new types of challenges' to which response from the UN was needed. Being 'solicited to act' has also become a regular incident by the 90s – which is equally noted with formulas in this sub-category –, meaning that the UN has built a veritable reputation as an effective and unique agent in world politics. It is also expressed in 'Contribution' (8), primarily in terms of 'providing', and within 'Abstract action' (10) category, with describing what the UN 'disposes' (8). Ban Ki-moon closed his term with highlighting how far the Organization has gone in its evolution and with emphasizing once again its utility for the other actors of world politics.

7.4 Summary

	T.L.	D.H.	U.T.	K.W.	J.P.C.	B.B.G.	K.A.	B.K.M.
Abstract action	11	24	26	34	20	3	1	10
Negative action	3	5	10	12	13	0	1	2
Neutral action	5	12	42	24	16	5	2	9
Positive action	57	129	199	169	179	33	37	55

Figure 21. Numerical summary of occurrences under all Secretaries-General (AC)

	T.L.	D.H.	U.T.	K.W.	J.P.C.	B.B.G.	K.A.	B.K.M.
Agency	9	18	15	33	27	6	4	13
Character	7	7	5	21	10	2	0	1
Criticism	0	6	4	9	8	2	1	0
Influence	4	2	0	3	7	0	1	1
Role	35	38	29	63	35	6	7	6
Normativity	19	19	4	27	18	5	7	12

Figure 22. Numerical summary of occurrences under all Secretaries-General (SD)

Having described the data on the previous pages, this summary assesses major trends, shifts and patterns, while placing it in the theoretical framework of the study. What is clear from the self-definition data is that all Secretaries-General awarded prime importance to talking about the role, agency and normative aspects of the Organization. In this respect, one interesting finding is that up until the end of Cuéllar's term, self-

definition in terms of ‘Role’ was by far the strongest representation, followed by the other two in a varied pattern. From the early 90s, as the length of the introductions has shrunk, we also witness a realignment in the distribution of the three most important main categories: Secretaries-General do not award special significance to talking about the role of the UN; they use such representations as much as, or occasionally even less than the other two main categories. It is equally noteworthy that representations under the ‘Character’ label also die down almost completely in the 90s: by this time, the UN has become a well-established, global institution, with no need of ‘introducing’ it to the general public, or explaining its basic characteristics. It has become ‘free’ from the antagonisms of the bipolar system, arguably in an optimal position to exert its influence in world politics.

Figure 23. ‘Influence’ through time



Still, while its capacity as an agent is elaborated on, representations of influence are barely existent after the 90s (they have been, together with the unbalanced voices of criticism, the most underrepresented categories throughout the whole period, see Figure 21). As detailed in Appendix 1., this category groups representations of the UN as ‘Strong’, ‘Popular’, ‘Influencer’, and ‘Central’ – categories that were expected to strengthen after the Cold War. What might explain the moderate use of these labels in a period as promising as the new world order seemed? The answer might lie in the stubbornly sovereignty-centric conception of world politics, which forewarns agents other than states

to appear as influential on the stage of global politics[55]. Political agency for such actors, while it has been unimaginable (although, importantly, not unrealistic) for long centuries, has become more nuanced with time, and especially from the 20th century, which saw a multiplication of world political actors (IOs, multinational corporations, civil society, etc.). Theory and practice adapted to the shifting situation, engendering first the practice, then the idea, and finally, the concept of global governance. Power (which is often defined as influence) of such 'new' agents, however has, most of the time, been portrayed as secondary, contingent, complementary to state power, as the idea of sovereignty did not undergo such change as ideas about political actors.

'Influence' category itself is a far cry from more direct formulations of a powerful Organization: being 'popular' or 'central' does not contradict the sovereign -rationality at all, and being 'strong' or an 'influencer' is not much bolder either. Still, it is visible that anything which has at least something to do with influence, stay marginalized in the self-conceptions put forward by the Secretaries-General. When they depict the Organization, they talk about its utility to states (as a more or less functional 'instrument', 'platform', or 'mediator'), or its 'genesis' tied to relations between states (peace, war, conflict, or diplomacy). When its 'Role' becomes established enough, the focus shifts to its 'normative value' and its 'agential capacities', interpretations that had been elaborated in the shadow of accounts on its nature in the first half of the Organization's existence. Norms of the new world order (the embodiment of which is the UN itself) and agency of the Organization are, by this time, firm enough to stand without the scaffolding of utility in the role of the UN: they, themselves are, however, pointed out less, as the definition of the Self becomes a routine exercise instead of a message of considerable significance.

The preliminary conclusions from the detailed description of agency construction are similar to, or show a similar trend as in the case of self-definition: it follows an expanding pattern until the end of the Cold War and sees a sudden break in the early 90s, starting with the first report of Boutros-Ghali. The frequency of representations falls, and many thus far important categories disappear. What is somewhat different, is that while the

[55] Here, there is an important difference between actually influencing events and talking about oneself as influential. According to this interpretation, it is the latter which is prevented by the sovereignty-principle. Global governance can actually be the framework in which the gap between actual actions and talking about them might be bridged, by dispersing and neutralizing power, and broadening the range of actors involved, as argued in the previous chapters. This line of thought is further developed in chapter 8.

basic pattern ('Role' as a predominant main category) changes in the case of self-definition, it is largely preserved in the case of agency construction (meaning the clear and persistent dominance of 'Positive action') – although it becomes less dramatic. An important and practical point for understanding this is that the overall distribution of main categories of self-definition did not look so dramatic as in the case of agency (here, the strongest category took up 75% of all mentions and remained predominant throughout the whole period). This simple fact has a lot to say about how the Secretaries-General had been depicting the agency of the Organization in the 71 years between 1946 and 2016. Arguably, agency-accounts had been forceful and hearty under all Secretaries-General, irrespective of the level of activism or individual conceptions of the office.

Nuances, as we have seen on the previous pages, prevail, but they do not tilt the overall tendencies, which seem rather stringent: Secretaries-General employ in the large majority of cases a language of 'Positive action' to describe what activities the UN is engaged in. They describe these in negative terms to a minimal extent, 'Negative action' being the least frequent category. Proportions between the other two categories vary, but in most of the cases (5:3), abstract forms of action come second behind positive ones (Figure 22 shows 'Abstract action' through time).

Figure 24. 'Abstract action' through time



As mentioned in the description of categories, it further enhances the claim advanced here, namely that the Introductions are indeed texts where a strong agency construction process unfolds. They use primarily grammatical tenses that refer to the present, the past in relation to the present, and future or future possibilities. This, of course, is not to say

that they do not assess the past year's events, achievements and such things, which is expected from an Annual Report. The database used in this research sheds light only on a small part of the content of the Introductions – but an important one: those instances, where the UN as a whole is directly described as a subject, engaging in different kinds of actions. The fact that these actions are either forceful themselves, or rely on a picture of a capable, legitimate and relevant Organization is telling from the point of view of rationality. The next chapter connects the above, rather raw descriptions of the data to the theoretical frames and interpret the findings in relation to knowledge/power complexes, political rationality and governmentality.

8. Discourse Analysis[56]

8.1 Embedding the narrative analysis in relevant parts of Foucauldian theory

What does the above described data tell us in light of the theoretical frames described in chapters I. and III.? First of all, it is necessary to pick up a line of thought dropped earlier, namely the process subjectivation in relations to rationality. After the earlier introductions, Foucault's thoughts on governmentality, rationality and power should be elaborated further here to enable the interpretation of the establishment, evolution and possibilities of the UN in contemporary world politics. So far, political rationality has been described as a form or a grid of knowledge, which is accorded a central role in producing political subjects, relations, actions, making them thinkable and acceptable, along with enabling the distribution and practice of power in a given historical period. This period should be imagined as a transitory one between modern and postmodern, represented by a shift in political rationality, enabling governmentality 'go global'. Thus, the present research, when invoking global governance, understands it as global governmentality.

The UN, occupying a central place in the global governance system, is a significant agent that is enabled by, compatible with, and fosters the evolution of global governmentality. The question is, how can this be analysed, so how to find textual traces of governmentality? Apart from the expectations described in chapter IV/5., I turn to one of the many existing governmentality analyses. Jaeger (2008), in his own analysis of

[56] A longer summary of the key results is available in section 8.5

‘governmentalities’ (governmental techniques in his case) found some practices which are relevant for the current study, although I do not see them as practices, but as representations of rationality. These are: 1. achieving security and peace through policing, 2. moving from warfare to welfare, 3. the logic of postcolonial pastoralism and discipline, 4. the normative concern with human rights, and 5. ’pedagogical panopticism’ (Jaeger, 2008). These practices cover the bulk of UN activity, and so they appear in the analysed texts in various forms. Importantly, one should not expect obviously formulated or openly declared ‘governmentalities’. Neutrality, a managerial, professional style, normative utilitarianism (as touched upon earlier) are among the key stylistic elements of governmentality language, which makes the role of interpreting the data and findings even more pronounced. The analysis attempts to make sense of individual occurrences, but in their relations to each other – in other words, of them operating as a system of knowledge. The interpretation presented below thus unfolds primarily by drawing on Foucault’s theory; at certain points, however, critique and complementation is also elaborated.

In chapter IV/7, the data has been described and placed in context, focusing on high politics as a context on the one hand, and the personality and views of the respective Secretaries-General on the other. These are relied on and elaborated further in this section, which interprets the findings primarily in light of governmentality theory. Recurrent points in the descriptions were the frequency of representations (overall frequency, average rates, shifts within and across the smaller periods), primary and secondary categories relied on the most under the Secretaries-General, any expressed criticism, the modality in which representations were used, and further conspicuous features, that varied with the cases. These viewpoints are also used here to integrate the findings in the theoretical frames, resulting in, but also based on a narrative, or rather narratives. In the followings, some further explanation and a narrowed methodological description is provided along with interpretation of the data. Both analytical objects of this study (self-definition and agency construction) come together in a “narrative process of identification whereby a number of identities that have been negotiated in specific contexts are strung together into one overarching story” (Neumann, 1999:218–19) – the story of the subject. The narrative analysis, at this point, gets embedded into a discourse analysis, the aim of which is to reveal how telling this story, as well as how understanding and accepting the UN’s subjectivity has become possible throughout the 70+ years.

Expectations and analytical criteria should be stressed once more here. As this research moves in a post-positivist framework, it works with an open research question, focused on understanding. The fact that the intentions are, before anything else, exploratory, means that it avoided preconceptions or assumptions about the text as much as possible (this is partly the reason why critical discourse analysis as a methodological frame was not chosen, as explained in footnote 39), and is also behind the fact that no hypothesis was laid down in the beginning. It cannot mean, however, an 'objective' account on the contours of the discourse: necessarily, I rely on the theoretical framework in interpreting the results. At its minimum, it suggests that representations of governmentality will be found in the texts, or will be the links connecting them. In this sense, the points collected by Jaeger and summarized above, are expected to be found in the texts, along with the typical language, logic, and *topoi* (conclusion rules) of governmentality. The results would thus be found weak (not supporting the claims of theory) if no such representations and logics were found in the texts. It would not jeopardize, however, the mission of this project, namely, the understanding of the global governance discourse, in its relations to the UN's subjectivity and modern political rationalities. It would simply mean that a governmentality-framework is not helpful in the discourse analysis.

8.2 The founders

Genesis: peace and security

Lie's start with an average/lower-than-average frequency of representations shows a cautious beginning in the narrative process. Caution is well-placed, as in 1946, devastated by two world wars, and with no positive example to follow, the first Secretary-General had to strike the right balances and manoeuvre correctly among the entangled strings in the forming knowledge-net. The immediately post-war context did not offer clear guidelines: while an apparently liberal institutional framework was emerging out of Bretton Woods and San Francisco, the 'iron curtain' had not yet fallen, and the immoderate Cold War environment has not yet crystallized. We saw that under Lie, defining the Self was given priority over constructing agency for it. This early form of self-definition built to a large extent on accounts of the genesis. The story talked about the necessity and uniqueness of the organization, the urge to bring peace, its roots in a

wartime union of people, the spirit of the San Francisco Conference and the noble intentions of the founders.

> *…the idea of a world organization for the maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of the welfare of humanity built around the wartime union of free peoples in defence of civilization – has become a reality. (AR, 1946: III)*

> *…the United Nations has become the chief force that holds the world together against all the conflicting strains and stresses that are pulling it apart. The United Nations has interposed law and human decency and the processes of conciliation and co-operation between the world's peoples and the naked, lawless use of power. The United Nations has continued to stand for brotherhood in the midst of all the voices that talk of national policy in terms of military strategy and tactics (AR, 1948: ix)*

As the years went on, these came together and formed a veritable mythical prehistory, relied upon and developed further by all the subsequent Secretaries-General, up until the 90s, where this reference stopped being directly employed. Elaborating a sublime myth for the nascent Organization is not a unique feature of the UN[57]: myths are present and have determining, enabling, naturalising, and constituting functions in various political spheres (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2016). They are similar to, but more than narratives: in myths, "successful claims are made not only to the status of truth, but what is more, to the status of *paradigmatic*[58] truth" (Lincoln, 1989:24). This assessment, along with the above listed social functions suggest that myths are in intimate relationship with what we termed rationality. They represent ultimate, pre-validated forms of knowledge, which do not even require any factual verification to be widely accepted in a given context. Indeed, accounts on the genesis imply such commonly shared truths –about war and peace, about freedom and welfare of the globally conceived people, about civilization. To understand the early years that fall under the category of 'founding', these mythical elements are

[57] See analyses of similar practices in the case of the European Union and the United States in the work of Christine Cadot (Cadot et al., 2006; Cadot, 2016)
[58] Highlight in the original – *D. M.*

discussed and interpreted in a governmentality framework. After such work, Lie's and Hammarskjöld's further contribution is also analysed from this perspective.

War and peace is a classic binary opposition in which one element of the word-pairs always dominate above the other, displaying certain values, while the other element lacking them (Derrida, 1998). These oppositions, their inherent tensions and implied forms of knowledge have been in the focus of deconstructionists (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Ashley, 1988; Klein, 1994) who aimed at ravelling out many of our commonly used notions in IR to advance a reflexive understanding. War and peace offer similar opportunities (Watkins, 1994; Mansfield, 2008). In this context, the positive end of the opposition is obviously peace, which has been regularly equated with the UN or the existence of the UN, suggesting that having such a world organization is the only possible way to avoid another world war:

> *There is too much support among the peoples of the world for the United Nations and too much constructive work being carried on under United Nations auspices to permit (…) to relax for an instant in the determination to do everything possible to save the United Nations as a universal Organization standing firmly against war and to make it a stronger instrument for peace and progress (AR, 1950: xiv)*
>
> *…a world organization was the one essential and primary instrument, to be available in all circumstances, through which the Member nations could over a period of time develop adequate means for controlling unlawful international conduct on the part of any government and for preventing those differences… (AR, 1951: 2).*

Without normatively questioning the truth in this statement, it suffices here to see how deeply the roots of this myth go in Western political thought: a glimpse on the pre-history of IR[59] and the first debate makes it clear that either we accept the existence of war and try to scientifically explain its reasons and mechanisms, or we believe in the possibility of peace and suggest various forms of (international) cooperation to advance it. Walker's

[59] The whole discipline could be read as a bunch of myths. See Weber, 2001. Further examples of the use of myths and mythology in IR: Lynch, 1999; Teschke, 2003; Hobson, 2012.

'limits of political imagination' have been in work here for at least over a century now, fixing such oppositions by considering them from a single (or a narrow set of) angle(s)[60].

In the black-or-white cognitive context of modernity (democracy or dictatorship, freedom or slavery, rights or deprivation, progress or tradition, secular or transcendent, etc.), the first step is, thus, to offer people strictly two possibilities (peace or war) with the relating policies and practices. Once peace (and security) became the utmost goal of people (which sane person would choose war, especially after two such devastating experiences), the next cognitive step is to equate it with the functioning of the UN, the institution invented to be its caretaker:

> *…the millions of people who watch our deliberations might really feel that their own cause, their indisputable longing for peace, is being truly championed by this Organization. (AR, 1950: viii)*

What assures understanding here is the *topos*[61], embedded in (European) modernity, built around security and the idea that people give up their sovereignty to be secure (from physical threats, need, etc.). However, while in the 'classic' case of states, equality between the subject and the sovereign is not a requirement (on the contrary), it stands clearly among the basic principles of the Charter, as a pillar on which the whole idea stands. While the point here is not to lament over such inconsistencies, such an arrangement is important also from the point of view of Foucauldian theory. As Jaeger pointed out, achieving peace was imagined through the means of constant policing and supervision by what was aptly named the Security Council (and not, for instance, the Peace Council); it is up to the Council to consider threats to peace and security, and it only disposes the mandate to formulate a global response (Charter, Art. 39). As the intellectual seeds for the rationality of government had already started to sprout from the 16th to 18th centuries, security as a central problem equally formed an important part of governmentality: according to Foucault, the culture of freedom in neoliberal terms go

[60] While, for example, as described in some detail in the introduction, Marxism had been there as an intellectual alternative for this dichotomy, what the myth holds as the genesis of IR thinking. On the other hand, Marxism also, was deeply Eurocentric in its explanations and mechanic in its scope, limiting the relevance of its possible ideas for a different solution to avoid war.

[61] *Topoi* are „formal or content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules'" which „connect the argument(s) with the conclusion, the claim. In this way, they justify the transition from the argument(s) to the conclusion" (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016:35).

hand in hand with this securitizing logic of permanent danger: "the condition, the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism. There is no liberalism without a culture of danger" (Foucault, 2008:66-67).

What the liberal art of government is responsible for, is "managing the dangers and mechanisms of security/freedom, the interplay of security/freedom" (Foucault, 2008:66). This is thanks to a remanence of relationships between the sovereign and its subjects, whose security should be guaranteed by the former in a way that does not contradict the new exigencies of freedom under the liberal rationality of government. This collective common sense has, for long, directed people toward states (or, on a global level, towards regulative institutions such as the UN) for protection. They have traditionally been pictured as providers of security against the cruelty of competition, the untamed market forces and their often violent by-products (armed conflicts) – and not as their facilitators. The linguistic practice of reaffirming and reconstructing permanent danger and claiming the capacities to counter it is thus fundamental not only to uphold the myth and image, but also to imagine governmental rationality on a global level.

