SUMMARY

Rudolf Tamás Metz

Three Faces of Political Leadership
Possible Interpretations and Practices for Leadership in Democracy

Ph.D. dissertation

Supervisors:
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Andrés Körösényi DSc

Budapest, 2018
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Table of contents

1. Framework of the research ............................................................................................................4
  1.1. Research problem ..................................................................................................................4
  1.2. Hypothesis ............................................................................................................................5

2. Methodological framework ..........................................................................................................7

3. Main findings ................................................................................................................................12
  3.1. Democratic leadership in theory: the typology of democratic leadership .........................12
  3.2. Democratic leadership in practice ........................................................................................17
    3.2.1. Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’s leadership during the refugee/migration crisis ... 17
    3.2.1. Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership between the Brexit referendum and the
genral election.................................................................................................................................21

References .........................................................................................................................................25

The author’s publications ..................................................................................................................29

List of tables

Table 1: Template for analysis ...........................................................................................................8
Table 2: Dimensions of empirical analysis and their relations to the elements of theoretical leadership
constructs ...........................................................................................................................................9
Table 3: Focal points of empirical analysis .......................................................................................10
Table 4: Three concepts of democracy ...............................................................................................12
Table 5: Typology of democratic leadership .....................................................................................14
Table 6: Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’s leadership ...................................................................20
Table 7: Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership ...................................................................24

Note: Tables in this summary of Ph.D. thesis are the author's own work.
1. Framework of the research

One of the biggest conundrums in political science – more specifically in political leadership studies – is the theoretical and practical tension between democracy and leadership as the growing discourse and interest in the literature demonstrates. This conflict within democratic leadership cannot be understood simply as a theoretical polemic. In fact, political events draw attention to this tension in practice over and over again by raising and reinforcing the fear of leadership (“Not my President”) and even desire (“Yes we can”, “Wir schaffen das”, “Stable and strong leadership”) for (strong) leaders. In other words: we face here a problem, which goes beyond an apparent theoretical discrepancy. It defines the actual course and content of (democratic) leadership as well as the relationship between leaders and followers. Based on this consideration, the research is strongly problem-driven (Shapiro 2005). I aim to investigate and dissolve the theoretical and practical problem of democratic leadership by connecting theories of democracy and leadership.

1.1. Research problem

Democratic leadership is usually seen as an oxymoron or a paradox (Beerbohm 2015; Kane and Patapan 2012; Keohane 2010, 155–193, 2016; Ruscio 2008; Teles 2012). Seemingly the ideal of democracy does not tolerate the practice of leadership, since our concept of democracy is usually tied to the ethos of self-governance, sovereignty, and equality, while (political) leadership often appears in our mind as a unilateral power relation, hierarchy, and manipulation. It’s clear: such strong leadership could only weaken democracy.

However, the problem of democratic leadership is not new for political theory (ambiguity of leadership: Dahl 1961; ambivalence of executive power: Mansfield 1989), it is surrounded by strong suspicion and fear, so it appears rarely in the theoretical discourse (Kane and Patapan 2012, pp. 10–30.; Ruscio 2008, p. ix). This fear can be approached from two sides. On the one hand, the fear of abusing power can be a satisfactory and legitimate justification for democratic forms of government, institutions and procedures. Hence, it seems necessary to limit leadership by certain principles and institutional arrangements and by maintaining a permanent requirement for legitimation and justification. On the other hand, it also means a serious threat, if practice of popular sovereignty, institutional veto players, distribution of power and checks and balances entirely undermine leadership and governance. In other words: it could become difficult or impossible for leaders to achieve the goals desired by the majority of voters. Therefore, democratic leadership must have a great influence and power and serve others’ will.
at the same time. Democratic leadership is both strong and weak, since power is granted to the leaders to achieve their and their followers’ goals and even limited by the constant need for legitimation and justification (Kane and Patapan 2012; Keohane 2010, pp. 155-93).

So this tension can and have to be negotiated and managed by leaders, as many researchers claimed (Beerbohm 2015; Kane and Patapan 2012, 2014; Kane, Patapan, and ’t Hart 2009; Keohane 2010, pp. 155–93; 2016; Körösényi 2005; Metz 2017a; Ruscio 2008; Teles 2012, 2015; E. T. Weber 2010; Wren 2007), but is never resolved completely and ever after. Thus, the question is not whether leadership is necessary for the functioning of democracy, but what form of leadership can be compatible with the idea of democracy. Our answer to this question strongly depends on what kind of democracy we want to defend and realize (Ruscio 2008, pp. 4–6). According to the literature, the contradiction seems to be resolvable, if the concept of leadership and democracy is properly tailored to each other (Beerbohm 2015, p. 639; Metz 2017). Briefly, the literature has drawn up clearly: rightly understood concepts of democracy and leadership are reconcilable.

1.2. Hypothesis

Following J. Thomas Wren’s work (2007), I assume that the concepts of democracy and leadership as social and historical constructs are related. Moreover, they are not just reconcilable, but also depend on each other. To be more provocative: there is no democracy without (rightly understood) leadership, and vica versa.

Wren (2007, pp. xii; 3; 132) argues that leadership is a new mode for arranging social relations and determining who should belong to the few who lead the many. In this sense, we can draw up a parallel between democracy and leadership. “If democracy is ‘a unique system for organizing relations between rulers and the ruled’[Schmitter and Karl 1991, pp. 76–77], and leadership is ‘an influence relation among leaders and followers that facilitates the accomplishment of group or societal objectives’, the leadership process in a democracy might be viewed as simply democracy at work.” (Wren 2007, p. 2) In the concept of leadership, the focus shifts from the leaders to all members of the polity suggesting that this ongoing process is based on mutual influence. From this perspective, the tension within democratic leadership is seemingly fading away. Moreover, leadership as the practice of democracy gives meaning to democratic politics by creating its own democratic reality and fulfilling the obligations of legitimization and justification. In some way, this process outlines what the “good” (effective or/and ethical) leadership and the “right” relationship between leaders and followers should be
like. Thus leadership – regardless of its actual content and direction – contributes to the process of democratic politics.

