SUMMARY

Daniel Harangozo

Civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces in independent Slovenia and Croatia (1991-2011)

Ph.D. thesis

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I. Main concepts and research questions

Political control over the military is one of the oldest problems in the world of politics, but the question of “who guards the guardians?” is relevant in modern times as well. Relations between armed forces and politics played a key role in the democratic transitions of the second half of XX century, like those in Southern Europe and Latin America. (Agüero 1995, 3-6). As opposed to those two regions where the role of armed forces was crucial in the process of democratic transition, the military was a rather passive “spectator” during the collapse of single-party systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Barany 1993, 155-157). But that passivity does not mean that there were no unique challenges in this region regarding the relations between armed forces and politics. In the party-state systems the armed forces were under civilian control, but that control was by no means democratic: one of the main tasks of the army was the defense of Party rule, and the Party had an institutional presence in the army via party cells. (Barany 1993, 10-11).

As pointed out by Zoltan D. Barany (2012, 222), while in democratic transitions the main challenge was “demilitarization of politics”, in the post-Communist transition the “depoliticization of the military” was the main task. These challenges were complemented in the newly established states, like successor states of the former Yugoslavia, with the problems of state-building, and thus, army-building as well (Barany 2012, 225-226).

In my PhD thesis I analyze the evolution of civil-military relations and the development of democratic control over the armed forces¹ in Slovenia and Croatia, two successor states of the former Yugoslavia, during the first twenty years of their existence as independent states.

One of the conceptual “frames” of the dissertation is the process of state-building and military-building, and its relationship with the main question mentioned above. A further aim is the assessment of explaining factors which may have influenced civil-military relations and the democratic control over the armed forces during the period under analysis.

Upon designing the research, I posed four research questions in relation with the two countries:

1./ How did the Yugoslav political-historical legacy influence army-building, as a particular area of state-building?

¹ In my dissertation by „armed forces” or „military” I understand the regular armed forces of the two countries concerned, excluding, where applicable, any paramilitary or irregular armed formations. I will likewise exclude from my analysis law-enforcement organizations like the police, border guards, as well as the intelligence and security services.
2. What effect did the differing duration and intensity of armed conflict, experienced by the two countries, have on civil-military relations and the democratic control of the armed forces? 
3. What role did the different political setting in the two countries during the 1990s (absence or presence of democratic deficit) play in the evolution of civil-military relations and establishment of democratic control over the armed forces? 
4. What was the effect of the different perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration in the two countries concerned on civil-military relations and the reform of defense sector?

One of the key concepts of the thesis, *civil-military relations*, can be interpreted in different ways (Nelson 2002, 161). According to the “narrow” interpretations, as used by classical authors of the field, like Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), by civil-military relations we understand the relationship between the political and military leaders. There is also a “broad” interpretation of the concept (see for example Born et al. 2006, 4-5, and Cottey et al. 2002, 6), according to which civil-military relations can be defined as the interaction between the armed forces as a social institution and the society as a whole. In my PhD thesis, generally I will build upon the former, “narrow” interpretation.

With regards to control, we need to distinguish between “civilian” and “democratic” control over the armed forces. *Democratic control of the armed forces* is the key element of civil-military relations in liberal democratic states. According to Cottey et al (2002, 6) democratic control of the armed forces can be defined as “political control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state”.

While democratic control is necessarily civilian control, not all forms of civilian control are democratic. Militaries in the former party-state systems in Central and Eastern Europe were under firm civilian control, but this was the political control of the Communist Party, which was underpinned by, among others, institutional presence of the party in the armed forces, party membership of large part of the officer corps, participation of certain members of the military elite in Party executive bodies (like the Central Committee), and intensive political indoctrination of the officers and soldiers (Gow 1992, 28-29).

The nature of civilian control over the armed forces under Communism also did influence the challenges during the transition: a transition between two modes of civilian control, from Communist (one-party) civilian control to democratic civilian control had to take place (Cottey et al. 2002, 3-4).
II. Analytical framework and methodology

Building on the research questions mentioned in Part I, upon reviewing the relevant literature I defined four explaining factors:

1. Historical legacy: previous historical experiences (or the dominant perception thereof in the given countries) can play a considerable role in policy processes of the field of defense and security and the question of civil-military relations. Those experiences can include the presence or absence of independent state traditions, previous military traditions of the given people or nation, or historical social attitudes regarding armed forces and military (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 39-40, Edmunds, Forster, and Cottey 2003, 249, Nelson 2002b, 427-428).