Normativity: freedom, welfare and civilization

At this stage in the analysis, it is becoming increasingly visible that analytical categories should not stay as strictly separated as they were in the previous section. The work is very much about bringing them together, fusing them and looking for the commonalities, which point at the rationality that binds them together. 'Genesis' was considered here as being part of the Role-narratives of the Organization, but it should not be separated from 'normative' ideas, grouped under this category. As the description showed, 'Normativity' worked as secondary self-definition under both Lie and Hammarskjöld, following 'Role'. The above genesis-narratives, which have just been interpreted as forming an 'origin-myth', constitute the core of how the Secretaries-General – and indeed the world – imagined the ideal, uncorrupted UN, champion of its core principles and aims. These principles and aims are formulated – and indeed considered – as universal values themselves, so many of them appear in the self-definition attempts of the Secretaries-General, under the 'normative value' title[62]. Here, what is highlighted are the references

[62] 'Normative value' itself has three sub-categories (utopian, symbolic and necessity). Occurrences enforcing the Charter values are put under the blank 'normative value' category. See in more detail in Appendix 1.

to the UN as a guarantor of the welfare and freedom of peoples, and the embodiment of civilization, as these have especially a lot to do with governmentality theory. A few examples are cited here to show the kinds of formulations considered here:

> *…Member States have once again confirmed in practice the concept reflected in the United Nations Charter that world organization is essential for the advancement of the welfare of their peoples. (AR, 1951: 5)*

> *… the time has come for the United Nations to deal more directly with – or at least to serve in a more systematic way as a forum for the consideration of – major international economic policies. (AR, 1959: 7)*

Welfare and freedom have occupied a central position in governmental rationality from the 19th century onward, owing to a transformation of social and economic relations as well as political thinking. Foucault's descriptions of this long process (the shift from reason of state to reason of government) is largely coincidental with the evolution of the socio-economic institutions of capitalism (as well as state formation, and later the idea of the nation). The early modern period in the 16th century saw the early forms of capitalism, the first modern states in Western Europe and later, by the 18th century, the formation of the Enlightenment ideas of liberal government (Pasquino, 1991). At the core of this new reason, as suggested above, was "the introduction of economy into political practice" (Foucault, 1991:92), meaning the opposite of the brute application of sovereign power. To govern is to uphold the wellbeing (welfare and freedom) of the people, who, in return, can flourish, conduct their own conducts, and produce as much as possible for the national economy. The technique for the advancement of these aims was termed 'biopower' or 'biopolitics' by Foucault (2008), and by the 19th century, it came to be an important complementation to the thus far known individualizing/disciplinary power, resting on sovereign reason.

The idea "of a kind of power which takes freedom itself and the 'soul of the citizen ', the life and life-conduct of the ethically free subject" (Gordon, 1991:5) is perhaps the most disturbing and one of the most controversial points in Foucault's *oeuvre*. How is it problematic to improve the general status and condition of populations? What is 'wrong' with the liberal principles of government if they are centred on ideas of freedom? Why should one be cautious with the UN's motive to move 'from warfare to welfare'? To avoid

further misunderstandings, it is important to state that such questions are not the right ones to ask, as they do not bring us closer to the life-blood of Foucauldian theory, his understanding of power. What one should concentrate on instead of entangling oneself in confusing normative questions, is how such practices are infused with various forms of power, while they often seem neutral or even progressive. The reason for this holds the key to the Foucauldian understanding of power, applied also in this research: power, at all times should be understood in its relations with knowledge, infused with and inseparable from its mechanisms. It is futile to talk about how they affect each other: what we should see instead is how their forms are integrated (Foucault in Kiss, 1994:47)[63].

The centrality of freedom and welfare is thus seen here in this perspective: not only advancing another form of governmentality in the practices of the UN, but also bringing governmentality as a key element in its (early) self-definition. References to civilization, like the following one, are equally considered critically in the analysis:

> *…we can, if we all strive for it, move quickly and steadily towards a new era of peace, prosperity and civilization. It is this latter belief which has the United Nations as its chief exponent (AR, 1947: viii*)

Postcolonial studies and the scholarship that integrated its insights offer a great many examples showing how the word 'civilization' and its usage throughout the last centuries have been problematic (Césaire, 2001; Said, 2003; Dussel, 2000; Loomba, 2005). This, again, is a concept that is incomprehensible without invoking its opposite, the lack of civility: barbarism. The links to colonialism are undeniable: the dichotomy was – and still is – regularly employed to justify the cruellest practices that the colonial powers systematically engaged in throughout the centuries. It was used to shore up Western Europe's dominance not only upon its colonies, but also upon territories at its peripheries: as Larry Wolff pointed out in his analysis of Eastern Europe, 'civilization', a neologism of the late 18th century Enlightenment thinking was developed and first employed in relation to this region (1994). The Enlightenment roots already hint at commonalities in the structure of knowledge that made these developments possible. The famous omnipotence of European modernity, which has been the prime target of various forms

[63] And also how they were integrated at certain points in history. The knowledge/power complex did not originate at modern times, only took a different form. See summarized in Kiss, 1994.

of postmodern critique, prevails in the legacy of 'civilization'. The fact that the UN, at that time, had a functioning Trusteeship Council, managing colonial affairs enforces this point even further. Apart from what Jaeger called 'postcolonial pastoralism and discipline', using the Western ideas of civilization as a positive reference, and stretching them upon the globe enforces the governmentality perspective: the totalizing discursive practices of forming an easily manageable mass out of the great variety of humankind, favouring the Western culture, lifestyle, and all the things that are implied in the notion of civilization.

The 'Role' of the Organization under Lie and Hammarskjöld

Apart from the prevalence of genesis, Lie's texts also introduced the two most frequently used types of 'Role' representation: being an instrument and a platform. Both categories were frequently applied throughout the entire period in question, and also in the early years, especially under Hammarskjöld. As suggested in the description of the data, these labels are understood primarily as emphasising the UN's utility to Member States: the Organization is there to serve them: as an instrument to use for various purposes and a platform where they can meet and discuss pressing business. In both cases, the UN is a passive, tool-like construct, lacking all those elements of subjectivity (and agency) that were implied in the genesis-narratives.

> *The United Nations is no stronger than the collective will of the nations that support it. Of itself it can do nothing. It is a machinery through which the nations can co-operate. (AR, 1946: VI)*
>
> *…the record of the past six years has shown the United Nations to be a practical instrument for all nations seeking peace, security and the well-being and advancement of their peoples (AR, 1951: 5)*
>
> *the United Nations Organization remains the only universal agencv in which countries with widely differing political institutions and at different stages of economic development may exchange views, share their problems and experiences, probe each other's reactions to policies of mutual interest. and initiate collective action". (AR, 1960: 6)*

How does this translate in terms of rationality? What would be important to remember here is the non-exclusivist conception of governmentality on the one hand, and the 'sublation' of rationality, as explained in detail in chapter III/3.

'Rationality', meaning 'reason' this time, was incorporated in the idea of the exercise of power with the gradual emergence of modernity, eventually replacing transcendence as a source and legitimation. But it did not exclusively mean the appearance of the reason of state: it also allowed the emergence of the first texts written about the art of government, which ideas, at that time, did not meet suitable conditions for their further development and application (Foucault, 1991). As conditions transformed by the 18th and especially the 19th century (meaning the evolution of capitalism and the parallel social transformations, the ascent of liberalism and its new political economy, among others) 'economic government' as a rationality fully caught up with the statist counterpart (*raison d'état*), but importantly, did not replace it. Yet another transformation is observable with opening up 'the international' as a political sphere both in intellectual and practical terms to actors other than states. While evidently, this is also a long and gradual process, this study marks the establishment of the UN as a useful and well-placed handle to map its evolution. One of the most frequently discussed development casting its shadow on state sovereignty is the proliferation of IOs; there is a consensus in the literature that the UN's establishment is a milestone in this process: Murphy, for example formulates it as a 'UN era' in the history of IOs and global governance (2013:26). The UN itself is a family of numerous organizations, and along with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions, after WW2, the number of IOs started to grow fast. Adding to this, the proliferation of NGOs from the 70s onward, along with the changes in the structure of world economy created a situation in which state sovereignty as an 'eternal' principle got questioned more and more often.

This slow shift in rationality, as it has been unfolding side by side with the UN's evolution, has left its mark on the emerging subjectivity, causing what might first seem like inconsistencies or contradictions in the conception of the Self (UN as an independent organization versus UN as the vassal of sovereign Member States). It is just too easy to keep asking the wrong questions here: is the UN the sum of its Members or is it something more? Does it have any independence, initiative and influence, or only those given to it

by its Members? Does it take away sovereignty? If not, where does sovereignty 'go' if states are losing (from) it? Such questions are frequent in everyday debates (in a more sophisticated form also in scholarly ones) about the UN, international organizations, and the changing framework of world politics. Understanding the process as a sublation in the rationality (having its roots in the 16th century questions about how to govern, infiltrating into state politics from the 19th century onward and globalizing with the emergence of IOs) has the capacity to integrate these directions and offer a theoretically sound understanding: according to this, the UN is compelled to express the tension between sovereignty and post-sovereignty, between serving the Member States and representing the noble ideals embodied in the Charter, between its simple utility as an instrument or platform and its normativity and agency.

Criticism, agency, and the specialties of the founders' narratives

Under Lie and Hammarskjöld, in the 40s and 50s, the institutionalization of international politics was just beginning. They were the first ones on the razor's edge, establishing the pattern of 'Role' being the prime category with 'Agency' and 'Normativity' alternating in the second place, which lasted until the early 90s. In their case, 'Normativity' was the stronger secondary representation, emphasizing in the majority of the cases the UN's normative value, as explained above. The ambitious, yet 'realistic' posture was exemplified in Hammarskjöld's words: "the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell" (Press release, 1954). For this enterprise, we saw a bigger emphasis on self-definition in terms of 'Agency' in Hammarskjöld's case, paired with a bigger emphasis on 'Criticism'.

Lie before him refrained from 'negative' messages (represented in the data both by 'Criticism' and 'Negative action'), but still managed to account for the 'labour pain' experienced in the first years of building the Organization, while building a certain authority to the project under construction and the men working on it. As it was mentioned in the description of the data, this phenomenon (that 'Criticism' surges only when 'Agency' is also high) is observable throughout the years. The knowledge structure of rationality, again, offers an understanding: 'Agency', as a form of self-definition, covers those cases where the UN is a quasi-independent, but definitely a unitary actor, engaging in or being frustrated in its actions. When the frequency of such representations is high,

signalling a tilt towards a post-sovereignty rationality, the urge of introspection might also follow to correct the balance. The fact that self-criticism (either in terms of self-definition or in terms of agency) is in a low key, as well as the use of negative tenses is an interesting point, which might have to do with the recurrent positive-negative dichotomy touched upon above, and with the preferred effect that the texts are planned to have on the audience (keeping a balance, complementing agency with criticism and *vice versa*). What is the most interesting, however – and this is also apparent in Hammarskjöld's case – when the Secretaries-General criticise the Organization, they might talk about its weakness, marginality and imperfection, or of being overcompetent or misunderstood, but they never address such substantial issues like hegemony, biased functioning, paternalism, or, for that matter, neither of the issues that Jaeger pointed at in his referenced account.

> *At present, the Organization is severly handicapped by the fact that it has to function in a world where the necessity of co-existence is as yet not fully recognized. (AR, 1954: xii)*
>
> *…necessary to maintain its strength as an instrument for the world community in their efforts to reduce those areas of major conflict where the Organization so far has been powerless… (AR, 1960: 8)*

This is of course not surprising, as these would be points of substantial criticism, raised primarily by the scholarly community and directed at the very core of the Organization, questioning its basic rationales[64].

In terms of agency, as the description of the data showed, 'Positive action' was unquestionably the most frequently used category of all, throughout the whole period. It gathers all those cases where the meaning of action is something indeed 'active': it contributes and reacts to, or harmonizes others' actions, targets a goal and succeeds, or proves its ability to be proactive and evolve. Within this big category, 'Strong action' is the most frequently used type, grouping together forceful actions, formulated with strong words, which make this category particularly important from the point of view of agency. These actions require resources, entitlement, authority, and will, among other things, so

[64] As formulating an adequate and constructive criticism is also part of this work, the issue will be further elaborated in the conclusion section.

the agential qualities should be – in line with the basic tension running through the UN's subjectivity – expressed in a prudent way, which does not translate as a threat to the Members and their cherished sovereignty. 'Strong action' is the most pronounced form under The founders, describing the authority, adaptability and benevolent capacities of the Organization: in Lie's contributions, acting with authority and championing certain ideals could be highlighted, as well as his accounts on the evolution of the Organization.

> *Though we are now approaching only the second regular session of the General Assembly, the United Nations is rapidly maturing into a fully functioning organization. (AR, 1947: vii)*

> *The United Nations, with certain of the specialized agencies, has assumed leadership in many phases of the· world movement towards better social conditions. (AR, 1948: xvi)*

Again, we can observe the fusion of the different kinds and forms of representations: 'championing', for example, is usually employed to transmit a similar picture of the UN as in the case of a 'normative' self-definition. The UN champions the brotherhood of men, the fight for peace and against aggression, the freedom of people, etc. When it 'acts with authority' (in this case, in the Korean conflict) it is to prove that the Organization is strong and capable, a guarantor of peace that can be counted on.

> *In this situation there has been only one thing for the United Nations to do - to act quickly and decisively. (AR, 1950: x)*

Importantly, he already started to talk about the UN's evolution: how it matured into a functioning organization, and a centre of international action. Hammarskjöld picked up where Lie left off in terms of using 'Strong action': besides of its own evolution, he also talked about how the UN 'shapes' economic affairs, actors' behaviour, and norms of interaction.

> *We are far from having established such conditions as would permit of a return to free trade, free movements of capital and free movements of population (...) The United Nations should take an active interest in these efforts and attempt to create an atmosphere favourable to positive solutions. (AR, 1954: xiii)*

This category seems to be one of the most significant ones in terms of actor's agency informing the structure; such examples demonstrate greatly the performative function of language (how the Secretaries-General are 'talking the UN into significance'), and are probably among the occurrences that show the attitude of the respective Secretaries-General the most clearly. After Hammarskjöld, this category almost stops being employed, and only returns at the end of Cuéllar's term, which closes the Cold War period.

Hammarskjöld also stressed how the UN 'confronts' the challenges that the present and future holds, a category that is important for a similar reason than that of evolution: it accounts for the adaptability and readiness of the Organization to meet new problems and stand firmly in the face of whatever the future holds. How can these features be interpreted in the framework of this study? These early examples of stepping over the initial frames and emphases on how forcefully the Organization can act, depicted exactly the kind of world organization that the public would have wished for after the failure of the League. Around the first half of the 20th century, in this transitory period, where the sovereign logic of exercising power was losing from its significance to the governmental one, showing force and strength was seen as a necessity in politics. The governmental rationality was confined to the domestic realm, where the principle of sovereignty assured order. Here, we come across another popular binary distinction, this time between inside and outside, the world of order and the world of anarchy (Walker, 1993; Ashley, 1988). As Walker's, Ashley's and others' deconstructions show, this opposition has been extremely important in international thought – meaning not only IR, but all the rationalities that are attached to 'the international' in common knowledge. In this sense, the only thing that governs the realm beyond the state is the 'law of the jungle' and no international treaty or regulation can do anything about this. In effect, what has usually been claimed the biggest shortcoming of the UN by critics, is the fact that it lacks the necessary forms of power (as they can only be found in states), and consequently, it cannot substantially influence events on the world stage.

Either we link this obsession with strength to the logic of the previous imperial system (often described in IR as based on the logic of 'balance of power'), or the then-forming bipolar one, appearing as a potent actor (in a traditional sense, primary meaning having

the monopoly on violence) was a precondition for being taken seriously[65]. Evidently, this insistence on part of the Secretaries-General to depict the UN as an agile and influential player had to be accommodated with the sovereignty-principle. Lie's strategy differed from Hammarskjöld's: while the former employed 'Successful action' representations to prove utility and efficiency to Member State, showing that their investments pay off, the latter put emphasis on 'Contribution': what the Organization provides and how it can assist Members.

> *If properly used, the United Nations can serve a diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to the Member States. (AR, 1957: 3)*

Also, as we saw, 'Harmonizing action' peaked under Hammarskjöld's tenure, which, in a similar vein, expresses a complementary action, infused with a mere 'helper' attitude. Together with the above described emphasis on instrumentality and normative value of the Organization, this motive in the texts can thus be interpreted as a self-defence mechanism – while allusions to agency and influence show a careful political subjectivity in the making.

8.3 The Middle Trio

Universality and agency: scopes and dimensions of subjectivity

After Lie and Hammarskjöld, the UN's place and role in world politics were largely given contour (by the Secretaries-General, as well as other actors in world politics). The 'Middle Trio' continued to manoeuvre among established patterns, exigencies, constraints and possibilities. While the structure, content and distribution of representations did not undergo enormous transformations in this period, some features can be pointed out in relation to the respective Secretaries-General and the period as a whole, which bear significance for this analysis. Starting with a feature in self-definition, we see that 'Normativity' gave its second place to 'Agency' under all of the Secretaries-General in this period, although the former remained important in Waldheim's and Cuéllar's texts (under Thant, we saw an overall decline in self-definition). As figure 6. demonstrated, the

[65] This emphasis, somewhat surprisingly, can also be linked with normativity. „Strong UN. Better World" was the slogan of the 70th anniversary ceremonials. The message was projected upon iconic buildings worldwide, along with the 'UN blue' colour and a logo. My analysis of this visual project combining discourse and symbolic analytical tools interprets these as representatives of the UN's efforts of totalization. See Mendly, 2017a.

shift was due more to an increase in the other categories than a decline in normative representations, which means that those elements of governmentality which were expressed in these terms, persisted. Along with an overall increase in both frequencies, as it has been pointed out, an increase in length was also observable during these years: Secretaries-General said more in their introductory chapters, and as the data shows, in terms of self-definition, it was primarily about what kind of an organization, and/or actor the UN is.