The conceptual and practical interdependence is strengthened by the fact that both democracy and leadership are essentially contested (Gallie 1955; Grint 2005a, pp. 17–19). These concepts are surrounded by endless debates on correct use of them, in which various definitions¹ rival and compete with each other. Such concepts are very complex and so they can be captured in different ways. Their contents are open to periodical revisions, which strongly depend on the social and historical context. The stake of the debate is whether democratic leadership as an “universal idol concept” – borrowing the concept of Koselleck and his colleagues (“allumfassenden Idolbegriff”: Brunner, Conze, and Koselleck 1997, pp. 897–98) – embodies the best form of governance and political system.

My hypothesis is based on three presuppositions. Firstly, despite the conceptual diversity, leadership has a stable denotation (Ciulla 2014b, pp. 12–16). So, it cannot be detached from the mutual influence, relationship and interactions between the leaders and the followers. Secondly, leadership as an action cannot be identified simply as headship, statesmanship, formal authority (Edinger 1975, pp. 255–56; J. W. Gardner 1990, pp. 2–3; Heifetz 1994; Kellerman 1984, pp. 70–71; Tucker 1995, pp. 1-30.), a raw power relationship (Burns 1978, pp. 9–28), or the exclusive action of political elite (Blondel 2018; Zuba 2016). Finally, leadership has a normative connotation as well (Ciulla 2014b, 2018; Ciulla and Forsyth 2011; Kort 2008). The concept of leadership includes some form of effectiveness (get things done) and morality (do the right thing), the content and scale of which depend on followers’ voluntary action and consent. In this light, we can settle the role of power in the concept of leadership by drawing it up as a voluntary relationship (Burns 1978, p. 11; Nye 2008, pp. 27; 34) between leaders and followers.

¹ The countless interpretations of leadership and democracy are good examples for this conceptual uncertainty. While Joseph C. Rost (1991) reviewed 221 different definitions from 587 works published between 1900-1990, Jean-Paul Gagnon and his colleagues (2014; see also Collier and Levitsky 1997) collected 507 different forms of democracies.
2. Methodological framework

The aim of the research is to understand democratic leadership both on the theoretical and the practical level. I am looking for answers to two connected questions: *How can the problem of democratic leadership be solved at the theoretical level? How does it dissolve in practice?* In order to answer these questions simultaneously, the research requires an approach that is able to handle the conceptual diversity of democratic leadership and to examine the problem of democratic leadership at both levels. For this reason, I create and apply two constructivist perspectives. Gail Fairhurst and David Grant² (2010, pp. 177–78) distinguish between the (1) *construction of social reality*, which emphasizes the cognitive products of social interactions; and the (2) *social construction of reality*, which focuses on these interactions themselves. I clarify my initial questions and the steps of the research building on these perspectives.

The (1) *construction of social reality* foregrounds citizen’s perceptions and sense-making, and more precisely: the meaning of leadership (Grint 2014, pp. 242). To specify my first question in this light: *In what kind of theoretical constructs could we think about democratic leadership?*

To provide adequate answers to this question, I will reveal the *implicit leadership theories* of a moral, a material and a political concept of democracy, namely: the theory of the deliberative-participatory, the aggregative-pluralist and the leader democracy (Pakulski and Körösényi 2012). Wren (2007, 4) borrowed the method of implicit leadership theories from the field of social psychology (Fairhurst and Grant 2010, 178; Fischbein and Lord 2004) and adapted it to the context of historical and theoretical analysis. The implicit theories are “filters” through which followers perceive and interpret others’ actions. These determine the criteria based on which an actor can be called as a leader, or an action can be considered as leadership. In the case of the mentioned conceptions of democracy, implicit leadership theories function as lens, which define how “good” leadership and “right” relationship between leaders and followers should be seen.

Following Wren’s work, I applied a specific protocol of analysis to isolate and identify key premises and assumptions on the theories of democracy and democratic leadership in order to make analytical sense of the countless sources upon which this research is built. The benefit of this analytical template (*Table 1*) lies in revealing the not explicitly addressed elements of democratic leadership, and clarifying the differences between the theories.

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² Fairhurst and Grant (2010) borrowed the distinction from Bennett Pearce (1995).
In this frame, I firstly reveal the core premises and assumptions of democratic theories focusing on the process, as well as on the input and output side of democratic politics. It is particularly important to see how these theories describe the role of political participation, the citizens and their preferences, as well as the direction, content and outcome of the political process. Hereby these theoretical frameworks determine the context in which we can think about democratic leadership. Secondly, I reconstruct and rethink the meaning of democratic leadership within these frames. On the one hand, I focus on „good” leadership by considering how they define leadership challenges and the political knowledge required to meet these challenges. On the other hand, I look at more closely how they organize the right relationship between leaders and followers by settling power relations, interactions and the leadership roles. By this method, I draw up three particular types of democratic leadership, and analyze how they contribute to the specific visions of democratic politics. After all, these types establish a typology for democratic leadership.

Concerning the (2) social construction of reality, the researches focus on investigating the interactions that create political reality. Leadership here is not a “product of thought” or a theoretical construct, but a collective action that shapes the understanding of politics. Thus, the subject of studies is the “leadership of meaning” (Grint 2014, p. 242). In this sense, I ask here how democratic leadership is created in practice, or from another perspective: how leaders create their own democratic reality. In the empirical phase of the research, I focus on leaders’ rhetorical and performative action.