In case of Slovenia and Croatia my analysis does include the role of the Yugoslav historical and political legacy in general, and civil-military relations in the Titoist period as well as the post-1968 Yugoslav military doctrine, called All-People’s Defense, in particular.

2. Armed conflict and threat perceptions: in the literature we can find classical examples on theorizing the relationship between security threat and civilian control of the armed forces. According to Harold Lasswell (1941) the strong external threat to the state leads to the weakening of civilian control: this is the “garrison state” hypothesis. As opposed to Lasswell, Stanislav Andreski (1954) posits that the lack of external threat, and therefore the “idleness” of the military leads to weakening control by the civilian authorities. (Desch 1996, 12-13, Desch 1999, 1-2). The structural realist model proposed by Michael C. Desch treats internal and external threats separately when assessing their effect on civilian control (Desch 1999, 11-13).

3. Internal political processes: democratic control of the armed forces and existence of a democratic political system necessitate each other, as the successful operation of a democratic state presupposes democratic control of the entities entrusted with exercising the legitimate monopoly of violence of the state (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 3-4, Cottey et al. 2002b, 262-263). On the other hand, even if institutional and political conditions of democratic control are provided for, “politicization” or use of the armed forces for party-political purposes by civilian politicians can still present a problem (Huntington 1996, 11, Born et al 2006b, 244-246, 253, Bland 1995). When assessing the effect of this factor I took into account the democratic or authoritarian nature of political power in each country, and whether security or defense issues did become “politicized”, or in other words, did became subject of intense political or ideological debates or controversies.
4. International actors and organizations: in my work I considered the role of NATO, and, in some cases, the European Union, and I aimed to find out the degree of their influence on policy- and decision-making in the field of military and defense. In case of the UN arms embargo on the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and Croatia’s bilateral defense cooperation during the 1990s I also took into account the effect of international actors different from the two organizations mentioned above.

The twenty-year time-span was divided into four multi-year periods in case of both countries, and I assessed the effect of the explaining factors already introduced on a four-point scale for each period and each country. In doing this I aimed to establish the extent at which the given factor was able to influence the main trends of civil-military relations during the given period.

- The effect was declared “insignificant”, if the given factor did not have any effect, or that effect was not relevant for the topic in question
- I consider the effect “discernible” if the factor did have effect on the processes in question but that effect was limited
- If the given factor played an important role in the processes I study, but it wasn’t the principal explaining factor in the given period, its effect is declared “considerable”
- Finally, the effect was deemed “decisive”, if in the given period the processes in question were principally to be explained by the given factor

The thesis combines approaches from political science, military science and international relations, in line with the interdisciplinary nature of the field of civil-military relations (Olmeda 2013, 62-63). It addresses a gap in the literature by analyzing the problem of civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces in a comparative setting and with multiple explaining factors. In case of the external determinants, my analysis is not limited to the influence of international organizations, but I also consider the impact of armed conflict and security threat perceptions. In the international scholarly literature there is a relative paucity of comparative studies in the field of civil-military relations (Olmeda 2013, 68), and in Hungarian literature in general little attention is paid to this issue as well as military and defense affairs of neighboring Yugoslav successor states.

From a methodological standpoint the thesis project has two goals. First, I wanted to explore and analyze the evolution and main trends of civil-military relations and the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces in the two countries concerned. In that respect, my research is idiographic or atheoretical (Lijphart 1971).
On the other hand, I also assessed the effect of four explaining factors on the policy areas included in the analysis, therefore, aiming to provide an explanation on the main “drivers” of policy processes in these areas.

The thesis belongs to the category of qualitative comparative case studies, using *structured focused comparison* (George and Bennett 2005, 67-73) and *process tracing* (Beach and Pedersen 2013) as its main methods.