A chief category, being an 'agent' accounts for the growing number of engagements and responsibilities in peace-keeping, requests for assistance, human rights and decolonization issues, and the like. Showing through a couple of examples, the UN is/has been:

> *... in the forefront of support for the principle of self-determination (AR, 1966: 11)*
>
> *... engaged in a wide range of efforts to deal with the situation in South Africa (AR, 1967: 14)*
>
> *... already involved in the great issues of our time (AR, 1974: 9)*

The proliferating activities are highly important from the point of view of this study: with the social, economic and technological transformations referred to earlier, came a heyday of international – or rather global – cooperation, regimes and legal arrangements in various governance areas, realizing for the first time in its present day form what later came to be summarized as global governance[66].

Along with these developments – which unfolded parallelly with what was formulated as the sublation of rationality – the UN itself was also growing steadily, covering more and more areas of activity, institutionalizing and integrating into its body separate arrangements, emerging issue-areas, and very importantly, welcoming more and more states among its Members. The political controversies caused by decolonization and the expansion of membership was already described, as well as how the structure of the

[66] This of course does not only mean the enhanced activity of IOs, but importantly, the growing inclusion of civil society actors in global decision making. This process, albeit it became pronounced in the second half of the 90s, started in the 70s-80s. See Charnovitz, 1997; Pianta, 2005; Mendly, 2017b.

reports reflected the widening responsibilities. Here, these developments are integrated and interpreted in light of the forming global governmentality, centred in many aspects on the UN.

The conception of universality of ideas has already been discussed in the previous section; universality in terms of membership is not unrelated, if considered in terms of rationality.

> *One element in the strength of the United Nations is the progress towards universality that the Organization has made so steadily during recent years. (AR, 1963: 6)*

While it might seem 'methodologically untidy' to conflate these multiple manifestations of universality (in membership and the scope of activities/competencies), it makes sense in the current analytical framework. Rationality, per definition is a grid of knowledge, which makes different ideas and developments intelligible and acceptable, by simultaneously enabling and melding them under its logic. Without normatively assessing the workings of the respective logic, it is important to show the multiplicity of interpretations: the noble and surely benevolent efforts to integrate humankind under one organization can equally be seen as an attempt of uniformization and homogenization (Mendly, 2017a), the folding of different actors into arrangements the frames and norms of which are not 'negotiated on equal terms', as the mainstream governance approach would suggest, but are the products of hierarchical cognitive and material relations as well as mechanisms. What those at the bottom of these hierarchies are expected and confined to do is to accept the standards and comply with them.

> *In its nineteen years of existence, the United Nations has developed, both at Headquarters and in the regional centres, conference techniques which permit great gatherings of almost universal scope to be welded into instruments of organized and planned co-operation. (AR, 1964: 3)*

The continuous expansion of the UN's competencies carries a similar load: the management of the ever growing number of issues require definite and meticulously elaborated strategies of governance. These are only possible if there is a well-defined and complex set of truths, 'know-hows', 'best practices' and instruments to orient in this enterprise, which raises serious questions from a governmentality point of view: "What

forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation, or rationality are employed in the practices of governing? How does thought seek to transform these practices? How do these practices of governing give rise to specific forms of truth? How does thought seek to render particular issues, domains and problems governable?" (Dean, 2010: 42). The concern formulated in Dean's questions sheds light on knowledge/power problems in claiming competency and even authority in a wide set of global issues. Once it is acknowledged that the idea of universality is problematic, it is clear that all those arrangements made in its name are equally so. This line of thought can be further developed to better understand the morphosis and significance of 'Neutral action' category.

Knowledge/power and 'Neutral action'

"The UN has always managed a great deal of global data and information in order to carry out its chartered mandates, but it is only in the past couple of decades that this aspect of its operations has come to be seen as, potentially, one of its most valuable assets" (…) Various types of knowledge are developed, managed, applied and warehoused in different parts of the UN system, and they typically have separate functions" (Svenson, 2016: 231). While the author of the above quote does develop a critical understanding based on her observations, this chapter intends to put these practices, rightly identified by her, into a different light. As the description showed, under Thant, the 'Neutral action' category reached its high-peak, and was generally relatively high under his term, with two categories especially relevant: 'consider' and 'research'. While the textual environment of these occurrences suggest power-neutral, 'innocent' activities, accounted for in a descriptive fashion, accepting them as such would be problematic in the current framework. In fact, one of the characteristics of the governmentality-language is the 'managerial' style, which claims a right to act on the basis of 'value-free' expertise (Sinclair, 2003; Merlingen, 2003; Brand, 2005). The following typical example shows some characteristics, which worth citing in some length:

> *… the question of development financing also promises to be a major United Nations preoccupation. As of today, much remains to be done regarding the identification, measurement and understanding of the forces at play and of the mechanisms involved (…) The same holds true for industrial development,*

> *a field in which research and operational activities initiated or intensified during the year are directed towards enabling Governments to adopt policies and take investment decisions in the light of the knowledge and experience that an international organization like the United Nations can muster. (AR, 1964: 4)*

As discussed already, the thinkability of the governance-model derives from a modern conception of knowledge and science as tools used for discovering and appropriating truth, which is an objectively existing ideal, accessible once the proper method is found and sufficient accumulated information is possessed. Based on such cognitive foundations, governance can be "presented as an apolitical, technically sound, and universally valid endeavour" (Zanotti, 2005:480).

The highlighted actions in the 'neutral' category account for the input mechanisms in the practice of governance: the collection and initial consideration of knowledge and information. 'Researching' covers an activity that is similar to the Enlightenment project of discovering and examining nature, carried out under the flag of scientific objectivity, while used in establishing the modern systems of rule over it (Weber in Barnett and Finnemore, 2004:29).

> *There is an urgent need, therefore, for the United Nations to study the problems arising from the development of science and technology as a whole. (AR, 1970: 8)*

> *The United Nations has begun to play a central role in concentrating available information and expertise on the new breed of global problems which have resulted from accelerating technological change, and in stimulating the thinking and plans for action of Governments on these problems within a series of agreed international guidelines. (AR, 1974: 2)*

In Foucauldian theory, collecting and accumulating knowledge is not a neutral activity, but a necessary precondition for developing disciplinary instruments: "hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and examination can be employed by national authorities such as prison services to discipline inmates just as they can be used by IGOs to discipline countries" (Merlingen, 2003:369). Rendering ever newer areas visible to

scientific ‘gaze’, ordering the accumulated knowledge according to the exigencies of governing, distributing the acquired knowledge in the form of standardized education programmes are themselves power techniques which are applied (in this case) by the UN, in collaboration with various types of other actors producing and managing knowledge, such as think tanks, foundations, expert consultants and advisers, forming what Stone called ‘knowledge networks’ (2002). The aim of these processes is to construct a body of accepted truths, and based on them, verified governance models, which is then passed on to a wide range of actors – states, state institutions, NGOs – who process them and contribute to their internalization within societies (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Guzzini and Neumann, 2012).

The prime targets are, in most cases, those societies which are deemed lower in the ‘developmental hierarchy’ (Melegh et al., 2012 and 2016; Thornton et al., 2015) and are thus in ‘need’ of normalization through education.

> *More research has been undertaken over a broader range of problems and more assistance is being provided to Governments by the Organization through its technical assistance programmes and through its work as an executing agency of the Special Fund. (AR, 1965: 5)*
>
> *It has raised consciousness of global economic imperatives: through its development programmes and the specialized agencies it has represented a vital source of economic and technical assistance to developing countries. (AR, 1988: 3)*

As Jaeger points out, however, these ‘panoptical and therapeutic ambitions’ should not be imagined as exclusively expert interventions: “as with welfare and development, the ultimate goal was help towards self-help, education towards self-education” (Jaeger, 2008:607; also Joseph, 2013), realizing an important aspect of governmentality, the norm of conducting one’s own conduct. Such considerations should not be neglected when interpreting the surge of interest in ‘research’ under Thant. They are inherent in his accounts on various issues coded as ‘research’, ranging from the challenges arising from scientific and technological advancement, pollution of the seabed, education of youth, and the capacity of the Organization to do research and accumulate knowledge.

‘Considering’ certain issues is equally interesting from a knowledge/power perspective. As discussed above, acquiring knowledge about a certain event, for instance, is just the first step in the process of governance infused with the diffuse mechanisms of power. After having acquired the information, a decision should be made on what to do with it: is the event important enough to induce action? If yes, what sort of action should be carried out? What is the preferred end that is expected from the action? Deciding on these questions require that the event, the reaction, as well as other elements of the process have a meaning (like, putting it simply, insurgency is harmful and counterinsurgency is beneficial). Meanings, however, are not given, but socially constituted in a process where, out of the competing discourses, one ‘wins’ the right to give the hegemonic understanding (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Hajer, 2006; Fairclough, 2005). As the example of Barnett and Finnemore shows, “the information that millions of Africans live on less than two dollars per day might have been unremarkable eighty years ago but today is understood as a ‘development problem’ and a ‘poverty crisis’” (2004:30). Issues ‘considered’ by Thant cover fields as diverse as human rights in Africa, the elaboration of further humanitarian instruments, combating racial discrimination and apartheid, finding solutions for territorial disputes, problems of technology transfer and technological development, or the emergence of the environmental question. All of them could be analysed separately just to show how much the attributed meaning counts in the way these challenges are met, but this would take the analysis too far. The aim is merely to point to the fact that decisions on what is ‘considered’ and what is not, or how things are framed in hegemonic understandings are essential in any analytics of governance and even more in a governmentality approach.

Apart from the textual occurrences, the years labelled with the ‘Middle Trio’ also saw advances in the institutionalization of the UN’s knowledge management practices, which is important to mention, to put the above interpretations in context. A host of new arrangements, methods and approaches were incorporated in a host of new international programs, funds, and bodies between the 60s and 80s – as well as before and after of course (Ward, 2004; Jolly et al, 2004; Weiss, 2010), carrying on the above described spirit of governmentality. Some of the most important formal institutions established under the ‘Middle Trio’ are the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), established in 1963 by U Thant, the United Nations University (UNU), established in

1973 (but initiated by Thant in 1969), and Cuéllar's Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) founded in 1987 primarily to facilitate 'fact finding' in conflict zones (disbanded a few years later).

The UN and the world: shifting rationality and subjectivity under the Middle Trio

The Secretary-General's did not only express the will to acquire knowledge of the world while constructing the UN's subjectivity: they accounted for the ways in which the UN changed along with the world, how it kept mirroring the transformations and how it had represented a pillar of guidance in the maze of large-scale change. 'Abstract action' is a main category that, among others, deserves attention for such contributions. As suggested in the description section, verbs coded as such presuppose an existing, sophisticated subjectivity, with definite qualities and characteristics. This category peaked under Waldheim's term: a closer look is given here to the two most significant sub-categories 'dispose', and 'represent'. Disposing, in the great majority of the cases, is used with one of its sub-categories (see Appendix 2), having responsibilities or having capacities. What falls under UN responsibility in Waldheim's texts are territories (typically 'Non-Self-Governing Territories' like in this period Namibia), countries deemed problematic (typically former colonial countries like South Africa), and specified and un-specified political problems.

> *The world community, and the United Nations in particular, have a responsibility to persist in efforts to induce the Government of South Africa to abandon this inhuman policy. (AR, 1975: 7)*
>
> *Of the great political problems for which the Organization has specific responsibilities, the Middle East continues to be the most urgent and complex. (AR, 1979: 2)*
>
> *The most urgent remaining problem of decolonization is certainly that of Namibia, for which the United Nations bears direct responsibility. (AR, 1986: 5)*

This category is used from the 50s until the end of the 80s, predominantly in relation to different processes of decolonization, representing a case for what Jaeger called 'postcolonial pastoralism and discipline'. This form or manifestation of governmentality

is in close connection with others that have already been discussed, enriching the already dense net of discursive intersections under the governmental rationality: "Like welfare, post-colonial trusteeship and development implied (pastoral) charitable solidarity and protective care as well as the (liberal) fostering of individual productivity and the promotion of self-development" (Jaeger, 2008:604).

The UN, while fulfilling its responsibilities did not only "extend a 'helping hand' toward the achievement of these standards; it also held the trustee powers accountable and thereby ensured that, in time, their 'wards' would become productive and responsible members of the 'international community'" (ibid). This disciplinary monitoring had, by that time, been possible, for the UN also 'had capacities' (and 'power' used to a significantly smaller extent): in Waldheim's Introductions among the capacities were its different programs and agencies, organizational infrastructure, peace-keeping capabilities with considerable experience, as well as more abstract and normative things such as:

> *...the enduring power of a great and necessary idea (AR, 1974: 9)*

or

> *...a unique outlook and set of guiding principles (AR, 1972: 5).*

These latter ideas were also stressed – by both Waldheim and Cuéllar – in those cases of 'Strong action' that were coded as 'develop', 'define' and 'play a central role'. The UN 'defined' many things throughout the years, from global problems to their remedies, systems of priority, as well as some contradicting things, like the right to self-determination on the one hand, and goals for the Non-Self-Governing Territories on the other. It 'developed' techniques and instruments in various fields of economic development, political affairs, and human rights, different policy rationalizing activities, as well as new ideas and capacities to meet emerging challenges. It 'played a central role' in security-related fields like conflict management and disarmament, carrying out and forward its basic mandate.

Using this point to revert to 'Abstract action', these could only be done by 'representing' the cherished principles of the new era: the 'international community' and cooperation, the best structure to keep peace, and occasionally the scapegoat for failures. Representing these mean that such things had, by that time, already formed a part of the subjectivity,

but importantly, this sub-category also accounted for its expansion and the incorporation of new aspects. What is especially interesting from the point of view of rationality is how the 'great changes' (AR, 1976: 2) or 'transition' (AR, 1980: 1) that the world had undergone, the 'new form of world society' (AR, 1977: 6) is claimed to be reflected in the UN in the 70s and 80s. This characteristic supports the theoretical point made earlier in this study claiming that the shifts in political rationality are in close connection with the UN's forming subjectivity and discursive agency. The Secretaries-General saw the Organization as mirroring the reality of world politics from the early years (explicitly from 1957 onward), but references to change in what it should mirror appear in these years of deep transformation for the first time. Adding to this claim, another feature from Waldheim's years can be pointed out: the self-definition main category 'Character', which is otherwise not too significant, reached a peak under these years, stressing, apart from its 'political' character, the Organization's 'complexity' and 'dynamism'. Accounts on how the UN 'evolved' to be able to adapt to the new circumstances (explicitly in ARs 1973, 1974, 1975, 1979) is yet another such feature.

Transition to the era of global governance

As the above analysis showed, by the time Cuéllar had taken the office, the processing of world-scale changes had already started. It was under his term that the shift 'officially' happened, with the closure of the Cold War. In terms of his discursive contributions, two things were conspicuous: first, that 1986, where he started his second term, was an important year in self-definition: representations reached their all-time maximum, thanks primarily to discussions on 'Role' and 'Agency', with being an 'agent' also reaching a peak-point in this year. While the overall category of 'Agency' was balanced throughout his term, 'Role' was stronger during his first mandate, suggesting that he dealt with such questions first, and then focused on 'what to do' with the Organization: agency-representations show a clearly ascending tendency, with 'Strong action' and 'Contribution' leading the way as in the case of his predecessors. The emphasis on the year 1986 and the second term is interpreted here as the further processing of contextual changes and preparation for a 'new' role for the UN in the 'new' world. We do not find lofty descriptions in his text: even in the 'Normative value' category, he relied the most on more pragmatic notions, such as the UN being a 'necessity', 'universal' and 'visionary'. He did not speak in exclusively positive terms either: 'Negative action'

accounts for the various 'dependencies' of the Organization as well as its 'lacking' resources and support, breaking Waldheim's 'record' in terms of frequency, who was emphasizing its weakness and failures the most. This suggests that by the second half of the 80s, 'realities' could perhaps be faced in such accounts in a more straightforward fashion than before.

His term, thus, did not introduce too much novelty in the narratives of subjectivity. Why it is all the more interesting still in the current analytical framework, is the prevalence of the adjective 'global' in the corpus of the Introductions. Apart from the two, already known objects of analysis, another inventory was extracted out of the texts, the occurrences where 'global' was used as an adjective, showing also the collocations in which it figured (Appendix 3). As Appendix 3 shows, it was first used in the Introductions by Lie, as 'global significance' in 1951, and until 1965 it was employed only occasionally and moderately. Its frequency rose substantially during the Middle Trio and especially under Waldheim, but a real ascent begun towards Cuéllar's second term, with 1990 being the all-time maximum of occurrences, counting 24. This signals, again, a shift in political thinking (or rationality) – informed in part by a turn in a wide range of social sciences, unfolding in the 90s (Darian-Smith and McCarty, 2017). The turn, as suggested in the Introduction, was not necessarily about the transposal of issues, questions, and research problems from the local or national levels to the higher, global level; instead of this hierarchical imagery of spaces one should go for what Darian-Smith and McCarty called "a new conceptualization of practices within a global imaginary" (2017:5). 'The global' typically mixes with, and embodies all possible levels – local, regional, nation, etc. – to express their interrelations (Babones, 2006). This intersectionality is also to be understood in terms of issues or themes: the neat separation of problems into disciplines – as stressed in the introduction – is not beneficial anymore (if it ever was). Instead, they cross-cut and appear with their various aspects in different spaces.

This understanding, again, is in mutually constitutive relationship with the shifting political rationality: imagining the world as a complex, multi-layered totality necessitates aiming strategies of governance at this totality. The two power techniques of Foucault's governmentality – individualization and totalization (Rabinow, 1984:14-23; Foucault, 1982 and 1991) – are, however, equally included in the governance of '*omnes et*

singulatim' (Foucault, 1979), representing the above described complexities, this time in the exercise of power. How these techniques are applied simultaneously by IOs already has a huge literature, thanks not the least to the emergence of IGS. Here, the goal is not to analyse the techniques but to grasp the discursive logic that made them possible, their embeddedness into rationality, and to show how that rationality is interwoven in the text of the Introductions. Interestingly, a 'global' self-conception does not appear directly in the Secretary-General's self-definitions. As a sub-category of 'Character' it is used in 1971 for the first time, but stays marginal, with only 3 mentions in the whole period under review[67]. It appears all the more as an adjective by a growing number of notions, encompassing little by little a wide variety of things, ranging from a 'global' society, subjects and responsibilities to communities, partnerships and solidarity (Appendix 3).