Based on Keith Grint’s works (2001, 2005b), I draw up this collective meaning-making process along five analytical dimensions: building identity, defining situation, creating vision, setting up tactics and mobilizing followers (Table 2). Structuring cases along with these five aspects contributes to the whole research in three ways. Firstly, it links the leaders’ rhetoric (wordcraft) and actual performances (stagecraft) (Uhr 2014), which together provide the leadership practices. Secondly, the analysis involves both leaders and followers by taking account of

### Table 1: Template of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructs of democracy</th>
<th>Input side of democratic politics</th>
<th>Process of democratic politics</th>
<th>Output side of democratic politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst of the political process (political participation), citizens’ political competences and the nature of preferences</td>
<td>Catalyst of the political process (political participation), citizens’ political competences and the nature of preferences</td>
<td>Direction and content of the process</td>
<td>Result of the political process, role of election and vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Good” leadership</td>
<td>Challenges (goals), and political knowledge</td>
<td>&quot;Right&quot; relationship between leaders and followers</td>
<td>Power relationship, direction of interactions, and the role of leaders and followers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8
mobilization. Thus, we can construct a comprehensive picture about leadership without missing the elements of the concept’s denotation. This means that construct of leadership created by leaders cannot be accepted based on its nominal value since it is evaluated by followers. In this sense, the differences between leaders’ words and deeds are relevant only insofar as they are articulated in the relation to followers. Putting it simply, the question here is whether followers consider leaders authentic in the light of leadership created by leaders. Thirdly, by structuring leaders’ stories in a transparent way it becomes possible to highlight the elements of leadership types and to position leaders in the typology and comparing them. Moreover, along with the analytical dimensions, the abstract elements of leadership types and latent features of the cases can be identified.

Table 2: Dimensions of empirical analysis and their relations to the elements of theoretical leadership constructs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good leadership</th>
<th>Right relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Identity</strong> <em>(Who are we?)</em></td>
<td>Role of followers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What role do followers have in the leadership process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Situation</strong> <em>(Where are we?)</em></td>
<td>Challenges:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What challenges must leadership face?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Vision</strong> <em>(What do we want to achieve?)</em></td>
<td>Challenges:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What goals are set by leadership?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Tactics</strong> <em>(How do we want to achieve it?)</em></td>
<td>Political knowledge:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What political knowledge do leaders need to choose the right means to achieve their goals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction of interactions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How can the interactions between leaders and followers be drawn up?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power relationship:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How can the power relationship between leaders and followers be interpreted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role of leaders and followers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What role do leaders and followers play in the leadership process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Mobilization</strong> <em>(Why do we want to achieve it?)</em></td>
<td>Feedback:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>evaluation of leadership by followers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the identity building, leaders do not just create their “imaginary” community (Grint 2001, p. 6), but also determine what role followers could get in that relationship. By defining the situation, the leaders describe what challenge they must face, while they set goals and concretize the direction of action in their vision. Tactics are adapted to optimize the exploitation of resources to reach these goals. Leaders aim to determine the outcomes of collective actions. In this process, leaders must demonstrate the appropriate political knowledge in their choice of means, decision making and politics. Tactics minimize the gap between leaders and followers by synchronizing their will and action. In this sense, it becomes crucial for leaders to arrange their relationship with their followers regarding power relationship, direction of interactions.
and leadership roles. Mobilization of followers is based on evaluating and accepting leaders’ performance. On one side, leaders make attempt to influence their followers by persuasive communication, but on the other, followers judge their leaders by expressing and changing their preferences.

In the empirical analysis, I examine two problematic leadership situations: Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’s leadership during the migration crisis in 2015-16, and Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership between the Brexit referendum that took place on 23 June 2016 and the general election held on 8 June 2017. I will compare and place them into the typology of democratic leadership, which as a heuristic device enables us to understand these situations more deeply.

Case selection is based on two circumstances. On the one hand, the above-mentioned leaders they are placed in the middle of events, which some analysts and commentators interpreted as challenges to democracy while others described those as a fulfillment of democracy. Generally, this kind of uncertainty highlights and contrasts the problem of democratic leadership, which can be easily concealed by the routine course of political action. On the other hand, these leaders provide significantly different picture about democratic leadership, which makes it easier to place them closer to one type of leadership or another.

In the case studies, I analyze both leaders’ rhetoric and actions, focusing on their speeches, interviews and press conferences, political decisions and their politics’ effects on followers. Therefore, I chose three different methods – qualitative content analysis, historical narrative analysis, analysis of opinion polls and elections – that contribute differently to the exploration of leadership (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focal Points of Empirical Analysis</th>
<th>Content Analysis</th>
<th>Historical Analysis</th>
<th>Analysis of Opinion Polls and Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The purpose of empirical analysis is not to provide a quantifiable result, or a proof for theoretical leadership constructs, but to demonstrate the relevance and analytical utility of the typology and to restructure and understand more deeply these problematic leadership situations.

This work intends to join the agenda of the critical leadership studies (Collinson 2014; Collinson and Grint 2005), which aims to highlight and understand the changing nature of
leadership by recalling and rethinking its fundamental dilemmas and contradictions. In my hypothesis I stated that the concepts of democracy and leadership do not contradict each other but depend on each other. Moreover, if we look at the practice, political leadership contributes formatively and constitutively to the process and idea of democracy. Based on this, I wish to resolve the tension within democratic leadership both at the theoretical and the practical level. The stake of this venture lies at the heart of that experience demonstrating that this problem has not just theoretical, but practical relevance as well.