During the research phase of the thesis project I did review the secondary sources related to the subject in English and Hungarian, including, where possible, literature in Croatian and Slovenian as well. Secondary sources were complemented by relevant legislation from both countries (laws, regulations, internal orders), as well as ministry documents (such as annual reports). Apart from the sources mentioned above I also conducted several interviews with security and defense policy experts and two former defense ministers of Slovenia.
III. Main findings

In Slovenia at the end of June 1991 a brief, ten-day armed conflict took place between armed units under control of the Slovenian government and units of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) which ended with a cease-fire on terms favorable to Slovenia (Szilágyi 2002, 40-43, Gow and Carmichael 2000, 177-181). The Slovenian forces which took part in the conflict were established by the Slovenian government in 1990-1991, based on the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), which was a component of the post-1968 Yugoslav defense system, nominally under control of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia (Horncastle 2013). That institutional legacy of the Territorial Defense, along with the heterogeneous composition of the officer corps of the Slovenian Army (presence of former TDF officers in the military leadership), and experiences of the 1991 war did influence during the 1990s the development of the Slovenian armed forces and civil-military relations (Malesic and Jelusic 2005, 211-212, Jelusic 2017, Kopac 2017).

The Yugoslav historical legacy did play a role in “negative” form as well. Some solutions in the new Slovenian defense system were instituted to show a “clean break” with the former Yugoslav practice, such as the very liberal provisions on conscientious objection to military service (Jelusic 2002, 114-115). Likewise, it can also be interpreted as a reaction to Yugoslav practices that the defense sector, particularly during the 1990s, was dominated by civilians (Bebler 2004, 128-130, Furlan 2013, 443).

Since the end of that decade, the role of historical legacies diminished significantly, but did not disappear completely as it can be evidenced by the survival of pacifist social attitudes in some form (Svete 2011, Bebler and Jazbec 2010, 55).

As, apart from the “ten-day war”, the country did not participate in the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, the role of armed conflict and threat perceptions is discernible only in the initial periods, in particular until the conclusion of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in 1995 (Vankovska 1995, 219-220). For the 2000s, conventional security threats lost their importance for policymakers and the public opinion, as shown by strategic documents adopted in this period (such as the National Security Strategy: ReSNV 2001, 3.2-3.3.) emphasizing non-traditional threats, as well as opinion polls (see for example Kotnik and Kopac 2002, 156-157).

Due to challenges related to state-building and intense political debates and controversies concerning security and defense policy (such as political affairs related to defense minister Janez Janša, as well as disputes on competences between the defense minister and the president) in the first period the internal political processes played a decisive role in the evolution of civil-military relations in Slovenia (Malesic 2006, 131-132, 143, Bebler 1996, 209-210).
At the same time, impact of international actors and organizations was insignificant, as institutional contacts with NATO were established only at the end of the period (in 1993-1994), during this time the effect of the UN arms embargo was the most discernible (Kopac 2017, Szilágyi 2002, 63-64).

The effect of internal political processes remained important during the period from 1994 to 2000 as well. Frequent ministerial changes at the Ministry of Defense and lack of policy continuity hampered long term strategic planning, with negative consequences for Slovenia’s NATO bid (Malesic 2017, Jelusic 2002, 118-119, Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 177-178).

Despite that a consensus was formed in the Slovenian political elites on the need of NATO membership as soon as in 1994, membership did not materialize during the 1990s due to both external and internal reasons (Szilágyi 2002, 79-83). Even so, effect of international organizations, mainly NATO, became stronger during 1994-2000 on the field in question, particularly towards the end of the period when preparations for NATO membership were intensified and the country became a participant in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP).

NATO had the strongest effect on the field in question during the period between 2000 and 2004 (Kopac 2017). In this period internal political “will” to fulfil the conditions of NATO membership (expert minister leading the MoD, policy continuity, strategic policy and decision-making) was “met” by credible membership perspective as well as structured and institutionalized forms of pre-accession assistance (such as the Membership Action Plan) from the NATO side (Malesic et al. 2015, 12-14, Kopac 2017).

Strong impact of NATO in this policy area somewhat decreased after joining the organization, but remained considerable, as NATO defense planning rules and structures were introduced, and capability development decisions were influenced by the need of foreign military deployments on NATO-led missions. Intense political and social debates on military deployments in Afghanistan (Malesic et al. 2015, 119-120, 129-130), and a corruption scandal linked to the procurement of armored combat vehicles, the “Patria” affair (Furlan 2013, 448-449), show that internal political processes still had a considerable effect in the policy area concerned.