This should not be separated from direct self-definition: Cuéllar, as all Secretaries-General before and after him, interprets the UN's environment to find a place for the Organization within, and through these acts, he constructs new 'realities'. According to interpretive organization theory this is necessary, as every organization must relate to its environment in a selective manner, as social reality as such is incomprehensibly complex (Szabó, 2016: 241; Gelei, 2006: 90). The following examples show how direct forms of subjectivization intertwined with making sense of a new, global 'reality' in the second half of Cuellar's tenure. These intersections seem to appear around two issues, as the quotations will show:

The UN's role in global problem solving

> *the existing and natural universal instrument for international co-operation on global problems (AR, 1987: 8)*
>
> *an important catalyst for consensus on global problems and, at the same time is itself, I believe, the object of a greater commonality of view (AR, 1987: 1)*
>
> *the catalyst for the adoption of a corpus of internationally agreed plans of action and guidelines that in fact provide the elements of a global social strategy (AR, 1989: 11)*

[67] Other, less direct formulations (like 'universal', for example) are not considered here, as this section deals explicitly with the global imaginary.

has raised consciousness of global economic imperatives (AR, 1988: 3)

put the question of the environment on the global agenda (AR, 1990: 11)

will face a very important test of its capacity to meet global challenges (AR, 1991:7)

And its mission in global change:

in its agenda has until now kept pace with global change. Indeed, on occasion, it has set the pace for such change. (AR, 1987: 8)

[our global vessel] will need skillful piloting and the assistance of dedicated oarsmen to navigate the many shoals and reach safe landfall in the next century (AR, 1987: 1)

must develop a greater capacity to associate with its global mission statesmen and scientists of the highest calibre from around the world (AR, 1987: 8)

Importantly, 'global', contrary to self- and agency-representations, does not experience a descent after the 90s, on the contrary: it stays strongly present until the last year of this analysis, where it reaches a higher-than-average 19 mentions. Turning back to the two main objects, it is important to stress again that, with Cuéllar's term, many representations disappeared completely: being 'acted upon', being a 'mediator', 'strong', 'political', 'caring', 'criticized', 'frustrated', as well as references to 'genesis', just to mention again some of the more important ones. Overall, it can be said that the diversity of self- and agency-representations wanes, as the discourse gets tighter and more definite – a characteristic which can also be observed in the usage of tenses: in the post-1992 period, the texts use present tenses almost exclusively, with only a few exceptions (could be, should be). Reverting to the questions asked in chapter IV/7.2: do these developments represent the shift that this research is essentially about? Do they comply with the preliminary expectations? The answer is yes and no: what surprised me in the analysis of this first period was the extent of continuity in the texts: a great deal of the categories are used largely throughout the entire period, meaning that the vocabulary and inventory of ideas had been more or less the same from the earliest years, and employed until the end of the analysed period (with a significant break, as described above, in the early 90s). The main difference lies in their strategical usage and combinations, emphasizing certain, or

other nuances according to the current discursive, political etc. contexts (what is allowed by the rationality) and/or the incumbents' personality and beliefs (how the speaker's subjectivity is transposed into the organization's).

This is, of course not a generally surprising feature as "every text relies on its predecessors and carries with it their echoes" (Neumann, 2008: 69). What makes this case interesting is that the core, the main features of subjectivity, which was formulated in large part by 'the founders', remained intact throughout the decades – which left space only for a delicate and nuanced game played with extending or contracting the limits. The construction of self and agency thus do not form a neat and unambiguous arch (how I expected and probably even would have wanted it to), rather, a sometimes patchy curve, organized around some key patterns and characteristics. This result, if contrasted to the ideas about discursive agency and subjectivation, shows that they were relevant for this analysis: the key patterns and characteristics are those enabled by and having direct roots in rationality, while the rest is about manoeuvring among and manipulating its limits. In the followings, the developments of post-Cold War era are interpreted in a similar way as earlier. The focus, however, is explicitly on the UN as one of the main sources and actors of global governance, understood as global governmentality. A more thorough summary then follows this section and closes the analytical chapter.

8.4 Secretaries-General and the UN in global governance

The global governance concept meets the UN's subjectivity

The era of post-Cold War Secretaries-General brought a steep decline in numbers for both categories of representations, constituting arguably the most conspicuous shift in frequency throughout the analysed period. As figures 15 and 16 showed, however, it did not mean that the decline in representations was proportionate to that in length, on the contrary: the post-Cold War Secretaries-General said more on fewer pages, in other words, they used a greater portion of the shrinking Introductions to address the UN's subjectivity directly. In the followings, the same data analysis is done as in the previous cases, but with a more flexible interpretation, and looking more beyond the texts, to incorporate contextual factors to a greater extent.

The starting point is thus what seemed an early post-Cold War consensus on the forming 'new world order', something like a second 'Era of Good Feelings' in world politics.

According to the popular understanding, in the early 90s the US 'reigned supreme' after the socialist alternative failed, and a great deal of public "attention turned to international institutions, human rights, democracy promotion, and economic liberalization. Infused with the liberal zeitgeist of the time, 'global governance' began to emerge as a perspective on world politics as well as a new approach to managing international affairs" (Stephen, 2017: 483). As described in detail in chapter II/3., the 'new' idea of global governance appeared in a normative sense within global decision making circles, penetrated in various ways by different bodies, mandates, advisory groups, etc. of the UN. In the early years, the Organization itself was also subject to a great deal of enthusiasm, as an embodiment of key principles, a prime means for cooperation and the fostering of rules for a more predictable and peaceful global life. As it was shown earlier in the analysis, little by little, it successfully appropriated a management (governance) approach, so characteristic of the mainstream idea of global governance – offering an opportunity for critical authors to interpret its discourses and practices as fostering global governmentality.

The governance approach invigorated in the Introductions as well, in an especially direct fashion following the 90s, as emphasis shifted from technical and humanitarian assistance to 'new types of challenges' to which response from the UN was required. "After the Cold War, the international arena is governmentalized through the extension and globalization of techniques of rule" which "play an increasingly central role in normalizing the international arena and maintaining order in the context of the proliferation of unpredictable threats". (Zanotti, 2005:467) The proportionate increase in direct subjectivization (especially self-definition but also agency construction) can also be seen in this light: the 'need' to redefine the Organization, its roles and fields of activity showed in these trends, and chapter IV/7 also showed the qualitative direction behind these quantitative shifts. As the data descriptions showed, 'Positive action' kept its leading position among the other action types, dominating agency-narratives more than ever before. Its most prevalent category, 'Strong action' featured in large part 'confronting' the threats to global peace, health, and other aspects of human security, the governmentality-connotations of which have been discussed in detail in previous chapters. Beyond these, the turbulence of these early years, or more specifically the perception of an accelerated change is also something to be faced in the Introductions: in Boutros-Ghali's account, the UN

> *has not confronted a time of such significance since the period of its founding in 1945. The years between 1992 and the fiftieth anniversary in 1995 may well determine the course and contribution of the Organization for the next generation or more. (AR, 1992: 1)*

These views allude, first of all, to the pace of change and the difficulties of adaptation, which is claimed to be a necessity. Two things follow from this: first, to meet these ends, new techniques of conflict resolution and relief, new solutions for economic and social development, strategies for engaging global business and civil society has been/should be 'developed', to be able to

> *deliver the required services to people all over the world" (AR, 2009: 2*).

This also requires the further 'evolution' of the UN itself. The direction of the evolution is set by the new mentalities of government: In Ban's account, the UN

> *has changed from being principally a conference-servicing Organization to become a truly global service provider working on the ground in virtually every corner of the world (AR, 2006: 1)*

Apart from the evidently managerial style, what deserves attention here is the difference that lies between being a 'conference-servicing' organization – as exemplified earlier by the UN as 'instrument' and 'platform' representations – and as a service-provider. While the formers have been described in the analysis as passive, tool-like conceptions of the UN (an instrument is essentially something that only acquires meaning if someone, a real actor uses it, while a platform is merely a location where real actors meet), service is something that links together the provider and the consumer, making both equally important in the process, and while a hierarchy remains between the participants of these transactions, the logic of the subjectivity changes substantially.

'The agent-structure problem'[68] *meets the UN's subjectivity*

Importantly, this is described as a response on part of the Organization to the evolving context in which it exists and functions (how that context is 'talked into existence' was

[68] The formulation comes from the memorable article of Alexander Wendt, who summarized and developed the debate in 1987 in his 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory'.

discussed in the previous chapter), as the following typical example from 2016 also shows:

> *by adapting to evolving needs and opportunities, the Organization has become more effective and efficient in how it delivers on its mandates. (AR, 2016: 4)*

Apart from the interpretation of these ideals (effectiveness and efficiency), as already discussed, an important aspect is that these qualities, claimed to be publicly attributed to the Organization, are the reason why it is 'solicited to act' so routinely by states and other actors. The UN, in these accounts, is trusted with various mandates because it has the above qualities and thus the capacity of effective 'Reaction', of responding to new challenges and solicitations (expressed also in certain categories of 'Contribution' and 'Abstract action'). This line of thought leads to the second thing that follows from the above claim (that the world is changing so rapidly and the UN needs to keep up with the changes), which is more implicit than the first one was. It sheds light on how the Secretaries-General imagine the connection between rationality (structure) and agency.

Accounts that picture the UN's evolution, reforms, experienced difficulties in adaptation, etc. suggest a unidirectional relationship (structure informing agency) instead of a bidirectional one, suggested in this research. Change, in the majority of the accounts is something that is happening independently of what people in the UN think or do about it, making it similar to natural facts. Social, technological, cognitive, etc. change, however, is nothing like the laws of nature, at least understood in a post-positivist epistemology. Actually, the case is similar to the one through which Jorgensen and Philips explain the meaning of discourse in their book on DA: a flood is a material fact, happening independently of what we think about it. The event, however, acquires meaning as people start to talk about it, interpreting it either as a consequence of climate change, political mismanagement or the wrath of God – becoming part of the discourse, with all the consequences talking about discourses have, among others, suggesting different coping strategies (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002:9). In our case, that the Secretaries-General talk about change almost as a natural fact is already the meaning-giving phase: the flood of history, as always, is finding its way no matter what we do about it.

This extremely structuralist point suggests a similar understanding of agency as the one often attributed to Foucault, but especially the structuralist predecessors of his thought: no room for real agency, accepting the subject position of an adaptive organization, ensuring our survival (criticism also disappears almost entirely from the accounts, and when formulated, it is typically not specified further.) It is all the more interesting, as we saw 'Strong action' dominating the era, as well as 'Agency' as a self-definition taking over the lead, along with 'Normativity'. The Secretaries-General thus see the UN as an active and purposeful agent, but when it comes to often claimed sweeping change, it prefers to appear as an object of the ongoing processes, almost as a justification for the developments in and initiated by the Organization. Is this the self-defence mechanism we say earlier in the attempts of consolidation and accommodation with the statist rationality? It is as possible as it was in the earlier cases. Is this ignorance or negligence? It is not very likely, as the UN, especially after the 90s, has been supported by a growing number of academics, counsellors, and various civil actors, disposing and sharing with the Organization a significant amount of information and insight. The question, however, as always, should not be 'what it is' but 'how is it possible'? And the answer is, as in the majority of the cases, lies in modern knowledge structures, tending to confound natural facts with social facts, necessities with possibilities, linear understandings with contingencies.

The identification of this trend however, does not mean that there are no exceptions; the number of these, however is very limited, and the formulations can sometimes prove ambiguous. From the point of view of the analysis, however, having a closer look on them is necessary. Probably the strongest formulation is from 1993, where Boutros-Ghali claimed in his Introduction that the UN

> *could play the pivotal role in establishing world order and progress that have been assigned to it by the drafters of the Charter. (AR, 1993: 1)*

First, it is important to see that the mode of this sentence is not indicative, it merely expresses a possibility, although a desirable one. While change or transformation is not directly formulated, both 'progress' and the 'new world order' imply it, moreover

accepting them as facts of life[69]. Interestingly, from what we see in this quote, the order taking form around the 90s is the one that was envisaged by the Organization's founders, and which was obstructed from unfolding by the great power rivalry of the Cold War. Therefore, in a sense, even this seemingly forcible formulation or agency could be interpreted as contingent on contextual features. A similar sense is apparent in another example, from 2009, where, according to Ban the UN

> *can be the agent of transformation that helps the human family adjust and adapt to the tremors and tectonic shifts reshaping our world. (AR, 2009: 2)*

The last example, however, is interesting also for the reasons elaborated more in the next section: Annan saw the Organization as

> *both witness to and participant in the birth of a global civil society (AR, 1998: 2).*

While this observation is not explained further by him, it points beyond the unidirectional conception of structure and agency.

Emerging ideas and global governmentality

As shown in chapter IV/6, after 1992 (taking the whole period, without separating it to smaller ones according to the mandates of Secretaries-General), 'Role' is not the strongest main category in self-definition anymore: it is overtaken by both 'Agency' and 'Normativity'. This shift seems to be an important one if we consider that the strongest pattern so far has been Secretaries-General tackling the nature of their Organization. In what follows, this specificity is elaborated on in the framework of governmentality theory, reflecting also on the agent-structure problem described above. 'Normativity' and 'Agency' being the most important categories after the end of the Cold War is interesting first of all because of their linkages and coincidence with emerging concepts and ideas, designed to form the new system based on liberal norms and principles, many of which

[69] It might be important to point once again to the significance of progress as an Enlightenment idea. As progress is something beneficial, it is implied in the same structures of knowledge that 'new' necessarily means something 'better'. New world order, led by the UN will thus be a qualitatively better world order. A telling expression of this line of thought is also to be found in the slogan of the 70th anniversary ceremonials, referred to already: 'Strong UN. Better World.'

originate directly or indirectly in the UN framework (Weiss, 2000; Mingst et al., 2018; Zanotti et al., 2015). As Ban put it in his 2008 Introduction, the UN

> *has had a long and proud history of establishing norms and principles that govern international relations. (AR, 2008: 1)*

Some of these, which bear heavily on the principle of state sovereignty (and thus the shift in political rationality), are discussed here in more detail. In the formulation of Jens Bartelson, whose scholarly work is in large part devoted to the study of sovereignty: "Sovereignty is no longer a constitutive attribute of states, or an inalienable right whose ultimate source is to be found within the state. Sovereignty is no longer the prize of successful claims to self-determination or declaration of independence, but rather a grant contingent upon its responsible exercise in accordance with the principles of international law under the supervision of a host of global governance institutions and non-governmental actors who claim to be maintaining the order and stability of the international system on the grounds that this is in the best interest of mankind as a whole" (Bartelson, 2014: 87). The notable international career of human rights, the principle of the 'responsibility to protect' (r2p) or 'good governance' are concepts which can be mentioned here, the normative nature of which is clear. While 'normativities' in these concepts and in the self-definitions are not interchangeable, they have commonalities in their mutually constitutive relationships with liberal political rationalities. It is equally clear that such concepts and ideas assume some kind of a political agency on part of the UN, like devising, defining and promoting, or enforcing them by different means.

I argue that this sense of agency goes beyond that we have seen in the previous era: as Boutros-Ghali wrote in his 'Agenda for Peace', while respect for the state's sovereignty and integrity are still crucial, "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world" (1992). The agency implied in such formulations is not only about the articulation of requirements, 'normally' done by the UN as the prime representative of 'the international community': it also sets the standards for the highly normative questions of what counts as substantially 'good' governance, discursively penetrating the thus far largely intact state sovereignties. If we

turn to governmentality theory to make sense of such activities, we find structures similar to the previous cases: according to Zanotti, the idea of good governance "aims at universalizing governmentality both as a modality of state rule and as a modality of international 'conduct of conduct'" (2005:466, see also: Zanotti, 2011). This activity does not only fix meanings, but also indicators, targeted policies, assessment tools, monitoring mechanisms and so on – things that a purely sovereign way of exercising power would never make use of. The calculation, prudence and management like professionalism of exercising power globally are flaring examples of a governmental rationality, first defined by La Perrière – according to Foucault – as "the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end" (Foucault, 1991:97). Right and convenient, of course, are discursive exercises, regularly done by different UN or UN-affiliated bodies, as well as the Secretaries-General themselves.

The case where an Secretary-General's contribution was perhaps the most remarkable, was the creation of the r2p as a norm of world politics. The idea was "that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states" (Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [CISS], 2001:VIII). After it was picked up by a UN high-level panel, interpreting it as an 'emerging norm', Kofi Annan, in his 'In Larger Freedom' report, stated that world community had to "move towards embracing and acting on" the new norm (2005:35). After this intervention, r2p was codified and celebrated as a new legal norm, an actual international guarantee for the protection of human rights (Williams, 2017). Why this story is highly interesting from the point of view of this research, is the assumed effects it has had on the sovereignty principle. It has been beyond question that the novel version of humanitarian intervention erodes the 'traditional' concept of sovereignty, as institutionalized and exclusive control over a territory. What CISS did to brush aside this obstacle, was that it deliberately reformulated sovereignty as responsibility: "The commission (…) flipped the coin, shifting the emphasis from a politically and legally undesirable right to intervene for humanitarian purposes to the less confrontational idea of a responsibility to protect" (Stahn, 2007:102).

This solution, of course, is not without theoretical antecedents (Glanville, 2011), and does not go against the actual practice of sovereignty, as interfering with each other's affairs has, no matter the principles, been a constant in international affairs (Krasner, 1999). However, here the question is, as always, how the norm itself and the way the Secretary-General took up its promotion and codification relates to rationality. First of all, it should be laid down that r2p is an offset of the human rights regime, growing steadily during the Cold War, notably under UN auspices. As Jaeger notes, human rights not only have a "legally 'post-sovereign' quality", they also "have to be understood in relation to the international governance of security and welfare" (2008:606). This insightful statement should perhaps be reformulated, stressing that it is probably their post-sovereign quality that made them suitable tools of the international governance of security and welfare. Encompassing various aspects of peoples' lives under its reach, starting from their political subjectivity to their economic and social status and possibilities, governance in the name of human rights has been able to legally penetrate state borders for the first time. Care for each individual's security and welfare is, by the time of Annan's contribution to r2p, a universally accepted[70] concern, and importantly, an object of national and international good governance.