The aim of the research is to form a typology focusing on democratic leadership and to apply it in the two perspectives of constructivism. At the theoretical level, the typology includes three different perspectives which frame the possible interpretations of democratic leadership. At the empirical level, the typology provides a “plural” reading and understanding of actual leadership situations. In this plural reading we cannot just avoid discrediting and delegitimizing any relevant forms of leadership, but we can also manage our own theoretical assumptions, their impacts on the knowledge of leadership and interpretation of leaders’ rhetoric and performance in a transparent manner. Overall, the innovation and complementary knowledge provided by the research relies on its direction and mode to resolve the tension within democratic leadership. More specifically, (1) my thesis goes beyond the conceptual strategies applied in literature; (2) my analytical approach based on the two viewpoints of constructivism connects the theoretical and practical levels of research problem; (3) my typology allows plural reading of leadership situations without discrediting and delegitimizing any relevant elements.
3. Main findings

3.1. Democratic leadership in theory: the typology of democratic leadership

In drawing up the relation between democracy and leadership, the first step is to reveal the key premises of democratic theories. I focus on three different concepts of democracy: the moral concept of deliberative-participatory democracy, the material concept of aggregative-pluralist democracy, and the political concept of leader democracy. As a moral theory, deliberative-participatory democracy articulates the normative goal that citizen’s control and autonomy should be strengthened in politics. Lowering expectations, aggregative-pluralist democracy focuses on how citizen’s preferences could be aggregated to a specific governmental program or public politics and on how various groups’ interests could transform into political power without damaging democratic frames. However, for the theory of leader democracy, democratic politics is just a method or a mean for selecting leaders to rule and govern. Looking through the basic assumptions and premises of the theories (Table 4), I point out how they construct and justify their picture of democracy.

Table 4: Three concepts of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deliberative-participatory democracy as a moral concept of democracy</th>
<th>Aggregative-pluralist democracy as a material concept of democracy</th>
<th>Leader democracy as a political concept of democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Input side</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalyst</td>
<td>direct and non-conventional participation</td>
<td>indirect and conventional participation</td>
<td>leaders’ action as a distinct form of participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>public-minded, rational, competent and well-informed</td>
<td>self-oriented, rational, competent, but ill-informed</td>
<td>self-oriented, irrational, incompetent, but uninformed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferences</td>
<td>ex-post</td>
<td>ex-ante</td>
<td>ex-post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction*</td>
<td>bottom-up</td>
<td>bottom-up</td>
<td>top-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>multilateral forming of preferences by deliberation</td>
<td>mechanical aggregation of preferences (responsive politics)</td>
<td>unilateral forming of preferences by manipulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output side</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of election and vote*</td>
<td>secondary, but unavoidable: temporary closure of deliberation</td>
<td>primary: formal aggregation of preferences</td>
<td>primary: selecting, replacing and authorizing leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>fair decision acceptable for all (through a constant building of consensus)</td>
<td>compromise based on an aggregate decision (majority rule)</td>
<td>solving collective problems (otherwise the leader will be replaced)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*based on Pakulski and Körösényi 2012, 100

On the input side of democratic politics, I inquire who are the main actors of politics and what triggers the political process. Political participation is always the catalyst for political process. But in the theory of deliberative-participatory it is non-conventional and direct, and ought to be widened, while in aggregative-pluralist democracy citizens initiate political process indirectly
through politicians via formal and conventional action. By contrast, in leader democracy, the political process is started by leaders’ decisions and actions as a distinct form of participation. However, while leaders’ privilege is to participate with real political effect, it seems necessary that citizens passively and sometimes actively contribute to the political process by authorizing and replacing leaders. Accordingly, we can also draw different pictures from citizens. In the deliberative-participatory democracy public-minded, rational, competent and well-informed citizens are needed, while the aggregative-pluralist democracy is more pessimistic about how informed citizens are and emphasizes selfish and egoist motivations. Leader democracy offers the most pessimistic picture on citizens, when it distinguishes citizens from professional politicians by describing their political competences and consciousness. Although politics is organized around citizen’s preferences in all three theories, the assumed nature of those preferences differs significantly. In deliberative-participatory – and leader democracy they are being changed through the political process (ex-post), but they are given for aggregative-pluralist democracy (ex-ante).

During the examination of the process of democratic politics, I focus on how theories place actors into the political process. The first two theoretical frameworks describe a bottom-up process that form preferences to public interest by multilateral deliberation or mechanical aggregation. By contrast, leader democracy describes a top-down process, which is determined by monopolistic competition of leaders and unilateral formation and manipulation of preferences.

Regarding the output side of the politics, I point to the goals of the process, or more precisely what politics is going for. In deliberative-participatory democracy the institution of voting is secondary, but it is inevitable when the deliberation has to be temporarily closed. The politics here results in a fair decision which is acceptable for all, but it remains questionable later on. This means that consensus for the theory will be a constant but unreachable goal. However, election and vote as preference aggregation mechanisms are primary for aggregative-pluralist theory since it establishes a stable base for compromise. From different reasons this institution is important for leader democracy as well, because leaders could be selected, authorized and replaced only by elections. However, the aim of politics is here not this, but a “good” governance that tackles and solves collective problems of the political community.

The concepts of democracy require different types of leadership and prescribe different relationship between leaders and followers. I created three possible interpretations (implicit
theories) of leadership (Table 5). All of them show “strong” leadership, which do not endanger, but rather strengthen and promote democracy. So they contribute to democracy in different ways. Or in other words: they describe different practices of democracy.

Table 5: Typology of democratic leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Deliberative-participatory democracy</th>
<th>Aggregative-pluralist democracy</th>
<th>Leader democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“moral founding”</td>
<td>transforming leadership (moral concept of democratic leadership)</td>
<td>transactional leadership (material concept of democratic leadership)</td>
<td>charismatic leadership (political concept of democratic leadership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political knowledge</strong></td>
<td>episteme (theoretical knowledge)</td>
<td>techné (productive, technical knowledge)</td>
<td>praxis (practical knowledge, ability to act)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power relation</th>
<th>Direction of interaction*</th>
<th>Role of leaders and followers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exercising power with others (empowerment)</td>
<td>exercising power over others (domination)</td>
<td>exercising power to do something for others (authorization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>horizontal (value-based)</td>
<td>vertical (interest-based)</td>
<td>vertical (emotional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coactive</td>
<td>reactive</td>
<td>proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coactive</td>
<td>proactive</td>
<td>reactive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*based on Pakulski and Körösényi 2012, 100
**based on Körösényi 2005, 239