Effects of the explaining factors in the Slovenian case are shown on Table 1.
Table 1: Effect of the explaining factors in the Slovenian case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period and examples</th>
<th>Historical legacies</th>
<th>Threat perceptions</th>
<th>Internal political processes</th>
<th>International actors</th>
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<td>1991-1994</td>
<td>Experiences of the 1991 “ten-day” war “Clean break” with the Yugoslav past Institutional legacy of the Territorial Defense</td>
<td>War in Croatia and Bosnia, instability in the neighborhood Effects of the UN arms embargo</td>
<td>Dispute on competences between the president and the defense minister “MORiS” affair Scandals related to violations of the UN arms embargo</td>
<td>Effects of the UN arms embargo “Soul searching” in security policy No NATO membership perspective</td>
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<td>1994-2000</td>
<td>Institutional legacy of the Territorial Defense 1995 military doctrine</td>
<td>War in Croatia and Bosnia until 1995 Declining importance of conventional threats from 1995</td>
<td>Frequent change of defense ministers Frequent change of development priorities Lack of strategic planning</td>
<td>NATO membership perspective from the second half of 1990s Participation in NATO MAP from 1999</td>
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<td>Discernible</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
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<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>Pacifist social attitudes: debate on NATO membership</td>
<td>Non-conventional security threats</td>
<td>Debate on the introduction of all-volunteer force Reforms needed for NATO membership</td>
<td>Participation in NATO MAP and NATO accession process High-level personal contacts between Slovenian and NATO actors</td>
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<td>Discernible</td>
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<td>2004-2011</td>
<td>Pacifist social attitudes: debate on foreign military deployments (mainly Afghanistan)</td>
<td>Non-conventional security threats</td>
<td>Debate on foreign military deployments (mainly Afghanistan) “Patria” affair Defense expenditure cuts</td>
<td>Introduction of NATO defense planning system Increased participation in NATO and EU-led missions</td>
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</table>

Source: own work
In the Croatian case effect of the Yugoslav historical legacy was stronger and more enduring than in Slovenia. Due to the war in 1991-1995 the newly created Croatian Army did incorporate a large number of ex-YPA officers of Croatian ethnicity, who played an important role particularly in the initial stages of the conflict (Lukic 2008, 194-195, Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 180-181, Bebler 1996, 202). Moreover, according to several authors (Domjancic 2015, 171-172, Lukic 2008, 190-191) patterns of civil-military relations in Titoist Yugoslavia did influence the forms of authoritarian or party control of the Croatian military during the Tudjman regime. During the 2000s, historical experiences only had a limited impact on the field I analyze (Edmunds 2007, 75-76, Tatalovic 2010, 18-19).

Armed conflict and security threats did have the strongest effect on Croatian civil-military relations during the 1990s, as the 1991-95 war had a profound impact on both the political process and the internal organization of the military (manpower, structure, modes and opportunities for promotion) (Edmunds 2007, 121-124, Bellamy 2002b, 176-177). The war situation made possible a certain legitimization of authoritarian methods and techniques of governance, and during this period the “political instrumentalization” of the armed conflict can also be observed. For example, snap elections were called for October 1995 by the government, in order to capitalize on the August 1995 victory over the rebel Serbs in Croatia and the end of the war (Vankovska 2002, 58-59, 77, Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 209-210, Dolenec 2013 138-140). In the 2000s, conventional security threats gradually lost their importance for both Croatian policymakers and the public opinion.

Internal political processes did have the strongest impact on the field in question during the nineties as well, as authoritarian forms of civilian control were established during this period. (Dolenec 2013, 133-134, 139-140, Bellamy 2002, 176-180). The internal processes conserved their importance in shaping Croatian civil-military relations during the period after the “regime change” of 2000, due to intense political disagreement inside the centre-left governing coalition, along with disputes on competences between the president and the defense minister (Edmunds 2007, 59-60, 75). Moreover, defense and the military were one of the “battlegrounds” in the heated political confrontation between the centre-left parties and the opposition right-leaning HDZ (Edmunds 2003, 41-42, Edmunds 2007, 132-133). Those debates and controversies had a negative effect on implementing the reforms necessary for NATO membership (part of those related to establishment of democratic civil-military relations), therefore the intensification of the reform process can be dated only from 2002 (Edmunds 2007, 59-60, 132-133).
Political debates and controversies concerning the defense sector did decrease somewhat during the period 2003-2011, as a fundamental consensus was established on main issues of NATO membership between the president and the government, and between and left- and right- wing of Croatian politics. Moreover, the center-right coalition led by Ivo Sanader was more unified internally than the preceding centre-left cabinet. (Lukic 2008, 205, Simunovic 2015, 182-183, Edmunds 2007, 60-61). Nevertheless, intense political debates on the issues relevant for my thesis did take place in this period as well, particularly the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has given rise to these disagreements (Edmunds 2007, 198-199, 202-204).