The UN's normative contribution is beyond debate; its institutionalized practices, funds, and instruments are manifestations of its agency. How does all this matter in the present study's analyses? This section started from the assessment that 'Normativity' and 'Agency' are the new bases of self-definition following the end of the Cold War. This tendency unfolded parallelly with the shrinking of the Introductions' length and the tightening of their language, suggesting that what the Secretaries-General have to say does not require wordy explanations or justifications anymore, they can simply be stated: many meanings are, by this time fixed and can be employed without problems of understanding, so previous categories of self-definition intermingle into a complex subjectivity under the idea of global governance. The Organization often appears as a mixture of the most important categories, but first of all something that could be termed as a 'normative actor':

[70] Universality, as suggested above on multiple occasions, is problematic from various points of view. Its criticism in terms of human rights is usually formulated as one or another form of cultural relativism. See Donnelly, 1984; Douzinas, 2007.

> *as a strengthened voice for the poorest countries, as deliverer of humanitarian relief, as guardian of human and minority rights, as rescuer of States in crisis and as an instrument for repairing a damaged global environment" (AR, 1993: 1).*

Its uniqueness in terms of universality of membership and mandate, its established position and agency in world politics, as well as the covered fields of action and areas of interests are sketched by the Secretaries-General in line with all the mainstream definitions of global governance.

8.5 Summary

The above analyses of the dataset first of all supported the prime argument of this research, namely that the Secretaries-General's contributions can fruitfully be interpreted in a global governmentality framework. Such a framework proved applicable not only from the turn of tides in the early 90s, but for the entire period in question. As suggested already in this study, governmental rationality evolved parallelly with the statist rationality, but, according to Foucault, took over in many aspects only with the Enlightenment and the social change induced by the rise of capitalism, achieving a hegemonic status, supported by liberal discourses of global governance by the late 20th century. This, however, as the Secretaries-General's texts showed, never meant (at least not until today) the elimination of the principle of sovereignty (as Foucault hoped it would) from modern political rationality. Even today, the idea holds on firmly in the midst of various transformations, and is actually experiencing a comeback pushed by reactionary political forces worldwide. This analysis aimed to sketch a historical account of the construction of the UN's subjectivity by the Secretaries-General. The question was treated as situated in a context of transition, provided by the forming post-war international order, with all its ambiguities, modern and postmodern elements. What signalled the transition were the professed weakening of the sovereignty principle and the parallel rise of governmental rationality on the level of world politics, accelerated by the transformation of global capitalism from the 70s onward. The fact that the UN has suffered from inherent controversies – like representing a largely progressive attitude within conservative frames, or promoting a global agenda while the world is still composed of rather parochial states – is nothing new. What is novel about it, is the finding

that this disjunction is indeed the core element of subjectivation in the analysed textual corpus.

The data rarely showed clear patterns: the Organization's subjectivity has been in constant motion from the very beginnings. Some of the few recurrent themes and representations, however, evolved specifically around this dichotomic aspect – assuring continuity and coherence that is necessary for any story line to remain intact and acceptable. Both faces of modern political rationality are recurrent in both datasets (built around self and agency), revealing a form of subjectivization, as ordered by the given political rationality as a discursive structure. On the other hand, formulations relying on extensive understandings of self and role remained patchy, signalling the existence of careful attempts to shape subjectivity and equally the constraints that limited these attempts. This finding has the capacity to shed light on the relationship between agent and structure. In Leipold and Winkel's Discursive Agency Approach, discursive agency was defined as "an actor's ability to make him/herself a relevant agent in a particular discourse by constantly making choices about whether, where, when, and how to identify with a particular subject position in specific story lines within this discourse" (2017:524). The UN has constantly been making such choices within its own limits, claiming to adapt to the changing *Zeitgeist*: the example of colonization/decolonization is a telling one. The Organization was initially created with a Trusteeship Council as a main organ, mirroring the structures of the then-recent past. As the forces of decolonization grew stronger and stronger, it gradually became a champion of the self-determination of people.

Similarly, as time became ripe for the idea of global governance to take root and get accepted, the UN embraced it and adjusted its subjectivity accordingly. Actors' ability usually depends on their social characteristics, and structural position. The UN 'had it all', mirroring the state of high politics and the consensuses of hegemonic elites. These qualities made it an adaptive actor, which is also able to shape discursive structures. On the level of world politics, as suggested earlier, post-WW2 high politics and the hegemonic consensus was standing on modern rationality in transition, (or sublation). Its two forms had operated simultaneously on the state level throughout modern times, but inter-national politics had been ordered predominantly by the statist one. By the time of the UN's creation, this has already started to shift, 'elevating' the art of government to an

equal status. Following the mentioned changes in capitalism, and the introduction of its neoliberal form, the reality of global governance, institutionalized after the war, became increasingly palpable. Managing first of all neoliberalism globally, its failure to cope with fundamental – and indeed structural – global problems is due to the fact that the turn to global governance did not mean systemic change not even after the Cold War ended. It rather meant that both elements of modern political rationality were taken beyond the state, realizing the 'inherently globalising' project of modernity.

The United Nations, being the embodiment of the post-war hegemonic consensus and a central actor in (and for) global governance, mirrored and enabled these developments. While normatively assessing its performance is not among the goals of this study, we can find the relevant aspect of this idea taking shape in the above analyses: self- and agency-construction moved back and forth between the two forms of modern rationality, reaffirming not only the sovereign form of the exercise of power (confined to states and still standing on the early modern understanding of the reason of the state), but also governmentalizing the international. This characteristic showed that the Agambenian critique of Foucault was indeed well placed (de Boever, 2009; Bussolini, 2010; Erlenbusch, 2013; Leshem, 2015). When the former suggested that "the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power" (Agamben, 1998:11), he drew attention to the fact that these power logics are not opposing, rather necessarily complementing each other in the modern state. This insight also holds beyond the state and domestic politics: together, the two rationalities ensure that a legitimate and effective control is maintained in world politics. In the analyses, we saw that when legitimacy was at stake, state sovereignty as an eternal principle was confirmed. Otherwise, representations satisfied what we understand by the governmentalization of the inter-national.

This claim is not only supported by those cases that were highlighted in the analyses, but also those formulations that were conspicuously absent, or marginal. The 'Influence' main category, or 'Political' category were such examples – used moderately and cautiously in direct self-definition. 'Having power', or 'acting with independence' were also rather neglected agency-categories, meaning that such direct formulations were mostly avoided by the Secretaries-General. Caution, however, is still more apparent in

the self-definition cases; agency construction, as the analysis showed, was, beyond question, dominated by 'Strong action', featuring numerous categories that proved highly important from the point of view of imagining global governance and the Organization's own central role in it. These instances, apart from being interpreted in a governmentality framework, were seen as contributing to the often acclaimed weakening of state sovereignty on the level of rationality, by allowing such roles to an IO – albeit the biggest and arguably most important one in world political affairs. What follows from these observations is the assessment that the Secretaries-General extended their 'subject positions' much more in terms of agency than in terms of defining the self, in other words, they were more careful in pronouncing ontological questions than in accounting for what the UN 'does'. If we compare the case for a brief moment with a 'regular' subjectivity, say, an individual, it is clear that narrating its own actions (whichever directions they point at, or however it is expressed) comes way easier than fixing the ontology by telling definitively: I am this or I am that. This dichotomy can even be referred to the original one, the two forms of political rationality: while in 'sovereign mode', being the sovereign is enough to maintain the position; in 'governmentality mode', the emphasis is on the sophisticated and subtle means by which power functions, got dispersed – *performs* in the society.

In the last chapter, we saw how 'the founders' designated the course for the nascent Organization: they integrated its prehistory from the point of view of peace and security to form a veritable origin myth for the UN, a strong foundation to rely on for their successors. In their normative accounts, they embedded further core elements of governmental reason into the forming subjectivity, while they stressed the instrumentality of the Organization and its imperative respect for the traditional conception of state sovereignty. Such a careful balancing must have seemed necessary, as in these early years, the memory of historic failures was still very close. The UN's predecessor, the League was formed after the design of a major figure in liberal-idealist IR and its 'updated' version was expected to function properly after some adjustments and reforms. Adjustments, however did not only occur in the organizational structure or the processes and practices of the UN; by the time of the 'Middle Trio', world politics was being increasingly governmentalized. Analyses of this period showed how the Secretaries-General made sense of the changing environment and participated in the processes

themselves. The universal aspirations of the Organization – both in terms of membership and scope of activities was reflected in the Secretaries-General's referred narratives. The most significant shift, however, which was also apparent in the structure of the texts, happened under Boutros-Ghali, the first Secretary-General spending his mandate fully in the 'new era' following the Cold War. Analysis became more challenging as the body of texts and number of representations shrunk substantially, but the core directions – sketching the UN's relation to global governance and its self-conception as being an active and passive subject in the changing environment – could be drawn up. Finally, through some telling examples, the analysis concluded in an understanding of the UN's role in global governmentality.

V. CONCLUSION

1. Concluding and self-reflective remarks

Showing how globalization and global governance can indeed be useful concepts and vehicles of meaningful change (Hardt and Negri, 2004; Munck, 2007; Reitan, 2007; Zanotti, 2013; Gill, 2015b) is not among the goals of this research. This is touched upon here only as a part of my self-reflection, summed up to show the personal point from which I have been looking at the question of global governance. This point is important to clarify here, as my stance in social and political questions informed the research in many ways. "All theories are ultimately based on intuitions, insights typically implicit and vaguely formed about how the universe, social life, or politics 'works'" – David Lake states in his recent article, *White Man's IR: An Intellectual Confession*, entirely written as a sacrifice on the altar of self-reflection (Lake, 2016). This project, as many others before, grew out of a vague feeling that 'something's wrong' and the idealistic urge that I should fix it. It was also getting clear after receiving a degree in political sciences that I should look for answers beyond domestic politics. I thus turned to IR and finished my masters with a thesis titled 'Perspectives for the liberal paradigm', a rudimentary attempt to solve the mystery, looking for answers in the inherent controversies of liberalism, having a recourse at that time primarily to the Schmittian tradition. As I started the PhD program, my attention turned to global governance and its assumed crisis, as I saw this as

an appropriate framework to squeeze my problems into, from the looming environmental catastrophe to the widening gap between the rich and the poor, all of these infused with relations of power.

Power and hierarchies have never seemed 'natural' for me, and I have always had a strong drive to contribute somehow to the dismantlement of the grinding and oppressive structures all around us. At first, being immerged in post-positivist philosophy of sciences and discourse theory I tried to focus strictly on cognitive structures. As the time went by, I felt that the situation was getting serious enough to give a definite and critical stroke to how I frame the problem, and thus I connected the story to the critique of capitalism (thanks in large part to fellow scholars with whom I have had the pleasure working with in Karl Polanyi Research Centre at Corvinus University of Budapest). I did not have the intention to conduct a 'regular' analysis of the material structures of capitalism as this falls beyond my expertise, and it would have pushed the boundaries of the current project too wide. Nevertheless, as it was visible though throughout the text, I kept pointing in those directions which could, once explored, enrich the analysis further, giving it a definite critical stroke. It is my conviction that the Gramscian school of IR has the most potential in this regard, as it is in itself an approach which, compared to other critical schools, pays the most attention to immaterial structures, and, importantly, their tight connection to material ones. A possible continuation of this (and such) projects would be to explicitly link Foucauldian and Gramscian IR, as (among others) Jonathan Joseph outlined in his recent research agenda (2017).

This critical attitude, which stands on a strong personal belief that the world could and should be a better place had two practical consequences to the writing of this dissertation. The first one is hopefully less visible, but most probably not entirely invisible: the tension between my strong political conviction that what is 'wrong' about global governance could and should be 'fixed' or turned into something entirely different, and a scholarly conviction that is tightly linked to the linguistic turn and the resulting epistemological revolutions, which suggest that this is exactly what one cannot do, at least not without analytical and logical blunders. The whole project was thus a careful balancing exercise, striving to keep the analytical frames wide enough but not too wide. The other consequence of my attitude shows in focusing on governmental rationality in IR and the

deliberate and continuous attempts to distance the analysis as far as possible from 'traditional' IR – which would have meant in this case more focus on the traces and implications of the reason of the state as the order of world politics. With this, I obviously took part in tilting the way world politics is thought of in the era characterized by the concept of global governance. The following conclusions and indeed the whole text should thus be read with these self-reflective points in mind.

A final one should touch upon my contribution to the institutionalization of the discourse of global governance, and, by highlighting the Secretary-General's and his Secretariat's role in it, to the institutionalization of their contribution. As I tried to stress already in the methodological chapter, an analysis of discursive agency is 'trialectic', meaning that the analyst is always there, immerged in the mutual constitution of structures and agents. In this specific case, the reports' introductions were given such relevance for the first time, through my actions (Szabó, 2016: 208-209). Thus, with due modesty, I must say that I made these texts relevant in this particular question, contributing also to global governance as a discourse, governmentality as a discourse, etc. It should also be stressed once more, that my actions did not come out of thin air either, but joined a complex discourse with a long history and several participants.

2. Summary and findings

This research was conceived as a project of understanding global governance. As I read myself into its literature discussing its different aspects – from the diverse sets of actors involved, the complex interaction networks they have, the ways it changes the game for states – I realized that understanding requires to ask the most basic questions, to reveal the systems of assumptions (the grids of knowledge) on which this whole research agenda has been built in the past decades. The broad goal of my research was thus the deconstruction of the structures of knowledge in which global governance has been imagined and discussed in the recent decades. Surveying the literature, I found that global governmentality studies provided the best tools to make this happen, as they built on very broad concepts, among others, on Foucault's understanding of discourse and modern political rationalities. It is what he called governmental rationality that enabled to think about world politics in terms of global governance, as subsequently pointed out in this study.

The UN, appearing as a central actor in global governance throughout the literature, seemed like a well-placed object for an empirical analysis. The discourse of world politics as global governance, structured by the dynamics of modern political rationalities was thus assumed to be in a complex relationship with the UN, and especially the construction of its subjectivity throughout the years, since its establishment. This approach placed the focus on a cognitive structure, but also stayed sensitive to agency, and pre-eminently 'discursive agency'. Making this linkage engendered the questions guiding this research: How has the UN's subjectivity been evolving from 1946 to 2016? How does this process relate to modern political rationalities and particularly to governmentality 'going global'? The empirical dataset I worked on consisted of the Annual Reports of the Secretaries-General on the Work of the Organization, starting with the first one and finishing with Ban Ki-moon's last report, analysing the reports' introductory chapters as prime sources of the Secretaries-General's vision and strategy.

These complex problems required careful and detailed discussions, unravelling the different elements of the problems. First, I briefly reconstructed the story of global governance. I started with the advances of the long 19th century in a critical framework, and continued with the period after the Second World War, with international organizations awarded a special role. The main argument here was that the intense institutionalization of global governance after the war – inaugurated and symbolized by the creation of the UN – let the governmental rationality 'loose' on the level of world politics, introducing significant changes that have been widely discussed in IR ever since. Globalization and the global turn to neoliberalism was also highlighted, as a prelude to the joint efforts of scholars and practitioners that made the idea and practice of global governance what it is today, by the early 90s. The peculiar developments in the historical periods mentioned in this chapter were important in the current framework, first of all, because they bore on how global governance has been thought of and discussed. A multiplicity of contingencies thus enabled the 'thinkability' of global governance, as a hegemonic discourse of world politics.

The next chapter, following some general discussions about the boundaries and limitations of IR, and the immediate theoretical precedents, showed in a focused literature review how the discipline has approached global governance so far. While the question

became widely commented on only after the end of the Cold War, the literature is huge, so I kept a strict focus on how knowledge and power appear in the relevant schools' approaches. The review found that problem solving of 'mainstream' theories – meaning the different versions and combinations of IR's two traditional approaches, the realist and the liberal ones, but including also mainstream hybrids such as the English School – have no sophisticated answers neither to questions of power, nor to knowledge in global governance. This is, as usually, the result of their particular (and indeed too narrow) definitions of both, which is less the case in alternative approaches to IR: different versions of Marxist scholarship, while it places less emphasis on knowledge, offer dissident views on power, while constructivist IR has the capacity to approach knowledge and norms in a meaningful way. It is, however the Foucauldian branch of post-structuralist IR that says the most about both terms, placing the emphasis exactly on their interrelations. The governmentality framework thus proved to be the coherent analytical scheme within which the main questions of my research could be elaborated.

These considerations were followed by the outline of my methodology, and the empirical analysis, which itself was composed of several interrelated parts. After the specification of the research methods, I outlined what I termed the UN's subjectivization narrative in this research: I argued that it consists of self-definition (operationalized as occurrences which answer the question what the UN is/was/will be/should be etc.) and agency construction (occurrences which answer the question what the UN does/did/will do/could do etc.) and introduced the system of categories I constructed for the empirical analysis. I divided the analysis into two steps: in the first, (mostly descriptive) narrative part, I presented the dataset in numbers, with minimal contextualization and some preliminary analytical points: I counted and weighed the occurrences of the different categories of self-definition and agency construction, and linked the visible patterns and trends to the historical-political context, and the attitudes of the respective Secretaries-General. The raw results of this first part were used in the second analytical step, where I developed a discourse analysis, rooted in these contextualized numerical results. These investigations evolved around the forms and combinations of political rationality which have made such constructions of the UN's subjectivity thinkable in the discursive and institutional context, and the mechanisms between the structures on the one hand, and the Secretary-General's discursive agency on the other.

The chapter presenting the empirical analysis also included an original interview research which helped in uncovering and understanding the ways in which the reports of the Secretary-General construct the framework of world politics and within this, reproduce the Organization itself. The interviews served a double purpose: based on the information communicated by the Secretariat officials I talked to, I could reconstruct the exact process of drafting the Secretary-General's reports, with a special focus on the Annual Reports, document which have not been analysed so systematically so far. The other purpose was to build another case for the discussion of knowledge, power, bureaucratic, and governmental rationalities. Through this part of the project, I could also reflect on the functioning of IOs as bureaucracies, following an existing research agenda and linking it to my bigger project.