Deliberative-participatory democracy favors primarily the Burnsian transforming, moral leadership (see Barber 1989, pp. 237–42, 2004; Burns 1978, 2003; Ruscio 2008), which has to cope with the challenge of “moral founding” of a more democratic political system and process. However, this challenge becomes permanent because of the unattainable nature of ideal democracy. It consists of three crucial aims. Firstly, leaders have to provide a moral (ideological) guidance based on their universal theoretical knowledge (episteme: Körösényi 2005, p. 233) and moral character. They have to ask the right questions (truth-seeking) and determine and facilitate the right way of democratic public reason (truth-giving) as well. Thus, leadership is value-rational (M. Weber 1978, pp. 24–25), and could only be judged from the viewpoint of the Weberian ethics of conviction (M. Weber 1946, pp. 120–27). Secondly, leaders have to handle problems and conflicts in a constructive and adaptive way through the process of deliberation (Barber 1989, 2004, pp. 237–42; Gastil 1994, pp. 960–62), in which they have to facilitate and promote coercion-free communication based on mutual respect, recognition...
and reciprocity. The third task is to empower and enable followers to participate in politics and to become leaders (empowerment: Barber 1989, p. 121; Burns 2003, pp. 25–26; 182–85; Ciulla 2014; Gastil 1994, pp. 959–60; Perkins 2010). In short: transforming leadership allows political participation and deliberation by educating and transforming followers, by supporting the rationalization and convergence of preferences and by facilitating consensual and fair decisions. As a result, the roles of leaders and followers can be often inverted (law of the situation: Follett 1942b) and they exercise the social and political power collectively (power with: Follett 1930, pp. 179–94, 1942). The interactions between leaders and followers becomes horizontal, in which they must be coactive actors (Barber 1989, pp. 121–25, 2004, pp. 239–40; Gastil 1994, pp. 958–63; Kuyper 2012; Raelin 2012). This relationship relies on certain end-values (e.g. liberty, justice and equality: Burns 1978, p. 426) and political participation. On this basis, it can be stated that real political participation of citizens and bottom-up political process presuppose transforming leadership.

In the aggregative-pluralist theoretical framework, Burns’ transactional leadership (Burns 1978; Downton 1973) can prevail to deal with the challenge of “making politics”, which implies aggregating preferences and forming compromise. Transactional leadership has to connect individual preferences and public interest to democratic governance within market-like exchanges and bargain. Firstly, leadership needs to maintain collective action of citizens to create public goods and express preferences (Olson 1971, pp. 174–78). Secondly, leadership has to produce politics and policies that embody the public interest (Downs 1957, p. 87, 1962; McFarland 1969). Leaders can only fine-tune politics by selective incentives (Olson 1971, pp. 174–78), “hard power” (Downton 1973; Nye 2008, pp. 77–84), and heresthetics (Riker 1986; see: Körösényi 2009a, 2009b; McLean 2002). Choosing and applying the right means requires a productive technical knowledge (techne: Körösényi 2005, pp. 232–33), which helps leaders to produce policies from given preferences and to operate the machinery of politics. Their action is instrumentally rational (M. Weber 1978, pp. 24–25), and can be judged based on the ethic of responsibility (M. Weber 1946, pp. 120–27). This means that leaders cannot neglect and disregard the rules of democratic game and have to respect the institutional and procedural modal values (e.g. honesty, responsibility, fairness, the honoring of commitments: surrounding the institutions Burns 1978, p. 426), while they are enforcing public interest. This knowledge can be mastered by anyone who accepts these rules of democratic politics. Although leaders have the greatest influence in politics and exercise power over their followers (Dahl 1957, pp. 202–3); they are also controlled by institutions, procedures, citizens’ preferences and will (Dahl
Since followers do not lose their ability to initiate proactively political action, leaders are forced into a reactive position (cf. *eventful man*: Hook 1955). Overall, the relationship between leaders and followers is hierarchical and vertical, but the two sides are mutually dependent on each other. Thus, the bottom-up nature of the political process and the dominant role of the leader (power relations, vertical interactions) can be maintained.

Leader democracy is built explicitly on the need of highly effective charismatic (Tucker 1968, 1995; M. Weber 1987, pp 248–60; 271–75, 1989, 2009, pp. 340–417) and innovative (Schumpeter 2006; Brooker 2010) leadership, which could handle the alleged and real collective problems by overcoming the uncertainty and contingency of politics (Körösényi, Illés, and Metz 2016). In this sense, the purpose of democratic politics and leadership is the same. Democratic politics as leadership (Tucker 1995) faces two tasks. Firstly, leaders must prove and demonstrate their capability to govern. To do so, they need to have highly context-dependent virtues (“*sense of proportion*”, “*virtù*”) and practical political knowledge (*praxis*: Körösényi 2005, pp. 232–33), which enable them to act and make decisions responsibly. However, leaders’ abilities and competences (*charisma*) must be recognized and acknowledged by their followers (M. Weber 1946, pp. 1111–15, 1978, pp 241–45; 267–69). Secondly, leaders must create a new political order or regime (Illés, Körösényi, and Metz 2018) based on their charismatic revelation, vision or innovation, which entails the destruction of the old order (*creative destruction*: Schumpeter 2006, p. 83; M. Weber 1946, pp. 1115–17). Consequently, the leaders, who do not tolerate any rivalries, create a monopoly for leadership (M. Weber 1946, pp. 1111–15, 1978, pp. 267–69). Based on these, leaders’ devotion (*passion*) and vision (*sense of responsibility*) need both instrumental and value rationality as the internal logic of their action, while their external evaluation is provided by both the ethic of ultimate ends and that of responsibility.