Impact of international actors of organizations during the 1990s was limited. During the 1991-1995 war, due to the UN arms embargo, bilateral defense cooperation between Croatia and the US did only take place indirectly, through the American private military contractor Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI). Owing to the authoritarian nature of the Tudjman regime, the country was excluded from Euro-Atlantic integration processes in the second half of the 1990s as well, therefore indirect (MPRI) and direct (inter-governmental) bilateral links did provide Croatia the only opportunity for defense cooperation during this period (Tatalovic 2010, 7, Edmunds 2007, 192-193, 198-199).

Increasing effect of NATO can be observed only in the period after 2000: several strategic documents and legislative acts adopted in this period did reflect NATO requirements (Tatalovic 2010, 9, Pietz and Remillard 2006, 36). That effect intensified even more in the period 2003-2011, when political will to implement needed reforms for membership was met by credible membership perspective from NATO side. In this period the administrative part of NATO Headquarters and experts from some NATO member states did assist directly the Croatian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to prepare strategic documents, and to design and implement reforms needed for NATO accession. (Edmunds 2007, 200-201, Simunovic 2015, 194, Tatalovic 2010, 13). Moreover, participation of Croatian Armed Forces in international missions were also motivated by NATO membership ambitions, as the large majority of Croatian soldiers deployed abroad were serving in the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan. (Simunovic 2015, 194-195).

Effects of the explaining factors in the Croatian case are shown on Table 2.
Table 2: Effect of the explaining factors in the Croatian case

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Source: own work
Based on the research questions set out in Part I. and the explaining factors mentioned in Part II. the main conclusions of my research can be summarized as follows:

1. The Yugoslav historical legacy did have an effect on the issues in question in both countries, but in Slovenia that effect was rather indirect and more limited in nature. The Slovenian Army was created on the basis of the Territorial Defense Force, whose internal structures, operation, and doctrine did influence during the 1990s the development of the Slovenian armed forces and civil-military relations (Malesic and Jelusic 2005, 211-212). Moreover, during the 1991 conflict the Slovenes did use some elements of the 1968 Yugoslav doctrine of “All-People’s Defense” in organizing the resistance to Yugoslav federal forces (Horncastle 2013). The Yugoslav historical legacy did play a role in “negative” form as well. In Slovenian democratization and independence processes opposition to the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) played an important role, as that force was seen as authoritarian, centralist, and insensitive to Slovenian national characteristics (Gow 1992, 78-88). Some solutions in the new Slovenian defense system were instituted to show a “clean break” with the former Yugoslav practice, such as the very liberal provisions on conscientious objection to military service (Jelusic 2002, 114-115). In the Croatian case effect of the Yugoslav historical legacy was stronger and more enduring than in Slovenia. Stjepan Domjančić (2015, 171-172) mentions as a “Croatian paradox” that the Croatian Army (HV) did fight against the YPA, or armed formations supported, equipped or trained by the YPA, its battlefield successes were nevertheless partly based on YPA doctrines and YPA provided the model in terms of its political control and relations to the broader society. Reneo Lukic (2008, 190-191) likewise points out that the patterns of civil-military relations in Titoist Yugoslavia did influence the forms of authoritarian or party control of the Croatian military during the Tudjman regime. Alex J. Bellamy (2002, 178, 2003, 193-194) mentions that, similarly to the Yugoslav case, the military in Tudjman’s Croatia was used by the political leadership to legitimize the state and the political system.