2.1 Key results

Because of the nature of my research question and the overall theoretical-methodological frames in which I was working in this project, summarizing briefly the key results of the empirical analysis is indeed a challenging task. Risking to be somewhat didactic, I could say that the descriptive first part answered more the question how the UN's subjectivity evolved from 1946 to 2016. In terms of self-definition, the answer is composed of the following key elements:

- All Secretaries-General awarded prime importance to talking about the Organization in three main forms: in terms of its 'Role', about the UN as a form of 'Agency', and prioritizing its 'Normative' aspects. Until the end of Cuéllar's term, 'Role' was by far the strongest representation, followed by the other two in a varied pattern. The strongest categories within this main category were the UN as a 'mediator', as an 'instrument' or a 'platform' – ideas that are perhaps the most familiar from public, as well as academic discussions.
- From the early 90s, 'Role' as a main category lost its significance. It signals the shift in rationality and the associated change in self-conception: briefly, by this time the UN has become established enough in our collective knowledge, so there was no need to elaborate on such basic questions anymore. The focus could shift towards its normative values and its expanding agential capacities. The same process also showed in the

slightly different case of the ‘Character’ category: it disappeared almost completely by the 90s.

- As the weighted results showed, however, the fact that the end of the Cold War saw a quantitative decline in occurrences, did not mean that subjectivization became irrelevant altogether, on the contrary: Secretaries-General in the era of global governance said more about the subjectivity of the UN, on fewer pages, accounting for a renewed importance of such questions within the ‘new’ frames of world politics, widely understood as having undergone deep transformations.
- In itself, the fact that ‘Influence’ as a main category stayed marginal throughout the whole time was interesting, especially compared to the findings in agency construction (‘Positive action’ being clearly the most dominant type). This goes to anything which has at least something to do with defining the Self as influential (or powerful), and the presence of such self-definition attempts only weakened after the 90s, where this main category became virtually non-existent.
- In terms of its relations to states, it could be observed that the Secretaries-General talked primarily about the Organization’s utility to states (as a more or less functional instrument, platform, or mediator), or its genesis, tied to relations between states (peace, war, conflict, or diplomacy).

The case of agency construction in the first analytical step also offered interesting results, especially when compared to the other pillar of subjectivization:

- Overall, the categories showed a similar quantitative trend: they were expanding until the end of the Cold War, and then experienced a sudden break: the frequency of representations fell, and many thus far important categories disappeared (here also, the quantitative decline did not mean a ‘proportionate’ one, as the weighted results showed).
- An important difference was, however, that the basic patterns were largely preserved in this case (while we saw that in terms of self-definition, ‘Role’ gave its primacy to the two strongest secondary categories): the dominance of ‘Positive action’ was plain and clear throughout the entire period, although it became less dramatic after the 90s.

- Another interesting result was that agency-accounts had been forceful and hearty under all Secretaries-General, irrespective of the level of activism or individual conceptions of the office attributed to them in the literature, and judged based on their own accounts. In this particularly we could detect the impact of the bureaucracy, the functioning of which is more detached from contextual and personal factors than the Secretary-General's. Another explanation might be found in the dynamics of political rationalities, which is touched upon later in this summary.
- Introductions, thus, indeed proved to be texts where a strong agency construction unfolds. They used primarily present tenses, or discussed the past in relation to the present, and the future or future possibilities (similarly to self-definition).

Following the above outlined didactic logic, the second part elaborated on the more complex and theoretically informed question, how this 'subjectivization' related to the dynamics of modern political rationalities and particularly to (global) governance as governmentality. From an analytical point of view, it could be translated more into 'how could the first step be embedded in the theoretical framework'? This means a more pronounced focus on knowledge structures in this part, even though I was looking at back-and-forths between rationality and actor (between the structure and the agent). Governmental rationality was traced in the texts by following the relevant literature. I adopted especially much from Jaeger and his 'governmentalities' (2008) as they seemed to reappear regularly in the texts: achieving security and peace through policing, moving from warfare to welfare, postcolonial pastoralism and discipline, the normative concern with human rights, and a pedagogical panopticism were therefore used to structure the discourse analysis. Stylistic elements of governmentality language (like neutrality, a managerial, professional style, normative utilitarianism) were also identified on several occasions.

So this part analysed the individual occurrences in their relations to each other, operating as a system of knowledge. Recurrent points from the narrative analysis (like frequency, primary and secondary categories, modalities) were developed further here, using these viewpoints to integrate the findings in the theoretical frames. Here, I summarize the key findings in bullet points, similarly to the first part's results:

1. *The founders*

- The story about the genesis of the UN displayed a clear structure of knowledge, elaborating a sublime myth for the Organization. These accounts were based on commonly shared truths about war and peace, freedom and welfare, or civilization and civility.
- War and peace, a classic binary in IR, showed the limits of political imagination in terms of how we think about each, and what strategies this way of thinking offer (various forms of international cooperation, the archetype of which is the UN). A key insight of governmentality theory was clearly appearing here, in thinking about freedom in terms of the securitizing logic of permanent danger.
- The UN, an uncorrupted champion and guarantor of the welfare and freedom of peoples, an embodiment of civilization – in brief normativity – was connected to the genesis-myths. Its principles and aims (built around Western ideas, culture and lifestyle) were routinely discussed as universal values, which helped in forming an abstract and manageable mass out of the great variety of humankind.
- Governmentality presented itself as a useful theoretical frame again, as to govern is to uphold the welfare and freedom of the people, who, in return, can flourish, conduct their own conducts (and produce as much as possible). This rationality ran through The founders' texts. In order to understand the parallel, rather conservative 'Role' categories (instrument, platform, etc.) employed, the UN was argued to be (structurally) compelled to express the tension between the two forms of modern political rationality.
- The fusion of 'Strong action' with different representations (like 'normative' self-definition) depicted exactly the kind of world organization that the public would have wished for after the failure of the League: one that appears as a potent actor. This, as summed up in the previous point, had to be accommodated with the sovereignty-principle, which the respective Secretary-General's solved differently (Lie by employing 'Successful action', Hammarskjöld by using 'Contribution' frequently, for instance).

2. *The Middle Trio*

- 'Agency' becoming a primary category in self-definition reflected the growing number of engagements and responsibilities. Universality became a unifying theme,

connecting membership questions and the scope of activities, symbolizing the benevolent efforts to integrate humankind on multiple levels. These arrangements were, however, not 'negotiated on equal terms' (as the mainstream governance approach would suggest), but were products of hierarchical relations and sophisticated power mechanisms.

- The expansion required definite strategies of governance, and knowledge as an emerging issue area seemed central to these efforts. 'Neutral action' employed often exemplary governmentality-language ('managerial' style, claiming a right to act on the basis of 'value-free' expertise, etc.). The governance strategies' prime targets were those societies which were in 'need' of normalization and education.
- 'Abstract action' accounted for how the UN kept mirroring the transformations in world politics. It fused with 'Strong action', representing the Organization as a pillar of guidance in these transformations. 'Character' representations also reached a peak in this period, stressing, apart from its 'political' character, 'complexity' and 'dynamism', evidencing the formation of an autonomous organization, in an increasingly globalized environment.
- Processing contextual changes and preparation for a 'new' role for the UN in the 'new' world became a central structure of thought in this period. With political rationality shifting, the Secretaries-General were imagining the world as a complex, multi-layered totality, necessitating the aims of governance of '*omnes et singulatim*'.
- 'Global' did not appear as a self-conception directly in the texts, rather as an adjective for a growing number of notions: society, subjects, partnerships, or solidarity. Many representations disappeared completely parallel to this, leaving the structure of subjectivization tighter and more definite.

3. The UN in global governance

- Among the key points in these texts were the occasions where the new idea of global governance met the UN's subjectivity. 'Strong action' appeared in 'confronting' the new threats to human security, 'developing' new techniques to deliver services to peoples – all with proper governmentality-connotations and the logic of the subjectivity changed substantially.
- 'The agent-structure problem' also more visibly came to the surface in this period, in relation to the UN's subjectivity and evolving around the idea of change: either it was

seen in an extremely structuralist light, almost as a natural fact of the new form of life, or appeared in the 'Strong action' representations dominating the era, and 'Agency' as a self-definition, imagining the UN as a lead of change.

- This era also saw several emerging ideas, in close association with how scholars imagine global governmentality. Governing international relations through establishing norms and principles appeared in the shining career of human rights, the principle of 'r2p' or 'good governance'. The UN's agency in devising, defining and promoting, or enforcing norms went way beyond the initial ideas, corresponding with the bureaucracy-centred explanations touched upon in chapter II/2 and the interview analysis.

Finally, what could be highlighted more generally as results drawn from the entire textual corpus are the following points:

- The fact that all the above results came from formulations which are *directly* addressing what the UN is/was, etc. and what it does/has done, etc. is an especially strong argument for making the link I made in the Introduction. A serious methodological choice was made when I decided that I would not subject the entirety of the report introduction's texts to a discourse analysis, and it proved to be a relevant approach. As the results leave less space for generalizability like this, it has more potential to talk to the relationships between the UN's subjectivization, global governance and political rationalities, which was the primary puzzle in my research.
- There was a high level of continuity in the vocabulary of the Introductions and their inventory of ideas. Where differences were identified (illustrated by the above points) was in the strategic usage and combinations of ideas, leading to contextually informed solutions in the analysed periods. This conclusion points to the importance of knowledge structures defined by modern political rationalities: they are the unifying factors providing continuity throughout the 70 years. It shows also the role played by the bureaucracy in such an organization: their standardized language and mechanisms keep the organization going and provide the necessary coherence and continuity.
- Variation, on the other hand, took shape in line with historically specific strategic goals and needs of institutional manoeuvring of the Secretaries-General. It was also clear that the Secretaries-General extended their 'subject positions' much more in terms of

agency than in terms of self-definition. It appears that identifying the Self with something particular was more problematic under the limits of political imagination than engaging in action and narrating it. With this, nevertheless, the Secretaries-General could slowly tailor the space to manoeuvre for their bureaucracies, which took up the ever newer conceptions of agency under the governmental rationality, as argued in detail in chapter IV/3.

- Both political rationalities had their role in the construction of the UN's subjectivity. When legitimacy was at stake, *raison d'état* as an eternal principle was repeatedly confirmed. Questions of self-definition and the related results beg to be mentioned here, as a broad conclusion: stepping up, defining the Self as an autonomous actor – or one with genuine authority, as some of the literature like to suggest – seems to be out of the line for the Secretaries-General of the UN, at least in these reports. The preservation of the order of states 'no matter what' seeps through the self-definition pillar of the subjectivization narrative. Otherwise, the governmentalization of the international was strongly and persistently represented, depicting an organization that is striving for a certain form of control in world politics, and following the rationality of government in this endeavour, as its basic rationality. This showed, more than in the other pillar, in agency-construction: narrating the ever expanding agency seems a less risky enterprise than defining the Self 'in the image of states', still widely claimed to be the only legitimate players in international relations.
- Putting the above point in a somewhat oversimplified way: out of the two modern political rationalities, while the reason of the state showed more in self-definition, governmentality showed more in agency construction. From the fact that this latter category was visibly stronger – both in qualitative and quantitative terms – than the first one, we could conclude that the research indeed speaks to the shifting political rationality of 'the international', establishing a connection between rationality, subjectivization and global governance, as promised in the Introduction.

2.2 Key contributions

What I accomplished here is an empirical case study in the research field defined by global governmentality theory. The original research worked itself through a large corpus of texts, the 544 pages of the Secretary-General's Annual Report Introductions, an object

that has never been analysed so systematically before. It also means that a database was created (manually) from these texts, comprising every occasion where the 'UN' was referred to as being something or engaging in action. This means an empirical contribution to the debates on the UN's place and role in world politics (Roberts and Kingsbury, 1993; Ruggie, 1998b; Thakur and Weiss, 2010; Simai, 2015; Mingst et al., 2018)

It is also worthy of mentioning that I found a way in which actors' agency is not dwarfed by the study of knowledge structures. While the relevant (Foucauldian) literature usually acknowledges the importance of the study of agency, actual empirical cases are not particularly popular or frequent. Much of the existing literature, when it approaches the question, it deals with subaltern agency (Bhabha, 1985 and 1994; Munck, 2007; Caldwell, 2007; McNay, 2010; Zanotti, 2013), or a specific, neoliberal form of subjectivization, which works through 'responsibilization' (Gleadle et. al., 2008; Pyysiäinen et. al., 2017; Yoon et al, 2019). This study was rather about how a potentially powerful actor shapes its own space to manoeuvre under the cognitive constraints posed by rationality.

'Discursive agency' (Leipold and Winkel, 2017), the analytical tool developed recently, paved the way for my research, which can thus be understood as an empirical case for how 'structuration' works. The contribution is also to the emerging research on discursive agency (Albrecht, 2018; Lang et al., 2019): it seems that it could be fruitfully combined with the study of IOs as bureaucracies, which is a well-established direction in IR, with the potential to channel this concept into the discipline.

The interviews are original contributions to the study of the UN as a distinct research field. Even though the Annual Reports are the only written document by the Secretary-General mentioned in the Charter, they have not been studied in this depth so far. From this point of view, the main contribution of the interview-research was that it helped reconstructing the process of drafting them in the Secretariat, shedding light on some notable formal and informal mechanisms.

On a more abstract level, the interview analysis was an empirical contribution to the branch of IO literature, which sees them as bureaucracies detached from states, developing authority on their own (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Ellis, 2010; Barnett and Duvall, 2013; Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Bauer and Ege, 2016; Busch and Liese, 2017;

Dijkstra, 2017). Agency (and discussing agency) proved to be more important than talking about what the Organization was. Acting (proactively governing) instead of entering into abstract – and politically slippery – excursus of the Self seems to be in line with a bureaucratic approach: this kind of power does not spend time on directly reaffirming and claiming sovereignty. This circumstance offers interesting pathways also towards governmentality theory, as explained on multiple occasions in the text in in more detail.

Discourse analyses are always case-specific and distinct in their exact methods. Methodologically speaking, a contribution still worthy of mentioning is that the discourse analysis I developed covered a large textual base, while it 1. remained theoretically focused, and 2. did not detach itself from the texts. The quantitative analytical step was necessary to meet these goals, which resulted in an original, and hopefully convincing research approach.

Finally, and most importantly, this research presents a complex understanding of global governance, as a hegemonic discourse of world politics. The question is not so much why it became hegemonic or what makes it hegemonic (the text offers multiple answers, based on the relevant literature). The emphasis is, uniquely, on the complex relations between this discourse, political rationalities, and the UN's subjectivity, as explained in the above points. These complex relations were elaborated on, through meticulously examining each of the elements from the inside: the discourse of global governance as standing on the dynamics between academics' and practitioners' endeavours; the rationalities, as being in a dynamic relationship themselves, transforming as modernity itself is transforming, and rendering real alternatives impossible; and subjectivity, constituted continuously in the dynamics of self-definition and agency-construction, in intimate relations with all the above. This perspective cannot give a one-sentence answer to the research question, asking how has the discourse of global governance been structured by modern political rationalities and the UN's subjectivity – but hopefully gave a substantial one all the same.

3. Outlook

The history of the UN and the analysed discursive processes did not, of course, end with Ban Ki-moon's term. With António Guterres, the analysis could be continued, bringing yet different context and personality in play[71]. The current project, however, stops in 2016, mainly for two reasons. First, as the mandates of the Secretaries-General served as reference points in periodization, engaging in the analysis of an ongoing mandate could be problematic. Second, the last three years brought significant political developments that are too soon to be judged. Changes – briefly referred to also in the above summary – that started to show especially under Ban's term has got increasingly visible since Guterres took over, and are pointing to a highly indefinite future. They are often interpreted in terms of the long-fashionable 'decline of the West', or the decline of liberalism (Keohane, 2012; Ikenberry, 2011). Without going too much into details (as such question falls beyond the current framework), here a Gramscian interpretation seems better placed. What I referred to in chapter IV/8 as reactionary forces are seen to be working on a counter-hegemony (Worth, 2016), exploiting the possibilities arising from what has widely been interpreted as the failure of neoliberalism, discrediting also liberalism as such, as a medium of governance both in domestic and international terms.

These ambiguous tendencies eroding, transposing, or re-formulating hegemonic discursive structures of (neo)liberalism, are unfolding before our eyes. As Stephen puts it, "a 'new global governance' is materializing that is strongly contested, less universal, less liberal, and more fragmented" (2017:484 and 2014; also Schweller, 2011). Arguably, this has some serious implications in terms of rationality as well. While the study argued that the post-war era was advantageous for the strengthening of global (liberal) governmentality, the current developments show a 'reactionary' turn towards the old statist political rationality in international affairs, manifesting in rampant nationalist and fascist discourses, growing distrust in multilateralism, or rising protectionism globally. While this nascent counter-hegemony strives – on a rhetoric level – to crush the structures of liberal hegemony, this does not mean that they represent something qualitatively 'new' terms of rationality. Rather, we might talk about a new combination of the existing ones,

[71] All the more, as since he has started his mandate, there is an interesting tendency aiming to popularize the Annual Reports, by making them more easily digestible documents, richly illustrated with graphs, pictures and figures organizing the text and the readers' understanding (see especially AR, 2018).

forming a new mutant, merging the authoritarian exercise of power with delicate forms of governance, nationalism with liberalism, etc.

In effect, the strength of Foucault's conception of liberalism – which understands it not as an ideology but the cornerstone of rationality – lies here. As it was pointed out earlier, claiming that politics is conducted under the *ethos* of liberalism does not mean that political actors are professed liberals. His governmentality concept proves useful "in identifying how government is formulated, how it problematizes, what techniques it uses, and so on" (Rose et al., 2006: 97). This idea is intimately linked to what Foucault understood by liberalism, but does not confine its usage to political structures which claim to be one or another form of 'liberal'. The workings of the dichotomous modern political rationalities should thus be imagined as a seesaw: either one or the other form is on the top, but none of them disappears. The shift in political rationality that manifested especially with the post-WW2 wave of international institutionalization lifted global governance out of being an exception in international political thought.