However, citizen’s political role and participation are secondary for the theory of leader democracy; followership becomes a crucial moment (M. Weber 1978, pp. 267–69). The community of followers connects to leaders emotionally (M. Weber 1946, pp. 103–4), to whom they subordinate themselves and whom they authorize to act (*power to*). Therefore, this relationship is unavoidably vertical, in which the leader's role is proactive, while the followers become reactive. Charismatic leadership is controlled and limited only by the fact that followers cannot be forced by discipline (violence) (M. Weber 1946, pp. 1148–56) to recognize and acknowledge leaders’ charisma.
By revealing the implicit theories of democratic leadership, I develop a typology. Looking more closely at the different views of democracy, it becomes apparent that leadership can play a crucial role by contributing to democratic politics in some way. In their theoretical context, they present sterile but coherent images in which the expectations set for democratic leadership are easier to recognize. According to this, we can also talk about a moral, a material and a political concept of democratic leadership. This comprehensive typology allows plural readings and interpretations of concrete leadership practices in democracies, and so it seems appropriate to assist at an empirical analysis as a heuristic tool.

3.2. Democratic leadership in practice

Concerning the practical problem of democratic leadership, I asked the question: how is democratic leadership being constructed in practice? Or, more precisely: how can the leaders create their own democratic realities and practices, how do they justify their leadership for their followers? During the analysis of the four leaders (Angela Merkel, Viktor Orbán, Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn), leadership types served as reference points or heuristic devices to understand their practices of democracy. The leaders’ constructs of democratic leadership can be placed closer to one or the other theoretical position.

3.2.1. Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’s leadership during the refugee/migration crisis

The refugee or migration crisis has clearly highlighted the need and necessity of good democratic leadership. Angela Merkel and Viktor Orbán defined the crisis situation and their leadership differently, so they are judged from different grounds as well. I outlined their leadership stories in a way that makes the different types of democratic leadership recognizable, thereby highlighting the differences between the two leaders (Table 6). It is important to underline that research here does not want to say that one of them has been “better” based on moral or efficiency considerations, but to point out that they have shown completely different types of democratic leadership.

What challenges have leaders faced? What goals have been set by leaders?

During the crisis, the two leaders faced different challenges. Orbán’s interpretation of the crisis followed the narrative of securitization (see also Szalai and Göbl 2016), which prescribed to overcome uncertainty by the protection of the public security, the living standards, the Christian and national culture. As a consequence of crisis dramatization, the situation escalated and spilled over into the crisis of European identity, elite and democracy. By contrast, Merkel
described the situation as a humanitarian crisis (see also Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2018; Mushaben 2017b, 2017a), in which the moral hazards of terrorism, extreme right-wing mobilization and lack of European solidarity could rise. This led directly to the idea and the challenge of "moral founding", which could be grasped in the aim of shaping German and European community into societies of “Willkommenskultur”.

Leaders drew different goals to cope with their differently construed crises. To overcome uncertainty, Orbán made a great effort to create an old-new order (Orbán’s regime in Hungary, new migration policy in Europe) and to question the European Union’s normative power based on liberal values (see also Illés, Körösényi, and Metz 2018; Metz 2017b). In this frame, Orbán’s populism demonstrated his honesty, authenticity and sense of reality, which enabled him to lead. By contrast, Merkel formulated the challenge of moral leadership in her transformational leadership. This was supported by her moral guidance on “rightly” understood crisis based on defending certain end-values (tolerance, justice, freedom, openness and solidarity). This involved the need and requirement of empowering followers (citizens and refugees) to actively contribute to crisis management. Nevertheless, the transformation of followers (open society, integration of refugees) was subordinated to a constructive problem-solving, which was articulated as a task of transactional leadership (forming governmental program based on public interest) emphasizing the economic and demographic opportunities of refugees’ integration.

**What political knowledge did leaders need to choose the right means to achieve their goals?**

By setting up tactics, leaders demonstrated the political knowledge required for overcoming challenges and achieving goals. Merkel's tactics was characterized by a duality: she had to demonstrate a strong moral commitment and responsibility as well as a pragmatic and task-oriented problem solving at the same time. Accordingly, Merkel's politics required both ideological and philosophical (episteme) and technical (productive) knowledge (techne). This meant that the German Chancellor wished to achieve her moral goals with hard power (with selective incentives and legal sanctions) and with her sense of compromise. In contrast to providing vision, Merkel’s tactics indicated transactional leadership. For Orbán, the challenge of overcoming uncertainties (creating new order, proving competences and abilities) demanded strong and vigorous political responses and actions that reflect his political virtues and practical knowledge (praxis). Therefore, Orbán’s tactics focused on effective management of illegal migration, and neutralization of European liberal refugee policies.
How can the power relationship between leaders and followers be interpreted?

The relationship between leaders and followers was coordinated by both leaders. One of the most critical elements was to determine the power relations. The empowerment projected by Merkel’s rhetoric assumed a form of power exercised collectively with followers. However, this offer remained symbolic, since she tried to achieve her goals (e.g. integration and registration) by selective incentives and legal sanctions that demonstrated her power over others. In contrast, Orbán explicitly asked his followers for more power to accomplish what the citizens were not able to do (authorization).

How can the interactions between leaders and followers be drawn up?

Power relations determined the direction of interactions between leaders and followers. Both leaders drew a vertical relationship. However, for Merkel it was based on her positional interpretation of leadership and interest-based interactions, while for Orbán it means followers’ emotional devotion.

What role do leaders and followers play in the leadership process?

During building collective identity and creating effective tactics, the leadership roles became clear. In addition to placing the national community on a moral ground, the refugees and the member states of the EU were also required to be followers of Merkel leadership. All of them had to participate coactively in managing crisis: citizens must help the integration process, refugees should accept the moral ground of German society and integrate themselves into it, and member countries must take part in the common European solution. Meanwhile, Merkel followed the events in a reactive way, which is more familiar in the transactional form of leadership. By contrast, Orbán restricted the community of followers to Christian Hungary, Central Europe and Europe. He sharply separated immigrants and political actors (left-wing political elite, Brussels’ Bureaucrats, civil activists and George Soros) considered responsible for the crisis from his community. Interestingly, outsiders to the group were proactive by creating crisis situations, while Orbán’s followers became reactive and passive, who need to be defended by his proactive leadership.