2. I did find a link between the intensity and duration of armed conflict on one hand and its effect on civil-military relations on the other hand. In Slovenia the experiences of the brief conflict did influence the development of the Slovenian Army, and field commanders of that conflict during the 1990s came to occupy leading positions in the Slovene armed forces, even though sometimes they lacked formal military education. These trends, however, did not influence the evolution of democratic civil-military relations. (Kotnik and Kopac 2002, 152).
In Croatia the longer armed conflict did intensify the authoritarian tendencies in President Franjo Tudjman’s leadership style present before the war (Meier 1999, 147, Ramet 2010, 259), and some extraordinary measures were needed in itself due to the conflict. Moreover, the war situation made possible, to a certain extent, the legitimization of the authoritarian modes of governance, and increased the role of secrecy and lack of transparency in the field of defense (Horowitz 2005, 161-162, Vankovska 2002, 58-59, Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 209-210).

In both countries the role of armed conflict as a “founding myth” of the state can be discerned: the “ten-day war” of Slovenia, despite its duration, served as one of early bases of legitimacy for the young state. (Malesic and Jelusic 2005, 211-212). That phenomenon was more enduring and more intense in case of Croatia and the 1991-1995 war. According to Domjančić (2015, 171) some parallels between the YPA and the Croatian Army on one hand, and Tudjman’s Croatia and Titoist Yugoslavia on the other hand can also be observed in terms of “politics of historical memory”. In Yugoslavia during the Tito era, the YPA was the principal representant of the myth of WWII partisan war, as created by government propaganda. In Croatia, the Croatian Army, and the narrative of “Homeland War” (domovinski rat), as one of the “founding myths” of the state and the Tudjman regime, were also closely linked (Bellamy 2002, 181-182).

3. Authoritarian features of the Tudjman regime did fundamentally influence civil-military relations during the 1990s. Even though civilian control of the armed forces was never seriously questioned, during this period authoritarian forms of civilian control were established (Horowitz 2005, 162-163, Edmunds 2007, 54, Bellamy 2002, 177). Main characteristics of that mode were: concentration of power in hands of the president, party control of the military, political activities of active military personnel through formal or informal channels, existence of parallel chains of command, limited or minimal oversight role of the parliament, and lack of transparency and accountability in policy and financial matters of the security and defense sector. (Dolenec 2013, 133-134, 138-140, Bellamy 2002b, 176-177, 179-180). Party-political use of the armed forces could also be observed, such as candidacy of high-ranking officers on the ticket of the ruling HDZ party in parliamentary elections, in order to appeal to the patriotic feelings of the electorate. (Vankovska 2002, 58-59, Zunec 1996, 226).

In Slovenia democratic control of the armed forces was successfully established from the beginning, nevertheless there were certain attempts by political actors to “politicize” the military or to “recruit” certain high ranking military figures as political allies in party-political controversies. Examples of such attempts could be observed during the period 1991-1994 in
the dispute on competences between the president and the defense minister (Malesic 2006, 146, Bebler 1996, 206-210).

4./ I was clearly able to discern the effect of different perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration in case of both countries. My research established that NATO was able to influence internal policy processes of the given country the most when internal political “will” to fulfil the conditions of NATO membership was “met” by credible membership perspective as well as structured and institutionalized forms of pre-accession assistance (such as the Membership Action Plan) from the NATO side. This was the case in Slovenia in the period 2000-2004, and in Croatia between 2004 and 2008.

In these periods in both countries we can observe the formation of a “transnational coalition” (Epstein 2005, 69-70) comprised by local and NATO actors which helped to successfully design and implement reforms needed for NATO membership.

When there was neither political will from the country concerned to fulfil the conditions of NATO membership (apart from declaring the intention for rapprochement to NATO), nor credible membership perspective offered by NATO, effect of the Atlantic alliance on policy areas in question was absent. I was able to observe this in case of Croatia during the 1990s in general, and between 1996 and 1999 in particular, as intention for rapprochement to NATO was first declared publicly by the Croatian President in 1996-1997 (Simunovic 2015, 192).

Finally, when political will from the aspirant country to fulfil the conditions of membership in principle was present, but NATO was not able to offer a short-term credible membership perspective, the organization made an effect, but at a lesser extent than in the first case.

That situation could be observed in Slovenia between 1994-1995 and 2000 on one hand, and in Croatia between 2000 and 2003-2004 on the other hand.
IV. References


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Kopac, Erik (2017): Interview with Erik Kopac, security and defense expert, advisor on security policy of Slovenian Prime Minister Miro Cerar. 26 of October 2017, Ljubljana.


V. Author’s publications related to the topic


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