Processes culminated around the end of the Cold War, which, in the euphoric circumstances in the West, was seen as the triumph of not only capitalism and liberal democracies, but also of post-sovereignty tendencies. This breakthrough, however, was present in the analysed sources much more modestly. The texts, as well as the above described forceful reactions – often formulated in a nationalist language in the name of sovereignty – show that with global governance we do not automatically get rid of state sovereignty once and for all, not even on the level of political rationalities. 'Sublation' was used as a concept to make this dynamism clear: the broad interest in the idea and 'mainstreaming' the practice of global governance indeed points at important shifts in political rationality – a shift toward governmentality and its globalization. Modern political rationality, however is more about the dynamic than one or the other form 'winning'. The UN is essentially an organization which both mirrors and reproduces this perfectly.

The above described global tendencies are thus one of the reasons why the analysis stops with the end of Ban's mandate. A basic assumption of the whole study was that the analysed developments unfold under a global liberal hegemony, which, considering the most recent political tendencies, seems for many, to have come to an end. While the

current study does not allow for a deep analysis of this contemporary shift, agreeing with many (Piketty, 2014; Brodie, 2015; Bloom, 2016), I argue that this can be attributed to the neoliberal phase and form of global capitalism – and the fact that what global governance has been, so far, occupied primarily with its management to ensure a smooth functioning. Mentalities and techniques identified as governmentality on the above pages contributed to this, and recent authoritarian/extreme nationalist turns in many parts of the world mean by no means an end of such an approach. The question of how global governmentality would look like under this emerging new era is, however, beyond the reach of this study. What seems important to point out (very briefly) are the renaissance for the reason of the state/sovereignty-centred discourses globally on the one hand, and the fact that the new regimes are by no means hostile towards capitalist structures, on the other hand.

This suggests that such analyses should, ideally, complemented with structuralist ones, asking the extremely important why-type questions as well. Another perspective, neglected in this project would be to examine this story in a genealogical perspective: what were those subjectivities that did not have the opportunity to come forth throughout the analysed decades? Were there historical constellations where alternative subjectivities had the possibility to be voiced, only did not make it? Would these alternatives have comprised elements of a genuinely 'new' political rationality in them? Is such a thing imaginable in the current circumstances? What would be the ideal historical conditions and discursive strategies to talk them into existence? All these questions are fascinating, but way exceed the scope of this project. In the current framework, what is left, apart from pointing in these directions, is to conclude that, as the cognitive and material structures, the basic conditions and limitations of the political rationalities stay intact for now, there is no reason to think that a systemic change of political rationality is on the way. What one may expect is the emergence of yet another innovative combination of modern political rationalities (tilting towards the sovereignty-pillar) and capitalist structures.

4. The UN in the web of modernity

The UN's place in such a system is unclear and the present study does not go into such an analysis. My research did not aim for an assessment of the 'performance' of the UN in the past 70+ years either. Some remarks should, however be made to ensure a proper

understanding of this research in such turbulent times, and also to offer some 'practical' conclusions. The most trivial question that arises is the following: does the fact that the UN is the expression of a hegemonic consensus, practices ambiguous political techniques, or expresses the particular fixity of modern rationality mean that it is ethically condemnable, fakes benevolence or is otherwise normatively problematic? It seems that critical commentators often suggest something similar either implicitly or explicitly. Without having the intention to beat around the bush, answering such questions is not an easy task. It is my firm conviction that the analyst cannot distance herself from the object of her research, neither can she talk from a generally objective position about the social and political phenomena she is embedded in. It should, however be an objective to make any kind of normative assessment on empirical basis. This section will thus lay down some theses based on the results presented in the empirical analysis, and integrate self-reflective points in the conclusion.

The interpretation of the data presented in this study suggests, as it was promised in the Introduction, a critical perspective. Critical, as laid down earlier, can either be understood as a strive towards either a methodological, or a material emancipation. The above analyses showed how the methodological part was carried out, as this research confirmed the relevance of radical constructivist social thought and epistemology in such endeavours. Here, material emancipation means that beyond pointing at the (both cognitive and material) structural problems in global governance and the functioning of the United Nations in this environment, some normative points of orientation are put forward for the amelioration of global governance. The 'global governance work' of the UN has been marked by a long series of reforms. The motive of 'necessary' adjustments, averting obstacles from the way of proper functioning, enabling the idea to become reality has been a constant in such experiments. Subtracting 'reality' from the equation is, as suggested, a recurrent theme in many manifestations of liberal rationalities: it prevails in the economic theory of free markets and free trade, the political philosophy of freedom and justice, as well as the theories of global governance. It exemplifies the Mannheimian

utopia (1936) which is never reached but is there to provide justification for the adjustments[72].

At one point, however, it should be faced that global governance will not reach its rosy goals (confirmed over and over again since at least the CGG's report) until it does not step out of the box in which it was conceived as an idea, namely the box of modernity. This latter's specificity, as described in the Introduction, is the historically contingent way in which highly hierarchic private and public structures fuse, reproducing violence, inequalities, social tension and destructive competition through a combination of coercive and consensual means, and preventing systemic change from happening. The modern state and capitalism have been providing both the cognitive and material basis of social life in the past centuries, limiting political imagination and action, and either leaving room only for superficial institutional reforms, or leaving core problems entirely invisible. Thus, following the lines of critique advanced by this study, one should reflect more on „the effect that the knowledge we produce on language has under current political-economic conditions, how our knowledge both is conditioned by and structures our society, and how it particularly contributes to nourish and authorize those ideological formations that create conditions that allow forms of social difference and inequality to be viewed as natural and thus to become invisible" (Del Percio et al., 2017:70).

Being mindful of the interlinkages between cognitive and structural conditions enabling and reinforcing persistent global problems is thus the first step towards a global governance that benefits all. Following this logic, the second step of course would be to take radical action challenging the state and capitalism as the 'natural' frames of human existence. Thomas Kuhn showed illustriously the commonalities in the dynamics of cognitive and 'actual' revolutions; his insights worth to be cited here in some length to close this line of thought and the whole project:

> "Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased

[72] An interesting case is presented in a similar vein by Christopher Holmes, analysing Karl Polanyi's 'double movement' as a discourse of transcendence, in which a true transcendence is impossible. In this case, he finds that „problematisation places a double-limit upon the ways in which 'solutions' can be presented", making the question of double movement a never-ending story, to be recited over and over again (2012: 273). This opens up a further interesting way to look at global governance, which, however, will not be elaborated in the present project.

> adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created (...) In both political and scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution (…) Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit. Their success therefore necessitates the partial relinquishment of one set of institutions in favor of another, and in the interim, society is not fully governed by institutions at all. Initially it is crisis alone that attenuates the role of political institutions as we have already seen it attenuate the role of paradigms. (…) At that point the society is divided into competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to institute some new one (Kuhn, 1996:92-93).

The UN is of course not designed to be a revolutionary force, quite the contrary. This fact – that it is designed and destined to be the guardian of the *status quo* – makes it inappropriate to solve global problems it is set out to solve. The point should thus not be the normative condemnation of the Organization as a source of global governmentality and an evil executor of an inter- and transnational hegemonic historical bloc. Rather, as this study also did, we should try to understand how it is embedded in and tied to the structures/ideas of global governance, and political rationalities.

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Appendix 1.

List and description of categories for self-definition

Agency

The category covers those textual occurrences which touch upon the UN's agential capacity in global affairs. They talk about a variety of engagements from the part of the Organization and depict it as a unique institution in world politics. Being a front-runner in international diplomacy and politics, a champion for various issues, protector and promoter of rights, peace and other principles of the Charter are represented under this category. Importantly, this main category includes occurrences with both positive and negative connotation, in the first case largely affirming agency, while in the second denying it or depicting it as being impeded.

Agent: In this sub-category, the UN appears as an active agent of global affairs. Involvement, engagement, commitment, effort and responsibility are highlighted on the part of the Organization in various fields of action, ranging from political to humanitarian issues.

- **Champion**: As a variant of the category of 'agent', this label represents those cases where the UN appears as more than an agent: a fierce representative, a natural protector of rights, predominantly in relation to those groups and peoples who lack voice, influence or proper means for fighting for their interests, and in relation to peace.
- **Capable**: The UN is described as being uniquely positioned to perform certain tasks in world politics. The emphasis is less on its agency and more on its unique position to act.

Institution: A descriptive category, when used, referring to the UN as a responsible international body. Its place it in this category is justified by it presenting the UN as a unity, a confinable entity in world politics.

Acted upon (+/-): In this set, positive and negative variants are separated. What is common in both is treating the UN as a unified actor, although exposed to other actor's (MS's) actions. The positive variant highlights competencies of the UN as acquired through its constituents (and not by own agency or by the law of nature), while the negative one emphasizes the Organizations exposure to external effects, such as conflict among Members, intractability of certain international problems, or inherent structural limitations of the Organization.

Frustrated: Refers to occurrences where the (predominantly financial) frustration of the organization is being pointed out, along with its negative effects on agency. It differs from a negative 'acted upon' category mostly in emphasis, as here no definite subject is accountable for the situation, only the situation itself is voiced.

Influence

This broad label groups together representations that depict the UN as a strong and influential institution.

Strong: The UN is represented as an entity of relative strength – to overcome difficulties or engaging in its duties. Strength is not elaborated and is often used in an abstract way.

Popular: The Organization is represented as something that is present in public discussions and that is popular (or at least recognized) across the wider public.

Influencer: Apart from using 'strength', this is the furthest the texts go in talking about the power of the UN. Influence is primarily a normative influence and is used to advance the principles of the Charter.

Central: This category compiles those occurrences which depict global political affairs in their complexity, while claiming a central place for the UN in the hub of relations and progressive endeavours.

Normativity

This broad category covers those occurrences where the UN appears as a value and an achievement itself or is described with progressive terms as a unique entity. Values that are understood as progressive are largely those included in the Charter and in these instances the UN sees itself as a depository and guarantor of these.

Normative value: The UN in itself represents a normative value – sometimes specified, sometimes stated in general as such. When specified, it is most often its value that is being demonstrated in terms of peace, but other Charter values are also present, such as welfare, civilization, and freedom. The UN as a normative value means a model, a sense, an ideal that could be reached only through the institution, which is, although not perfect, the best one available for humankind.

- **Utopian**: As a subcategory of the UN as a normative value, this representation is even more high-toned in emphasizing the Organization's normative merit.
- **Symbolic**: The UN is explicitly represented as a symbol of the normative values described above.
- **Necessary**: Essentiality and necessity of the UN are put forward in these statements. Occasionally even a naturalness or historical inevitability of the development of the Organization is explicitly expressed.

Caring: This category is used for those cases where the text discusses specific international issues where the UN has – or claims to have – a specific concern. The concern is usually based on humanitarian grounds or matters of peace.

Universal: (Close-to) universality of the Organization is presented as a value and representative legitimation.

- **Collective**: Talks about Members' collective (financial) responsibility and humanity's common needs.

Unique: The UN is represented either as simply unique, or a unique agent or instrument in world politics. Uniqueness is thus seen as a capacity. Often it is based on universality, as described above, or the comprehensive nature of its mandate.

Visionary: These representations look in the future: they talk about and analyse change, the world order of the future, and utter the Organization's long-term efforts and plans for itself, being part and catalyst of transformation. Visionary statements about life or death choices, future ambitions and occurrences for an expansive view about its own role are grouped together in this category.

Criticism

This broad category includes both external and self-criticism. While it is also true that forms of criticism appear differently in these cases, as elaborated in the subcategories.

Criticized: A general category, when criticism is not specified as follows.

- **Imperfect**: Admitting 'imperfection' if a form of self-criticism. Limitations and structural constraints are presented as such, with a touch of euphemism.
- **Marginal**: Being on the side-line of international affairs appear both as self-criticism and as an outside perception. Usually comes up in hard issues of power politics.
- **Weak**: Lacking authority or the enforcement power is the central issue in this sort of criticism. It can come either from the outside or the inside.

Misunderstood: Referring to criticism based on unrealistic demands, demands which would ask more from the Organization that is within its competency as per the Charter. It is not communicated in the same way as 'relevant' criticism as its grounds are not justified.

Overcompetent: This criticism appears without exception in a negative form, affirming that the UN *is not* claiming competence over other actors' competencies. It is also applied for those cases where the text emphasizes that it *is not* the only forum, body, or instrument to use for different purposes.

- **Obstacle for states**: It is not a separate category, because while it also appears in positive forms – contrary to the previous form of criticism – in those cases exclusively as coming from the outside, usually from MSs. The UN in these accounts represents an institutional barrier for nationalist/purely interest-driven politics.

Character

These representations are important in the definition of the Organization's character. It is based on the important features, be them either positive, negative or neutral in the given context. Some of these questions are discussed elsewhere in this study, as they are presumed to be important points of identification.

Political: References being made to the UN as a primarily political institution. In these cases, it appears as a rather neutral adjective, admitting this specificity similarly to a starting point.

Global: Referring to the UN as a global institution lacks the normative substance attached to similar claims grasped with the notion of universality. Contrary to this latter, this category contains descriptive claims.

Dynamic: The UN is represented as a dynamic institution, changing, evolving, developing with time, showing different features as 'maturing'. Contains also simple statements stating the age of the organization.

Intergovernmental: This category contains claims that enforce the intergovernmental character of the Organization, as opposed to an independent agency. The UN is the sum of its Members, its bodies and decisions represent their will and nothing more.

Constructive: Being a constructive force in world affairs is a characteristic of the Organization. It means an attitude in debates and decision-making.

Complex: This category contains representations describing the multiplicity of tasks, bodies and Members as part of a complex system that should not be reduced in any way.

Professional: It is applied to those occurrences which stress the functional separation of bodies, functions and priorities within the Organization as descriptive elements of its structure.

Merit rating (+/-): This label includes both positive and negative adjectives applied to the Organization, that cannot be linked to any other specific category.

Role

As for the functions of the United Nations, the texts separate three main categories, representing also the Role of the Organization: a mediator, an instrument or a platform of MSs. Apart from these, this broad category also includes representations of the UN as a basis and depository of knowledge or as being able/unable to function properly. Some deliberate questions regarding self-definition and accounts of the genesis of the Organization are also grouped under this category, talking about the true nature and functions of the UN.

Mediator: In line with its commitment to peace, these occurrences represent the UN as an important actor in conciliation, peaceful conflict resolution and the containment of conflicts, and also in prevention and crisis management. It is important that the UN being the only such actor is not implied in these accounts.

Platform: According to another understanding, the UN should be seen primarily as a meeting ground, a forum, a place for discussion and negotiation among Members. In this view, the Organization is similar to a perpetual diplomatic conference, the embodiment of multilateralism.

- **Centre for harmonizing**: A subcategory of the UN being a platform, it is a centre for harmonizing actions and interests, of integrating harmonizing efforts, primarily of nations.

Instrumental: In this representation, the UN appears as an instrument, pre-eminently in the hands of the MSs. As a machinery, it can then serve different purposes, ranging from cooperation, negotiation or mediation to distributing aid, conflict resolution, human development and economic management. Apart from being a tool to serve Governments, it is also in the service of the international community. Instances, where the texts emphasize that the UN is not an end itself, only the means are also put under this label. It also contains normative types of occurrences where it is the instrument of survival, hope and change for the future.

- **More than instrumental**: Occurrences stressing that the Organization is much more than an instrument also appear here in a sub-category.

Knowledge base: Another version of the Role of the UN theme is to represent it as a place where information and intellectual resources might be found, research and analysis might be properly made.

Genesis: An important discursive strategy throughout the decades is to reach back to the origins, the genesis of the United Nations. Sometimes it is only referenced as such, in general, more often it is tied to one or more of the founders' original ideas, like peace and war, cooperation and conflict resolution, creating a platform and an instrument, reacting to a changing world or having a vision about it. What links these together is the reference to the founding in the self-narrated history of the Organization.

Self-definition: The occurrences grouped here are mostly rhetorical questions about the role, preferable activities or place of the UN, although in some cases direct self-definition questions appear also in indicative.

Functional (+/-): This category equally includes positive and negative claims of efficiency. Functionality is used instead of efficiency to suggest that efficiency, in these accounts, appears as a necessity not a possibility for the Organization. Negative statements highlight that when functioning ineffectively, the UN loses from its basic functionality. It should also be distinguished from instrumentality: although they often appear together, statements in this category emphasize the effectiveness, preparedness, capacity of the UN as an instrument in the hands of MSs.

Appendix 2.

List and descriptions of categories for agency construction

Positive action

Arguably the most important main category, comprising of several categories and sub-categories. 'Positive' does not refer to a normative judgement but to the nature of action: those verbs are grouped under this label which express that the Organization is engaging in proactive actions, making actual efforts, either reacting or contributing to others', developing its own ways, acting with authority and independence, or successfully accomplishing tasks that are required of it. Occurrences in this main category point in a certain direction through action, have effects on world events, shape the agenda or respond to solicitation of other actors. Positive action is the action of an independent organization, with its own goals, means, potentials and agenda, which makes this main category especially important from the point of view of agency construction.

Action: This category is a general one, grouping occurrences which describe action with no specific content or direction, merely assessing that they take place.

- **Act**: Any kind of general action (expressed, for example with the verb 'does', 'deal', or 'carry out') is labelled with 'act'. It also serves as an 'other' category for those verbs which could not be further specified.
- **Make efforts**: Brings together those occurrences which are stronger than a mere action, but are still not further specified. Typical verbs are 'make efforts' or 'take steps'.
- **Strive**: This sub-category groups together verbs that are stronger than making effort. These occurrences describe an endeavour on the part of the UN, a struggle to reach an end which is otherwise unspecified.

Contribution: Actions in this category represent those instances where the UN is an actor, but not the primary one. Its contribution is chiefly complementary, aiming to support, facilitate other actors or provide help in situations that occur. Mediation or providing assistance to emerging and developing states are frequent examples of such activity.