Overall, Merkel hardly became completely a transforming leader during the crisis since her pragmatic task- and compromise-oriented transactional leadership dominated her tactics (cf. Helms 2012, pp. 119-123.; Helms and Van Esch 2017; Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2018; Middelhoff, Schijvenaars, and De Landtsheer 2016). Although such moral commitments were not typical for Merkel’s leadership, but so did she approach the idea of transforming leadership.
(cf. Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2018; Mushaben 2017a; Stefani 2017). This moral commitment went beyond the modal values associated with transactional leadership, although it is important to underline that Merkel identified the German constitution as the source of these values. It is noteworthy that Merkel took political risks and made a stand for these values. Thus, although her political position has become uncertain as a result of the change of citizens’ preferences, she successfully created dual (value- and interest-based) attachment for her followers by providing compromise with tightening her refugee policy, and by not giving up the symbolic moral commitment. As a result, Merkel’s democratic leadership has found its audience and managed to defend its main policy direction during the first years of crisis.

Table 6: Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’s leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Angela Merkel</th>
<th>Viktor Orbán</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good leadership</td>
<td><strong>moral founding</strong> (German and European society as „Willkommenskultur“)</td>
<td><strong>overcoming uncertainties</strong> (defending the county and Europe from the migration crisis and the crisis of European identity, elite and democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- moral guidance (situation as humanitarian crisis)</td>
<td>- proving competences and abilities (populism as honesty, authenticity, and sense of reality)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- empowering followers (mobilizing civil society and integrating refugees)</td>
<td>- creating new order (a new migration policy based on national and Christian values, the protection of Orbán’s regime)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- constructive problem solving (facilitating the transformation of followers) subordinated to form governmental program based on public interest (integration as economic and demographic opportunity) (transactional leadership &lt; transforming leadership)</td>
<td>(charismatic leadership)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Political knowledge</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>tyche</strong> (setting up effective tactics: „Wir schaffen das“)</td>
<td><strong>praxis</strong> (strong and vigorous political responses and actions)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>episteme</strong> (value-based identity, situation definition and vision)</td>
<td>(charismatic leadership)</td>
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<td>(transactional leadership &gt; transforming leadership)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Right relationship</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>exercising power with others</strong> (followers active, but symbolic participation in crisis management)</td>
<td><strong>exercising power to do something for others</strong> (populist and illiberal democratic authorization)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>exercising power over others</strong> („als Bundeskanzlerin“; „meine Aufgabe“; selective incentives and legal sanctions)</td>
<td>(charismatic leadership)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(transactional leadership)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>vertical</strong> (positional approach to leadership, interest-based relationship)</td>
<td><strong>vertical</strong> (necessity of leader, emotional attachment)</td>
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<td>(transactional leadership)</td>
<td>(charismatic leadership)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Role of leaders and followers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>reactive</strong> (following events)</td>
<td><strong>reactive</strong> (defending national community and Christian culture)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>coactive</strong> (citizens, refugees and EU member states’ active participation in crisis management)</td>
<td>(charismatic leadership)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(transactional leadership &gt; transforming leadership)</td>
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Table 6: Angela Merkel’s and Viktor Orbán’s leadership
The crisis provided an opportunity for Orbán to strengthen and preserve followers’ emotional engagement to his charisma. He constantly dramatized the crisis to create the need for his leadership to overcome the uncertainties. He proved his abilities and efforts to protect his “old-new” political order and regime. Particularly worthy of consideration are Orbán's thoughts on leadership and democracy, which pointed out that he seeks and asks his followers for power to defend the community. This call was addressed only to his audience excluding those who could not been expected to follow his lead. However, it is also important to see that certain elements (the picture of the EU and immigrants, the definition and management of the crisis) of his leadership were widely supported by citizens. This may indicate that the Hungarian political context favors the charismatic leadership, which Orbán also recognized.

3.2.1. Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership between the Brexit referendum and the general election

The period between the Brexit referendum and the general election was determined by the question of who could provide an “adequate” leadership in this uncertain and contingent situation. Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leaderships (Table 7) were interesting in many ways. On the one hand, their stories were similar in many respects (e.g. creating the group of followers), but they have drawn different conclusions. On the other hand, the consequences of contradictions in May's leadership became tangible in the development of voter preferences.

What challenges did leaders face? What goals were set by leaders?

May and Corbyn both saw the uncertainty and opportunities in the Brexit decision. This uncertainty did not arise from external factors, but from ineffective (e.g. Corbyn) or morally hazardous politics (e.g. May). However, this did not call for charismatic leadership. May described the situation as the challenge of “making politics” (transactional leadership), in which she tried to connect preferences and public will expressed in the referendum to governance. By contrast, interpreting Brexit was particularly difficult for Corbyn because of its negative moral connotations and his reluctant Remain campaign. To bridge this gap, he provided a strong moral stance and foundation (transforming leadership) along left-wing and liberal values.

Corbyn's moral founding meant creating a “kinder” (more democratic) politics. In his interpretation, the referendum wasn’t a manifestation of democracy, but a cry for a more democratic and fair politics and society. Brexit provided a perfect opportunity to extend his vision on “new” democratic politics announced earlier. For this reason, it was essential that his moral guidance mediates and embodies certain end-values (e.g. social justice, solidarity,
equality and internationalism). In addition, Corbyn emphasized the empowerment of followers as well, which was manifested in his tactics of permanent mobilization and movement politics. Constructive problem solving was also a crucial elements of Corbyn’s politics. He was not just (symbolically) open to debate freely the social and political issues led to Brexit in „human rights language”, but he aimed at expanding discourse and eliminating disturbing factors like racism and xenophobia.