- **Assist**: One of the most frequent labels (and also actual verbs), expressing the Organization's readiness to offer its assistance in various situations, ranging from mediation between great powers or decolonization efforts of dependent territories to providing technical assistance or expertise in various policy areas.
- **Contribute**: This category includes cases of undefined forms of input by the Organization. Making a difference, playing a part, making a contribution are understood to belong under this category.
- **Help**: The verb to help has a slightly different meaning than the other forms of assistance, expressing benignity behind the action. Every occurrence under with this label uses 'help' directly.

- **Mediate**: It is used for occurrences where a search for a peaceful solution, negotiation in relation to conflicts or reconciliation is at stake and the UN participates in the efforts.
- **Play an important role**: This sub-category is used for those cases where the UN is not pictured as a central actor, but one that deserves special attention, in relation to various issues.
- **Provide**: Being a provider of various things is the most frequently used description of the UN's activities. It can provide, among others resources, a platform for negotiation, possibilities of action, its structures or institutions for a range of other actors in world politics.
- **Support**: This category mostly includes instances where the verb 'support' is used directly one the one hand and where it means sponsorship also in financial terms.

Harmonizing action: Occurrences under this label describe an action which aims at the orchestration of others' actions, enabling discussion and consensus, and playing an intermediary role.

- **Convene**: Convening meetings, panels, conferences is an important task and activity of the UN. Mostly it is described with this word and even if not, the essence is the same.
- **Coordinate**: These verbs emphasize the UN's intermediary role in facilitating communication and work between different actors, often including itself. NGOs, regional organizations, private actors and MSs are supported in finding each other, communicating and forging partnerships.

Targeted action: Actions in this category have a definite direction, they point at something, like universality, or express a movement toward a certain end.

- **Progress:** A rather general label that is used in those cases where a mere 'action' is not expressive enough, as it has a direction coded into it (for example achieving a certain quality or making progress in a conflict situation towards peace).
- **Become universal**: This category contains those instances where becoming a universal organization is emphasised – celebrated, stated or promoted.
- **Promote**: As an action type it is used in those cases where the UN is acting to popularize or encourage certain processes, issues or ideas in global politics.

Reaction: This type of action brings together those sub-categories which express a positive, but reactive form of action on the part of the Organization.

- **Respond**: Responding means in this context those actions which would not have happened unless the situation required them. The situation can be a natural disaster, the emergence of new problems and challenges, or unspecified demands.
- **Solicited to act**: This category is only applied where the UN is expressly asked to act or intervene, most often by governments and in relation to territorially specific problems.

Strong action: This category groups together those cases where action is described in the most forceful way. In these cases, the UN seems to be a proactive, independent agent in

world politics, shaping the agenda, acting with authority, taking on new responsibilities, initiating policies and acting as a champion for the rights of the oppressed. This is, in itself the strongest sub-category, which makes it central to the analysis.

- **Act effectively**: Action is specified by the quality of effectiveness in this category.
- **Act with authority**: Exerting strength and influence through its action appears in a separate sub-category. It is often employed in relation to conflict situations.
- **Act with independence**: This is probably the strongest qualification regarding action and not surprisingly it is not employed often. It is only used in one case, where the word 'independence' is directly used. It deserves a separate code because of the focus of this study.
- **Assume responsibility**: Verbs in this category describe cases where the UN takes on a new responsibility, meaning the broadening of its competencies.
- **Champion**: The Organization is depicted as the protector of rights and supporter of the weak, acting for their sake and speaking up for them in the world political stage. In case it is employed, the activity described is a highly normative one.
- **Confront**: This category covers those cases where the UN faces challenging situations or looks in the future in a determined fashion.
- **Define**: In these strong representations the Organization is depicted as providing authoritative definitions for new norms, setting priorities for the world community, and defining policies and guidelines for states to follow.
- **Develop**: Somewhat similarly to the previous case, the UN takes the lead in elaborating different techniques, structures, provisions, capacities and rules for the benefit of the world community.
- **Engage**: This category describes an active involvement of the UN in various issues. Engagement also holds the meaning of a moral practice, not a 'simple' action.
- **Evolve**: When this label is employed, the SG elaborates on the evolution of the Organization, describing how it has grown through time, and developed new competencies, responsibilities and capacities for action.
- **Initiate**: This is the category that describes most clearly the proactivity of the UN. It is used when it takes the initiative on crucial issues.
- **Launch**: It is more than initiating, in these cases the UN takes up the respective projects and launches them. It is also often used in relation to peace-keeping missions and different campaigns.
- **Lead**: In the cases described with 'lead', the Organization assumes/provide leadership on certain issues, usually guiding humanity towards a brighter future.
- **Play a central role**: Compared to playing an important role, it is a stronger representation: being the main, and indeed indispensable actor is described (in most of the cases literally) with the verbs with this label.
- **Prevent**: Preventive action on the part of the Organization is featured with this label.
- **Shape**: Those instances are put in this category where the UN puts certain things on the global agenda, shaping – or attempting to shape – priorities, or influence the behaviour of international actors worldwide.

- **Strengthen**: These occurrences talk about the strengthening of the Organization: the UN is expected or has the potential to grow and emerge strengthened out of difficult situations.
- **Supervise**: It means more than supporting or assisting, meaning a forceful action where the UN seems to have some authority. It is usually used in relation to truces, elections, or situations endangering human rights.
- **Validate**: Verification of certain measures is a prerogative of the Organization. It is used in cases where it has the authority to accept something as valid, be it valid knowledge or any kind of compliance.

Successful action: This category covers those cases where action is completed: issues are solved, conflicts ended, functions of the Organization fulfilled. This category is especially important from the point of view of the main goal of the ARs, assessing accomplishments for the year in question.

- **Fulfil its function**: Being aware of its own responsibilities and the limits of its mandates, this category groups together those instances where responsibilities are met and mandates accomplished by the UN.
- **Solve**: Solving certain problems in general is labelled with this category, covering verbs such as resolve, deal, or cope.
- **Accomplish**: It differs from fulfilling the function only in the fact that representations in this category do not refer to any specific or general mandate. They account for achievements and accomplishments of the Organization.
- **Succeed**: Having success or succeeding described as such directly are put under this category.
- **End**: Ending certain processes is labelled as such, typically talking about wars and colonialism.

Abstract action

This main category includes representations describing indirect forms of action, expressed with verbs. They describe either capacities, acts of showing certain qualities, and similar actions effectuated by the Organization without positive action being made. These are, however, important parts of agency as they show those cases where the UN has already achieved a stage in its development where it can ‘represent’ or ‘demonstrate’ certain qualities, ‘has power’ or ‘has capacities’ to do something, or keeps its already existent integrity in its actions.

Attract: These representations describe the UN’s relationship to the wider public. They show how the Organization captures the imagination of people and the media, how it inspires and retains trust, how it is able to build support for its actions, although it often appears with negative auxiliary verbs.

Dispose: This category contains expressions of possessions: various things, such as resources, powers, capacities, experience, or perspectives can be at its disposal, adding to its influence and overall agency.

- **Dispose**: This sub-category covers those instances where the object is not specified.
- **Has power**: Having authority or even power, when formulated directly as such pertains to this sub-category.
- **Has capacities**: Capacities appear in various forms: it can mean material and financial capacities, but also immaterial ones such as expertise or experience or legitimacy.
- **Has responsibility**: This category is put under 'Abstract action' because it talks about responsibility which is not acquired but already existing (or in certain cases does not exist) in the Organization, without question or need for justification. Often these descriptions appear in relation to specific conflicts of issues on the global agenda.

Keep integrity: Actions in this category stress that the UN acts in accordance with its values, principles and the goals it was created to work for. According to these instances, its integrity must always enjoy priority while making decisions and engaging in action.

Receive: These occurrences describe the passive act of receiving, primarily financial, but also other support from its Members.

Rejoice: This category describes emotive action on part of the Organization. Pride, gratitude, and appreciation is 'felt' by the UN as it looks back upon its achievements of celebrates anniversaries.

Represent: Being the strongest representation in this main category, the fact that the UN represents or demonstrates certain values or qualities is put forward in these occurrences. It also mirrors the state of global affairs and the variety of its MSs. Reflect, show, demonstrate, embody, display and symbolize are among the actual verbs categorized as such.

Negative action

Verbs under this main category talk about the UN's failures: when it falls back, depends on others, or lacks certain things required for action. The fact that it is the weakest representation in terms of frequency shows that this is not something very often discussed in a direct form in the Introductions, however it is important to show that self-critique is also a part of self-definition.

Depend: These instances describe situations in which the UN is in need of its MSs, of NGOs, or on a more abstract level accurate leadership, resources, or other forms of support. Its dependence on such things represent an anti-thesis of independent agency.

Fail: Being the opposite of 'Successful action', this category accounts for the failures of the UN: how it is unable to meet the requirements and demands, achieve Charter objectives or simply achieve results.

Ignore: When the Organization is unresponsive, inactive, or refuses to consider certain issues, this category is applied.

Impose: This is a strong type of action, but with a negative connotation, which latter justifies its place in this main category. It always appears, however in negation: the UN cannot, should not, did not etc. impose itself on a situation or compromise state sovereignty in any sense.

Lack: This category is the opposite of 'Dispose' in a sense that it talks about all the things the UN does not possess but would be important to perform action: reserves, agreement among its Members, sovereignty, or means of action.

Yield: Described without exception in negative terms, this rare category describes the UN yielding its principles or abandoning its projects.

Neutral action

With this main category those instances are grouped which express the UN engaging in action which seems value-free and neutral in intent. Of course, speaking, allowing things to happen, or considering certain issues are not power-neutral acts, but since it was principally the meaning which determined categorization, they were labelled as such. Here also, it was the context of the verbs which played a role in putting occurrences in this main category, as examples of descriptive textual parts as the following categories would show.

Allow: In these examples (which are without exception formulated in negative terms), the UN's action is vague but definite, describing situations that the Organization did not tolerate or allow certain things to occur, but the concrete counter-action is not pronounced.

Consider: It describes those cases where the UN took interest in certain developments, considered issues or developed concern in conflicts or other events. The descriptions are 'neutral' to the extent that they stop at denoting these actions and do not elaborate on them further.

Exist: This category is used when the existence of the UN is simply declared or references to its age are made.

Maintain: These actions express that the UN carries on with its previously developed activities: sustains peace-keeping operations, continues its activities, or maintains peace without any further specification.

Operate: In this category, the mere functioning of the organization is described. Often these occurrences are tied to the Organization's finances.

Research: Occurrences in which the UN studies phenomena, accumulates knowledge and information, and conduct research are put into this category. While such action is not neutral from the point of view of power, it is categorized as such based on the formulations and the textual context.

Speak: This category describes those instances where the UN as such simply speaks (up) in certain cases, without suggesting any normative substance, like it is the case in many instances of representation.

Use: When the texts talk about that the UN uses, utilizes, or employs certain tools, means and resources, this category is applied.

Appendix 3.

'Global' referents in the Introductions to the Annual Reports

1951	significance							
1956	studies							
1958	organs							
1960	approach							
1962	effort	effort	war	issues				
1965	relations	importance						
1966	needs	needs	operations					
1967	nuclear war	approach						
1968	strategy	strategy for development	strategy	strategy for development	concept of international security			
1969	problems	military expenditures	disarmament	trade	partnership			
1970	framework	strategy	strategy	strategy for development	problems	strategy		
1971	issues	scale	endeavor	automatic telephone network	issues	services	problems	organization
	research	development goals	meeting	civilization	scale	requirements		
1972	basis	aims	Organization	dangers				
1973	nature	cooperation	problems	challenges	problem	problems	problems	development effort
	problems	goals						
1974	problems	problems	society	approach	crisis	economy	society	
1975	conflict	society	level	expenditures	political stability	problems	undertaking	concern
1976	items	problems	problems	subjects	task			
1977	problems	crisis	responsibility	(art of global) management	problem			
1978	organization	order	economic opportunities	objectives	concerns			
1979	basis	issues	problems	level	issues	disasters	civilization	interests
	scale	priorities	problems					
1980	war	nuclear Powers	problems	negotiations	negotiations	negotiations	management	concern
	issues	institution						
1981	economic solutions	problems	ailment	negotiations	problems			
1982	agony	catastrophe	negotiations					

1984	conflict	problems	economic relations	negotiations	level	issues	consciousness	economy
	policy-makers	war						
1985	level	problems	stage	conflagration	devastating effects	adjustment	nature of problems	problems
	conferences	conference	undertaking	source of advise	society			
1986	development	problems	problems	peace	development	economy	basis	development
	perspective	conference	enforcement capability	change	problems	economic and social problems	constituency	development
	advantage							
1987	implications	challenges	environment	problems	vessel	threat	economy	economy
	problems	programmes	priorities	problems	problems	challenges	threats	problems
	threats	problems	mission					
1988	level	power	economic imperatives	concerns	problems	level	interdependence	powers
	levels	climate of distrust	war and peace	issues	problems	solutions	initiatives	AIDS initiative
	convention	level	society	goals	ethic			
1989	watch	stability and peace	situation	society	war or peace	political climate	society	warming
	documents	effort	society	tranquillity	war	environment	social strategy	
1990	significance	Powers	order	society	community	concern for human rights	watch	level
	agenda	tensions	order of peace	economic problems	economy	response	economy	economy
	social strategy	population	society	hegemonies	situation	security	approach and action	programme of action
1991	scene	problems	watch	level	community	economy	problems	challenges
	society	social strategy	problems	society	conditions	strategies	attack	
1992	problems							
1993	environment	challenge	society	integration	change	organizations	convening power	security and stability
	organizations							

1994	consensus	newtowk of field offices	commerce	context	consensus			
1995	nuclear catalcysm	economy	change	conferences	conferences			
1996	environment	institution	environment	conferences	consensus	issues	problems	attention
	problems	conferences	issues					
1997	public goods	capital flows	financial resources	economy	factory	environmental interdependencies	civil society	networks of "uncivil society"
1998	hearings and seminars	town meetings	civil society	citizenship and responsibility	arena	people power	village	
1999	media	warfare	warming	warming	economy	corporations	level	
2000	markets	economy	economy	institutions	economic transactions	economic environment	governance	affairs
	warming	partnerships	[Global] Compact	[Global] Compact	[Global] Compact	policy networks	agendas	
2001	cooperation	level	trends	responsibilities	partnerships			
2002	threat of terrorism	problems	solutions	problems	peace			
2003	coalition	disarmament						
2004	leadership	partnership	action	civil society				
2005	mission	effort	outpouring of solidarity and generosity					
2006	constituencies	service provider	constituencies	business	civil society	responsibility		
2007	peace and security	population of refugees	commons	legacy	challenge	action		
2008	community	challenges	goods	goods	threats	health	scale	threats
2009	landscape	communication	developments	public goods	health	goods issues	multilateral architecture	reach
	changes							
2010	economic depression	recovery	political leadership	public goods	challenges	effort		
2011	shocks	growth	challenges	transition	efforts	challenges	health	strategies
2012	community	threats	convening power	supply chains				
2014	sustainable development agenda	warming	mean temperature	crises				
2015	work	conflict						
2016	operations	landscape	community	repercussions	institutions	affairs	poverty	coalition
	action	record	partnerships	humanitarian system	solidarity	organization	stage	challenges
	agenda	response	level					

Appendix 4.

Tables and figures referenced in the study



FIGURE 1. *Analytical foci of contributions to International Organization.*
Source. International Organization, 1947–84.

Reference 1. The results of Kratochwil and Ruggie's inquiry. Source: Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986.

Table 13.1 *The requirements of global governance*

	Material capability	**Knowledge**
Legitimacy	Authority	Epistemic validity
Fairness	Good practices	Practical reason

Reference 2. The epistemic requirements of global governance according to Adler and Bernstein. Source: Adler and Bernstein, 2005.

Table 1. Theoretical and Analytical Dimensions Related to Agency in Discourse Analysis Approaches

	Foucault	Discourse Theory	Argumentative Discourse Analysis	Discursive Institutionalism	Critical Discourse Analysis	Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse
Relation between structures and actors	Trialectic agency (as capability to act socially), constrained and enabled by structures (i.e., discourses, institutional settings, immediate contexts of communication), and interpreted by a researcher					
Concept of agency	Being subjectivized through discourses, but also observing or judging subjects (i.e., in science and law) and subjectivizing oneself (employing specific technologies of the self)	Articulation (all social practices) determined by discourses as expression of agency, agency arising from the necessity to decide in situations of undecidedness (over-determined subject)	Being subjectivized by dominant story lines, imposing own ideas on others predominantly through story lines	Being subjectivized through background discursive abilities, use of foreground discursive abilities to change institutions	Being subjectivized by dominant discourses/ideologies, manipulating language use in order to create power imbalances; revealing power imbalances through analysis	Subjectivizing oneself; referring to oneself with an outside perspective, intervening in discourses through speaker positions

Reference 3. Approaching agency in discourse analysis. Source: Leipold and Winkel, 2017. Table refashioned according to relevance.

Appendix 5.

List of Reports of the Secretary-General ont he Work of the Organization – Introductions

Year	Secretary-General	Introduction length
1946	Trygve Lie	4
1947		2
1948		10
1949		7
1950		6
1951		7
1952		5
1953	Dag Hammarskjöld	5
1954		5
1955		6
1956		8
1957		7
1958		6
1959		10
1960		8
1961		8
1962	U Thant	5
1963		7
1964		11
1965		12
1966		14
1967		21
1968		23
1969		24
1970		22
1971		43
1972	Kurt Waldheim	6
1973		8
1974		9
1975		11
1976		11
1977		10
1978		11
1979		12
1980		12
1981		12

Year	Secretary-General	Introduction length
1982	Javier Pérez de Cuéllar	4
1983		6
1984		6
1985		7
1986		8
1987		9
1988		10
1989		13
1990		17
1991		11
1992	Boutros Boutros-Ghali	1
1993		3
1994		2
1995		4
1996		4
1997	Kofi Annan	4
1998		2
1999		7
2000		3
2001		2
2002		1
2003		2
2004		2
2005		2
2006	Ban Ki-moon	3
2007		2
2008		2
2009		2
2010		2
2011		1
2012		2
2013		2
2014		3
2015		2
2016		5