In contrast, May's vision was limited to pragmatic politics based on the interest of “ordinary working people”, whom British politics just left behind. May’s leadership focused on forming a clear policy from Brexit decision; therefore she needed to call her followers once again to express their preferences in order to create a more stable and stronger mandate for her leadership. From her perspective, the referendum was a clear manifestation of democracy that restored British parliamentary democracy and national self-determination. In this sense, one of her main goals was to maintain and initiate collective action for the re-affirmation of public will. May made a great effort to define the public interest expressed at the referendum. However, she ruled out any compromise by recognizing only one reading of Brexit (“Brexit means Brexit”), which she had to enforce as the public interest demanded. As regards the content of public interest, May has also set a goal in foreign policy (“Global Britain”) and in domestic policy (“Great Meritocracy”). Her politics had approached the idea of charismatic leadership (the need to create a new order), but she didn’t create an emotional (charismatic) relationship with her followers, and didn’t proved the required political virtues, but attempted to strengthen an interest-based relationship and to manage Brexit as a technical problem.

What political knowledge did leaders need to choose the right means to achieve their goals?

Leaders’ vision and tactics highlighted the political knowledge they wished to demonstrate. Theresa May appeared as an “expert” and a “professional” manager, whose task is technical by its nature. Thus she could just produce and “deliver” the “best deal” during exit negotiations to satisfy the public will. In this sense, strong and stable leadership meant fulfillment of a specific mandate and pledge by using hard power and selective incentives. This required a technical and productive knowledge (technē). By contrast, Jeremy Corby's leadership and authenticity were based on his moral character and ideological knowledge (episteme). Challenge of moral founding presupposed an ideological (value-driven) thinking (ethic of ultimate ends: Shaw 2017), which Corbyn has derived from the values, moral commitment and conviction of his party and movement. In the end, he became a moral leader who was surrounded by a cult of personality among his followers and supporters.
**How can the power relationship between leaders and followers be interpreted?**

Arranging the relationship between leaders and followers was a serious problem due to the nature of Brexit that increased the distance between them. To fill this gap, leaders aimed to settle power relations. May described a position- and self-centered leadership and relied on the hard power and selective incentives of her office. This meant that May exercised her *power over* others to dominate political processes and so achieve the collective goals. By contrast, Corbyn’s movement grassroots activity demonstrated his vision of democratic politics, in which the idea of exercising collectively *power with* others could be realized.

**How can the interactions between leaders and followers be drawn up?**

The power relation determined the interactions between leaders and followers as well. While May has outlined an interest-based vertical relationship, Corbyn has created a horizontal one with their followers along certain values and participation.

**What role do leaders and followers play in the leadership process?**

Both leaders aimed to address ordinary working people, who chose to leave the EU. They became a base of imaginary community of followers. However, May described her followers as an interest-based community which proactively declared their preferences in the referendum. By contrast, Corbyn saw them as a moral community, which should coactively participate in overcoming the challenge of Brexit. At the same time, Corbyn has also showed himself in a coactive role during the permanent mobilization and movement politics. May’s transactional leadership projected a reactive role by subordinating herself to the public will. This was reflected in changing her position on Brexit and forming her cabinet including both sides of “leavers” and “remainers”, but her hard interpretation of Brexit could not provide room for wider social compromise. Moreover she has begun to play a proactive role, which gave rise to contradictions in her leadership, questioning her authenticity.

Overall, it is not no exaggeration to say that the general election measured the leaders’ authenticity. While Corbyn was able to embody transforming leadership credibly (cf. Bennister, Worthy, and Keith 2017; Crines 2017) by defining Brexit as a moral challenge and applying movement politics, May’s transactional leadership has lost its authenticity (cf. Worthy and Bennister 2017) due to contradictions that appeared in her tactics, and insufficient performance in overcoming the challenge of making politics (ensuring political participation to express preferences, producing political program based on public interest from pre-existing preferences). This does not necessarily mean that Corbyn would have handled this situation
more effectively and successfully, but more and more citizens saw his leadership in this way. In a more abstract level: we cannot declare that one or the other type of democratic leadership would be better in a specific situation. May simply wanted to achieve more (like a charismatic leader) than what she could be expected to do, or for what she created need among citizens. She has lost her ability to form an effective and strong relationship with followers, which set the boundaries, or even the end, of her leadership.

Table 7: Theresa May’s and Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theresa May</th>
<th>Jeremy Corbyn</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Good leadership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>making politics (delivering Brexit based on the will of electorate)</td>
<td>moral founding („kinder” democratic politics,)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- produce governmental program based on public interest („Brexit means Brexit”, „Global Britain”, „Great Meritocracy”)</td>
<td>- moral guidance (mediating values)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ensuring political participation („Give me the mandate”, snap election)</td>
<td>- empowering followers (constant mobilization and movement politics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(transactional leadership)</td>
<td>- constructive and adaptive problem solving based on deliberation („human rights language”, encouraging open political discourse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>techne (Brexit delivered as a political product based on hard power and selective incentives: „no deal is better than a bad deal”, „bloody difficult woman”)</td>
<td>episteme (moral character)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(transactional leadership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right relationship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power relation</td>
<td>exercising power over others („Give me the mandate”, using hard power of her office)</td>
<td>exercising power with others (grassroots mobilization to overcome the moral challenge of Brexit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(transactional leadership)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction of interactions</td>
<td>vertical (positional approach of leadership, interest-based relation)</td>
<td>horizontal (relation based on participation and values)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(transactional leadership)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of leaders and followers</td>
<td>reactive (changing the position on Brexit, forming cabinet)</td>
<td>coactive (lead the flow of politics but not dominate it)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proactive (hard understanding of Brexit to form preferences)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proactive (preferences and interest of the ordinary working people expressed in the referendum)</td>
<td>coactive (empowering ordinary working people and movement politics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(transactional leadership &gt; charismatic leadership)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
References


The author’s publications

1. Book chapters ( Hungarian publications)


2. Journal articles ( Hungarian publications)


3. Journal articles ( English publications)

